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Ghana
235. Memorandum From William H. Brubeck of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/ Washington, January 3, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Bundy Files, "B." Confidential. I understand that Secretary Rusk in his staff meeting this morning told Soapy Williams that if Ghana starts blaming us for the attempt against Nkrumah/2/ that we should be prepared to react vigorously. Mahoney, in the attached telegram takes the same view./3/ However, he goes ahead to face the possible consequences which I think are serious. /2/A January 3 memorandum from Director of Intelligence and Research Thomas L. Hughes to Rusk reported an unsuccessful assassination attempt on Nkrumah that day and speculated on its possible sources. It warned that Nkrumah suspected the CIA of plotting his removal and that charges of CIA involvement might appear in the leftist press. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Ghana, Vol. I, Cables 11/63-2/64) /3/Not printed. Ambassador Mahoney suggested in telegram 478 from Accra, January 3, that action be taken, including his temporary recall, if Ghana launched a campaign that implied or stated that the United States was involved in the assassination attempt. In Nkrumah's emotional state we can easily find ourselves in an escalating fight and, given the Congressional (e.g. Dodd) animus against Nkrumah the whole Volta-Valco issue/4/ could well be revived. The question is less whether we want to use Volta as a club against Nkrumah than whether we want to expose the President to political embarrassment over the Volta commitment (even though it was President Kennedy's not his). /4/Reference is to the question of U.S. funding for the Volta River Hydroelectric Project. For previous documentation, see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. XXI, pp. 337-368. In sum, if we get into any kind of argument with Nkrumah at this point we might find ourselves in an election year caught between a political fight on Volta at home and the alternative of an Aswan Dam fiasco in Ghana. I have told AF that we would like to see any proposed reaction to such a Nkrumah attack for possible Presidential interest. You might want to suggest to the Secretary directly the President's potential interest in any such gambit. WB
236. Memorandum for the Record/1/ Washington, February 11, 1964, 3 p.m. /1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-B01285A, DCI (McCone) Memo for the Record, 01 Jan.-15 Apr. 64. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by McCone. SUBJECT [Here follow four items of discussion not related to Ghana.] 5. Discussed the Ghana situation,/2/ reviewing the memorandum #0681/64 on Nkrumah anti-American push/3/ and stated that despite denials there was no question in our minds that Nkrumah and others in his government were behind the anti-American agitation in Ghana. Advised the Secretary that I felt the substantial aid programs, including the Volta Dam and the Aluminum Project should be reviewed in view of Nkrumah's attitude and that I thought that he might have a sensitive situation on the Hill unless this was done. The Secretary asked whether General Ankrah might not take over. I stated that we had no indication, observed the General had no political ambition and thought that if it was desired to develop something, we might work with the British on a joint program. No decision was reached. I suggested this be discussed with Home and Butler while they are here. /2/McCone and Rusk had reviewed the Ghana situation on February 6. According to McCone's memorandum for the record, Rusk "raised the question of the ability of General Ankrah to take over the government." McCone replied that "the General, in our opinion, was well respected in Ghana, but not inclined to accept responsibility." Rusk asked McCone to explore this prospect fully and report to him. (Ibid.) /3/Not found. Note: Following this meeting I reviewed the Ghana subject with Governor Harriman and in the course of the conversations advised both Rusk and Harriman that Edgar Kaiser was going to dine with me this evening. [Here follow nine items of discussion not related to Ghana.]
237. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of West African Affairs (Trimble) to the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams)/1/ Washington, February 11, 1964. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 GHANA-US. Secret. Drafted by Trimble, Mahoney, and Deputy Director of the Office of West African Affairs Leon G. Dorros. SUBJECT A. Assumptions The course of action outlined below is based on the following assumptions: (1) By his present actions, Nkrumah is daily rendering our position in Ghana more difficult. He sees us as an ideal scapegoat to cover his domestic shortcomings and a handy whipping boy to promote his extreme brand of Pan-Africanism. In contrast to his leftist advisors, it is doubtful, however, that he wishes us to leave. He probably desires to retain the Volta aid and also some connection with the West to give him a posture of neutrality. But his present conduct can only lead to circumstances under which our position could well become untenable. (2) The U.S. should make a determined effort to remain in Ghana. Voluntary withdrawal of our representation would be interpreted both there and elsewhere in Africa as a defeat for the U.S. and a victory for the Communists. It also would encourage the Communists and leftist elements in other parts of Africa to adopt the same tactics they have been following in Ghana. The Soviet bloc desires us to leave Ghana and is actively engaged in promoting this end. (3) Nkrumah is convinced that the U.S. is the principal obstacle to his program for African unity. He is also convinced that through the CIA we are seeking to engineer his downfall. He is living in a state of fear induced by the several assassination attempts and an overriding sense of insecurity, and consequently is increasingly irrational and irresponsible. (4) Nkrumah's popularity has markedly declined in the past 18 months, especially among civil servants, police, businessmen, university students and the professions. Though he still enjoys a considerable following among the rural masses, the more politically-minded urban population has lost confidence in him. (5) Time is not on our side. The Parliament, judiciary and police have been emasculated; a purge of the universities is now under way and one of the civil service imminent. Although moderate elements still exert a slight influence on Nkrumah, he increasingly depends for advice and counsel on the small group of leftists in his immediate entourage. Nkrumah is consciously and deliberately creating a police state based on national Marxist principles. (6) Although Nkrumah's leftward progress cannot be checked or reversed, it could be slowed down by a well conceived and executed action program. Measures which we might take against Nkrumah would have to be carefully selected in order not to weaken pro-Western elements in Ghana or adversely affect our prestige and influence elsewhere on the continent. (7) U.S. pressure, if appropriately applied, could induce a chain reaction eventually leading to Nkrumah's downfall. Chances of success would be greatly enhanced if the British could be induced to act in concert with us. (8) Failure to act can only result in a further deterioration of the situation to the point where we may feel compelled to leave Ghana, thereby facilitating the chance of Soviet success. B. Summary of Proposed Actions (1) Postponement of Ambassador Mahoney's Return to Accra Ambassador Ribeiro should be called to the Department and informed by Governor Williams that in view of the Ghanaian Government's expression of regret at the demonstrations before the American Embassy and the Foreign Minister's assurance that they would not re-occur, it had been decided that Ambassador Mahoney would return to Accra on February 14. Because of the subsequent expulsion of American professors at the University of Ghana and vicious attacks on an officer of our Embassy, we now intend to postpone the Ambassador's return. The same statement should also be made to Botsio by our Charge at Accra. (2) Award of Medal of Freedom to Adger E. Player Congressmen Oliver P. Bolton and Zablocki have proposed that the Medal of Freedom be awarded to Mr. Player for his action in preventing desecration of the American flag. The White House has asked for the Department's views on the proposal. Our response should indicate that a decoration is fully justified, and suggest that it be either the Medal of Freedom or the Legion of Merit. Mr. Player's valorous conduct has been widely reported in the American press, and the award would constitute tangible evidence of the country's gratitude and admiration. It would also underscore our contempt for the controlled Ghanaian press in seeking to besmirch Mr. Player's character. (3) Representations to Nkrumah by Ambassador Mahoney The Ambassador should see Nkrumah as soon as possible after his return to Accra and make clear to him our concern at the course of developments in Ghana and their seriously adverse implications for U.S.