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210. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, June 6, 1967. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Confidential. Drafted by Eliot and approved in S on June 9. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS Ambassador Ansary began by expressing concern about demonstrations in the Arab countries against American citizens and installations. The Secretary referred to malicious and false reports that American planes participated in the Israeli attacks. He said that the UAR knows where our carriers are; Soviet destroyers are in their area. But such reports incite Arab mobs. The Ambassador mentioned that there have been reports that the Kuwaitis and Iraqis have stopped the flow of oil. The Secretary said that it is important for as many countries as possible to remain detached. What is involved is the Jehad psychology on one side and the apocalyptic psychology on the other. Mob pressures in the Arab countries make it impossible for Arab governments to be detached. Hopefully, some of them will be able to draw a distinction between what they say and what they do. We are pleased that Israel has said it has no territorial ambitions. Nasser is riding a tiger; it is difficult to see how he can disengage from a holy war which cannot succeed. Ambassador Ansary commented that the ill effects of the war are likely to last for some time. Iran, which values its progress and stability, is quite concerned and hopes for a settlement. The Secretary said we want His Majesty to understand that the United States was not involved in the outbreak of hostilities. We had received commitments from both sides not to attack. We had no advance notice from either side. We are making no judgment as to who started the fighting. Our advice to all capitals concerned was to give the Security Council and diplomatic efforts a chance to find an answer. The Ambassador said that the Israelis had apparently felt that time was running out for them. The Secretary replied they had been touchy as far as the military problem was concerned. They had had a report of 400 Egyptian tanks moving on Elath. Ambassador Ansary commented that they were also concerned about the Egyptian Vice President coming to Washington. The Secretary replied that we have had no such information from the Israelis. The Secretary then reviewed the history over the past 10 years of our support for the integrity of the states of the area, mentioning support we had given to the UAR, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Algeria, Kuwait, Tunisia and Morocco. We have had a consistent and even-handed interest in protecting the integrity of the states of the area. All this is forgotten when the issue is Arabs against Israel. Ambassador Ansary said that it was too bad that the Yemen problem had not been solved. The Secretary, mentioning the use of gas by the UAR, said that Nasser's attitude toward the Yemen was not in accordance with usual standards of conduct. The Ambassador asked if the United States and the USSR would get together on a resolution in the Security Council. The Secretary said that we may get together on a resolution, but that the resolution might be a complicated one which would mean different things to different people and hence might be the beginning rather than the end of a problem. He stressed that we could not persuade Israel to go back to the status quo before June 5. The Israelis have made clear that closing the Straits of Tiran was a casus belli. What is involved for the United States is not only the general principle of freedom of an international waterway but also the fact that in 1957 we persuaded Israel to withdraw from the Sinai peninsula on the condition that there would be freedom of passage through the straits. We cannot forget such a commitment.
211. Memorandum for President Johnson's Diary/1/ Washington, June 7, 1967. /1/Source: Johnson Library, President's Appointment File (Diary Backup), June 7, 1967. Confidential. SUBJECT /2/Rostow's June 6 briefing memorandum for the President noted that Meyer was in Washington laying the groundwork for the Shah's visit. (Ibid.) The U.S. Ambassador to Iran, Armin Meyer, visited with the President about twenty minutes on 6 June. Two general topics were discussed: 1. When the President asked how the Shah of Iran was getting along, Ambassador Meyer described the success of the Shah's land reform program and of his economic policies in general. The President was pleased and suggested Mr. Rostow look into ways of translating Iran's experience to Vietnam. 2. Ambassador Meyer described his views on the current crisis between Israel and the neighboring Arab states. He felt that President Nasser, in accusing the US and Britain of involvement in Israeli air attacks, was trying to trigger a cutoff of oil supplies by the oil producing Arab countries, thereby shifting the confrontation on to other shoulders. The meeting closed with the President expressing his hope that the Shah would be able to reschedule his visit to Washington and asked Ambassador Meyer to convey his warmest wishes to the Shah, the Empress, and their children. Harold H. Saunders
212. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iran/1/ Washington, June 8, 1967, 11:14 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 IRAN. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Drafted at the White House. Cleared by Bromley Smith and Meyer and in draft by Deputy Chief of Protocol Chester C. Carter and Special Assistant to the Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs Stephen Low; and approved by Handley. 209548. 1. Please deliver to Shah following message from President dated June 8, 1967: "Your Imperial Majesty:" "I very much appreciate the kind letter you sent me from Paris./2/ I fully understand why you felt obliged to return home directly from Paris, but wish you to know not only how much Mrs. Johnson and I will miss seeing you and the Empress on this occasion but also how disappointed I am not to have this opportunity to discuss our mutual concerns especially in the Middle East. I hope we will be able to get together soon and that you will let me know when it would be convenient for you to come to Washington." /2/Document 209. "Meanwhile, Your Majesty, I assure you that in these troubled times I deeply appreciate your counsel and Iran's constructive position in world affairs. Ambassador Harriman has informed me of his conversations with you in Paris and of your desire to continue a close exchange of views. That is my desire too." "I have just learned that the UAR as well as Israel have accepted a cease-fire. I would greatly welcome your thoughts as to how we might proceed in trying to bring stable peace, prosperity, and regional cooperation to the Middle East, out of the wreckage of this crisis." "Mrs. Johnson and I extend our very warmest personal wishes to you and the Empress and also to the Iranian people whose progress under your leadership is greatly admired by Americans everywhere." "Sincerely," Lyndon B. Johnson" Rusk
213. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State/1/ Tehran, June 10, 1967, 1650Z. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 IRAN. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Passed to the White House. 4900. Subj: Shah's Desire Assist with Middle East Crisis. Ref: State 209548./2/ /2/Document 212. 1. Zahedi called me to Foreign Ministry today to discuss Shah's interest in playing helpful role in resolution present Middle East crisis. Shah had taken note of 3rd paragraph President's letter and has been particularly wondering how, in light postponement his own visit to US, we can best arrange exchange of views. Shah has now decided instruct Ansary propose to Department that either US send special emissary to Iran or GOI would be prepared send someone to Washington. 2. Accordingly, Department will no doubt be receiving urgent request for Ansary meeting with appropriate level Department officers discuss this idea. 3. Comment. Zahedi did not give me any idea what moves or suggestions Shah may be considering but perhaps Ansary may be prepared spell things out in somewhat more detail. It would seem Iranians could be particularly helpful in contacts with Feisal and Hussein. In this connection, see Tehran 4899./3/ Conceivably they could also play some kind of intermediary role with Iraq./4/ /3/Dated June 10. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 ARAB-ISR) /4/Telegram 210152 to Tehran, June 10, reported that the Department had told Ansary that in view of the fact that the U.S. Government was still studying all aspects of the Middle East situation and formulating its plans, it would seem premature to send a special U.S. representative to Tehran. On the other hand, if the Iranian Government wanted to send a special representative to Washington, U.S. officials would be happy to meet with him if there were no publicity and he realized that top-level U.S. officials were extremely busy. Ansary replied that he would recommend to his government postponing a decision on whether to send a representative to Washington. (Ibid.) Thacher
214. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State/1/ Tehran, June 30, 1967, 1330Z. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Special Committee Files, Iran. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to Paris. 5266. NATUS for Battle. Ref: State 218169./2/Subj: Amb Hare's Meeting with Shah: Arab-Israeli Situation. Following discussion of Glassboro Summit, Amb Hare provided Shah detailed presentation Dept's views contained reftel. Shah from time to time interjected comments which led to further mutual elucidation of respective viewpoints, as noted below: /2/Telegram 218168 to Tehran, June 29, for Ambassador Hare stated that the principal purpose of his meeting with the Shah was to get his views on the Middle Eastern situation, particularly any ideas he might have for steps which would lead to a permanent, peaceful solution. Hare was also to congratulate the Shah for the constructive steps he had taken during the crisis, such as intervening with Feisal and Hussein not to break with the United States and urging restraint and moderation to the Israelis. (Department of