208. Telegram From Bromley Smith of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson in Texas/1/

Washington, July 4, 1968, 1834Z.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. X, Cables and Memos, 6/68-11/68. Secret. Repeated to Walt Rostow at the LBJ Ranch.

CAP 81447. Looking at the situation in Tel Aviv, Barbour concludes: 1) we should not be in a hurry to press the Israelis for their ideas on a settlement; 2) our prospects are not hopeless if the UN Security Council gets involved in another round of debate on the Arab-Israeli problem; 3) there is a good chance that Amb. Jarring's efforts can be kept alive on the present basis at least until fall when the Foreign Ministers meet; and 4) a US or US-UK initiative to stimulate proposals from Israel will not minimize increased Soviet penetration in the Middle East.

Barbour suggests that if we feel something must be done, either alone or with the British, we should limit ourselves to a genuine exploration with the Israelis of the whole situation and solicit their ideas as to useful further steps.

Barbour's reasoning is explained in his cable/2/ which follows:

/2/Telegram 4329 from Tel Aviv, July 1, which is quoted below. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 ARAB-ISR)

1. I have not commented on US-UK talks since in my view reports thereof have indicated a healthy skepticism on our part as to probability and desirability of our taking initiatives at this time with regard to the Jarring Mission. I am also skeptical whether we need be as apprehensive as the British about the consequences of a further SC round if it cannot be avoided, and, in addition, perhaps more importantly, whether if we decided on a joint US-UK effort to stimulate substantive proposals, we are in fact in a position to succeed in that endeavor. Furthermore, I wonder to what extent such a course will serve to minimize increased Soviet penetration in the area.

2. While obviously a further SC exercise could get intense and might be detrimental and retrogressive, it seems to me that although it could be better, the Israeli position, so far, is supportable on its merits. They have, at our urging, accepted the November resolution and have been endeavoring to get their defeated adversaries into some kind of substantive discussion which has been resisted by the latter on the ground that they wish an advance commitment that Israel will eventually withdraw to unrealistic (June 4) lines. There is also considerable supplementary public evidence at least that the Arab tactic only masks a real intention to do nothing politically toward a peaceful settlement. Eban tells me that Jarring in his latest conversation with Riad heard the latter give startlingly frank exposition why Nasser is too weak internally to do anything. In addition Jarring told Eban that he does not wish to submit the report at the end of July, promised on his behalf by the Secretary General, and if he does so he will not place blame for lack of progress on any party.

3. As to desirability, or more accurately feasibility, of our pressing Israelis for further indication substantive ideas on settlement, it seems to me unlikely in the extreme that any Israeli thoughts we might be able to evoke will not, as bargaining positions, fall far short of the goals set by the Arabs and therefore tend to harden Arab attitudes. Furthermore, while our total capabilities of exercising pressure and influence on the Israelis are theoretically limitless and overwhelming, I question whether as a practical matter we would or should exert such maximum measures as probably would be necessary to achieve a halfway step which might or might not move the parties toward an ultimate solution.

4. Soviet penetration into the Middle East is, of course, our major concern. However, I doubt that a unilateral or bilateral US-UK initiative could be expected to deter effectively Soviet current activities. I am inclined reluctantly to the theory that in the absence of a genuine US-Soviet detente affecting the area, which seems highly unlikely, there is not much room for maneuver on our part to influence a minimization of Soviet involvement. Rather this would seem likely to come about by the Soviets' own realization that they may be over-extending themselves, for example, in Egypt, or a longer range realization by the peoples experiencing Soviet tutelage that such tutelage has features they could better do without.

5. However, the foregoing is a prologue to the central question which you ask, that is, an assessment of the impact of such US initiative on the Israeli domestic political situation./3/ Most fundamental in Israeli thinking as I see it at the moment is the existence of a large body of the public which would be prepared to accept a compromise to the political solution involving major concessions to the Arabs. There is also a more vocal series of minority groups which would resist concessions to the end. But the whole spectrum of Israeli political public life is unanimously apprehensive of initial Israeli concessions in the absence of any indication that they would be matched by Arab willingness to conclude binding peace. This is based on the same security considerations which have been of paramount concern to all Israelis for twenty years and created a climate of fear and apprehension prior to June 5, 1967. Also fundamental is the fact that Israel is a democracy with a government headed at present by an individual who, although decisive enough on occasion, is not a world, or even Israeli, figure enjoying the charisma of Ben-Gurion, who in his long heyday could take personal decisions and subsequently maneuver the democratic process to a ratification thereof. Also the American relationship and support of Israel, not only that of the Jewish community in the US, but the broader understanding by the whole American body politic, is the one practical and sustaining psychological prop on which Israelis consciously or unconsciously lean. Despite any reassurances we could give them as to our motives therefore, US initiatives would at least arouse major apprehensions.

/3/See Document 202.

6. Therefore, assuming as I think you rightly do, that a serious and forceful US effort as outlined would increase tensions within the GOI, I offer the following specific comments on your specific questions:

A. There would [be] no doubt a "Cabinet crisis" with the probable departure from the coalition government of the right wing Gahal members and less likely a revolt by the religious party. However, the Labor alignment, while shaky within itself, is now so close to a majority that Eshkol would probably weather the storm, more especially since there is no leadership alternative to him at the current time, including Dayan.

B. As to present timing, Dayan has no public organizational base, despite his very widespread popular support. An American initiative might well provide the issue he may be looking for on which to challenge Eshkol, but whether this would or would not be the result, the dispute between the two would not necessarily affect the receptivity to US Government initiative.

C. Given the widespread popular apprehensions I would only assume that any concessions made by Eshkol to resolve Cabinet divisions in the light of US initiatives would be in the direction of concessions by Labor towards greater rigidity rather than the contrary.

D. Eshkol is currently bound firmly by the November 67 Cabinet position on direct negotiations and supplemental Knesset pronouncements. However, the government in this parliamentary system can theoretically reverse such decisions and by a narrow majority the Prime Minister might win if he sought an alteration in those directives. However, binding as these decisions are they do not specify direct negotiations in the first instance and in fact Eban has made clear in recent months that Rhodes procedure which the GOI advocates would include indirect talks at the outset. The controlling issue is rather that the ultimate settlement must be by agreement, i.e. contractual and not by some outside guarantees, acquiescence etc.

E. As to the Israeli request for F-4 Phantoms, I am quite clear that a favorable decision on the Israeli request would have an effect on the fundamental US-Israeli relationship referred to above. It would certainly strengthen the confidence throughout Israel in US preparedness to assist in the vital field of security and would diminish the arguments of substantial sections of opinion who question whether our anxiety to improve our position among the Arabs will not dictate US policies prejudicing the Israeli estimate of their security capabilities. Conversely further delay can do nothing but adversely affect our relationship. Any concept that we could expect the Israelis to make political concessions affecting their security in return for military hardware, including Phantoms, is in my view erroneous.

7. The conclusion I draw from the above, unfortunately largely negative estimate, is that at this time we should not be in a hurry to endeavor to press the Israelis for specific delineation of substantive positions, our prospects if the SC gets involved in another round are not hopeless, and that we have a good chance Jarring's efforts can be continued and kept alive on the present basis until the Foreign Ministers presumably meet in New York in the fall. We should, therefore, resist British nervousness to the maximum extent possible. However, if your appraisal is that something must be done now, or the British are so determined on their course that there is no dissuading them, I strongly urge instead of our coming forth unilaterally or bilaterally with specific suggestions, we limit ourselves to a genuine exploration with the Israelis of the whole situation as we both now see it and solicit any ideas they may have as to useful further steps to be taken.

209. Telegram From Bromley Smith of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson in Texas/1/

Washington, July 4, 1968, 1851Z.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Arab Republic, Vol. VII, Cables and Memos, 6/68-1/69. Secret. Repeated to Walt Rostow at the LBJ Ranch.

CAP 81450. McGeorge Bundy came away from a 90-minute meeting with Nasser yesterday with the impression that there is no prospect for early improvement in the Middle East situation.

Following is a report of the Bundy conversation from our representative in Cairo:/2/

/2/Telegram 2833 from Cairo, July 3, which is quoted below. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 7 US/BUNDY)

Subject: Nasser-Bundy conversation July 3.

1. (N.B. Following drafted from notes taken in course debriefing Bundy after his talk with Nasser this morning and just before his departure for Beirut. Request Bundy make such changes or comment as he desires.)

2. Bundy saw Nasser for ninety minutes this morning. Bundy found Nasser relaxed and candid. Bundy came away from meeting with impression there no prospect for early improvement in the Middle East situation.

3. About 1/3 of conversation had to do with Ford Foundation business. Nasser very cordial toward Foundation. He admitted UAR birth control program had got bogged down in last couple of years because of higher priorities assigned to other activities. Bundy made point Ford wanted to help but could not do so if no budgetary support from UAR. Said program of this importance needed Presidential leadership. Nasser took note.

4. Political portion of discussion opened with fairly lengthy and fairly standard Nasser lecture on Middle East, attachment of people to their land, etc. Nasser evidently feels himself hemmed in by public opinion. Although Nasser referred to "extreme left" and "extreme right," Bundy's impression was that his real concern is that Egyptians having suffered defeat are taking refuge in pride.

5. Nasser did not give impression he interested in any diplomatic initiatives. He seems believe present UAR diplomatic position is sound and is not disposed undertake any tricky initiatives for sake of movement.

6. On refugees, Nasser referred to previous Anderson conversations and stressed UAR prepared accept compensation and repatriation as solution. Nasser said this in way to indicate he believed this was movement forward in UAR position. Bundy pointed out repatriation not now practical alternative. Nasser did not react.

7. Nasser said his reason for linking Suez Canal and refugees was that until there is solution to Palestine problem, he could not allow Israel flags pass through heavily populated areas of Canal. He had already told Jarring he prepared allow Israel cargoes. Seemed to him this created no practical problem for Israel. Israel had plenty of other places to show her flag. But Israel flag in Suez Canal presented practical problem to Nasser. Bundy countered that refugee question presented practical problem to Israel requiring practical answer. Nasser said problem must be solved by Palestinian leaders. Bundy felt Nasser recognized that his was timid position but he wouldn't get off it.

8. Nasser felt that if great powers worked together there would be progress on Middle East. Bundy said he had heard that from Soviets. If great powers had an agreed solution in mind, this might be so. But neither Soviets nor ourselves had an acceptable solution. While both Soviets and U.S. had influence they alone could not produce progress. Bundy recalled that one year ago he had counseled President Johnson that distance between two sides so great there was no practical opportunity for U.S. expend political capital to produce a solution.

9. Bundy said Nasser's remarks had indicated an underlying belief that no political solution is in sight. Nasser said "Then there is only one other solution." Bundy said: "How unfortunate."/3/ This closed political portion of conversation.

/3/Bundy commented on Bergus' account of his meeting with Nasser in telegram 10757 from Beirut, July 5. He found it to be accurate but suggested an amendment at this point. "My response to Nasser's hint at renewal conflict was somewhat stronger than 'how unfortunate' and less convinced that he meant what he was suggesting. My own guess is that renewal hostilities are far from his personal intent, and my reaction was both stronger and less credulous, as perhaps, 'that would be most unfortunate for all concerned, and surely there is a better way to be found.'" (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Lebanon, Vol. I, Cables, 2/68-1/69)

10. Miscellaneous gleanings:

A. Nasser did not press view that U.S. one-sided but did say U.S. 100 percent pro-Israel. Bundy said we only 77 percent. Nasser rejoined 110 percent. (Mutual laughter.)

B. Nasser said UAR would fight better next time, he had taken initiative obtain Soviet military advisers, etc.

C. Bundy said he going Israel, asked Nasser if any message for Israelis. Nasser: "Tell them we are patient."

D. Of all Bundy's previous Egyptian interlocutors during this visit, Nasser mentioned only Heykal by name and with warmth.

E. Nasser said he didn't think Hussein had much freedom of action. Said other Arab leaders did not give as much support to November 22 res as did UAR.

F. Nasser thinks Israelis realize there will never be bilateral agreement between Israel and Egypt./4/ It follows that Israelis don't really want settlement.

/4/Bundy qualified this in his comment on Bergus' summary to indicate that Nasser was referring to an agreement by direct negotiations.

11. In conclusion Bundy saw Nasser as a man heavily preoccupied with a problem without a solution. The existence of Israel occupation is a heavy weight on the morale of Egypt. But consequence is not Anglo-Saxon notion of need to negotiate out of this situation. Rather, Nasser's reaction is that this is time to show no weakness.

