

4. If PM asks whether this means we will not extend aid unless Turkey goes along you may say that this is not necessarily so but that you are sure the US will wish to look at the problem in light of Turkish reaction.

5. When final position reached we will of course wish to consult him further.

6. You may assure PM our awareness embarrassment because of delay and express regrets. Decision will be made soon as possible.

7. Please emphasize we are giving him this advance notice because he is leaving Karachi before we can expect Turk reaction. Would be embarrassing if Turks learned we had spoken to him at this time. You may assure him it is unlikely final US position will be reached before his return on the 12th.

FYI we are awaiting return of President and Admiral Radford to Washington and we hope to have matter taken up for early decision then.

Also FYI British Embassy informed substance Deptel 475 to Karachi and 686 to Ankara.³

DULLES

² *Supra.*

No. 166

760.5/12-3163: Telegram

*The Ambassador in Pakistan (Hildreth) to the Department of State*¹

TOP SECRET

KARACHI, December 31, 1953—6 p. m.

484. Reported essence of Deptel 483,² to Prime Minister in utmost confidence this morning and he asked me to keep Governor General informed in his absence and advise Prime Minister in Dacca through our Consulate, important developments. On return to office found Governor General trying to reach me for private lunch because he worried about delay in decision. Knowing Governor General would hear news from Prime Minister at their afternoon meeting felt wise tell same thing to Governor General at lunch I had told Prime Minister lest I offend head of state.

Though I told both I was not free to ask their reactions because they were being prematurely advised of line of our thinking solely because departure Prime Minister both voluntarily expressed appreciation as well as pleasure and approval of line of thought as

¹ Repeated to Ankara.

² *Supra.*