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218. Memorandum From Edward Hamilton of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow)/1/ Washington, September 12, 1966. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Hamilton Files, Arms Control for Africa. Secret. WWR: SUBJECT /2/A handwritten notation on the source text reads: "E.H./Interesting. What does AF & Red Duggan think? WR." As you well know, prospects for U.S. influence in Africa are cloudy. Level-headedness on black/white issues is likely to resemble indifference. Economic progress will be slow at best. As we continue--and rightly--to devote the largest share of our foreign aid to Asia and Latin America, charges that Africa is of second-class interest to us will become louder. Of course, we are not without answers. I won't linger over our assets: strong commitment to racial equality, substantial aid, expanding private investment, influence with the metropoles and international organizations, etc. But I don't mean to dismiss them. (As you know, I believe that we can steer a course around the most serious traps in Africa.) My thought is to add to those assets, and at the same time to make progress on a very worrisome problem--the dissemination of sophisticated weaponry throughout the continent. The Arms Problem It is a well-established myth that there are no arms races in Africa. In fact, arms "contests" have already helped to create a number of very volatile situations--e.g., Ethiopia-Somalia, Morocco-Algeria, Tunisia-Algeria. We have tried to hold weapons deliveries to $25 million--mostly to Ethiopia, Congo, Libya, and Morocco--but even that amount, together with our weapons sales and the much larger Soviet and Chinese programs, results in visible increases in the likelihood and scale of potential conflict. Just as important, sophisticated weapons encourage diversion of pitifully scarce local resources to unproductive military uses. We know--and the Soviets almost certainly agree on the merits--that supplying sophisticated weapons to African countries is absurd from a security point of view and very dangerous politics. (See attached cable--which arrived as I was dictating this--reporting that the Soviet Ambassador to Somalia has suggested to our Ambassador a "Gentlemen's Agreement" banning arms to Ethiopia and Somalia.)/3/ The Chinese don't agree, but their recent reversals have rendered them less important. Moreover, all other things being equal, the Soviets would probably prefer to buy their influence with economic aid if they could be convinced that we weren't stealing a march on them in the military area. /3/Telegram 596 from Mogadiscio, September 9; not printed. See footnote 2, Document 315. An Arms Control Initiative Suppose, in this context, that the President were to announce a policy of "Safe Conduct for Development" in Africa. Its elements might be the following: --U.S. support for an African disarmament conference to develop arms control rules and techniques for enforcing them. (Tanzanian President Nyerere has already mentioned such a conference publicly; with some encouragement, he might formally propose it. It would be important that the proposal come first from an African leader.) --Quiet exploration with the Soviets of an agreement to limit arms exports to Africa--excluding the UAR--to small arms. Inspection might be done by the UN. --Efforts to get the major countries of Europe to join in putting pressure on the OAU to sponsor the conference and whip its members into line. --A hard line on the U.S. or World Bank economic aid to countries who refuse to join and continue to waste scarce resources on arms. If this approach worked, it might be a model for similar pushes in the rest of the less developed world. If it didn't, we would have lost very little in a worthy cause. In either event, it would drive home the President's continuing interest in Africa, add another strand to his peace posture, and dramatize his determination to focus on the real problems of the poor countries. Most important in the short run, it would give us a policy basis for refusing requests for further military aid, which multiply daily. Procedure Three possibilities: 1. An immediate Presidential offer to adopt such a policy--perhaps in the UN speech. 2. An entirely private proposal to the Russians of a "Gentlemen's Agreement" on a few specific countries. 3. A low-key attempt to get Nyerere, Houphouet-Boigny, Kenyatta, and others to call for a disarmament conference, together with a quiet approach to the Russians seeking agreement to support it--or at least not to oppose it. On balance, I would favor the last of these, followed by a Presidential announcement of our support of the conference proposal. The Africans can be expected to be a bit nervous and suspicious of this enterprise; it will help a great deal if the initiative comes from among their own ranks. More important, their depth of commitment is the basic determinant of success or failure. Whatever route were chosen, the present arms recipients--particularly Haile Selassie--should have some warning and opportunity for reaction. (For an interesting report of HIM's view of the Nyerere speech, see the attached cable from Korry.)/4/ /4/Telegram 1022 from Addis Ababa, September 11; not printed. Timing The sooner the better, particularly if we move to your line on non-proliferation language. This proposal would be a perfect handmaiden./5/ /5/On September 15, Hamilton sent a follow-up memorandum to Rostow noting that he had talked to Acting Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Wayne Fredericks who was enthusiastic about the arms control idea provided the Africans proposed it initially. Fredericks suggested sending a special emissary who was trusted by the Africans to talk quietly to a few key heads of state. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Hamilton Files, Arms Control for Africa) EH
219. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ SecDel/MC/34 New York, September 24, 1966, 1:15 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL AFR-US. Confidential. Drafted by Alec G. Toumayan and Harry R. Melone, and approved in S on October 4. The conversation was held at the Waldorf Towers in New York. SECRETARY'S DELEGATION TO THE TWENTY FIRST-SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS Ketema Yifru, Foreign Minister, Ethiopia Speaking for the other Africans present, Joseph Murumbi thanked the Secretary for his statements indicating that the US would support African countries in working toward solutions for their problems and in aiding them. African problems were of world-wide dimensions and threats to Africa were threats to the free world. Africa needed the aid of Governments like the American Government. In reply, the Secretary stated that the contention that Vietnam is occupying American attention to such a degree that the US was disinterested in the rest of the world was not true. President Johnson had made it clear that the US was concerned with the problems of Africa and the