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Southern Africa Region
403. Letter From the Permanent Representative to the United Nations (Goldberg) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/ Washington, October 29, 1965. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 10 PORT/UN. Secret. Dear Dean: As you know, we are faced with two difficult Security Council exercises over the next few weeks--one on the Portuguese Territories and one on apartheid. I have had a look at some of the staff papers that have been prepared on both of these questions and have had several long discussions with Joe Sisco regarding our present and future policies. With respect to the Portuguese Territories, I appreciate receiving the go-ahead to try to get the Portuguese and the Africans together in some kind of a dialogue based on the principle of self-determination, defined in such a way as to leave open all possible options, i.e., independence, free association, or integration. I am not sanguine that the Portuguese will show any flexibility at this time, particularly in view of the negative statements being made regarding self-determination in the Portuguese election campaign. Nevertheless, such an attempt on our part will at least help to demonstrate our bona fides to the Africans and might even provide the basis for a Security Council resolution calling for discussions on the principle of self-determination. I know on of the important considerations in our policy has been the need to retain the Azores. I discussed this point with Bob McNamara the other day and he is of the view that while the Azores are useful and convenient, they are not essential. I would like to see the Defense Department clearly on record to this effect so that we will be in a stronger position in the future to persuade the Portuguese to begin a practical dialogue with the Africans. I hope, therefore, that looking toward the future you can seek in a more formal way from the Defense Department its latest assessment regarding the utility of the Azores. Regarding apartheid, although as you know I favor an active interim approach including a number of specific steps, I agree that basically our position is sound, that we should continue to re-state our unalterable opposition to apartheid, that pending the Court decision on South West Africa we should continue to oppose sanctions while maintaining our full arms embargo. However, both as regards any steps we may wish to take now as well as contingency planning for eventualities following the Court's decision, we are somewhat hampered by our present dependence on the South Africans for our complex of space tracking stations. In the same conversation with Bob McNamara, I asked for his informal judgment on the degree of our dependence, and he once again said that there are practical alternatives available but that Defense would need a little time (presumably a few months) in order to develop other arrangements. Joe Sisco tells me July 1966 is the current target date, but we may not have this much time. For my part, therefore, I should like to urge the need to move along quickly with the plans for these alternative sites. In short, I hope that we can get the Defense Department to focus both on the question of the Azores and on our tracking stations in South Africa from a military point of view in the hope that their current assessment will give us more flexibility to deal with these problems politically. Cordially,
404. Memorandum From Ulric Haynes of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/ Washington, November 2, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Botswana, Vol. I, 9/66-1/69. Confidential. A copy was sent to Komer. McGB Wednesday, November 3, at 4 pm, Bechauanaland Prime Minister Seretse Khama has a appointment to see you. Bechuanaland moved from protectorate to self-governing status this year with Seretse Khama's party forming a government. Independence--and a wealth of complex problems--will come in September next year. Khama is here to encourage private American Foundations, the US Government, the World Bank and the UN to give tangible support to this impoverished country the size of France with a population of only 350,000. Bechuanaland is, in effect, an enclave in the "White redoubt" of Southern Africa, surrounded as it is by South Africa, Southern Rhodesia and South West Africa. Its economy is wholly integrated with that of its white-governed neighbors. Therefore, the geographical and economic facts of life make it impossible for the territory to insulate itself from the crises affecting its neighbors. When independence comes, Khama will be faced with the conflicting pressures of accommodation with his racist neighbors and of proving that he is a "true African" in the spirit of the OAU. Our interest is in helping him to develop a more viable model of working multi-racialism in a part of the continent where the pattern is otherwise. So far, Khama's visit has resulted in the Peace Corps' decision to send a two-man mission to Bechuanaland at the end of the month to examine ways in which they might be helpful. Khama is delighted with this hopeful sign of US interest. His return to Bechuanaland, followed quickly by the arrival of a Peace Corps mission should further strengthen local support for him. The big question you might raise with Khama is, just how does Bechuanaland plan to meet the crises of Rhodesian UDI and the International Court's decision in the South West Africa case when they come--as come they will./2/ /2/A memorandum of Bundy's conversation with Khama on November 5 is ibid. Rick
