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555. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, January 24, 1967. /1/Source: Johnson Library, Meeting Notes File, Briefing Papers for NSC Meeting January 25, 1967. No classification marking. Mr. President: The State Department paper/2/ contains a useful summary of the history of the Rhodesian problem. It is less helpful about future U.S. policy. /2/Document 553. Ambassador Goldberg is expected to make a strong appeal to continue our present policy in the UN. He has been asked to speak no more than seven minutes and to address his remarks to where we go in the future. The two questions are: a. What is Prime Minister Wilson going to do if Rhodesia won't give in, and economic sanctions don't work primarily because South Africa won't comply? b. How are we going to work our way out of this black/white African problem --without drifting into a situation involving the use of force, Walt
556. Summary Notes of the 567th Meeting of the National Security Council/1/ Washington, January 25, 1967, 12:10-12:45 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings, Vol. 4, Tab 49, 1/25/67, Southern Rhodesia. Secret/Sensitive; For the President Only. U.S. Policy Toward Southern Rhodesia The President: The purpose of this meeting is to review our current policy toward Southern Rhodesia, to see where we are now, as well as where we expect to end up. Secretary Rusk will outline the State Department paper/2/ (copy attached) and Ambassador Goldberg will give his views on the problem as seen from New York. /2/Document 553. Secretary Rusk: This is first a UK problem, then a UN problem, and only then is it a U.S. problem. We should not take a dominant role but should seek to get the parties together. When the issue was brought to the UN Security Council, we voted our principles. We rejected efforts to settle the problem by force and we took our lumps. We will be criticized by both extremes as having done too much or having done too little. We can expect increasing trouble here and in Africa. Economic sanctions will not bring down the Smith Regime in Rhodesia. We must get UK Prime Minister Wilson talking to Smith and exert our influence behind the scenes. This problem cannot be settled by force. The thought of using U.S. troops is appalling. A multi-division effort would be necessary. We must get negotiations going again because there is rising support in the UN for sanctions against South Africa which is not complying with the UN resolution of limited sanctions against Rhodesia. Ambassador Goldberg: The Rhodesian problem causes us difficulties with domestic public opinion and with Congress. There is in the U.S. a very active Rhodesian lobby. In the U.S. business community, there is more support than opposition for our policy. We were obliged to vote in the UN as we did because to do otherwise would have caused us domestic racial difficulties and hurt our business interests in every African country. We have a strong political interest in keeping moderates in control of the problem. Our military interests, i.e., tracking stations in African countries, can be affected by the policy we pursue. We have been talking to U.S. Negro leaders trying to convince them that we are not pulling UK chestnuts out of the fire as they believe. Senator Russell was told that no military commitment is involved in our current policy. He relaxed after he learned that we do not plan to use U.S. troops and of my promise to veto any proposed use of force in Africa. Secretary Rusk: The House Foreign Affairs Committee was reassured when told that our vote in the UN for sanctions against Rhodesia is not looked upon by the Administration as a first step toward the use of U.S. forces. Ambassador Goldberg: Our role is a moderating one. We are not egging anyone on. African radicals are not happy with our policy. The Communists are actively troubling the waters in Africa. Sanctions will not work against Rhodesia. However, their economy may be affected sufficiently to induce them to negotiate. We have told the British to settle this issue honorably. Meanwhile, we will have to take current criticism. Even Haile Selassie cannot take a firm stand. Senator Dirksen is not in as great a sweat as appears. He acknowledges we can't control the actions of our junior partner. Acting CIA Director Taylor: Zambia is harder hit as a result of the current difficulties than is Rhodesia. It depends on Rhodesia for copper ore and coal. It is now toying with the idea of working out a deal with the Soviets. The President: What are the British going to do if Rhodesia won't give in, and economic sanctions don't work, primarily because South Africa won't comply with them? A blockade would not be effective and there is no way to stop South African oil from going to Rhodesia. The British would be hurt if South Africa moves against them. We can't prevent South Africa from giving aid to Rhodesia. Secretary Rusk: The British do not have a plan to propose if the selective sanctions do not force Rhodesia to negotiate an honorable settlement. The President: How are we going to work out of this black/white African problem: (a) without drifting into a situation involving the use of force; (b) upholding the UN; (c) maintaining our good relations with the UK; (d) avoiding a showdown with South Africa; and (e) retaining our influence in black Africa? Secretary Rusk: We must tell the British to resume their negotiations with the Rhodesians. At one point the parties were close to a compromise agreement which would not make black Africans happy but would get closer to a peaceful solution. Ambassador Goldberg: To push for this kind of a solution is a delicate policy decision. We will be charged with selling out black Africa. Deputy Secretary Vance: There is one thing which is quite clear; namely, no U.S. ground or naval forces are to be used to settle this problem. Secretary Fowler: Concurs in the proposed policy direction. The Rhodesian problem is having a serious effect on sterling and the UK economic situation generally. The talk of sanctions against South Africa may have an impact on the U.S. dollar. The State Department paper should be revised to deal with the U.S. financial aspects of the Rhodesian problem. Bromley Smith
557. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ London, February 24, 1967. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 16 RHOD. Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text. Approved in S/S on February 27. The source text is marked "Part III of III." SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS The Foreign Secretary then turned to Rhodesia. He said that the evidence indicates that Smith is having increasing difficulties, but so far no alternative to his Government is emerging. Business is deteriorating and the Rhodesians are now faced with the problem of disposing of the second crop of tobacco since sanctions were originally imposed. The real problems, the Foreign Secretary said, are Portugal and South Africa. If sanctions are to be fully effective, the borders of Portuguese Africa had to be sealed off and, as we know, the British were currently discussing this matter in Lisbon. If we were really successful with the Portuguese, then it was essential that the South Africans not fill the gap in the Rhodesian economy resulting from Portuguese cooperation. The South Africans would never, of course, join in sanctions, but Brown thought there was a good chance of their cooperating "discreetly" by not increasing trade with Rhodesia above "normal" levels. Brown also mentioned the fact that there is a good deal of informal, unofficial talk going on between various Rhodesians and the British Government. Some of the Rhodesians involved were in the Smith camp. Others were businessmen, etc., who were "anti-the present-situation" and were looking for a solution acceptable to both sides.
558. Country Summary Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research Washington, March 6, 1967. [Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Africa General, 1967-1968. Secret; Eyes Only. 2 pages of source text not declassified.]
559. Background Paper Prepared in the Department of State/1/ HWV/B-1 Washington, May 29, 1967. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Kingdom, Visit of PM Wilson, 6/2/67. Confidential. Drafted by Thomas A. Fain of AFSE; cleared by Leddy and Springsteen, Goldstein, Director of the Office of United Nations Political Affairs Elizabeth Ann Brown, Ruth S. Gold of E, McElhiney, and Trimble. VISIT OF UNITED KINGDOM PRIME MINISTER SOUTHERN RHODESIA /2/Prime Minister Wilson visited Washington June 2-3. No record of discussion of Rhodesia during his visit has been found. Summary: Following the unilateral declaration of independence by the Rhodesian Front regime of Ian Smith from the United Kingdom on November 11, 1965, the UN Security Council, at the request of the British, approved a voluntary economic sanctions program against Southern Rhodesia. During 1966 intermittent talks were held between the United Kingdom and Rhodesian representatives and, with the rejection on December 5 of the HMS Tiger "working document" by the Rhodesian "cabinet," the UK requested the Security Council to impose limited mandatory economic sanctions against Southern Rhodesia to strengthen and supplement the voluntary program. Such sanctions were approved by the Council on December 16 with the concurrence of the US. Discussion: Under voluntary sanctions, total exports from Southern Rhodesia are estimated to have fallen from nearly $400 million in 1965 to an estimated $224 million in 1966, a drop of some 40%. (These figures do not include gold or re-exports. Gold exports amount to approximately $21 million annually.) Under the mandatory sanctions program, a further reduction in Rhodesian exports of approximately $55 million is anticipated if South Africa and Portugal, while not complying with the program, do not increase their trade with Southern Rhodesia. Although it is estimated that the gross domestic product fell by 15% in 1966 compared to 1965 and present estimates suggest a further drop of about 10% by September 1967, the Rhodesians have not sought a settlement with the UK. In late April a conversation was held in Salisbury between the British Governor and Ian Smith, apparently on the Governor's initiative. Smith's remarks were subsequently dismissed by Commonwealth Secretary Bowden as not having contained any real concessions and, therefore, as not providing a promising basis for re-opening talks. It seems likely, however, that over the next two or three months the British will seek to create opportunities for re-opening negotiations with the Smith regime. If exploitable opportunities seem to exist, the British may be prepared to make further concessions to the so-far intractable Rhodesians in an effort to reach a settlement. UK Position: In the Commonwealth communique issued in London, September, 1966, the UK stated that, should the Smith regime not take steps to return to constitutional government by the end of 1966, it would: (a) withdraw all previous proposals made to the Rhodesians; (b) not propose to Parliament a settlement involving independence before majority rule; and (c) provided full Commonwealth support was obtained, seek selective mandatory economic sanctions against Southern Rhodesia in the UN. With the collapse of the HMS Tiger talks, the UK sought and obtained Security Council action on mandatory economic sanctions. The UK continues to make clear both publicly and privately that it wishes to avoid economic warfare with South Africa and that it hopes to avoid having sanctions against Rhodesia affect British-South African trade. In any future discussions at the UN, the British would probably oppose any call by others to expand sanctions to include the Portuguese territories and South Africa, although they might not go so far as to use the veto. As in the past, the British would very probably oppose any proposal to use force against the Smith regime. US Position: The entire international community acknowledges that Southern Rhodesia is a British colony. We believe it is important that the present sanctions program be made as effective as possible in the hope that the Smith regime will be led to reconsider its position and agree to a settlement to open the way to majority rule with minority rights protected. In cooperating with the international community in the sanctions program, we have been careful to commit ourselves only to the present program.
560. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Palmer) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Kohler) Washington, October 25, 1967. [Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, 303 Committee Files, 303 C. 62, November 10, 1967. Secret; Eyes Only. 2 pages of source text not declassified.]
561. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Portugal/1/ Washington, November 10, 1967, 1010Z. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 24 RHOD. Secret; Noforn; Immediate; Limdis. Drafted by Country Director for Spain and Portugal George W. Landau, cleared by Leddy, and approved by Katzenbach. Repeated to Salisbury, USUN, and London. 67914. Subject: Southern Rhodesia--Under Secretary-Portuguese Foreign Minister Conversation. 1. In his November 9 talk with Under Secretary, Portuguese FonMin Franco Nogueira regretted fact that world opinion seemed to hold Portugal responsible for failure of UN sanctions against Southern Rhodesia. He expressed hope that USG was correctly informed and did not blame Portugal for fact that oil and other goods reached Southern Rhodesia. He said oil arrived in Mozambique in British and American ships and there was active trade from all parts of world. It is true, he said, that Portugal has stated that it would not abide by UN resolution, because it maintained that there must be freedom of transit. Therefore supplies marked for Southern Rhodesia were permitted to cross Mozambique. Portuguese could not be the world's "gendarme" and stop shipments which arrived in transit to Rhodesia. 2. In reply to Under Secretary's question, FonMin stated that Mozambique refinery had not increased production, but it was known that South African purchases of Mozambique oil were transshipped back through Mozambique into Rhodesia. He said that sanctions would fail because South Africa had the potential to supply oil to Rhodesia indefinitely. Because no major power wanted to confront South Africa, Portugal had to be scapegoat. 3. FonMin said that the wanted to bring all this to US attention as he expected this matter to come up in UN soon. He complained that SYG had failed to reply to various questions about legality of sanction program and that Portugal was entitled to a reply. When Under Secretary inquired whether Portugal would accept a reply from the Security Council, FonMin somewhat evasively said that he certainly would accept a ruling from the International High Court of Justice. 4. Franco Nogueira said that trade between Portugal and its territories on one side and Southern Rhodesia on the other was insignificant but that large countries including US, UK, Japan and others had to stop trading with Southern Rhodesia if they wanted sanctions to work. 5. Under Secretary said that it was obvious Portugal and the US took different views of the UN resolution on Rhodesian sanctions. He then explained difficulties US faced in requesting foreign subsidiaries of US firms to comply with US regulations. 6. Franco Nogueira concluded by reflecting his belief that Smith would survive because South Africa could supply him and continue to do so without difficulty. Rusk
562. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Sisco) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/ Washington, March 8, 1968. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 24 RHOD. Secret; Nodis. SUBJECT Ambassador Dean has asked to see you very privately to discuss Rhodesia./2/ I assume that Ambassador Dean was instructed to take this matter up with you rather than leaving it in the hands of the British Mission in New York because the Foreign Office recognizes that Lord Caradon ordinarily wants to go much farther than his Government on African issues. /2/Telegram 127765 to London, March 9, reported Ambassador Dean's conversation with the Secretary and Ambassador Goldberg on March 9. Dean said that the British Government wanted U.S. views on what action to take at the United Nations in view of the likelihood that the Afro-Asian members would raise the executions in Rhodesia and the British failure to prevent them in the Security Council. Rusk and Goldberg suggested that a first step might be to have the Security Council express its abhorrence and call upon Rhodesia to refrain from further executions. If Rhodesia ignored such a call, they might examine the desirability of some extension of sanctions. (Ibid., POL 16 RHOD/UN) His call is probably prompted by recent UN activity in the Human Rights Commission and the Committee of 24 arising out of Rhodesia's execution of three prisoners despite commutation of their sentences by the Queen, as well as by reports of an early African initiative in the Security Council looking toward imposition of broader sanctions against Rhodesia. We now anticipate a Security Council meeting on Rhodesia about the end of next week. Mandatory sanctions now in force against Southern Rhodesia under the SC resolution of December 16, 1966/3/ prohibit (a) imports from Southern Rhodesia of asbestos, iron ore, chrome, pig-iron, sugar, tobacco, copper, meat