

possibly relieving pressure between GOP and GOI and accomplishing even more than the original proposal. Prime Minister requested permission to tell Finance Minister but on my objection said he would tell no one except Governor General. Governor General said he had laid groundwork in Turkey and felt sure Turks would approve and hoped soon Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia could come in and since their rulers soon visiting GOP Governor General felt he could help encourage them if he were free to do so. I said I would keep him advised important developments as fast as I could but meanwhile utmost secrecy vital. I indicated probably Prime Minister be back before I could formally approach them for their reactions.

Meanwhile, pressure for decision great in minds of public to degree of irritation and if nothing forthcoming will do irreparable injury to Prime Minister personally and great damage US prestige.

HILDRETH

No. 167

790D.5/1-554

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET EYES ONLY

WASHINGTON, January 5, 1954.

Subject: Military Aid to Pakistan

At a meeting today held with the President¹ by Secretary Wilson, Governor Stassen and myself, the President agreed in principle to proceeding with military aid to Pakistan, subject, however, to our capacity to present this in a reasonable way, which would allay the apprehensions of reasonable people that we were trying to help Pakistan against India. The idea was that we would emphasize (1) that this was part of a regional security project being initiated by Turkey and Pakistan with other countries in the area for potential additions, and (2) that we would indicate to India that we would be prepared to extend military aid to India under the same type of agreement as was offered Pakistan.²

¹ Department of State files contain two different background memoranda for the President on military aid to Pakistan, both dated Jan. 4. There was no indication which one was sent to him before the Jan. 5 meeting. (790D.5/1-454 and 790D5 MSP/1-454)

² A memorandum by Byroade to the Secretary of State, dated Jan. 8, informed Dulles that officers of the Department of State had been giving further thought to the problem of how to begin the proposed arms program to Pakistan. Attached to the memorandum were two papers dealing with the subject: a summary of the steps to be taken in putting the program into effect and a draft statement for the Presi-

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