-Ghanaian relations. He should indicate that as Ghana has failed to carry out the understandings set forth in the 1961 exchange of correspondence between President Kennedy and Nkrumah, we may be forced to reexamine our commitments to Ghana. He should also express our shock that no action has been taken against the leaders of the demonstrations. The impact of the Ambassador's remarks would obviously be enhanced if he were in a position to state that he had seen the President just before leaving Washington and had discussed the Ghanaian situation with him. It is felt that the Ambassador should not bring a letter from the President to Nkrumah since it might (a) serve further to inflate Nkrumah's ego; (b) encourage him to initiate an exchange of correspondence with the President and (c) be quoted out of context by Nkrumah to serve his own purposes. (4) Visit by Edgar Kaiser Mr. Edgar Kaiser should be encouraged to seek an interview with Nkrumah in the near future at which he would stress the unfavorable reaction in the U.S. to recent events in Ghana and indicate that they are causing serious misgivings among the Directors of Kaiser Industries on the desirability of proceeding with the VALCO project. (5) IBRD Review of Its Support of Volta The recommendation should be made to the IBRD, preferably through the Secretary of the Treasury, that it send a team to Ghana to study the desirability of continuing its support of the Volta project in the light of Ghana's adverse financial situation. (6) Slow-down in Payments on the Volta Dam Project AID and the Eximbank should delay action on pending and future requests for draw downs of loan funds by the Volta Dam. (This course of action is possible only until around July 1, 1964 when the lake starts to form and further delays in construction might cause serious flooding and loss of life.) Because of the IBRD's direct involvement in the project, it should be informed in advance of any such action. (7) Termination of NIH Facility The Bureau of the Budget is anxious to close down the NIH research facility at Accra as part of its program to reduce the balance of payments deficit. Although useful, the facility has been unable to fully realize its potential as a source of data on tropical diseases because of the uncooperative attitude of the leftist Director of the Ghanaian Institute of Health. Although of marginal value, early announcement of our intention to terminate the facility would be interpreted in Ghana as an indication of our displeasure at recent developments there but should not alienate pro-Western groups. If feasible, the operation possibly on a reduced scale, in deference to Budget's B/P concerns, should be shifted to Sierra Leone thus making the point entirely clear to Nkrumah and at the same time achieving a favorable impact with moderate African leaders. (8) Psychological Warfare Intensive efforts should be made through psychological warfare and other means to diminish support for Nkrumah within Ghana and nurture the conviction among the Ghanaian people that their country's welfare and independence necessitate his removal. Themes which might be exploited include: (a) The strong non-Ghanaian element among Nkrumah's closest advisors and their Communist backgrounds; (b) Suppression of civil liberties as exemplified by the Preventive Detention Act, purge of the judiciary, etc.; (c) Perversion of the trade union movement without regard to the interests of the working people; (d) Announced intention to destroy civil service leadership; (e) Parliament is no longer responsive to public opinion; (f) Threat to academic freedom as evidenced by expulsion of eight professors, invasion of the campus by the mob, campaign to place political commissars in institutions of higher learning, removal of the respected headmaster of Achimoto, etc.; (g) Decline in Ghana's international prestige and increasing alienation of sister African nations; (h) Introduction of Soviet security agents among the President's household; (i) Serious deterioration in Ghana's financial position resulting from Nkrumah's irresponsible policies; (j) Creation of a police state; (k) Likelihood that Nkrumah's policies will result in Soviet bloc domination of Ghana, thereby substituting one form of colonialism for another; and (l) Increasingly precarious position of the ordinary Ghanaian citizen. (9) Nkrumah an African Problem We must bring home to other African leaders that Nkrumah is a problem which they must face up to in their own national interest.
238. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, February 12, 1964, 4:30 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330, February 1964. Secret. Drafted by Willis C. Armstrong. Approved in M on February 24, in S on February 27, and by the White House on February 24. The meeting took place at the White House. The source text is labeled "Part IV of VI." SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS US Side Governor Harriman said we were interested in discussing Ghana where we are greatly concerned over our investment in aid and Ex-Im Bank funds for the Volta project./2/ Nkrumah blames the United States for all his troubles, including the attempt at assassination, and he has now sent away some six teachers from the university against the wishes of the excellent British rector. His behavior has become intolerable. The Prime Minister said he was worried about Ghana. Nkrumah has gone very close to being Communist. If the United States took away its aid to the Volta project, it was his opinion that Ghana would go right over to the Russians who would supply the money for the Volta dam. (Sir Alec first said "Aswan", and then corrected himself.) /2/At a meeting between Rusk and Butler earlier that day, Butler asked Rusk not to take a position against the Volta River project, and Rusk said the United States would consult with the British before taking any decision to end U.S. support. (Memorandum of conversation, February 12; ibid., Central Files, POL GHANA-US) Governor Harriman said there was a date in March or April when work on the dam could be stopped or could continue to be pursued. If the decision were to proceed, one would have to finish the task because of the flooding problem which would result if the dam were not completed. He thought it desirable to take a look at the situation to see what could be done. Mr. Butler said he was worried about a collapse of the Ghana economy with or without the Volta project, and noted that another difficult question would arise over the implementation of the 7-year plan of development. If the United States could hold up Volta to accomplish certain objectives, this might be useful, but a withdrawal would be extremely serious since aid to Volta is about the only instrument we have in Ghana. Mr. Butler said he also thought one could not be sure how long Nkrumah would last. The President observed that it was going to be difficult to keep on giving aid in the face of public opinion in the United States concerning Ghana's actions and attitudes. However, the President added, we obviously do not want the Soviets to get a base in Ghana. The Prime Minister asked whether the project could be slowed down and Governor Harriman said that a decision in March or April could stop the project for a year. He wondered if the British could talk to Nkrumah and say that Ghana could not very well expect the project to go forward in view of the present attitudes of the Ghana Government toward the U.S. Mr. Bundy noted that our people have not been able to get at Nkrumah and the Prime Minister said there had been no British contact with him either. The Prime Minister said he had received an offensive letter from Nkrumah recently. The Secretary noted that Nkrumah had not been out of his castle since January 2. Ambassador Ormsby Gore said perhaps the British High Commissioner could get into see Nkrumah if he had a letter from the British Prime Minister. Governor Harriman said that Mr. Kaiser was prepared to go to Ghana promptly if it would be useful. Mr. Kaiser has had some access to Nkrumah. The President suggested that perhaps the Prime Minister could answer the letter from Nkrumah and then Mr. Kaiser could visit Ghana. Mr. Butler remarked that Nkrumah is obsessed with the thought that the US and the UK desire his destruction. Governor Harriman said that Nkrumah has Russian guards in his castle, and has confidence only in them. The Secretary said we recognize fully the consequences of canceling the Volta projects, but that we have to be aware of the fact of the possibility that Congressional resolutions or amendments to bills could require us to terminate aid. He added that our Ambassador to Ghana thinks that Nkrumah is in a stage of personal disintegration. The Prime Minister said he was convinced that Nkrumah had "gone round the bend." He said he would write to Nkrumah.
239. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson/1/ Washington, February 13, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Ghana, Vol. I, Cables, 11/63-2/64. Secret. Another copy of the memorandum indicates it was drafted in AF and sent to Rusk on February 13 with a covering memorandum from Williams. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Williams Records, White House Correspondence) SUBJECT The Problem The recent anti-American incidents in Ghana have generated Congressional and public resentment here. There have been some demands that the U.S. now pull out of the Volta Project in retaliation. If we accede to these demands we would destroy our chances of preventing massive Communist influence in Ghana. We must take steps to make Nkrumah realize the grave risk of losing U.S. friendship and assistance if present trends in Ghana continue. Our Objective We want Nkrumah to stop press and other attacks and reestablish friendly relations in accordance with the understanding he had with President Kennedy. Recommendation That you approve the action program outlined below. Proposed Action Program (Timing of these steps will depend upon developments in the Ghanaian situation): 1. A letter of warning from the British Prime Minister to Nkrumah on the adverse consequences of his policies for continued Western aid. 2. An early visit to Nkrumah by Edgar Kaiser to stress the unfavorable reaction in the US to recent events in Ghana and the difficulty for Kaiser Industries to carry out the VALCO Project in the present atmosphere of unfriendliness and even hostility towards the US. 3. Strong representation to Nkrumah by Ambassador Mahoney on his return, including an oral message from the President. 4. Termination of the NIH tropical disease research Project in Accra. 5. An IBRD review of its support of the Volta Project. 6. A letter from the President to Nkrumah, if conditions are sufficiently favorable in terms of success. 7. Send a Presidential Emissary to Nkrumah, possibly the Attorney General, to express deep US concern at developments contrary to Nkrumah's understanding with President Kennedy. The decision to go ahead on the Volta Project was made by President Kennedy in December 1961 as a calculated risk that Nkrumah would live up to his undertakings to maintain Ghana's independence and neutrality in foreign relations. President Kennedy made clear to key members of Congress that his decision in no way affected approval of Nkrumah's regime but was intended to help the people of Ghana. Since 1961 there has been a steady deterioration in Ghana's attitude toward the US. Press attacks and other evidence of hostility have been markedly noticeable following attempts on Nkrumah's life. Nkrumah, who exhibits marked signs of mental instability, is apparently convinced the United States is opposing his aims in Africa and intent upon destroying him. We recalled our Ambassador from Ghana following the recent demonstrations before our Accra Embassy. Since we have had: 1. The continuing attacks and vilification of the US by the press and radio. 2. Expulsion of six professors from the University of Ghana of which four are American. 3. Press attacks against patriotic American Negroes like Emerson Player. We have examined the feasibility of exerting leverage on Nkrumah through our participation in the Volta Project. While the Volta seems to offer limited leverage, its use presents significant complications and serious, risks: 1. Advance consultation with the IBRD is required because it organized and participated in the financing of the project. 2. Advance consultation with the UK is required because of intensive UK interests in Ghana and UK financial participation in the project. 3. Adverse African reaction to action stopping or slowing down an IBRD project because of US political interest. 4. Possible violent, irrational reaction by Nkrumah, and prompt Soviet expression of sympathy and support. The attached annex/2/ shows the extent of our commitment to this project and the aluminum smelter associated with it. As of now the Dam is 45 to 50% completed with construction scheduled to end in 1965. /2/Not printed. W. Averell Harriman/3/ /3/Harriman signed for Rusk above Rusk's typed signature.
240. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, February 14, 1964, 1-1:25 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Williams Records, White House Correspondence. Confidential. Drafted by Williams on March 2. The time is taken from the President's Daily Diary. (Johnson Library) SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS Under Secretary Harriman outlined the Department's position on the Ghana Situation and our feeling that for the United States now to pull out of the Volta project in retaliation for recent Ghanaian activities would be self defeating. Ambassador Mahoney made a few remarks. The gist of Under Secretary Harriman's remarks was that we were not coming to the President for instructions but rather were advising him of the situation and the plan of action we would follow unless he should choose to advise us to the contrary. The President took the briefing paper transmitted under cover of February 13th to the Secretary and took up the items one by one. Proposed Action Program 1. He indicated a message would go to Nkrumah from the British Prime Minister. 2. He thought it would be a good idea for Edgar Kaiser to see Nkrumah. 3. He agreed Mahoney should see Nkrumah. 4. He said he didn't know about the NIH but whatever we did was all right. 5. He said consultations could be undertaken with IBRD. 6. He would be agreeable to sending a letter to Nkrumah if and when it were decided to be advisable. 7. President said he would be pleased to have Under Secretary Harriman go to Accra as he had previously indicated that he had hoped he would go to Africa.