12. Bundy asked me make clear to Dept his belief that Nasser did not regard this conversation as a major encounter. At no time was there anything resembling a negotiating situation.

Bergus

210. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Warnke) to Secretary of Defense Clifford/1/

Washington, July 6, 1968.

/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 72 A 1499, 452.1 Israel. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Murray in NESA.

SUBJECT
Israeli F-4s

Ambassador Ball is going out next week to discuss with Israel, certain of the Arabs, and others, the possibilities for a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. He will be going first to London and Paris, then to TelAviv, Amman, Beirut and Jidda (also, being very closely held, he may meet the UAR Foreign Minister in Beirut).

We are told that State is preparing a Memorandum for the President in which they propose that Ball be armed with permission to reveal a "yes in principle" on the F-4s. We are not certain under what conditions this "yes" might be offered, but it seems to be related to the Israeli attitude on progress in the peace talks rather than, for example, Israeli signature on the NPT or their agreement to forego missile or nuclear acquisition.

The advantages of going forward with the F-4 agreement in principle at this time are as follows: Israel must be able to defend itself--there is a gap in high-performance aircraft between the Arabs and Israelis--eventually Israel will need U.S. aircraft in any case-the duration of the French embargo is uncertain--we could reassure Israel of our support and perhaps make them less rigid--we would convince the Arabs and the Soviets of the firmness of U.S. support for Israel-the Arabs and Soviets may already presume we will deliver F-4s and have discounted this--it would ease Congressional and public concerns in this country-it would strengthen the Israeli Government vis-a-vis its domestic critics.

The arguments against going ahead are: there is no real military need to do so now, and we are delivering A4s-there would be an adverse impact on the Jarring mission-it would be counter to the latest Soviet moves on Near East arms control--it would bring pressure on the Soviets to supply more and better aircraft--the Mirage deliveries may well go through and could be in operational Israeli units almost immediately after the decision is taken by de Gaulle. This would give the Israelis, at least temporarily, a sizeable "overkill", particularly if the MD-620 missiles were also delivered by France-F-4s will not deter essentially irrational Arabs--it would deprive us of potential inducements to get the Israelis to be more flexible.

We see certain advantages to giving Ambassador Ball authority to make a very conditional promise of a future agreement to sell F-4s on the following basis:

a. We recognize Israel's need for F-4s if Arab inventories continue increasing;

b. The need is not immediate;

c. The diplomatic problems are at present overriding; and

d. We must first see the results of the efforts to find a peaceful settlement (and the prospects for Near East arms limitation discussions with the Soviets).

We suggest that Ambassador Ball's kit include only this conditional promise for F-4s which should for the present be kept secret but which could be made public at a later point (say, October) after the progress of the possible Near East arms discussions with the Soviets and the Jarring efforts are clearer and provided Israeli movement toward a settlement, in the coming months, is adequate.

We suggest that you discuss the foregoing with Secretary Rusk or the President.

Paul C. Warnke

211. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan/1/

Washington, July 13, 1968, 1847Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, UN 7. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by Day, cleared by Davies in substance and by Saunders at the White House, and approved by Popper. Repeated to Paris for Ball and Sisco.

202036. 1. Please prepare following letter from President for delivery to King and hold for Amb. Ball, who will deliver it personally in his call on King.

Begin Text.

Your Majesty:

I have asked Ambassador George Ball, who has just assumed his new responsibilities at the UN, to discuss with you and certain other Arab statesmen, and with Israeli officials, current developments in the area. The trip to the area will give him the opportunity to become fully familiar with the Middle East problem. Ambassador Ball brings with him assurances of our continued firm support for Jordan and my sincere personal wishes for Your Majesty.

It has been more than a year since the end of hostilities. In this time there has not been any progress toward the agreement called for in the Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967. I fully appreciate the difficulties you face in the continuing absence of a settlement, and the courage and moderation you have shown in meeting them.

I assure you that the United States Government has given its full support to the efforts of Ambassador Jarring and that it will continue to do so. Ambassador Ball's visit to Jordan, and to other states in the area, is evidence of our concern and of our close interest in the efforts which are being made to find a way toward peace.

I shall look forward to hearing from Ambassador Ball your thoughts on these matters. I hope that his discussions with you will help lead to the just and durable settlement which we all so fervently desire.

Sincerely, Lyndon B. Johnson. End Text.

Rusk

212. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel/1/

Washington, July 13, 1968, 1849Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, UN 7. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Repeated to Amman, Beirut, Jidda, London, Jerusalem, USUN, and Moscow.

202037. 1. Please prepare following letter from President for delivery to Prime Minister and hold for Amb. Ball, who will deliver it himself in his call on Eshkol.

Begin Text.

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I have asked Ambassador George Ball, who has just assumed his new responsibilities at the United Nations, to discuss with you and your colleagues and with certain Arab statesmen current developments in the area. I know from our very useful exchange last January that you are fully familiar with our policy and that you share my concern over the lack of progress towards a peaceful settlement since the end of hostilities. We stand squarely on my statement of June 19, 1967, and we maintain our full support for the Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967.

The trip to the area will give George Ball the opportunity to become fully familiar with the Middle East problem. I must frankly say that I fear the situation is deteriorating and that it will continue to do so in the area and in the Security Council unless some progress towards a settlement can be made. In particular, I am asking Ambassador Ball to explore with you steps which your Government might be prepared to take now to facilitate UN Representative Jarring's efforts to bring about agreement between Israel and its neighbors.

I hope that you and Ambassador Ball may have a completely candid exchange of views which will advance our mutual interest in the prompt establishment of a durable and stable peace in the area.

Sincerely, Lyndon B. Johnson. End Text.

Rusk

213. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State/1/

Tel Aviv, July 17, 1968, 0645Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, UN 7. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Repeated to Amman, Beirut, Jidda, London, Jerusalem, USUN, and Moscow.

4534. Summary: In two-hour Ball-Sisco exchange with Eban,/2/ the following emerged:

/2/Ball and Sisco visited Israel July 14-16 as part of an orientation trip for Ball as the new Permanent Representative to the United Nations. The trip began in London on July 10 and included a stop in Paris before Tel Aviv. After leaving Tel Aviv, Ball and Sisco went to Amman July 16-17, Beirut July 17-19, and Jidda July 19-20. Their conversations in London, which included consultations about the Middle East, were reported in telegrams 10747 and 10803 from London, both July 12. (Ibid., POL 27 ARAB-ISR) The stop in Paris, which also included talks on the Middle East, was reported in telegrams 17949 and 17950 from Paris, both July 13. (Ibid.)

1. Responsive to urgings of USG representatives, Eban indicated that GOI regarded direct bilateral negotiations not so much as a doctrinal pre-condition but primarily as an expression of belief that adequate contractual peace arrangements could not be achieved without direct dealing between the parties at some point.

2. Eban said GOI had decided probe UAR intentions and had therefore authorized Jarring put to UAR two questions concerning Egyptian concept of peace and nature of future UAR/Israeli relations.

3. Eban stressed that submission of Israeli questions through Jarring to UAR was an effort to sharpen issues and indicated willingness to proceed along this general line without waiting for prior Arab commitment to direct negotiations.

4. This represents effort shift Israeli strategy to concentrate on contractual nature of final settlement without insisting on formal bilateral negotiations as the first step in the road toward this objective.

5. In addition, for the first time Eban indicated that GOI would not necessarily insist on a peace treaty as the instrument at the end of road. He noted our suggestion of Japanese-Soviet declaration/3/ as a possible pattern of agreement. Without in any way committing his government he indicated further that if this meant the difference between settlement and no settlement, they would not necessarily break on this point.

/3/See footnote 4, Document 207.

6. Eban said that by the end of July or early August GOI would make clear to Jarring whether or not their present unofficial flirtation with Jordan was paying any dividends.

7. In later evening discussions with Ball, Eban reiterated GOI determination not to stick on procedural insistence on direct negotiations but try to sharpen the issues through indirect means on the clear assumption that some form of direct negotiation would be needed before final contractual arrangements could be developed in a situation so complicated as that of Arab-Israeli relations.

8. In later conversation with Sisco, Raphael revealed Jarring has been asked to suggest on his own that secret Israeli-UAR contact be established at "any level which commands respect of UAR decision makers" and that such contact would not be characterized by Israelis as either "negotiations" or "prenegotiations." End Summary.

1. Ball and Sisco, accompanied by Ambassador Barbour, had two-hour sessions July 15 with Foreign Minister Eban and senior Foreign Office officials.

2. Ball opened with presentation along following lines:

A. USG concerned about Middle East problem in both long range and short range aspects. In longer run, USG desires satisfactory settlement of problems of Arab-Israel area. We recognize deep emotions on both sides and are sympathetic with Israeli desire for permanent settlement with recognized and secure boundaries. We agree there should be no further makeshift arrangements and understand Israel's desire that settlement should be recorded in agreement among parties at interest. USG will continue support this concept. As Israel knows, we do not however believe formal peace treaties only way to conclude agreement and will want to discuss precise form settlement might take.

B. Immediate problem is how to get settlement process started. Long stalemate benefits no one: continued Israeli occupation of Arab territory is unnatural situation and new explosion in area could be highly dangerous. USG continues rely on Israeli assurances it desires reasonable settlement and is not interested in acquisition of territory. The more GOI can reaffirm this position the better standing it will enjoy in world public opinion and the easier its position will be to defend.

C. Looking at the situation in short term we must consider what we face in the next few months. We understand Jarring intends to submit purely factual report and desires avoid termination of his mission for return to Security Council. It now seems less likely than previously that Soviets and UAR seek return to Security Council but that risk, with accompanying pressures for imposed implementation of resolution, cannot be discounted.

D. Emphasizing that for talks to be useful they must be completely frank, Ball continued that immediate problem is to avoid Israel's becoming isolated. GOI must give world an impression of a reasonableness and a will to peace. Arabs have recently conveyed appearance that they are more flexible and reasonable than Israel. This has been noted in Washington, in US public opinion and in other capitals. We do not know whether apparent Arab reasonableness is a mere tactical ploy or reflects substantive change. In circumstances however the implication is that Arabs want peace and Israel does not. The result is that USG has difficulty supporting Israeli position. We are particularly concerned about Israel's dogged insistence on bilateral negotiations as only way to settlement. We understand need for contractual agreement but we are not persuaded that the insistence on direct bilateral negotiations is more than a procedural maneuver. If Israel continues to stick on this point, it will lose support of other countries. We do not think Israel will persuade Arabs to agree to bilateral negotiations at least at the beginning. We would have difficulty supporting this Israeli position in the Security Council.

3. Eban responded that GOI agreed on need for candid dialogue about appraisal of situation and how it can be influenced. There are some differences between US and Israeli appraisals. Israel has greater sense of confidence and tranquility than US appraisal would  suggest.

4. "Atmosphere in Israel," Eban said, "is dominated by memory of 1967 war and conviction Israel must not settle for less than peace within secure and recognized borders--i.e. liquidation of historic Arab-Israel conflict." Recalling support of American people for Israel last year, Eban said that success of Arab design to destroy Israel would have had serious moral consequences for us and would have been enormous blow to USG credibility. Today, even USSR agrees that key to problem lies in Washington.

5. Eban continued that while there has been some Soviet penetration, particularly in Egypt, greater weight should be given to importance Arabs attach to US role and to existence of strains in Arab-Soviet relations. There have been several developments on credit side: doctrine of withdrawal without peace is discredited; Arab-Israel situation has had large impact in recent developments in Eastern Europe; and many Communist countries now regret having broken relations with Israel. In area itself, there is now intermingling of Israelis and Palestine Arabs which can never be reversed; logic of geographic proximity is beginning to prevail. Among governments concerned there is growing skepticism about efficacy of acrimonious public debate and GOI understands from Jarring that all parties including Soviets oppose return to Security Council.

6. Eban said foregoing are trends which should be permitted to ripen. Nothing radically dangerous has happened since November and we should not let delay plunge us into despair. Assumption that time not on Israel's side is true only if one assumes that war is likely if present situation continues or if one assumes active Soviet intervention. Of all Arab states only UAR might seek renewed hostilities but this unlikely in any case this year or next; we are not on brink of conflict. Re Soviets GOI hears from Jarring, from Rumanian and other governments and from public statements that USSR is taking long view and urging patience on Cairo. As for terrorism, it constituted "hit and run nuisance of severe proportions" but could not change basic GOI political facts. El Fatah is far from being Viet Cong or Algerian liberation movement and has not prevented development of normal relations in occupied areas.

