

give. He thought we could achieve necessary coordination among four powers and liaison with NATO through *ad hoc* arrangements. If war came, then changes might be necessary. Nitze pointed out views JCS on SG question, particularly possibility creating precedent which would encourage others such as Canadians to press for participation in higher direction.

Eden indicated he thought we were in substantial agreement on most points. He suggested further conversations by staff to see if agreed paper could be worked out. Secretary agreed and it was decided that Nitze and Nash should carry conversations further with Dixon and Bowker.³ Agreed paper would be *ad referendum* US and UK Govts. It was also decided discuss MEDO with French in tomorrow's tripartite.

For Far East discussion Scott joined British group and Ringwalt US group.

[Here follows discussion on Indochina (see volume XIII, Part 1, page 210) and Korea.]

ACHESON

³ Telegram Secto 18, June 26, not printed, reported on the staff meeting and informed the Department of State that the paper would be reorganized according to Nitze's suggestions. (780.5/6-2652)

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780.5/6-2752: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Department of State*¹

SECRET PRIORITY

LONDON, June 27, 1952—10 p. m.

Secto 24. Re Secto 18,² following paper on MEDO has been agreed here by US and UK *ad referendum* both governments:

"Nomenclature.

"1. It would be preferable that the organization to be set up in the Middle East should be termed a 'defense organization' rather than 'command organization' since, particularly in so far as the Middle East states are concerned, the former name is likely to have more psychological appeal. The term Allied Middle East defense organization (MEDO) is therefore used throughout this memorandum.

¹ Transmitted as a circular airgram from the Department of State to Paris, Ankara, Pretoria, Canberra, and Wellington on June 30. (780.5/6-3052)

² Not printed, but see footnote 3, *supra*.