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110. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State/1/ Tehran, November 28, 1965, 1730Z. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL IRAN-U.S. Secret. Repeated to CINCSTRIKE for POLAD, Ankara, Baghdad, Kabul, Karachi, London, Moscow, and USUN New York. 789. Country Team message. Shah and U.S. 1. Fathoming the Shah. To understand Iran one must understand Shah. This is not one-shot undertaking. Shah's personality undergoes steady metamorphosis. To understand current developments, such as authorization to borrow up to $200,000,000 for military purposes it is therefore necessary to fathom present state of Shah's mind. 2. Becoming more like father. Shah today is no longer ward of foreigners as in 1941-45, nor vacillating youth of late forties. Mosadeq era effected major conversion. While for decade leaning heavily on Uncle Sam's shoulders, Shah has increasingly become self-sufficient authority. Iran has been making remarkable strides. Shah believes it is because he knows better than anyone else how to handle his people. Former Ambassador George Allen/2/ aptly observed, "he is becoming more like his father." Old Reza Shah was tough, independent-minded, impulsive and autocratic. But he modernized Iran of his day. Shah is determined to do same. /2/George V. Allen was Ambassador to Iran May 11, 1946-February 17, 1948. 3. 1965 Model Shah. While it difficult dissect complex personality such as Shah's, following traits noteworthy at this stage his development: A. Hard worker. Shah is indefatigable worker. There is no tint of play-boy. Virtually every waking moment is invested in progress and security his country. This is dulling and can tend to foster sense of infallibility. Shah should have more diversions. B. Pretensions. Convinced that he has mastered job of pulling his listless and backward people forward, Shah knows that he is more firmly in saddle in Iran than ever before. This is fact which we must also recognize. It is not surprising that Shah feels his talents can have wider usefulness. Hence recent moves to build up his image in Afro-Asian world. At this point, however, his political ambitions in area do not include territorial aggrandizement, even Bahrain. On the whole his ambitions are constructive and responsible. C. Independent-mindedness (see Embtel 611)./3/ Even as he himself has learned to stand on own feet, Shah wants independent stance for his country. (As George Allen observes this is precise goal of U.S.G. policy since Azerbaijan days.) Soaring oil income makes independent policy possible economically. Politically, he is having inner tension between his basic beliefs which coincide with those of West and expediency of enhancing his image in unprincipled Afro-Asian political milieu. Shah cherishes his ties with U.S., but Viet-nam and Pakistan have shaken him badly. In Viet-nam, Diem was murdered and despite American military power, Shah fears end result may be negotiated settlement which in Iran's case could mean loss of wealthy Khuzistan. For Shah lesson of Pakistan is that Iran must have reasonably adequate military resources in event military supplies are shut off during regional conflict. Beyond these selfish considerations, Shah sincerely believes it is in US, as well as Iran's interest, that Iran itself be able cope with regional threats. Hence, his desire to have adequate military capability. /3/Dated October 19. (Department of State, Central Files, AID 6 IRAN) D. Surprise tactic. Over years Shah has learned that hesitation permits intrusion of opposing forces. When Soviets proposed non-aggression pact in 1959, delay in following it up permitted Western Ambassadors to block agreement. FonMin Aram tells me same thing happens in cabinet changes, i.e., Shah stages fait accompli. Steel mill transaction was initially [apparent omission] even before terms decided. Thus $200,000,000 borrowing authorization was rushed through before inevitable resistance could buildup either from within or from outside Iran. E. Congenital weaknesses. Shah's two greatest weaknesses stem from his father. He has obsession for things military. He is intolerant of criticism. These weaknesses require almost daily treatment. 4. Guilty conscience. Shah is self-confident and even a little cocky because of recent successes. He tells me his White Revolution has "taken wind out of sails" of Communist and National Front movements. Steel mill transaction, like eating of forbidden fruit, has given populace big lift. Yet Shah knows he is treading on dangerous territory. He, therefore, engages in rationalization and self-justification. A. Feigned grievances. As Dept knows, Shah has been dredging up whole set of grievances which are based on distortion (Embtels 244 and 776)./4/ Obviously he wishes to rationalize to us, and particularly to himself, his recent moves. /4/Documents 96 and 108. B. Sensitivity re small things. Shah has become increasingly sensitive to Iranian student criticism abroad, anti-regime articles in foreign press, Cuyler Young, etc. This past month PriMin Hoveyda, trying to be more royalist than Shah, threatened Turk Ambassador to recall Iran Ambassador from Ankara unless Turkish student who had criticized Shah were brought to trial. Fortunately FonMin Aram has throttled this stupidity. Similar case was Syrian PriMin's statement re Khuzistan re which Hoveyda made mountain of molehill. C. Alleged US infidelity. Shah is fully aware how US saved his regime in Azerbaijan crisis and in Mosadeq days. He also knows extent of our financial assistance. Yet in present state of mind he conjures up all sorts of spectres, e.g., USG could put Gudarzian in jail but really does not want to; McCloy letter to Ebtehaj/5/ shows USG is abetting Shah's enemies; no one in Washington appreciates really how in Kremlin Shah (alone among Afro-Asians) supported US policy in Viet-nam; delay in second tranche paper-work is retaliation for steel-mill transaction with Soviets: US supports Iraqis on Shatt-al-Arab; while economic aid to Iran is being terminated and military aid rapidly diminishing, USG continues subsidize generously those who undermine Western cause, e.g. Nasser and India; US is discriminating Iran on interest rates, etc. /5/Telegram 568 to Tehran, November 8, transmitted a letter from John McCloy to Ebtehaj stating that it would not be possible to take the latter's testimony by deposition. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 15-1 IRAN) 5. Shah feels misunderstood. Not all of Shah's complaints are due to self-rationalization. He is basically on our side. He is affording U.S. facilities of tremendous strategic importance. He has spoken up for us on Viet-nam when others have spit on us. He is piloting his country on an economic take-off. His efforts in this connection are gaining wider support and participation from skilled Western-trained civil servants. Shah's security problems cannot be dismissed lightly. Soviet-backed neighbors are receiving some military equipment superior in quality and quantity. Despite all that we have done in past, Shah feels U.S. today does not appreciate him nor understand his needs. 6. $200,000,000 Motivation. Shah is military expert. There is little doubt his present military posture is weak in air defense. While we may not agree, he understandably believes that Kharg Island and virtual forest of off-shore oil installations in Persian Gulf require security protection, including destroyers. In Shah's view, other countries in this area, whether US allies like Turkey or Soviet-supported outfits like Egypt, Iraq and Afghanistan, have equipment better both in quantity and quality, notably SAM's and MIGs. A pilot himself, he is envious of Mach 2.3 MIG speeds. Since he now has financial resources of his own, Shah is determined to maintain parity, hopefully via supplies from his closest friends, the Americans; but if not from whatever sources available. He has mentioned to me several times that while he was in Moscow Soviets offered him MIGs. As Shah sees it, greatest need is in anti-aircraft and naval equipment. (We have impression that General Khatemi, who is realist as well as admirer of US Air Force equipment, has toned Shah down for moment re more highly supersonic aircraft.) In any case, Shah himself has indicated that about $80,000,000 of new $200,000,000 authorization will have to go for increased costs of already agreed U.S.-Iran military program. 7. Our monopoly is cracking. I am convinced we no longer have ability dictate Shah's policies, including details his military establishment. Our agreement of 1962 was intended to do that. It lasted only until 1964, when revision was unavoidable. But even 1964 agreement was signed under Iranian protest. We hoped our grant aid "sweetener" would retain our dominance. It has not. He has told me he would hate to change American pattern in which his military establishment is molded but unless U.S. recognizes his security requirements he has no choice. Thus his move to obtain $200,000,000 additional authorization from Majlis is not ploy to obtain favor from U.S. (Deptel 591)./6/ He is deadly serious. If U.S. were to denounce our 1962-64 agreements, in his present mood, Shah could just as easily obtain additional authorizations from Majlis to replace American military program. In fact, it could be portrayed as another triumph for Iran's independence. Such a move might be foolhardy on Shah's part, but as Ambassador Grady/7/ observed years ago, "One cannot assume that Iranians will not cut off their nose to spite their face." /6/See footnote 2, Document 105. /7/Henry F. Grady was Ambassador to Iran July 2, 1950-September 19, 1951. 8. Soviet potentiality. While I know my Washington colleagues are weary of Ambassadors raising Soviet bogey, I must place on record these possibilities: 1) Soviet readiness to supply Iran with military equipment even MIGs 2) Shah's interest, revived from 1959 days when he turned Soviets down because West insisted, in non-aggression pact as replacement for onerous Soviet-Iran 1921 treaty. At present Commie clandestine radios are concentrating heavy attack on U.S.-Iran military relationship, urging ouster of ARMISH/MAAG. This is all part of perennial Czarist-Soviet aim of penetration to warm water port. Worth reading is authentic Tudeh document (CAS NIT-6894) where Soviets themselves describe present phase as "cultivating the land" before overthrow of Shah and "imposition of socialism". 