

the position of Egypt if present difficulties can be surmounted. Have explained as well reasons why defensive arrangements in Middle East and maintenance of base for immediate use are considered essential from US point of view. I believe these talks held with both Naguib and members of RCC have been effective and believe (but cannot be certain) that they will do nothing drastic until I have had chance return to present my views to the President and JCS.

Caffery has sent you by despatch 2367 of May 7<sup>2</sup> the proposed British and Egyptian texts in matter under disagreement. A proposed US draft that might conceivably solve present stalemate is being sent in following cable. A third cable will give some of thinking behind US redraft. This series of messages not being repeated London. Caffery will inform London information he passes on to British here.

CAFFERY

<sup>2</sup> Not printed, but see footnote 1, *infra*.

## No. 7

Conference files, lot 59 D 96, CF 158; Telegram

### *The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State*

TOP SECRET

CAIRO, May 13, 1953—1 p. m.

2423. Personal for Smith from the Secretary. In discussions with both British and Egyptian officials it became clear that there are a number of points of disagreement on technical matters. Some of these are apparent by comparison of British and Egyptian text already transmitted.<sup>1</sup> It became clear in discussions, however, that major differences were really over following two points:

1. The British position is that British "technicians" (which also covers superintendents, administrators and the like) under direct instruction from London should remain on base as long as British equipment is stored there, i.e., perhaps indefinitely. The Egyptian position is that British personnel should remain only long enough to adequately train Egyptian replacements.

2. The manner of channeling instructions from London to British technicians so long as they remain on the base.

In discussing point 2 above with the British it became obvious that a real point of principle could be involved. The Suez base is at

<sup>1</sup> The texts of these documents were transmitted to the Department in despatch 2367 from Cairo, May 7. (641.74/5-753)