354. Note From the Soviet Embassy to the Department of State/1/

Washington, December 19, 1968.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 ARAB-ISR. Exdis. The text is a translation prepared in the Division of Language Services. The original of the note has not been found. A handwritten notation indicates that the note was handed to Secretary Rusk by Soviet Charge Tcherniakov on December 19. Telegram 290908 to Cairo, December 21, which transmitted the text of an unofficial translation of the note prepared by the Soviet Embassy, indicates that Tcherniakov gave the note to Eugene Rostow rather than Rusk. (Ibid., POL 27 ARAB-ISR) See also Document 355.

Note was taken in Moscow of some recent statements made by American officials in conversations with Soviet representatives in Washington and New York regarding the problems of a Middle East settlement, including observations made by Under Secretary Eugene Rostow, on behalf of the Secretary of State, in the conversation with the Soviet Ambassador on November 8 last. We welcomed the statement by the American side of its interest in continuing Soviet-American contacts and a regular exchange of views on the problems of a Middle East settlement. We, for our part, consider these contacts to be useful and are ready to continue them.

American representatives have put forward a number of considerations on the questions related to a settlement in the Middle East. These considerations are of definite interest, and we would like to express our opinion in connection with some of them.

1. The Soviet Government notes with satisfaction the statement by the American side to the effect that Israel is now resting the whole territorial question on the Armistice Agreements of 1949, that is to say, in other words, that it has no territorial claims against the Arab States. It would be highly important that such a clear-cut and unequivocal statement be brought by the Israelis to the attention of Arab representatives as well (for instance, through Mr. Jarring). Such a statement, in our opinion, would undoubtedly facilitate progress in the cause of a settlement in the Middle East; it would lead to the development of a new and positive approach to this question.

2. The American side expressed the view that Israel's only territorial claim, so far as the UAR is concerned, concerns the question of guaranteeing freedom of navigation through the Strait of Tiran, since Israel raises the question of the necessity of stationing her forces at Sharm El Sheikh. Such a suggestion reveals once more the lack among the Israeli leaders of a realistic approach towards the problems of a settlement in the Middle East and their unwillingness to take the path of introducing reasonable and constructive proposals capable of advancing the whole question of settlement.

3. In the conversation of November 8 the American side drew our attention to the two points in Eban's document of November 4:/2/ that it is essential for the UAR to clarify its attitude toward a number of aspects of a settlement in the Middle East; and that the question of boundaries between Israel and the UAR could be discussed after the Egyptians have stated their readiness to establish a lasting peace with Israel.

/2/See footnote 2, Document 307.

As we see it, the UAR position is determined not only by the fact of its official recognition of the Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967 and by the statement of the UAR's readiness to implement the provisions of that resolution, but also by the constructive response of the UAR government to the known "seven points," outlined by Mr. Rusk. In that answer it is stated: "As to the termination of the state of belligerency, it will come into force on the Arab side as soon as Israel's forces are withdrawn from the entire Arab territory occupied after June 5, 1967."

At the same time, the Arab States have reasons to be dissatisfied with the fact that Israel, so far, has not made a clear and precise statement concerning recognition of this resolution and the readiness to implement it, that is, a statement similar to the corresponding statement by the Arab side.

Moreover, the UAR is known to have proposed drawing up a timetable for implementing the resolution, that is, for implementing all of its provisions, and has made specific suggestions in that connection. The Secretary of State has already had an opportunity to become acquainted with these suggestions. As for Israel, we know nothing about its attitude, not only toward these specific suggestions but even toward the very idea of drawing up a concrete program of measures to implement the resolution, which could lead to the establishment of peace and tranquillity in the Middle East. The American side, it seems to us, concurs in the necessity of a concrete approach to the questions of settlement. All the more valid, then, is the proposal of the Arab side regarding the necessity of working out a plan of concrete steps for the implementation of the Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967. It would seem proper for the American and Soviet sides to make efforts to assist the sides in working out such a plan. We would like to point out, in this connection, that we had already conveyed to the Secretary of State, on September 4 last, our views on this score.

4. Moscow concurs in the idea of stepping up the mission of Mr. Jarring, who could, taking into account the positions of the sides known to him, himself make proposals that would help to bring these positions closer.

5. We believe that the so-called seven points, enumerated by the American side, contain some constructive views. In particular, we noted that the first place among them is given to the question of Israel's withdrawal from the Arab territories seized after June 5, 1967. Naturally, the attitude of the Middle Eastern countries to these proposals is of crucial importance. As it is known, the UAR Government has already replied to these American views. On the whole, the UAR leadership regarded the US "seven points" favorably, stipulating that the question can be that of the withdrawal of the Israeli troops from all the occupied Arab territories, i.e., not only from the territory of the UAR but also from those of Jordan and Syria.

6. As for the proposal made by the American side regarding the demilitarization of the entire Sinai Peninsula, we do not believe that it will be acceptable to the UAR. In view of the incommensurability of the Sinai and the Negev, it would be feasible, in our opinion, to speak only about the possibility of creating separate demilitarized zones along the boundaries in this area.

7. Now, as never before, there is a need for clarity and unambiguity in the positions of the sides. One cannot but admit that up to now efforts to obtain such clarity from the Israelis have been unsuccessful. While the Arab side has made a number of concrete and realistic proposals, which largely contributed to the development of some positive changes in the matter of a Middle East settlement, one cannot say this about Israel. Its position continues to be the main obstacle in the way of achieving a settlement in the Middle East.

Therefore, we hope that the US Government will exercise its influence upon the Israeli Government so that the latter may adopt a more realistic position.

The Soviet Government expresses its readiness for a further exchange of views with the American side regarding the problems of a settlement in the Middle East.

355. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Washington, December 20, 1968, 5:10-5:30 p.m.

/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 91-0017, Israel 452 (Sen). Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Murray on December 21 and approved by Schwartz. The meeting was held in Warnke's office.

SUBJECT
F-4 Agreement

PARTICIPANTS

Israeli Side
Israeli Ambassador to the U.S.--Ambassador Rabin
Deputy Commander IAF--B/General Peled
Defense and Armed Force Attache--B/General David Carmon

United States Side
Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA)--Paul C. Warnke
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (NESA)--Harry H. Schwartz
Deputy Director, Near East & South Asia Region, ISA--Robert J. Murray

Ambassador Rabin said he had called to review the status of the F-4 agreement. He said that the political side was finished with his exchange of letters with Mr. Warnke./2/ The negotiations with Mr. Schwartz are also finished. Ambassador Rabin asked if they may start tomorrow to develop a letter of offer. Mr. Schwartz said that they could.

/2/See footnote 3, Document 332, and Document 333.

Ambassador Rabin said that the answer on financing had been given to Mr. Kuss;/3/ Israel would only take government credit. Rabin said: "If someone asks why our reserves in the United States go down, this is it." General Carmon said that the overall package would cost about $300 million. Some of this would be on credit with the remainder a "dependable undertaking."

/3/Henry J. Kuss, Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Logistics Negotiations.

Mr. Schwartz said he had just learned that Israel had decided to buy 6 RF4C aircraft now and, working with the company, have the engines changed to make it compatible with the F-4Es. General Peled confirmed that this was their decision.

Ambassador Rabin said there was still one problem: early deliveries. Mr. Warnke said that we had done our work and sent the facts to the President. He said that the decision rests with the White House. Ambassador Rabin observed that there were two aspects: political and technical. He said the President would of course decide the political. He asked, however, whether Mr. Warnke could tell him whether early deliveries were possible on the technical side. Mr. Warnke said anything was possible; it was a question of whether it was desirable.

General Peled said that he had talked with everyone he could in the Air Force about how the IAF would handle early deliveries. He complained that the USAF people would not engage him in a discussion--they just listened. Peled asked whether we thought he had been convincing. Mr. Warnke said he did not appear to have convinced the Air Force. He said that while General Peled's sincerity in pleading his case was not at all doubted, it was a difference of professional judgment. General Peled asked if he may talk further with the Air Force people. Mr. Warnke replied that he could and that General Larson was the man to talk to. Mr. Warnke said that it would be the President who made the decision, in any case.

General Carmon suggested that a draft letter of offer be completed for General Peled to take back to Israel with him. Israel could then make decisions and these decisions could be communicated to the United States after the holidays. Mr. Warnke agreed.

Ambassador Rabin raised the question of publicity and said, somewhat unhappily, that he presumed that we wanted to continue to say the same thing as before. Mr. Warnke said yes. We would say only that negotiations were continuing. Mr. Schwartz suggested this was a matter primarily for the Department of State.

Ambassador Rabin asked Mr. Warnke if he would like to sign the agreement in Israel. Mr. Warnke said he would like to very much but was not sure he would be able to do so.

356. Telegram From the Department of State to the U.S. Interests Section of the Spanish Embassy in the United Arab Republic/1/

Washington, December 21, 1968, 0139Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Eugene Rostow, Hart, and Parker; cleared by Day (IO/UNP); and approved by Eugene Rostow. Repeated to Amman, Moscow, Tel Aviv, and USUN.

290924. Subject: Arab-Israel Settlement.

1. Soviet Charge Tcherniakov called on Undersecretary Rostow December 19. Hart also present. Tcherniakov presented unofficial translation of Soviet document/2/ responding to November 8 remarks by Rostow to Dobrynin and outlining positive nature of UAR position, including reply to Secretary's seven points. Text of document being transmitted separately.

/2/Document 354.

2. Rostow read note quickly, said we welcomed it, and would be glad to continue exchanges on the subject. We would give document study and reply as soon as possible. In meantime, he had some preliminary comments

3. First comment was with regard to para. 1 of Soviet paper. Rostow wished there to be no misunderstanding between us on significance of reference to Armistice Agreements in Eban paper to Jarring./3/ The Armistice Agreements clearly specified that Armistice Demarcation Lines were not definitive political and international boundaries, but could be changed by agreement as part of transition from Armistice to peace. FYI. These provisions inserted in 1949 at Arab insistence. End FYI. We believe GOI position as stated in Eban paper to Jarring is that Israel has no territorial claims as such, except for minor rectifications of Armistice lines and arrangements to guarantee security and maritime rights. But we cannot speak for Israel. And we wish to avoid any misunderstanding with Soviets such as occurred in summer of 1967.

/3/See footnote 2, Document 307.

4. Rostow's second general preliminary comment was that Soviet paper made no reference to his questions to Dobrynin put on July 3 and on November 8 regarding UAR willingness to make peace and to enter into an agreement establishing peace, and equally to his suggestion of Nov. 8 for a practical negotiating procedure by UAR and Israel through Jarring to deal with issues of withdrawal, demilitarization of Sinai and guarantee of maritime rights. The prime interest of the US and USSR was in the establishment of peace, as set forth in the Resolution of November 22, 1967. This was the goal of the Resolution and of US policy from June 5, 1967. The UAR position in this respect was not clear and these questions must be answered before further progress could be made in implementing SC Resolution of Nov. 22, 1967.

