Tehran, November 20, 1968, 1240Z.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt W. Rostow, Vol. 107, 11/19-22/68. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Walt Rostow sent a copy of this telegram to President Johnson on November 20 under cover of a memorandum in which he concluded that Nasser appeared to be under conflicting political pressures and unable to decide or to lead. But, Rostow noted, there were some factors that seemed to be operating in the direction of a settlement in the Middle East. (Ibid.)

7379. For the Secretary from Robert Anderson.

1. While I was in Cairo discussing with United Arab Airlines the acquisition of eight Boeing planes, President Nasser asked me to come to his house on Monday. We talked about three hours. Gist of what Nasser said was:

A. Nasser was more anxious than ever to have some kind of peace because he thinks that if war should come again there would be vast destruction on both sides. He said he would not be alone in the next round.

B. Nasser said he was not entirely free any longer to act as independently as before and as each day passed he probably would be less free. In order to emphasize his loss of freedom, he said, first, he had to listen to the Soviets and, second, if he was going to continue to get financial support from Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Libya, he had been told that he had to abide by the Khartoum agreement which in effect said there would be no negotiation and no declaration of non-belligerency. (Donor countries would welcome pretext to discontinue their aid to UAR.)

C. Nasser thinks King of Jordan is in a much weaker position after his confrontation with Fedayeen and he believes that in showdown Iraqi troops in Jordan would oppose King and favor King's younger officers. If this took place there would probably be a collapse of King's government with both Iraqis and Syrians trying to participate in the remains.

D. Finally, Nasser said he now has "factions" in his country which make it more difficult to make independent decisions even inside his country. He stated that if for any reason he should be replaced in Cairo, any successor would be dictated to by the army and the army would be less inclined to any peaceful settlement than he is.

2. For foregoing reasons, Nasser feels that there is a sense of urgency about achieving peace. On other hand, he reiterated his old statements that under no circumstance can he have direct negotiation, either secretly or openly. He insists he has to have a timetable and some kind of a map that would show what boundary adjustments are being contemplated before he can "do a selling job" even to his own people. He believes that if any move of his is termed to be capitulation, he will lose support of the army and without the army he would lose his own control of the country.

3. I asked Nasser if he didn't think a major part of his trouble was a lack of communication both with Israelis and with countries like ours. He agreed but said he could not figure out a way to establish communication with Israelis, first, because he didn't trust them and, second, because if he made an agreement with some part of Israeli Government they would be undercut by other political segments in Israel who are competing in next spring election.

4. Nasser expressed great confidence in Jarring and stated he does not intend for Jarring Mission to end on his account. He feels, however, that something more is going to have to be done than Jarring's simply carrying messages between two parties. He did not make any specific suggestion as to how this could be done except to say that he needs more definition from Israelis so as not to agree in effect to a program of Israeli expansionism.

5. Nasser was obviously pleased to receive a reply from President-elect Nixon. He talked about possibility of this being some excuse to resume diplomatic relations with United States providing there was some statement from new administration which would offset statement during campaign of maintaining Israeli arms superiority. Nasser also has under consideration writing a letter expressing his views to President-elect Nixon.

6. I am going to be back in Cairo within next ten days in connection with financing of Boeing planes. Nasser stated he might ask me to bring a letter from him to President-elect Nixon.

7. There is considerable amount of details that took place in long discussion which I have not tried to incorporate here but which I will convey fully to appropriate people upon my return, which should be toward end of this month. In view of fact that I am going back to conduct discussions re airplane financing, if you have any suggestions I will be here in Tehran until late Saturday or Sunday and would be grateful to receive them.

8. One further thing of some significance. In a talk with Hasan Abbas Zaky he stated he wanted to tell me confidentially that Nasser was under pressure from two sides, one to secure immediate peace and other to continue arms development and training. He said that in view of Ali Sabri's heart attack and absence of some other people who are not so interested in peace, next two or three weeks are going to be crucial in decisions which Nasser makes. Abbas Zaky stated that he is among those who believe that peace is indispensable for Egypt and is urging President to go as far as he can to secure peace.

9. I was unable to see Don Bergus after receiving this information and have therefore not passed any of above on to him.

Meyer

328. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State/1/

Amman, November 20, 1968.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 ARAB-ISR/SANDSTORM. Secret; Nodis; Sandstorm. There is no time of transmission on the telegram, which was received at 12:26 p.m.

7548. Ref Tel Aviv 6152,/2/ Amman 7409./3/

/2/See footnote 2, Document 326.

/3/See footnote 3, Document 312.

1. Since I had assumed our position on territorial assurance for Hussein was already well known to Israel (I understood we had immediately informed Israel what we told Hussein in November 1967) and particularly in view of State 270935/4/ and 272847,/5/ Eban's statements on "unpopulated areas" reported in Tel Aviv 6152 are somewhat disconcerting. When I saw King Hussein on November 9 (Amman 7409), I read to him the following sentences from the memorandum on the "U.S. position as presented to Hussein on November 6, 1967." "The United States, as a matter of policy, does not envisage a Jordan which consists only of the East Bank. The United States is prepared to support a return of the West Bank to Jordan with minor boundary rectifications. However, the United States would use its influence to obtain compensation to Jordan for any territory it is required to give up. For example, if Jordan is required to give up the Latroun salient, the USG will use its influence to obtain in compensation access for Jordan to a Mediterranean port in Israel. Finally, although as a matter of policy we do not agree with Jordan's position on Jerusalem, nor do we agree with the Israeli position on Jerusalem, we are prepared to use our influence to obtain for Jordan a role in Jerusalem. In short, we are prepared to make a maximum effort to obtain for Jordan the best possible deal in terms of settlement with Israel."

/4/Document 320.

/5/Telegram 272847 to Tel Aviv, November 16, informed the Embassy about a telephone conversation on November 15 between Sisco and Argov of the Israeli Embassy. Minister Argov called "to unravel mystery" of the seven-point program for a peace settlement he had heard Secretary Rusk had put forward. In the course of explaining that there was no separate U.S. peace program and that the points made by Rusk in his conversation with Riad were merely restatements of long-established U.S. positions, Sisco noted U.S. concerns that Israel was defining its security concerns with respect to Jordan not in terms of minor rectifications of the pre-war border, but in terms of a significant acquisition of Jordanian territory. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR)

2. The territorial assurances that we have given Hussein are manifestly inconsistent with any proposal that would place "certain unpopulated areas of West Bank" under Israeli sovereignty or jurisdiction. The relevance of "unpopulated areas" to "minor border rectifications" is, of course, another moot point. (Incidentally, the Jordan Govt's 1961 maps on the "distribution of population" and "population density" show very graphically that the only "unpopulated areas" on the West Bank lie along the present ceasefire line between Israel and Jordan. These maps are in vol. 4 of the GOJ Dept of Statistics "First Census of Population and Housing" published in April 1965. A similar graphic representation of the population complexion of the West Bank is shown on "The Population of the West Bank by Settlements, November 1967," published by the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics in 1967.) As I read para 1 of Tel Aviv 6152, Eban seems to be saying that Israel has suggested to Hussein some kind of variation of the Allon plan, which we have already indicated is unacceptable in principle both to US and to Jordan. What Eban appears to be asking of Jordan is certainly "significantly" different even if not "violently" different from the territorial assurances we have given Jordan.

3. I do not know what the Israelis may have proposed to Jordan beyond the generalities occasionally passed on to us by Eban and others, nor do we know Hussein's reaction to any specific territorial proposals Israel may have made. The King and senior GOJ officials continue to take the line with me that the Israelis have never been specific with them about territory and I, of course, have not probed them regarding this matter. Nevertheless, because of the territorial assurances we have recently reiterated to Hussein, I would strongly doubt that he would feel he should entertain seriously any Israeli proposal that either specifically or in principle provided "certain unpopulated areas of West Bank to remain as Israeli territory." I am convinced that anything like that is a non-starter with the King. Even if he accepted it, I do not believe he could bring along other Jordanians with him.

4. I am certain that the Dept is well aware of the foregoing. I review the matter primarily to underline my hope that we will be very firm in letting the Israelis know (1) we intend to stand by the territorial assurances we have given to Jordan and (2) our expectation that they will proceed as soon as possible to give the Jordanians acceptable territorial specifics as part of a peaceful settlement.

Symmes

329. Information Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, November 22, 1968, 1:45 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. X, Memos, 6/68-11/68. Secret. A handwritten notation indicates that the memorandum was received at 2 p.m.