405. Letter From Secretary of State Rusk to the Permanent Representative to the United States (Goldberg)/1/ Washington, January 7, 1966. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 10 PORT/UN. Secret. Drafted by Donald McHenry of IO/UNP on December 28, 1965; cleared by EUR Regional Planning and United Nations Adviser Edward T. Lampson, Captain Asbury Coward of G/PM, Pierson M. Hall of AFE, Colonel James W. Milner of SCI, and UNP Office Director Elizabeth Ann Brown. Dear Arthur: I agree with the view expressed in your letter of October 29/2/ that our flexibility in dealing with the issues of the Portuguese territories, South West Africa and apartheid is limited by our dependence on our base in the Azores and our tracking stations in South Africa so long as these facilities remain essential to us. As you requested, I am asking Secretary McNamara for the latest military assessment of the importance of the Azores to our military requirements, and I am urging the Defense Department and NASA to speed preparations on alternative space tracking facilities so that we may move out of South Africa without undue damage to our space program if this should prove necessary or desirable on political grounds. /2/Document 403. In the meantime, you should know that NASA now estimates it will not be able to meet its earlier estimate of July 1, 1966 as a target date for the completion of alternative facilities because of difficulties encountered in acquiring the necessary land in Spain. NASA now estimates that suitable alternative facilities will not be ready before December 31, 1966. In addition, NASA has expressed a strong preference to maintain the tracking facilities in South Africa if political circumstances permit since, in its view, this area continues to be the optimum location for instrumentation supporting all unmanned lunar and planetary programs. With warm regards, /3/Printed from a copy that indicates Rusk signed the original.
406. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (McNaughton) to Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/ /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 71 A 4546, 092 Africa. Secret. Drafted by Bader and Lang on January 15. I-20291/67 Washington, January 18, 1967. SUBJECT The purpose of this memorandum is to alert you to the difficult decisions that will confront the United States when the UN reconvenes in April and focuses its attention once again on Southern Africa. During the last session of the General Assembly, the US actively supported two resolutions involving Southern Africa: one on South West Africa declared that South Africa's mandate had terminated and established a committee to recommend means for administering the territory under the UN to permit self-determination;/2/ and a second on Southern Rhodesia declared mandatory economic sanctions on selected commodities in an effort to bring down the white-minority regime./3/ Neither resolution, of itself, is expected to work. South Africa is not likely to relinquish peacefully its mandate, and the economic sanctions against Southern Rhodesia are given little chance of bringing down the current regime as long as South Africa and Portugal refuse to participate. /2/For text of U.N. General Assembly Resolution 2145 (XXI), October 27, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1966, pp. 585-586. /3/For text of U.N. Security Council Resolution 232 (1966), December 16, see ibid., pp. 608-610. We can expect to be confronted with new pressures for an escalation of measures against Southern Africa when the General Assembly convenes in April. Specifically, we could be called upon to support (i) economic sanctions against South Africa and the Portuguese Territories or (ii) the use of force to implement a blockade against Southern Africa or to intervene militarily in Rhodesia. Extended Economic Sanctions: Extension of sanctions to South Africa would be extremely costly. It would mean an annual balance of payment loss to the U.S. of about $250-300 million and, more importantly, about $840 million to the UK (UK estimates). This impact, plus the possible jeopardy of $3 billion in UK investments, would probably preclude UK participation. But, even with UK participation, sanctions against South Africa would not be expected to succeed because of South Africa's high degree of self-sufficiency and South Africa's ability to retaliate by such measures as withholding its gold from the market--it produces about 70% of the West's annual output of gold. Blockade or Military Intervention: The Joint Chiefs have stated that a blockade against South Africa alone would require four carrier task forces (4 carriers, 24 destroyers and 3 submarines), and treble this number if extended beyond six months because of rotational and repair requirements. The force requirement would be greatly increased if, as would be likely, the Portuguese territories had to be included (also involving us in a possible military confrontation with our NATO ally). In face of present US military involvement in Vietnam, it would be impossible to participate in a military operation of this magnitude without a substantial increase in our present military posture, including the call-up of reserves. (See attachment for military requirements under various contingencies.)/4/ /4/Not printed. Up to now, the US seems to have been working on the promise that we must make every effort to satisfy African aspirations on Southern Africa issues. It is at the least questionable, however, as pointed out in the CIA Special Memorandum at Tab B,/5/ whether our short-term relations with Africa would suffer significantly if we took a more moderate stance. In fact, the wiser course of action--particularly when looking to longer-term relationships--would seem to lay in dealing more frankly with key African leaders. If explained properly, they should be quick to understand the factors that militate against the realization of their aspirations over the short term and the unwisdom of pressing the United Nations to adopt courses of action which it cannot carry out. If we continue unrestrained support for the positions pressed by the Africans, we will soon reach a point where we will either have to support more drastic action or back down in an embarrassing fashion. /5/Not found. Against this background, I think it would be useful for you, sometime between now and April, to have a quiet word with Secretary Rusk, and possibly the President. From what we can see of Secretary Rusk's attitude, I believe that he views the matter much as we do, but there are strong forces favoring a more extreme position, and Secretary Rusk would probably welcome your support. John T. McNaughton/6/ /6/Printed from a copy that indicates McNaughton signed the original.
