

the Middle East will depend on the reactions of other Arab Governments to the circumstances of the break and on the situation obtaining in the Canal Zone thereafter. We therefore feel that we should leave for further examination the question whether, in the event of a breakdown of the Anglo-Egyptian negotiations, to invite Iraq to the London Conference or whether to proceed on the seven-Power basis originally suggested, or on some new basis altogether.

8. We should be glad to have the views of the United States Government on these questions.

WASHINGTON, 28th April, 1952.

No. 73

780.5/5-352: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Embassies in Turkey, Egypt, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon*¹

SECRET

WASHINGTON, May 3, 1952--2:52 p. m.

Brit Emb Apr 28 handed Dept memo re preparatory mtg MECO² substance of which corresponds summary provided Lon's 4909 Apr 29.³ NE Missions and Ankara requested comment on following views which Dept considering stating in oral reply.

(1) Dept agrees desirable postpone preliminary mtg on MECO until outcome Anglo-Egypti negots clearer. Dept also agrees that procedures for establishing MECO must be adapted to circumstances as affected by development these negots. Dept's present comments assume circumstances which will not diminish willingness Arab States to cooperate in venture.

(2) Dept agrees desirable consult Arab states while MECO still in planning stage. However, doubts wisdom of exclusive invitation Iraq and Egypt to planning mtg at least unless these countries alone indicate willingness provide important base rights to MECO. Otherwise such discrimination would violate principle area-wide cooperation on basis equality which Dept considers feature fundamental to success MECO concept.

(3) Dept appreciates difficulties and probable futility holding 13 power mtg including all Arab states for purpose initially drafting form of org for MECO. Believes that coordination views of seven sponsors re outline general form and structure organization acceptable to them and essential elements which cannot be compromised

¹ Sent as 995 to Ankara, 1704 to Cairo, 759 to Baghdad, 429 to Jidda, 357 to Amman, 463 to Damascus, and 1141 to Beirut; copies were sent for information to the Embassies in the United Kingdom, France, New Zealand, Australia, South Africa, and Israel.

² *Supra*.

³ Not printed, but see footnote 1, *supra*.