5. Rostow said US recognized importance of problem of withdrawal. He cited with approval Dobrynin's remarks on Arab distrust of Israel's intentions in this regard, and on Israeli suspicions that Arabs do not intend peace, as the key to the problem. Eban had given a functional definition of Israeli policy towards withdrawal, and said that when the Arabs make clear their intent to make peace, Israel will go into more detail on withdrawal. The Secretary, in his November 2 conversation with Riad, had spoken of complete withdrawal from Sinai, putting the question of Gaza to one side for the moment, and saving the question of security arrangements and guarantees of maritime rights. Withdrawal would be subject to security arrangements, demilitarization and guarantees of maritime rights. Israel did not want to be put in a position of having to fight once more to regain those rights. Our position was that the Secretary had given Riad powerful assurances on withdrawal from Sinai. The guarantees on the other matters were not discussed by the UAR. We felt that we had taken a very big step in the Secretary's talk with Riad, and that UAR had not responded on the issues of crucial concern to us.

6. The Israelis took position they did not have territorial claims as such but had legitimate interests under the Nov. 22 Resolution in questions of security and maritime rights, which could have territorial implications. Armistice lines were not final borders, but Dobrynin himself had said minor rectifications possible (Tcherniakov interjected that Dobrynin had said this was not quite what he had said, his words had been misinterpreted by Rostow. Latter however read from Para. 5 of State 269827/4/ reporting conversation in question and clarified his own recollection. FYI. We have also had report of conversation with Semenov in which he accepted idea of some border rectification./5/ End FYI). In any event US position was clear. We had thus taken big step and UAR should make use of Secretary's position and also come forward with progress on the other side of equation, namely peace and a procedure for reaching it.

/4/Telegram 269827 to Tel Aviv, November 9, reported on a November 8 luncheon conversation during which Eugene Rostow and Dobrynin discussed the Israeli and UAR positions in the Middle East peace process. Paragraph 5 reported Dobrynin's understanding that Israel had no territorial claims on the UAR, but had raised territorial questions in connection with security problems and with the question of guaranteeing rights of passage through the Straits of Tiran. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR)

/5/See footnote 2, Document 310.

7. Rostow said US could not take position with UAR that no agreement was possible until Syria came along. Syria had not even accepted Nov. 22 resolution.

8. We were unable to understand sentence in Soviet document to effect that Israel had not "accepted" Resolution. We thought debate on that topic was finished. Israel had said to Jarring that it accepted the Resolution. Rostow had given a copy of GOI statement in this respect to Dobrynin. As a matter of Soviet policy, was there anything wrong or insufficient in Israeli statement that it accepted the resolution and was ready to implement it by agreement? It was important that we clarify this question between US and USSR. For us, Resolution was not self-implementing. Under para. 3, implementation required agreement of parties. Did USSR agree? Did Arab position reported in para. 3 of Soviet paper mean that implementation required withdrawal first, negotiation later on other items in Resolution? Secretary had taken clear position on this with Riad.

Tcherniakov replied that he was not aware of public Israeli statement in form of Rostow's formula. He did not directly challenge Rostow formulation, but said he knew of no public Israeli statement to that effect. Rostow undertook to provide him with series of texts. Tcherniakov said Arabs and Soviets worried by fact Israel had not accepted resolution while Arabs have. First step was for Israel to accept the resolution. The second was to implement it. The UAR had come forward with a timetable of implementation to which Israel had not responded. Rostow said the UAR timetable was not complete, and in any event could not be made a substitute for the agreement between the parties required by para. 3 of Resolution. We had never objected to a timetable as a way of carrying out agreement of parties. The first question was how the parties could reach agreement.

9. Tcherniakov asked why we doubted UAR willingness to implement the resolution. Rostow said it was because US had yet to get clear answers to its questions, either through Soviets or directly from UAR. From earlier Sov paper/6/ it was clear that a multilateral document was acceptable to Sovs as a means of embodying the agreement among the parties called for by the resolution, but UAR had so far not given assurances it would sign such a document. After experience of 1957, when US negotiated on behalf of Egypt, and latter broke agreement when it closed Strait of Tiran, Riad simply says he will give a letter to the Security Council. This would not suffice. We have said there must be agreement if we are to support withdrawal. We had no objection to a timetable if it was part of an agreement, but UAR proposal had made no reference to para. 3 of the Resolution nor answered Secretary's 7th point.

/6/An apparent reference to the attachment to Document 245.

10. Tcherniakov said that some form of "juridical document" could be worked out. Rostow said it would have to be signed by both parties. Tcherniakov said UAR in its timetable proposed that both Israel and Arabs deposit documents with the Security Council. Rostow said we had not insisted on a Treaty but suggested the Soviet-Japanese procedure as a model. Secretary, in his 7th point, had indicated that document establishing peace must be signed by both parties.

11. Tcherniakov said both US and Sovs agreed there must be legal, formal agreement, but there were several forms it could take. If UAR proposed a specific form, it did not mean it was rejecting concept of agreement. Rostow said this was a good point, but UAR had never proposed anything quite that clear to us. He cited the confusion regarding Riad's remarks on signing the same document in his Nov. 2 conversation with the Secretary. A document was needed, as with USSR and Japan. We have had no answer from UAR as yet on this point. Israelis had taken important initiative, next step was up to UAR, which must define what it had in mind with regard to (a) peace, (b) security and (c) maritime rights. This could be done in a private meeting with Jarring, at which issues of withdrawal and security arrangements could be settled. With all the ammunition given to Riad by Secretary, UAR had not yet moved. We had given Egyptians the US position. This was a major step. We had expected a major step in reply, but Riad kept saying the only important question is withdrawal.

12. Tcherniakov said UAR position unequivocally recognized Israeli right to exist whereas the Israelis had not made their first step towards the Arabs. The Arabs had made the first step and had been more forthcoming than Israelis. Rostow said we would study document and give a formal reply. He asked for Russian original and was promised it for Dec. 20.

13. For Moscow. Suggest Ambassador may find a convenient occasion to review ground with Dobrynin, either at this stage or when fuller reply is provided. We should also appreciate Ambassador's judgment of the significance of timing, tone, and content of Soviet reply in broader setting of Soviet policy.

Rusk

357. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan/1/

Washington, December 21, 1968, 1827Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 12-5 JORDAN. Secret. Drafted by Murray (DOD/ISA) and Robert P. Pag-anelli (NEA/ARN); cleared by Hart in draft and by Sidney Sober, Murray, Seelye, and Lewis D. Junior (G/PM); and approved by Davies. Repeated to CINCSTRIKE and London.

291067. Subject: Military Supply Program for Jordan. Ref: Amman 7941./2/

/2/Telegram 7941 from Amman, December 16, presented the Country Team's recommendations for a 3-year military supply program for Jordan. One of the recommendations was a proposed credit sales program of up to $15-20 million per year. (Ibid.)

1. We have reviewed Country Team's timely and well-reasoned recommendations for US military supply relationships with Jordan over the next few years.

2. FMS Credit: FMS credit approved in principle for Jordan in FY 69 but exact figure will depend on worldwide and regional priorities as matched against total credit available. We note your recommendation for $14 million in FY 69 and $15-$20 million in FY 70. At moment we are using $14 million as a planning figure for FY 69 and for contingency use in FY 70. Technical requirements for release of FY 69 FMS credit for all countries not yet complete. In addition, credit amount for Jordan cannot be fixed until intra-USG discussion of country allocations, now underway, is finalized. You authorized inform GOJ that we have approved FMS credit for Jordan in principle for FY 69 but that exact amount as yet undetermined pending completion evaluation of worldwide priorities. You may state we hope to have clearer picture over coming weeks.

3. Grant Aid: Grant aid under MAP for FY 69 and 70 will be limited to CONUS training. After extending discussions at the highest levels of the Dept and DOD it has been decided that a materiel increment for FY 69 and FY 70 cannot be supported. Embassy views were given full consideration. Decision made in context future status of MAP programs on worldwide basis taking into consideration present programs, future availability of funds, Congressional attitudes, etc. Khammash may be informed of this at your discretion, possibly in context of your further arms supply discussions with him and after FMS credit picture clearer.

4. Internal Security: High priority assigned by CT to equipment for improvement and expansion of Jordan's internal security forces appears reasonable based on limited information available. We will give serious consideration to possibility proposed FMS credit be applied to procurement such equipment. Suggest GOJ in consultation with Embassy formalize proposed program in some detail. Assume this will be related to SIG-requested Foreign Internal Defense Plan, which Embassy preparing.

5. Additional Major Items of Military Equipment: Anticipated GOJ requests for major items of military equipment (as reported in reftel) appear to be appropriate subject for annual review discussions specified in March 1968 Memorandum of Understanding./3/ Embassy may consider suggesting this to Khammash in context of possible Khammash visit to Washington early next year, perhaps in March.

/3/See footnote 3, Document 111.

6. Agree generally with proposed plan outlined para 5 reftel./4/ Believe following general guidelines appropriate: (a) Internal security program should have highest priority, followed by items required to maintain existing forces (spares, etc.), and only then major new modernization items for army; (b) spare parts, uniforms, ammunition and other maintenance-type items should be purchased for cash. We can agree to annual open-end sales case for spares and minor items which will permit, after annual approval, direct and expeditious requisitioning by U.S. Military Departments. (c) We continue adhere to earlier agreement to consider additional aircraft of same type at some time in future. We are not prepared to go beyond this before: (1) we are convinced GOJ actually desires to have first 18 aircraft in Jordan and operational and (2) they are so located.

/4/In paragraph 5 of telegram 7941, the Country Team proposed that the Embassy be authorized to inform the Jordanian Government that the United States was prepared to make available military sales credits for FY 1969. The Country Team proposed a breakdown for the program among the requirements of the army, the air force, and the public security program.

Rusk

358. Telegram From the Department of State to the U.S. Interests Section of the Spanish Embassy in the United Arab Republic/1/

Washington, December 24, 1968, 2228Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Parker; cleared by Hart, Sisco, Davies, and Eugene Rostow; and approved by Katzenbach. Repeated to USUN, Tel Aviv, and Amman.

292048. Subject: Seven Points./2/

/2/Reference is to the seven points outlined by Secretary Rusk in his November 2 conversation with Foreign Minister Riad; see Document 301.

1. In view all the circumstances, we do not believe it would now be useful to give formal reply to Egyptian response on seven points. We therefore do not plan to raise matter further for time being with UAR reps in Washington or New York. Should they wish to discuss, we would of course be prepared to do so.