407. Memorandum From Edward Hamilton of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow)/1/ Washington, June 9, 1967. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Malawi, Visit of President Hastings K. Banda, 6/8-11/67. Confidential. WWR: SUBJECT This will be a short, largely ceremonial visit connected with Banda's attendance at EXPO-67. I have talked with his advance man; he has nothing in particular on his mind he wants to raise with the President. He will undoubtedly want to hear about Vietnam (he is with us), and to give the President his conception of the prospects for ameliorating the black/white problems of South Africa. I do not think that he will have anything specific to offer in the latter regard, however. Banda is a unique figure in Black Africa. He is the only Black African leader--except for the Prime Ministers of neighboring Botswana and Lesotho--who willingly does business with the Rhodesians and the South Africans. He is much criticized for this, but it is also widely recognized in both black and white camps that he has no choice. Malawi is heavily dependent on Rhodesia for supplies. The Malawian economy is built around the white expatriate community which is highly sensitive to the morale of expats in Rhodesia and Zambia. Thus, Banda is given very little choice by the economic facts of life; still, he is so strident about currying favor with Smith and Vorster that he draws a great deal of unnecessary fire from his Black African comrades. In my view, the moral of this is to treat him with impeccable manners, but not overwhelming warmth. We should be particularly careful that our toast and welcoming speeches don't portray him as a great Africa-wide figure. We certainly lose nothing by being correct with him, but we risk difficulties with his many African enemies if we go out of our way to embrace him. You may wish to make some of the following points this afternoon: 1. Banda is U.S.-educated, articulate, and very pro-American. If we can keep the visit casual and keep public statements away from the problems of southern Africa, this short stop should go off without a hitch. 2. Banda does not have any particular problem in mind in visiting the President. We should minimize the business aspects of the meeting, both publicly and privately. 3. We should be particularly careful in drafting toasts and statements to avoid identifying Banda as a leading figure Continent-wide. Ed Hamilton/2/ /2/Printed from a copy that bears Hamilton's typed signature below a typed notation in parentheses that reads: "dictated--not read."
408. National Intelligence Estimate/1/ NIE 70-1-67 Washington November 24, 1967. /1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency: Job 79-01012A, ODDI Registry of NIE and SNIE Files. Secret; Controlled Dissem. According to a note on the cover sheet, the estimate was submitted by Deputy Director of Central Intelligence Rufus Taylor and concurred in by the U.S. Intelligence Board on November 24. THE LIBERATION MOVEMENTS OF SOUTHERN AFRICA The Problem To estimate the character and prospects of the movements, commonly called liberation movements, that seek to end white minority rule in Southern Africa, their relations with other African states and with Communist countries, and the implications for the US. Conclusions A. The liberation movements which are attempting to depose the white regimes of Angola, Mozambique, Southern Rhodesia, South Africa, and South-West Africa stand little chance of significant progress through 1970, and probably for some considerable time thereafter. Most of the liberation groups will probably continue to suffer the disabilities, especially the lack of broad indigenous support, that so far have limited their efforts. But even with greater success in recruitment, none of the liberation groups is likely to expand its insurgency operations sufficiently to shake the determination of the white regimes to resist all challenges to their domination of affairs. B. The liberation cause has broad support among African states, and many of these believe that the US and the other great powers should take action that would terminate white rule in Southern Africa. The continued frustration of the liberation movements, therefore, will complicate US relations with African states and also US efforts to garner African support at the UN. But US relations with the African states are influenced by a number of factors and the impact of its positions with respect to Southern Africa will vary. The liberation issue alone will have the greatest impact on US relations with Tanzania and Zambia, states that border on the white dominated areas, are engaged in operational support of liberation forces, and fear retaliation by the white regimes. C. The USSR, Communist China, and Cuba seek to expand their influence in Africa by providing limited, yet much-appreciated, military and financial assistance to the liberation groups. If the capacity of these groups to use aid effectively were to grow, the Communist states would probably provide increased assistance, but it is highly unlikely that the USSR or China would engage in direct military intervention. [Here follows the body of the paper.]