and meat products, and hides, skins and leather; (b) exports to Southern Rhodesia of arms, aircraft, motor vehicles and petroleum and petroleum products; and (c) any activities that promote or are calculated to promote such imports and exports. /3/See footnote 2, Document 552. During recent months there have been reports that the British were considering the advisability of extending mandatory sanctions to cover (a) oil shipments to Rhodesia via Mozambique; (b) a ban on communications with Rhodesia (principally telecommunications); (c) a ban on the export of television film materials to Rhodesia; and (d) a total embargo on trade with Rhodesia. On March 7 UK representatives in New York told our Delegation that the UK might be prepared to extend sanctions to telecommunications and a total embargo might even be within the realm of possibility. I am skeptical regarding these reports given the present financial straits of the UK. So far as the present sanctions are concerned, the major loopholes have been (a) Portugal and South Africa, who ignore the SC resolution; (b) the activities of Japanese, French, Germans and others who continue to trade in embargoed commodities while their governments look the other way; and (c) the activities of certain overseas subsidiaries. US regulations issued to implement mandatory sanctions, like British regulations, do not extend to the activities of American overseas subsidiaries registered in countries other than Southern Rhodesia. We suggested such coverage to the British at the time our regulations were being drawn up, but they refused to agree to it. I recommend that you simply note any proposals the Ambassador may make. You should be aware that the present sanctions are not achieving the desired goal of inducing Ian Smith to negotiate on UK terms and that it is our best judgment no piecemeal additions to the present sanctions can do the job. I would be generally discouraging regarding extension of sanctions.
563. Paper Prepared in the Department of State/1/ Washington, May 9, 1968. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Rhodesia, Vol. II, Cables, 2/66-12/68. Confidential. No drafting information appears on the source text. A May 9 covering memorandum from Read to Rostow reads: "I enclose for your information a report on the UN Security Council's current consideration of the question of Southern Rhodesia. It supplements my memorandum of April 6 which indicated that the British Government, in an effort to deflect Afro-Asian proposals in the Security Council for the adoption of radical measures to deal with the Rhodesian problem, was trying to develop support for less far-reaching proposals of its own." A copy of the Department's earlier Status Report on Southern Rhodesia (dated April 7, not April 6) is ibid., Memos and Miscellaneous, 2/66-12/68. STATUS REPORT ON SOUTHERN RHODESIA Two draft resolutions on Southern Rhodesia are now before the Security Council. The first resolution, introduced as a negotiating tactic by the Afro-Asians on April 18, calls upon the United Kingdom to use force to end the rebellion and provides a basis for the imposition of Chapter VII enforcement measures against South Africa and Portugal for their continued non-compliance with sanctions. The second draft, introduced by the UK on April 23, would (1) make comprehensive the present limited mandatory sanctions on trade with and investment in Southern Rhodesia; (2) prohibit the transfer to the territory of most private remittances; (3) attempt to restrict emigration to Southern Rhodesia; (4) impose a limited ban on travel from and air transport to Southern Rhodesia; (5) exempt landlocked states in southern Africa from full compliance with sanctions; and (6) expand the role of the Secretary-General and the Security Council in supervising implementation of sanctions. Two weeks of British negotiations with the Afro-Asians in New York have produced slight accommodations by both sides toward a mutually acceptable draft resolution, but the Afro-Asians insist that any final resolution include (1) calls for UK action to prevent further executions in Salisbury and to end the rebellion "all effective measures"; (2) censure of South Africa for having assisted the Smith regime in defiance of sanctions; (3) termination of all communications with Rhodesia; (4) prohibition against transfers of funds from Rhodesia; (5) severance of consular relations; and (6) an injunction against further UK consultations with the Smith regime. Both the British and we find these additional proposals unhelpful and most undesirable. However, reports from New York indicate that several friendly Security Council members are prepared to support many of them. For this reason, we followed the UK on May 2 in making representations in Asuncion, Copenhagen, Ottawa, Paris and Rio de Janeiro in an effort to muster enough abstentions in the Council so that the question of vetoing the Afro-Asian proposals will not arise. [Next documents] Volume XXIV Index | Historian's Office | Department of State |