7. Looking at short term problem, Eban said it all important to focus on and sustain Jarring Mission. Time will continue to work on Arab mind. While UAR now talking differently for tactical reasons, it may some day act differently as well. Jordan has expressed interest in talks at Ministerial level but remains inhibited by desire for greater clarification of Israeli position and need for signs of acquiescence from Cairo.

8. Eban said he has told Jarring Israel expects have clearer idea of whether it can move with Jordan by end of July or early August. Logical place to move is in area where human issues are largest-i.e., with Jordan. Problems of Sinai are less urgent and Syria has eliminated itself.

9. Jarring has been telling GOJ Foreign Minister Rifai that he does not favor renewed debate with Soviets and not optimistic about getting better SC res. He (Eban) does not understand why UAR not pressing for return to SC if this would be as bad for Israel as USG indicates. In Eban's view UAR does not have good case; in SC Cairo would have to say it wanted peace without negotiations, without signing anything, without explicit recognition of Israeli sovereignty-in brief, UAR wants to keep Palestine problem alive, liquidate results of last year's defeat and again take up cry of liberation of Palestine.

10. Eban continued that Arab tactical ingenuity is breaking down. It becoming clear despite Arab denial that peace has juridical meaning and requires negotiations. If SC were only a tribunal of opinion, Israel would win on points; fact is that SC is a "packed court" and renewed SC session would constitute set-back to modest gains with Jordan.

11. Eban then summarized Israel's assessment of UAR and Jordanian positions as follows:

(A) UAR does not see peace as specific and formal but only as absence of war. It not only refuses to begin by direct negotiations but wishes avoid direct contact throughout. Instead of agreement between parties UAR wants greater part [great power?] guarantee; Israel learned in 1967 what guarantees mean and understands in any case that USG not enthusiastic about guaranteeing settlement which parties have not accepted. UAR willingness accept fact of Israel's existence is meaningless; what is needed is judicial acceptance. UAR position falls short of what Israel, USG and SC have asked. Nasser has admitted internal weaknesses prevent his going further and Eban sees nothing much to do except to hope UAR situation changes. While UAR has admittedly achieved certain semantic gains, it began again in week of July 9 to come under world criticism, inter alia as result of break following Riyad's reported Stockholm statement.

Eban at this point surfaced fact that Israel feels UAR should be put to test and therefore two weeks ago authorized Jarring to put following questions to UAR: "(1) Is Egypt prepared to exchange the state of war that she has maintained for 20 years for a state of peace consecrated by a binding instrument which contractually engages both parties? (2) What will be the content, quality and status of relations between Israel and Egypt after the two parties will have reached agreement regarding all points mentioned in the Security Council resolution?"

In presenting foregoing questions, Israel had told Jarring that for GOI peace means end of conflict analogous to settlements following World War II. This included, for example, Soviet-Japanese agreement. Israel also probing UAR through others (e.g., the Netherlands) and has sent letters which could be shown to UARG.

(B) Re Jordan, Israel has better contact and therefore better idea of GOJ position. Jordan less obsessed by juridical and procedural inhibitions, but wants better idea of substance of Israel's terms, i.e., will Jordan get back enough to make peace worthwhile? Israel has given Jordan some ideas and some, unfortunately, have also become public knowledge. Allon plan/4/ is example of effort devise arrangements to safeguard Israel's security, but Eban emphasized that none of plans which are being publicized represent Israeli Government position. Re Jerusalem, Israel prepared work out formula giving juridical status to Christian and Moslem interests but within framework of the reality that Jerusalem has been Israel's capital for 19 years and cannot be again divided.

/4/The Allon plan, formulated by Yigal Allon, called for a line of fortified Israeli settlements along the Jordan River, with the remainder of the West Bank to be otherwise demilitarized.

12. Eban said Israel has seen some change in U.S. view of settlement with Jordan. Whereas U.S. supported idea of Israel-Jordanian agreement last fall, he (Eban) now senses U.S. skepticism re this idea. U.S. must take Israel's word that advanced discussions are going forward at high level in hopes of beginning Ministerial talks in New York-perhaps during fall session of General Assembly. Situation is in flux and not all symptoms are negative.

13. Re U.S. concern about SC resolution, Eban said there have been too many Soviet initiatives in support of Arab interests and too few U.S. initiatives in support not of Israel's but of American interests. Israel believes U.S. could again rally support against irresponsible efforts to upset "delicately and obscurely balanced" SC res.

14. Eban agreed need to refurbish appearance of Israeli position but saw no reason to move from basically good posture. Israel will not withdraw from cease-fire lines except in return for peace. Withdrawal must be justified to Israeli people. In some places peace and security have territorial implications, and Israel accepts U.S. view stated by Goldberg November 15 that permanent boundaries must be different from armistice lines. Israel cannot now say where boundaries would be; nature of peace settlement will influence nature of boundaries. As U.S. knows, there are tendencies in Israel to emphasize security in territorial terms.

15. Eban said Jarring agrees on usefulness of asking UAR how it interprets peace. UAR would probably answer by asking how Israel defines boundaries to which GOI would reply its aim is to devise agreement which will avoid military confrontation and assure free navigation. Re Tiran, no one has yet suggested way of assuring passage without Israeli presence at Sharm al-Sheikh. Re Suez, Israel must have full equality with all other nations. GOI doubts that UAR will develop dialogue further but has some hope with Jordanians.

16. Eban said GOI is flexible about form of peace settlement (e.g., Israel willing examine Soviet-Japanese formula) and sees territorial possibilities.

17. In Eban's view, charge of rigidity re direct negotiations is not justified. Israel cannot be ostracized and in any event issues are too complex to be negotiated indirectly. Israel does not exclude third party good offices leading to fruitful negotiations--e.g., Jarring's probing of UAR and its own contacts with Jordan. There could be a turning point if Israel had informal and disavowable channel with UAR as with Jordan and Lebanon, and GOI would be willing to state it would not consider this to be "negotiations", or "pre-negotiations". Rafael described this as a "clarification" approach.

18. Eban said there were number of things which could be done: U.S. could pursue active diplomacy, reasserting support for Israel as Soviets do for Arabs; U.S. could reaffirm that it wants a solution and not palliatives; U.S. and GOI could work in other capitals; U.S. could maintain balance of political and material strength in area--e.g., by providing aircraft. Even though aircraft would not arrive before 1970, decision would be important psychologically and politically to eradicate in 1968 the illusion of a military solution in 1969.

19. Ball said GOI decision to put questions to UAR and Jarring was useful step. Re description of Israeli negotiating posture as rigid, Ball said he wished to clarify this as follows: he inclined agree that no contractual agreement possible without parties sitting down together at some point, but much can be done to sharpen issues through intermediaries.

20. Sisco noted that it important to know what Jarring does with these questions, for them to be followed up by Israel. Israel now has moved down road towards substance as U.S. earlier suggested. It now important also to consider public relations aspect of this movement. Whatever UAR intentions are, fact remains that comparison of UAR and Israeli public statements gives impression of hardening Israeli position.

21. Ball said it desirable eliminate elements of ambiguity in order clear way for hard bargaining and latest Israeli questions to UAR represent progress. What is important is that a process be set in motion which Jarring can then guide as he thinks best. Israel seems to have made a start and we would urge that it press for continuing this process. So far as concerns negotiating procedures, our concern is that Israel not continue to insist that direct bilateral negotiations be prior condition for anything to happen. The insistence on direct negotiations should not be erected as a major principle; they should be viewed as something whose necessity becomes apparent to all as other processes are exhausted. This is point on which we differ with GOI.

22. Ball said there no change on US attitude towards negotiations with Jordan. Misunderstanding may have arisen from his statement to Argov in Washington that, so long as such negotiations must be kept secret that cannot help Israel's public position. Continuation of dialogue with Jordan is useful although there are limits on how far Hussein can go without nod from Cairo [garble], however, that most difficult questions lie with Jordan and that these also weigh most heavily in world opinion. One could make case for not treating opening of Suez Canal as urgent matter but issues with Jordan are pressing. To help get negotiating process started, Israel should reiterate as often as possible its willingness to withdraw and its will for peace. It is important to counteract cynics who tend discount Israeli statements and conclude that Israel has territorial ambitions.

23. Eban said Jordanian Minister Rifai had told Jarring in London that (A) Jordan wants Jarring Mission to continue; (B) Jordan does not want Security Council session (which only Iraqi PermRep is pressing for). Rifai did not say that Israel was holding back but considers further clarification of Israeli position necessary, a clarification which Israel cannot for "technical reasons" provide before late July or late August.

24. Ball then described impressions of talks in London and Paris as follows:

A. UK is more impressed than USG with indications of Arab movement and has sense of urgency about opening Canal and releasing trapped ships.

B. French reiterated view that bilateral negotiations are unrealistic goal and only way to progress is through Security Council action and great power guarantee-in effect an imposed settlement. Sisco noted that new element in French position was that France does not preclude introduction of four power UN forces in area as part of settlement.

25. Eban said he had received letter from Foreign Secretary Stewart which brings British and Israeli relations closer. Stewart agrees nothing can be implemented that is not negotiated and agreed and clearly wants to avoid any impression of UK-Soviet alliance. Eban said he suspects UK wishes demonstrate it not tied to US; he says no fissures between Israel and UK, however. Israel agrees it would be better for Suez Canal to be open, but if this done without clarification of Israel's rights a "May 22 casus belli situation" would be created.

26. Ball noted that UAR and Soviets are the most interested in opening the Canal. To extent that the Soviet insistence on opening Canal is not satisfied, it may be easier to influence Soviets to take positive attitude.

27. Eban said Jarring was in delicate position; he did not want too many mediators and Israel itself favors working through UN mechanism. In this process Israel should perhaps make clearer its willingness enter pre-negotiations.

28. In response to Sisco's comment that Jarring needed to submit as non-substantive a report as possible, Raphael reported Jarring had told him he (A) will not submit substantive report but will talk of "movement," (B) will not make new suggestions unless both parties agree and (C) will not assess blame on either side.

29. Re tactical problem, Eban said it would be useful to play out situation until Foreign Ministers are in New York in September. It could then be possible to explore not only what to do in public but to use UN as diplomatic cover. To get away from "procedural acrobatics," it would help to press idea of "UN conference procedure with Jarring in the chair." Israel understands that Jordan does not need equal movement on UAR side but does require some token movement.

30. Sisco thought Jordan would be influenced by what they learn in advance of Israel's position on substantive issues. It would be dangerous for Jordan to engage in joint meetings without first having given Jordan some concrete indication on substance of settlement. Eban observed that in Palestinian community there was growing sense of nationhood and need for settlement. This is good in that it helps push Jordan toward settlement but is no substitute for interstate agreement.

Barbour

214. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State/1/

Tel Aviv, July 17, 1968, 0930Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, UN 7. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Repeated to USUN and to Beirut and Amman for Ball and Sisco.

4535. Subject: Ball-Sisco Trip-Meeting with Eshkol.

1. After handing President's letter/2/ to Prime Minister Eshkol, Ball said he had come to Jerusalem to get insight into Middle Eastern problems, to get Prime Minister's views first hand and to convey USG views./3/ Ball said he wished make clear that USG hopes to encourage movement toward contractual settlement of permanent nature and that we are not supporting makeshift solution.

/2/See Document 212.

/3/This meeting took place on the morning of July 15. Ball and Sisco also met with Defense Minister Dayan on July 16, who discussed Israeli concern about the danger of war with the Arabs. (Telegram 11105 from Beirut, July 18; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, UN 7)

Ball said he and colleagues had just come from useful discussion with Foreign Minister Eban and now have better appreciation of GOI position and intentions. Particularly gratified and encouraged to learn both of GOI move to have Jarring probe UAR specifically on nature of peace and contractual arrangement and of Israeli action in testing possibility of agreement with Jordanians. Ball said he wished repeat what he had told FonMin that GOI should be alert to danger of appearing to take negative stance thus creating impression it not interested in reaching settlement while Arab governments gave appearance being ready to move forward.

