

I hope that the Dept will consider carefully my October 28 letter to the Secy ² on what we believe to be the danger India's slipping behind the Iron Curtain in next few years and direct and indirect results of such a disaster. Whatever mil benefits may be derived from participation of Pak in MEDO must be carefully weighed against the certain reaction here.

The dangers to US-Ind relations cld be lessened somewhat by broadening concept of MEDO participation to include Iran, Afghan, India and even Ceylon as well as Pak. If that were done—even with certainty of refusal by one or all, at least India wld have less basis for imagining participation were directed against her. But regardless of how the cloth is cut Dept must understand that this proposal will have serious repercussions here. ³

BOWLES

² For text, see vol. XI, Part 2, p. 1668.

³ Telegram 1595 to New Delhi, Nov. 28, not printed, informed the Embassy the Department of State was keenly aware of the possibility of an adverse Indian reaction and desired to minimize that reaction in every way. It added that continuing consideration was being given to the problem, and no approach had yet been made to Pakistan. (780.5/11-2052)

No. 109

State JCS Meetings, lot 61 D 417

Department of State Minutes of State-Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting ¹

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] November 28, 1952.

PRESENT

General Bradley	Mr. Bruce
General Vandenberg	Mr. Matthews
General Collins	Mr. Bohlen
General Lemnitzer	Mr. Nitze
General Lee	Mr. Byroade
General Slaton Bradley	Mr. Jernegan
General Cabell	Mr. Bonbright
General Shepherd (Marine)	Mr. Ferguson
Mr. Nash	Daspit
Mr. Hoopes	Mr. Stelle
Adm. Wooldridge	[Mr. Bissell]

¹ The meeting was held in the Pentagon at 3:45 p. m. A notation on the first page of the minutes reads: "Draft not cleared by any participants."