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Iran 1. Letter From President Johnson to the Shah of Iran/1/ Washington, January 2, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence File, Iran--Presidential Correspondence. No classification marking. Your Majesty: I am delighted that my friend Sargent Shriver is visiting Iran, and can deliver this personal message to you./2/ I wish that I could come back to Tehran myself; my heart is warmed even now by memories of the welcome which you, the Empress, and your subjects of high and low estate extended to the Johnsons last year. Unfortunately, the press of work makes it impossible for me to be with you now other than in spirit. /2/Shriver visited Iran January 14-20 in the dual capacity of Peace Corps Director and personal emissary of President Johnson. He delivered the President's letter during a personal meeting with the Shah on January 15. (Telegram 648 from Tehran, January 16; Department of State, Central Files, ORG 7 PC) The circumstances which elevated me to the awesome responsibility of this office still weigh heavily upon me. I know that you, too, feel deeply the loss. I was helped in the period of immediate shock and sorrow following the tragedy by your kindness in sending Prince Gholam Reza to extend your sympathy and Iran's. Since my own trip to Iran I have followed with great interest the strides Iran is making under your leadership toward a new birth of freedom and justice in your ancient land. In freeing the energies of Iran's peasantry and laborers, as well as the women, you have taken a difficult and courageous step. You have proven your faith and confidence in the Iranian people and your resistance to alien pressures. You will be misunderstood and you will be maligned. That is the price of historical movement--the price of progress. But you will also be admired and loved by your people./3/ /3/A January 3 memorandum to Shriver from NSC staff member Robert Komer stated: "One of JFK's unheralded achievements was to con our nervous Shah into stressing reform and modernization at home, instead of constantly bleeding to us about his need for more arms to deter the Soviets and even Nasser. Every time the Shah said 'more arms,' the President came back with `more reform.' Now we've got the Shah thinking he's a 20th Century reformer (and not doing a bad job of it). You might try the same recipe." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Robert W. Komer Files, RWK CHRON FILE, January-June 1964 [3 of 3]) I have asked Sargent Shriver to convey to you our deep appreciation for your warm welcome to the 45 Peace Corps Volunteers in your country. Since its birth under President Kennedy, I have regarded the Peace Corps as one of the most imaginative instruments ever devised for capturing the idealism of youth and putting it to work in the cause of world peace and understanding. Our Volunteers have benefited enormously from their experience in your country. The United States will also benefit as they return, with broader horizons and greater understanding of the world, to take their places in our society. They will add a new dimension to American life. I only hope that, while with you, they have contributed in some small way to the well-being of your people and to their understanding of us. I realize now, even better than I did when last we met, just how heavy is the burden of ultimate responsibility for the security of one's country. In searching for words to convey to you our response to Iran's concerns, let me repeat what I said to your entire nation when I left Iran more than a year ago: "We of the United States know that a free Iran is vital to freedom everywhere, and that as long as freedom stands, Iran's independence and Iran's control over its own destiny will not be compromised. We shall walk beside you toward the new horizons of human dignity. Let me assure you that as long as you walk this road, you'll never walk alone." Those words came from my heart and from the heart of my country when I spoke them. They still do. Sincerely, Lyndon B. Johnson/4/ /4/A handwritten postscript at the end of the letter reads: "Please convey the high regard and warm wishes Mrs. Johnson and I both entertain for the Empress--LBJ."
2. Letter From the Shah of Iran to President Johnson/1/ Tehran, January 7, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence File, Iran--Presidential Correspondence. No classification marking. The copy of the Shah's letter in the Department of State is attached to a covering memorandum indicating that the original was delivered by the Iranian Embassy to the Department on January 17. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 15-1 US/Johnson) Dear Mr. President, I have been recalling with pleasure impressions of your memorable but short visit to Teheran, in the company of Mrs. Johnson and your daughter. It was indeed gratifying to have had the occasion to meet you again personally. For the citizens of our capital it was a rare and cherished opportunity to have a glimpse of a kind-hearted and affable personality of your stature, to show their genuine admiration for you and to extend to you, as you no doubt witnessed, their spontaneous and cordial welcome. Such personal contacts and human relationships make for more sincere cooperation, still better understanding and closer ties of friendship between our two countries. Let me express the earnest hope that the United States, under your wise and capable leadership will further succeed in her continued efforts to usher in a new era of peace and prosperity for mankind. I am quite confident, Mr. President, that your wisdom and high statesmanship, as well as your long and intimate association with American politics and extensive knowledge and experience of world affairs, will prove invaluable assets in the successful discharge of the heavy responsibilities of your high office both in the United States and abroad. Since your visit, Mr. President, much has happened in Iran. A comprehensive programme of far-reaching social, political and economic reforms, of which you were then given a brief account, has now been fully implemented. These reforms have transformed completely the entire structure of our society, and placed its foundations firmly upon the enlightened and progressive principles of our time. In their application, varying political slogans which essentially cater for the interests of only a certain class of society played no part. The guiding principle of our national policy