like this as the concept of trading evacuation for MEDO has become a fixation.

Egyptian thinking on defense arrangements for the area centers around building up the Arab States under the Arab League pact. They stress the theme that the US and UK already have treaty arrangements with members of the Arab League which provides the necessary Western tie-in. In addition to this they state they are ready at any time to undertake defense planning with the US and cooperate fully upon any needed infrastructure for the defense of the area as a whole. They state they are willing to contemplate similar plans with the British, but cannot make such fact public at present time. They state they also would have difficulty in agreeing at this time in writing that British could have re-entry right in event of hostilities. We gave them no reason to believe such an arrangement would be satisfactory. They finally devised a formula which specifies that in event of attack upon any Arab State, access and use of the base would not only be given to Arab partners, but to any nation allied with any of them. It is not clear whether they would agree to put this in writing.

Although there is considerable urgency in getting matter here off dead center, have declined to become middleman because of nature my trip and fact that matters raised in this cable are of such fundamental nature as to require Washington decision. Consequently US draft reported separately has not been shown in Cairo to either British or Egyptian officials. I am inclined to believe question can wait my return Washington before need for action on part of US with British and Egyptians. Full report by cable being sent so that you will have opportunity form recommendations for early action after my return and basis for action if, in your opinion, developments after my departure here indicate need for quicker action on our part.

CAFFERY

No. 8

Editorial Note

Telegram 248 to Secretary Dulles in Dhahran, May 18, repeated to Cairo, reported concern in the Department of State that military moves by both Egyptians and British would result in an incident which could set off a chain reaction. Telegram 2456 from Cairo, May 19, advised the Department that the likelihood of an immediate "blow-up" had been considerably diminished as a result of the Secretary's visit. Telegram 6235 from London, May 22, reported,