2. In course of an hour long discursive and passionate exposition Prime Minister said he wanted us to know basic Israeli concerns. He said problem for him is that he has too complete confidence in what Nasser says. He was not referring to contradictory statements by Nasser and Hussein re their alleged desire for peace but to continuing and repeated statements of Arab intention to destroy Israel. This Eshkol said is Nasser's true aim and those who refuse to believe him are making same mistake as those in Europe before World War II who refused give credence to Hitler's statements re his intention destroy Jewish people. Eshkol cited Heykal article calling for gradual breaking up and destruction Israel regardless of cost in blood to Arabs. Over the years Israelis have come to know Nasser as an actor who tells all who speak to him what he knows they want to hear, though his basic intention always remains Israel's destruction. By contrast Eshkol said he did not think USSR wants Israel's destruction if only because it does not want to be identified in history with Nazi Germany.

3. Prime Minister stressed that question for Israel is one of survival. Israel had not wanted war. Eshkol recalled GOI had waited three weeks but finally it became clear there no other way out. PriMin noted that even then he had sent message to Hussein stating GOI desire avoid hostilities with Jordan. Israel won war but in process learned it cannot rely on international guarantees to protect its security. Now it cannot give away gains of victory for nothing. Government which did so could not survive. Eshkol pointed to 1957 guarantees re free navigation in Straits of Tiran and King Hussein's promise he would not allow tanks he received from US be deployed west of Jordan River. Prime Minister said day will come when he will have to bring Israeli Cabinet to a decision re steps to be taken toward a settlement. This could break up present coalition. He not afraid to work with a smaller cabinet, as before Six-Day War, but he cannot go before Cabinet and people empty handed. Eshkol asked USG sympathy and understanding of his problems in this regard.

4. Ball expressed appreciation for Prime Minister's exposition. The point he wished to emphasize was following: although USG and GOI were agreed on need for a settlement that will ensure lasting peace, he had emphasized to GOI that they were in his view putting too much weight on procedural requirements.

5. Ball said that USG shares Prime Minister's skepticism regarding Nasser. Problem GOI faces is to make sure of all possible processes for sharpening issues through instrumentality of Jarring Mission and otherwise so that no one can accuse GOI of lacking will to find final settlement.

Ball said there are two issues that need discussion. First, the nature of the ultimate peace settlement and its expression in adequate structural terms./4/ On this, there is no difference in approach between the GOI and the USG. Second, the procedure by which peace could be achieved. On this there is some difference in approach.

/4/Ambassador Ball subsequently revised this sentence to read: "First, the need for an agreed peace settlement and its expression in contractual terms." (Telegram 11144 from Beirut, July 18; ibid.)

6. Ball conceded that it was probable an ultimate peace settlement could be achieved only after a bilateral Arab-Israeli negotiation but this should not be a doctrinal sticking point. GOI should exhaust every pragmatic opportunity to sharpen issues through Jarring Mission and other means and should not rigidly insist that bilateral negotiations be a condition precedent to any progress.

7. Ball indicated USG did not much care how GOI publicly described its probings through Jarring Mission or other mechanisms. It need not say that those probings constituted negotiations; it could use the word clarification or any other word it preferred. The important point was that GOI should not appear as impaled on a procedural issue; it should stress its willingness to get on with a solution--while defining the requirements of the solution--but should not dig itself in on the negative point that no progress was possible without a direct bilateral negotiation. Otherwise it would be vulnerable to the accusation that it did not really want a settlement and would find itself increasingly isolated.

8. Ball stressed he making foregoing points because Israel and US fundamentally working for same objective of lasting peace. Ball said he knows Israelis are pragmatic people and is confident their ability move forward toward solution of area's problems.

9. Eshkol's response to Ball's statement was curious. He did not challenge Ball frontally but indicated a certain measure of private agreement while suggesting that his own problem was with the Knesset.

10. Discussion of Israeli request for Phantom aircraft which raised at Eshkol's initiative, and broke no new grounds will be reported on Ball's return to US.

Barbour

215. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State/1/

Tel Aviv, July 17, 1968, 0930Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, UN 7. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Repeated to USUN and to Beirut and Amman for Ball and Sisco.

4536. 1. During meeting with Prime Min Eshkol morning July 15, Ball raised issue of Israeli delay in signing Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. He referred to Eban's letter to Secretary Rusk/2/ and made clear position expressed was unacceptable. All other states in area had signed treaty and GOI's intransigence called into question their basic good faith. The only result of GOI's footdragging would be to breed suspicion in Arab states and USSR.

/2/See Document 205.

2. Prime Minister said he knows USG view and stands on earlier position that Israel will not be first to introduce nuclear weapons in area. Eshkol pointed out, however, GOI is not only state which still thinking NPT over. Problem is that Israel surrounded by enemies on all sides. Eshkol said he not seeking to link NPT problem with Israeli request for Phantom aircraft but did wish to point out security consideration is a major one. Israel not interested in relieving Arabs of their suspicions re its nuclear intentions. Barbour recalled he had said earlier this was dangerous view. Ball stressed that anything Israel might do which would create shadow of a suspicion that it has nuclear arms aims would establish an even stronger UAR security claim on the Soviets. Ball drew attention to US-USSR assurances in Security Council to non-nuclear powers in case of nuclear attack. Prime Minister, noting he realized he on dangerous ground, asked whether this a real guarantee or rather a declaration of intention which powers may choose ignore if circumstances change. Israel faces "to be or not to be" situation.

3. GOI FonMin SecGeneral Gideon Rafael noted GOI participating in non-nuclear congress which scheduled convene August 29. Rafael said outcome of deliberations non-nuclear powers would be important to GOI's final decision with regard to NPT.

4. Prime Minister did not challenge Ball's view but gave impression of confusion suggesting that his government had been caught with fingers in the cookie jar. He referred rather plaintively to GOI's situation. The clear impression gained by Ball and Sisco was that this was a tactical move related to Phantoms and did not represent position GOI would hold over time.

5. Eshkol appeared very defensive on this point and stated three times that he "would take the USG's position into consideration."

Barbour

216. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State/1/

Amman, July 17, 1968, 0737Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files, 1967-69, DEF 12-5 JORDAN. Secret; Nodis.

5757. Subject: 155mm guns for Jordan.

1. Speaking "off-the-record" on 16th, Zaid Rifai read to me from a letter sent to King Hussein by "a British person." The writer stated that his firm had been able to locate seventy 155-mm Long Tom guns which were immediately available. Shortly after finding these 70 guns, however, the "source of supply" had informed the writer of the letter that the guns had originally come from the U.S. Source alleged the American authorities had learned of Jordanian interest in them and had taken steps to insure that they could not be made available for sale to Jordan. The writer stated that he regretted that particular source was no longer available but that he was following up certain other sources (Zaid implied the other source was Turkey) and that he hoped to be able to find 20 or 25 guns for Jordan.

2. According to Zaid, King Hussein is furious about the indication that the USG has taken steps to cut off all possible sources of 155-mm guns for Jordan. The King has been making noises that he will accept Iraqi offers to supply new 122 (possibly 130) mm guns from the Soviet Union as a "gift." Zaid said quite a "head of steam" has built up on this matter and that both King Hussein and General Khammash are determined that they must at least make up their losses in this category of weaponry. He said the King and Khammash are particularly upset that USG officials on the one hand have been implying that 155-mm guns are not available because they cannot be located, whereas, in fact, the USG seems to have taken steps to make them "unavailable."/2/

/2/Ambassador Symmes sent an official-informal letter to Rodger Davies on July 18 emphasizing the problem posed by the 155-mm guns. He noted that he had discussed the problem briefly with Ball and Sisco and had found them opposed to supplying such artillery to Jordan, "particularly in the period prior to November." Symmes referred again to the King's angry reaction and concluded: "I think whatever we do we have got to come clean soon with the King. We cannot continue this masquerade of 'unavailability.' It is causing further disenchantment with us and is not a correct way to deal with a friend." (Ibid.) Davies responded in a July 25 letter that the Departments of State and Defense were puzzled by the reference to 70 155-mm guns. "We know nothing of this and most certainly have not been requested to assent to provision of 155 mm guns by the British." He added, however, that Ball and Sisco's reactions concerning the guns were generally shared in the Department. (Ibid.)

3. Zaid indicated the JAA currently has eight 155-mm guns operational. This agrees with indication given DATT July 16 by Commanding Gen 2nd Div.

Symmes

217. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State/1/

Amman, July 17, 1968, 1515Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Repeated to Tel Aviv, Moscow, Jidda, Beirut, Cairo, USUN, and London.

5774. Subj: Ball/Sisco farewell talk with Eban.

1. During farewell call by Ball and Sisco, FonMin Eban said he had discussed with PriMin what it might be useful for Ball to say to King Hussein in Amman. Eban and PriMin agreed that if Hussein could overcome inhibitions about negotiations with Israel, Israel would make serious effort reach agreement. Eban had no idea how much leeway Hussein had from Cairo. As regards Hussein's desire have clearer idea of what Israel would offer, however, Eban said GOI agreed "it necessary give Hussein a push" in this respect. If we agreed, Eban said Ball could convey to Hussein impression that in "real peace settlement" he would get very much back-not all, but great deal of what he lost.

2. Eban said it would also help if Ball stressed that US wanted settlement among parties so that Hussein would realize he must turn to Israel to make progress. In addition to five points, President's emphasis on concept that "parties to conflict must be parties to peace" was important in this respect.

3. Eban said we could also convey on Israeli behalf that, while Israel does not envisage restoration of June 4 lines, it does envisage limited Kingdom on both sides of Jordan River, including Arab population and most of territory. In response Ball's comment that he understood security was controlling principle for Israel, Eban replied in affirmative, saying Israel only seeks changes in territory justified on security grounds. In addition, Hussein could obtain non-territorial gains such as free movement of goods and persons and access to natural Mediterranean outlet. Eban stressed he did not expect Hussein to commit himself, but Israel was urging that Jordan at least explore the ideas outlined above within context of overall settlement.

4. Sisco asked what could be said to Hussein about Jerusalem. Eban commented that there was no international pressure to redivide Jerusalem but, nevertheless, within limits set by fact that Jerusalem is Israel's capital and must remain united, Israel would stretch its imagination to find solution. Israel's thinking ran towards finding formula which would comprise expression and incarnation of Moslem interests. Coupled with concept of open frontiers, this should be helpful move.

5. Ball commented that with respect West Bank Hussein perhaps had some flexibility. Where Jerusalem was concerned, however, he was under pressure from other Arabs and non-Arab Moslems. Eban thought this was easiest aspect of problem since it was precisely Moslem interests for which Israel was prepared make special arrangements. Eban noted that neither US nor UK had said they favored redividing Jerusalem although some have been encouraged to think that US prepared return to June 4, 1967 status on basis its statements in UN following Israeli administrative unification of city last year.

6. Sisco asked what we could tell Hussein about two questions GOI had given Jarring for UAR. There was possibility, though no certainty, that Hussein would see this step as progress toward UAR-Israel negotiations and that this would help relieve his inhibitions about moving ahead of Nasser.

7. Eban suggested telling Hussein, if Israel-Jordan settlement endorsed by Palestine Arabs could be achieved, he would then have strong card since Nasser would have difficulty objecting to Palestinian settlement which Palestinians accepted. Eban also thought that degree of approval which USG would indicate for Israel-Jordan settlement would be important factor with Hussein. (Raphael, in response to Sisco's urging, later said Israel agreed we could inform Jordanians of two substantive questions they asked Jarring to put to UAR.)

8. Raphael expressed view that if Cairo allowed to "stew in own juice," situation would evolve in which Cairo would eventually have to join.

9. In response Ball's query about Faisal's position, Eban said characterized by inconsistencies: on one hand Faisal was emotional about Israel and Jerusalem but, on other hand, he concerned about Nasser.

10. Returning to Jerusalem question, Raphael noted that there had never been Moslem endorsement of Jordan's unilateral annexation of Jerusalem. If Jordan had been strong enough to carry annexation off, it should be strong enough to make arrangements safeguarding Moslem interests. Eban commented that to pious Moslems it was intolerable for Jews to control second most holy place of Islam. Israel should accept this reality in seeking Jerusalem solution.

11. Re general problem of getting negotiations started, Raphael said that once Arabs realized no one would pull their irons out of fire and that they must choose between status quo and progress toward new situation, they would stop hoping for big power intervention. Jordan should, however, realize dangers in unstable border situation. Jordan should also know that, while Israel is cooperating in exploring issues, there must be discussions for Israel to go as far as Foreign Minister had indicated it would.

12. On question of territorial adjustments, Ball noted that he had been briefed earlier in day by Allon on so called "Allon plan."/2/ Eban stressed that this plan not endorsed by govt but should be viewed [as] possible model for way of achieving greater security without Israeli domination of Arab population. (Eban's answer, however, was given in such a manner as to convey impression he did not think Allon plan was ever going anywhere.)