is the realization of that which is advantageous to the interests of a free and independent society. That the Iranian people wholeheartedly supported the cause of our revolutionary reforms was amply manifested at the referendum of January 1963, and during our recent general elections. I am certain that you are already familiar with these events. Our position today, from the point of view of internal stability, national prestige, and our people's confident hope for a better life has reached a point where, if no external dangers should threaten us, gives us reason to look to the future with well-founded optimism and confidence. Turning to conditions outside Iran, we are thankful that the firm and far-sighted policy of the United States has led the world to the threshold of a period of relaxation of international tension, and that the Soviet Union seems, for the present at least, to have discarded the use of force as an instrument of her foreign policy. In these circumstances, I believe, Mr. President, co-existence with Russia, in the face of the Chinese peril to universal peace, commends itself as the wisest course to adopt; bearing in mind that until such time that complete and general disarmament with full and precise control becomes a reality, the fundamental question of our time, namely the preservation of peace, remains unsolved. Meanwhile, it is a matter of course that we should be well-disposed to undertake any step or action that would contribute to the realization of this goal, provided, of course, that in so doing we do not compromise our principles. Your illustrious predecessor, in a letter written to me just before his tragic demise, had asked my opinion, in view of our past experiences with the Soviet Union, on the question of the bruited non-aggression treaty between NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries. You are well aware, Mr. President, that in 1959 we were on the point of signing with the Soviet Union a non-aggression treaty for a period of some 30 or even 50 years. Their rather ridiculous initial conditions, however, delayed the negotiations for a few days. In the meantime, we received messages from the Presidents of the United States, Turkey and Pakistan warning us of the dangers of such a step. We were even reminded of the fate of the Baltic States. The reason they advanced was that if any action of this nature were to be taken, it would have to be on behalf of all the countries of the free world; in other words, that such an action would have to be collective, if the free world's united front were to remain intact. This reasoning I found convincing, and I believe that it holds true even today. There can be no objection, in principle, to the conclusion of a non-aggression treaty between NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries; it may even be fruitful; but what, may in that case be asked, will be the impact of such a treaty on the regional member nations of the Central Treaty Organization? Where will American and British obligations to CENTO stand? Will Russia, then, be allowed to have a free hand to do as she pleases elsewhere? In such a situation--should it arise--it is not unlikely that the countries thus exposed will have to see how best they can arrive at a bilateral agreement with the Soviet Union and that, certainly at a price. It is, therefore, highly advisable that the non-aggression pact between NATO and Warsaw Pact countries--if there is to be one--should cover all member countries of CENTO, in particular those bordering on the Soviet Union and not to leave them outside the agreement. We have also heard of a proposal that all countries of the world should sign a treaty of non-aggression with each other. There are certain countries in the world, the preservation of whose independence and territorial integrity, because of their characteristic geographic position, does not only constitute a service to those countries alone, but a service also to the stability and peace of an entire area. Iran is an instance of such a country. Mr. Brezhnev paid a visit to Iran about a couple of months ago. In his talks with me he did his best to be friendly and to leave formality aside. So much so, that on the last day of his stay he went as far as confiding to me that, relations between Iran and the Soviet Union having improved considerably, he would permit himself to express Russia's dislike of Iran's participation in military agreements with the West. My immediate reply, of course, was that one did not have to go too far to seek the reasons for the existence of such regional defensive agreements. They would automatically lose their force and validity as soon as the numerous military pacts between countries of the world ceased to exist and the dangers of war and aggression no longer posed a threat to the territorial integrity of smaller nations; and that such an ideal situation could only be brought about when general and complete disarmament with proper controls became a reality. Permit me to say a few words now about developments in some of the countries around Iran. A matter to which I wish, Mr. President, to call your attention is the danger which threatens this area of the world. I refer to the stockpiles of weapons of aggression in the possession of Egypt and the ever increasing delivery of offensive equipment to that country by the Soviet Union, designed to serve, overtly or under cover, as instruments of Egyptian intervention. Yemen, the Morocco-Algeria conflict and the arming of Somalia for expansion are instances in point. Egypt, in fact, has already prepared an "intervention force" of considerable size, equipped with long-range bombers, missiles, heavy troop transport planes, submarines, ships, and torpedo boats armed with missiles, so that if a "change" should happen to occur in any Arab country and President Nasser be asked to "intervene" he would willingly do so and let the world be faced with a fait accompli. I should perhaps add that even Iran does not seem to be too distant for his designs or immune from his subversive activities. It is in consideration of these compelling reasons that the security of the Persian Gulf poses for us a source of constant concern, not only in the interest of our own country, but in the interest of the West as well. Indeed, the stakes involved are so great that any lack of vigilance on our parts may have disastrous consequences. To this situation, we have endeav-oured to draw the attention of the United States Government.