9. Art of possible. Given foregoing, it strikes us that most sensible course is for U.S.G. to adjust its relationship with Shah to "be responsive to his basic security needs" (Deptel 561)./8/ To be rigid and insist on compliance to letter with unaltered 1964 agreement (and his withdrawal of $200,000,000 bill) would defeat very objectives we sought in those agreements. We would lose our influence on Shah in military field and other fields as well. It is much better in our view to hold Shah to aims of those agreements by recognizing that modifications are possible. This will permit us to retain considerable leverage in his military planning. It will also permit us to use solid citizens like General Khatemi to curb some of Shah's extreme desires (Khatemi has told us of his annoyance that other supreme commanders and sycophants fail to air with Shah Iran's limitations such as trained manpower). Incidentally, it may be that some diversification in sources of Shah's military procurement would be of value to U.S. by removing onus that U.S. is Shah's exclusive support in vital military field. In any case, by maintaining dialogue with Shah re things military we can retain influence in whole spectrum of our relations. Furthermore, by picking up large portion of $200,000,000 business we could help our dollar balance, which we gather is still problem of major concern in Washington. /8/Dated November 3. (Department of State, Central Files, AID 6 IRAN) 10. Top priority: second tranche. At moment, our military relationship with Shah, and much of our political relationship, is stymied by lack of response from Washington re second tranche documentation. As indicated in Embtel 611, favorable response with 4 percent interest rate can help us retain fruitful relationship with Shah. In our conversation 25th (Embtel 776), Shah made clear this one problem is fateful road-block in pathway of continued friendly U.S.-Iran relations. In his present mood Shah considers delay as proof positive that Washington has lost interest in him. It is my sincere hope Washington will give us speedy indication that paper-work is cleared, hopefully with 4 percent interest rate. On our end, we can make clear that such rate would not necessarily apply to purchases under new $200,000,000 authorization. 11. Have money, will buy. IBRD has indicated Iran highly credit-worthy with capability assume additional $200,000,000 worth of debt annually through 1967 (Embtel 724)./9/ Shah is going to buy additional equipment (in effect $120,000,000 more than what we have agreed). To extent possible he wants to "buy American." We think favorable attitude on our part is in our interest: a) to maintain our military cooperation (including strategic facilities); b) to help our gold outflow problem; and c) to maintain friendly political relationship which has until this year been thriving between our two countries. First step is breaking second tranche log jam. /9/Dated November 16. (Ibid., DEF 19-8 U.S.-IRAN) 12. Protection of investment. Foregoing is not to suggest that we cater to Shah's every whim. Until now we believe our differences re scope of military program here have been honest differences of judgment. Iran's shift on ChiRep issue, I am convinced, was not premeditated move by Shah. In fact we have every hope of repairing Iran's position to large extent. To influence his behavior re this and other issues we need maintain friendly dialogue which has characterized our relations over years. Vast sums we have invested in Iran have succeeded in saving this country from chaos and Communism and Shah knows this. Our help has assisted Iran to stand on its own feet. USAID economic assistance is being terminated. Our technical assistance program is being phased out. Our military aid program is also tapering off. In recommending that we unfreeze second tranche and maintain military cooperation on adjusted basis, our conviction is that this will help insure that after take-off Iran will still remain member of our flying club. Meyer
111. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State/1/ Tehran, December 2, 1965, 0950Z. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19-8 U.S.-IRAN. Confidential. Repeated to Karachi. 808. Shah and U.S. 1. In phone call Dec. 01 FornMin Aram said Shah had instructed him to express to us his gratification for U.S.G.'s favorable response on second tranche interest rate./2/ Aram said Shah is extremely pleased this problem finally settled and happily so. Shah told Aram to reaffirm his desire for continued close harmony in military matters and his wish to "buy American." /2/Telegram 629 to Tehran, November 29, informed the Embassy that the U.S. Government had approved a 4 percent interest rate to be applied to the second tranche of the $200 million military credit sales program. (Ibid.) 2. Since Pak FornMin Bhutto visiting here 2nd, I took occasion to refer Aram to Assistant Secretary Hare's talk with Khosrovani, particularly re important and useful role which Iran is playing in keeping channel open for exchanging information and ideas (Deptel 637)./3/ Aram welcomed this word and again indicated Shah and he hope to do some useful missionary work on Bhutto particularly vis-à-vis Pak-ChiCom relations. /3/Dated November 30. (Ibid., POL IRAN-U.S.) Comment: Hare-Khosrovani hand-holding exercise was very helpful. Meyer
112. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, December 4, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence File--Iran, Shah Correspondence, Vol. I. Limited Official Use. A handwritten notation on the source text indicates that it was received at the LBJ Ranch on December 10 at 9:30 a.m. A second handwritten notation reads: "Passed to Bromley Smith 12-11-65, 3:45 p. JJ." The Shah has promised to send a medical team to Vietnam, and we recommend the attached note thanking him./2/ /2/Attached to the source text is a copy of telegram 683 to Tehran, December 13, transmitting the President's message of thanks to the Shah. He has been in one of his gloomy moods lately, fearing that we're backing away from him. (Ayub's experience has shaken him badly.) But his heart is in the right place; he approved the team almost on the spot because he knows of your personal interest. So this is an inexpensive way of showing you haven't deserted him./3/ /3/The approval line is checked on the source text. McG.B.