2. At your discretion, however, you may seek clarification certain points in Egyptian response through informal discussion with your contacts in Cairo. Would be useful, for instance, to have clarification of UAR positions on Golan Heights issue and refugees. There apparent contradiction between what Riad said in November 2 conversation and December 4 memo and what he and Nasser said to Governor Scranton on UAR insistence Israel withdraw from all Arab territory as condition for settlement./3/ We would like to think harder line of November 2 and December 4 was bargaining position for the record and that UAR prepared be flexible on this issue. Long history of misunderstandings with Egyptians, however, indicates danger our believing Egyptians will actually be flexible when and if parties ever advance to negotiations on substance.

/3/See footnote 2, Document 337, and Document 343.

3. On question refugees, would be useful know nature Egyptians' reservations on proposal put forward by Secretary. Are they actually in process sounding out Palestinian opinion as Ghorbal says, or is it simply question of unwillingness commit themselves in writing at this stage?

Rusk

359. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan/1/

Washington, December 24, 1968, 2236Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 ARAB-ISR/SANDSTORM. Secret; Nodis; Sandstorm. Drafted by Davies; cleared by Atherton, Seelye, Sisco, and Katzenbach; and approved by Hart. Repeated to Tel Aviv and USUN.

292074. Amman's 6994./2/

/2/The reference is incorrect. The correct reference is telegram 7992 from Amman, Document 353.

1. We share your view that efforts to reach an Arab-Israel settlement are at an impasse and that some changes in tactics will be necessary if progress toward a settlement is to be made. These could be in the direction of (a) a more active U.S. role with the parties making more explicit to them and publicly what we are prepared to support and what we will not support; (b) an effort to concert with the Soviets in order to bring the UAR to acceptance of a contractual, agreed peace as the price of Israeli withdrawal; and, (c) more intensive U.S. efforts with Israelis to secure GOI commitment to principle of withdrawal (Jerusalem, Gaza and minor border adjustments aside) in context of peace. In any event, we plan to operate within the context of the November 22 Resolution keeping Jarring in play, if possible, and avoiding a direct U.S. involvement in the mediatory process. This, of course, will be subject to review by the new administration.

2. Covert Israeli-Jordanian negotiations seem also to be at impasse. Whether the Israelis sought to lull us into inactivity by assuring us repeatedly of progress being made in these talks or whether they simply unable to assess the limits of the possible insofar as Hussein's options are concerned, process seems moribund until such time as one or the other government tables alternative proposals.

3. Your recommendations are along lines of our thinking here. Trend has been toward making more specific U.S. ideas on issues involved in a settlement and clarifying what we are prepared to support. Thus, we agree that when you or Ambassador Barbour sees occasion to feed in ideas or opportunities for substantive probing, you should do so. A necessary caveat is that this must be in the context of an informal exchange of views unless subject is an established U.S. position and should be limited to the two or three decision makers on each side who count and whose discretion can be relied upon.

4. Reftel came as we were clearing letter suggesting you raise with Zaid Rifa'i or other the possibility of Jordan tabling counter proposals to the Allon Plan along lines of recognizing Israel's legitimate concern at security on the West Bank and exploring various interim arrangements which would obtain until Israel is assured of Jordan's capability and willingness to prevent hostile actions being mounted from area against Israel./3/ Joint patrols, UN force with Jordanian and Israeli liaison contingents, or Israeli military enclaves maintained for a limited period, until a regime of peace and security established were ideas that came to mind. These would provide reasonable security assurances for Israel and at the same time give regime stronger grounds for moving against any Palestinian irredentist movements as prolonging Israeli presence. You may wish to touch on these in your forthcoming discussion with King Hussein along with other thoughts in Paragraph 4A of reftel. You might stress to King that an articulated GOJ position on these questions would be useful in flushing out a possible Israeli fallback position to Allon Plan.

/3/The letter was not found.

5. You should assure King that USG will be actively engaged in supporting moves toward a settlement in the context of the November 22 Resolution.

6. There has been a small working group (NEA-IO-L) which has been engaged in planning on an ad hoc basis for a settlement since August of 1967. Some of the "think pieces" are currently being revised and will be pouched to both posts for comment and background use in informal discussions.

7. We are considering ways of making public more detailed USG views on what we would consider a fair and reasonable settlement under the November 22 Resolution. Recommendations now being formulated for this or next administration.

Rusk

360. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, December 24, 1968.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. XI, Cables and Memos, 12/68-1/69. Top Secret; Sensitive.

SUBJECT
The Israeli Phantoms--Final Loose Ends

Warnke and Rabin have exchanged letters on the general conditions of the F-4 sale (Tab B)./2/ In short, the Israelis have agreed not to use the F-4s to carry nuclear weapons and "not to be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the area." Rabin told Warnke that as long as Israel had neither tested a device nor made its existence public, it would consider that it had not "introduced" nuclear weapons. Warnke in his letter says mere possession is "introduction," and that is where the issue rests. Eshkol's last letter to you on the NPT was non-committal./3/

/2/See footnote 3, Document 332, and Document 333.

/3/See footnote 2, Document 349.

Two issues remain:

1. Delivery date. The Israelis have asked for April 1969. Bus Wheeler believes Israel will be at its greatest disadvantage between June 1969 and mid-1970. However, he does not believe the Israelis could be fully ready to maintain the planes much before January 1970. Also, delivering as early as April, 1969, would require "an unacceptable drawdown of spares" from USAF inventory. Therefore, Bus recommends we begin delivery in September 1969. This could be done without hurting the USAF, and if the Israelis need technical support for a few months they can hire US civilians from the manufacturer. Secretaries Clifford and Rusk endorse his recommendation (Tab A)./4/

/4/Attached at Tab A was a December 21 memorandum from Secretary Clifford to President Johnson dealing with the Israeli request for accelerated delivery of the Phantom aircraft. A December 20 memorandum from Warnke to Clifford indicates that Rusk approved Clifford's memorandum to the President. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 91-0017, Israel 452 (Sen))

Approve/5/
Disapprove
See me

/5/President Johnson checked this option.

2. Credit. Defense has offered $60 million credit--$30 million each in FY 1969 and FY 1970. The Israelis have formally accepted, so there is really no issue. However, Abe Feinberg says an additional $15 million would help. I believe Defense could handle that much more this year, but the question is whether you wish to offer $75 million after the Israelis have already accepted $60 million. The only advantage to us of the higher figure would be a slightly better picture in Congress for the military sales bill.

Stick to $60 million/6/
Go to $75 million

/6/The President checked this option.

Walt

361. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel/1/

Washington, December 24, 1968, 2323Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Atherton, cleared by Day and Hart, and approved by Eugene Rostow. Repeated to Amman, Moscow, Cairo, and USUN.

292113. Following is full text of Israeli Aide-Memoire of December 23/2/ commenting on Soviet communication delivered to Under Secretary Rostow by Soviet Charge on December 19:/3/

/2/The original of the aide-memoire is ibid., POL US-USSR.

/3/Document 354.

Begin Text: Paragraph 1. The document presented by the Soviet diplomat confirms that serious damage to Israeli vital interests has been caused by a USA-Soviet dialogue of this kind./4/ In particular, it is shocking to find that the USSR could have misinterpreted the USA version of Israel's position as in paragraph 1. It is basic to Israel's position that peace requires secure and recognized boundaries and not return to the June 4 lines. Israel's refusal to restore the June 4, 1967 situation is absolute, basic and irrevocable. To avoid returning to the June 4 lines is of supreme national interest which Israel considers worthy of all tenacity and sacrifice. We have attached importance and confidence to USA statements on this point including that of President Johnson on September 10, 1968. But in any case, Israel has the absolute right to be sure that its own position is not misunderstood by the USSR as a result of conversations in Washington. Can we have assurance that the Soviet representative will be given an accurate description of the Israeli and USA positions as hitherto formulated?

/4/On December 20 Assistant Secretaries Sisco and Hart briefed Israeli Embassy officials on the contents of the Soviet note. (Telegram 291089 to Tel Aviv, December 21; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR) Minister Argov telephoned Atherton on December 20 to register his dismay over the U.S.-Soviet exchanges on the Middle East. Argov expressed concern that the Soviets would use the exchanges to further erode the Israeli position. (Memorandum from Atherton to Hart, December 20; ibid., NEA Files: Lot 72 D 39, Israel, July 1 through Dec 31, 1968)

Paragraph 2. As against Israel's proposal on navigation in the Straits of Tiran, it should be recalled that the U.A.R. has not even acknowledged international character of the Tiran Straits and has specifically rejected any permanent arrangement for protecting navigation more effectively than hitherto. The Soviet paper, too, is completely silent on the freedom of passage through the Straits. This strengthens Israel's view that without Israel's presence there would be a repetition of aggressive U.A.R. action of May 22.

Paragraph 3. U.A.R. reply to USA seven points is not "constructive" but destructive. Israel's statement on the resolution in the November 4 memorandum is affirmative and legitimate. Israel will not make any declaration on the resolution which excludes the concept of "agreement" as the governing factor. Israel's attitude on timetable is that after negotiations what is agreed would be implemented. There can only be a timetable after agreement is reached directly between the Arab States and Israel. At this time there can be no timetable since the Arab States have refused to negotiate any agreements. Furthermore, it should be clear that the establishment of peace is more than the "termination of the state of belligerency" and more than what is called a "political solution."

Paragraph 4. Confirms that the USA-USSR dialogue is in danger of interfering with the Jarring Mission. We should like to be assured that the "Idea" to which "Moscow agrees" is not shared by the USA.

Paragraph 5. Falsely glosses over the UAR rejection of the USA seven points and confirms Israel's apprehensions that the seven points would encourage the illusion and discourage realism both in Cairo and in Moscow, in addition to causing serious danger to Israel's legitimate negotiating position.

Paragraph 6. Marks a retreat from previous hints given through Jarring that the UAR would accept demilitarization arrangement in Sinai. Israel rejects the Soviet-Egyptian idea of separate demilitarized zones "along boundaries." The UAR policy is to keep open the possibility of making Sinai a springboard and base for future assaults or intimidation.

Paragraph 7. Israel is a sovereign state exclusively responsible for its own security and does not need to be "influenced" in the direction of realism. Its positions as stated on November 4 are realistic and legitimate and it is now for the UAR to show a genuine interest in the establishment of peace. The Soviet document does not even discuss the establishment of a permanent or serious peace between Israel and the UAR. End Text.

Rusk

362. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel/1/

Washington, December 25, 1968, 0054Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Atherton, cleared by Day in draft and by Hart, and approved by Eugne Rostow. Repeated to Amman, Moscow, Cairo, and USUN.

292126. Ref: State 290908;/2/ State 290924./3/

/2/See footnote 1, Document 354.