question central to American thinking was what do the people primarily concerned think about the situation in their own country. This was a simple and fundamental reaction of the American people. Ambassador Goldberg had enunciated American views on Rhodesia and South West Africa and the Secretary wished to repeat that the US would never agree to a situation where a few thousand white men could dominate four million Africans. The problem was not reaching agreement on the nature of the issue but rather on how to arrive at the result we seek. The US had a definite interest in security, the independence and the prosperity of every country represented at the table. On the question of independence of African countries, Africans would always find the US ready to support them. Turning to Vietnam, the Secretary stated that a country can work for a solution within the framework of the Geneva Agreements of 1954 and 1962 and retain its non-aligned position since both sides have claimed the desire for a settlement based on the Geneva Agreements. The efforts of the US and other countries to bring an end to the conflict by negotiation had no parallel in history. It was very disappointing to see Hanoi and Peking denounce Ambassador Goldberg's speech as a swindle. The Secretary wished fully to assure the Ministers that the US would say "yes" to any reasonable settlement that could be devised by the minds of men. Returning to Africa, the Secretary said there was a tendency for great powers to play games in a continent where there were only new governments. As far as the US was concerned, it would always strive for African solutions to African problems. It would also support the authentic voice of Africa wherever heard. It was not important that there be 100% agreement between governments but governments should try to control the extent of their disagreement so that it would be possible to build on existing agreements. Liberian Secretary of State Grimes stated he and his colleagues had come to convince American officials of the real problems of Africa. He was thinking not only of problems like South West Africa and Rhodesia, but more generally, of all those the central issue of which was man's inhumanity to man. Africans could sympathize with the American problem in Vietnam only insofar as they saw a marriage of opinion between it and African problems. That is, if the principle of self-determination in South Vietnam was also applied to the non-self-governing peoples of Africa. The Secretary replied that there should be no difficulty there so far as US policies were concerned but that the US was extremely reluctant to use force. It wanted to make sure every avenue to peaceful settlement was explored. The US had sustained 170,000 casualties since 1945 on behalf of the independence of other countries, and the US there wanted to makes every effort for a peaceful settlement. For the first tine in history the expression "the survival of mankind" was a very real problem for governments. In American minds, the central question in both Vietnam and Africa was what do the parties concerned think about the situation. The US felt that the fact that there was no future in South Africa's present attitude must be impressed upon the South African Government, but the time factor was such that Rhodesia was a more urgent problem and the situation there must be stopped in its first stage. Replying to the comment that Africa was running out of patience, the Secretary stated that Africa did not have a monopoly on this problem. It was a fact that a permanent solution to the German question had not yet been found, something which had cost the US an enormous amount [in] 1947. The Cuban question created an intolerable situation within the Western hemisphere giving rise to a great temptation to resort to violence. The Kashmir conflict between India and Pakistan was not resolved and no one dared suggest the use of violence to resolve it. Recourse to violence was extremely disagreeable and must be avoided wherever possible. The Secretary said the US had brought great pressure to bear on South Africa to the point that US influence was feeble and relations tenuous. The US probably had more influence in Dar es Salaam than in Pretoria. Tanzanian Minister Mgonja commented that despite its proclamations, the US had a military alliance with Portugal. The Secretary said that five years ago US interest in the Azores base might have been important but with today's long range aircraft the usefulness of the Azores was now minimal and the US was not bargaining with Portugal on that. Sudanese Deputy Prime Minister el Mufti remarked that there was a general sentiment in Africa that the US was not really interested in the continent or it would aid the under-developed countries more and assist the non-free areas to gain their independence. Ambassador Nabrit stated that he thought President Johnson had very clearly emphasized in his May speech on Africa where the weight and influence of the US was to be found. The Secretary of State had indicated on many occasions the guide lines of US policy but the US was limited in what it could do in the world. There was no doubt that the weight and influence and opinion of the American Government and people were solidly with the movement for African independence. Amb. Nabrit said Governments had certain objectives in terms of their own interests but in the day-to-day conduct of international relations they were limited by reasons beyond their control. In the cases of Rhodesia, South Africa and South West Africa, there was no doubt that the US resolutely opposed apartheid, opposed the manner in which South Africa treats its people, believed the International Court of Justice decision was wrong and that African peoples had equal right to a place in the sun. US beliefs, however, must operate within the limitations of what was possible and if the US did not act as Africans would like to have it act, Africa must nonetheless believe that the US wanted full freedom for Africa, that it was not separated from it, and that by cooperating with it Africans would find the US at their side. There was no magic by which the US had managed to escape the limitations imposed on all countries. Vice President Murumbi said that while Rhodesia was a British problem the US should go beyond this as Prime Minister Wilson recognized. Africans did not seek to expel the European population because as had been learned in Kenya, European and African populations needed each other. The Secretary concluded by mentioning the internal difficulties the US faced. If President Johnson last year had presented a program of economic sanctions against Rhodesia to Congress it would have been defeated. Those opposed to the US civil rights program and those who, because some British vessels have entered Haiphong, were against cooperation with the United Kingdom and the United Nations, would have opposed it. President Johnson was far ahead of Congress in his attitude toward Rhodesia. The US would continue to do its best.
220. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, October 3, 1966, 6:30 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Histories, President's Speech on 3rd Anniversary of OAU, 5/26/66. No classification marking. SUBJECT As you know, the Korry Report/2/ suggested two kinds of initiatives: a broader role for the World Bank in Africa, and a number of modifications of U.S. bilateral programs. The following summarizes the state of play on each front. At Tab A, for your signature, is a proposed NSAM--explained below--to carry out the changes in bilateral programs. /2/Document 215. World Bank Position You will recall that George Woods reacted very favorably to the Korry ideas. He agreed in August to discuss them with the African Finance Ministers at the Bank/Fund meetings (September 26-30) if, in the meanwhile, we got the major Europeans to support the proposals. After some groundwork at lower levels, Livingston Merchant went to Europe early in September to solicit help. The results were: (1) enthusiastic support from the U.K., Italy and Canada; (2) a flat turndown from France; (3) inconclusive replies from Germany and Belgium. Woods did in fact raise the proposals in a general way with the African Finance Ministers last week. There was not enough time to get a solid feel for their reactions. Well try to get Woods to follow up as quickly as possible. We also plan further approaches to the Europeans, particularly Germany. Bilateral Program Changes Bill Gaud and Joe Palmer have agreed to receive the attached NSAM./3/ It has also been cleared on the Seventh Floor. Essentially, the NSAM asks State to set up a procedure for reviewing and carrying out each recommendation--absent a compelling case against it--by December 1. It also specifically requires State to consult with the other agencies concerned, and instructs my office to monitor the operation. I think it will do the job. /3/See Document 221. Walt
221. National Security Action Memorandum No. 356/1/ Washington, October 5, 1966. /1/Source: Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM 356. Confidential. TO SUBJECT I have approved Ambassador Korry's Report in principle. Steps are already underway to carry out the several recommendations which involve an enlarged role in Africa for the World Bank. The Secretary of State--together with the AID Administrator--is authorized to take whatever additional actions are appropriate to this end. I would like the Department of State to take primary responsibility in developing an action program to carry out the Report's other recommendations. I would hope that this program would be in effect by December 1. It should include steps for the implementation of each recommendation unless the Secretary of State finds that a particular recommendation is inappropriate or unsound, or that alternative steps would be preferable. I would like the Administrator of AID to work closely with the Secretary of State or his designate in developing this program. Other agencies should be fully consulted on those recommendations which are of direct concern to them. I have asked Walt Rostow to serve as White House liaison for this effort. In view of the sensitive nature of many aspects of the Korry Report, it should not be made public, nor should its recommendations or plans for its implementation be released to the press except upon the explicit instructions of the Secretary of State. Lyndon B. Johnson
222. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Katzenbach to President Johnson/1/ Washington, December 17, 1966. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Hamilton Files, Korry Report on African Development Policy & Programs. Confidential. SUBJECT Following your approval in principle of the Korry Report last August, and pursuant to NSAM 356 of October 5, 1966, the Secretary of State designated Assistant Secretary Joseph Palmer to develop a program of action to carry out the Korry Report recommendations. Mr. Palmer and his staff undertook extensive consultations within the State Department, with AID and with the other ten Departments and Agencies to whom the NSAM was addressed. All these Agencies carefully reviewed the Report and gave Mr. Palmer their views on the recommendations of direct concern to each of them. He also kept in close touch with Mr. Walt W. Rostow and his staff As a result, we now have an "action program" on each of the forty-two recommendations in the Korry Report (Enclosed)./2/ Where there was disagreement with the specifics of many of Ambassador Korry's recommendations, an alternative course of action has been agreed to and a program to carry it out has also been approved. Many of these programs are already under way. Others will now be able to proceed along the approved course of action. /2/Not printed. For the Korry Report, see Document 215. There was broad agreement with Ambassador Korry's proposed strategy and the essential elements of his Report. These could be characterized as follows: --Development and strengthening of multilateral donor coordination mechanisms for dealing with African development; --Concentration of assistance to Africa on functional sectors of fundamental importance and on programs around which regional and sub-regional institutions and activities can be built or reinforced in such fields as infrastructure development, agriculture, education and health; --Stimulation of increased U.S. private investment in Africa: --Concentration of major economic development assistance in those countries where it can be utilized most effectively, and reliance on regional and multilateral organizations and methods as our primary means for development support elsewhere; --A modest annual increase in AID development assistance to Africa, as well as an increase in the total resources available to the IDA so that it can also increase assistance to Africa; --A revision of AID procedures for its work in Africa; --Participation in an effective international cocoa agreement; --Support for arms limitation and control in Africa. While all of the individual action programs should be considered together as a new approach to African development, we wish to draw your attention to certain of them which are of particular interest and are described in the immediately underlying enclosure. Follow-Up At the end of each action program, we have noted the agency which has follow-up responsibility for that program. In keeping with the spirit of NSAM 356, the Secretary of State will report to you again on the status of the major action programs at the end of March 1967 and then as regularly thereafter as he deems advisable to keep you fully informed of how we have implemented the Korry Report. Now that the review of assistance policies and programs in Africa, which you called for last May, has been carried out, we plan urgently to address the question of public presentation of the results. Such presentation must take account of several distinctly different audiences: the recipient African nations, interested European and other donor countries, the United States Congress and the American public. We need to describe how this combination of actions will maximize our responsiveness to expressed African needs, while contributing to orderly economic and social development and serving U.S. national interests. We shall inform you no later than January 1967 of how these courses of action can best be presented to other nations and to the American Congress and public. Nicholas deB Katzenbach
223. Memorandum From Halvor O. Ekern of the Operations Staff, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, to the Director of the Operations Staff (McAfee)/1/ Washington, March 8, 1967. /1/Source: Department of State, INR Historical Files, Africa General, 1967-1968. Top Secret. SUBJECT Attached are summaries of CIA staffing, and 5412-type operations in each of the countries of Africa./2/ The consolidation of this information into one convenient book poses a serious security risk. Therefore, I have given it an over-all classification of Top Secret. I recommend that it be made available only on an Eyes Only and personal basis to selected officials within the Department, and that this selection be confined to the Secretary, Undersecretary, Deputy Undersecretary for Political Affairs, and Mr. Hughes. The material contained herein has come only from DDC files, and the book should not be made available to CIA. /2/Attached to the source text are [text not declassified] country summaries. One of the attachments is Document 442. The build up of CIA staffing and covert operations which began around 1960 reached its peak a couple of years ago and is now in the phase of consolidation and even retrenchment. Some stations have been closed out, the Congo counter-insurgency program is being liquidated, and some political action programs being scaled down. The recent disclosures of CIA activities could make both foreign governments and our Ambassadors more cautious in the future. The requirements of Vietnam have tended to siphon off French-speaking Agency field personnel. Since DDC has seldom been consulted on projects carried out by the Agency covert action staff (Cord Meyer's unit), the country summaries are incomplete in this field.
224. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, April 18, 1967. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Africa, General, Vol. V, 6/66-1/69. Confidential. SUBJECT On December 17, 1966, I sent you the Action Program to carry out the recommendations of the Korry Report on African Development Policies and Programs (enclosed)./2/ This is a status report on the major Action Programs to keep you informed of how we have implemented the Korry Report. /2/Document 222. In the immediately underlying enclosures/3/ are status reports on 22 of the 42 Korry Report recommendations. Among the highlights of the actions taken since December, I wish to draw your particular attention to the following: /3/Not printed. --The IBRD, the African Development Bank, the UN Economic Commission for Africa and the UN Development Program have met to work out a plan for coordination of African economic development in transportation, telecommunications and power. We hope that their next step will be to involve major interested donor governments. --IBRD and the International Telecommunications Union are beginning to cooperate on the plans for African regional telecommunications development. --The National Academy of Sciences, with AID financing, is organizing an African Conference on Agricultural Research for Economic Development which is to take place in the Congo (Kinshasa) in September and to involve 150 African, European and American agricultural scientists and financial and economic development planners. This is a first stage toward improving African research for increased food production. --AID is about to assist the heads of African universities to form working associations to promote and establish academic centers of excellence in Africa. --AID is contracting with 14 US private financial institutions to seek out investment opportunities in Africa for their clients. Some of these institutions are already actively promoting 26 investment projects. They have shown some interest in another 36; and 106 more are under review. --Four US commercial and investment banks have agreed to take the lead in establishing a private investment finance corporation for Africa. They are negotiating with AID on the terms and conditions; the principal delay relates to requirements for tying AID funds--which are to be loaned to this corporation--to US procurement. --New AID policies for a substantial reduction in the number of African countries receiving bilateral assistance, coupled with increased emphasis on regional and multidonor projects, have been conveyed to Congress in your Foreign Assistance Message, as well as in the AID FY 1968 Presentation. --We are working on proposals for a US contribution to the Special Fund of the African Development Bank, in line with your Foreign Assistance Message. Problems of the timing of submission to Congress, the amount and relative percentage of the US contribution, and tied procurement have yet to be resolved. In view of your decision to maintain the same level of AID assistance to Africa, in the coming fiscal year, the participation in the ADB Special Fund represents the only way of increasing US assistance to Africa. In addition to the 22 major recommendations on which I am enclosing status reports, I can assure you that plans and programs are moving forward, consistent with the Action Program, on the other Korry Report recommendations. In effect, they have become integrated with the regular programs for Africa of State, AID and other agencies. Nicholas deB Katzenbach/4/ /4/Printed from a copy that bears this stamped signature.
225. Summary Notes of the 572d Meeting of the National Security Council/1/ Washington, July 13, 1967, 12:10 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings, Vol. 4, 7/13/67, African Problems. Secret; Sensitive; For the President Only. Another record of this meeting is ibid., Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings, July 13, 1967-12:08 p.m., NSC Meeting # 572. African Problems In the absence of Secretary Rusk, Under Secretary Katzenbach summarized the six major problem areas in Africa. (See attached State Department paper.)/2/ /2/Document 226. 1. Rhodesia--We must continue to exchange views with the British who may decide to settle this problem in a way we cannot accept. 2. There is no solution to the Southwest African problem. 3. The Portuguese cannot hang on forever to their African colonies. 4. Developments are favorable to us in East Africa, i.e., Zambia, Tanzania, and Kenya. 5. In the Nigerian civil war, we are remaining neutral. Other African states are trying to solve the Nigerian problem to prevent a breakup of the Federation. The trouble arises primarily out of tribal differences. Our AID programs have not been a failure. 6. Congo--We have put in a half billion dollars in aid in the last few years. We do not know the reason for the current revolt of the mercenary troops which has broken out. We must keep Mobutu in power because there is no acceptable alternative to him. It was correct for us to send in our C-130 planes as proof of our support of a black government which was being attacked by white mercenaries. Our aid program is small and any payoff we may get is years ahead of us. The President: Have we learned any political lesson from the intense Congressional opposition to the decision to send in the C-130's? Under Secretary Katzenbach should background the press. The domestic racial issue kicked off the Congressional debate. Senator Javits should be seen by Assistant Secretary of State Palmer today to explain why we sent in the C-130's. All members of both the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee should be talked to promptly. Bromley Smith
226. Paper Prepared in the Department of State/1/ Washington, undated. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings, Vol. 4, 7/13/67, African Problems. Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text. The paper was discussed at the July 13 NSC meeting; see Document 225. AFRICAN PROBLEMS We see six decisive problems whose solution will be important to large areas of Africa and to United States policy toward the continent as a whole. At the north there is the complex of issues in Arab Africa arising from the Near East crisis and deep-seated local tensions. At the south there is the complex of issues arising from colonial control and racial discrimination. Without ignoring a number of other issues in Black Africa, there are three areas in the middle belt of the continent which present critical problems: Nigeria, the Congo, and East Africa (including Zambia). Finally, our aid and other economic policies face obstacles here and abroad, and our responses to these questions will affect our interests in the continent. In dealing with these problems, this paper points to essential conclusions and critical decisions. In view of its rapid preparation, it does not have interagency clearance. 