241. Memorandum for the Record/1/ Washington, February 26, 1964, 1 p.m. /1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-B01285A, DCI Meetings with the President, 01 Jan.-5 Apr. 64. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by McCone on February 27. SUBJECT [Here follow five items of discussion not related to Ghana.] 6. We were then joined by Secretary Rusk, Harriman, Edgar Kaiser and Mr. Calhoun and engaged in a long discussion on Ghana. Kaiser reported on his conversations with Nkrumah and his absolute and positive insistence that Nkrumah stop the anti-American actions in his country or else he, Kaiser, could not proceed with the work. Furthermore, under the climate that Nkrumah had developed Kaiser could not raise a single cent toward additional investments in Ghana. Nkrumah seemed to agree and said he was writing President Johnson./2/ I insisted that Kaiser explain to the President Nkrumah's criticism of CIA. This Kaiser did in the manner outlined in Nkrumah's letter to Mr. Calhoun, a copy of which is attached./3/ I asked Ambassador Mahoney if he felt that CIA was operating independently of his office, whether there was any truth in Nkrumah's statements (a lot of which were general and no specific examples cited). Mahoney answered absolutely and positively no. The President asked Kaiser what he wished to do. Kaiser stated that he had a contract that had not been broken by Ghana despite the exasperating situation and that he intended to fulfill his contract. He reviewed the situation about as follows: Volta Dam will cost about $200 million of which Ghana is putting up half and the other half is being put up by AID, the World Bank, the British, and the Export-Import Bank in varying amounts and for differing components or parts of the project. The aluminum plant will cost about $150 million, about $100 million has been put up by the Export-Import Bank and about $50 million by the Kaiser-Reynolds Syndicate (Kaiser, 90%--Reynolds, 10%) but all of this is guaranteed by the United States Government. The entire $350 million in the form of loans, there are no grants made. The power that Kaiser will take, representing half of the power generated at the dam, will pay for the entire project in 30 years. Kaiser stated that he could not forecast the permanence of his position in the project. It was entirely possible that Nkrumah would take it over. This was a risk and represented a very serious problem to him because he was proceeding with manufacturing outlets in Europe to utilize the raw aluminum produced. Despite this risk he was going forward. The President was noncommittal. /2/See Document 243. /3/Not found. 7. Later Governor Harriman stated he wanted to get together with me to reach a conclusion on our policy concerning the Volta Project. He was in favor of proceeding--here were many who wished to cut and run. He sensed that I would favor staying with the project. What he was seeking was a partner to support his position. 8. At 5:30 p.m. Edgar Kaiser came to my office in East Building. We discussed ways of counteracting Nkrumah's complaint against the CIA. Also he was trying to get an indication from me of what the President really thought. I told him I didn't know, that I was sure the President had not made up his mind. Kaiser felt that he should communicate with Nkrumah concerning the CIA charge. Calhoun should do the same and we should help Calhoun with his reply (I warned against being in any way confidential with Calhoun as Nkrumah has Calhoun charmed and anything we tell Calhoun in confidence will go to Nkrumah). I showed Kaiser Sherman Kent's comments on the Andrew Tully book. Kaiser felt that he should send a copy of that to Nkrumah since Nkrumah had mentioned the book to him. Note: Kaiser feels that Nkrumah will extract a statement from one of the individuals who had attempted to assassinate him that they were CIA agents and that we could expect to read this in the paper most any day. Therefore this matter is urgent and should be pursued promptly and wrapped up prior to my departure.
Washington, February 26, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Bundy Files, Memorandum of Meetings with the President, Vol. I. Confidential. Drafted by Brubeck. MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT ON GHANA PRESENT Kaiser reported on his talks with Nkrumah/2/ concluding that he is not at all confident that, even if Kaiser builds the smelter and starts operations, Nkrumah will make it tolerable for them to stay in business in Ghana. /2/Brubeck reported in a memorandum earlier that day that Kaiser had just returned from 2 days of meetings with Nkrumah. Kaiser had warned Nkrumah that it would be impossible to do business if hostility toward the United States continued. (Ibid., Country File, Ghana, Vol. I, Cables 11/63-2/64) The President asked if this is still a sound project economically and Kaiser said definitely yes. Secretary Rusk asked what were the strongest assurances Nkrumah gave Kaiser with regard to maintaining good relations with the U.S. Kaiser said Nkrumah reiterated several times his need for private investment and his intention to prevent attacks and demonstrations against the U.S. The President asked whether the alleged role of the CIA in Ghana is a matter of great concern to Nkrumah. Kaiser said that it was a major factor in his attitude and McCone agreed. The President asked if Kaiser would recommend a year's postponement of further financing and construction on the dam, awaiting further political developments. Kaiser said no; we should decide firmly whether to proceed or completely terminate the project. In response to the President's further questions Kaiser said he thinks Nkrumah has moved further toward the bloc in the last year or so and that his attitude is worse now than it was at the time the contracts were signed in December 1961. In response to another question Kaiser said Nkrumah believes that Kaiser cannot and will not get out of Volta unless the U.S. Government withdraws its support. The President asked where else Nkrumah might get financing and Kaiser indicated that the 20-odd million of U.S financing still to come would be available from the Soviets, internal Ghanaian sources or otherwise. Harriman informed the President that U.S. withdrawal of Volta financing would probably not lead the World Bank to withdraw its own financing. The President and Harriman discussed the timing of a Harriman trip to Ghana and Harriman indicated that he would go in the next few weeks, shortly after Ambassador Mahoney's return. The President indicated his feeling that the reports from Accra, including Kaiser's,/3/ make the situation look now a little better than it did a week or so ago. /3/Telegram 700 from Accra, February 24, reported that Kaiser had made clear to Nkrumah that the latter's wish to meet with President Johnson could not be accommodated unless relations improved between the two governments. (Department of State, Central Files, FSE 12 GHANA) The Embassy commented in telegram 704 from Accra, February 25, that Kaiser had aroused concern in Nkrumah's mind. (Ibid., POL 12 GHANA) Kaiser's talks with Nkrumah were further reported in telegrams 691, 695, and 703, February 22 and 24. (Ibid., FSE 12 GHANA) WB
243. Letter From President Nkrumah to President Johnson/1/ Accra, February 26, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence File, Ghana--Presidential Correspondence. No classification marking. Ghana's Ambassador Miguel Augustus Ribeiro delivered the letter to Johnson on March 11; see Document 245. In a March 7 memorandum, Harriman forwarded the text of Nkrumah's letter, as telegraphed by the Embassy, and recommended that the President receive Ambassador Ribeiro. (Department of State, Central Files, POL GHANA-US) Dear President Johnson, I wish to take the opportunity of the return of my Ambassador to Washington, after a brief visit to Accra, to send you this personal note concerning one or two matters which are of interest to Ghana and the United States. In the first place, I should like to repeat the expressions of regret already conveyed to your Government over the recent incidents in Accra, and to reaffirm the assurances I gave to the late President Kennedy in regard to my Government's policy of non-alignment. As you are probably aware, we have pursued this policy unflinchingly from the very day of our independence. In my first meeting with President Kennedy,/2/ I explained how dangerous it is for the emergent States of Africa to take sides in the diplomatic manoeuvres and political disputes among the Great Powers. One of our principal aims has been to protect ourselves from the dangers of involvement in these manoeuvres and disputes. It follows from this that Ghana must establish good relations with all countries of the world, irrespective of the political