

by London Prime Ministers' Conference² at which India and Pakistan had both agreed with other Prime Ministers that defense of Canal Zone vital.

Greek representative acknowledged efficacy Turkish colleagues' arguments but counseled caution, pointing out possibility Arabs might be thrown into arms of Soviets if MEDO formed without their participation. Such a decision, if made public, might irritate Arabs and make them more recalcitrant. Turk explained he suggested no formal communiqué, but merely advocated coordination in council of NATO governments policies and moral support for United Kingdom in its dealings with Egypt, leaving complete freedom of action to United Kingdom delegate.

ANDERSON

² A communiqué on the London Prime Ministers Conference was issued on June 9, 1953.

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Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Jernegan)

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] June 17, 1953.

Subject: American and British Attitudes on Middle East Defense
Participants: British Embassy: Mr. Beeley
NEA: Mr. Jernegan

Mr. Beeley asked me to give him our present thinking on the general question of Middle East defense. I outlined it as follows:

1. We had decided that the MEDO concept had to be put on the shelf for the present. The political atmosphere in the Arab States simply made it useless to push this plan. (Mr. Beeley indicated the Foreign Office agreed with this view.)

2. We thought the best plan for the moment would be to work individually with those States which seemed most disposed to cooperate with the West for defense. These would include Iraq, Syria and Pakistan.

3. So far as concrete military planning for area defense was concerned, in the absence of participation by States in the area, we had reached no firm position. However, on the working level the Department inclined to feel that planning should be done secretly and rather informally by military representatives of the Nations