1. The Effect of the Near East Crisis on Africa The Middle East crisis has sent shock waves throughout Arab Africa from Mauritania to Sudan. All condemned "Israeli aggression," some offered military support to the UAR, all now demand Israeli withdrawal. Algeria, Mauritania and Sudan have broken diplomatic relations with the United States. Algeria has increasingly become a spearhead of Soviet influence. Arab emotionalism caused riots almost everywhere, even in Tunisia. In Libya the foundations of government were shaken. More than half of the 13,000 Americans in Libya were evacuated, the vital flow of Libyan oil to Western Europe was suspended for a month, normal operations at Wheelus Air Base ceased, and we have been asked to negotiate for the relinquishment of Wheelus. Libya is only now slowly recovering, and the outlook remains precarious. The crisis has set back prospects for Maghrebian economic cooperation; it has caused new problems of internal stability in Morocco and Tunisia and new anxieties about the military strength of radical Algeria; it has opened new opportunities for the extension of UAR, Algerian and Soviet influence. The Sudanese, for instance, are now seeking military assistance from Czechoslovakia and the USSR. As a consequence of these events, we face the following principal policy issues: a. The impingement of Near East policy. If methods cannot be devised of dealing with the Near East problem which are tolerable to the moderate governments of Arab Africa, we risk the weakening of Tunisia, Morocco and Libya and a strengthening of views of the extremists like Algeria. Conversely, whatever is done to reinforce the moderates will enhance their prospects of contributing constructively to a Near East settlement. Morocco, Tunisia, Ethiopia, and perhaps Libya will be more than ever interested in obtaining US arms. We should adhere to present commitments and resume shipments as urgently as our general arms policy allows. We should be prepared to examine means of strengthening the internal security systems of friendly governments. b. At the same time, we should try to move forward on the President's proposal of an arms registry. The need of our friends for limited additional military assistance and our interest in arms control need not be in conflict. c. In the emotional atmosphere of politics in Arab Africa, our political actions in the Mediterranean and the Near East will be of primary importance, but economic support will remain an essential element in restoring political stability and American influence. It is therefore extremely important to keep aid going--to expand it where the situation is propitious, as in Morocco and Tunisia, and not to abandon it entirely where the situation is more difficult, as in Sudan. Initial steps in this direction have been taken, but they are bound to run into difficulty; patience abroad and perseverance in Washington will be essential. d. We should give particular attention to what we can do to shore up the regime in Libya. A special contingency paper on Libya will be available this week. 2. The Southern Sixth While the group of problems in southern Africa--Rhodesia, Portuguese Territories, South West and South Africa--are basically different from those of the northern littoral, they have three things in common. They are deep-seated emotional problems on which our influence is limited. They interact on each other, inevitably making our efforts to solve them more difficult. They affect other parts of the continent and adversely affect our interests there. Hence we have an interest in their solution for their own sake and because of their wider effect. Rhodesia. We are committed to supporting British and UN efforts to end the rebellion through economic sanctions. While the British currently through the Lord Alport Mission to Rhodesia are seeking to determine whether there is any basis for renewed negotiations, the British Government remains publicly committed to the pledge of "no independence before majority African rule." Settlement on any other basis would produce strong anti-British reaction in Africa with the British unpopularity transferred to the US and the West generally. We thus have an interest in the terms of any settlement of the Rhodesian problem. Portuguese Territories. As there is little likelihood of any change in the foreseeable future to the respective positions of the Africans or the Portuguese on this problem, the US should continue to: (1) advocate to both parties a peaceful solution based on the principle of self-determination; (2) assure maximum Portuguese concurrence with our policy that arms and equipment supplied or sold to Portugal not be used outside the NATO Defense Area. South West Africa. Caught in the dilemma of asserting UN responsibility without achieving UN authority over the territory, we have no choice but try to maintain our support of the UN without endorsing action that is totally unrealistic. It is very important that we continue to support through peaceful means the right of the people of South West Africa to self-determination. South Africa. Facing the problem of opposing tendencies--to associate with South Africa or to disengage from it entirely--the pressures have been strong to take actions which swing between the two extremes. A fully consistent policy is probably impossible at this time, since the policies at each end of the spectrum are contradictory but nevertheless have strong attraction and considerable support. One possible formula would be continued economic association; active political dissociation; and progressive strategic disengagement. The aim would be to influence South Africa to accept necessary accommodation to the realities of Africa. 3. Nigeria The outbreak of hostilities on July 6 between the Federal Military Government and the East (Biafra) intensifies our various basic polity problems with respect to Nigeria. We have consistently stated that the Nigerian problem is one for the Nigerians themselves to solve. This policy of non-involvement, however, is being complicated by several factors: the FMG is unlikely to defeat Biafra immediately; Biafra, and perhaps the FMG, may be getting arms from Eastern Europe; and Biafra may obtain sympathy or recognition in due course from some other countries. The policy of urging peaceful solutions has failed for the present. Our refusal to intervene in this internal Nigerian struggle has caused us to limit our active support for the established government, to deny support for the secessionist government, and to refuse to sell arms to either side. It has also led us to cut down on the numbers of Americans in trouble areas and to slow down implementation of our aid programs. This is a conscious policy of limiting commitments and involvement while continuing to recognize the FMG as the government for all of Nigeria. We see our policy coming under increasing pressure during the coming months. With aggressive agility Biafra will probably get more arms, further involve groups in the United States friendly to its cause, and with considerable skill continue its diplomatic efforts for external support. The FMG, more inhibited by its internal divisions, will increasingly react against our neutral stand. Key policy issues will be: (a) UK Role. Given our other commitments, we have no other practical course than continuing to assert that among foreign governments the UK has primary responsibility, in view of its large stake and traditional ties with Nigeria. (b) Arms for the FMG. Provision of arms will destroy our posture of non-involvement, and will progressively open up greater financial and military commitments. We should stay out of this; urge the UK to provide assistance and not try to restrict FMG acquisition of arms elsewhere. (c) Further political assistance to FMG. We should not connive with secession, either in the Nigerian context or because of precedents elsewhere in Africa, nor should we oppose it. (d) Future of AID, Peace Corps, etc. We should reaffirm our goal of helping the people of Nigeria in their long run development irrespective of the political configuration of the country. Subject only to safety of individuals, we should offer to continue programs in all of Nigeria, and we should be prepared to bend legal requirements to this objective. (e) Settlement of the dispute. Given our limited engagement, we have limited influence. Our best course is actively to support Commonwealth, especially African, efforts, with other types of African mediation (e.g. OAU, or an ad hoc group) as an alternative. 