systems of their governments. /2/A record of Kennedy's conversation with Nkrumah is printed in Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. XX, pp 95-98. You will appreciate, Mr. President, that the success of this policy depends on the extent of mutual respect which can be shown in the relationships that subsist between ourselves and the Governments which wish to maintain links with us. It is on this issue that I must express some concern about that which has come to notice within recent times as a result of the activities of certain United States citizens in Ghana. There appears to be two conflicting establishments representing the United States in our part of the world. There is the United States Embassy as a diplomatic institution doing formal diplomatic business with us; there is also the C.I.A. organisation which functions presumably within or outside this recognised body. This latter organisation, that is, the C.I.A., seems to devote all its attention to fomenting ill-will, misunderstanding and even clandestine and subversive activities among our people, to the impairment of the good relations which exist between our two Governments. If my analysis of this situation is correct, and all the indications are that it is, then I could not, Mr. President, view this without some alarm. Neither will any other Government in a developing State, however weak its economic position, accept this situation without demur. We of the Independent African States wish to be left alone to pursue policies and courses which we know to be in the best interests of our people, and at the same time conducive to the maintenance of good relations with other governments of the world. Mr. President, permit me to say a few words here about Ghana's socialist ideals and the place of foreign investment within the socialist structure which we intend to build. It should be obvious to any one who has followed the history of Africa's development with impartiality that a planned economy and rapid industrial and agricultural development can be best achieved through a socialist course. Mr. President, the ravages of colonialism and its effect upon the territories now emerging from colonialism make it difficult and almost impossible for us in Africa to follow the traditional path of capitalist development. We must therefore ensure that the public sector of the productive economy expands at the maximum possible rate, especially in the strategic areas of production upon which our economy essentially depends. It is my primary ambition, therefore, to secure and maintain the economic independence of Ghana in such a manner as to forestall the danger of the growth of those social antagonisms which can result from the unequal distribution of economic power among our people. Within the framework of this position there is an open door for foreign investment in Ghana. The Ghana Investment Act--the best in all Africa yet--makes this quite clear. Ghana welcomes foreign investors in a spirit of partnership; they can earn their profits here, provided they leave us an agreed portion for promoting the welfare and happiness of the majority of our people, as against the greedy ambitions of the few. From what we get out of this partnership we hope to be able to expand the health facilities for our people, to give them more and better educational institutions and to see to it that their housing conditions are improved and that they have a steadily rising standard of living. This is, in a nutshell, what Ghana expects to achieve from our socialist objectives. I am sure, in these circumstances, Mr. President, that you could appreciate the aims and aspirations of Ghana. It seems to me, however, that a large section of the American Press either does not understand our way of life, or is unwilling to appreciate the changing scene in Africa. This section of the Press continues to indulge in scurrilous and unjustified attacks, not only on the policies of my Government, but also on me personally. As long as this continues, we can be sure that a kind of Press warfare between Ghana and the United States will continue to be an embarrassment to our two Governments. In the interests of good relations between Ghana and the United States, I, Mr. President, will do whatever in my power lies to ensure that Party papers follow courses which will improve the relationship between our two countries. Mr. President, I have attempted to write as frankly as I can to let you appreciate Ghana's position. I hope I have been able to indicate that all we wish to do in Ghana is to establish a happy and prosperous State for the good of our people. In this endeavour, all that we wish to do in Ghana, which I know you, Mr. President, generally support, is to establish a happy, prosperous and stable State for our people. In this endeavour we expect nothing but understanding and goodwill from our friends. I am asking my Ambassador, Mr. M.A. Ribeiro, to deliver this message to you personally. Wishing you and Mrs. Johnson continued health and happiness, and with my most sincere and respectful regards,
244. Telegram From the Embassy in Ghana to the Department of State/1/ Accra, March 2, 1964, 5 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 GHANA. Confidential. 717. Talked nearly hour with Nkrumah this morning, opening with presentation along lines my instructions./2/ I stated I had two conversations with President Johnson, was speaking on his behalf. President and other top officials regard relations between USG and GOG as in grave condition. Nkrumah interrupted to say he also regarded situation as serious. I said American Government and people tending believe GOG does not wish maintain even tolerable relations with US and point to accusations of rumor-mongering, demonstrations, deportation American professors. /2/Reference is apparently to a cable based on a February 27 memorandum from Williams to Harriman, which outlined points to be made by Mahoney in his talk with Nkrumah. (Ibid., POL GHANA-US) With respect rumor-mongering, I said everyone in Ghana had heard rumors. Ironically, I had cautioned staff on two occasions re repeating them and had expressed doubt their truthfulness. Nkrumah said he appreciated this. Mentioned he was particularly upset about rumors now going around re his perfectly healthy baby, that it "half animal, half human." I said every figure in public life subjected to rumor, though these latter below contempt. I was sure American community discreet. Re demonstration, I said it clearly government-inspired. CPP were acting officially and workers brigade of course directly under GOG. Nkrumah tried to excuse CPP action as "independent enthusiasm," but said now that Ghana has one-party system CPP is same as government. He conceded there no excuse for workers brigade. I pointed out he might as well have had police demonstrating. He did not dissent, said there were two Cabinet members present but they just curiosity seekers. Re deportations, I said GOG had right dismiss anyone it chose. We not trying to tell GOG what to do. But manner in which GOG acted was unfriendly. I had checked background of men in Washington and none had ever been even remotely connected with USG intelligence. I then described feeling of American Congress and people, pointed out President subject to public opinion. If situation continued, we could not continue what we were doing here. Nkrumah agreed that something must be done. He referred to editorial in Los Angeles paper which he said "recommended assassination." I deplored editorial but said we had free press, and that hostile feeling of press was consequence of Ghanaian press and Ghanaian activity. Nkrumah agreed that nothing could be done about US press and that it would improve when Ghanaian attitudes improved. He asked me whether I had noticed Ghanaian press on my return. I said I had; it was better. He claimed it would take time but would change even more, said he had issued instructions against any broad attacks. I made point that merely shifting attacks UK and Free World was unsatisfactory. He argued that he cannot renounce his principles, must oppose South Africa and UK action in southern Rhodesia. But said from now on attacks will be specific and he will maintain greater control. He said by way of example he was meeting with press immediately after our conversation and would tell them to stop using "Hitler" and "Nazi"; will call Verwoerd's performance a form of fascism. I stressed view Ghanaian press is Soviet-Bloc enterprise. Bloc almost never criticized. We not seeking such criticism but Bloc must make mistake on some occasion. I gave African student incident in Moscow as example, saying that although it was front page news all over world it suppressed here. Nkrumah became riled at this point (for only time during discussion), though he had