/3/Document 356.

1. Summary: Israeli Amb. Rabin December 23 delivered Aide-Memoire to Under Secretary Rostow outlining Israeli reaction to latest Soviet approach to USG on Middle East./4/ Aide-Memoire and supplementary comments by Rabin reflect Israeli concern that U.S. policy is changing and that U.S. dialogue with Soviets and UAR is undermining Israeli position and harming Jarring Mission. Rostow reassured Rabin that fundamental U.S. policy unchanged, that U.S. reply to Soviet approach would protect vital U.S. and Israeli interests, and that our dialogue with Soviets is entirely within context and in support of Jarring Mission. End Summary.

/4/See Document 361.

2. Israeli Ambassador Rabin, accompanied by Minister Argov and Counsellor Raviv, called on Under Secretary Rostow December 23 to present Aide-Memoire from Foreign Minister Eban setting forth GOI reaction to latest Soviet communication on Middle East handed Rostow by Soviet Charge Tcherniakov December 19. Asst. Secretary Hart, Day (IO), and Atherton (NEA) also present.

3. Rostow commented as follows on Israeli Aide-Memoire (text by septel), which deals point by point with correspondingly numbered paragraphs of December 19 Soviet communication:

(a) Paragraph one. First paragraph of Soviet Note dealing with General Armistice Agreements is tendentious misinterpretation of what U.S. had told Soviets. Rostow had made this clear to Tcherniakov and we would do so again in our formal reply to Soviet approach. Our position is that changes in 1949 Armistice lines are inevitable and desirable and are foreseen under terms of Armistice agreements. At same time we maintain that Armistice agreement provisions on this point should not be excuse for territorial expansion as such, that any changes in Armistice lines must be agreed and that extensive changes would be incompatible with our position and with GOI position as presented to us by Eban at earlier stage.

(b) Paragraph two. Our position on Straits of Tiran is that any agreement would need to be clear with respect to navigation rights. We recognize that this problem has two aspects: (1) acknowledgment of international character of Straits and (2) method of guaranteeing free navigation.

(c) Paragraph three. Our position on "timetable" concept is same as Israel's. Timetable would be acceptable if it derived from agreement but could not be substitute for agreement. Rostow said he had asked Tcherniakov what was wrong from Soviet point of view with Israeli statement on acceptance and implementation of SC Resolution. Tcherniakov had not responded to this challenge.

(d) Paragraph four. Rostow asked Rabin for clarification of this paragraph of Israeli Aide-Memoire. Rabin said GOI thought that continuation of US-Soviet dialogue would interfere with Jarring Mission since, if Arabs believed other channels to settlement were available, they would be encouraged not to cooperate with Jarring. Rostow said our entire dialogue with Soviets was designed to help Jarring. We were urging Soviets to prevail upon UAR to be more forthcoming with Jarring and had made clear that we opposed idea of Four-Power approach as substitute for Jarring Mission. Fact remained that there was considerable support in world for idea that Jarring should take more active role. For this reason we had urged Israelis to take initiatives with Jarring as means of heading off pressures from other sources. Rostow emphasized that we would continue our dialogue with Soviets, which was within context of US responsibilities as world power.

(e) Paragraph five. Rostow agreed that December 19 Soviet communication attempted to defend negative UAR reaction to Secretary's Seven Points. We would give due attention to Israeli comments in this respect in our reply to Soviets, making clear we will not support Israeli withdrawal except in context of peace.

(f) Paragraph 6. Rostow agreed that this point in Soviet communication represented a backing away from earlier Soviet statements on demilitarization of Sinai. We suspected that this was bargaining position on part of Soviets and would deal with this question firmly in our reply.

4. In oral comments supplementing Aide-Memoire, Rabin recalled November 12 conversation with Under Secretary Katzenbach and quoted latter as stating that if Israel had changed its position on borders, USG would undermine that position. Hart corrected this interpretation, noting Katzenbach had said, in response to Argov's expression of concern that USG had in fact undermined Israel's bargaining position by giving seven points to UAR, that this could be considered to be the case only if Israel's position had changed and it now sought territorial acquisitions (State 270935)./5/

/5/Document 320.

5. Rabin said that until recently Israel had never understood it was US position that Israel should withdraw to June 4 lines "give or take a few miles." Rabin said it now seemed that US had in fact decided to undermine Israeli position. By telling UAR that USG envisaged Israeli withdrawal to June 4 lines plus special arrangements for Gaza, USG had given away its own bargaining position with UAR and had demonstrated that it did not know how to deal with Arabs. UAR would proceed from this point and seek to erode US position on meaning of peace. Specifically, UAR was now seeking to make withdrawal from Syrian territory a condition for UAR-Israeli settlement and, in its reply to Secretary's Seven Points, had made no mention of peace and had said nothing about signing same document as Israel.

6. Rabin said problem as he saw it was that US (a) assumed others were as reasonable as it was and (b) could not live with unsolved problems. Israel had to live with people who were not reasonable and believed that solutions sometimes could be achieved in long run by leaving problems unsolved. Until recently US and Israel had created situation in which Soviets and UAR were at disadvantage. If we continued to show patience, their position would change. Rabin said he could not reconcile US policy of past two months with President's Five Principles for Middle East peace. In talking with UAR and Soviets, USG was on dangerous course unless it gave clear signal that it intended to stand by President's Five Principles. Rabin said that in his view current US position could reduce chances for separate Israeli settlement with Jordan.

7. Rostow replied that we welcomed this frank expression of Israeli views. Excess of frankness preferable in this relation to excess of discretion. See Rider A/6/ not agree, however that we were on wrong course. Our policy had not changed; Secretary had stressed President's Five Principles in his talk with Riad, making clear there could be no withdrawal except to [on?] condition of peace established through agreement. We had relied on Foreign Minister Eban's statements to us in telling UAR we saw no need for territorial changes in Sinai, on condition that there was demilitarization and guaranteed free navigation. Rostow said he could not see how this had damaged Israel's negotiating position. As was case with our reply to September approach by Soviets, GOI would be reassured by our response to this latest Soviet communication. There would be no change in fundamental US policy. We did not see that any damage had been done to Israel's vital interests which, so far as UAR was concerned, consisted of a demilitarized Sinai and free navigation. With respect to Jordan, which remained key to solution of Palestine problem, we believed that chances of settlement with Jordan were better if dialogue was maintained with UAR.

/6/A note on an attached page fills in the text at this point: "Rider A as follows: US acknowledged it was capable of error. Rabin interjected that Israel too was capable of error. But Rostow could".

8. Rostow concluded by assuring Rabin that we would take Israeli views into account in our reply to Soviets. We could understand Israeli anxieties but saw little substantive difference between us. GOI should recognize that it too could be wrong. Rostow reiterated that he could assure Rabin there was no change in US policy and no abandoning of vital US and Israeli interests in just and durable peace. We would nail this down firmly in terms of the President's stated policy in our reply to Soviets. Rostow said he regretted first sentence of Israeli aide-memoire, and hoped GOI would think better of its conclusion in the light of events.

Rusk

363. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan/1/

Washington, December 25, 1968, 1827Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Paganelli and Davies, cleared by Hart, Seelye, Atherton, Sisco, and Walt Rostow; and approved by Katzenbach.

292142. Ref: Amman 7684./2/

/2/See footnote 4, Document 338.

1. Please deliver the following message to King Hussein from the President: "Your Majesty: I appreciate the frank exposition of your concerns and problems regarding the general area situation and that of Jordan in particular as contained in your letter of November 30./3/ I believe it is indicative of close and friendly US-Jordanian ties and of your personal confidence in me that you feel free to express your views in such a direct manner.

/3/See Document 341.

2. In the past difficult eighteen months we have played an active role in support of Ambassador Jarring's efforts to bring a just peace in the framework of the Security Council Resolution of November 22, 1967. I feel certain that the new administration will give priority attention to attainment of peace in the Near East.

3. Since this will most probably be our last exchange of correspondence before I relinquish office as President, I reaffirm my great admiration for your wise leadership, gallantry and courage which have been so severely tried over the past months. I wish you success in your determination to bring peace, justice and prosperity to your people. Your constructive goals have my support and that of my country, and I feel confident that my successor will view your praiseworthy aspirations in a similar light. With warmest personal regards, Lyndon B. Johnson."

Rusk

364. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State/1/

Tel Aviv, December 26, 1968, 0900Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 ARAB-ISR/SANDSTORM. Secret; Nodis; Sandstorm.

6600. Ref: State 290330./2/

/2/Not found.

1. I have studied with great interest Amman's thoughtful message 7992/3/ assessing the current Arab-Israel situation and recommending tactics in the next stages of our search for a solution. If I read it correctly, it seems to me that that analysis concludes that there are courses essentially of a tactical nature by which the parties might be brought to accept an arrangement providing the elements of a measure of real stability, security, and tranquility in the area with some prospects of enduring.

/3/Document 353.

2. Unfortunately, in my view, such an assessment must, at least by implication, be based on a fundamentally non-existent major premise which would be that the Arabs (read Egypt principally) desire or are capable of being made to accept a settlement providing real security for Israel, her recognition not only juridically but morally as having a right to permanent existence, and her genuine acceptance, again morally as well as juridically, as a Middle Eastern nation.

3. I do not believe that procedural tactics of whatever kind, which merely paper over the cracks of abysmal differences in these respects, can hope to achieve a settlement providing that degree of stability which will avoid the continuation of American involvement in the Arab political mire indefinitely.

4. Obviously, the present situation is not without dangers. However, I think it is possible to and, if I am not mistaken, US public information media do, exaggerate the present possibilities of renewal of large scale hostilities. Israel's security position is obviously better on all fronts than in May 1967; her casualties in the guerrilla clashes and from sabotage, while serious, are regarded by the public here as consistent with and not in excess of the price they are prepared to pay for existence; and except for an aberrationally inspired air attack on Tel Aviv there is little the Arabs could do to start a new configuration.

5. The Israelis are, of course, concerned with the Soviet role in the area. But if our assessment is that the Sovs are not prepared militarily to support with Sov forces a new Arab initiative, it seems to me that the threat of a US-Sov confrontation, which would be greatest in the event of renewed hostilities in circumstances where Israel would be likely to lose and we would be called upon to prevent her annihilation, is not immediate nor need it be over the longer time, even if no solution is found.

6. My apprehension is that the Sovs succeed by diplomatic maneuver to which we give verisimilitude in convincing the Arabs that us support for Israel is less than firm. I believe strongly that we have been correct to date in our refusal to be drawn into a negotiating posture with regard to a solution and (in declining) to participate in any moves toward an imposed settlement. Negative as it may sound, my view is that, while we can and should nudge the parties toward each other, so long as there is no fundamental change in the Arab inability to seek a genuine viable peace on borders clearly defensible against Arab attack, our best course is to make our basic sympathy toward Israel unmistakably clear, and to continue to avoid becoming a broker in a deal where one party refuses to trade.