409. Paper Prepared in the Policy Planning Council/1/ Washington, November 20, 1968. /1/Source: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 70 D 263, SIG/MEMO: #107--11/22/68--U.S. Policy Toward Southern Africa, 47th SIG Meeting. Secret; Noforn. Filed with a November 22 memorandum from Staff Director Arthur A. Hartman to SIG Members transmitting a revised text of the draft National Policy Paper on Southern Africa for discussion at the 47th SIG meeting on December 3. No drafting information appears on the source text, but Hartman's memorandum notes that the new text reflected certain areas of agreement that emerged from the IRG/AF meeting on November 14, and a number of minor changes and amplifications. The Introductory Notes to the paper state that, when approved, it would rescind the National Policy Paper on South Africa approved by Secretary Rusk on January 18, 1965 (see Document 600), and supersede the preliminary draft NPP on Southern Africa dated April 26, 1967. NATIONAL POLICY PAPER, SOUTHERN AFRICA [Here follow a table of contents, a map of Africa, and Introductory Notes.] SOUTHERN AFRICA--U.S. POLICY Precis The confrontation between black and white-controlled Africa--with the Zambezi the approximate dividing line--is deepening. The African liberation movements, staging through Zambia, Tanzania and the Congo, have stepped up their activities. While these operations remain relatively low-level and containable by white-regime security forces, the outlook is for an insurgency of gradually rising intensity which could lead to cross-border retaliations. The Communists, most strikingly the Chinese through their support of the proposed TANZAM railroad, are responding to the Southern African target by increasing their presence in Tanzania and Zambia and by material support for the African insurgents. The South African government has expanded its area of security operations implicitly to include much of the white-controlled area, a development which makes the South African problem regional rather than national in character. The U.S. relationship to Africa, involving links with both black Africa and the white-controlled countries of southern Africa, is under increasing pressure. On the one hand, the U.S. supports the aspirations of the African states--and implicitly of the African liberation movements--on racial discrimination and colonialism and possesses valuable interests in the black African countries. On the other hand, the U.S. has a range of material and strategic interests in the white-controlled states and a commitment to the peaceful adjustment of racial relations in southern Africa. Essential U.S. objectives in southern Africa are to: --encourage long term constructive change in the area; --moderate trends towards violence and confrontation; and --minimize the adverse effects of violence on U.S. interests. These objectives cannot be satisfactorily achieved either by intensified pressures on, or by closer association with, the white minority regimes of the area. In regard, therefore, to South Africa we need a policy that will: --continue pressures to move towards racial equality and majority rule; --continue to avoid such conspicuous association as would result in U.S. identification with repressive racial policy; --where not inconsistent with the foregoing, continue contacts and relationships of material benefit to the United States (e.g. in the fields of trade, scientific and technical exchange, routine naval visits, tracking stations, etc.); and --encourage wider exposure of South Africans to the outside world through cultural contacts and exchanges in the hope that such exposure may marginally contribute to constructive evolution in South Africa. The other side of the coin is equally important: the strengthening of the black states of the region. To do this we need: --assistance to these states through the UN and bilaterally in all available peaceful means to maintain their territorial integrity and political independence; --maximum utilization of existing USG aid instrumentalities (regional, self-help, Peace Corps, PL-480, investment surveys), and encouragement of private input; --recognition of these countries as eligible for U.S. bilateral aid programs, especially technical assistance; --active cooperation in UN and other Free World aid projects; and --encouragement of their non-political cooperation with neighboring white-controlled states. Vis-a-vis the Portuguese Territories, we should: --maintain our support for the principle of self-determination; --prepare for future change by contacts with Brazil, other European and African states, and the post-Salazar political elements in Portugal; and --avoid involvement in likely bloodshed in those colonies. In Southern Rhodesia: leave lead to UK unless the latter so clearly betrays the principle of unimpeded progress toward majority rule as to force the U.S. to weigh the relative pros and cons of explicit U.S. disassociation from