Last year, the Pentagon prepared a Five Year Plan for Iran which was accepted with some reservations and for want of a more satisfactory alternative./2/ This Plan has already proved inadequate for the requirements of the changing situation in this area. The Iranian Army is capable of serious combat neither in the mountainous regions--for lack of adequate material requirements and logistical support--nor in the plains--for being devoid of the required mobility, and armour for such warfare. Our armoured equipment, the M47 tanks, are of type not in current production whose replacement and spare parts can be found with great difficulty. Now, if such is the condition of our equipment in peace time, it is difficult to imagine how they can be of any serious value at times of emergency. We have no military stockpiles of any kind and no reserves, even of machine guns, automatic rifles and ammunition to meet routine demands. Should unforeseen circumstances require us to put our army in a state of mobilization, we shall hardly be able to place ourselves in a state of readiness for the emergency. All our supplies and equipment have been distributed to provide for the army's current requirements. /2/For text of the U.S. Five-Year Military Program for Iran, accepted by Iran on September 19, 1962, see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. XVIII, pp. 105-109. The responsibilities of the Iranian Air Force, moreover, have never been equal to even the minimum of the Army requirements. Our airfields are limited in number, and where they do exist we are there faced with deficiencies in radar facilities and anti-aircraft protection. Furthermore, ships and vessels presently in service with our navy, in number as well as in military value, are hardly adequate to carry out their vital responsibilities. If our armed forces are to function effectively and to perform their alloted duties, and if Iran, a staunch and steadfast ally of the United States, is to play her full part in the changing political climate of the Middle East, then obviously, Mr. President, these shortages have to be met. Otherwise, we must consider as wasted the funds that are presently allocated for maintaining our armed forces. In my correspondence with you, Mr. President, I wish to be perfectly candid in dealing with matters of mutual interest. If the United States is not in a position to meet our clear and urgent military needs in addition to the Five Year Plan, in order to be able to fulfil our duties, I thought that we might advisedly arrange for the purchase of our additional needs, under favourable conditions, from the United States of America or from elsewhere. Of course, the question of CENTO strategy, American engagements and a great many related topics will form the subject of discussions by our representatives at the CENTO Ministerial Council. We hope that this forthcoming meeting, due to be held in Washington, will provide a suitable opportunity for clarifying all these points. In the meantime, it would be useful if you should see fit to appoint someone to discuss with me urgent matters of interest to our two countries and to report the result to you. In the field of economic activity, it is a source of satisfaction that our own potentials are so great that if we can devote all our planned resources to the implementation of our Five Year Plan, we can envisage an annual growth of 8 per cent, with every hope of raising considerably the material welfare of our people. We have received a number of proposals for economic assistance from Western and even Eastern European countries as well as from the Soviet Union. Doubtless, we would be more than gratified to have offers of loan from the A.I.D. with their very generous terms, and also from the Export-Import Bank and its subsidiary organizations. We would welcome, further, private American investors who would wish to participate in the development of our economy. To turn once again to the Middle East, the situation in Iraq seems uncertain. With the fall of Kassem's unwholesome regime, we welcomed with relief what we hoped would be closer ties with Iraq, thinking that since the Baathists at once began to purge their country of Communists, we had been rid of a troublesome neighbour. Our optimism was shortlived however, for we soon discovered in Southern Iran centres of Arab espionage, with their covetous eyes on a certain integral part of our country, namely Khuzistan, the main centre of our oil industry. With the overthrow of the Baathist Government in Iraq, this danger seems to have abated. Uncertainty however, still persists. For our information indicates that Marshal Aref himself had been fully aware of the above activities and had given them his full support. I regret to say that already Marshal Aref has shown a tendency to turn towards Egypt. If I lay emphasis on this question and express my concern, it is because we are well aware of the developments in this area and the course they are likely to take. Here, I must state that our attitude towards Iraq has always been a friendly one, and we have always hoped that Iraq will have a strong and stable Government, capable of preserving its independence and of safeguarding its national interests. The Kurdish question is still unsettled. Agents of international communism are making every endeavour to exploit the situation to their own advantage, and Cairo is anxious to play its dubious role in any development in this situation. If negotiations between the Government at Baghdad and the Kurds should fail to reach an understanding, we have reason to expect that the fighting will flare up again in the spring. We have reports to the effect that President Nasser did try, and is still making efforts to "mediate" between the Kurds and the Central Government of Iraq. This, on the surface, sounds quite harmless, even perhaps commendable. However, the contents of one of his messages to the Kurds fully reveals his ill intentions towards Iran. He has said in effect, according to our information, that it was a pity the Kurds were fighting the Arabs. He would have given them full support if their force were directed against Iran. Thus with the situation prevailing in Iraq and with the UAR adventures in Yemen and elsewhere likely to erupt in other parts of the Middle East as well, my obligations to my country and my people make it incumbent upon me to take all precautions for the safety of the country and of our national interests. We cannot tolerate Egypt's subversive influence at our doorstep; nor fail to regard it seriously. I think, as referred to above, upon the stability of Iran depends the security of the entire Middle East. While we in Iran are seeking to ensure the security and stability of our own country, and that of the Persian Gulf, we are contributing also to the preservation of peace in this entire area--an area in which the United States has vital interests. Happily, on these as on other matters, we have always maintained close and cordial contact, and our views have never been far apart. Again, my best wishes for your happiness and success in the service of the United States of America as well as in the cause of the free world. With high esteem, Sincerely, M.R. Pahlavi
3. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff/1/ Washington, January 23, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Robert W. Komer Files, Iran, November 1963-December 1964. Confidential. RWK: Bob Macy came back to plan the phase-out of the Iranian program. Though he originally argued we'd have to continue development lending to retain influence, he's now reconciled to its end. The big question now is how Macy plans to retain maximum influence in Iran's economic machinery with the few top-level advisers we can keep there. How many people would he need? What kind? Does he have suitable ones on board now? What are his best channels to key points in Iranian decision making? What can we use for leverage (What about MAP?)? Wheeler doesn't think you'll have to argue with Macy so much as enthuse him. Why not make your speech about "getting more for less"? Paint him a picture of how, as Congress cuts our aid resources, we have to find new ways to push our interests in important countries like Iran. We're looking to guys like Macy to come up with new techniques. May I sit in? H.
4. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State/1/ Tehran, January 28, 1964, noon. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19 US-IRAN. Secret. 669. The following comments may be helpful in connection with preparation of reply to Shah's letter to President of Jan 7./2/ /2/Document 2. Important to realize that at time of writing letter Shah was not, and is not now, in one of the depressed moods which have in past resulted in excessive insecurity leading to appeals for military assistance. On the contrary, he is self-confident and self-assured. In addition to his continuing desire for military equipment beyond what we are providing him, Shah has what seems to me legitimate concern over what will happen when five-year military agreement comes to an end, particularly with regard to providing for replacement of equipment, such as M-47 tanks, which will become unsupportable toward end of current agreement. In addition, Iran is now having to assume certain military expenses (spare parts, consumable supplies) which were not commitments in the agreement but which the Military Assistance Program had previously covered. Shah's long existing desire for military equipment beyond that provided in the agreement has not [now] been reinforced by marked improvement in Iranian financial position arising from increase in revenues from oil. With regard to Shah's attitude to the agreement itself, there is no doubt in my mind, despite language in his letter to President, that he does not consider that he has abrogated agreement or asked for formal renegotiation of it. We will, of course, wish to stress essential validity of five-year agreement, underline our condition that it adequately provides for defense of Iran, convey our assessment that threat to Iranian security now less, not more, than at time agreement signed, and point out that we are meeting our commitments despite fund stringencies and expect Iran to continue to meet hers. However, Shah's concern for post-agreement military needs is in practical terms by no means premature. I, therefore, think President's response should be positive in sense of expressing our willingness to discuss reasonable on-going program of Iranian acquisition military equipment after expiration of agreement. Appropriate comments regarding possibility of declining US grant assistance or its replacement by military credit could be included as necessary. I would hope that possibility of credit at least could be indicated. Within this framework I could then explore in less formal manner more specifically what Shah has in mind and ascertain possibility of mutually satisfactory solution. I believe that if I am able to discuss problem of future program with him in reasonably frank terms, we will be able to contain within acceptable bounds his desire to purchase additional equipment now and ensure that such purchases are from us and compatible with our MAP and advisory program. I could also in this context pointedly remind Shah once again of danger that excessive Iranian purchases of military equipment now could call into question agreement itself and result in sharp reduction in US grant military assistance. Reference should also be made to the Indian Ocean Task Group and to DELAWAR as evidence of US interest and ability to reinforce the security of Iran, and of increasing US capacity to deal with limited war situations. With regard to Shah's request that representative be sent here, we have since confirmed he had in mind military representative and referred to his November conversation with General Adams. This request probably arises from fact Eckhardt and I have held line firmly with regard to additional military equipment and Shah would no doubt like to attempt to influence such a representative in that direction. I would hope that President's reply might make clear that his civilian and military representatives in Iran have his full confidence and are entirely qualified to discuss whatever the Shah may have in mind. To avoid brushing off request and in interest Shah's personal relation with President, reply might note General Adams will be coming to Iran in March (we understand this is tentative plan) and this will afford opportunity for him to join Eckhardt and me in discussing military matters related to defense of this region. With regard to international political aspects of Shah's message, Dept will not require lengthy comments from us, but I put forward following. Unlikelihood of non-aggression treaty should be mentioned as well as fact that such treaty, if it should come to pass, would in no way detract from our CENTO commitments. Question about USSR's being allowed free hand in non-European areas should be vigorously refuted. Ref to USSR's having discarded use of force as instrument of foreign policy could be used to lead to emphasis on need for economic development and social, administrative and political reforms to counter possibility of aggression through subversion, especially in vulnerable areas, which is only weapon available to Arabs at moment and in foreseeable future to cause trouble for Iran in Khuzistan. Finally, the President would presumably refer at some point to the situation in Iran. Need to keep Shah's attention focused on what remains to be done fully as great as requirement to approve his hopeful start. I believe we should avoid leaving impression that we share Shah's view that his "comprehensive program...has now been fully implemented" but rather should indicate we are glad he is aware and actively working on the serious social, economic administrative political problems that beset Iran. Holmes
5. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Ball to President Johnson/1/ Washington, January 29, 1964. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 IRAN. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Tiger; cleared by Jernegan and in draft by Chief of Greek, Turkish, Iranian, and Cyprus Programs in CU/NEA John T. Forbes, Assistant Chief of Protocol for Visits and Public Events Samuel L. King, Special Assistant to the Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs Windsor G. Hackler, and Special Assistant for Congressional Relations (Appropriations) to the Deputy Under Secretary for Administration William R. Little. A typed note on the source text indicates that the Department was informed of the President's approval on February 1. SUBJECT The exhibit, "7,000 Years of Iranian Art," which had a highly successful tour of European capitals last year, is now scheduled for a tour of United States cities, beginning in the spring of 1964. The formal opening of the United States tour will take place at the National Gallery of Art in Washington some time between May 25 and June 6, 1964. We think that the value of this event as a landmark in United States-Iranian cultural relations would be greatly enhanced if the Shah of Iran were invited to open the exhibit. This visit might be combined with a trip to Los Angeles, since we have been informed that the University of California at Los Angeles is considering the possibility of awarding the Shah an honorary degree at the commencement exercises in June. The Shah last visited the United States, in an official capacity, in April 1962. An unofficial visit for the purposes mentioned above would be useful in demonstrating to him continuing United States interest in the welfare of his country and approval of his program of social reform. If the proposed unofficial visit is made, we would recommend that you and Mrs. Johnson host an informal luncheon for the Shah (and the Empress if she accompanies him) and that you also have a private informal talk with the Shah on the same occasion. If it should prove impossible to schedule these events, we would not advise the National Gallery of Art to invite the Shah to open the exhibit and we would discourage the University of California from awarding him an honorary degree. George W. Ball/2/ /2/Printed from a copy that indicates Ball signed the original.
6. Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Jernegan) to the Special Group (Counter Insurgency)/1/ Washington, March 2, 1964. /1/Source: Department of State, NEA/IRN Files: Lot 69 D 178, POL IRAN 1964, POL 23-1-a, Internal Defense Plan. Secret. Drafted by Tiger on February 28; cleared in draft by Special Assistant to the Under Secretary for Political Affairs Charles Maechling, Jr., Abe J. Moses (G/PM), Terence T. Grindall (INR), Colonel M.R. Preble (DOD/ISA/NESA), Captain Pollard (DOD), Officer in Charge of Iran Affairs Henrietta Towsley (AID/NESA/GTICC), and Edward A. Padelford, Jr. (NR). Sent through Harriman. SUBJECT The Country Team's fourth progress report on the Internal Defense Plan for Iran, covering the period September 25, 1963 to February 3, 1964, is contained in Embassy Tehran's Airgram 421 of February 3, 1964./2/ Further detailed reporting on the political situation is contained in Embassy Tehran's Airgram 361 of December 31, 1963,/3/ and an appraisal of police capabilities is contained in Embassy Tehran's Airgram 420 of February 1, 1964./4/ These reports have been reviewed and approved for transmittal to the Special Group by the interdepartmental working group, with qualifications and additional comments as indicated in this memorandum. /2/Not printed. (Ibid., Central Files, POL 23-1 IRAN) /3/Not printed. (Ibid., POL 2 IRAN) /4/Not printed. (Ibid., POL 23-1 IRAN) 1. The Threat and Iran's Vulnerabilities. The interdepartmental working group's last progress report on Iran, dated October 14, 1963, noted that, while "Iran is subject to the basic political vulnerabilities of a society in transition,...no clearly identifiable threat to internal security is likely to develop in the near future except in the event of the demise or abdication of the Shah." The intervening period has been relatively uneventful, and nothing has happened which would cause us to change this basic evaluation. In fact, with the passage of time, the disposition of the important disaffected groups (middle-class dissidents, clergy, tribal elements) to engage in anti-regime adventures has diminished and the Government's control of the country has improved. (See A-361, p. 2 and A-421, p. 2.) 2. Basic Developments Affecting Internal Security. a. The most noteworthy internal political development was the formation of the New Iran Party, based on the intellectual-bureaucratic supporters of the Shah's reform program in the new Parliament. This move is part of an attempt to marshal public support for the reform program and prepare the groundwork for the long-planned accession of the Party's leader, Hasan Ali Mansur, to the premiership. (See A-361, p. 6 and A-421, p. 3.) b. The most significant actions in regard to internal security were the arrest of a retired General for "plotting against the regime," and the apprehension of some 40 Arab "subversives" in Khuzistan. The former appears to have been strictly a precautionary move, with no apparent evidence of an actual "plot," whereas the latter appears to have been a response to probably exaggerated Israeli "tips" on alleged Iraqi and Egyptian subversion attempts. (See A-361, p. 2 and A-421, p. 2.) c. In respect to the oil problem, Iran has been successful so far in forestalling unilateral actions by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries against the oil companies. But the issue is not yet settled: Iran faces possible dissension with its Arab neighbors as well as internal political problems if forced to make a unilateral settlement with the companies. On the other hand, if forced to go along with OPEC-voted sanctions, Iran would face financial problems. (See A-421, p. 5.) d. The developing "normalization" of Iranian-Soviet relations was marked by: a visit from Soviet President Brezhnev (marred by the Soviet shooting-down of an Iranian plane near the border); serious negotiations for an Iran-Soviet air agreement; concrete steps toward implementation of an agreement for joint development of a border river; and tentative arrangements for a small contingent of Iranian students in the USSR. All evidence--especially Iranian cooperation in heavy publicity for U.S. assistance during the Brezhnev visit--points to continued wariness as regards Soviet intentions and determination to avoid excessive involvement. (See A-361, p. 2 and pp. 8, 9; A-421, p. 4.) e. U.S.-Iranian Relations were affected by: Iran's decreasing economic dependence on the U.S.; Iran's largely verbal flirtation with "non-alignment"; and an increasing divergence of views between Iran and the U.S. as to the Arab threat. The Shah, moreover, is expressing dissatisfaction with the quantities and sophistication of military equipment being supplied under the Five-Year MAP and has indicated interest in obtaining, by purchase if necessary, equipment not included in the strategic concept of the MAP. There is as yet no reason to believe that these trends and issues portend any essential change in the character of U.S.-Iranian relations. The recent visit of Sargent Shriver afforded an occasion for a ringing affirmation by the Shah of his fundamental commitment to the West. (See A-361, pp. 1, 2; A-421, p. 2.) 3. Developments Tending to Enhance Internal Defense Capabilities. a. The very existence of the new Parliament has, as predicted, improved the position of the Government by tempering the constitutional uncertainties about the reform program. (See A-361, p. 3.) b. The creation of a "Health Corps" to use conscripts for an impact program in rural areas is a potentially significant new element in the reform program and, like the already functioning "Literacy Corps," a means of engaging the participation and enthusiasm of urban youth. (See A-421, p. 2.) c. The security forces have continued to work toward improved capabilities in several respects: (See A-421, pp. 5, 6 and A-420, p. 2): (1) Planning with U.S. advisers was completed for a counter-insurgency Command Post Exercise and three successive Field Training Exercises in the First Army area in west and northwest Iran during the next few months; (2) Planning also moved forward satisfactorily for the joint U.S.