State, Central Files, POL ARAB-ISR) 1. Nasser's Threat. Shah acknowledged substantial benefits gained by Nasser's other neighbors such as Iran or even Turkey, from Israeli victory. On his recent visit to Ankara he found full awareness that aggressive UAR threat might have been directed against others if not so effectively blunted by Israelis. Nasser remains an evil force and must someday be destroyed. Yet he had been allowed go on too long unchallenged, throwing gas bombs in Yemen and carrying out other nefarious doings. Arab arrogance and aggressiveness repugnant to Iran. Arabs made much of their long subjection to foreign rule, excuse they constantly draw on to explain their own lack of accomplishments in health, education, etc., whereas real responsibility for lack of progress lay with area countries themselves. If they had actually wanted education, they could have had it, and likewise in other fields about which they now complain. In this atmosphere Communists have been provided with fertile ground for stimulating anti-West reaction on every aspect of Arab sensitivities. Shah concluded Russians now "have" Syria, Algeria, Yemen and UAR. 2. Israel. Shah more vehement if anything in his criticisms of Israelis. Iran's ties with Israel are close but Shah deeply disturbed by their "arrogant" attitudes: "Mouth of General Dayan should be closed." Israelis should be taking line that they merely trying to defend their security and rights. They should be emphasizing simple desire live in peace enjoying security. Instead Israeli spokesmen taking strong positions all over place, annexing Jerusalem, affirming their desires for this and that, proposals obviously aimed using their recent territorial acquisitions as levers remake their surroundings on lines of ambitions they have long harbored. Concept of demilitarized areas, strengthening of frontiers etc. were ideas which might be put forward by Danes or other Israeli friends but should not be propounded by Israelis themselves. 3. Hare replied that we did not, of course, condone Israeli position on Jerusalem as recent Presidential statement/3/ had made clear. Fact was hard-liners now getting most publicity. Shah agreed there two schools of thought in Israel but moderates seem unable attract public attention. /3/Reference is to the President's address at the Department of State to the Foreign Policy Conference for Educators on June 19; for text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1967, Book I, pp. 630-635. 4. Ambassador said examination of problem indicated Israelis perhaps not as hard line as they might seem. Thus fundamental Israeli need is security (requirement which Shah readily acknowledged). Hare said to begin with Israelis obviously don't want Sinai and would probably settle for demilitarization. If belligerency problem could be done away with, beginning with UN vote, this would then take care of Straits of Tiran and Suez problem. As to Gaza, this never historically part of Egypt, but not clear what Israelis want or don't want there beyond security. With regard exodus of refugees from West Bank, U.S. has been striving hard persuade Israel adopt enlightened policy permit West Bankers remain and allow return those who have already fled. Hare urged Shah take similar vigorous line with Israelis. Shah said he had already instructed FonMin in New York urge such policy on Eban. Iran would say something further this topic but he wondered whether Israelis prepared to listen. Shah said US must assume principal role for damping down Israeli exuberance. Time will come when U.S. must say flatly, "Stop the nonsense." (Shah's views on UNGA strategic situation reported Tehran 5261.)/4/ /4/Dated June 29. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 ARAB-ISR/UN) 5. Other Factors. Hare mentioned reactions he had encountered in New Delhi talks and myopic Indian tendency view Arab/Israeli question solely in terms India's problems with Pakistan. Talk turned to Tito's role with Hare noting press reports of opposition within Yugoslavia to Tito's strident support of Nasser. Hare said this explainable perhaps in terms evolving internal political patterns with growth "new" guard chafing at dominance of oldsters. Hare also suggested there perhaps some connection between Tito's hard support for Nasser and recent events in Greece. Shah said he did not know the Greek Junta but felt they had done job which had to be accomplished; otherwise Papandreou like Mossedegh would have thrown country into chaos. 6. Middle East Arms Control. When Hare touched on our interest terminating ME arms race, Shah asked pointedly how, in this context, US defined Middle East. Hare replied he not in position answer authoritively, but, speaking personally he had not understood we intended that restrictive plans should apply countries with whom we in treaty relationship. 