

not make peace with Israel without first the prestige of getting the British out of the Suez.

Mr. Eden urged that we should promptly send a high-ranking general to begin the negotiations with Slim. The President suggested that *if* we did this, it might be in order to ask General Hull to go, but that President did not in any way commit the United States to participation in the initial phases of the negotiations.

The President suggested that the United States might have to exercise a freer hand with relation to Iran and the oil situation.

### No. 122

780.5/2-2453: Telegram

#### *The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Iraq*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

WASHINGTON, March 6, 1953—1:06 p. m.

892. R<sub>2</sub> Deptel 891 March 6.<sup>2</sup> Department appreciative urtels 1032 February 22<sup>3</sup> and 1050 February 26<sup>4</sup> and despatch 596 Feb-

<sup>1</sup> Repeated as telegram 5910 to London, 4734 to Paris, 1763 to Cairo, 515 to Jidda, 506 to Damascus, 820 to Tel Aviv, 1114 to Ankara, and transmitted to Moscow by air pouch. Drafted by Funkhouser and cleared by GTI, EUR, S/P, NEA, BNA, RA, and S/S-CR.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed; it reported the Department of State was giving further study to the approach to MEDO through a protocol to the Arab Collective Security Pact. The "back door approach" would be considered as a substitute if Egypt was unable to accept the original MEDO draft. (780.5/3-0653)

<sup>3</sup> Not printed; it reported on a telegram being sent to London by the British Embassy in Baghdad, concerning the substance of a Feb. 19 conversation between the British Ambassador and the Premier of Iraq. Telegram 1032 reads, in part, summarizing the British Embassy telegram: "Nuri reiterated his idea that Middle East defense should be based on Arab collective security pact. He said a protocol could be added to the pact enabling non-Arab countries to become parties to it. Nuri said previous defense proposals sponsored by West had two defects, namely (a) a 'command' (sic) implied purely military arrangement without any covering political agreement; (b) Arab states, except for Egypt, would have had an inferior position." (641.87/2-2253)

<sup>4</sup> Not printed. It reads, in part: "Embassy suggests that Nuri's idea of relating a Middle East defense to the Arab collective security pact is being put forward by him in his belief that it is potentially acceptable to the Iraqi people in contrast to a western involved MEDO, against which Iraq opinion has been aroused. Further consideration by the Department might therefore be given to fuller utilization of Nuri's ideas in developing a defense plan, if only as insurance against failure of Anglo-Egyptian talks. Embassy further suggests that obstacle to the proper consideration and acceptance by Iraq of a MEDO is the continued lack of anything concrete which the government or the public can grasp. In the meantime, the field is left clear to those who, for political or ideological reasons, are conjuring up all the dangers and disadvantages which a Middle East Defense Organization could bring to Iraq." (641.87/2-2653)