Mr. President:

If true, this report of Israeli position on Jordan and Allon plan is pretty grim news; and it is probably true.

The following cables report parliamentary debate-indicating Israeli politics getting rough./2/

/2/A list indicates that telegrams 6154, 6186, and 6191 from Tel Aviv were attached. Telegram 6154, November 19, described a debate in the Knesset on November 18 on a speech made by Defense Minister Moshe Dayan calling for the economic integration of the occupied territories into Israel. Telegram 6186, November 21, reported that Dayan and four other members of the Cabinet had taken the position that the Allon plan did not go far enough in incorporating the occupied territories and that its adoption by the Cabinet would lead to their resignations. Telegram 6191, November 21, reported on additional sentiment in the Cabinet in favor of economic integration of the occupied territories. Debate on the issue in the Knesset remained sharp. All of these telegrams are ibid. and in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR.

Walt

330. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Washington, November 22, 1968, 5:40-6:15 p.m.

/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 91-0017, Israel, 452 (Sen). Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Murray and approved by Warnke. The meeting was held in Warnke's office. The memorandum is marked "Fifth Session."

SUBJECT
Negotiations with Israel--F-4 and Advanced Weapons

PARTICIPANTS

Israeli Side
Ambassador of Israel, Lieutenant General Yitzhak Rabin
Minister Shlomo Argov, Israeli Embassy
Major General Hod, Commander, Israeli Defense Force Air Force
Brigadier General David Carmon, Defense and Armed Forces Attache
Mr. J. Shapiro, Director, Ministry of Defense Mission, New York

United States Side
Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), Paul C. Warnke
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), Harry H. Schwartz
Deputy Director, NESA Region (ISA), Robert J. Murray

Ambassador Rabin said that he had received his Government's reaction to the US-proposed Memorandum of Understanding (referring to the draft Memorandum of Understanding sent to the Israeli Embassy on 19 November 1968)./2/ He said that there is a paragraph in that memorandum which looks to the Government of Israel as "quite awkward." Rabin said that the awkwardness was "not because of its practical implications" but because of the way it is worded.

/2/A copy of this draft memorandum of understanding is ibid., OASD/ISA Files: FRC 73 A 1351, Chronology of F-4s for Israel, 10 Oct 68-5 Sept 69, Folder 1. A handwritten note on the memorandum indicates that Secretary McNamara cleared it with the President.

Ambassador Rabin read a portion of the paragraph in question: "It is understood by the Government of Israel that action contrary to any of the understandings specified in paragraph II of this memorandum shall constitute 'unusual and compelling circumstances' and shall permit the United States to recover any aircraft already delivered under this Agreement." Rabin said that his Government could not accept that the United States could ask for such language. "There is no precedent. It creates something that I don't believe that exists anywhere." Rabin said that the paragraph implied that the United States considered Israel "the bad guy" and that it did not believe the undertakings made by the Government of Israel, and therefore this paragraph was worded as it is.

Mr. Warnke took issue with Ambassador Rabin's statement. Mr. Warnke said that he had talked with Mr. Clifford, and Mr. Clifford in turn with Mr. Rusk, and the United States Government clearly did not put such a construction on this paragraph. The United States does believe the undertakings made by the Government of Israel. "I believe you and what you have said." It is quite natural, however, that Israel would look after its own national security requirements. It would be understandable for Israel to enter into an F-4 agreement now and later feel compelled to change its mind for reasons existing at that time. It would not be unusual in international agreements for undertakings previously made to prove improvident in the future. But the United States for its part must look after its own national security interests; if Israel were to decide at some point that it could not adhere to the provisions of the agreement, it would revert to status quo ante. That is the purpose of this paragraph.

Ambassador Rabin said he couldn't understand why, for example, the United States could ask in ten years for these aircraft to be returned. Mr. Warnke said: "Suppose you deliver nuclear weapons in these aircraft in ten years time?"

Mr. Warnke said that what was put in the Memorandum of Understanding, after all, represents only the summation of our discussions. Ambassador Rabin said that he had not agreed to commitments in the contract; he said that Israel had agreed to reaffirm its previous understandings--that they would not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons or carry nuclear weapons on U.S. aircraft. "Why do you want us to do this?"

Minister Argov said: "We feel we are on parole." The Israeli Government is giving assurances, said Argov, but the paragraph presumes we will not live up to them. Ambassador Rabin said that it isn't the standard paragraph.

Mr. Warnke disagreed that there was a "presumption" in the contract that Israel would not live up to its assurances. Mr. Warnke also disagreed with Ambassador Rabin's statement that this wasn't a standard paragraph. "There is no such thing as a standard contract." Each one varies. A past contract is not a binding precedent for future contracts.

Ambassador Rabin, somewhat apologetically, said that his instructions were to follow the former wording. He said also that, although he agreed with the form of the U.S. proposal (i.e., a memorandum of understanding), "my Government has had second thoughts" and prefers the same format as in the Skyhawk Agreement: "I send you a letter, you send me a letter."

Mr. Warnke observed that we had the form of a Memorandum of Understanding before, in the Skyhawk Agreement. Ambassador Rabin said he thought not. Minister Argov said that yes, at the time in 1965 of the visit of Mr. Harriman and Mr. Komer, there was a Memorandum of Understanding: "You participated in its development Mr. Ambassador." Ambassador Rabin agreed and said that that was the Harriman Mission, which was a different matter.

Mr. Warnke observed that that was the point he was trying to make: there are different matters and different circumstances that now exist. Mr. Warnke said that he understood that what Israel wanted now wasn't a Memorandum of Understanding but an exchange of letters; for this he had no instructions, and would have to discuss the matter with Secretary Clifford. Mr. Warnke also asked the Ambassador whether he had a letter to submit. The Ambassador passed him the Israeli letter (attached)./3/

/3/Not printed.

Mr. Schwartz suggested that Ambassador Rabin not press the A-4 analogy too far, that it consisted of a number of documents, not just an exchange of letters, and that it was negotiated under different circumstances. For example, it contained an agreement that Israel would not come back to the United States for planes for five years.

General Hod observed that the President, when Prime Minister Eshkol was here, was willing to overlook the five year clause. Ambassador Rabin said that the United States didn't say anymore that it would not be a major supplier; the formulation of the communique issued at the Ranch in 1968 was different from that of 1965. In 1965 it said that the United States would not be a major supplier; it did not say that in 1968, but said instead that the United States would keep Israel's defense requirements under review in light of the situation in the area.

Mr. Warnke said that the Ambassador's remarks were not inconsistent with what Mr. Schwartz had just said. Mr. Schwartz said that the 1965 precedent (of the Skyhawk) didn't apply.

Mr. Warnke said he would discuss the latest Israel proposal with Mr. Clifford. Mr. Warnke asked Ambassador Rabin if he wished to sign the letter. Rabin did.

Ambassador Rabin said that there is a third problem. He laughingly said that he assumed we would overcome the "technical difficulties" of getting a satisfactory agreement in an acceptable form. Rabin said: "Everyone has his own superiors." Rabin asked if we could proceed with the technical talks while waiting to sort out the basic agreement.

Mr. Warnke said that the problem won't arise, for he expects to respond to Ambassador Rabin the first of next week. General Hod interjected that what he needs to know is what specific equipment can be included on the F-4 aircraft and its approximate cost, so that he can draw up a list of his specific requirements for the USAF, and they in turn may prepare a Letter of Offer. Mr. Murray said that he would review this and call General Hod on the telephone.

331. Information Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson

Washington, November 23, 1968, 3:35 p.m.

[Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Walt W. Rostow, Arab-Israeli Private Talks. Secret; Eyes Only. 1 page of source text not declassified.]

332. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Washington, November 26, 1968.

/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 91-0017, Israel, 452 (Sen). Secret; Sensitive.

SUBJECT
F-4 Negotiations with the Government of Israel

On November 26, Ambassador Rabin called me and reported that he had received my letter/2/ in reply to his letter requesting that the United States Government sell 50 F-4 Phantoms to Israel./3/ Ambassador Rabin said that the letter posed no problems for him except for the reference to the interpretation of the United States Government as to what would constitute the introduction of nuclear weapons by a Middle East power.

/2/Document 333.