7. Foregoing was drafted before receipt of State 292074,/4/ with which it does not appear to conflict on major points.

/4/Document 359.

8. Assume Dept will repeat Amman.

Barbour

365. Information Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, December 26, 1968, 1:30 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. XI, Cables and Memos, 12/68-1/69. Secret. A handwritten notation indicates that the memorandum was received at 1:45 p.m.

Mr. President:

With respect to the Phantoms:

--I have checked again with Sec. Clifford;

--I made clear to him your view about credit and delivery dates;

--He repeated what he said at lunch on the 24th; namely, the next move is up to the Israelis. They must make up their minds on three matters: weapons systems they want to go with the plane; the electronics systems they want; and the quantity of spares. The Israeli negotiating team is awaiting a response from Jerusalem.

It is possible that Abe Feinberg and others interested in the matter are not aware that the next move is up to Jerusalem. Do you wish me to inform Abe of this fact?

Yes/2/
No
Call me

/2/The President checked this option. A handwritten note in an unknown hand dated December 26 reads: "Mr. Rostow telephoned Mr. Feinberg."

Walt

366. Action Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, December 26, 1968, 6:30 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. XI, Cables and Memos, 12/68-1/69. Secret. A handwritten notation indicates that the memorandum was received at 6:45 p.m.

SUBJECT
Approval of PL 480 Credit Sale for Israel

Bill Gaud, Orville Freeman and Charlie Zwick recommend you approve a $30.8 million PL 480 credit sale including 300,000 tons of feed grains and 200,000 tons of wheat for Israel./2/ The sale would be repayable in dollars.

/2/The recommendations came in a December 12 memorandum to the President signed by Gaud and John Schnittker, Freeman's Under Secretary, and a December 18 memorandum to the President from Zwick. (Both ibid.)

Israel continues to improve its agricultural performance, but still has to import over half its grain requirements. This credit sale would reemphasize self-help measures, and is a continuation of previous programs. The terms are identical to last year's $40 million sale except for an increase to 3 percent in the interest.

In approving the 1968 PL 480 program, you concurred in a finding that Israeli military expenditures did not materially interfere with development. State/AID confirms that the basis for this finding is still valid.

Walt

Approve/3/
Disapprove

/3/President Johnson checked this option.

367. Editorial Note

On December 26, 1968, two members of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine attacked an Israeli El Al aircraft in the airport in Athens, Greece, with automatic weapons and grenades. One passenger was killed and a crew member was injured in the attack; both were Israeli citizens. The plane caught fire and was severely damaged. The two men who launched the attack were captured and jailed by the Greek Government. The Popular Front issued a statement from its office in Beirut taking responsibility for the attack. Prime Minister Eshkol denounced the assault as a murderous attack on innocent civilians, and the Israeli press noted that the terrorists had come from Lebanon. (Telegram 6618 from Tel Aviv, December 27; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR)

Israel held Lebanon responsible for the actions of a group based on Lebanese soil and retaliated with an attack on December 28 on Beirut International Airport. An estimated 45 Israeli commandos landed in 4 helicopters and attacked planes and facilities at the airport with grenades and machine guns for 20 minutes before withdrawing. Thirteen Lebanese-owned aircraft were destroyed. (Memorandum for the Record by Rear Admiral Robert Baughan, Deputy Director for Operations of the National Military Command Center, December 28; Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. XI, Cables and Memos, 12/68-1/69)

368. Telegram From the Department of State to the U.S. Interests Section of the Spanish Embassy in the United Arab Republic/1/

Washington, December 28, 1968, 0057Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 1 UAR-US. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by James Johnston (NEA/UAR) and approved by Davies.

293090. 1. Ghorbal at his request called on Davies December 27 after week's absence in New York catch up on current state of play in Middle East. Davies reviewed your conversation with Mohamed Riad on Gromyko visit (minus protected section).

2. Davies informed Ghorbal of noon announcement of agreement with GOI for sale of Phantoms. Noted that all concerned with agreement regretted decision which would not have been made had there been movement toward peace or restraint on delivery of Soviet supersonic aircraft to area.

3. Ghorbal became increasingly emotional as he reacted. Described decision as "abhorrent" and most damaging action by Johnson Administration since war. Forecast that meeting Israeli request would make it even more intransigent and that timing of announcement was most inappropriate in view of recent progress of resumption US-UAR relations.

4. Davies noted again that US action had been taken after study of developments over past year and in light ratio of holdings supersonic aircraft on both sides. Pointed out further that by meeting some of Israel's security concerns decision could contribute to more flexible position in Cabinet as regards settlement terms.

5. Ghorbal said decision could only be viewed with dismay.

Rusk

369. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel/1/

Washington, December 29, 1968, 0123Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Confidential; Flash. Drafted by Davies, cleared by Root (AFN) and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs George S. Springsteen, and approved by Hart. Repeated to Beirut, Amman, Cairo, Jidda, Kuwait, Aden, Tripoli, Tunis, Algiers, Rabat, London, Paris, Athens, Ankara, Tehran, Jerusalem, Rome, Bonn, and Moscow. Walt Rostow repeated the text of the telegram to President Johnson at the LBJ Ranch in White House telegram CAP 82946, December 29. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. XI, Cables and Memos, 12/68-1/69)

293154. Subject: Israeli Attack on Khaldeh Airport.

1. On instructions Secretary Rusk Assistant Secretary Hart called in Moishe Raviv, senior Israeli Embassy officer present in Washington, evening December 28 to lodge immediate protest at Israeli action along following lines:

(1) USG extremely disturbed by Israeli action. While attack against El Al aircraft at Athens cannot be condoned, this was carried out by individuals and we know of no indications that GOL was in any way involved. To contrary there are strong indications that GOL has been seeking to cope with terrorist problem. Lebanese basic intentions and concern are indicated by their regular participation in Mixed Armistice Commission meetings with Israel.

(2) Certainly Khaldeh International Airport and the many people therein were not involved. This is a very busy international airport with people of all nationalities present. Our preliminary reports indicate extensive damage resulted and although we have no knowledge of casualties it seems likely that there will be some.

(3) Assistant Secretary Hart stressed that he had been instructed by the Secretary to make protest in strongest terms and to make clear that we simply cannot have this kind of violence in the Near East. This incident is of particular concern when it involves international airport used by many nations. The people at the airport and the facilities thereon certainly in no way could be related to Athens incident.

(4) The Israeli action is particularly unfortunate coming on the heels of the US announcement of agreement to sell Phantom aircraft to Israel.

(5) GOI should know both President and Secretary are deeply concerned. If this case should be taken to the Security Council, the GOI will find the US strongly opposing this Israeli action. We will support condemnation.

(6) As a personal observation, Ambassador Hart said that the Israeli action did not improve the capability of the Government of Lebanon to deal with terrorist organizations but will in fact impair it. This will not produce the result intended by Israel but will arouse a spirit of revenge among people who up to now have not been involved and who have wanted not to be involved.

2. Mr. Raviv responded that he would transmit our views to Jerusalem. Speaking from a paper he made the following points.

(1) It is a fact that the individuals perpetrating the outrage in Athens came from Beirut.

(2) It is a fact that the communique of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLOP) also came from Beirut.

(3) Beirut is the center and headquarters for some organizations including PFLOP. Israel's view is that no government harboring such organizations can be immune from responsibility for actions of these organizations. The savage attack on Israeli aircraft on an international flight struck at Israel's vital life-line. No Government can permit this to happen.

(4) If case comes to Security Council, GOI hopes that USG will view incident in context of what has been going on in past months in Beirut and elsewhere.

3. Ambassador Hart responded that we find a great difference between the action of two deranged or misguided individuals who happened to come from Beirut and the action of a government using its armed forces to violate the air space of a country and to attack its international airport. We believe this an inexcusable retaliatory act striking at innocent people and facilities and also greatly impairing US interests. We understand the deep feelings motivating the Israelis but noted that we have some provocation from Cuba in the form of hijacking aircraft and imprisoning American citizens. The quality and nature of US actions in handling these problems are in stark contrast to those of Israel. To hold the Government of Lebanon wholly responsible and then to express this by striking at innocent people and international facilities is incomprehensible. We consider this a dangerous escalation all out of proportion to the provocation.

For Tel Aviv: Ambassador Barbour should seek to see immediately either Prime Minister Eshkol or Foreign Minister Eban to express USG concern making points made by Ambassador Hart. You should stress that USG deeply shocked by action for which we can find no justification. Holding Lebanese Government responsible for action of individuals will be most difficult to defend. More importantly, we believe this will change the whole nature of GOL-Israeli relationship in which Lebanese sought to limit use of Lebanese territory to the full extent of its capabilities in face of general public support for Palestine Liberation movements.

Rusk

370. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Lebanon/1/

Washington, December 29, 1968, 2123Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Confidential. Drafted by Davies, cleared by Hart, and approved by Davies. Also sent to Tel Aviv, Amman, Cairo, Jidda, Kuwait, Aden,Tripoli, Tunis, Algiers, Rabat, London, Paris, Athens, Ankara, Tehran, Nicosia, Dhahran, Jerusalem, Khartoum, and USUN.

293184. 1. Lebanese Ambassador Kabbani saw DeptyAsstSec Davies (NEA) at noon Sunday to inform USG of Lebanese request for urgent convening of Security Council to hear complaint against Israeli attack on Beirut International Airport.

2. Ambassador sought USG support for a resolution embodying three points: a) a condemnation of the Israeli action, b) compensation for damages and attendant losses, and c) sanctions if Israel does not provide compensation.

3. Ambassador was informed USG extremely disturbed by Israeli action and would take Lebanese request into consideration in developing its position.

4. In ensuing discussion, Ambassador rebutted Israeli charges of GOL complicity in terrorist actions and noted: a) Lebanese press completely free and Government cannot prevent publication communiques of Palestine Liberation Organizations; b) baggage of embarking passengers customarily not subject to customs inspections at Beirut Airport; c) there is absolutely no evidence that sabotage material used in Athens was in fact carried from Beirut by the two men involved in the attack against Israeli plane; d) Front for Liberation of Palestine states two terrorists involved only transited through Beirut from occupied Palestine; e) the GOL has done its utmost to prevent attacks against Israel from being launched from Lebanese territory; and f) it is not true that PFLOP headquarters are in Beirut as it is untrue that there are training camps for terrorists in Lebanon.

Rusk

371. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State/1/

Amman, December 30, 1968, 1419Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 15-1 JORDAN. Secret. Repeated to Beirut, Jerusalem, Jidda, London, Moscow, Tel Aviv, Cairo, and USUN.