/2/See footnote 4, Document 213.

Symmes

218. Telegram From the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State/1/

Beirut, July 18, 1968, 1906Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, UN 7. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Repeated to Amman, Tel Aviv, Moscow, Jidda, London, USUN, and Jerusalem.

11145. Dept pass Cairo. To Secretary from Ball. Subject: Audience with King Hussein.

1. Sisco, Amb Symmes and I were received by King, Wednesday, July 16. Zaid Rifai was only other Jordanian present at beginning of conversation, but during course of discussion Prince Hassan joined group.

2. We were received with warmth and a perceptible sense of expectation. Throughout our discussion, the King displayed philosophical detachment, suggesting substantial resignation to the unhappy situation of his country but indicating at the same time that he was not discouraged though eager to find a solution.

3. After handing King President's letter (Beirut 11146)/2/ for which he expressed gratitude, I underlined continuing US support of November 22 resolution and Jarring Mission. I also referred to US assurances made to King during discussion of November 22 resolution in NY and stated that "we still bore them in mind."

/2/Document 219. The July 13 letter from President Johnson to King Hussein was transmitted in telegram 202036, Document 211.

4. I then outlined presentation made earlier to PriMin, placing emphasis on two questions Israelis had requested Jarring to put to UAR. Significance of these questions, I explained, was not so much their content but their value as evidence that Israel tentatively seeking to begin process of clarifying issues through means other than bilateral negotiations at outset. I made clear that this provided opportunity for Arab nations to move the situation off dead center provided UAR gave sensible and not merely dialectical reply to the Israeli questions. I suggested also that if UAR really wanted negotiating process to begin, it should accompany its response with submission of question of its own, implying this was test of Arab good-faith determination to seek lasting solution. To avoid misunderstanding, however, I made clear that I had not recently talked with Jarring and did not know how he intended to handle Israeli questions.

5. Israel was, I stated, clearly more interested in attempting to settle its relations with Jordan than with the UAR. It wanted to find a modus operandi with its closest neighbor as soon as possible, while being prepared to wait for unlimited time for solution of Suez and Sinai problems. It was in this context that I reviewed with King details of message that FM Eban had asked me to convey to the GOJ./3/ In serving as an instrument of transmission, however, I made it clear that the USG was expressing no independent judgment as to merits or demerits of Israeli position. Moreover, the King should understand that we saw the Israeli proposals as representing merely an initial bargaining position.

/3/See Document 217.

6. The Israelis, I said, had retreated somewhat from their insistence on direct negotiations at the outset and were obviously prepared for some indirect exchanges with the GOJ in order to give the King some indication of Israeli thinking. At same time, the USG considered it imperative that the GOJ be prepared to utilize FonMin Rifai's visit to the GA in September as the occasion for serious talks with the Israelis. I told the King that I had strongly pressed on Israelis that the position of doctrinal insistence on direct negotiations to exclusion of all other diplomatic exchanges was totally unrealistic and self-defeating. At the same time, the Arab world should understand that in our view no secure peace could ever be arranged unless the Arabs were prepared at proper point for some form of direct discussions leading to contractual arrangement. I pointed out that as I saw it, the GOI had not formulated a governmental position as to precisely what kind of a settlement with Jordan they envisaged. The government was in some disarray with sharply conflicting opinions among the members of the Cabinet and I thought the GOI incapable of making any precise plans until forced to do so by the necessities of an ongoing negotiating process. Time was working on nobody's side and if any progress were to be made, the present excuses for inaction on both sides must be put aside. The only way to begin was to begin.

7. King Hussein responded with quite evident gratitude for President's letter and for information we had brought him. He made brief general review of efforts he and GOJ had made to bring sanity into situation following the war. At the Khartoum summit, he had tried vigorously, but without success, to avoid the adoption of the conditions of no peace treaty, no direct negotiations and no diplomatic recognition, which today were not only obstructing Jarring Mission but also enabling Israel to exploit alleged Arab intransigeance. Since Khartoum, he had tried hard to find out what the Israelis really wanted but, again, without success.

8. Israel, the King said, had three faces. There was the religious group, the hard-line expansionist and the moderate realistic element. As a result, there was no consistent Israeli policy to which the Arabs could address themselves.

9. Jordan had made clear to Jarring and to its friends, including the US, where it stood on all aspects of the Nov 22 resolution, and the King felt that Jordan must stay within the framework of the resolution since there was no other clear guide to settlement. The King then asked me what in our opinion he could and should do to move the problem forward.

10. I answered by referring again to the possible significance of questions that Israel has asked Jarring to transmit to the UAR and emphasized need for a constructive Arab response. I referred also to Eban's expressed hope that joint Israeli/GOJ meetings of some sort might be arranged in New York in September. The King appeared to agree with these ideas and both Sisco and I interpreted his reaction as a determination to do all that was possible along these lines.

11. In more general conversation in which Zaid Rifai participated, Sisco made point that the November 22 resolution is a package of principles, the details of which require discussion between the parties to reach a settlement.

12. At the conclusion of our long discussion, the other luncheon guests were brought in, including PriMin and FonMin. The conversation at luncheon was social in character, although toward the end of the meal, in replying to general question, the FonMin stated for the benefit of the whole table that he was not at all discouraged about the Middle Eastern situation and that "we have moved from first phase into second phase." The FonMin then observed that "if we can move it to this second phase, we can start doing business."

13. When we took our leave after lunch, King stated with great warmth: "I can't tell you what it has meant to me or how grateful I am for your coming here and for what you have told me."

14. Impression given during entire meeting was that King was tired and very serious, by no means despairing and eager and determined to get on with settlement. In course of conversation, the King made two statements which seemed particularly significant. One was that information we had brought him from Israelis gave him "something he could get started with." The second was that Jordan and UAR had "different interests," implying his willingness to press for a settlement of Israel/Jordan problem alone, regardless of UAR foot dragging.

15. It seemed significant that audience with the King did not include any Ministers and that at no time did tone or content suggest any of the more formalized Arab position we had been given by Rifai and PriMin in earlier meeting. Nevertheless, Sisco tells me Rifai seemed more attuned to King's views than was case during detailed talks in NY last year./4/

/4/Documentation on King Hussein's U.S. visit in November 1967 will be printed in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, volume XIX.

16. The King made no comments that tended in any way to corroborate Israeli contention that there were secret direct contacts between Israel and Jordan. In fact, implications of his statements were quite to the contrary.

17. The King also did not react specifically to any of Eban's points, except to indicate that it would be most unfortunate if Jerusalem, as the city of peace, should be the single factor that obstructed a peaceful settlement. By what he did not say, he seemed to indicate that he personally has some flexibility on the question of Jerusalem and recognized there can be no return to the pre-June 1967 situation.

Porter

219. Telegram From the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State/1/

Beirut, July 18, 1968, 1906Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, UN 7. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Repeated to Amman, Jidda, London, Moscow, Tel Aviv, USUN, and Jerusalem.

11146. Dept pass Cairo. Subject: Ball/Sisco trip--discussions with Talhouni and Rifai of Jordan.

1. Summary: In two-hour meeting July 17 with Jordanian PriMin Talhouni and FonMin Rifai, Ball gave them his overall impressions of present Israeli attitude towards Jarring Mission and a peace settlement. While obviously noncommittal and at the outset presenting Jordanian position along traditional lines, reaction of Ministers gave impression that specific substantive ideas which Eban asked Ball to transmit to the Jordanians regarding possible shape of an eventual settlement would not be dismissed out of hand particularly in light of fact Ball made clear our feeling that this Israeli opening bargaining position. Suspicion obviously remains in minds of Jordanian leaders that concrete propositions we conveyed to GOJ on behalf of Israel are largely tactical gambit to, in GOJ words, "escape responsibilities of SC resolution"; nevertheless we had impression matter would be weighed carefully.

Atmosphere of talks was influenced in part by fact that word was trickling in regarding Iraqi coup. While conversation in opening round tended to be rather hard expression of Jordanian view, we were impressed with Rifai's very brief but objective summation of current state of play re Jarring Mission which he gave to King Hussein at lunch. For example, Rifai told the King in front of us that the situation was not unhopeful, that there was some movement, that Jarring Mission should be continued and that Jordan should continue to support him and respond constructively. We had distinct impression that Rifai has bought idea of Jarring continuing his probes between now and opening of GA and that GOJ has intention of sending Rifai to GA during opening days to help move things along.

Ball had excellent opportunity to get across to GOJ our impression that there is a will toward peace in Israel though we doubted Israeli substantive position on settlement would crystallize until there were discussions between Arabs and Israelis which would tend to force GOI Cabinet to face issues and to make decisions of a substantive character. GOJ seemed impressed with Ball description that we had been categoric in conveying to Israelis our view that while we did not see how final settlement could be achieved without parties at some appropriate stage sitting down together, nevertheless insistence on acceptance of direct negotiations as condition precedent was untenable posture for GOI.

GOJ leaders also showed interest in information Ball provided them regarding two specific substantive questions Israelis had asked Jarring to pass to UAR in hopes that this might help get "a process" started. Fact that Israelis were conveying specifics to UAR through Jarring and specifics to GOJ through us seemed to make some impression, though difficult to ascertain how much.

We found that Talhouni and Rifai agreed with us that there is no value to going into the SC in the foreseeable future, though they obviously felt the need to leave open this possibility, particularly on the question of Jerusalem, should future developments require. Re Israeli desire for direct contacts with GOJ, they (A) voiced suspicion that GOI seeking evade obligations under SC resolutions; (B) asserted that overriding need was for plan to implement resolution which Jarring could work out; and (C) that GOJ "never had nor would enter separate direct contacts with Israel." In connection with foregoing, Ball stressed that resolution was not a peace settlement, and that Jarring's activities could help prepare way, by clearing underbrush and sharpening issues, for agreement between parties.

Biggest area of doubt which developed during course of conversation relates to Israeli intentions vis-a-vis Jarring in late July or early August on which we wish Barbour to follow up as he deems appropriate. Rifai was told by Jarring that GOI has promised Jarring map, or at least descriptive memorandum, giving its conception of secure and recognized boundaries. Neither Ball nor Sisco received any such impression from the Israelis. All Eban and Raphael indicated to us was that they intend to tell Jarring one way or another by the end of this month whether they see any real prospects for progress with the GOJ. They mentioned nothing about providing either Jarring or the GOJ with maps of boundaries and we were candid with the GOJ in questioning Israeli intention of going this far this soon, particularly in circumstances where there are obvious divisions in Israeli Cabinet and no consensus reached on elements of territorial settlement.

We made headway in one other way in that Talhouni and Rifai both agree that Jarring should continue his probes between now and opening of the GA and that Rifai very much hopes that circumstances will be such that he and number other FonMins can engage in intensive consultations during opening days GA in order move things along. In fact the idea of intensive effort on the ME among the FonMins at the time of GA opening which we have been selling all along the circuit has taken hold. The only real question which unhappily is crucial, will be the UAR willingness to send Riad. Burgus ought to be working on this on a day by day basis so as to assure Riad's presence at that time. End summary.

[Here follows the 12-page body of the telegram.]

Porter

220. Telegram From the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State/1/

Beirut, July 18, 1968, 2106Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, UN 7. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to Amman, Jidda, London, Moscow, Tel Aviv, and USUN.

11148. Department pass Cairo.

Begin summary: Ball and Sisco, accompanied by Amb Porter, had frank exchange with Lebanese FonMin Boutros July 18./2/ Boutros stressed that Arab decision work for settlement on basis Security Council resolution, involving as it did willingness accept Israel as fact, was act of political courage. For Arabs this made it all the more essential to stay within UN context and work through Jarring. USG should therefore influence Israel to give up insistence on direct negotiations and to implement resolution. This Boutros saw as step by step process. Ball said step by step approach was unrealistic; Israel would not and could not be compelled to give up its only bargaining position, namely occupation of Arab territory, except in return for agreement on all issues. Ball said overriding need was to get negotiating process started. We had urged Israelis not to make direct negotiations a condition precedent. Similarly we urged Arabs to recognize it unrealistic expect that settlement reflecting agreement among parties, as called for in resolution, could be achieved without direct talks at some point down the road. Boutros acknowledged that progress toward implementation could make direct talks easier at later stage.