113. Memorandum for the Record/1/ Washington, December 21, 1965, 2 p.m. /1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency Files: Job 78-03805R, US Govt--Special Group CI & 303. Secret. Drafted by C.G. Moody, Jr., Executive Secretary of the Special Group (CI). SUBJECT PRESENT Governor Harriman, Mr. Marks, Mr. Komer, Mr. Gaud vice Mr. Bell, Mr. McNaughton vice Mr. Vance, Mr. Karamessines vice Admiral Raborn, General Anthis vice General Wheeler Messrs. Sayre, Davies, and Maechling were present for the meeting [Here follows discussion of other subjects.] 3. Progress Report on Internal Defense Plan for Iran Mr. Davies briefly reviewed the memorandum, explaining that the recent agreement with the Soviet Union for the construction of a steel mill is another manifestation of the Shah's desire for a more independent posture. He explained that an increasing ruble balance over the years would bring closer economic ties between Iran and the Soviet Union. The Chairman asked if we are prepared to sell the ships and planes requested by the Shah. Mr. McNaughton replied that the question of ships is out. Mr. Komer suggested that we sell planes to the Shah and let the British sell them ships. The Chairman pointed out that the Shah is concerned over our reliability as a supplier of spare parts for military equipment in light of our recent stand in Pakistan. Mr. Davies said that the Bureau of Near East Asia supports the Country Team's recommendation that future progress reports be submitted on an Ad Hoc basis. Mr. Komer expressed concern over the complacency of recent reports and apparent concentration on short term factors. He suggested that the Group keep a close watch on Iran. The Group agreed with the Chairman's recommendation that the Ambassador report quarterly by letter on the situation rather than through an IDP progress report and endorsed Mr. Komer's suggestion that the letter report reflect concern for future contingencies. [Here follows discussion of another subject.] C.G. Moody, Jr.
114. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State/1/ Tehran, December 29, 1965, 0835Z. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19 U.S.-IRAN. Confidential. Repeated to CINCEUR, CINCSTRIKE, London, and Paris. 929. US-Iran Military Cooperation. 1. Shah's Purposes. In conversation 28th, Shah made studied effort to persuade U.S.G. of: a) what he considers need for $200,000,000 augmentation Iran's military establishment, and b) his desire to maintain U.S. supply pattern to maximum extent possible. 2. Reasons for Revision. In citing reasoning behind augmentation Shah cited: A. 1964 Reservations. When 1964 Memo of Understanding was signed Iranian authorities, according to Shah, had made clear their belief that joint military program envisaged was inadequate, particularly since circumstances might change. Furthermore, Iran as independent country had reserved right to alter program if it determined it to be necessary for national self-defense. B. International Developments. Since 1964, there have been various international developments which have left their imprint on Iran's judgment of its defense needs: (1) Vietnam where USG intervention is necessary but not particularly desirable course of action; (2) Indo-Pak hostilities with lesson that a small nation must have sufficient independent defense capability to handle itself in regional quarrel for up to three months; (3) Cyprus where Soviets playing chameleon role but people of country still suffer; and (4) instability and uncertainty of Arab world as witness collapse of Haradh Conference, Nasser's non-withdrawal from Yemen, Iraq's subservience to Nasser and ever festering Arab-Israel question. C. Persian Gulf Vulnerability. More specifically Iran's attention is increasingly riveted on Persian Gulf because of: (1) almost inevitable British withdrawal; (2) Syrian and Iraqi agitation re Khuzistan; (3) development of Kharg Island which makes Iranian crude oil exports almost totally vulnerable to one surprise attack; (4) King Faisal's increased interest in cooperating with Iran, but until both have military establishment of reasonable respectability such cooperation is ephemeral; and (5) Iran's obvious destiny along with Saudis, as heirs to British, to protest security and tranquillity of Gulf not only from predatory regional threateners but in interest of whole free world. D. Unfavorable Comparisons. As far as Iran's defense is concerned, Shah believes that USG has "built two-thirds of dam" and should complete it if Iran's defensive role is to be useful. Shah again noted Saudis, who have much less need than Iran, are being allowed to purchase $400,000,000 or more from Western sources, including three battalions of Hawk missiles. He wondered why we continue to "beef up" Turkey in much more favorable way than Iran, e.g. nine destroyers, submarines, etc. (I noted: his impression of U.S. MAP program in Turkey is exaggerated, Turkey has always had much larger military establishment, Turkey has no $500,000,000 annual oil income, and in U.S. public opinion Turkey still ranks high for its effective role with U.S. in Korean War.) Shah went on to point out Soviet-supplied neighbors, notably Iraq, continue to get MIG-21's and other equipment more efficient than what Iran has. E. U.S. Ally. Making clear his continued dedication to U.S.-Iran alliance, Shah once again said if Soviets cross frontier it would be world war and Iran would count on U.S. support. He believed however that Soviets at least for present have peaceful intentions. If regional hostilities were to develop, Shah added, he doubted, as he had observed to NYTimes man Brady, that Iran could "count on" active U.S. military help. Conclusion, therefore, was clear: Iran itself must be in position to cope with such trouble. 