

No. 176

780.5/1-2354

*Memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Bonbright) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Byroade)*¹

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, January 23, 1954.

Subject: Turkish-Pakistan Pact

In view of the rapid pace developing in plans pertaining to prospective exploratory talks between Turkey and Pakistan and relative United States military aid, there are several aspects of the matter which EUR believes should be given urgent attention.

EUR's immediate interest in these developments is to avoid unnecessary friction with our principal allies and among the smaller NATO members. Such difficulties, we believe, can be minimized, if a satisfactory understanding is achieved among the United States, United Kingdom and France. If all three support the arrangements and the Turkish presentation in the NAC, there is no reason to believe any unmanageable problems will arise. Thus EUR believes that every effort should be made to assure that the timing of steps now being planned, such as presentation to NAC by Turkey, press communiqués, President's statement, etc., should take this contingency into account.

Because of her previous association in the sponsorship of MEDO and because of her basic desire to maintain a position as a great power entitled to consultation generally in global matters, and especially in the Middle East, France may seek assurances of future consultation on developments in this area as a condition for speaking in support of the Turkish statement in the NAC at this stage. In fact, if this question is raised and not resolved to France's satisfaction, the latter might well combine with the British in an effort to assure consistency between any plans which might develop from Turkish-Pakistan talks and their own interest in the area.

British support is even more important because (1) Pakistan is a member of the British Commonwealth with all that implies; (2) British interests and responsibilities in the area; and (3) if understanding is not reached with the British, the latter might well combine with the French in demanding closer association.

If the United Kingdom and France were both to refrain from supporting the Turkish statement in NAC, and from favorable public comment on the proposed arrangement, other NATO mem-

¹ Drafted by Palmer and Adair, and cleared by WE, BNA, and RA.