

We would leave it to the Iraqi leaders themselves to assess the advantages and disadvantages of joining such an arrangement.

With respect to Afghanistan, I expressed the hope that Turkish influence could be exerted to reassure the Afghans. Turkey could promise Afghanistan that it would see to it that the pact was not used in any way against Afghan interests. The Ambassador suggested that the pact itself should contain some language to show that it would not be directed against states of the area, such as Afghanistan and India, and that it should be open to Afghan adherence. He appeared to think that Turkey and Pakistan should even make an affirmative effort to obtain Afghan participation. I suggested that if this were done at the very beginning it might provide premature Soviet reaction, but the Ambassador did not seem to think this such a serious objection.

The Ambassador and I agreed that the Pushtanistan issue would have to be at least tacitly shelved if Afghanistan were to join in any group with Pakistan. In this connection he said the Iraqi Ambassador in Washington was optimistic that Iraq could play an effective role in adjusting the Afghan-Pakistan difficulties.

### No. 170

780.5/1-1154 Telegram

*The Ambassador in Turkey (Warren) to the Department of State*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET

ANKARA, January 11, 1954--6 p. m.

702. Re Embtel 699, January 11.<sup>2</sup> Following are principal points emerging from long conversation with Foreign Minister in connec-

<sup>1</sup> Repeated to Karachi, New Delhi, Tehran, Baghdad, Kabul, and London.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 699, repeated to Karachi, New Delhi, Tehran, Baghdad, Kabul, and London, contained the full text of the English translation of the Turkish Foreign Office memorandum delivered by the Foreign Minister during the meeting described in telegram 702. The Turkish memorandum was an answer to a U.S. memorandum of Dec. 28, 1953, the text of which is in telegram 686 to Ankara, Document 164.

According to the memorandum, the Turkish Government's reading of the U.S. memorandum of Dec. 28 gave it the impression that the U.S. Government, while hoping an agreement between Turkey and Pakistan would contribute to the formation of an organization for the defense of the Middle East, considered the immediate aim of an agreement to be the possibility of providing military aid to Pakistan without arousing adverse reactions in the international field. The memorandum stated the Turkish Government was willing to do its best to help the United States provide military aid to Pakistan because of feelings of friendship for Pakistan, and also because such aid would increase effective resistance to Soviet aggression. The Government of Turkey hoped an agreement with Pakistan might create the core for a future organization for the defense of the Middle East, and suggested that the fact an agreement with Pakistan would be followed by American aid to Pakistan might be the principal factor in the ultimate attraction of such an organization to other Arab states. (780.5/1-1154)