/3/Rabin's November 22 letter to Warnke requested the sale of the aircraft, together with related armament, ammunition, training, spare parts, and other related services. The letter reaffirmed Israeli commitment not to be the first power in the Middle East to introduce nuclear weapons, and agreed not to use any U.S.-supplied aircraft as a nuclear weapons carrier. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 72 A 1499, 452.1 Israel)

Ambassador Rabin said that he understood from our second conversation that we would not incorporate a definition of this term. I pointed out that this discussion had occurred in the context of an anticipated Memorandum of Understanding, to be subscribed by both parties. With a Memorandum of Understanding it would be necessary to arrive at an agreed upon interpretation and our conversation had made it clear that this was unlikely. I commented further that the existence of such differences of opinion had, as I understood it, been the reason for his proposal of an exchange of letters in lieu of a Memorandum of Understanding. I also commented that, as Ambassador Rabin had noted in our last conference on Friday, neither of us was responsible for the content of the other's letter.

I pointed out further that the interpretation of the United States Government was not directed exclusively at the circumstances under which Israel would be deemed to have introduced nuclear weapons into the Middle East but that it applied equally to the eventuality of such action by any other Middle Eastern power. In the event that another Middle Eastern power should acquire possession and control of nuclear weapons then this would relieve the Government of Israel from the restrictions of its announced policy.

Ambassador Rabin said that he recognized that our position was equally applicable to other Middle Eastern powers and asked again if I thought this paragraph should remain in the letter. I said that I did and Ambassador Rabin said "all right."

In response to my question as to how the negotiations are proceeding, Ambassador Rabin said that General Hod had met yesterday with Mr. Schwartz and had presented a list of the items desired in order that an appropriate letter of offer could be prepared. He also commented that he might want to talk with me at the end of the week with regard to the delivery schedule. I said that I would be free to see him on Friday.

Paul C. Warnke

333. Letter from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Warnke) to the Israeli Ambassador (Rabin)/1/

Washington, November 27, 1968.

/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 72 A 1499, 452.1 Israel. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Murray.

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

This will acknowledge and respond to your letter of 22 November 1968,/2/ requesting on behalf of the Government of Israel that the United States sell to the Government of Israel fifty Phantom aircraft and related equipment and training. The Government of the United States agrees to sell to the Government of Israel fifty F-4 Phantom aircraft and related equipment and services in accordance with this exchange of letters and technical and financial annexes to be negotiated separately. This transaction is subject to the provisions of the Foreign Military Sales Act/3/ and the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement of July 23, 1952./4/

/2/See footnote 3, Document 332.

/3/Reference is to Part II, Chapter 3 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended. (P.L. 87-195, 75 Stat. 424)

/4/TIAS 2675; 3 UST 4985.

The United States Government, for its part, accepts the assurances given by the Government of Israel as stated in your letter:

"On its part the Government of Israel reaffirms its longstanding policy as laid down in the Memorandum of Understanding of March 10, 1965,/5/ that it will not be the first power in the Middle East to introduce nuclear weapons and agrees not to use any aircraft supplied by the United States as a nuclear weapons carrier."

/5/See Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XVIII, Document 185.

In this connection, I have made clear the position of the United States Government that the physical possession and control of nuclear arms by a Middle Eastern power would be deemed to constitute the introduction of nuclear weapons.

I wish also to confirm the understanding of the Government of Israel as set forth in the fifth paragraph of your letter of 22 November 1968./6/ Such unusual and compelling circumstances would exist in the event of action inconsistent with your policy and agreement as set forth in your letter.

/6/The fifth paragraph of Rabin's letter stated that Israel understood that the United States reserved the right, under unusual and compelling circumstances, to cancel all or part of its commitment to provide F-4 aircraft and related equipment and services at any time prior to delivery.

The agreement contained in the last paragraph of your letter concerning the secrecy of this undertaking is satisfactory to us.

It is understood that we can now proceed to negotiate the technical and financial details of this transaction./7/

/7/As initially conveyed to Rabin, the last paragraph read: "It is understood that your letter of 22 November 1968 and this letter in reply together constitute an agreement between our two governments." Rabin objected in a telephone conversation with Warnke on November 27 that the proposed last paragraph of Warnke's letter implied that Israel agreed with the U.S. interpretation of the circumstances that would constitute the introduction of nuclear weapons. Warnke agreed to substitute a "bland" concluding paragraph that did not carry such implications. (Memorandum of conversation, November 27; Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 91-0017, NESA Chron)

Sincerely,

Paul C. Warnke

334. Memorandum for the Record/1/

Washington, November 27, 1968.

/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 80-R01580R, DCI Executive Registry Files, Box 11, Folder 240, MFR. Secret. Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency on December 2.

SUBJECT
Near East South Asia IRG Meeting
Wednesday, 27 November 1968
Arab-Israel Action Paper

1. The Interdepartmental Regional Group for Near East and South Asia met 27 November 1968 to discuss a draft paper on the Arab-Israel problem designed to highlight action matters with which the new national administration may be faced during its first 90 days in office./2/

/2/Not found.

2. The circulated draft stated there was little prospect that in the near future much progress would be made toward an Arab-Israel settlement. This conclusion was not challenged by anyone at the IRG meeting.

3. The draft went on to outline three alternative policies which the United States Government might follow given the impasse. Very briefly these were: (a) put real pressure on Israel to negotiate an agreement consistent with the reasonable meaning of the words of the 22 November 1967 Security Council resolution; (b) publicly support such a settlement in order to improve our position with the Arabs, but do not bring pressure on Israel to go along, thus virtually ensuring that no progress would in fact be made; and (c) continue as at present to back the Israeli position while urging Israel to be more flexible in both procedure and substance.

4. Assistant Secretary Hart expressed the opinion, which was generally supported by the IRG members, that a better format than presenting "alternatives" would be to explain our present posture and then outline progressive "steps" which might be taken to increase the prospects for an Arab-Israel settlement. He felt our present policy included many points of difference with Israel which should be mentioned, while admitting that in spite of these differences we are putting no meaningful pressure on Israel to change its stand where we disagree with it. The "steps" open to us all lead in the direction of withdrawing the blank check which Israel now holds from us, in order to move Israel toward a reasonable implementation of the Security Council resolution. An early one would be to advise Israel privately that if no progress is made toward implementation we would support some form of mediation or arbitration. Making a public statement to this effect would be a further step. An ultimate drastic step would be our actual active participation in an international effort to interpret and compel compliance with the Security Council resolution.

5. Procedurally, it was left to Assistant Secretary Hart to re-work the circulated draft along the lines he favored. This will go to Under Secretary Katzenbach and possibly be on a future SIG agenda.

6. The White House representative on the IRG/NEA, influenced by recent policy decisions in regard to aid to Biafra, favored a recommendation that the Arab refugee problem be cut loose from the rest of the Arab-Israel confrontation, and that we try to make progress on this issue as a separate matter. The general consensus was that the humanitarian aspect of the Arab refugee problem was completely subordinate to international political considerations, and that this was not a practical proposal. I expect, however, that the paper which eventually goes to the Under Secretary may contain some reference to this proposal, perhaps presenting it as a step which we might consider taking.

David H. Blee/3/
Chief, Near East and South Asia Division

/3/Printed from a copy that indicates Blee signed the original.

335. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel/1/

Washington, November 30, 1968, 0127Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by Sisco, cleared by Atherton, and approved by Davies and Katzenbach. Repeated to Amman, Cairo, and USUN.

280027. 1. Believe it would be desirable for you to have a chat with Eban prior to his December 2 meeting with Jarring, making clear you doing so on instructions. In view of the number and detailed discussions we have had with GOI in recent days, and fact that they are clear as to what our position is in relationship to Jarring Mission and our desire to make progress, we leave to your discretion how best to get across to the Israelis our continuing feeling that they should put forward positive posture in this next round. In the course of your conversation, you might make clear that for our part we have been pressing both USSR and UAR with a view to trying to get Nasser to be more explicit on concept of peace, which of course is of primary interest to GOI.

2. From Sisco's conversation with Tekoah in New York on Tuesday,/2/ we have the impression Israelis very relaxed-much more relaxed than we are-regarding Jarring's willingness to serve for an indefinite period. We are pleased that he is having another round in the area and apparently plans further discussions after Christmas vacation in Moscow. While Jarring is no longer talking about wanting to sign off in the next weeks, our distinct impression is that he will not stay on indefinitely in circumstances where prospects for progress are very bleak.

/2/November 26.