4. The Congo The outbreak sparked by the revolt of the mercenaries on July 7 has obscured the basic problems of the Congo and hindered our efforts to assist the political and economic development of the country. We have three immediate objectives in connection with the revolt. (a) To provide emergency assistance, without deeply engaging ourselves on a continuing basis. We have so far done this by providing airplane transportation for Congolese forces on a temporary basis. We expect to draw the line in our own direct involvement at this point. (b) We should exert such influence as we have in both Brussels and Kinshasa to retain maximum Belgian presence in and assistance to the Congo. Belgium is a principal source of further help in strengthening the security and economic development of the Congo. Congo-Belgian estrangement will cause loss of badly needed personnel and resources with consequent pressure on the United States to replace them. (c) To associate responsible African nations with the Congo in dealing with the present revolt. The association either in word (e.g. Kaunda) or in deed (e.g. Ghana and Ethiopia) with Mobutu and our efforts to help his government is already our tactical goal. Similarly, we should try to keep the Congo out in front both in obtaining and using any African support. If successful, this tactic will also make it more difficult for communist forces to reinsert themselves into the Congo. At the same time, we wish to prevent the current situation from ruining the prospects for longer term development in the Congo. The recent devaluation will fail in its purpose if economic development falters. An emergency examination of what is required to keep the Congo going during the coming months may be necessary. Economic development will also be stifled if there is a mass exodus of Europeans from Katanga, and special measures to assure their security may be required. The severance of Belgian efforts in production, transportation and training would also set back development badly. Here we may have to employ a mixture of pressure and economic help to restabilize the situation. 5. East Africa and Zambia The situation in East Africa and Zambia lacks the dramatic impact of the crises in Nigeria and the Congo, but it nevertheless has several important aspects. Several developments during the past months have been encouraging. Each of the East African governments have gradually consolidated its position. Kenyatta and his supporters have clipped Odinga's power; Obote has so far been successful in his centralizing policy; Nyerere is slowly strengthening his authority over Zanzibar. At the same time, these governments have agreed to expand their cooperative efforts by establishing an East African community. Zambia has made substantial progress in developing alternative transport routes for its imports and exports following the illegal seizure of independence in Rhodesia. This progress could be affected, however, if the offer of the Chinese Communists to build the Tanzanian-Zambian railroad is accepted. Appealing to a deep-seated desire of Nyerere and Kaunda for this link, and exploiting their frustration at failing to get the assistance from the West, the Chinese may be able to consolidate their influence and compensate for their various losses elsewhere in Africa. Our own position in these two countries is also affected by the problems of Rhodesia and the Portuguese territories. Frustrated and disillusioned, Zambia and Tanzania have whittled down their relations with and confidence in the United Kingdom. This estrangement has also affected us, since we are Britain's major partner. This has tended to limit somewhat the initiatives open to us in East Africa and Zambia. In view of the Chinese initiative in the single most important regional project in the area, we may have to challenge this competition by helping to provide valid alternatives to it. We may in this way succeed in convincing the Tanzanian and Zambian governments that we continue to support their aspirations. By such a demonstration of our commitment to their economic development we can also hope to offset somewhat the negative effects of our policies in southern Africa. 6. Aid and Economic Programs Our AID and other economic programs for Africa are running into heavy weather both in Congress and in Africa. Congressional criticism is an amalgam of several views. The fear of involvement which stimulated the country limitations of last year is even stronger. Because the prospects of Africa, were exaggerated and the effects of external aid were overestimated, Congress tends to be disillusioned. The internal difficulties in Nigeria and the Congo contribute to the disenchantment. They have become an excuse for cutting funds, and even our modest aid request ($195 million) is threatened. A number of African leaders (and some Congressmen), on the other hand, are dismayed by our phasing out of bilateral assistance from some twenty-five countries. The Africans see this as a denial of much needed help and a sign that the United States has lost interest in the continent. Certain Congressmen also see it as foregoing much needed US influence. This group seeks, first more flexibility in our policy and progressively moderate increases in the totals. The regional approach--whether through the IBRD, the African Development Bank, formal African groupings, or ad hoc national combinations--is slow in developing. The principal gesture available to us in the immediate future is a contribution to the ADB, which so far has been postponed because of the Near East crisis and other priorities. Commodity prices affect some African nations far more than external assistance. Cocoa is a chief issue. We have worked out acceptable principles for an agreement on price and buffer stocks with Ghana, but the proposals face hurdles: other producers have got to agree, and the concerted and stubborn opposition by US companies must be overcome. Among the key decisions facing us in the coming months are the following: a. Level of Aid. We have got to mobilize support for reasonable assistance levels, or suffer a serious psychological blow in Africa as to the validity of our interest in the continent, to say nothing of the loss of influence. b. Flexibility. Since our inflexibility is due partly to the African situation, to Congressional restrictions and to Executive Branch decisions, we cannot do much right away. We could start first with the "Self-Help Fund" to make it a "Politico-Economic Fund." We should be sure to make every effort to search out regional possibilities, including selective bilateral help to develop regional capabilities c. Regional Development. As soon as appropriate, we should make known our intention to seek Congressional authorization to contribute $60 million over three years to the ADB special fund, with a minimum of conditions attached. d. Cocoa. We should enlist full Executive Branch support to negotiate the proposed cocoa agreement and to assure its domestic and international acceptance.
227. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of the Treasury (Barr), the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach), and the Administrator of the Agency for International Development (Gaud) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, August 14, 1967. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Africa, General, Vol. V, 6/66-1/69. Limited Official Use. SUBJECT In your Foreign Aid Message, you stated that we would "seek an appropriate means of responding" to the request made last year for U.S. participation in a soft loan fund to be administered by the African Development Bank. In your Economic Message you also stated our policy of supporting such regional development efforts. Thus far, however, we have not given any answer to the African Bank request. The absence of any U.S. response has in effect stalemated the Bank's effort to put together a package of contributions to this proposed loan fund. Normally, we would want to obtain thorough Congressional soundings before making a response. However, State, Treasury, and AID have reviewed this matter carefully in light of all of our other plans in the foreign assistance area, and we are agreed on the following points: 1. Our bilateral aid programs for Africa have been designed on the assumption that we will be moving into participation in an African Bank fund; it therefore is important to our own plans for the Bank to get serious international discussions underway. 2. We cannot obtain legislation for an African Bank contribution this session, if only because there is not sufficient time to put together a package involving other contributors. Action in the next Congressional session is entirely feasible. 3 In view of the fights expected this year on the AID bill, the Inter American Bank, and the Asian Development Bank, it would be counter-productive to attempt full Congressional soundings on an African Bank proposal at this time. (In addition, since the African Bank includes the U.A.R., and other Arab North African countries, this is a particularly inopportune moment to discuss the Bank with the Congress.) 4. The Congressional group headed by Rep. Multer that accompanied Under Secretary Barr to Africa this Spring (the group that later met with you on this subject) was strongly in favor of U. S. participation in an African Bank fund, and can be expected to assist in mobilizing Congressional support for a suitable proposal next year. Earlier, very limited soundings on the Senate side also indicated a generally favorable reaction. 5. With essentially every other regional development effort coming up for U.S. action either this year or next, there would be some political advantage to having--and some disadvantage to not having--an African Bank proposal to submit to the Congress next year. 6. The appropriate U.S. participation would be relatively small--about $20 million a year for three years, conditioned upon (a) limitation of our share to about 40 per cent of the total fund, (b) complete "tying" provisions to protect our balance of payments, and (c) a strong U.S. voting position, including a right to prevent the use of our own contribution for a particular project. No authorizing legislation would be sought until 1968, and appropriations next year would be small. We therefore believe it would be desirable to inform the Bank that we would be prepared to approach the Congress next year for authority covering a U.S. contribution along the lines indicated briefly in paragraph 6 above, and in more detail in the attached memorandum (Tab A)./2/ If you approve, the first step would be for Secretary Fowler to send the President of the Bank the letter attached in draft form (Tab B). (This would be transmitted in confidence, but we would have to expect that the U.S. response would leak out eventually in the course of international discussions.) /2/None of the tabs is printed. Secretary Fowler and representatives of other potential donor countries have been invited to attend the meeting of the Bank's Governors on August 21-26. Our response will get the most mileage if it is conveyed to the Bank by that time. Joe Barr Concur: Recommendation: That you approve our advising the African Bank that we would be prepared to approach Congress next year for authority covering a tied Special Fund contribution of up to $20 million a year for three years, subject to appropriate contributions from other contributors and to other terms and conditions./3/ /3/The "approve" option is checked.