nothing to say in rebuttal. He commented that he was planning to maintain closer control over students in Soviet Bloc countries and described mission he has sent to set up CPP branch parties among students in Bloc. Emphasized this will give him control. Said when he first proposed doing this, Soviets strongly objected but he threatened pull students out and Soviets finally agreed. (Note: CPP official setting up branches is notorious pro-Communist Kweku Akwei.) Nkrumah digressed to discuss his growing concern at extent corruption in Ghanaian public life. Gave example of man he now trying to catch up with who had substantial sum of money deposited abroad. Said European--but not UK or US--firms made practice of signing contracts for Ghana pounds 3 when worth only Ghana pounds 1, paying off GOG officials. He said he announcing seven-year plan soon and will make policy statement against corruption. I then told Nkrumah I would like to take up question of CIA. He said he was glad I brought up matter; he had mentioned CIA in letter sent via Ribeiro to President Johnson. I told him I had discussed possibility of letter with President Johnson and that latter would welcome it. I said [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] that I am in full control of all US Government activities in Ghana. I could assure him without hesitation that during my incumbency absolutely nothing has been done by any US agency which could be construed in any way as being directed against him or his government. Nkrumah replied with words to effect "I will take your word for it," [11-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]. I repeated that there had been no conceivable activity on our part to subvert or overthrow him. I pointed out how inconsistent our entire aid effort, aimed at assisting and strengthening his government, is with wild accusations in Ghanaian press that US acting against him. I added that, speaking frankly, our main intelligence effort is to keep an eye on his Soviet and Chinese friends, whose activities are really large scale. I added that it was common over world that good part of so-called Soviet diplomatic personnel were actually intelligence agents. Nkrumah replied he understood this to be so and keeps eye on them himself. Nkrumah brought up matter of his "socialism." Saying that Western press always jumps down his throat when he mentions socialism. He claimed that he was not talking about Soviet or Chinese forms of socialism, but about Ghana's own type of socialism developed from Ghana's communal traditions. His socialism is evolutionary, not revolutionary, and specifically provides for private sector and foreign investment. I commented that just as he resented attacks on his socialism, we resent his press's uniform condemnation of capitalism, which has changed radically in recent decades. Nkrumah replied that he understood changed nature of capitalism, and said that present economic system of US might better be termed "enlightened capitalism." Nkrumah agreed with me that we had not talked enough. I said that although I did not wish to burden him, we should get together at regular intervals, so that we could be in touch and be in position to iron out difficulties before they are acute and led to public embarrassment. I suggested semi-monthly meetings and urged him to call me on any occasion. Nkrumah agreed with alacrity to idea of regular meetings, even throwing out idea that we might meet weekly. I told him that we ought try semi-monthly meetings at first and see how they worked out. We left it that I would telephone his secretary twice each month for specific time. In course of conversation, Nkrumah mentioned that he planned to move back to Flagstaff House soon. Speaking of Chou En-lai visit, he volunteered that joint communique had caused him great difficulty, and that Soviet had "come down hard" on him for it. He said that now he is having trouble with his friend Tito and that it seems impossible to please everyone. As I took my leave I repeated that I must say in all candor that President Johnson and my government regard relations between our countries as grave. I had not given up; I had come back to make honest effort to improve relations. Nkrumah agreed that we should make every effort. As we parted he gave me copy of his letter to President Johnson (dated Feb 26; telegraphed separately)/3/ and bottle of rum and bitters which he had received from Prime Minister Williams of Trinidad. /3/See Document 243. Comment: 1. Nkrumah was as friendly as I have ever seen him. Only new element was tendency speak very rapidly, making him at times hard to understand. He seemed extremely anxious to please. It was evident from conversation that he realizes some eating of crow necessary. He in fact did so to some extent. 2. He is aware of and concerned by serious state of our relations, although he seems to feel an upward turn has already begun. 3. He has made and will probably continue to make efforts to moderate his press. Although I have no illusions that Nkrumah has basically changed, I believe that likelihood of a period of tolerable peace, of unknown duration, has been strengthened by our conversation. 4. Our personal relationship has been warmed and an opportunity created for more helpful talks. 5. Beginning has been made in effort to dispel some of Nkrumah's misconstructions on role of CIA. Will follow-up. 6. Pressure should be kept up. Washington could contribute by parallel talk with Ribeiro. Mahoney
245. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, March 11, 1964, 12:30 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL GHANA-US. Confidential. Drafted by Williams. Approved in M on March 14 and in the White House on March 18. A March 11 briefing memorandum from Brubeck to the President states that Ribeiro was to give the President the February 26 letter from Nkrumah (Document 243). (Johnson Library, National Security File, Bundy Files, "B") SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS President Johnson greeted Ambassador Ribeiro very warmly and throughout the meeting treated him with great cordiality. Ambassador Ribeiro for his part was also cordial. President Johnson began the interview by saying he was extremely interested in good relations between our two countries. We have the same objectives. We want to give respect and be respected. He continued that he was concerned about the feeling in Ghana [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. He said this matter had been carefully investigated and that he would be very happy to consider any examples of such conduct the Ghanaians might bring to his attention. [1 line of source text not declassified] He told Ribeiro that if President Nkrumah had any questions or problems he should see Ambassador Mahoney right away. President Johnson then said he was asking Governor Harriman to make a visit to Ghana. He expanded at some length on his confidence in Governor Harriman, saying he had settled more disputes than any other American. Ribeiro asked when Governor Harriman would leave. The Under Secretary replied that he would leave March 19th, spend a day in London where he wanted to discuss East African problems, and then fly to Ghana. Ribeiro was very pleased that Harriman was going to visit Ghana. He said Nkrumah knows Harriman personally and they would be able to "exchange secrets." Ribeiro pointed out that Nkrumah was worried about the unfriendly attitude evidenced by certain American citizens [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. He said that before he left for Ghana he was assured by both Governor Harriman and Governor Williams that [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. He said that Nkrumah believed what Harriman and Williams had told him but nevertheless felt there were some U.S. citizens who were opposed to him. Ribeiro said that Ambassador Mahoney's fresh assurances were important to Nkrumah and the suggestion that they meet periodically to settle any problems was an important move. He added that Ambassador Mahoney was highly regarded, particularly by President Nkrumah who had "profound respect" for him. Ribeiro went on to say these incidents had arisen because of Ghana's suspicion of certain American citizens. He said the matter had been fomented by the press but that the press was now under control. If the U.S. press were reasonable there would be no more such occurrences. The President pointed out that he knew of the commitments that Nkrumah had made to Kennedy and said, "I want you to live up to them, and we will live up to our commitments." He again assured Ribeiro of our good will toward Ghana. He asked that Ambassador Ribeiro see that Harriman had a good visit. Ribeiro said that he wanted to raise one more thing which was most disturbing, and that was Senator Dodd's "witch hunting."
246. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ghana/1/ Washington, March 17, 1964, 11:01 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15-1 US/JOHNSON. Confidential; Limdis. Drafted at the White House, cleared by Dorros, and approved for transmission by Marion A. Baldwin of S/S. 541. Request you deliver before March 21 to President Nkrumah the following message from President: Verbatim Text "Dear Mr. President Your Ambassador has conveyed to me your letter of February 26, 1964,/2/ and we discussed it in the same spirit of frankness in which it was written. It is my sincere hope that you and I will be able to create together the same kind of open and direct relationship you had with President Kennedy. I appreciate your expression of regret over the recent incidents in Accra, and your affirmation of nonalignment as the policy of your Government. /2/Documents 243 and 245. In turn, may I assure you that there is no basis in fact for the allegation that the CIA is carrying on subversive activities in Ghana or attempting to impair the good relations between our governments. If at any time you should have further doubts on this score, I would like you to communicate directly with me. We fully share your desire to see Ghana prosperous, stable, and independent, and our policy towards Ghana has from the start been directed toward working with you to attain these goals. We fully understand your policy that in achieving these objectives Ghana is determined to remain unaligned in its relations with other countries. We concur that foreign private investment can be of crucial help to Ghana's economic progress both now and in the years to come. As you know, we are contributing as a Government and as private citizens to the development of Ghana. We are therefore naturally deeply concerned when these positive efforts are jeopardized by actions and propaganda that serve no apparent purpose other than to damage our relations. A great deal remains to be done if we are to establish the climate of mutual respect and understanding that is essential if we are to work together in friendship and good will. I am sure you will agree with the importance of this task. In this connection, I have asked Governor Averell Harriman to visit Accra for discussions with you. I am also pleased that Ambassador Mahoney, who has my complete confidence, will be seeing you regularly for frank talks about common problems. I should like to take this opportunity to extend to you and to the people of Ghana my sincere good wishes and those of the people of the United States for happiness and prosperity as your country enters the seventh year of its independence. Sincerely, Lyndon B. Johnson" End Text. Rusk
247. Telegram From the Embassy in Ghana to the Department of State/1/ Accra, March 23, 1964, 8:30 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 US/HARRIMAN. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Passed to the White House. 791. For the President and Secretary from Harriman. Ambassador is dispatching memo of conversations with Nkrumah totaling about three hours plus lunch./2/ We went over in detail his policies for Ghana, problems in our relations, attitude towards Volta project and private investment. Most effective part which was confirmed by Robert Jackson/3/ was my insistence that he had personal responsibility and power to see that project was success not only in maintaining atmosphere in which US citizens could work in Ghana but image conveyed through his press and other activities which built up public and political opposition to him and Ghana. I stated this would require constant and frank two-way exchange between him and Ambassador and also between him and President Johnson. He assured us he would accept personal responsibility and I could give President his complete assurances. We believe there is reasonable chance he will keep this assurance at least tolerable minimum providing but only providing we keep his feet to the fire. /2/Telegram 793 from Accra, March 24, reported Harriman's talk with Nkrumah in detail. (Ibid., POL GHANA-US) Mahoney commented on the meeting in telegram 794 from Accra, March 25. (Ibid., POL 7 US/HARRIMAN) /3/Robert Jackson, a director of the U.N. Special Fund, was a former adviser to Nkrumah. This means continued hard work by Ambassador and a series of effective Presidential emissaries and visitors. Robert Jackson's quarterly visits are most useful account his eight years of intimate association. Kaiser must come more frequently. There is no doubt that his leanings are to the left and he pays more attention to his leftist advisers. However, he has many well-trained government officials who help put brakes on to some extent. He is awed with socialist doctrine although when I pointed out Communist failures in agriculture and otherwise and that British and all European socialist leaders were becoming much more pragmatic in policy, it seemed to sink in a bit. I assured him we accepted non-alignment but only true non-alignment. What we could not accept was in fact support of Communist Bloc through his press and otherwise. We discussed African unity and he stressed freedom for all Africa. I explained we accepted Wilson's position that freedom was indivisible referring not just to Africa but elsewhere, particularly Eastern Europe still enslaved by Moscow. He took this without argument, admitted Moscow had been imperialist but felt Khrushchev was changing, becoming even pragmatic on economic matters whereas China was still rabidly doctrinaire. These generalities may be superfluous to our problems but I believe some one has to keep hammering him. Jackson reports he is encouraged by his and my visit but forecasts difficult financial period ahead account imbalanced budget and continued foreign payments deficit. He expects inflation and drastic import restrictions with resultant economic difficulties. As Ghana is basically rich he expects it to pull through in time. Also cocoa price increase from depressed level would be helpful. Work on the DW impressive and resettlement of some 60,000 persons to be flooded out is progressing rapidly and competently. Relations between Volta authority, Italian contractor and Kaiser are excellent and so far government has put up all funds as required to fulfill its commitments. Canadian Chief Executive Dobson says he has good working relations with Nkrumah and is satisfied he will have his continued support. In sum, Nkrumah has been on his good behavior during my visit and it will require constant effort and skill to prevent too many and too deep relapses. There is, of course, no fundamental change in his beliefs. Ambassador concurs. Mahoney
248. Summary Record of the 526th Meeting of the National Security Council/1/ Washington April 3, 1964, 2 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings File, Vol. I, Tab 7, 4/3/64, Various Topics (Panama, etc.). Top Secret. Congressional Leaders--Various Subjects/2/ /2/McCone recorded the meeting in an April 3 memorandum for the record. (Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-B01285A, Box 2, DCI (McCone) Memo for the Record, 01 Jan-5 Apr 64) [Here follows discussion not related to Ghana.] The President then introduced Under Secretary Harriman to summarize his recent trip to Africa. (A copy of Harriman's report to the President is attached. It contains a detailed account which he summarized at the meeting.) [Here follows discussion not related to Ghana.] Mr. Harriman then turned to the situation in Ghana. He reviewed the past of the Volta Dam project and the Kaiser Aluminum plant which is being built to use power produced by the dam. The dam is half finished. The lake is filling and some 60,000 people are being moved out of the flooded area. Nkrumah has left this operation alone and has not so far interfered with its progress. It is about a year ahead of schedule. The dam will cost $200 million. The U.S. has made a $30 million loan on the dam, has guaranteed the $100 million Kaiser investment against expropriation and has loaned money to Kaiser to assist in financing his plant. Mr. Harriman said that Nkrumah was moving to the left. He is afraid of assassination and blames the U.S. and the U.K. for his troubles. He is turning to the East in an effort to gain support. He appears to be heading toward a personal dictatorship somewhat comparable to that of Tito. Mr. Harriman recommended strongly that we continue our support of the Volta project. We cannot stop now because the project is half finished and liquidation would mean loss of our standing and of the money so far invested. There is a reasonable chance that the project will pay out. It is best for us to carry it through. The World Bank is prepared to continue its support. Our policy should be to keep Nkrumah under continual pressure. [Here follows discussion not related to Ghana.] Senator Dirksen asked whether other nations had large investments in Ghana. Mr. Harriman replied that the U.K. had large and expanding investments there. Senator Dirksen asked about press reports of attacks on four U.S. professors in Ghana. Mr. Harriman and Mr. Bell replied that six professors had been fired from a university, four of them were Americans. This was done by Nkrumah who felt that the professors were indoctrinating the students with false ideas. Involved also is the issue of academic control of the university. [Here follows discussion not related to Ghana.]
249. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Harriman) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, April 3, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Ghana, Vol. II, Cables, 3/64-2/66. Secret. SUBJECT Nkrumah is leading Ghana towards what he calls African Socialism which is, in fact, a personal dictatorship. He is impelled by his own proclivities as well as personal fear resulting from his two close call assassination attempts. He suspects almost everybody, even the CIA. This affects his actions domestically and his attitude towards the U.S. He is driven on by his own conceit, blaming others, internally or foreign, for his own failures. The effect is that he has assumed more and more power into his own hands, leans more and more on a small group of leftists who applaud this trend, and cuts himself off from those who oppose. He has developed a one-party political system, in itself not uncommon in Africa, but in Ghana this has meant imprisoning many of his opponents, controlling the press, and recently the courts. All of this trend may project an eventual Tito type dictatorship, with the State assuming all political and economic direction or ownership. However, there are still forces at work within the country which may stem this trend and at least leave the Valco operation uninterfered with. The University is still independent to a considerable degree and run by a forceful Irishman. The students oppose State interference. There is a large and prosperous small farmer production of cocoa, and the historic village owned and individually farmed general agriculture. There is a body of independent women marketers who exert strong political pressures. The Army is Western-oriented although so far it has stayed out of politics. The civil servants are also largely Western-oriented and resist as far as they can this trend. Nkrumah himself has repeatedly stated that foreign private capital is essential to Ghana's development. He realizes also that foreign private capital is in short supply to meet the needs of the developing nations and therefore must be catered to. His speech outlining the new seven year plan proposed development of a mixed economy with agriculture largely in private hands and "for some time to come" the need for large foreign private investments to develop industry. In my conversation with him he assured me "for some time to come" related only to the period of need to attract new private foreign capital and was not intended to limit the time companies investing could remain. "Kaiser," he said, "can stay as long as he wants--50 or 100 years." The success of the seven-year plan as presented clearly requires several hundred million dollars of new foreign private investment. He has strong personal feelings for a few individuals as in the case of President Kennedy and also such men as Edgar Kaiser. Although he is the Chairman of the Volta River Authority, he has supported the Canadian Executive Director--Dobson. The operation has been well directed and the government has fulfilled all of its obligations so far, including putting up its share of the money as needed, more than 50%. There is no financial default on the part of the government which would be a cause for the World Bank, Export Import Bank or AID to stop their financing. President George Woods has stated to me that he sees up until now no basis for the Bank to discontinue payments under its commitment. The Valco, Kaiser's company, is committed to take a large percentage of the power development by 1966 which necessitates the commencement of work in Ghana and the ordering of machinery this summer. The principal difficulties we are having are the abuse of the U.S. Government, UK, and other Western powers, and the praise for Communist countries in the press, and the recent demonstrations before our Embassy. Also the arbitrary ejection from the country of U.S. and other Western individuals. The leftist trend may augur increasing difficulties. On the other hand, the frank talks by Edgar Kaiser and Ambassador Mahoney, as well as my own, have shown some results in tempering the press and treatment of our Embassy and U.S. citizens. Nkrumah has responded to these personal representations for a time at least. The financial situation of the country is getting into increasing difficulties as a result of an unbalanced budget and adverse balance of payments. There will be increasing inflation and payment difficulties which will necessitate severe import controls. These difficulties may force Nkrumah to turn to the I.M.F. for assistance. Bloc assistance does not usually help in this type of financial crisis. On balance, I recommend we continue our participation in the Volta Project. However, we should constantly watch the situation and plan a campaign of visitors to Accra to bring pressure on Nkrumah whenever his actions indicate they will cause us difficulty./2/ Edgar Kaiser is probably the most effective individual. Sir Robert Jackson, now with the UN Special Fund, visits Accra periodically and has a long-time relationship. Visits of other influential people should be planned to support the Ambassador's vigilant pressures. /2/Harriman met with Johnson that day at the White House. According to an April 3 NSC memorandum of the meeting, the President agreed with Harriman's recommendation to keep pressure on Nkrumah through a series of visitors. (Ibid., Bundy Files, Vol. I) The Valco could well be successful in its production and export even if other foreign operations are not. Nkrumah will need the income from the power purchases by Valco to pay off the international debt of the project. It would be impossible for him to operate and sell the aluminum as a Ghanaian government operation, and it would not be easy to attract bloc investment. With Nkrumah's desire for close personal relations with you and his respect for certain other individuals, I feel there is a reasonable chance that his attitude and activities towards the U.S. Government and Valco can be held within liveable limits. The decision today is not whether to embark on the investment in the Volta project, but whether to continue with our commitment. I am convinced that there is more to lose in backing out now than in going ahead./3/ If we back out now, we will not only lose the money already expended or irreversibly committed but also the confidence of many African and other developing nations. /3/An April 15 memorandum from Brubeck to the President recommended that he approve Harriman's proposal "that we continue participation in Volta and Valco, along with a program of visits and other means to keep Nkrumah under reasonable control." An attached note, undated, states that the President had approved the recommendation, and a handwritten note on Brubeck's memorandum states that the Department of State was informed on April 17. (Ibid., International Meetings and Travel File, Africa-Harriman Trip-3/64) The dam which I inspected is well along, with mountains of earth and rock moved. Some 60,000 people are being displaced by the enormous lake, which will begin to be filled this summer. New more modern villages are being built for them and people are beginning to move in. To stop now would leave an international eyesore. Although little work so far has been done on the Valco project, it is in fact an integral part of the whole project. The company has a fixed contract to take a large block of power. Incidentally if Valco should not go ahead the soundness of the international investment will be jeopardized. On the other hand, I believe there is a reasonable chance of carrying the entire project through successfully. Averell [Next documents] Volume XXIV Index | Historian's Office | Department of State |
