

(d) Influence with Pakistan, coupled with supply assistance as practicable to increase Pakistan's capability of contributing to the defense of the Middle East, and continued efforts to secure a settlement in Kashmir to this end;

(e) Influence with the Arab States, Israel and Iran, coupled with supply assistance as practicable, to:

1. Increase the effectiveness of Egyptian forces for the maintenance and defense of the Suez bases, in the event of an Anglo-Egyptian settlement;

2. Improve the effectiveness of the Israeli forces, and increase their size as Arab forces are increased;

3. Develop additional forces comparable to the Arab Legion where that is feasible, and in any case plan with the Arab States for effective guerrilla resistance;

4. Continue military assistance to Iran, and, in the event of improved political conditions there, seek the creation of forces capable of undertaking defense as well as security tasks.

(f) Assistance either to the U.K. or directly in meeting the air deficiency which now appears to exist.

We would appreciate having the views of the JCS as to (1) the relative importance and time phasing from their viewpoint of strengthening the Middle Eastern defense situation; (2) the relative importance from the military viewpoint of the objectives for which we might use our influence and assistance as outlined above; (3) the degree to which the use of atomic weapons against the mountain passes into the area would permit the defense of substantial portions of the Middle East even under present conditions.

## No. 75

780.5/5-2852

*The Secretary of State to the Secretary of Defense (Lovett)*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

[WASHINGTON, May 28, 1952.]

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I refer to the paper entitled, "Recommended United States Position with Respect to the Establishment of a Middle East Command Organization" which was prepared by a

<sup>1</sup> This letter was attached to a memorandum from Berry to Matthews, dated May 23, not printed. The memorandum suggested that, since the statement of the Department of State to the British on May 20 had the effect of cancelling part of a paper formally under consideration by the Department of Defense, it would be desirable to give Defense officials notice of the action. It also stated that it would be desirable to give Defense notice of the approaching discussions with the British, and the expectation that Defense representatives would participate in them. (780.5/5-2852)