/2/A memorandum of Ball and Sisco's conversation on July 18 with President Charles Helou and Prime Minister Abdullah Yafi was transmitted to the Department as an enclosure to airgram A-1198 from Beirut, July 22. (Ibid., POL 27 ARAB-ISR)

Ball stated that while recognizing magnitude of difficulties, he was not discouraged; pressures of time would compel some movement on both sides. Israel had recently asked Jarring to pass two questions to UARG, in effect providing opportunity to get indirect negotiating process under way. Boutros showed interest but expressed suspicion that Israel laying trap for UAR and in general was pessimistic about chances for overall settlement. Stressing dangers to Arab governments of deep popular feeling on Palestine issue, Boutros argued that "all or nothing" approach to settlement unrealistic. There was need for Jarring or Security Council to devise accommodations that could begin "disarmament of minds" on both sides, without which any treaty would be meaningless. Ball and Sisco replied that process GOI trying to start was initiative by Israeli moderates; Arab response could foster or stifle initiative. They expressed hope Jarring would follow through and UAR would respond seriously. Re form of settlement, Ball said he had impression Israel would not stick on treaty and that alternative (e.g., like Soviet-Japanese arrangement after World War II) could be found. When Sisco noted that UNGA session in fall would offer opportunity for quiet consultations with Jarring and FonMins present, Boutros agreed but said question of whether Arab FonMins would go to NY would probably need to be considered first in Arab League FonMin meeting, which he expected occur prior GA.

Boutros also raised GOL's concerns re Israeli intentions toward Lebanon. Ball said he had made clear to GOI how strongly US opposed any Israeli actions against Lebanon and had received categoric denial of hostile Israeli intentions. GOI had stressed, however, that it would have to respond to serious incidents against Israel across Lebanese frontier. End summary.

[Here follows the 10-page body of the telegram.]

Porter

221. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State/1/

Amman, July 20, 1968, 0650Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to Beirut, London, Jidda, Rome, Tel Aviv, USUN, and Cairo.

5810. Subj: Bundy's July 18 talk with King Hussein. Pass Ball/Sisco.

Summary.

1. In his July 18 talks with Bundy, King Hussein sought Bundy's impressions of Israel, showing special interest in attitudes of Dayan. King stressed the importance of progress toward a settlement by the year's end, and the necessity of having something tangible in the form of expectation of a "just" solution before he could directly confront the Fedayeen. Hussein also indicated a willingness to consider some territorial "give and take" in any settlement. The King was worried by the Iraqi coup, and appeared concerned that sooner or later Iraq and Syria might move closer together.

2. Bundy stressed that he believed the Israelis genuinely want peace. He encouraged the King not to waste any opportunity for indirect examination of the issues with key Israeli leaders such as Dayan; and he underlined the theme that all avenues leading to an exchange of viewpoints should be explored carefully. Bundy also conveyed Dayan's warning that if Fedayeen forays into Israel continue, Israel might be forced again to strike at Jordan, causing further population displacement. Bundy advised the King that parties themselves have main responsibility for achieving settlement and should not expect USG or other outside govts to do it for them. Bundy said he sensed that the King has no currently active dialogue with Israelis but that he might, under some circumstances, undertake an initiative with the Israelis. Meanwhile King appears to hope someone else will do the job for him or at least get out in front. End of summary.

1. Bundy had audience July 18 with King Hussein. Crown Prince Hassan and King's private secretary, Zaid Rifa'i, also were present. Bundy did not have opportunity before departure to clear following report of his conversation, which he gave us orally.

2. Bundy said his general impression was similar to that which he had acquired during King's visit to Washington last summer. Hussein knows the problems that he faces, and he appears to realize that sooner or later he will have to make a stab at solving them. Bundy felt, however, that Hussein hoped someone else would achieve a settlement for him and that at least he, Hussein, would want someone else with him if not out in front. Bundy thought Hussein had regained some of the confidence he lacked during the summer of 1967, when Bundy found him "very shaky."

3. Hussein asked Bundy to talk about his visit to Israel. Bundy said he thought the Israelis really meant it when they said they want peace but that of course they want it on a secure basis. Alluding to the fact that Amb Ball had conveyed to the Jordanians only the day before Eban's comments on the outline of settlement, and his desire for a Jordanian response, Bundy emphasized that any avenue directed at feeling out the respective positions was worth exploring. Hussein commented that the Arab Foreign Ministers might be able to do this later in the summer in New York. The King also volunteered he considered highly important there be some meaningful progress by the end of the year. (But Bundy again felt that by progress the King did not mean Jordanian initiatives.)

4. King was most interested in Dayan. Bundy told him he thought that Dayan, in the absence of peace, was the firmest of Israelis; yet he would be the most moderate of all and essentially the most helpful to the Arabs once peace and Israel's security was achieved. The King agreed with these comments. Bundy repeated to Hussein what Dayan had said to him about the cease-fire violations and Fedayeen raids. If Jordan were unsuccessful in controlling the Fedayeen situation in the Valley (implication being Beisan area), Israel would again have to take firm action and this might mean more Jordanians would be displaced. Bundy did not use Dayan's argument that deeds, not words, were what counted, but he repeated Dayan's comment that it would be in the King's own interest to control the Fedayeen. Hussein responded that he could now meet any direct Fedayeen challenge to his authority but that he thought it was better to deal with the situation with indirect tactics for the time being. Hussein felt strongly that he had to have something tangible, the expectation of a "just" solution, in order to justify a direct confrontation with the Fedayeen.

5. Bundy commented to us that Hussein used the word "just" frequently and in much the same manner the Israelis used the word "peace." A settlement in which all parties had confidence was the only solution, said the King. He obviously considers that Israel has given the Arabs thin soup so far. Nevertheless, he said he was continuing to pressure Nasser to continue the dialogue with Jarring (which Bundy took as a reference to the Israeli "two questions" posed to the UAR through Jarring), and said that some progress has been made since the Khartoum conference.

6. Before the King arrived at the meeting, Bundy had been told by Rifa'i that Israeli terms proposed for Jerusalem were "impossible." When Jerusalem came up with the King, the latter was not so flatly assertive. Bundy referred briefly to President Helou's idea of deliberately leaving the Jerusalem question "unsettled," and obtaining agreement on all other issues first, but the King was unresponsive. Hussein repeated his frequently-used description of Israel as possessing three faces: the extremist one, which seeks the downfall of Jordan and Israeli occupation of the East Bank; the seemingly reasonable face, which wants a Palestinian entity; and the moderate face. The King said he has been trying to find the third face. He gave Bundy the impression that various territorial adjustments favorable to Israel could be considered, and that, for example, some territory could be given Israel in return for free Jordanian passage to the Mediterranean.

7. Bundy said he got no response from the King when he broached some of Eshkol's ideas about a refugee solution. (Bundy noted wryly to us that Eshkol had sought his, Bundy's, reaction to Ford financing of the settlement costs.)

8. Hussein pressed Bundy for information about political conditions in Washington. Bundy said that the US was heavily preoccupied with the war in Viet-Nam and with elections, and that there was little incentive to expend energy on a no-result exercise in the Arab-Israel contest. Bundy advised Hussein frankly not to depend on just the US and other outside states to find a way out, and he followed this up with the suggestion that Hussein should test the water with the Israelis, in any feasible, indirect way. Bundy mentioned that he thought Eban's proposals, as conveyed through Ball, constituted an asking price, a bargaining position, and suggested Hussein not be discouraged by them. In addition he proposed specifically that Hussein not lose any opportunity to send a trusted emissary to talk to Dayan,/2/ for example, if the latter should travel to Europe. Bundy mentioned also that Teddy Kolleck, one of the most moderate men in Israel, was fortunately also Mayor of Jerusalem. This was another person with whom the Jordanians should get in touch.

/2/The Department reacted with concern to this suggestion. Telegram 207551 to Amman, July 23, warned that establishing a channel between the King and Dayan might pose risks for the King and could prejudice existing contacts between Israel and Jordan if Dayan was not aware of them. The Embassy was instructed to explain to the King that Bundy's suggestion was not made at the behest of the U.S. Government. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country Series, Jordan, Vol. V, Cables, 3/68-1/69)

9. Crown Prince Hassan, during the discussion of the possibilities of using US influence, proposed that the US apply pressure on Libya, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, all friends of US, to discourage them for subsidizing the Fedayeen. But the King dismissed these remarks as "minor point."

10. Hussein revealed considerable uneasiness about the Iraqi coup. He said he was discouraged and worried, indicating that he thought that the new Iraqi govt, some way or other, sooner or later, would get close to the Syrian regime. Hussein regretted the fall of the Arif govt because he had been entertaining hopes of being able to deal with it effectively.

11. Summing up, Bundy said he gained the impression that Hussein ought [sought?] take an initiative with the Israelis if he saw a discreet opportunity to do so, but we should not count it. If we had to depend on Hussein to take the initiative, Bundy told us he was sure there would be little progress toward a settlement.

Symmes

222. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow)/1/

Washington, July 22, 1968.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East, Vol. II, 4/68-1/69. Secret; Exdis.

SUBJECT
Next Steps in the Mid-East

Sisco confirms that the Israeli position described to Ball resulted from a Cabinet decision that Israel had to be more flexible to keep us with them. Our next job is how to capitalize on their shift. These are the follow-up steps now being taken:

1. Ball will brief Jarring in New York tonight. He will try to find out whether Jarring wants any further help right now.

2. Rifai is in Cairo urging the Egyptians not to react negatively to the questions Israel put to Jarring for the UAR. He will suggest that Cairo at least come back with questions of its own.

3. The British are also going to try to prime the Egyptians for a constructive answer to Israel's questions.

While we shouldn't crow about this minimal shift in Israel's position, we can claim credit for it--for whatever it turns out to be worth. It was basically the result of our plugging away at them here, but apparently our decision to send Ball is what finally shook them into action.

We still have plenty of work ahead of us, but maybe we should ponder the fact that even a small move by us can inject new flexibility into this molasses-like situation.

Hal

223. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France/1/

Washington, July 24, 1968, 2247Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, AV 12 ISR. Confidential. Drafted by James K. Matter (NEA/IAI); cleared in draft by Williams Beal (E/OA), and in substance by Parker (NEA/UAR) and Peter Sebastian (AF/N); and approved by Davies. Also sent to Rome, Cairo, and USUN, and repeated to Algiers, Tel Aviv, London, and Montreal for USRep ICAO.

208286. Subject: El Al Aircraft Hijacking./2/

/2/Israeli El Al flight 426, bound for Tel Aviv from Rome, was hijacked by three Palestinian commandos 25 minutes after it took off from Rome on July 22 at 10:30 p.m. On instructions from commandos, the plane made a forced landing at Algiers in the early morning of July 23. The plane carried 38 passengers and a crew of 10. Two of the passengers were U.S. citizens. On landing at Dar El Beida airport, the plane was surrounded by Algerian security forces. Israeli Prime Minister Eshkol publicly accused the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine for the hijacking, and warned the UAR, where the Palestinian group had its headquarters, that Israel would hold the UAR responsible for its acts. (Memorandum from Thomas Hughes to Secretary Rusk, July 24; ibid.)

1. In somber presentation, Israeli Charge Argov appealed to Acting Assistant Secretary Davies for USG help to extent possible in regaining hijacked airplane and Israeli citizens. Israel approaching other governments also. Argov stressed they taking restrained public line in order leave Algerians maneuver room. Nonetheless Argov pessimistic about success.

2. Argov concerned that other Palestinian groups may seek to emulate this feat. He noted this was new dimension of trouble for Near East, in field which had not been affected for past 20 years. He expressed fear that this now about to occur, if Algerians [Palestinians?] get away with it. Foresaw prospect of adverse effect on tourism.

3. Davies replied USG, of course concerned about hijacking, which we have own interest in opposing. Principle of hijacking is profoundly troublesome. He willing consider what we could do. He thought direct USG approach to Algerians useless (Argov agreed), but perhaps approaches by third countries might help, especially France and Italy.

4. Action addressees accordingly requested approach their governments (Secretariat for USUN) make following points:

USG concerned over serious blow to international civil air transport which likely arise if hijacking of El Al aircraft permitted to stand. Aside from dangerous stimulus hijacking might provide to mentally unbalanced individuals, this incident, if not quickly redressed, might stimulate competitive hijacking attempts which could have disastrous impact on international civil aviation in Near East. We think all principal civil air transport powers have major interest in trying to avert such a potential disruption of air traffic. We hope governments will make these points strongly on their own initiative to Algerian Government.

5. For Cairo: Hope you can impress on UARG how potentially dangerous this matter is. Hope UARG would see its way clear to urge Algerians to release plane and Israelis. We have ominous precedent of consequence of sinking of destroyer Eilat in mind.