3. Anything you can get of a specific character regarding where matters stand on Jordanian side of settlement would also be helpful to the Department./3/

/3/Telegram 280086 to Tel Aviv, November 30, amplified Barbour's instructions. Barbour was instructed to stress to Eban that if the UAR did not soon make a positive response to Jarring, Jarring would be under strong pressure to take an initiative himself. In those circumstances, the United States viewed it as important for Israel to make suggestions to Jarring about the initiative he might exercise. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR)

Rusk

336. Notes on Meeting/1/

Washington, December 4, 1968, 12:30-1:30 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, Transcripts of Meetings in the Cabinet Room, December 4, 1968, 12:30 p.m. to 1:30 p.m. No classification marking. Prepared from a tape recording by either President Johnson's secretarial staff or by his staff in Austin after the President had left office and begun research for his memoirs. The tape recording the notes are based on is ibid., Recordings and Transcripts of Telephone Conversations and Meetings. The notes have been corrected to accord with the tape recording. Secretary Rusk's comments were preceded by a discussion unrelated to the Middle East. The tape recording picks up Rusk's briefing at the point indicated.

PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S NOTES ON MEETING IN THE
CABINET ROOM

FOLLOWING WERE PRESENT
Secy Rusk, Clifford, Smith, Fowler, Udall, Freeman, Cohen, Boyd, Atty Gen. Clark, Amb. Wiggins, The Vice President, PMG Watson, Under Secy Robert Wood sat in for Secy Weaver, Chairman Macy, Art Okun, Director Zwick, Bromley Smith, Charles Maguire, DeVier Pierson, George Reedy, Joe Califano, Harry McPherson, Ernie Goldstein, Harry Middleton, Bill Blackburn, George Christian, Tom Johnson, Jim Jones and Larry Temple, Charles Murphy and Amb. Averell Harriman

Secretary Dean Rusk said:

"It is an expression of an intention which is to a considerable extent understandable, and an attempt to emphasize to the Arabs that the continuation of these terrorist raids is not profitable and could lead to a buildup of hostilities. We will continue to do everything we can, and get others to bring their influence to bear to reduce these incidents, because it makes it more difficult to get an atmosphere in which a peaceful settlement will follow.

"The possibilities of a peaceful settlement are being fully explored by Ambassador Jarring. I wish, Mr. President, I could report more progress on the part of his efforts. He is now in the Middle East talking currently with the Governments of the States directly concerned to see if he can get some sort of movement by both sides to move us closer to a peaceful settlement."

The Secretary added that for a long time there had been an obstacle on the procedural points. He said Israel has insisted upon talking directly with the Arab Governments in a direct negotiation face-to-face. He noted that the Arabs have indicated they would not do that and would only negotiate indirectly or discuss these matters indirectly in the Security Council or with Amb. Jarring.

Secretary Rusk said that in recent weeks Israel had taken two important steps. On the one side they have actually taken up with Amb. Jarring various points of substance having to do with a peaceful settlement, opening the way for indirect talks which the Arabs apparently have been saying they want to see.

Secretary Rusk continued:

"We are disappointed that the Arab side has not been more responsive to this change in attitude on the part of Israel. It has not been willing to talk seriously with Ambassador Jarring about the particular points of substance more than you have heard thus far.

"Secondly, Israel has now been talking about the need for a contractual settlement of the situation and has taken the emphasis off the term 'peace treaty.' This should open the way for a somewhat less formal arrangement, which would nevertheless bind all the parties but would be more congenial to Arab sensitivities. Again, that has not met very much response."

The Secretary said that along with this issue there was the deep feeling among many Arabs that Israel is bent upon territorial expansion and similarly a deep feeling on the part of the Israelis that the Arabs are bent upon the destruction of Israel. That deep emotional commitment on both sides obviously gets in the way of a peaceful settlement.

The Secretary said:

"I think it is fair to point out that there are internal political problems on both sides. Some of the Arab leaders may well feel that if they take a dramatic step toward peace, they will be subject to assassination, and it may well be true that they do face such a problem. And there are internal debates going on in Israel today which make the position of the Prime Minister very difficult if he should translate dramatic moves toward peace on his side. So we may have one of those situations where the parties feel internally too weak to be wise. Unless there's some unusual experience in diplomacy, that does complicate the situation."

Secretary Rusk commented that fortunately, Amb. Jarring was going to serve further and is going to continue his efforts but that we needed the help, however, of the other powers, including the help of the Soviet Union. He reported that just yesterday Pravda issued a statement which was highly polemical in content, which associated Israel with the imperialist forces, which are supposed to be the bugaboo in the communist world. He said it did, however, point to Soviet support for the November resolution in the Security Council and support for Amb. Jarring's mission.

Secretary Rusk said we would hope that although outside powers cannot settle this situation among themselves in the positive form, we could hope that all outside powers, including the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. and others would bring [all?] their influence to bear that they could on the parties, to try to get the parties to be more cooperative in Ambassador Jarring's movement toward peace.

He said:

"So, Mr. President, we have the short-run model of trying to find ways to reduce these acts of terror and violence along the cease fire lines.

"We must try to get additional muscle behind Ambassador Jarring's mission so we can draw a reluctant people on both sides more toward a serious peaceful solution because the Middle East not only is inflammatory in its own right in terms of its own territory, but because of many circumstances, including its geographical location, it is an area which could be inflamed depending upon whether the great powers could be engaged or highly involved with each other in a most dangerous fashion. We will continue to work for that just as hard as we can."

[Here follows discussion unrelated to the Middle East.]

337. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Washington, December 4, 1968, 3 p.m.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Parker.

SUBJECT
Seven Points

PARTICIPANTS
Dr. Ashraf Ghorbal, U.A.R. Interests Section, Embassy of India
Mr. Richard B. Parker, Country Director for NEA/UAR

Mr. Parker said that the UAR Foreign Ministry had given Don Bergus the text of the UAR's comments on the Secretary's seven points on the morning of December 4./2/ He could tell Dr. Ghorbal on a personal basis that the Department, including the Secretary, had found the response most disappointing. Not only did the Egyptians insist on an irritating and counter-productive rehash of everything since Genesis, but they had not responded in a frank and open manner. In his presentation of November 2, the Secretary had made an important and far-reaching initiative. He had committed us to a position which our friends the Israelis had not liked and which would have entailed considerable difficulty for us in terms of implementation. The Israelis had recently assured us that the Egyptians would get us off the hook by responding negatively. Their forecast had been amply justified by the document we had received that morning. If the Egyptians wanted us to help them, they would have to learn something about dealing with the United States Government. The sort of foggy replies that the Egyptians specialized in only succeeded in irritating people.

/2/The text of the UAR's response to the Secretary's seven points was transmitted  in telegram 4047 from Cairo, December 4. (Ibid., POL 27 ARAB-ISR) In his comments Bergus noted that UAR policy remained focused on the demand for Israeli withdrawal from all occupied Arab territory. (Telegram 4051 from Cairo, December 4; ibid.)

Dr. Ghorbal said we would have to understand in the first place that the prologue reciting Israeli misdeeds was an essential expression of deep and bitter feeling on the part of the Egyptians. Their territory was occupied. They had a long history of injustice at the hand of Israel and they could not disregard this or set it to one side. Mr. Parker said that on the previous day Dr. Ghorbal had been searching for a word to describe an action which produced a result contrary to that desire. That word was "counter-productive". This was the term which should be applied to the prologue.

Dr. Ghorbal went on to say that the Egyptian response was not really an answer to the seven points, but rather an amplification and a reaffirmation of what Mahmoud Riad had already said on November 2. As Dr. Ghorbal had said earlier, Mahmoud Riad had given his response on November 2. The Americans had chosen not to accept it as definitive. Riad had now reaffirmed it. The Americans kept getting the Egyptians to make concessions while the Israelis made none. Then they proceeded from the new position of the Egyptians and asked them to compromise further instead of asking the Israelis to move. There were some things the Egyptians could accept and others they could not. The US could not, in any event, expect the Egyptians to set forth in a document of this sort, which might fall into the hands of anyone, a position more forthcoming than that given by Riad. It would also have to understand the atmosphere in which this response was drafted. While, on the one hand, the Secretary had been very fair and forthcoming in his statements to Riad, he had also made much of the fact that American leverage with the Israelis was limited. Mr. Parker had subsequently informed Dr. Ghorbal that the seven points were not a peace plan but were rather a statement of the sort of position we could support. Mr. Parker had also said that we could not guarantee Israel's acceptance. Indeed, the Israelis did not like the seven points. All the while, Eshkol and Dayan were making bellicose statements about the retention of territory, the consolidation of the Golan Heights and other territories into Israel, on the inevitability of war, etc. We could not expect the Egyptians to put their hands in ours, given these uncertainties.