8101. Subj: Meeting with Hussein on 28th.

Summary: King Hussein told me on 28th that: (A) Phantom announcement could not fail to have a bad effect on Middle East situation: (B) he was keeping a watchful eye on the Iraqi troop presence in Jordan, whose total number, he said, was just over 10,000 (about half our present estimate); (C) the 14-point arrangement was working satisfactorily with Al-Fatah but the PFLP and similar Fedayeen groups were giving him trouble; (D) Gromyko apparently had used in Cairo a line similar to that recently asserted by the USSR Ambassador in Amman, i.e., USSR support for peace and for Arabs, and US could influence Israel; (E) he would take a special interest in problem of DP feeding; and (F) he expected to spend some three weeks in London in January. End summary.

1. I had a lengthy meeting with King Hussein on 28th: Phantom announcement. I opened the conversation by saying that I had not anticipated the Phantom announcement would have been made just before my audience. I commented that the President and others had already made clear that whatever we did on the Phantoms should not be taken as any diminution of our support for Jordan. Unfortunately other factors in the area had made the Phantom deal a foregone conclusion, citing as examples the absence of some dramatic improvement in the Arab-Israel confrontation or Soviet willingness to discuss practical arms control with US. Hussein shook his head and said emphatically that he considered the announcement most unfortunate and that he believed it could not fail to have a bad effect on situation in Middle East. He was very sorry to hear news of the conclusion of the deal.

2. Iraqi troops. I told Hussein that we remained concerned about the Iraqi troops in Jordan. When he was here, Governor Scranton had been quite interested in the implications of their presence. More recently we have received significantly different estimates from various sources of number of Iraqis in Jordan. We hear from some sources that there may be more than 20,000 and from other sources that there are just over 10,000. Hussein interjected that there were just over 10,000. I asked if there were not other supporting troops, in addition to the three brigades. Hussein said emphatically that there are just over 10,000 in all and that he intends to be very careful about allowing any more. King also said that recent removal of Chief of Staff Ansari and other Iraqis has further complicated the situation. He said that he believes Communists are determined to get rid of the Ba'athists and that the Communists have a good base in Iraq to do this. He mentioned that the Iraqis in Jordan are very upset about the most recent changes. In conclusion, he said he is well aware of and worried about the Iraqi troops in Jordan and is keeping a very careful eye on them. He said, "We are penetrating them instead of having them penetrate us."

3. Fedayeen. The King said he believes the 14-point arrangement has been working all right with Fatah and some of the other groups but that the "Front" and groups like the "Front" are giving him considerable trouble. Just yesterday, the 27th, on the outskirts of Amman, he said, three rival groups in the "Front" had had a fire fight. (By Front, I presume King meant Popular Front--PFLP.)

4. Soviet Initiatives. I asked the King whether he had any comments on Gromyko's visit to Cairo. The King said a report from his Ambassadors in Cairo had not indicated anything startlingly new. It was consistent with what the Soviet Ambassador had said to him when he called before leaving for Moscow a few days ago: that is, the Soviets want peace, they want to prevent conflagration in the Middle East, they are supporting the Arabs as strongly as they can, and they think the United States should use its influence more effectively with Israel. The Soviet Ambassador had also informed him that the Soviets had had contacts with the United States about the situation but they had not reached any conclusive results.

5. Refugees and Displaced Persons. I outlined our efforts during current GA to induce Israel to allow more displaced persons to return to West Bank. I said we would continue these efforts. Meanwhile, as I had mentioned to him on several previous occasions, I hoped we could continue our discussions with GOJ on how the displaced persons on East Bank would be fed in coming months. I said our contacts with GOJ levels below the Prime Minister had not been fruitful so far, and that I believed some indication of interest and a green light were needed from higher levels. I had not had an opportunity so far to mention this to the PriMin. I hoped that the King could indicate his interest in our at least having detailed discussions without any commitment on either side. The King agreed that this was important and said that he would make clear his interest in it.

6. King's Forthcoming Visit to London. (Noforn) The King said he was not certain yet how long he expected to be gone but that he thought it would be about three weeks. His first operation (on his jaw) would be on January 9 and would require a general anesthetic. He had been told he would have to have another operation before he returned. (End Noforn)

Symmes

372. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State/1/

Amman, December 30, 1968, 1459Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 12-5 JORDAN. Secret. Repeated to London and CINCSTRIKE.

8104. Subj: Discussion with King Hussein on military questions and internal security.

1. During my meeting with King Hussein on 28th, I said I was happy to report considerable progress in certain aspects in the military field. Most important, it appeared we might be able to get some credit for Jordan's purchases in the present fiscal year. I did not yet know how much this would be, but I believed it would be very helpful to Jordan.

2. I then noted that we were ready to schedule air transport delivery of the F-104's, with the first to arrive commencing February 3. A 25-day period would be required to assemble and test fly the aircraft. Assuming six aircraft would be delivered each month, the whole squadron could be ready by the end of May. In other words, our schedule had been advanced by 30 days. I noted that General Kurdi had explained to DATT that H-5 air base would not be operational before March 1st and he preferred that no deliveries take place before that date. The King acknowledged that he was aware of this and said he was happy that the 104's would be coming in.

3. I cited several examples of proposed accelerated deliveries of other items. I told the King I was mentioning these details because I hoped he could use them to show critics of his arms relationship with us that we not only were able to deliver on time but that we were making significant advances in delivery dates whenever we could.

4. I said we had been exploring with General Khammash and others Jordanian requests for additional materiel. I was confident that these new Jordanian requests could be examined under the annual review mechanism provided in the March 1968 Memorandum of Understanding./2/ Perhaps Khammash might visit Washington early next year for that purpose. In noting that there might be some personnel changes under the new administration with a consequent settling-down period, I suggested we might best aim for sometime in March for that visit. Meanwhile, we would strive to get as much done as possible in communications with Washington. I emphasized that we are still prepared to consider supplying additional aircraft of some type at some time in the future. I said it seemed to me important, however, that Jordan first get its 18 F-104's located in Jordan and operational. In principle, the option certainly remained open, I concluded.

/2/See footnote 3, Document 111.

5. The King expressed thanks at various points in my presentation and I gathered that he was pleased with the accelerated delivery dates and with the general indication of our willingness to consider Jordanian requests.

6. Internal Security. I told the King that we had had detailed discussions with Khammash and former security chief Abu Nuwar with regard to proposed equipping of the three-battalion Bedouin force, after which we had had further useful discussions with the British Embassy. I hoped that in a short time we might be able to get down to the specifics of financing (which might be a problem), as well as actual orders and deliveries of both US and UK equipment. The King laughed and commented that we would now have to talk to Mohammad Rasoul Kaylani (who has just replaced General Abu Nuwar). I said I assumed that, since General Khammash had had a "heavy hand" on the equipment aspects, we would not have any new problems with Kaylani.

Symmes

373. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State/1/

Amman, December 30, 1968, 1440Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 ARAB-ISR/SANDSTORM. Secret; Nodis; Sandstorm.

8105. Subj: My discussion with Hussein on 28th. Ref: State 292074./2/

/2/Document 359.

Summary: With the authority given me in State 292074, I broached with the King the issue of secret Israeli-Jordanian contacts. I am convinced that the King welcomed this initiative. In addition to supplying considerable details about substance of these contacts, the King made clear that the channel with Israel was still open if the Israelis wanted to use it, but it was up to them, he emphasized. He said he could do nothing more unless or until the Israelis became more forthcoming. He stressed that secret talks with Israel could only be complementary to, not a substitute for, talks through Jarring. End Summary.

1. During my lengthy meeting with Hussein on 28th, I told him that I wanted to raise a very sensitive matter which I had wanted to discuss with him for a long time but for a number of reasons had been unable to do so. I said I was referring specifically to the paper he had given Governor Scranton regarding secret contacts Jordan had had with Israel./3/ I had known generally about these contacts but I had not been in a position to discuss them with him. I personally had detected indications that in the coming weeks there might be in some ways a more active U.S. participation in the peace-making process under Jarring's auspices. I wished to make clear that the U.S. continues to want to reinforce and complement the Jarring Mission in constructive ways. I also wanted to make clear that we stand firmly by the assurances that have been given to him. My present approach to him was a purely personal and informal one. I particularly wanted him to know that I could pass on in a secure way anything further he wished us to know about sensitive contacts he had had with the Israelis. It seemed to me there was mutual benefit in our being able to discuss this matter in detail in the coming weeks. I added that I had never discussed the subject with anyone in his government; for example, I had reason to believe that Abdul Mun'im Rifai probably was not privy to the sensitive contacts with Israel. (The King affirmed that this was true.) I then referred to the King's forthcoming visit to England and said I thought it would be useful to him to let me know if there is any Jordanian official now in the know with whom I might discuss this general subject if necessary during his absences from the country. I added that I personally believed there was "give" in most aspects of the Israeli position and it would be useful for him to try to flush out their attitudes particularly on how withdrawal from the West Bank would be organized.

/3/See footnote 2, Document 344.

2. The King responded that he indeed thought it would be useful for us to have such an informal relationship in the coming period because he very much hoped the United States would take a more active role, but still under the aegis of Jarring. He said he would think over the situation in the coming days before he departs and would get in touch with me to let me know with whom I might talk during his absences if that were necessary. Meanwhile he wanted to brief me on what had transpired so far.

3. Hussein said that talks with the Israelis have gone on "for some long time." In spite of all the contacts, however, there had been no discernible give in any specific aspects of the Israeli position. "In effect, the Israelis keep giving us their general position and we keep giving them ours." As far as Jordan is concerned, the Nov 22 resolution contains the principles under which a settlement is to be worked out. The principles do not allow for any bargaining. It is details under the principles that need to be discussed. In regards to principles, however, Jordan had to make perfectly clear that it must have the Jarring umbrella: that is, that while details might be discussed by secret contacts, such discussions were only an aid and could not be a substitute for reaching agreement under the aegis of Jarring. Anything discussed in secret with Israel would have to be made known to Jarring to be passed on officially.

4. Another essential principle for Jordan is that the UAR must be associated with the Jarring process. Jordan at this time was unable to go it alone. Hussein indicated that even if he were willing to go it alone he thought any separate settlement reached with Israel would not endure. Hussein referred parenthetically to recent US-UAR discussions of the seven points and emphasized that we should not consider that Syria presents a problem. Jordan and the UAR are not in a position completely to disregard Syria and could make no public statement to that effect. On the other hand, if arrangements could be made between Israel and Jordan and the UAR, Syria could be left aside.

5. A third essential principle for Jordan is that Israel must publicly accept the principle of withdrawal from territory occupied in June 1967. The resolution provides that there shall be no territorial aggression. It also provides that boundaries are to be discussed and that there may be some territorial modifications; but unless the principle of withdrawal is accepted by Israel, Jordan will be unable to move further toward a peaceful settlement.

