

(f) Positive and possibly dramatic move in foreign affairs field for US domestic consumption, particularly if parallel "Security Pact" arrangements with Israel could be developed.

(g) Reversed tactical position whereby Arab Collective Security Pact rather than MEDO proposals become target of attention, criticism and consequent modification.

Disadvantages, while not yet fully explored, would include (1) implications re Israel and (2) ACSP language. However it may develop that any defense scheme would be faced with (1) and suggested protocol might allow West to subscribe only to those parts of (2) which might be acceptable.

Department would appreciate further field comments re this backdoor approach, particularly Embassy Cairo views as to whether discussions with Arab states along lines Baghdad Despatch 596 February 24 might dispel adverse popular impression of MEDO sufficiently to contribute to successful conclusion of British-Egyptian "package deal" on Suez. In making field recommendations it should be kept in mind that Department places in high priority necessity for obtaining psychological warfare by-products which may be perhaps more valuable than immediate military benefits from any defense organization. An essential result which must follow any tactical approach to the Middle East states on defense arrangements is, of course, continued Western interest in and access to Suez Base.

DULLES

No. 123

780.5/3-1052: Telegram

*The Ambassador in Iraq (Berry) to the Department of State*¹

SECRET

BAGHDAD, March 10, 1953—4 p. m.

1107. Turkish Chargé Umar called last evening and informed me of Iraqi MEDO developments since our last conversations. He had again seen Foreign Minister and told him tht Turks in due course expected official response to Chargé's proposal. Chargé explained to me that proposal was for all practical purposes an invitation to Iraq to associate in setting up MEDO. Foreign Minister replied that he had studied Chargé's proposal; that a sub-commission had been established to examine it in detail; that sub-commission had already finished its work and submitted its report; that this report will go soon to the Council of Ministers with Regent likely partici-

¹ Repeated to Ankara as telegram 26 and Cairo as telegram 64.