Mr. Parker said that we had made what seemed to us a reasonable offer. We had delineated the position we could support, a position which was not unfavorable to Egypt. If the Egyptians had accepted it wholeheartedly, we would at that moment be working in an effort to get it accepted by the Israelis. The Egyptians were always asking us to put pressure on Israel, but they were not willing to make it possible for us to use what leverage we had.

Dr. Ghorbal and Mr. Parker proceeded to examine the Egyptian reply point by point. With regard to the indivisibility of withdrawal, Mr. Parker noted that the Secretary had proposed as an eighth point an understanding that Egypt's acceptance would be with the understanding that the problems of the other Arab states and Israel would be regulated in a satisfactory manner. It was, of course, difficult to visualize any settlement which returned the Golan Heights to Syria given the fact that Syria refused to cooperate with Jarring or to accept the November 22 Resolution. In these circumstances, did the UAR response mean that if all other issues were taken care of and the sole remaining issue was Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights, and the Israelis refused to withdraw, the UAR would not go to settlement? Dr. Ghorbal said that was correct. Egypt could not settle with Israel as long as Arab territory beyond what Israel already had before June 1967 was occupied. Mr. Parker commented that Egypt was likely to forfeit a settlement over this issue.

On termination of belligerency, Mr. Parker noted that the language of the Egyptian response seemed to mean that termination would come after withdrawal. Was this the intent? Dr. Ghorbal said he understood the response to mean that termination of belligerency and withdrawal would be simultaneous.

As for the navigation issue, Mr. Parker noted that the response tied free navigation to the resolution as a whole and not just to the refugee issue. This was a better formulation than the earlier Egyptian position.

On the question of refugees, Mr. Parker said the UAR response was unclear. The Secretary had made a specific proposal. The UAR had replied in general terms that it accepted the UN resolutions on the subject. This was not news, nor was it responsive. Given the fact that both Dr. Fawzi and Salah Gohar had commented to foreign ambassadors that the Secretary's proposal regarding refugees was unacceptable, we suspected this response was a rejection. Dr. Ghorbal said he did not think this was the case. He believed that the UAR was at the moment consulting with Palestinian leaders as to what they could accept. Until those consultations were finished, the Egyptians could not commit themselves to any detailed understanding on the issue. We should interpret the present response as keeping the door open and meaning that the UAR did not reject the Secretary's proposal, which after all, was not contrary to the UN resolutions.

Mr. Parker noted that the UAR rejected a permanent UN presence at Sharm Ash-Shaikh. We could not expect the Israelis to settle for less, if indeed they would accept even that. The idea that the Israelis would accept a temporary UN presence which the Egyptians could recall when they felt like it, as they had done in 1967, was unrealistic. Both we and the Israelis had to have reassurances that the Straits would be kept open and neither of us trusted the Egyptian word in this regard, given past history. Dr. Ghorbal said that we should stretch our imaginations on this problem. What we wanted was freedom of navigation, not a UN presence. In a climate of peace, a satisfactory arrangement should be possible. Egypt, however, could not alienate for eternity a part of its territory, no matter how remote or how unimportant as real estate. We should stop talking about a permanent UN presence and start thinking about some arrangement which would give satisfactory assurances to both sides without derogating from Egyptian sovereignty. Mr. Parker suggested that if the Egyptians had any ideas in this regard they should bring them forward.

Mr. Parker noted that the UAR also rejected the concept of signature of the same document. This presumably was because Egypt rejected sulh (reconciliation), in accordance with the Khartoum formula, although it was now talking of peace (silm), at our urging. Signature of the same document was a symbol of sulh, just as the handshake was a symbol of reconciliation in any ceremonial sulh. The Egyptians should realize that without sulh there would be no silm. If the Egyptians wanted to get the Israelis out of their territory, they had better start thinking about sulh.

Dr. Ghorbal said that we should be ingenious enough to find a way to get around the question of signature. The Arabs simply could not sign the same document with Israel. They could, however, sign identical documents on the same day, both of which could be registered immediately with the UN and published simultaneously side by side, both committing the two parties to the same things and having the binding force of contracts. Signature on the same piece of paper should not be blown up into an obstacle to agreement. Mr. Parker commented that it was this very inability of the Arabs to sign that same piece of paper which convinced the Israelis that the Arabs were not prepared to offer meaningful peace.

338. Information Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson/1/

Washington, December 4, 1968, 4 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. XI, Cables and Memos, 12/68-1/69. Secret. A handwritten notation indicates that the memorandum was received at 4:12 p.m.

SUBJECT
(1) Israeli Raids on Jordan
(2) Message from King Hussein/2/

/2/See Document 341.

Before he left this morning, Walt asked me to send you our latest reading on the Israel-Jordan fighting today.

The Israelis say their Sunday commando attack in southern Jordan was a direct response to terrorist shelling of Israel's Dead Sea phosphate works, but that may only have been the last straw following the Jerusalem bomb explosion last week.

Today's attack, however, was directed mainly at the Iraqi troops who have been supporting the terrorists logistically and who themselves opened fire for the first time on Israeli settlements in the Jordan Valley last night. The Israeli embassy here says Israel just couldn't sit still any longer without encouraging more such attacks.

Eban has asked Wally Barbour to transmit a message from Eshkol to the Jordanian government, saying that the Iraqis were the target and that Israel had no intention of widening the action./3/ Rabin's deputy here called me to say the same.

/3/This request was reported in telegram 6361 from Tel Aviv, December 4. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR)

This will probably delay Jordan-Israel talks. Even the Israelis who are concerned about that argue that they have no choice if they're just not going to roll over in front of the terrorists. But with Jarring beginning another round in the area-he saw Eban Monday and goes next to Cairo-the Arabs can't help but assume the Israelis don't care. It's clear that they put short-term security above all.

Hussein alludes to this Israeli attitude in his message (attached),/4/ written to you before the attack on another subject-your wire explaining your go-ahead on negotiating the Phantom deal with Israel. He expresses sharply his disappointment with our policy, but given his feelings, the message is restrained.

/4/Not attached. The text of King Hussein's letter to President Johnson, dated November 30, was transmitted to the Department in telegram 7684 from Amman, December 2. (Ibid., DEF 12-5 ISR) The signed original of the letter was transmitted as an enclosure to airgram A-513 from Amman, December 5. (Ibid., POL 15-1 JORDAN) Ambassador Symmes provided his assessment of King Hussein's letter in telegram 7774 from Amman, December 6. (Ibid., POL JORDAN-US)

Hal

339. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Washington, December 4, 1968.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Atherton and approved in S/S on December 10.

SUBJECT
Reports of Israeli Plans For Settlements on Golan Heights

PARTICIPANTS

His Excellency Yitzhak Rabin, Ambassador of Israel
Mr. Shlomo Argov, Minister, Embassy of Israel
Mr. Moshe Raviv, Counselor, Embassy of Israel
Assistant Secretary Parker T. Hart, NEA
Assistant Secretary Joseph J. Sisco, IO
Deputy Assistant Secretary Rodger P. Davies, NEA
Alfred L. Atherton, Jr., Country Director, NEA/IAI

During a conversation primarily on other subjects, Mr. Hart referred to recent press reports that Israel planned to establish new settlements on the Syrian Golan Heights, allegedly to accommodate some 15,000 settlers. Such reports could only be interpreted as pre-judging the question of sovereignty over areas presently occupied by Israel, and we therefore trusted that these reports were erroneous.

Ambassador Rabin said that, when Under Secretary Katzenbach had set forth the US position on Israeli withdrawal, he had not mentioned the Golan Heights. Mr. Hart replied that we were talking about the principle of the non-acquisition of territory wherever it might be.

Ambassador Rabin noted that Israel had already established Nahals, which he described as military-agricultural settlements, on the Golan Heights and asked why we were raising this question now. Mr. Hart said that reports of new settlements carried implications of a permanent Israeli presence which was inconsistent with efforts to make progress toward peace.

In response to Ambassador Rabin's comment that this issue could be tested in negotiations if the Syrians would negotiate, Mr. Hart said that he inferred from the Ambassador's comment that the future of the Golan Heights was negotiable. Rabin replied that the Government of Israel had made clear everything was negotiable except Jerusalem. He could not say, however, what Israel's position with respect to the Golan Heights would be. Meanwhile he saw no reason why Israel should not do what it wished to fulfill its responsibility for maintaining the territories under its control so long as Israel acted within the context of military occupation and abided by the Geneva Conventions.