6. A final principle is that any territorial changes must be made on a basis of "reciprocity." Hussein used the word "reciprocity" several times during his conversation. I think he meant that if Jordan agrees to a territorial change in one place it will have to be compensated by some territory elsewhere on at least a face-saving basis. He used the word "reciprocity" in discussing security as well. He stressed, for example, that he had told the Israelis repeatedly that security must be worked out on a basis of reciprocity. He is fully prepared to accept the notion that Israel has security concerns, but he also expects Israel to recognize that Jordan has security concerns.

7. Hussein discussed some of the specifics that the Israelis have thrown out in the secret contacts. With regard to territory, the Israelis have said they want a 12-kilometer-wide strip running along the Jordan River from the north (Tiberias) to a point a few miles north of Jericho. Jordan would be allowed to have corridors across this strip. The Israelis have noted also that they expect boundary changes in the west. Hussein mentioned no specifics with regard to Latroun and Qalqiliya, but he said that in addition to the boundary changes the Israelis insist upon the new western frontier being completely opened for all Israelis. The Israelis also want a strip of territory running to the Hebron area (sic). They have indicated in a general way that they would consider giving Jordan access to Mediterranean port facilities. With regard to Gaza, their last word was that they want to keep it, but there were some indications they might be willing to discuss its future.

8. Far from giving anything on Jerusalem the Israelis have taken a very hard line, and Hussein said that he could see that all Jordan would get was "access to the Holy Places." Hussein said that "sovereignty" over what it previously had in Jerusalem is important to Jordan and that the Israelis so far had given him no hope of an arrangement in Jerusalem as "a city of peace" which would no longer be the cause of division between Arabs and Israelis but would be the place where they would meet. He did not go into any details of what kind of practical administration this would entail in his view, and because there was so much else to discuss I decided not to probe him for details.

9. On refugees the King said the Israelis were proposing that Jordan and Israel form a sort of bilateral committee to discuss the status and disposition of the refugees. The King had responded that this was unacceptable to Jordan and Jordan's position is that the existing UN resolutions on refugees must be applied, at least in principle. He believed firmly that Jordan and Israel alone could not effectively settle the refugee problem and that the international community must be involved.

10. The King said the Israelis were still insisting upon signing some kind of "government-to-government" document. Jordan did not take the position that it would never sign any kind of document. On the other hand, the way the Israelis kept putting it, it appeared that they wanted a government-to-government peace treaty of the traditional sort. This was not acceptable.

11. I suggested that submitting counter-proposals to Allon plan concepts might help to flush out Israeli "give." Drawing on State 292074 and Amman 7992,/4/ I advanced several illustrative ideas. The King did not respond specifically but commented that Israeli insistence on a demilitarized West Bank gave him no problems. As he had already indicated to me, he was prepared to maintain only public security forces on the West Bank. On the other hand, things like the Allon plan would give him a problem, and he had stressed to the Israelis that Jordan also had security interests. Security was reciprocal, he reiterated, but, even more important, security would be a fruit of peace and would flow from an acceptable implementation of the resolution.

/4/Document 353.

12. Hussein concluded this section of the conversation by saying that despite the negative summary he had given me he wanted to make clear that the channel is still open if the Israelis want to use it. It is up to them. The ball is in their court. "Unless they are willing to help me on the principles I have outlined, I can do nothing more." When the King mentioned this to me another time, I emphasized to him that we would not be saying anything to the Israelis about this discussion and that I assumed that he already had told the Israelis that the ball was in their court. He indicated that this was the case.

13. As I was leaving the King said once again that he appreciated having had this conversation and that he would be in touch with me before he left to let me know if there were any late developments and also whom I might talk to in his absence.

14. Suggest Dept pass to Tel Aviv and USUN./5/

/5/A note on the telegram indicates that it was not passed to Tel Aviv or USUN.

Symmes

374. Telegram From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson in Texas/1/

Washington, December 31, 1968, 0118Z.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt W. Rostow, Vol. 112, 12/26-31/68. Secret; Sensitive.

CAP 82960. The Soviets brought in to Secretary Rusk this afternoon a general policy statement on the Middle East accompanied by a so-called "plan" for the solution of the Middle East situation./2/

/2/A memorandum of Rusk's December 30 conversation with Yuri Tcherniakov, with a translation of the note given to Rusk by the Soviet Charge, is in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 ARAB-ISR. Tcherniakov also met on December 30 with Robert Ellsworth, an assistant to President-elect Nixon, and gave him two documents for Nixon that were virtually identical to the two given to Rusk. A memorandum of the conversation between Tcherniakov and Ellsworth and the two Soviet notes are ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, HAK Administrative and Staff Files-Transition, Robert Ellsworth.

Secretary Rusk's preliminary comments and the documents follow. His further comments, as well as mine, will follow tomorrow.

For the President from Secretary Rusk.

Mr. Tcherniakov, Charge d'Affaires of the Soviet Union, came in to see me at 6:30 p.m. this evening to bring two documents from his government. The first was a general policy statement on the Middle East to accompany the second document which is a so-called "plan" for the solution of the Middle East situation. I emphasize that both of these documents now being transmitted are unofficial translations. We will get to you an official translation, taken directly from the Russian text, sometime tomorrow.

Mr. Tcherniakov said that he did not believe that the Soviet Union was planning to make this communication public. I asked him to confirm this with Moscow and that we would assume that it is not being made public unless we hear to the contrary from him. He also said that the same communication is being given to the British and French Governments.

Mr. Tcherniakov added that the USSR is of the opinion that the UAR is in agreement with the plan which they are now submitting. This undoubtedly reflects the outcome of Mr. Gromyko's visit to Cairo. You will recall that we had from Egyptian sources the Egyptian impression that Gromyko would be in touch with us following his visit to Cairo.

I told Tcherniakov that I would not wish to reply off-the-cuff and that I would get this communication to you as soon as practicable. He knows that you are in Texas. I would like to study it very carefully before giving you my considered opinion. My first reaction is that it looks a bit toward what we could accept as a final settlement but is not yet good enough. I have in mind such matters as the handling of the passage of the Suez Canal and the continued insistence that the withdrawal of Israeli forces to the lines of June 4th is, in effect, a prerequisite to agreement on all other subjects. There is no flexibility in this present Russian plan for any modification of frontiers. On the other hand, the present Russian communication does seem to accept the idea of a package and that may give us some basis on which we can pursue the conversation.

First Document (Unofficial Translation)/3/

/3/The translations of the two documents are as received from the Soviet Embassy.

In continuation of the exchange of opinion with the American side with regard to the situation in the Middle East I am instructed to state the following to be transmitted to President Johnson.

Moscow takes with serious concern the situation now developing in the Middle East in view of the absence there of any real movement towards achieving a stable political settlement. The pertinent facts are well known to the US Government and there is no need to dwell upon them.

The Soviet Union in the course of the entire present Middle East conflict has consistently advocated its settlement by political means and consequently has maintained and continues to maintain contacts with the governments of Arab states which we believe has facilitated a constructive evolution in the approach on the part of those countries towards the problem of settlement with Israel.

The Arab states, first of all the UAR, are known to have formally recognized the UN Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967, and declared with all clarity their readiness to implement the provisions therein. Moreover, the UAR, as is known, has spoken in favor of working out a time-table for stage-by-stage implementation of the resolution, i.e. all its provisions and has put forward concrete considerations in that regard, which the American Government has already examined earlier.

Finally, one cannot but note the constructive nature of the UAR Government's answer to the "7 points" introduced by the US Secretary of State last November.

That answer, while confirming the already noted positive aspects in the UAR position, in addition specifies the Egyptian position on such questions of principle as termination of the state of belligerency, freedom of navigation, refugee problem, guaranteeing implementation of the commitments with regard to the settlement, UN participation in implementing the settlement. The UAR answer is in full accord with the November 22 Security Council resolution.

Thus, there can hardly be doubt in anyone's mind as to the good will on the part of the Arab states and their readiness for a just political settlement of the conflict which would ensure stabilization of the situation in the Middle East.

Now, what is the Israeli position? Are there any real positive changes in her position?

One should state, that, in fact, there are no such changes. Moreover, the Israeli forces do not cease armed provocations in the areas of the Suez Canal and Jordan River; public statements by the leaders of Tel-Aviv testify to the fact that expansionist mood influences more and more the policy of Israel.

The basic question of the Middle Eastern settlement is, undoubtedly, the necessity of complete withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Arab territories seized by them. As we understand the US Government also realizes the primary importance of the solution of this question. Notice was taken in Moscow of the statement by Under Secretary of State Mr. Eugene Rostow in the conversation with the Soviet Ambassador on November 8 to the effect that Israel has no territorial claims against the Arab countries and is ready for settlement on the basis of the demarkation lines under the Armistice Agreement in 1949.

However, subsequent statements by the Israelis themselves have in fact disavowed such an assertion. This clearly follows, for example, from the remarks made by Israeli UN Representative Mr. Tekaoh in the conversation with Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR Mr. Semenov that took place in New York at Tekoah's initiative. Incidentally other remarks by Mr. Tekoah in this conversation do not show any reasonableness and soberness on the part of the Israelis either.

Moscow would like to hope that the US Government understands to what dangerous consequences could lead in the long run such a defiant behavior of Israel.

The Arab countries show their readiness for a peaceful settlement and for contributing constructively to its achievement. The conversation between the Foreign Minister of the USSR and the leaders of the UAR, which took place recently, fully confirms such a conclusion. At the same time one should keep in mind that in the circumstances of the continued aggression on the part of Israel the Arab countries, naturally, have taken and are taking maximum efforts to strengthen their military power. And nobody can blame them for doing so in the face of such a position of Israel.

In Israel, and not only in Israel, one can hear arguments to the effect that time, perhaps, works for Israel and therefore they could be in no hurry with the settlement on the conflict. This is a dangerous delusion. And if Israel does not show prudence, one can not exclude any surprises, such a turn of events that would be not only contrary to the interests of the Middle Eastern countries, naturally including Israel, but also would create a situation of crisis extending beyond the limits of that area.

Under these circumstances, it is the duty of all states, sincerely interested in stabilizing the situation in the Middle East, to take urgent and determined measures to prevent a new flare-up there through speediest achievement of a just, peaceful settlement on the basis of the resolution of the Security Council unanimously adopted on November 22, 1967. We proceed also from the assumption that Mr. Jarring's mission serves these purposes and in our opinion it should be supported in every possible way.

The Soviet Union, in pursuing its policy of strengthening international peace and security, which was demonstrated anew by its contribution to the beginning of settlement of the Vietnam conflict, will continue to do everything depending on it to prevent a flare-up of a new crisis in the Middle East.