Rusk

224. Information Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Rostow) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/

Washington, July 26, 1968.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 12-5 ISR. Secret; Exdis.

SUBJECT
Phantoms for Israel

Reading Luke's pro-con memorandum (Tab A)/2/ on the difficult problem of Phantoms for Israel, I come down on the side of acting now, perhaps in the form of the last sentence of the memorandum./3/ I should add that we should start the training part of the exercise at once, to eliminate factors of delay if actual deliveries in 1970 do prove to be necessary.

/2/Attached is a 5 page unattributed memorandum with the handwritten date of July 6 and a subject line that reads: "F-4 Phantoms for Israel-The Pros and Cons."

/3/The last sentence reads: "That solution would be to tell Israel now we are prepared in principle to go ahead on F-4s while deferring a decision on timing and the signing of contracts and seeking to minimize and obfuscate publicity."

Since Luke wrote, several things have happened. To me, they reinforce the argument for acting now.

I'm afraid that the newspaper publicity about George Ball's trip, and some of our diplomatic conversations about it, may have given the Arabs (and the Russians) the sense that we are pushing the Israelis' hand, so that they can sit back and wait. Indeed, according to the last report we got from Amman (Amman 5865) (Tab B),/4/ Nasser has raised the ante again.

/4/A copy of telegram 5865 from Amman, July 24, is attached. The telegram transmitted a summary report from Foreign Minister Rifai on his recent trip to Cairo and his discussions with Nasser and Foreign Minister Riad. The basic point that emerged from the discussions was the UAR insistence that not a single inch of Arab territory could be conceded to Israel in a peace settlement.

In that perspective, and taking into account the hijacking episode/5/ and Soviet preoccupation in Czechoslovakia, the Phantoms should be a good signal to the UAR to proceed at once towards a settlement. It is indispensably important that the Arabs (and the Soviets) understand our firm intention to support a fair and evenhanded settlement, and a fair and evenhanded process of negotiation required to achieve it. Miscalculation on this point could in itself produce precisely the blow up we want to prevent.

/5/See Document 223.

On the Israeli side, I think the Phantoms make sense as well. It is very likely that we shall have to commit the planes anyway in connection with the military assistance bill. It is better to make the decision without coercion, and as part of the process of our overall cooperation with Israel. If we lose Israeli confidence, or create unnecessary suspicions, we may find it increasingly difficult to influence Israel towards moderation in the months ahead./6/

/6/On July 31 Harold Saunders sent a memorandum to President Johnson in which he drew on Ball's conversations in Israel with Eshkol to make the point that Eshkol was "upset" about the failure of any movement on the issue of the Phantoms. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. X, Cables and Memos, 6/68-11/68)

The Phantoms should be a factor for moderation in another sense as well. When the arms balance is precarious, Israel feels easily threatened, and tempted by the idea of a preemptive strike. It is our interest to avoid another blowup. With confidence in our support derived from an early decision on Phantoms, the Israelis might be less trigger-happy when the next round of episodes occurs.

The military situation is genuinely serious. The Arabs have too many planes, and too many modern planes. Their airfields are no longer easy targets. Too many of the Israeli planes are old and patched together. If a war does come, it will again be in our interest for Israel to win, and to win decisively.

It might conceivably be worth another round with the Soviets on the subject, on a pretty blunt "Phantoms or talks-with-Jarring" basis. I doubt it myself, but I wouldn't object to telling the Russians once more that we're tired of UAR stalling and double talk. The time has come to move.

225. Telegram From the U.S. Interests Section of the Spanish Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State/1/

Cairo, July 29, 1968, 0748Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Exdis.

3029. 1. Atherton and I spent over two hours with Mohamed Riad of FonOff evening 27th.

2. Atherton said he assumed from UAR discussions with other Arabs, particularly Jordanians, that Egyptians already had good feel of Ball talks in ME. Riad agreed.

3. Atherton emphasized that Ball talks within context pre-UNGA UN consultations and essentially fact-finding. He emphasized continuing USG desire assist Jarring in his efforts find areas agreement within framework Nov 22 resolution.

4. In course discussion, Atherton emphasized Ball's efforts move beyond present doctrinal impasse: viz. Arab commitment to Khartoum and Israel commitment to direct negots, in effort get pragmatic negotiating process started. This connection Atherton made points set forth Deptel 207803./2/

/2/Telegram 207803 to Cairo, July 24, instructed Bergus to draw on Ball's exchanges with the Israelis to make the point that Israel had responded to the U.S. initiative and was willing to engage in an exchange of views without insisting on direct negotiations. Bergus was also instructed to note that there was deep skepticism in Israel that the UAR was sincerely interested in peace. (Ibid.)

5. Commenting on short range problems, i.e. avoiding abortion of Jarring Mission and keeping problem out of SC, Riad indicated UAR's agreement. As to long range, he kept reiterating GUAR acceptance of Nov 22 resolution in its entirety, including concept of agreed settlement, with all its implications. He said this meant GUAR had no intention returning to pre-June 5 situation.

6. Stating that GUAR had received text Israel's "two questions" from Jordanians, he said he did not feel this anything new but said GUAR would not "be bashful" in responding and posing questions of its own. Riad said GUAR had given Jarring some substantive ideas of its position on free passage, borders and demilitarized zones without any response from GOI. Long before GOI, it had also taken initiative in posing question to GOI through Jarring--namely, what was Israeli concept of "secure and recognized boundaries." GOI had not responded. Atherton commented that GOI and UARG had each posed hardest question for other side and neither should expect immediate full and direct answer. Important point was that this could provide beginning of substantive engagement of parties which offered best hope of breaking present impasse.

7. As to procedural impasse, Riad said Rifai had communicated to GUAR view of Ball that direct negots necessary at some point. Speaking very carefully, Riad said UAR at this stage could not take position other than opposition to direct negots. We said that at this stage important thing was to get process started. We did not see how direct negots at some stage could be avoided but that was not immediate issue and we had some hope Israelis now more flexible this point. When Jarring presented his formulation of "two questions" we hoped UAR would take opportunity engage Israelis in substantive dialog.

8. I then reiterated seriatim points in last sentence para 13 and remainder of State 20780/3/ to Mohamed who took notes.

/3/The last sentence of paragraph 1 of telegram 207803 to Cairo instructed Bergus not to preempt Jarring by conveying the substance of the two questions the Israeli Government had asked Jarring to put to the UAR Government.

Bergus

226. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson/1/

Washington, July 29, 1968.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. X, Cables and Memos, 6/68-11/68. Confidential. A handwritten notation indicates that the memorandum was received at 5:45 p.m.

SUBJECT
Supplementary PL 480 Sale for Israel

In March you approved a $30 million PL 480 sale to Israel. We thought that would take care of them for this year.

Now, however, their crop is coming in smaller than either of us estimated because of drought. They have asked for a supplement to the March agreement adding another 70,000 tons of wheat ($4.6 million). Secretary Freeman, Bill Gaud and Charlie Zwick recommend approval./2/

/2/Freeman and Gaud sent a joint recommendation to President Johnson on July 19. Zwick sent a supporting recommendation to the President on July 29. (Ibid.)

The main advantage in the broader US-Israel context is that going ahead shows a general willingness to help them out at a time when they're studying our every move for signs of how firm our support is. We have an interest in moving the grain, and this would be a 100% dollar credit./3/

/3/The President approved the sale.

Hal

227. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State/1/

Amman, August 3, 1968, 1505Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Policy; Exdis. Repeated to London, Tel Aviv, USUN, Jerusalem, and Cairo.

6014. Subj: Jarring Mission: Jordanian comments on Eban's points. Ref: State 212831;/2/ Amman 5934./3/

/2/In telegram 212831, August 1, the Department commented on Foreign Minister Rifai's concerns about Eban's proposals that Ball conveyed to the Jordanian Government. The Department instructed Symmes to point out that Eban's proposals represented the starting point of an indirect process that Jordan could influence constructively or otherwise depending on how it reacted to Eban's overtures. Symmes was further instructed to warn that Jordan's failure to respond would halt the beginning of a constructive process. (Ibid., UN 7)

/3/Telegram 5934 from Amman, July 30, reported on Foreign Minister Rifai's reaction to the Israeli proposals as conveyed by Ball. Rifai felt that the Israeli positions that had been transmitted through Jarring, while less specific, were more encouraging than those outlined by Ball. He pointed in particular to the Israeli concept of a role for Jordan in a united Jerusalem which would remain the capital of Israel. Rifai reminded Symmes that Jordan had recently reached an agreement with the UAR that stipulated that any Jerusalem arrangement would have to be part of an overall peace settlement. (Ibid., POL 27 ARAB-ISR)

1. On third I met with FonMin Rifa'i to urge that Jordan respond to Israeli overtures such as Eban points conveyed through Ball during his recent visit to Amman. Using general line in State 212831 I said we hoped Jordan would lose no opportunity to be responsive to any indirect Israeli overtures so that progress on substance could be achieved between now and the UNGA meetings in the autumn. I stressed our belief that Eban's use of Ball as indirect channel was further evidence that Israel is no longer insisting on direct negotiations as precondition for the discussion of substance. I referred also to Ball's impression of policy disarray in Israeli Govt and our view of importance of using all possible means to keep pushing the Israelis to adopt substantive positions.

2. Rifai responded that Jordan very much wants to see progress between now and the UNGA. In fact, as far as Jordan is concerned, progress must be made well before the UNGA meetings because of the Arab League Council meeting now set for Sept 3. Jordan and the UAR must have something tangible to present to the Arab FonMins at that time. Rifai said he could speak for the UAR also in stressing the "eagerness" of both the UAR and Jordan to get down to substantive issues. He again recounted his various discussions of the Jordanian substantive position with Jarring. He said he is not trying to be obstructive when he says that the questions put to the UAR and the points brought by Ball from Eban are too general and too vague to justify specific comment. We could not see what could be said in response except that Jordan still wants to know what actual boundaries Eban has in mind when he talks about "not all but a great deal" of territory. What specifically are the "certain territorial concessions" that Israel would give? He had put these questions to Jarring on several occasions and Jarring had promised to get specific substantive responsive from Eban. So far, these were not forthcoming.

3. In the course of reviewing Jordan's position, Rifai stated that Jordan remains ready to enter into joint meeting (with Jarring present) if it finds there are substantive matters that can profitably be discussed. These would have to be something more than generalities like the points that Eban gave to Ball. Moreover, Rifai said once again that he believes he would be able to show that progress in getting substantive details had been achieved before the UNGA meetings.

4. After further discussions along these lines, I finally asked Rifai if he would authorize me to report that in commenting on Eban points he had said something like the following which might be conveyed to Israel: The GOJ had appreciated Mr. Ball's helpfulness in conveying Mr. Eban's points and had been interested in them. The GOJ welcomed the implication in Mr. Eban's points that Israel agrees in principle to withdraw from the occupied territories. The GOJ has already requested Amb. Jarring to obtain from the Israeli Govt specific statements of what they would consider "secure and recognized boundaries." Jordan is frank to say it would expect to go back to the June 4 boundaries. If, however, Israel has some specific rectifications to propose, Jordan would be prepared to consider these. It cannot consider them unless they are proposed. Jordan has already stated to Amb Jarring that it would not anticipate stationing its army on the West Bank after a peaceful settlement and would be prepared to limit itself to minimum forces needed for the preservation of public security. The GOJ, of course, found Mr. Eban's statement of the Israeli position on Jerusalem unacceptable. They would like the GOI to be more specific and forthcoming on Jerusalem and in particular would like to hear these ideas through Mr. Jarring.

5. Rifai said he would agree to my reporting the foregoing as a Jordanian response if I believed that this would help to bring about more specific Israeli substantive proposals to Jarring when Eban sees him in the next few days. He said also that I should tell King Hussein about our discussion when I saw Hussein later in the day. After reviewing "Jordan's response" once more, I told Rifai I intended to inform Washington and USUN that he had made these comments on the Eban proposals and that he had stressed Jordan's hope that Israel could give Jarring the specifics that had been promised in the last few meetings. Rifai said he had no objection.

6. With regard to the Israeli questions put to the UAR, Rifai told me he had now learned that Jarring had received the two questions brought by Ball in the form of three with the same substance. He said he did not believe the UAR would be responsive to these questions since they had already been forthcoming in much more detail to Jarring. As in previous discussions I again urged Rifai to recommend to the UAR that, notwithstanding their belief they have already given Jarring substantive details, they keep the ball rolling. If necessary let them restate what they have already said to Jarring as a response to the Israeli questions. Rifai seemed to buy this idea.