Mr. Hart said we saw a difference between Israel's utilizing the resources of occupied areas on the one hand and establishing permanent settlements on the other. Mr. Davies added that reports of permanent settlements tended to confirm Arab suspicions that Israel did not intend to withdraw; this could make the Arabs less willing to cooperate with Ambassador Jarring. Ambassador Rabin disagreed, saying that in his view the Arabs would be more eager to negotiate the more they saw a danger that they would not get their territories back.

340. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel/1/

Washington, December 5, 1968, 0137Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Atherton, cleared by Sisco, and approved by Hart. Repeated to Amman, Beirut, Jidda, London, Jerusalem, USUN, and Cairo.

282248. 1. Assistant Secretaries Hart and Sisco called in Ambassador Rabin afternoon December 4 to make following points re recent Israel-Jordan cease fire incidents:

(a) We are asking both Israeli and Jordanian Ambassadors to convey urgently to their governments our concern over recent cease fire violations./2/ We see risk that escalating situation will get out of hand.

/2/Hart made a similar presentation to Jordanian Ambassador Sharaf on December 4. (Telegram 282251 to Amman, December 5; ibid.)

(b) Without assessing blame, we look to both governments to observe cease fire.

(c) We are aware of problems that terrorism and shelling of civilian centers cause for GOI. To avoid jeopardizing peacemaking efforts, however, we are urging parties to exercise utmost restraint. Latest Israeli air operation strikes us as dangerous over reaction.

(d) At same time we recognize problem Iraqi operations from Jordanian territory cause for Israel and will stress to Jordanian Ambassador need for GOJ to assert control over Iraqis and Fedayeen.

2. Rabin said he would report foregoing promptly. At same time he wanted to explain how GOI views situation. Israel had accepted cease fire on assumption that it would be mutually respected. By entering agreement with Fedayeen organizations November 16, GOJ had assumed responsibility for Fedayeen activities. According Israeli information, GOJ understanding with Fedayeen groups provides inter alia that latters' operations against Israel would be coordinated with GOJ.

3. Rabin continued that Iraqis were in Jordan in division strength consisting of three brigades and had artillery units positioned in northern sector. Israel had evidence that Iraqis had initiated shelling of Israeli settlements December 2 along 25 mile front from Tel Qazir to Beisan Valley. This had been preceded by more limited shelling of settlements December 1, to which Israel had responded in limited fashion with 15 artillery rounds against Irbid plus shelling of known Fedayeen concentrations. Following further artillery bombardment of Israeli settlements December 2, Israel had used aircraft against Iraqi positions near Irbid and subsequently against Iraqi positions and other installations on larger scale December 4. Rabin stressed that IDF had sought to concentrate latest strike only on Iraqi military targets; neither town of Mafraq nor Jordanian airfield had been attacked and there were no overflights of Amman. Israeli Air Force had ignored two Jordanian Hawker Hunters which had been in area at time but had not attempted to engage Israeli planes.

4. Rabin added that as Israeli success in stopping terrorist infiltration had grown (he claimed 85-90 per cent of infiltrators now killed or captured), Fedayeen as well as Jordanian and Iraqi military had resorted increasingly to cross river shelling. As result latest Israeli action he thought Iraqis would think twice before provoking further incidents. Neither side wanted major hostilities and he did not believe situation would get out of hand as we feared. Israel could not tolerate shelling of civilian settlements, however, and unless cease fire was observed by Jordanians, Iraqis and Fedayeen there would be further incidents. Israel wanted to avoid "too much" escalation. Experience had shown, however, that use of "more than normal force" could calm situation for a time.

5. Rabin noted that, while Israel had never requested UN observers on cease fire line with Jordan, it was GOJ not Israel which had refused to accept them. In response to query whether Israel would accept observers if Jordan agreed, Rabin said GOI had never believed UN observers could bring tranquility. Nevertheless Israel had accepted observers on Syrian and Egyptian cease fire lines when UARG and SARG had done so.

6. Sisco informed Rabin that we expected press inquiries to which we would reply that (a) we had expressed our concern about cease fire violations to both Israeli and Jordanian Ambassadors and (b) we had asked GOI and GOJ to observe cease fire scrupulously.

7. For Tel Aviv: Ambassador should seek early opportunity to reenforce foregoing approach at appropriate level GOI.

Rusk

341. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Read) to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow)/1/

Washington, December 5, 1968.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence File, Jordan, 8/1/68-1/20/69. Secret; Exdis.

SUBJECT
King Hussein's Reply to the President's Message

Transmitted as an enclosure is King Hussein's reply/2/ to the President's message of October 11./3/ As you will recall, the occasion for the President's message was our announcement to open negotiations for the sale of Phantom jet aircraft to Israel. The message was designed to reassure the King that these negotiations in no way prejudiced USG support for the Jarring Mission or for Jordan.

/2/See footnote 4, Document 338.

/3/See Document 277.

The King is obviously very upset with the proposed sale of Phantoms to Israel. His sharply worded reply to the President reflects the great strains placed upon him during the past months. A principal thrust of the King's reply is that alleged Israeli intransigence and alleged United States' passivity in the face of this intransigence impedes a peaceful settlement in the Middle East. Other points made by the King include: (1) the proposed Phantom sale directly contradicts our profession of support for the Jarring Mission; (2) Jordan has suffered from Israeli military actions since the June 1967 war, particularly from aircraft supplied to Israel by the United States; (3) Jordan's marked military inferiority to Israel requires a military quid pro quo for Jordan to offset the Phantoms; (4) the United States' commitment to the territorial integrity of Jordan continues to be violated by Israeli occupation; (5) U.S. actions and positions on the Middle East problem are making it difficult for Hussein and other moderate Arabs to justify their close ties with the United States.

Our Ambassador in Jordan has a continuing dialogue with the King and there is no need for a further response on the part of the President. A signed copy of the letter has been sent by pouch.

Dirk Gleysteen/4/

/4/Gleysteen signed for Read above Read's typed signature.

342. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Beirut, December 5, 1968.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Edward P. Djerejian and approved by Ambassador Porter. The memorandum is Enclosure 1 to Airgram A-1505 from Beirut, December 13.

SUBJECT
The Prospects for a Peaceful Settlement of the Arab-Israeli Conflict

PARTICIPANTS
Prime Minister Abdullah Yafi
Governor William W. Scranton/2/

/2/Former Governor of Pennsylvania Scranton visited Lebanon on December 5 as part of a six-nation fact-finding tour of the Middle East undertaken on behalf of President-elect Nixon. His other stops included Iran December 2-5, the UAR December 6-7, Saudi Arabia December 7-8, Jordan December 8, and Israel December 9-11.

Governor Scranton asked Prime Minister Abdullah Yafi for his views on the Middle East situation. Yafi went into a detailed expose of the history of the Arab-Israeli crisis from 1948. He characterized Israel as a racist, expansionist and aggressive state in the heart of the Arab homeland. Yafi emphasized that the Arabs were in a state of legitimate self defense. From 1948 on, he said, the Arabs have been the victims of aggression on three separate occasions.

Governor Scranton inquired what form any future peaceful settlement might take. Would it be based, for example, on demarcation lines readily agreed to by both sides and Arab recognition of Israel? Prime Minister Yafi replied that the question of Arab recognition of the state of Israel was absolutely impossible for many reasons, to include the radical political pressures emanating from Arab youth today. Yafi characterized the views of the new Arab generation on the question of Palestine as being more fanatic than the views shared by the present Arab leadership. Insofar as demarcation lines were concerned, they could be agreed upon as long as Israel was not given any bonuses (in territorial terms) for her acts of aggression.

Governor Scranton asked the Prime Minister for his views on the Jarring Mission and whether or not Yafi thought there was any better alternative for reaching a peaceful settlement. Governor Scranton commented that President-elect Richard Nixon was very much interested in the Middle East situation and he was fully aware of the expectations surrounding his advent to the American presidency. The Governor wondered whether or not the Arabs were waiting to see what the Nixon Administration would do before they went any further on the Jarring Mission. Yafi said the Arabs have placed much hope in the New American Administration. Concerning a settlement, he said he sees no other means than the Jarring Mission and the November 22, 1967 UN Resolution as the basis of a peaceful settlement. He strongly supported execution of the UN Resolution, and said the Arabs had accepted the resolution in full but that the Israelis had considered it as sort of a "battle order" which they treated in a routine manner. What was needed was to carry out the principles of the resolution and establish a timetable.