3. Nature of Augmentation. Shah listed his additional military needs as follows: A. Anti-aircraft Defense. Shah said he anxious to have U.S. military expert survey Iran's air defense needs, so as to determine where various items such as Hawks and early warning equipment can most efficiently be installed to give Iran best protection. He said he is considering British bloodhounds but seemed interested when I suggested his greatest threat is from low-level attack which is better countered by Hawks. B. Aircraft. Shah said there is no question Iran will need higher performance aircraft than F-5. Question is which one. He disclosed he is giving serious consideration to Mirage, which he considers equal to MIG-21. There is also possibility of F-4C but price is probably $2,500,000 or $3,000,000 which is almost twice as much as Mirage. TFX would be best plane but Iran cannot afford aircraft which costs $5,000,000 or more per copy. Shah said his first choice F5X if and when it ever goes into production. As Shah sees picture, two squadrons of one of these higher performance aircraft should replace the eighth and ninth F-5 squadrons which according 1964 agreement Iran would purchase from U.S. Meanwhile, Shah feels that for efficiency purposes size of present F-5 squadrons should be increased from 13 to 16 planes each. He said Iran is prepared to purchase 21 F-5's necessary to enlarge seven MAP F-5 squadrons to this size. C. Naval Vessels. Shah said present key question is whether in expanding his naval security capability in Gulf he should get three small vessels (presumably recommended by British to General Toufanian) or one modern destroyer which Chief of Italian Navy recommended (at cost of $40,000,000). Noting problems of manning ships when present Iranian Navy already understaffed, I told Shah he wise in taking careful look before he leaps. D. Tanks. Shah said his M-47 tanks will eventually be phased out and he remains interested in possibility of Sheridans as their replacement. 4. U.S. Attitude. After appropriate remarks concerning longstanding friendly US-Iran relationship in military field, I told Shah his explanation of situation would be helpful in Washington. It no secret that recent $200,000,000 authorization had caught his U.S. friends by surprise. It not our intention to back-seat drive, but we did have close relationship translated into mutual commitments in 1964 agreement designed to provide Iran with biggest bang per buck. He must realize questions would inevitably arise in Washington, notably on Capitol Hill, as to need for USMAP grant component in that program if program ignored by Iran. I acknowledged it is difficult to argue that 1964 circumstances immutable, but at same time we would need valid explanations such as he had just given in order persuade Congress to continue providing necessary funds. It was good particularly to hear, I said, that he continues to respect 1964 agreement, even though he considers modifications necessary. 5. U.S. Pattern. Shah said it obvious Iran has every interest in continuing to obtain military equipment from U.S. To change pattern of supply would only compound Iran's military problems. He therefore sincerely hoped that U.S.G. would consider his revised needs promptly and let him know at an early date prices, financing terms and availability. He emphasized that while decisions must be made in near future, point is that in most cases it would be two or three years before equipment would actually be delivered. 6. Economic Frame-work. While appreciating Shah's eagerness to make decisions, I noted that important element in our 1964 agreement was fitting Iranian military program into Iran's economic capability. Shah reiterated his usual points that economic development is useless if it is not secure and that Iran's income is continually rising (again he mentioned $2,000,000,000 target by 1970). Moreover, his Chief Financial Advisor, Central Bank Governor Mehdi Samii, had noted that recent parliamentary authorization for $200,000,000 in fact made it possible for Iran to contract for more than that amount of military equipment if necessary. Shah again noted that 1964 program would cost $280,000,000 or $80,000,000 more than anticipated (including addition of 60 to 90 day supply of ammo. Ninety day supply is necessary, Shah said, because in any case it requires three months to transport materiel from U.S. and off-loading of explosives is impossible in heat of Persian Gulf summers.) Shah said his economists had recently produced economic data which made clear Iran's capability for proposed military purchases but he did not seem clear whether this was last annual review or something subsequent. In any case, Shah said he realized U.S.G.'s interest in economic aspects of his military program and he would assure that appropriate consultations would take place. Comment. Believe this conversation has been helpful in restoring to some degree dialogue re Iran-U.S. military relationship. At same time it is clear Shah is determined to make early decisions, specifically re anti-aircraft equipment, high performance aircraft, and naval vessels. Re anti-aircraft equipment, we can gain time and keep Shah content by favorable response to request for experts' survey which he has now thrice made (Embtel 850/2/ and Shah's talk with Jablonski 23d). Re naval craft, I am sure Shah would similarly appreciate some expert US advice. Even though he has not made specific request. Most troublesome item will be aircraft. For year now, Shah has been eager because of long lead-time to make decisions with respect to post F-5 period. Obviously French salesmen have gotten to him glamorizing the Mirage and such representations by French and others will undoubtedly whet his appetite further. One way of forestalling precipitate action in this field would be to provide info re prospects of an F5X. If Shah felt there were hope of his buying F5X, we would not need to worry about Mirages, Lightnings or even MIGs. /2/Dated December 10. (Ibid., POL IRAN-U.S.) Meyer