-Iranian exercise DELAWAR, scheduled to take place in southwest Iran in mid-April under the aegis of CENTO; (3) The Iranian Special Forces have been reorganized from their former status as paratroop forces and have been engaging in active training for the forthcoming counter-insurgency exercises; (4) With the arrival of most of the AID-programmed riot-control equipment for the Tehran police, plans are now under way for intensification of the training of the police in the use of this equipment. The operational plans, command arrangements, and assigned forces of the police, the Gendarmerie and the army appear sufficient to deal with any likely and foreseeable civil disturbance in Tehran. d. Civic action programs have been given increasing support by the Imperial Iranian Forces: The Air Force has entered more actively into this field, carrying fodder to starving livestock in snow-bound areas and preparing an operation to ferry medical teams and equipment to remote southeastern port areas this month; units of the Iranian Navy participated with a U.S. destroyer in medical assistance calls to southeastern port areas in December and have scheduled further such activities for the near future; two more vocational training centers were opened; and there has been active Iranian discussion of proposals for forming "development batallions" under military supervision. These developments have been receiving an increasing amount of publicity in Iranian media and some favorable public reaction. 4. Major Areas of Continuing Concern. a. The fundamentals of the reform program, while being addressed by the GOI in various ways, still require more vigorous action and forward planning to ensure success. Civil service reform is stalled in the Parliament and budget reform to achieve fiscal and program control has not passed the talking stage. Land reform activities have slowed down considerably, largely because of the increasingly complex administrative problems being encountered in the "Second Stage," although severe winter weather and some potentially beneficial reorganizations in the Ministry of Agriculture have contributed to the slowdown. While programs directed to labor and women's groups, mentioned in the last progress report, have remained in effect, there has been no great impetus on these fronts. The regime's base of support, which is so far largely restricted to the security forces, is too narrow for comfort and has not yet been significantly broadened by reform or political measures. (See A-361, pp. 4-6.) b. The economic recession, with its consequent large-scale urban unemployment, persists in spite of steady improvement in the government's financial position and the adoption of expansionary credit policies. (See A-361, pp. 2, 3; A-421, p. 4.) c. Iran's Kurdish problem may well be affected by the recently reported cease-fire between the Iraqi Government and the Iraqi Kurds. At present writing it is too early to judge whether the cease-fire will stick and, if so, whether it will exacerbate or ameliorate Iran's internal security problem. 5. U.S. Policy and Courses of Action. All major U.S. assistance programs in Iran except for military advisory services are being considerably affected by Iran's increasing financial strength and, more temporarily, by unexpectedly good crops. Indicated U.S. action in the more important assistance sectors are the following: a. PL-480. It begins to appear doubtful that there will be sizeable, if any, sales under the Title I wheat program signed in November. Therefore the anticipated rial facilities may not be available for our programs to assist agricultural credit. Title II and III programs remain significant and are having beneficial effects, although the Iranians find great difficulty in administering Title II. We intend to keep in close touch with the GOI on the grain situation to determine, in timely fashion, if the supply factors in the next season will provide scope for a Title I program, but the outlook is not promising now because of the excellent crop prospects for the coming season. b. Development Lending. Although the scheduled reduction of AID development loans and their termination at the end of FY 1965 is commensurate with Iran's improving financial situation, difficulties are being experienced in this transitional period. (A-421, p. 4.) Subsequent to the Country Team's progress report, word has been received that the GOI has finally decided to reject two Export-Import Bank loans on the basis that the terms are unacceptable and the GOI can finance the imports (road and railroad maintenance equipment) itself. In general our Government export-promotion lending programs are running into effective competition from some of Iran's other foreign suppliers. There are only two pending AID loan applications ($7.7-million for the Iranian portion of the CENTO Turkey-Iran rail link/5/ and $1.5-million for training assist-ance to the Iranian national airlines). We plan to take early action on these two requests. For purposes of retaining influence in Iranian development and reform programs and preserving markets for U.S. equipment, we intend to encourage applications for further qualifying projects within our FY 1965 development loan availabilities for Iran. /5/For the interdepartmental working group's position on the Turkey-Iran rail link project, see the previous progress report (Memorandum for the Special Group, October 14, 1963) p. 4. [Footnote in the source text. The October 14 memorandum is ibid., Special Group, Counterinsurgency Files: Lot 68 D 451.] c. Police Training. Within the context of the phase-down of the Development Grant Program as projected in the approved Country Assist-ance Strategy Statement, AID plans to begin immediately