Governor Scranton asked Prime Minister Yafi exactly what he meant by a timetable. Yafi said before any timetable could be established, Israel would have to accept the resolution as a whole. This would lead to specific stages of execution, to include, in part: Israeli withdrawal from the Occupied Territories; freedom of navigation for Israeli vessels through the Suez Canal; arrangements for the return of the Palestinian refugees either to their former homes in Israel or to other parts of the Arab world, etc.

Governor Scranton asked the Prime Minister exactly how any settlement, within the framework of the UN Resolution would be executed. Would it mean the establishment of demilitarized zones and the installation of an international police force, for example?

Yafi said he did not agree with the establishment of an international police force along the Arab-Israeli border. He stated the presence of such an international force has not and would not, in the future, deter any further aggression, which, he claimed, would come only from the Israeli side. However, he stressed that the United Nations should be used as the instrument for enforcing any settlement, and that the UN must, with this objective in mind, be "reinforced" by the Great Powers in order that it may play an active and productive role in maintaining peace in the area.

Governor Scranton commented that Prime Minister Yafi's frank remarks about the impossibility of the Arabs living with the State of Israel led him to ask whether the Arabs would ever accept the very existence of the state of Israel, and consequently, if there was any real hope for peace. Prime Minister Yafi replied that what the Arabs were opposed to was the racist, expansionist, zionist state of Israel which could not be tolerated. Governor Scranton said if this was the case, and the Arabs were not bent on the extinction of the state of Israel, then there would be some hope for a real settlement. He stated the United States had been opposed to Israeli expansionism and that this was also the position of President-elect Nixon. To limit Israeli expansion would, however, require some assurances from Arab states as well. Yafi stated that there could be no definitive peace between the Arabs and Israelis, and that, frankly speaking, only a comprehensive "truce" could be concluded between the two sides because the major issues dividing them were irreconcilable.

Governor Scranton said most Americans support the existence of the state of Israel, but also that most Americans were opposed to Israeli expansionism at the expense of the Arab states. However, the Governor continued, most Americans also believe that the Arab position is the elimination of the state of Israel. Prime Minister Yafi explained that this was not the case and that what the Arabs were opposed to was Israel aggression and expansionism.

In the long term, Yafi stated, the Israelis will not be able to maintain their present policies and remain in the Arab world. If history is any proof, Israel's destiny will not be unlike that of other foreign entities which implanted themselves on the Arab world like the Crusader Kingdoms and the French and British mandates. These entities, Yafi said, were unable to maintain their positions in the Middle East on any permanent basis.

Yafi made it clear that in his opinion the US should not pressure the Arab states to go further than implementation of the November 22 UN Resolution. He said any pressures in this regard would be unproductive.

Governor Scranton remarked that one thing which concerned him was the exaggerated expectations on the part of the Arabs that if the US exerts enough pressure over Israel, Israel will do whatever the US wants. Scranton said this is definitely not the case. However, he added, US pressure would seem to be necessary to contain Israeli expansionism. In any case, he emphasized, there are limits to US influence over Israel. Yafi said that he understood this very well but, unfortunately, the Arab masses believe otherwise. In conclusion, Prime Minister Yafi told Governor Scranton that what the Arabs were asking for is positive pressure from the US and not, what he termed, negative pressure.

As examples of such "negative pressure", he referred to the US-Israeli Phantom jet sale negotiations and US abstention on the UN Resolution on Jerusalem. Yafi said it was unfortunate that the US adopted these positions while Israel was defying international public opinion and UN resolutions by continuing her occupation of Arab territories. For these reasons, he repeated, the Arabs considered themselves to be in a state of legitimate self defense.

343. Telegram From the U.S. Interests Section of the Spanish Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State/1/

Cairo, December 7, 1968, 1036Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 7 US/SCRANTON. Secret; Exdis.

4082. 1. Governor Scranton met with Nasser for ninety minutes evening 6th. FonMin Riad present./2/ Scranton found Nasser completely relaxed. At no time did he become emotional. Following is brief sketch of highlights:

/2/Scranton's meeting with Mahmoud Riad on the morning of December 6 was reported in telegram 4079 from Cairo, December 7. (Ibid.)

2. US-UAR Relations. Nasser said he had been thinking of writing letter to President-elect Nixon and sending it via former Treasury Secretary Anderson. Then Scranton visit had been proposed and Nasser thought it might be better convey views orally via Scranton. Governor said he believed it would still be good idea for Nasser to write President-elect.

3. Nasser several times said he would like see resumption diplomatic relations. He would like have a clear assertion of US policy on which he could hang it. He believed that if UAR resumed relations, other Arab states would follow. Nasser said he had been ready resume relations last February but US behavior in Security Council had caused him change his mind.

4. Governor suggested desirability of Nasser's making some kind of overture to US. This would help with American public opinion which still to large extent dwelt on false accusation that US had participated militarily in June war. Moreover, Nasser gesture towards US would strengthen hand of new administration in influencing Israelis to take steps towards peace. Nasser did not argue this point.

5. Sharm-al-Sheikh. Nasser said that during May-June 1967 crisis he discovered he did not have military power physically to close Straits Tiran. Governor pointed out that with subsequent rebuilding of UAR armed forces, they probably had acquired this capability. Governor said this emphasized need for UN presence at Sharm-al-Sheikh. No argument from Nasser.

6. Sinai. Nasser said Sinai, while important, was less important than problems of West Bank of Jordan and refugees.

7. Refugees. Nasser felt back of refugee problem could be broken if 500,000 refugees (both '48 and '67) could be settled on West Bank of Jordan. He wondered how water could be provided for such resettlement.

8. Gaza. While Nasser didn't want it ceded to Israel, he indicated no problem in finding workable solution.

9. Demilitarized Zones. Nasser reiterated Riad's dislike of idea of demilitarizing entire Sinai on grounds this would give undue military advantage to Israel. He also said UN forces in Sinai would not fight if Israel invaded.

10. Suez Canal. Nasser implied there no problem re opening of Canal to flags of all nations.

11. Peace. Governor gained impression Nasser had yearning for Arab-Israel settlement so he could concentrate on internal situation.

12. Internal Problems. Nasser said both Egyptian youth and military wanted revenge against Israel. He said his own children called for revenge. He stated that many Egyptian youth were volunteering to join Fedayeen.

13. USSR. Nasser made usual statements to effect USSR did not control UAR.

14. Syria. Nasser felt that if overall Arab-Israel settlement came in sight, he believed he could handle Syrians. He spoke specifically in terms of a settlement which would not necessarily involve return of Syrians to Golan Heights.

15. Iraq. Nasser said recent Israel raids on Iraq forces in Jordan had solidified Iraqis behind their government. He noted riots in Baghdad had ceased.

16. Communist China. Nasser said UAR did not have good relations with ChiComs.

Bergus

344. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State/1/

Amman, December 9, 1968, 1532Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 7 US/SCRANTON. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Repeated to Cairo, Tel Aviv, and Jerusalem.

7823. Subj: December 8 Hussein-Scranton talk. Pass other posts at Dept's discretion.

1. Following is Embassy-prepared summary of conversation between King Hussein and Governor Scranton evening of December 8. Zaid Rifai, Secretary General of Royal Diwan, was only other person present. Summary report approved by Governor Scranton.

2. Governor Scranton said that King presented his points calmly and dispassionately throughout talk. While revealing disappointment with US actions, or lack of actions, did not punctuate his criticism with sharp or bitter comments. He was "very pleasant." (Zaid Rifai later at King's dinner told me that he thought the talk had gone very well and that the King had been impressed and pleased with the Governor.)

3. Much of conversation dealt with terms of possible settlement (Amman 7822)./2/ Hussein agreed with Scranton's interpretation of Nasser's position as revealed in recent Cairo conversation:/3/ i.e.,

/2/Telegram 7822 from Amman, December 9, provided an account of Governor Scranton's discussion with King Hussein on the informal exchanges between Jordan and Israel. King Hussein indicated that as a result of the exchanges he had become convinced that Israel was not serious about negotiating a settlement with Jordan. His conclusion was that Israel was determined to annex significant portions of the West Bank and would refuse to leave East Jerusalem. Hussein felt that the United States was the only country capable of exerting sufficient pressure to change Israeli policy, but he did not anticipate such a dramatic change in U.S. policy. (Ibid., POL 27-14 ARAB-ISR/SANDSTORM)

/3/See Document 343.

