

of the French Embassy called at the Department of State to inform the Department that the French position on the central direction of the MEDO seemed firm and unlikely to be altered under any conditions. (Memorandum of conversation, August 1; 780.5/8-152)

On August 15, an officer of the French Embassy handed the Department of State a copy of an *aide-mémoire* presented by the French to the British Government in answer to the British Middle East Defense Organization proposal of August 11, which was the same as the text transmitted in telegram Secto 24, Document 79. (780.5/6-1652) The French *aide-mémoire* was discussed at a joint meeting of representatives of the Departments of State and Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff on August 26, at which the Department of State was informed that the Joint Chiefs of Staff were fundamentally opposed to having the NATO Steering Group function for the MEDO. (For the minutes of this meeting, see the memorandum of conversation by Daspit, Document 84.)

No. 88

780.5/9-2252

The Secretary of State to the Secretary of Defense (Lovett)

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] September 22, 1952.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Attached is a memorandum¹ setting forth proposed United States comments on certain proposals concerning the Middle East Defense Organization put forward by the French Government in a memorandum handed to the Department of State August 15, 1952 (copy attached).² A copy of this memorandum was transmitted informally to the Department of Defense at the time of its receipt.³

The French memorandum is addressed principally to the question of the higher military direction of MEDO and emphasizes the importance the French attach to making the NATO Standing Group responsible for the guidance and direction of MEDO. In view of the interest of the Department of Defense in this matter, I would appreciate your advising me as to whether you consider the pro-

¹ Not printed. For substantially the same text, see telegram 2156 to Paris, Document 94.

² Not attached to source text. See the editorial note, *supra*, and the memorandum of conversation by Daspit, Document 84.

³ For the Department of Defense response, see footnote 2, Document 94.