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*The Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Jernegan) to the Ambassador in Pakistan (Hildreth)*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, April 22, 1954.

OFFICIAL-INFORMAL

DEAR MR. AMBASSADOR: In our message No. 883, April 16<sup>2</sup> we provided you just about all the data on the scope and intention of the Pakistan arms program it is possible to clear at this time on an official basis. I hope you will find it useful in clearing up some of the confusion which was generated by the statements as well, apparently, as by the unspoken attitude of the members of General Meyers' survey team. In addition to the material included in that message I feel we owe you a personal explanation of some of the off-the-record factors which contributed to this confusing situation. I am accordingly writing you this letter for your confidential information in the hope that it will provide some measure of reassurance that confused as the situation in Washington may be, it has not fallen into the state of utter contradiction which recent official communications might seem to indicate.

The first element to take into account in attempting to understand the Pakistan aid problem is the fact that the nature and importance of United States strategic interests in the general area of the Middle East and South Asia has been defined in only vague and general terms. As a consequence, the amount of the investment justified to protect these interests is a matter which is certain to produce considerable debate but has as yet led to no agreed conclusion. It can be said that over the past several years there has been a sort of glacial movement toward the acceptance of increased United States responsibility in the area. The movement has been so gradual, however, as to be almost imperceptible and it has taken place largely without benefit of conscious guidance and impulse. By and large the State Department has been convinced that the logic of events compelled this development and that this should be recognized as a basis of policy. The Pentagon, on the other hand, feeling that available United States forces and resources were inadequate for this additional undertaking on top of our many other commitments around the world have consistently fought shy of this con-

<sup>1</sup> This letter was drafted by Daspit and cleared by SOA.

<sup>2</sup> Document 205.