a comprehensive re-evaluation to determine the scope and nature of its police training program in the near future. The recommendations already made by the Country Team (e.g., A-420) will be taken into consideration and further Country Team assistance requested in making this re-evaluation. Prompt action has been taken to replace about $28 thousand of AID-financed communications equipment (out of the $500,000 AID program) which was lost in transit. d. Military Assistance. As noted above, the Shah is reacting increasingly to what he considers unreasonable restraints on his procurement of military equipment. We think he understands that MAP grants cannot be increased above the amounts necessary to meet our commitments under the five-year MAP worked out in September 1962. In view of Iran's increased financial resources, we are now studying the feasibility of Iranian purchase of certain spare parts and other items not covered in our commitments but nevertheless supplied heretofore under MAP grants. 6. No amendments in the basic Internal Defense Plan are proposed at the present time. Since the insurgency prospects in Iran are now considered latent rather than incipient, it is recommended that the schedule for consideration by the Special Group (CI) be changed to a semi-annual rather than a quarterly basis. 7. The review of the interdepartmental working group has not revealed any specific requirements for action at this time by the Special Group (CI) or any new resource requirements other than the Development Loan funds mentioned in paragraph 5-b above. It is therefore recommended that the Special Group (CI) approve the Country Team's fourth progress report, as qualified and expanded herein, for planning purposes./6/ John D. Jernegan /6/On March 16 Tiger sent a copy of this report to the Embassy in Tehran, noting that the Special Group meeting on March 6 had accepted the recommended change to a 6-month basis for IDP reporting, and that Harriman had asked that the Ambassador write to him directly in the interim if there were any particular problem or anything the Special Group could do to enhance the U.S. internal security effort in Iran. (Ibid., NEA/IRN Files: Lot 69 D 178, POL IRAN 1964, POL 23-1-a, Internal Defense Plan)
7. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State/1/ Tehran, March 10, 1964, 5:45 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15-1 IRAN. Confidential. 783. Re Deptel 617./2/ In audience today I told Shah that delay in President's reply to his letter of January 7 no doubt caused by numerous topics raised by Shah, all requiring study, and pointed out preoccupation of President with domestic program and critical international problems, adding that there was nothing in Shah's communication requiring urgent action. I said that I anticipated a reply within about a week. In circumstances, suggest that reply be sent by telegram which would contain statement that signed letter is to follow. /2/Telegram 617 to Tehran, March 9, informed Holmes that the Department intended to pouch the President's reply to the Shah's letter of January 7 within 1 week. (Ibid.) In telegram 754 from Tehran, March 5, the Ambassador reported the Foreign Minister's statement that the Shah had exhibited some concern at having not yet received a reply to his letter. (Ibid.) In calm, unemotional tone, Shah went over again his preoccupations about Nasser and his concern for the security of Persian Gulf. I gave him the obvious counter-arguments. He has focused his attention particularly on the prepositioning of military equipment, pointing out the advantages of the area in the mountains behind Bandar Abbas as an ideal location. He stated that with the development of the port, Bandar Abbas could become both a naval and military base, representing a secure position in terms of its distance from the Russian and Iraqi borders and pointing out the relative ease of preventing naval penetration of the Persian Gulf from this strategic point. His attention continues to be focused on the Persian Gulf and a potential Arab threat to Khuzistan. His fears of overt threat from Soviet Union are very much less than in the past. The Shah was critical of some of our policies, especially pursuing the same theme he has followed in the past that we do not treat our friends as well as we treat those who are either our enemies or are not committed to us. At the end of about 10 minutes of this, he turned and smiled and said, "but after all, if it weren't for America, none of us would be here", and then restated that he had taken his position with the US and the West and there was no question of abandoning it. He spoke in highest terms of the President, saying that during the latter's visit/3/ here he felt that he had developed cordial communication with Mr. Johnson, coupled with admiration and respect for him. He expressed the wish of having further discussions with me after the receipt of the President's reply, preliminary to his conversation with the President in June. /3/For information on Vice President Johnson's visit to Tehran August 24-26, 1962, see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. XVIII, p. 72. As previously reported, there have been rumors current in Tehran that the Shah's health has deteriorated. He told me that basically his condition had not changed but that the doctor in Vienna had counselled more frequent and longer periods of rest away from his heavy responsibilities. He does bear a heavy burden, works long hours, and is by nature a worrier. He appears to me to be unchanged from when I last saw him prior to his visit to Europe. Holmes