7. Comment: Foregoing paragraphs as well as extended discussion UNGA technical problem (Tehran 5261) revealed no major shifts Shah's attitude. He is still committed to public posture generally sympathetic to Arabs but deeply anxious with regard possible resurgence Nasser's power. Both he and Hoveyda would be delighted find way out of present stage of dilemma through vote for resolution strongly supporting withdrawal and also including paras for coming grips with Arab-Israeli fundamentals. Faced with grim facts rapid Soviet replenishment Arab arms, Shah non-plussed. So far he has reacted by making clear he intends prevent if he can any more overflights of Iran but apparently has refrained from any general remonstrances urging Soviets cease and desist from all arms deliveries to Arabs. Shah interested, courteous, and thoughtful throughout 1-1/2 hour meeting and obviously very appreciative Amb Hare's presentation US views. However, recent lengthy ceremonial visits abroad and hard perplexities of ME situation have left him somewhat weary and worried. He now definitely scheduled depart for Caspian July 1. Thacher
215. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iran/1/ Washington, July 21, 1967, 6:57 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19-8 U.S.-IRAN. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Drafted by Eliot, cleared by Handley and in substance by Kathryn N. Folger in H, and approved by Rusk. 11341. For Ambassador from the Secretary. Ref: Tehran 403./2/ Subject: Senatorial Criticism of Iran./3/ In your discussion with Shah of Senatorial criticism of Iran likely be published in next few days, please assure him on my behalf that the Senatorial views expressed do not represent views of executive branch. As the Shah is undoubtedly aware, entire subject US military assistance and sales programs is currently being intensely reviewed by Congress, and Senatorial barbs are aimed at executive branch and not at Iran. You may assure him that we do not like these barbs either. More important, you may assure him that these barbs have in no way diminished the esteem in which we hold the Shah and that we continue to look forward with great pleasure to his forthcoming visit. Our esteem for him and our desire to welcome him to Washington and to seek his counsel have increased in recent weeks as a result of our deep appreciation for Iran's constructive policies in the Middle Eastern crisis. /2/Dated July 22. (Ibid.) /3/The State Department Activities Report in the President's Evening Reading on July 19 stated that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee intended to release on July 24 testimony given before the Symington subcommittee on U.S. military assistance and arms sales to Iran, India, and Pakistan. The testimony included criticism by Senator Fulbright of U.S. military aid to Iran, and by Senator Symington of Iran's military and economic agreements with the Soviet Union and its middleman role as an arms supplier for Pakistan. The report noted that this was likely to annoy the Shah and that the Department was trying to soften his reaction by alerting him in advance. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, Department of State, President's Evening Reading, 3/1/67, Vol. VII) Rusk
216. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State/1/ Tehran, July 24, 1967, 1400Z. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 IRAN. Confidential; Limdis. 447. Subj: Shah's Washington Visit. 1. In lengthy discussion with Shah 24th, I conveyed President Johnson's greetings and his anticipation of Shah's forthcoming visit. I pointed out a blue ribbon program has been arranged providing every opportunity for discussion of matters of mutual interest. 2. Shah said he too looking forward to visit and been giving much thought to discussions which will take place. He gratified by what he considers USG's friendly attitude toward Iran and even looks forward to talking with "those Senators." 3. This provided occasion to convey to him Secretary's message (State 11341)./2/ He deeply grateful. I noted that New York Times may be breaking story today and hoped it would not cause difficulties. With certain amount of bravado, Shah said he feels Iran has matured sufficiently so that criticisms such as those by Senators can be taken in stride. Comment: We hope such equilibrium obtains after story breaks. In any case, he has been favorably conditioned thanks to Dept's foresight in alerting us and thanks to Secretary's invaluable personal message. /2/Document 215. 4. Shah does not believe special discussion with Mideast experts re Mideast details need be scheduled since he hopes essential ground can be covered in discussions at top levels. However, Thursday morning might be left open for Mideast experts briefing, final decision to be made after completion of top level discussions. 5. Shah indicated again that he hopes to discuss food problems. Delighted that Iran has unusually good wheat crop this year, he wants to concentrate with American help on increased food production in years ahead as contribution to major problems facing world during rest of this century. Shah noted with keen disappointment that Bill Warne's proposal for agricultural project in Khuzestan has now been scaled down to 5,000 acres when Shah wishes major commercial project of one or more hundred thousand acres. 6. Shah also indicated he will wish to discuss importance of Iran's maintaining adequate defense capability so that if troubles break out in this region American boys will not be shot a la Viet Nam. He said he thinks our countries owe it to each other to let each other know where we stand and implied that Iran will purchase elsewhere to the extent that the USG is unable to meet its needs. Meyer
217. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State/1/ Tehran, August 3, 1967, 1005Z. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 IRAN. Secret; Limdis. 557. Subject: Shah's Washington Visit. 1. In discussing August 2nd his forthcoming trip to Washington, Shah stressed that he considers it a "working visit in depth." He is pleased that program provides wide range of opportunities for talks with USG leaders. 2. Once again Shah stressed his interest in agriculture. He said that at pace Iran is going now, even though it has almost self-sufficient supply of food this year, full development of Iran's resources will take another century. What is needed, he said, is large-scale commercial farming of hundred thousand acres or more and only US has know-how for this. He mentioned not only Khuzistan, but also Jiroft area (where Kim Roosevelt's project has uncovered abundant water supplies), Sistan Basin, and Gorgan where real successes been scored this year with American hybrid corn. 3. Linked with agriculture is Shah's interest in desalination. He wishes to push forward in this field pursuant to talks which Minister of Water Rouhani has had with Secretary Udall and other well-disposed Department of Interior officials. 4. One of most important purposes of Shah's visit will be to get reassurance that we intend to continue our cooperation in military field. Although he will probably not go into detail in his talk with the President (and did not mention such details in the August 2 interview), we know that his greatest interest is in the following, which he will hope to discuss at least in general terms during his Washington visit: (a) filling gaps caused by attrition and other insufficiencies in our jointly agreed program; and (b) planning four and five years ahead in Iran's defense program. Re latter, he will be interested in: (c) possible re-hab F-4's; (d) possible follow-on plane(s) to F-5 (he has appointment with Northrop official); (e) Sheridan tanks; (f) helicopters to make his military mobile enough to counter Viet Nam-type guerrilla activities which are Iran's most likely threat; and (g) communications to assure command control. In this connection, I am pleased that DOD is suggesting ARMISH/MAAG Chief General Jablonsky be available. 5. Shah indicates he will also wish to make known in Washington his views that since Iran is most stable and trustworthy state in Mideast, Western oil companies should assure that high level of present liftings be maintained and in fact increased. He sees no reason why Arab producers should be allowed to blackball certain markets and still retain production levels higher than Iran. 6. Obviously of major interest will be exchange of views between Shah and USG officials re Mideast situation. Shah is proud that Iran is almost a model of progress and constructivism in this part of world and he ready to play whatever role is feasible in encouraging similar state of affairs in Arab world. He remains convinced, however, that until Nasserism is checked, as in Yemen, there is little hope for progress in Arab world. 7. Since my departure for Washington is only one week away, Shah and I agreed that unless he or Washington had something special to discuss before my departure we would tidy up any loose ends re his trip via either Court or Foreign Ministers. 8. Comment: Shah shared my view that on eve of his Washington visit US-Iran relations are as warm and healthy as they have ever been. There is in Embassy's view, however, a dark cloud on horizon, i.e., Senatorial action already taken blocking concessionary credit and sales by Henry Kuss' department in DOD. During our last audience Shah made clear he feels entitled to know where he stands re military supplies from US in future. In August 2nd discussion he pointed out Soviets continue to pump in arms to Iran's potential enemies and at much lower prices and two and half percent interest rate. While we sure he will avoid over-dependence on Soviets, we also sure that if USG is unresponsive to his future military needs Shah will without question turn to French, U.K., FRG and other suppliers. Embassy has consistently favored some diversification in Iran's military procurement, but we see present situation as somewhat of a crossroads. If we abdicate role of principal supplier, it will be a severe setback to present healthy relationship which we believe can be retained at small cost both financially and even arms-wise. While such setback in itself will not be fatal, we wonder if USG really wishes to alienate such a staunch friend and at same time surrender concomitant benefits we have here, notably our strategic communications facilities. 9. Embassy realizes Executive Branch is making Herculean effort to counter present unrealistic trends among our friends in Senate. Shah has been apprised of Senatorial concerns. We would like to think that via personal testimony he can play a key role in assuring that Iran-US relationship remains healthy. Meyer
218. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson/1/ Washington, August 15, 1967. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Iran, Visit of Shah (con't.), 8/22-24/67. Secret. SUBJECT Our aim during the Shah's visit will be to strengthen our relations with Iran by convincing the Shah that we recognize the importance to peace, stability and progress in the Middle East of a strong and independent Iran. To help strengthen our relations you might: 1. Assure the Shah that we share the same goal: to promote peace, stability and progress in the Middle East: --We greatly appreciate Iran's constructive efforts to moderate the Arab-Israeli crisis, and to assist the U.S. in its own efforts to this end. --We hope that Iran will maintain intimate relations with Turkey and Pakistan, retain close ties with Israel and moderate Arab countries, continue to work for better relations with Iraq, and support moderate forces in South Arabia after the British leave. --We appreciate Iran's concern about the possible extension of radical Arab influence to the Persian Gulf and approve of Iran's efforts to strengthen its position and engage in political bridge-building in the Gulf. 2. Take the Shah into your confidence on other major international problems: --Southeast Asia: the Shah will expect to be thanked for Iran's contribution of a medical team to South Viet Nam. --US-USSR relations: the strain caused by Viet Nam has been kept within tolerable limits, and we have made progress in other, unrelated fields. 3. Indicate our desire to continue to assist Iran within the limits of our heavy burdens and Iran's growing financial strength: --We want to continue our close military relationship. --The Exim Bank and private American businessmen will continue to play a role in Iran's economic development. 4. Discuss frankly Soviet-Iranian relations: --The Soviet aim is to break up the Irano-American relationship and eventually to establish Soviet influence and presence in the Persian Gulf area. --Soviet-Iranian military deals confuse our public and Congress. --Mutually beneficial economic relations do not cause us concern as long as they do not endanger Iran's independence. 5. Congratulate him on Iran's progress, inquiring about his goals for the future--economics, social and political--and expressing the hope that projected increases in Iran's military expenditures will not inhibit economic development. Dean Rusk Attachment POINTS THE SHAH MAY RAISE AND SUGGESTED RESPONSES 1. United States Military Assistance for Iran a. The Shah will seek reassurance that we intend to maintain our close military cooperation and is likely to express a desire to obtain additional equipment and advisory assistance. b. You might respond that we will sympathetically consider any requests he may make for our assistance in developing a long-range military purchase program. Such assistance will have to be considered in the context of Congressional opinion and action on arms sales, and Iran is one of the countries we have had in mind in pressing the Congress for authority to continue extending credits for military sales. 2. Oil a. The Shah may ask that we urge American oil companies belonging to the Iranian Oil Consortium to recognize Iran's stability by greatly increasing their offtake from Iran and by participating in the construction of an Iranian-Turkish pipeline to the Mediterranean. b. You might respond by indicating that these are matters for the companies and by expressing the hope that Iran and the Oil Consortium will maintain the mutually beneficial relationship they have had in the past.
219. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson/1/ Washington, undated. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Iran, Visit of Shah (con't.), 8/22-24/67. Secret/Nodis. Filed with the August 15 memorandum from Rusk to Johnson, Document 218. SUBJECT The Shah has suggested to us that he might attempt to establish a new mechanism for arriving at a peaceful solution of the Vietnamese war. He has been thinking of bringing together a group of countries, such as Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Japan and Cambodia, which would have access to the United States, the USSR and Communist China and might open new doors for discussions of a possible solution. Such a group would work discreetly and not make public proposals. The Shah may again raise this idea in his discussions with you. We have told the Shah that we deeply appreciate his interest and concern and that we are interested in any effort by any government or group of governments to help achieve a peaceful solution. We have indicated that if the governments the Shah has in mind agree that such an effort would be worthwhile and if the effort would be discreet, we would be openhanded and frank in dealing with such a group. We have stressed that explicit approval by us of such an effort would be a kiss of death. Dean Rusk [Continue with the next documents] |