When Averell Harriman met with the Shah in Tehran on January 3, 1966, he conveyed President Johnson's greetings and warm appreciation for his support on Vietnam. The Shah said that he had made his position clear on trips to various world capitals, i.e., that stopping aggression in Vietnam, as elsewhere, was a matter of vital principle. Emphasizing the need to recognize world opinion, however, he also stated that he unqualifiedly supported the President's initiative in the bombing pause. He pointed out that resuming the bombing too early would lend credence to Soviet propaganda claiming the U.S. peace moves were a "facade" before further escalation. (Text of telegram 954 from Tehran, January 4; Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 18, 1/3-2/23/66. Another copy of telegram 954 is in Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)
116. Special Defense Intelligence Agency Intelligence Supplement/1/ SIS-281-66 Washington, January 28, 1966. /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 70 A 4443, Iran 381, 28 Jan 66. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. The study was prepared in response to a request from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. ASSESSMENT OF NON-SOVIET THREAT TO IRAN
Conclusions Iran's Ability to Cope with the Real Non-Soviet Military Threat The arms inventory of the Arabs continues to increase in quantity and quality, but reportedly for use against Israel. The Arab's capacity to absorb sophisticated equipment is limited, however. Such equipment could be employed on a selective basis against Iran, e.g., Iraqi fighter aircraft, Iraqi and UAR bombers, and UAR naval craft. Its use en toto against Iran is unlikely in the next five years in view of inter-Arab rifts, Arab fears of an Israeli preemptive attack, and of current Arab commitments in Yemen and against the Kurds. Neither the Iraqi ground forces nor the estimated projected improvement of the Iraq Air Force pose a very formidable threat to Iran. The source of Iran's wealth and subsequent ability to develop itself has been and is likely to remain its oil-rich southwest. Iran has recently realized that its concentration at Abadan and the supplying oil fields must be spread out, and it has taken steps to accomplish this dispersion. Additionally, it is developing other capital investments--and potential targets--throughout Iran. Although this dispersion will make each target relatively less important if it is destroyed, concurrently they will become more difficult to defend and will require ever-increasing amounts of defensive equipment--which the Iranians do not have the trained personnel to operate. The Iranian AC and W System currently faces north. Regardless of how tight the Iranian defense system may become, however, some aggressive segment of an attacking force is more than likely going to reach its objective. Iran's Ability to Cope with the Real Non-Soviet, Non-Military Threat The urbanization likely to follow the increase in capital development will bring with it the problems already evident in other areas of the world--problems of housing, jobs, and food shortages which provocateurs will attempt to use to their advantage. The mullahs used these problems in June 1963 to instigate the urban riots which were strongly repressed by military forces and which can and probably will be repressed in the future. The bad effects of the traditional landlord-peasant relationship and the tribal nomadism have been broken, in part, by the land-reform program. This program will continue, but it will be phased so as to disrupt as little as possible. Social reforms will likewise be continued, but at a pace which will not alienate the conservatives. The Medical Corps and the Literacy Corps will receive more emphasis to implement these reforms. A more literate public will expect a larger share of the economic and social benefits from Iran's oil wealth. This is reported to be true in Khuzistan, the source of the oil, not only of the sizable Arab population there but of the other inhabitants as well; some tribes claim that the oil fields were taken from them. The exact number of Arabs in the population of the province is not known, although reports indicate that at least 100,000 Arabs live in the sugar cane area north of Abadan and another 100,000 live in the date groves to the south. The latest census of Iran (1956) counted about 2,000,000 people in the entire province. An estimate of the number of Arab-speaking people in the province is about 500,000, half of Iran's Arabs. In line with the historic aversion of the Persians to the "late-coming" Arabs, the Government of Iran until recently had not given much thought to the far-off Khuzistanis, especially the Arabs. Currently, however, it has indicated the district's importance and the potential for subversion of its Arab population. It has increased the amount of government funds spent there and has instituted some repressive measures against the Arabs. Although reports indicate that the Arabs have become less apathetic than heretofore, continued interest in the area by Tehran should preclude the start of the type of terrorism that changed British policy in Palestine and Cyprus and is working against UK presence in Aden. Possibly a greater danger to the government's operation of the oil fields will occur if the labor unions which are planned there get out of hand. The government is attempting to permit the laborers to "let off steam" by establishing several tightly controlled unions. These unions might merge and subversive elements could inflame attitudes as they did recently in Bahrein. The government appears to have recognized this potential problem. Whether it is willing to mend its autocratic and bureaucratic ways and satisfy the aspirations of the laborers and the other Khuzistanis, including the Arabs, however, is open to question. [Here follows the body of the paper.]
117. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/ JCSM-67-66 Washington, February 1, 1966. /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 70 A 4443, Iran 091.3 MAP. Secret. SUBJECT 1. (U) In response to a memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), I-20358/66, dated 18 January 1966, subject: "Constitution of a Military Survey Team, Iran,"/2/ the Joint Chiefs of Staff have requested CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA to activate such a team to proceed to Iran by mid-February 1966. /2/Not printed. (Ibid.) Telegram 992 from Tehran, January 10, reported that the Shah had requested that a U.S. group of experts be sent to Iran to make a long-range air defense study. Meyer urged a prompt affirmative response. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 1-4 IRAN) On January 20 Meyer and Jablonsky informed the Shah of U.S. readiness to send a tri-service military survey team to make a professional appraisal of Iran's security needs. (Telegram 1040 from Tehran, January 20; ibid., DEF 19-9 U.S.-IRAN) 2. (S) As requested, the team will be tri-Service to permit a comprehensive assessment of the full range of the Shah's stated requirements in air defense and for improving the Iranian Navy. The team also will be prepared to address other requirements which may emerge during the course of its in-country survey. 3. (S) The team will be headed by a general officer and such additional technically qualified officers as may be required to examine the following areas: a. The air threat to Iran and the minimum essential requirements for meeting that threat by a balanced air defense system, composed of a proper mix of air defense aircraft and missiles, supported by an adequate ground environment. b. The threats to Iranian ports, installations, and shipping in the Persian Gulf and the minimum essential naval surface forces required to counter those threats and to assist in the enforcement of Iranian law in its territorial waters. c. The minimum essential requirements for meeting other materiel needs; e.g., armor. 4. (S) The team is setting aside two full days prior to departing for briefings as requested by and at the convenience of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA). Additionally, CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA has been requested to submit the "U.S. Eyes Only" and sanitized versions of the report to the Joint Chiefs of Staff within ten days after the team has returned to the CONUS, with advance copies of both reports to be submitted concurrently to you and to the Secretary of State. The views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the findings and recommendations of the team will be submitted within three weeks after the team returns. 5. (S) Detailed terms of reference (see the Appendix hereto)/3/ for the survey team have been tailored to center on maintaining the primacy of the U.S. military presence in Iran at a moderate cost to Iranian resources. The objective of keeping Iranian military procurement at a level consistent with legitimate military requirements against the spectrum of threats to Iran, while minimizing the impact of military procurement on Iranian economic development, has been emphasized in the terms of reference and is further reflected in the U.S. Government-approved background data provided in the Annexes hereto. Finally, the terms of reference accommodate the fundamental reality that future military equipment assistance to Iran should be related to its ability to absorb and maintain that equipment. /3/Not printed. For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
118. Memorandum From the Assistant Administrator for Near East and South Asia of the Agency for International Development (Macomber) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs (Kitchen)/1/ Washington, February 2, 1966. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 12-5 IRAN. Secret. SUBJECT I have discussed with Dave Bell Iran's intention to purchase $200 million of military equipment. It is our view that this action by Iran is contrary to the spirit of the 1962 and 1964 agreements. We believe such a purchase will have an adverse impact on Iran's economic development. We realize that the U.S. probably cannot prevent Iran from making such a purchase. Moreover, any attempt to do so would likely damage the national and security interests of the U.S. in the Middle East. Nonetheless, we believe the following steps should be taken: 1. An analysis of the impact on Iran's economic and social development be highlighted in the annual review under the terms of the 1964 agreement, and a) this review in Tehran be attended by a senior representative from AID/W, b) the time for the review be moved up to occur before final agreement on the sale. 2. The Country Team should argue to the GOI that the threat the Shah envisages is not great, but the impact on Iran's economic development would be severe. Iran would be better off to shift its expenditures to capital investment and social progress. 3. In arriving at final agreement, the U.S. should seek to reduce the actual amount purchased and stretch out the delivery time over the long-est possible period of years. 4. AID should concur in and help prepare the instructions given to the military team to be sent out in mid-February. Meanwhile, while discussions are continuing among State, DOD, AID, and the White House Staff, I would propose that no commitment be made to the Government of Iran. WM
119. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (McNaughton) to Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/ I-21036/66 Washington, February 16, 1966. /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 70 N 6648, 381 IRAN 16 Feb 1966. Secret. A stamped note on the margin of the source text reads "Mr. McNaughton has seen." SUBJECT I. Problem: The Shah of Iran has become increasingly concerned over what he views as a mounting Arab threat to Iran's security. We have accordingly agreed, after several months of discussion, to conduct a survey of Iranian military requirements against the non-Soviet threat. The Survey Team will arrive in Iran on 16 February. The Survey Team's Terms of Reference direct that all recommendations be in full consonance with the U.S. objective of maintaining our position as primary arms supplier to Iran, while limiting equipment purchases to legitimate requirements and minimizing the impact on Iran's economic and social development. The Team does require, however, supplemental guidance as to specific items of U.S. equipment it can consider in formulating a response to Iran. II. Discussion: As you will recall, the 1964 U.S.-Iranian Memorandum of Understanding called for Iran to purchase two squadrons of F-5 interceptors during the late 1960s to supplement the seven squadrons provided by MAP grant aid. Soon after the agreement was signed, the Shah informed us that the introduction of Soviet-built MIG-21 aircraft into neighboring Arab countries, particularly Iraq, made it "imperative" for him to buy a higher performance aircraft than the F-5. In this context he has mentioned an improved F-5, the F-4 or the F-111 as possible substitutes. In a study of Iran's air defense requirements prepared for ISA last fall, the Joint Chiefs of Staff indicated their belief that Iran had a genuine need for a higher performance aircraft than the F-5 and recommended that the U.S. sell the Iranians two squadrons (UE-13) of F-4s in the 1967-1973 time frame. Another of the Shah's felt needs is an anti-aircraft system to defend key air bases and oil installations in western and southwestern Iran. The Shah deferred his decision on choice of weapons pending a U.S. decision on what we intended to procure for U.S. forces. When informed in December that the U.S. had chosen the gun (Vulcan)/Chaparral mix, the Shah expressed interest in procuring the system, providing that price and availability were reasonable. Although I understand U.S. requirements are expected to saturate Vulcan and Chaparral production capacity until FY 70, it might become politically desirable to be prepared to offer Iran one or two battalions from current production before U.S. requirements for 22 battalions are fully satisfied in 1970. The Shah also wants a tank to replace the M-47s now in inventory, and expressed keen interest in the Sheridan during last year's Annual Review of the 1964 agreement. Army production of the Sheridan is scheduled to peak at 50 a month in FY 68 and a phased delivery to Iran, beginning in the last half of CY 68, could be worked into the Army's production schedule. In the naval area, the Shah believes he needs destroyer types to meet the threat to his oil installations in the Persian Gulf area, and an Iranian purchase team recently visited Western Europe to secure price and availability data on various equipment items, including new-construction destroyers. In general we believe the Shah exaggerates the non-Soviet threat to Iran, and would like to discourage his purchase of highly sophisticated weaponry. We concede that Iranian air defenses in the southwest could be strengthened and a follow-on tank deserves consideration, but we regard the Persian Gulf naval threat as minimal. On the other hand, the Shah has purchasing power and a determination to modernize his forces, so our continued political relations depend on a moderately forthcoming response. III. Recommendations: That you authorize the U.S. Survey Team, Iran, in assessing Iranian requirements, to consider the following U.S. materiel for possible sale to Iran. This authorization would be for planning purposes only./2/ The findings of the Survey Team will be subject to a careful interagency review before a commitment is made. /2/The words "for planning purposes only" are underlined and initialed by McNamara. 1. Sale from new production of up to two squadrons (U/E, 13 each) of F-4 aircraft, in lieu of two F-5 squadrons, for delivery in approximately CY 70./3/ /3/McNamara initialed his approval of this recommendation on February 19 and added "reluctantly & for planning only." 2. Sale of up to two squadrons of F-5C aircraft, in lieu of F-5A/Bs, for delivery in CY 1968./4/ /4/McNamara initialed his approval of recommendations 2, 3, and 4. 3. Sale of the sanitized Sparrow (AIM-7-N). 4. Sale from new production of up to two battalions of Gun/Chaparral for phased delivery between CYs 68-70. 5. Sale from new production of up to 150 Sheridan tanks, with Shillelagh missiles, for phased delivery between CYs 68-70./5/ /5/McNamara initialed his approval of this recommendation and added "or earlier if he wishes." 6. Sale from new construction of one DE or DD-type ship (Hull class DD, Dealy Class DE, DEG or DDG) for delivery in CY 70-71./6/ /6/McNamara initialed his disapproval of this recommendation. John T. McNaughton [Continue with the next documents] |