the UK position. In the case of South West Africa: maintain our support for self-determination and the direct responsibility of the UN; protest infringement of the rights of the inhabitants and seek to protect their interests whenever possible through practical programs and judicial relief, while seeking to encourage a South Africa dialogue with the UN on the future of the territory. The foregoing measured approach contains only a limited hope of avoiding inter-racial bitterness and eventual large-scale violence. It may, however, offer some hope of limiting the effects of that confrontation: --by strengthening the stability and independence of the black states; --by identifying the U.S. with their aspirations; and --by avoiding seeming to align the U.S. with repressive white regimes, while seeking to encourage constructive long-term change in these areas. In short, it is a policy which will be damage-limiting for the range of U.S. interests in southern Africa and may ultimately have some slight constructive influence on long-term trends in the area. Meanwhile, by giving tangible support to the black states, we would hope to make them less dependent upon the white-ruled states and prevent achievement by the communists of an eventual monopoly of black aspirations in the area. The major changes in existing policy are: 1. Emphasis on African States In two concrete ways, the present paper innovates policy in connection with the five new African countries of the region: Zambia, Malawi, Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland. These are: (a) The restoration of U.S. bilateral aid programs (primarily technical assistance) in Zambia and Malawi, where these programs are currently being phased-out; and the establishment of similar bilateral aid programs in Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland. The implementation of this change of policy will require modification of the number-of-country limitations in current aid policy towards Africa. (b) Careful consideration is to be given to justified defense requirements of African states of the region threatened with white-regime retaliatory attacks for insurgent activities mounted from their territory. As a practical matter this is likely to be applicable only in the case of Zambia. 2. South Africa (a) This paper opens the possibility of eventual resumption of austere routine visits to South African ports by U.S. official ships for refueling, supplies and repairs, where such calls can be organized in a way which will not submit U.S. personnel to discriminatory treatment ashore and which can be carried out in a low key manner. (Present U.S. policy has suspended such calls pending a study of the problem.) (b) A requirement is added for a political review by the Department of State of EXIM Bank medium-term loan guarantee applications covering planned exports to South Africa. (c) A study is called for of continued South Africa participation in the U.S. sugar quota. (d) The U.S. would disassociate itself from Inter-Governmental Committee on European Migration (ICEM) projects which aim at the encouragement of European immigration to South Africa. 3. Reinforcement of UN direct responsibilities for South West Africa In the maintenance of continued pressure on South Africa, by protest and other peaceful means, as in connection with the training of South West Africans and on the question of UN issuance of travel documents to such persons, the present paper provides for U.S. support for the UN's responsibility for South West Africa and for efforts to protect the rights of the inhabitants. 4. Rhodesia Two new policy elements are involved here: (a) The concept of seeking at an appropriate point to persuade the South African Government to use its influence with the Rhodesian regime not only to take a more moderate line with the UK but also to fulfill its commitments under any settlement; and (b), the statement that the U.S. should follow the UK lead in a UK-Rhodesian settlement unless the agreement lacks reasonable protection for progress toward majority rule in which case the U.S. would have to weigh the related pros and cons of disassociation. 5. Toward the Portuguese Colonies (a) The current U.S. self-limitation on the shipment of arms to Portugal which might be used in the insurgent conflict is tightened to include shipment of sporting arms and ammunition (in line with the U.S. implementation of the Security Council arms embargo against South Africa). (b) EXIM Bank loans would not be available to Portuguese colonial agencies for financing major infrastructural-type projects such as the Caborra Bassa Dam in Mozambique. 6. USIA Activities As the result of treating the area for the first time as a single region, rather than a series of individual countries each competing for its share of available resources, priority is given to the independent black African states. [Next documents] Volume XXIV Index | Historian's Office | Department of State |