7. Comment: On the basis of this discussion, I believe we have enough to go back to the Israelis with a substantive reaction from Jordan. I think we could stress to the Israelis that we think it is now up to them to give Jordan through Jarring some specifics with regard to what they mean by "secure and recognized boundaries" and "certain non-territorial concessions." If they could say to Jarring that they are ready to withdraw to such boundaries, this could be used as evidence of their acceptance of the principle of withdrawal and would give added stimulus to continuance of indirect discussions. I think it is especially significant that Rifai stated that Jordan is still willing to proceed to joint meetings if some substantive details can be developed before the UNGA meetings./4/

/4/On August 5 the Department authorized Barbour to convey to the Israeli Government Rifai's position as outlined in this telegram. Barbour was instructed to urge Eban to make the most of the opportunity to help get the negotiations process going when he met with Jarring in London later in the week. (Telegram 215386 to Tel Aviv; ibid.)

Symmes

228. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission in Geneva/1/

Washington, August 4, 1968, 1813Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, AV 12 ISR. Confidential; Priority; Limdis. Drafted by Peter Sebastian (AFN), cleared by Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Joseph Palmer II and Atherton, and approved by ARN Country Director John F. Root. Repeated to Algiers and Tel Aviv.

214874. For Flott/2/ from Root. Ref: Geneva's 4310./3/ Subject: Hijacked El Al Airliner./4/

/2/Frederick W. Flott, assigned to the U.S. Mission to the European Office of the United Nations and Other International Organizations in Geneva.

/3/In telegram 4310 from Geneva, August 3, Flott reported that the Algerian Charge Khaled Khelladi called on him on August 2 to discuss the crisis over the hijacked Israeli airliner. Khelladi explained why Algeria had not yet released the Israeli plane, noting, among other things, that Israel and Algeria were formally at war. Flott responded that while international opinion applauded the release of some of the passengers, Algeria was becoming an accessory after the fact in a case of piracy by holding the aircraft an unreasonable length of time. In the course of the conversation, Khelladi said that if Israeli authorities were to liberate some Palestinian prisoners of war, not as a quid pro quo but as a humanitarian gesture, Algerian investigation of the case could be accelerated. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, AV 12 ISR)

/4/See Document 223.

1. Commend your effective response to Khelladi.

2. You may, at discretion, amplify remarks reported reftel as follows:

a. USG not involved in hijacking in any way whatsoever and has no control over Israeli reaction to the event; assumption to contrary would be false and misleading.

b. Washington read decision last Algerian Cabinet meeting to postpone determination re disposition plane, passengers and crew as indicative of GOA desire for time in which to employ resources of diplomacy. If this interpretation correct, GOA's decision constructive. However, we not sanguine much time likely be available for this purpose and we hope GOA will tailor its expectations of diplomatic possibilities to realities of situation. Signs of impatience following GOA's postponement decision already apparent. We unaware what Israel authorities likely do but disturbed lest they consider GOA's decision backward step.

c. We note in any event that overwhelming international opinion opposes continued detention plane and occupants, that GOA's linkage political and juridical aspects in this context does not provide internationally acceptable grounds for further detention civil airliner and occupants seized while on "innocent passage", and assume therefore that pressures will mount sharply once more if no agreement achieved.

3. We are repeating separately State tels 214832,/5/ 33/6/ and 39/7/ for your background only./8/

/5/Telegram 214832 to Tel Aviv, August 3, responded to Israeli requests for a public U.S. statement designed to put pressure on Algeria to release the plane, and for a new round of U.S. diplomatic efforts to the same end. The Department felt that both would be counter-productive. (National Archives and Records Administration, Central Files 1967-69, AV 12 ISR)

/6/In telegram 214833 to Tel Aviv, August 3, the Department reported the continuing Israeli belief that the United States should use its influence through third countries to help resolve the impasse with Algeria. (Ibid.)

/7/In telegram 214839 to Tel Aviv, August 3, the Department noted that the Italian Government had suggested a U.S. demarche to Israel urging a cessation of propaganda attacks and a "symbolic gesture" by Israel to help facilitate a settlement. The telegram reported that the United States had encouraged Israel to pursue a diplomatic solution but was reluctant to go beyond that in encouraging a settlement. (Ibid., AV 12 IT)

/8/Flott made the points outlined in this telegram to Khelladi on August 5. Khelladi noted that his government was in touch with the Italian Government in search of a resolution of the crisis. (Telegram 19114 from Paris, August 6; ibid.) Assistant Secretary Battle met with Ambassador Rabin on August 5 to offer continuing support for Israeli efforts to free the plane. Rabin indicated that Israel had concluded that because the hijacking had occurred in Italian air space Italy was the logical country to help break the impasse. (Telegram 215913 to Tel Aviv, August 6; ibid.) On August 7 Battle spoke to the Italian Ambassador to encourage Italian efforts to find a solution. The Ambassador stated that Italy felt that a solution might depend on an Israeli gesture after the plane was released. Battle indicated that the United States could not suggest such a gesture and considered that Israel should decide the matter. (Telegram 216974 to Tel Aviv, August 7; ibid.) On September 1 an agreement arranged through the good offices of Italy led to the release by Algeria of the El Al plane and remaining passengers and crew. (Washington Post, September 2, 1968)

Rusk

229. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Walsh) to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Smith)/1/

Washington, August 5, 1968.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. X, Cables and Memos, 6/68-11/68. Secret.

SUBJECT
Security Council Meetings Regarding Israeli Raid on Jordan

We are faced with a difficult situation in the UN Security Council over the next week or so resulting from the recent Israeli air raids against Fatah bases near Salt, Jordan./2/ We expect, regardless of our efforts, that there will be near unanimity in the Security Council for condemning the Israeli counter military action, as was the case last March following Israeli attacks against Fatah bases in the Karameh area.

/2/Israel launched air and artillery attacks against two Fatah guerrilla bases in Jordan on August 4. Foreign Minister Rifai summoned the Ambassadors of UN Security Council member states on the evening of August 4 to describe the Israeli attacks and to inform them that Jordan planned to request a Security Council meeting and hoped to count on Security Council members to adopt coercive measures against Israel. (Telegram 6022 from Amman, August 4; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR)

Ambassador Barbour has already expressed our concern to Eshkol and Eban over the consequences of this raid which according to the latest Jordanian figures has resulted in the death of 37 people. As Ambassador Barbour pointed out, our concern is that this latest military action will discourage the Jordanians from responding positively to Jarring's efforts to get peace talks started; that early prospects for getting back the El Al airplane and the 12 Israelis from Algiers have been seriously undercut; and that Israel will find itself completely isolated in the Security Council for taking counter action universally viewed as disproportionate to the incidents which preceded it./3/

/3/Barbour reported this in telegram 4774 from Tel Aviv, August 5. (Ibid.) Battle supported Barbour's initiative by registering a strong protest on August 5 with Rabin against the Israeli attacks. (Telegram 215559 to Tel Aviv, August 6; ibid.) [text not declassified] Helms stated that the Israeli attack, according to information from Amman, had created serious doubts [text not declassified] as to Israel's desire for peace. He also noted that the reported use of U.S.-supplied Skyhawk aircraft in the attack had sharply increased anti-American sentiment in Jordan. (Central Intelligence Agency, Job 80-B01285A, DCI (Helms) Files, Chrono 1 Aug-3 Dec 1968)

We have instructed Ambassador Ball: (a) to refrain from any United States lead which would be interpreted as an attempt on our part to condemn Israel; (b) to make a major effort to assure that any condemnation of Israel is balanced by explicit criticism of the Fatah raids which gave rise to the Israeli counter attack; (c) to call once again on both sides to accept a strengthened UN presence as a deterrent along the Jordan-Israel ceasefire line; and (d) to state publicly our support for an expected Israeli demand for release of the El Al airplane and its 12 personnel.

We have also asked Ambassador Ball to exercise maximum influence in discouraging a call for sanctions against Israel which we expect the Jordanians to press at the outset. We are reasonably confident that, while every member of the Security Council will support condemnation of the Israeli air raids, a number will be unwilling to support sanctions.

The Soviet strategy is to isolate the United States in the Security Council and to exploit this in the Arab world by portraying United States policy as one of total support for Israel. In practical terms, if our position of reasonable impartiality in the area is to be maintained and if our overall interests are to be protected, the United States will be required to vote affirmatively, as was the case last March (enclosed),/4/ on a resolution condemning Israel and which includes reference to prior provocative Fatah incidents. Such a vote would help neutralize Soviet efforts to exploit the situation and help to maintain our influence with both sides.

/4/Enclosed was a copy of the UN Security Council resolution of March 24; see footnote 5, Document 121.

Since the prior incidents which gave rise to the raid are not well documented, our efforts to achieve balance in the resolution will be very difficult. We can assume the Israelis will press us to make an effort to avoid condemnation. We intend to assure them that we will make a substantial effort. However, we would intend to make clear at the same time that U.S. interests in the area require us to avoid being isolated in the Security Council on this issue. An affirmative vote on such a resolution would come as no great surprise to the Israelis, in light of our affirmative vote last March.

We would expect that, as in the case of the Karameh raid, the Israelis will begin to discount in their own public opinion the significance of a second condemnatory Security Council resolution. This in turn leads us to believe, for the present at least, that there would be no serious adverse domestic flak if we voted affirmatively and thereby avoided being isolated.

We request that this memorandum be sent to the President for his information./5/ We will keep the White House informed as Ambassador Ball's consultations proceed in New York.

/5/There is no indication that the memorandum was sent to the President.

John P. Walsh

230. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State/1/

Amman, August 5, 1968, 1015Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 ARAB-ISR/SANDSTORM. Secret; Nodis; Sandstorm.

6029. Ref State 214812./2/

/2/In telegram 214812 to Amman, August 3, the Department, in response to an Embassy suggestion, stated that while it had operated for some time on the assumption that secret contacts were underway between Jordan and Israel, it saw no reason to ask the Israeli Government about the contacts. The Department noted that the Israelis had indicated that they intended to offer a judgment as to the possibilities for progress with the Jordanians by early August. The Embassy was instructed to deny all knowledge or suspicion of such contacts. (Ibid.)

1. While I was waiting to see King Hussein on the third, his confidant, Zaid Rifai, invited me into his private office for what turned out to be a long conversation. After making his usual arguments for the need of US pressure on Israel to move more constructively toward a peace settlement, Zaid at one point commented the Israelis should know that Jordan would welcome secret and separate talks if Israel had something concrete to offer. He said that Israel would be surprised by how receptive Jordan would be to realistic, concrete proposals designed to bring about a package settlement with Israel. He then volunteered that there are not now and have not been in the past any contacts with Israel about specific matters of substance. Referring to messages that have been brought over by people like Hikmat al-Masri, Zaid said, "The trouble is the Israelis never get down to earth with us."

2. Comment: Viewed in the gloomy aftermath of Israel's air strike on August fourth, Zaid Rifai's comments might not seem so significant as the day they were uttered. Nevertheless, I would judge they more than likely reflect the thinking of the King, and therefore should be treated seriously. Rifai's reference to the need for concrete proposals from Israel underlines what has been said frequently by the FonMin and Hussein to recent American visitors such as Ball and Sisco. It reveals that if concrete, specific proposals were advanced by Israel, Jordan or, rather, the King would attach relatively little importance to the channel through which they might be transmitted, whether from Jarring, or through something like the Ball/Sisco medium, or the "secret and separate talks" which Rifai mentioned.

3. I understand why Dept does not wish to probe either Israelis or Jordanians with regard to "disavowable" or other type contacts they may have. If any contacts, whatever their nature, are to do any good so far as Jordanians are concerned, they will have to get concrete. Dept may wish therefore to consider passing Zaid's comments to an appropriate Israeli official./3/

/3/Telegram 215397 to Tel Aviv, August 5, instructed the Embassy to pass along Zaid Rifai's comments, as reported in telegram 6029 from Amman. (Ibid.) When Barbour conveyed the comments to Eban on August 8, Eban said that his government did have concrete ideas about a settlement, but felt that they should be disclosed directly to the Jordanians, either privately or in Jarring's presence. He said he would speak to Jarring and offer Israeli cooperation, and added that the opening of the UN General Assembly offered the most propitious opportunity. (Telegram 4842 from Tel Aviv, August 9; ibid.)

Symmes