8. Letter From President Johnson to the Shah of Iran/1/ Washington, March 19, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence File, Iran--Presidential Correspondence. Confidential. Your Imperial Majesty: Thank you for your long letter of January 7, 1964,/2/ and for the frank comments which it contains. It is just this sort of mutual candor which you and I must always strive to maintain. /2/Document 2. Sargent Shriver has told me of the warm hospitality which you extended to him. We are all proud of the similarity between our Peace Corps and your Literacy Corps and recently established Health Corps. Indeed, your whole program of social reform is highly regarded here. Iran seems the brightest spot in the Middle East these days. On all those fronts of greatest concern to Iran--the threat from the north, internal security, and the modernization of Iranian society--the outlook seems most favorable. The important thing now is to press forward and consolidate the domestic progress so well begun. I am impressed with the support you are giving to civil service, budget, and fiscal reform. Let me urge on you the equal importance of a dynamic and buoyant economy; as you know, I too am devoting much attention to this problem in the United States. We wish all success to your new government, which seems to us to be going in the right direction. Because of Iran's exposed position, we have always taken quite seriously your military concerns. However, after another thorough look, we have concluded that the basic factors that led our military experts to agree on the current Five-Year Military Plan have not changed significantly. I personally believe the Plan remains practical and adequate. While we can understand your quite natural worry about potential developments in the Arab world, we simply do not yet foresee much likelihood of a substantial Arab threat to Iran. I can assure you, however, that should any such threat develop, we are more than prepared to re-examine the situation with you. Meanwhile, we trust that Iran will continue to do its best to live up to its very difficult tasks under the Five-year Plan. General Adams will be coming to Iran again in late March or early April, and if you desire he could discuss with you some of the very broad questions you have raised in your letter. Of course, Ambassador Holmes and General Eckhardt also stand ready to discuss at any time the full range of your political and military problems. I much appreciate your comments on the meaning of a possible non-aggression pact between Communist and non-Communist states. They strike a responsive chord, and I can assure you that no East-West pact of this kind is contemplated at present. If such a matter were ever to be seriously considered, I would expect to consult fully with you before any final decisions were made. Meanwhile I very much look forward to seeing you in June when we can discuss these matters further. Personal discussions between the leaders of our two Governments are important to both our countries, and it will be a pleasure to have you here in Washington again. Sincerely, Lyndon B. Johnson
9. Information Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Jernegan) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/ Washington, March 20, 1964. /1/Source: Department of State, NEA/IRN Files: Lot 69 D 30, Iran 1964, AID 1, General Policy, Plans, Coordination. Confidential. Drafted by Thomas and cleared by Director of the Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Regional Affairs Guy A. Lee. Copies were sent to Bell and Macomber. SUBJECT
On March 18 we in NEA were surprised to learn for the first time that Iran is one of the fourteen countries described in the President's foreign aid address of March 19 to Congress/2/ as in transition from reliance on aid to self-support. Before Iran's inclusion in this group of countries, it had been our understanding that the contemplated transition period was one or two years, and we were thus most concerned that a decision seemed to have been taken without our concurrence to end aid to Iran within so brief a time. We informed A.I.D. of our concern. /2/For text of the President's foreign aid message to Congress on March 19, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1963-1964, Book I, pp. 393-398. We now concur in Iran's inclusion on the list of transition countries, having been assured (1) that the list is not limited to countries to which we plan to end our aid within a year or two and (2) that there has been no change from the position agreed upon in the Country Assistance Strategy Statement for Iran signed by Mr. Bell on December 30, 1963. This statement calls for continuation of Development Loans to Iran through June 1965, after which the further continuation or termination of concessional rate lending will depend upon economic trends in Iran and the availability of U.S. funds. As for technical assistance through Development Grants, our aim is described as termination of this program in four or five years "if, as anticipated, Iran succeeds in obtaining assistance it needs through the international agencies and if our technical assistance activities are successful in building up the competence of the GOI to manage its development drive more efficiently." We agree, and we are pleased, that Iran does in fact appear now to be in stage of transition which it may be hoped will lead, if present trends continue, to eventual self-reliance. However, we believe it would be a very serious mistake to withdraw our aid presence abruptly from Iran, the most vulnerable country on the Soviet perimeter and the key member of CENTO. The progress of the past eighteen months should not hide the fact that Iran is still a weak country periodically in need of reassurance. It would be short-sighted, possibly tragically so, to become committed too far in advance and without adequate study to a position which would deprive us of an important means of providing such reassurance. Moreover, our assistance strategy should not ignore the fact that strategically located Iran still remains hospitable to our military and intelligence sites at a time when other countries are obliging us to remove or limit such facilities. [Continue with the next documents] |