228. Memorandum From Edward Hamilton of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson/1/ Washington, August 22, 1967. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Hamilton Files, Africa, General. No classification marking. An attached transmittal note from Hamilton to the President reads: "Mr. President: Attached is the memo you wanted concerning Senator McCarthy's speech on Africa. You should know that the final version of the speech is (1) much more complimentary to us than the AP report suggests, and (2) vastly improved--due to hard lobbying from AID--compared with the original draft which would have called upon you to scrap the current program and start over. I will send a copy of the speech as soon as I can get my hands on it." SUBJECT Senator McCarthy's speech (ticker clipping at Tab A)/2/ charges that we don't pay enough attention to Africa except in crisis; that U.S. aid should be concentrated on long-term problems, particularly agriculture; and that we are too optimistic about African development. In reply, I would cite the following facts: /2/An August 22 press release from the Senator's office about his speech in the Senate that day is not printed. 1. U.S. aid to Africa in FY 1967--excluding food--totalled $202 million, more than 14% above the 1966 level. The budget request now before the Congress ($195 million) would support a continuation of that high level. 2. Food aid to Africa increased by 18% in 1967 and will rise by a further 11% in 1968--a total increase of 25% over three years. 3. AID is now financing more than 1,800 technicians in Africa working on health, agriculture and education, the long-term problems of development. This is a 20% increase over 1966. The 1968 request provides for a slight increase. 4. About 25% of the 1968 request would be used for agriculture projects, an increase of almost 50% in agriculture spending over the previous year. 5. Supporting Assistance, the AID account which finances non-developmental, crisis-related activities, is declining in Africa. It amounted to about $22 million in 1967, more than $1 million less than in 1966. It should take another drop in 1968. 6. The President has worked harder than any President in history to make sure that U.S. policy toward Africa is energetic, sensible and realistic: --he commissioned the first general study of African development ever undertaken in the U.S. government--the Korry Report. --he gave the first speech entirely addressed to African development problems ever given by an American President (the OAU speech, May 26, 1966). --he sent his Under Secretary of State on the first tour of Africa ever made by an American official of his rank. --within the past year alone, he has received and exchanged views with President Senghor of Senegal, the King of Morocco, Emperor Haile Selassie I of Ethiopia, President Banda of Malawi, President Kayibanda of Rwanda, and President Houphouet-Boigny of the Ivory Coast. Within the next two months he will receive President Diori of Niger, General Ankrah of Ghana, and probably Presidents Ahidjo of Cameroon and Nyerere of Tanzania as well. (Last three not announced; last two not finally approved.) 7. AID's attitude toward African development problems is evident in the following quote from the Agency's Congressional presentation for FY 1968: --"Economic problems and the development challenge moved even more to the foreground . . . (in Africa) . . . with the difficult realities of the task becoming more widely and clearly recognized and the long-term nature of the development process becoming more generally accepted." This isn't rampant optimism. It is recognition that many Africans are finally coming to realize that there is no future in grandiose posturing on the world stage or in gratuitous adventures against their neighbors. More and more, Africa is looking inward to the immense labors required to achieve political stability and economic growth. This doesn't make those problems any easier; nobody pretends that it does. But it is the first necessary step toward dealing with them at all. We are right to hail it as reason for hope. EH
229. Memorandum From Edward Hamilton of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow)/1/ Washington, September 8, 1967. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt W. Rostow, Vol. 41. No classification marking. SUBJECT The 1960's are the shake-down years for African independence. There are only four African nations with as much as a decade of experience as sovereign states. With a few exceptions, the colonial powers left no durable patterns of power and responsibility into which the new local leadership could fit. Moreover, the transition to independence occurred during a period of continent-wide awakening to the possibility of economic progress. Added to the ferment produced by jockeying for position in the slowly-congealing power structure of independent nations has been the urgent insistence of every populace that its government carry out an economic revolution as well. Combined with the racial problems associated with independence and the disrupting influence of the East-West controversy, this is a prescription for turmoil. And considerable turmoil has occurred. But there is a hopeful trend in Africa in the last three years--one which in part reflects our own efforts. Stated in crudest form, it is a shift in political values from flamboyance, ideology and international adventurousness to inward-looking preoccupation with the harshly practical problems each country faces in its own backyard. Perhaps inevitably, Africa had her fling with, the Nkrumahs and the glamour of the international stage. There will always be some temptation to forsake the knotty difficulties at home for the bright lights abroad. Yet it is clear who is built for the long pull in Africa. It is the Nyereres, the Houphouet-Boignys, and the Senghors who are strong and getting stronger. The leader with a future is the leader who tackles the day-to-day problems of the common man--enough food for his family, decent housing, and the rudiments of medical care. It is a cold fact, for example, that the Ivory Coast's 9% annual growth rate in GNP is more important and durable political phenomenon in Africa than the great inflow of Soviet arms into Somalia, just as the current efforts of Nkrumah's successors to put Ghana's economic house in order are much more lasting and important than any of Osegyefo's political and economic extravagances. And it is not Americans or Europeans who are making these judgments. It is the people of Africa--the people who can enforce priorities with the discipline every politician understands and respects. This trend also shows signs of extending to regional and sub-regional cooperation, particularly economic cooperation. For example: --the Organization of African Unity (OAU) was formed in 1963 and has sponsored fifteen Foreign Minister's meetings and four summit meetings on the full range of African problems. --the Organization of African and Malagasy States (OCAM) was formed in 1965--within the OAU framework--to provide a forum for the Francophones. --earlier this year the three states of East Africa signed a treaty establishing an economic community, with room for expansion to include Zambia. --a customs union between five French-speaking nations was established in 1966, and the basis has been laid for a West African common market. --African nations joined together to form the African Development Bank in 1964, and the Bank began operations in 1966. All of the more than $200 million subscribed for the Bank's ordinary capital comes from African countries. (This is the only regional bank in the world that does not depend primarily on money from outside.) In addition, countries which share river basins are thinking in terms of joint development with their neighbors; surveys are underway for a transportation network covering Central Africa and a power grid for most of West Africa; the World Bank has undertaken to play a special role--welcomed by the African Bank--in promoting regional and subregional development of shared resources. Obviously, none of these hopeful developments obscures the tragedy of Nigeria, the chronic chaos in the Congo, or the dark portents of racial discrimination in the southern sixth of the continent. These problems will always be better fodder for headline-writers. But if one is to understand Africa, he must keep up with--and encourage--the hopeful forces at work behind the scenes. In the long haul, they will be at least as important as the setbacks--and they have already borne impressive fruit. EH [Next documents] Volume XXIV Index | Historian's Office | Department of State |