Attainment of a real progress in the political settlement of the Middle East conflict as well as a further progress in peace settlement in Vietnam would undoubtedly affect in a most positive way the entire world situation and would create more favorable conditions for the development of Soviet-American relations.

The main obstacle in the way of attaining a Middle East settlement continues to lie in the negative position of Israel. Therefore, hope is expressed in Moscow that the US Government will regard with all seriousness the considerations we set above and will take urgent measures to exert proper influence on Tel-Aviv so as to make them adopt, at last, a realistic position.

To facilitate finding a solution to the Middle East crisis the Soviet Government has prepared a plan containing new proposals, which are fully based on the above mentioned resolution of the Security Council and take into account the recently emerged moments favorable to the achievement of agreement on a peace settlement in the Middle East.

We are ready to continue further exchanges of views with the American side on the questions of a Middle Eastern settlement.

Second Document (Unofficial Translation)

Israel and the Arab countries-neighbours of Israel, that would be prepared to participate in the implementation of such a plan, reaffirm their adherence to the Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967, and declare their readiness to implement all its provisions.

They agree further that there will be worked out by way of contacts through Mr. Jarring a timetable and an order for the withdrawal of the Israeli troops from the territories occupied during the conflict of 1967 and that there will be outlined an agreed plan for the implementation by the sides of other provisions of the Security Council resolution, having in view the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East, under which each state in that region will be able to live in security.

The purpose of these contacts could be to agree upon specific arrangements to implement the above Security Council resolution.

1. An agreement be reached on simultaneous declaration by the Government of Israel and by the governments of the Arab states--neighbours of Israel which will participate in the implementation of the plan, of their readiness to terminate the state of belligerency between them and attain a peaceful settlement after the withdrawal of the Israeli troops from the occupied Arab territories. In this connection Israel states her readiness to begin, starting from a fixed date, the withdrawal of troops from the Arab territories occupied as a result of the conflict in summer of 1967.

2. On the day of the beginning of the withdrawal of the Israeli troops, to be carried out by stages under the supervision by the UN observers, the above mentioned Arab countries as well as Israel deposit with the U.N. appropriate documents on the cessation of the state of belligerency, on the respect for and the recognition of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of each state in this area and of their right to live in peace, in secured and recognized boundaries, i.e. in accord with the above mentioned resolution of the Security Council.

In accordance with an agreement to be reached through Mr. Jarring provisions would also be agreed upon concerning secured and recognized boundaries (with appropriate maps attached), concerning the ensuring of freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area, a justful settlement of refugee problem, the ensuring of territorial integrity and political independence of each state in the area (possibly through measures, including establishment of demilitarized zone).

It is understood that such an agreement will be viewed in accordance with the resolution of the Security Council as something of a whole, relating to all the aspects of a settlement throughout the Middle Eastern area, as a "package."

3. The Israeli forces within the subsequent month (as an example) withdraw from a part of Arab territories to certain intermediate positions on the Sinai Peninsula, on the western bank of the Jordan River (as well as from the Syrian territory-from the area of El Quneitra).

On the day when the Israeli forces reached predetermined lines on the Sinai Peninsula (for instance, 30-40 kilometers from the Suez Canal), the Government of the UAR brings its forces into the Suez Canal and begins clearing operations for the resumption of navigation.

4. Within the second month (conditionally) the Israeli forces are withdrawn to the lines which they occupied prior to June 5, 1967, upon which administration of the respective Arab countries is completely restored on the vacated territories, its troops and police forces are introduced.

On the date of the beginning of the second stage of withdrawal of Israeli troops the UAR and Israel (or the UAR alone if her government agrees) declare their agreement to the deployment of UN troops near the line which existed before June 5, 1967, on the Sinai Peninsula, at Sharm al Sheikh and in Gaza sector, that is a situation which existed in this area in May 1967 is restored.

The Security Council takes a decision to dispatch UN troops in accordance with the UN Charter and confirms the principle of freedom of navigation through the Tiran Straits and the Gulf of Akaba for vessels of all countries.

5. After the completion of withdrawal of Israeli troops to the lines of state demarkation through the Security Council, or through signing a multilateral document, the documents of the Arab countries and Israel, deposited earlier, are finally put into effect.

The Security Council, on the basis of the UN Charter provisions, takes a decision to guarantee the Arab-Israeli boundaries (as a variant, guarantees by the four powers-permanent members of the Security Council, are not excluded).

375. Telegram From the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State/1/

Beirut, December 31, 1968, 1008Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Confidential. Repeated to Amman, Jidda, Kuwait, London, Tel Aviv, USUN, and DIA.

15382. Subj: Israeli attack on Beirut Airport.

1. FonMin Hajj Hussein Oweini called me in afternoon Dec 30 to have a "completely frank discussion" of consequences of Israeli attack on Beirut International Airport. Speaking as "friend of US" (which he is), he wished me to know that, unfortunately, incident has created serious obstable in path traditional US-Lebanese friendship, one which can only be removed by subsequent US actions. Lebanon realizes Israel acted without prior knowledge of US but Lebanese are convinced Israelis would not have embarked on raid if they had not been confident repercussions would not be great and would not risk loss of US support. Therefore, it particularly important that Israel sustain more than just verbal condemnation which would soon gather dust with other UN resolutions. Lebanon calls upon US to use its influence in Tel Aviv to assure that Israel is made to understand that she must pay for her crime.

2. Arabs cannot accept that US has insufficient influence with Israelis since US is responsible for sustaining existence of Israel through constant material support. The US will be in most difficult position in Arab world if it does not now act to restrain Israelis and redress the wrong against Lebanon. Arab public opinion, both in Lebanon and outside, is turning more and more against the US and our friends in Arab governments are diminishing.

3. Hajj Hussein reiterated fervently that Government of Lebanon is in no way responsible for Fedayeen attack on El Al plane in Athens. Everyone, he pointed out, can enter and leave Lebanon freely. The two commandos were not Lebanese, were not trained in Lebanon, and were not recently residing in Lebanon. They merely transited Beirut on way to Athens, like hundreds of other travelers daily in Lebanon's open society.

4. Arabs cannot accept that Israeli raid was result of Athens incident; rather it came because Lebanon is weakest of Arab countries and has an open undefended airport. What hurts is fact that Israelis used "US arms and equipment," provided them for use in self-defense, for opposite purpose of aggression against friend of US. Unfortunately, announcement US decision sell Phantom aircraft to Israel inextricably viewed by Arabs as giving Israelis added confidence attack her weak neighbor to north. Hajj Hussein implored US reconsider decision supply Israel with Phantoms which would only be used to attack weaker Arab neighbors and sustain her position in occupied lands. Arabs cannot accept view that Israeli possession Phantoms would impede extension Soviet influence in Middle East, he added. On contrary, Arabs will now have to turn to Soviets for comparable support.

5. Hajj Hussein noted that whole world called upon Israel withdraw from Arab territories in November 22 Security Council resolution. This action produced no results because Israel, feeling it has US support, defies UN. Therefore, mere Security Council resolution condemning Israel and calling for compensation not enough unless US willing oblige Israeli compliance.

6. Hajj Hussein expressed gratitude for quick US response following raid in protesting Israeli action, and promising support for Lebanon in Security Council. He also expressed GOL's gratitude for many US offers of material assistance to Lebanese airlines.

7. I assured Hajj Hussein I would convey fully his views to Washington. After reiterating US support for Lebanon in UN and points made to PM Yafi Dec 29 (Beirut's 15327),/2/ I stressed fact that when Israel feels its security is at stake, it acts first in manner it considers in its own interests and only consults others later. I also expressed opinion that US public will be shocked by Israel action, as was USG.

/2/Telegram 15327 from Beirut, December 29, reported on a meeting between Ambassador Porter and Prime Minister Yafi in which Yafi protested the December 28 Israeli attack on the Beirut airport. (Ibid.)

8. Comment: Hajj Hussein, who is a genuine and loyal friend of the US, was making a heartfelt plea for the US to take action both in SC deliberations and with Israelis which will enable it to keep its remaining friends and influence in Arab countries. His parting remark was that he would never feel ashamed of his friendship for the United States, but he (and other like-thinking Arabs) would now have to be sustained by some more tangible manifestations of US interest in the Arab world than a slap on the Israeli wrist after the Khaldeh Airport attack.

Porter

376. Telegram From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson in Texas/1/

Washington, December 31, 1968, 2142Z.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt W. Rostow, Vol. 112, 12/26-31/68. Secret.

CAP 82970. Following is a memorandum to me from Hal Saunders on responding to the Soviet Middle East initiative. Sec. Rusk will be formulating his view in the next day or so.

"I believe the time has come to pick up where we left off on November 22, 1967. An intense period of negotiation with Russians, Arabs and Israelis produced the UN resolution. Then we stepped back to give Jarring a chance to arrange agreements that would carry out the resolution's intent. So far he has failed. Most of us, I believe, feel he will need more direct help from us and the Soviets if he's to get anywhere. Only the Israelis argue today that mounting tension will bring the Arabs closer to negotiation, and their eye-for-an-eye judgment is questionable.

The issue today is whether we move toward another period of intense five-or-six-cornered negotiation to establish a scenario for working out agreement under the resolution. When Dobrynin delivered a similar memo/2/ right after the Czech invasion, we answered by urging the Soviets to get behind Jarring. That was reasonable because Jarring was just starting his New York phase. But that produced little, and now he needs help.

/2/See Document 245.

If we go down this course, these points are crucial:

1. Our first effort should be to impose a negotiation-not a solution. The Soviet note/3/ speaks of contacts through Jarring to work out a timetable for withdrawal and resolution of other issues in the resolution. The purpose of this document, therefore, might be to arrive at an agreement to negotiate a timetable. Perhaps this could be an elaboration of the first page and a half of the Soviet memo. Then we would have a three-step process:

/3/See Document 374.

A. Declaration of intent.
B. Negotiation of details of elements of a settlement.
C. Final agreement on a timetable, meshing those elements.

2. We must bring the Israelis with us as we did in October-November 1967. We have lost their confidence since November 1967. They're bitterly suspicious of our past exchanges with the Soviets. Yet our main contribution to imposing a negotiation would be to bring the Israelis along. Therefore, I would urge giving Rabin the Soviet memo today, telling him that we are going to prepare a counterdraft and asking him to study and return to discuss an appropriate counter. I think State will do this.

3. The Soviets must bring the Arabs along. Gromyko obviously has Cairo behind this memo. But the point is that Moscow must be willing to keep Cairo behind subsequent negotiations.

These are just rough initial thoughts. The central point is my belief that we should now move back into intense involvement in the negotiation process.

/S/ Harold H. Saunders