(A) Nasser wanted Sinai back; (B) was willing to be accommodating re Canal, Tiran Straits; (C) could participate in contractual arrangement to Security Council under SC resolution; (D) could accept UN presence but not demilitarization; (E) would find no problem with UN or other kind of international presence at Sharm al-Shaykh; (F) did not believe Syria would present a major problem in settlement; and (G) did not necessarily want to keep Gaza, but did not want it to be given to Israel.

4. Hussein revealed a favorable estimate of Nasser now. Admitted having difficulties with him in past, but asserted he was utterly convinced that Nasser wanted a settlement. Said he and Nasser were working closely together. Zaid Rifai mentioned to Scranton that Hussein had occasionally "laid down the law to Nasser" and Nasser had complied.

5. Hussein seemed quite confident about his abilities to keep the country under control. Admitted he had problem with Iraqi forces but felt he had this situation under control as well. Admitted that King Faysal was giving money to Fedayeen, and that latter had ChiCom and Russian equipment.

6. Hussein did not raise Phantom issue as such, or his interest in sending General Khammash to Washington. Only Rifai referred to Hussein's Dec 2 message to President Johnson./4/ Hussein said he could not defend Jordan if Israel attacked. Mentioned that pressures to buy Russian arms were growing, but did not criticize US position on arms supplies.

/4/See Document 341.

7. Hussein said he was convinced that Soviets genuinely wanted peace.

8. Hussein also indicated his interest in an early visit to the US to see President-elect.

9. Scranton went into some depth with Hussein re Jordan's economic future, noting how well country had been doing prior to June war. (He also pursued subject during subsequent dinner with King, discussing water resources, desalination schemes, etc.)

10. Scranton also discussed refugee problem at length. King wanted some scheme which would bring refugees as a group under one authority./5/

/5/Scranton also met with Prime Minister Talhouni on December 8. A report on that meeting was transmitted to the Department in telegram 7831 from Amman, December 10. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 7 US/SCRANTON)

Symmes

345. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State/1/

New York, December 9, 1968, 2025Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 1 UAR-US. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to Amman, Tel Aviv, and Cairo.

8369. Subject: UARG reaction to USG reaction.

1. UAR PermRep El Kony called on Amb Wiggins Dec 9 to convey message from FonMin Riad. El-Erian, Mohammed Riad and Amb Buffum present.

2. Translating from statement drafted in third person, El Kony read four points:

A. FonMin surprised at USG reaction of disappointment to his memo/2/ replying to seven points Secretary raised with him.

/2/See footnote 2, Document 337.

B. FonMin regrets he cannot agree with US that UAR memo will not help Jarring because latter has informed Egyptians to contrary.

C. USG reaction will not be helpful to US-UAR dialogue.

D. It has been hoped this dialogue would promote understanding but now it seems it might create misunderstanding.

3. El Kony added his own hope that after further study of memo US would have different reaction from our initial one. Wiggins said if memo helps Jarring, that is good. Certainly early sections of memo (which El Kony called historical expose) look backward rather than forward. Perhaps we were expecting too much in a tragic situation which moves so painfully slow. If memo does prove to be helpful element, we will gladly admit our reaction to it was wrong.

4. Buffum inquired whether UAR memo envisages no settlement without Syria being part of it. Mohammed Riad declared principle of withdrawal underlies everything. While issues of Canal and Tiran Strait can be separated out as UAR-Israel bilateral problems, principle of withdrawal is common problem for UAR, Jordan and Syria. Wiggins pointed out that this brings situation back to basic impasse. Buffum suggested Riad's explanation seems something like adding apples and pears because Syria has not accepted Res 242. El Kony expressed view that if principle of withdrawal is recognized fully, other issues would fall in place.

Wiggins

346. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State/1/

Tel Aviv, December 11, 1968, 0845Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 7 US/SCRANTON. Secret; Priority; Exdis.

6445. Scranton Visit.

1. This is report of meeting December 9 between Gov. Scranton and FonMin Eban cleared by Gov. Scranton. DirGen Rafael and Asst DirGen Bitan also present.

2. Eban began by presenting his whole theory of global conflict. 1967 Arab-Israel war had been a great free world victory and global context was clear setback for Soviet penetration of ME. It was Sov policy to get Sixth Fleet out or to denuclearize ME. Chief agent of Sovs is Nasser. Since Israel has achieved success and has stopped Sov takeover of ME, US and Israel should join together as espousers of freedom.

3. In Eban's opinion USSR understands that US and Israel hope for freedom in area. Because of Israel's successful policy, Sovs have instituted contacts recently and have realized that Israel is a large factor in ME and does not intend to be displaced. It is true that Sovs have strengthened their influence in ME, but only in those places where they were strong before, such as Iraq, Syria, Yemen, UAR, Sudan. Sovs would like to make Mediterranean a Soviet lake.

4. Scranton asked whether Eban didn't agree position of Jordan and Saudi Arabia was weaker than before. Didn't they have more internal troubles on which Soviets could capitalize?

5. Eban said in his opinion US was dominant power in ME and all eyes were on Washington. Suez Canal was our big card and we should play it for peace and not wish for necessity to reopen Canal in absence of peace. US should depend on and help continue Israel's association with Iran and Ethiopia. If ever there was a clear exposition of Nasser's Sov ties and intentions, it was Dulles' written statement to Israel re UAR in 1957./2/

/2/An apparent reference to the August 1, 1958, letter from Secretary of State Dulles to Israeli Prime Minister Ben Gurion. For text, see Foreign Relations, 1958-1960, vol. XIII, pp. 77-79.

6. Eban's next theme was how to get peace. This should be done between Israel and Jordan first. Israel and Eban strongly anti-Nasser; Hussein more reasonable. Israel's two important principles were to "go forward" to secure and permanent boundaries that are recognized. There must be an agreed solution ("and US says this too") and not one imposed from outside. In short, nature of peace most important. There must be an end to blockades, raids, etc. though not necessarily exchange of ambassadors. In short, settlement must be in terms of international law and order.

7. Eban continued Israel was opposed to external guarantees. These never worked. Israel had had deepest commitment from France but this had not worked. Agreement must come from countries themselves. In Eban's opinion, Nasser's objective was to get territory back without peace or if this was not possible, wait until he was in position to go to war again.

8. On territorial problem, Eban said, Nasser did not wish to allow Gulf of Aqaba to be international waterway. He had been completely unresponsive to Secretary Rusk's seven points. Scranton pointed out this somewhat exaggerated and response not completely negative.

9. Eban thought Egypt represented greatest rigidity. Sovs however not so rigid now. They had recently come to Israel, which is victory for Israel's stand on strength and determination not to withdraw without real peace.

10. Eban said Jordan was not thinking of another war. Hussein needs to settle soon or there will be an internal collapse because of Palestinian problems. He could make peace without Cairo's assent, Hussein tells Israel, but he needs a peace good enough from his point of view as not to cause internal problems with Palestinians. Israel's proposals re West Bank were that no Arab army should be west of Jordan River. Jordan would get back 90 percent of population and 85 percent of territory on West Bank. Only 17,000 Arabs would be left in the territory which Israel required. Re Jerusalem, it must remain united and capital of Israel. Good progress had been made with Vatican re Christian Holy Places and Israel would be glad to give sovereignty (sic) over Christian Holy Places to appropriate bodies. Any agreed sovereign (sic) for Moslem Holy Places would be agreeable to Israel but Jordan was nearest and second obvious choice.

11. Asked by Scranton about talks which had gone on with Palestinians about possible West Bank state, Eban said GOI not optimistic. Did not like idea of buffer state. Most Palestinians wish to be with whoever is in charge of East Bank. Inference was that any such separate state likely to be only a temporary problem child.

12. In response question about future of UAR and Nasser, Eban said anyone would be better than Nasser. If there were a change, at least whoever came after Nasser would be fresh and might do what Sukarno's successors have done.

13. Eban did not give clear picture of thinking on Gaza. Said UAR didn't want it, Israel didn't want it but also did not want Jordan to have it because did not desire to see Jordan-UAR border. Eban made vague references to Jordan's having opening to sea through Gaza but was not committed to that.

14. Eban noted he had made proposal for world conference on refugees but had been turned down.

15. Dept repeat other posts as desired.

Barbour

347. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State/1/

Tel Aviv, December 11, 1968, 0850Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 7 US/SCRANTON. Secret; Priority; Exdis.

6446. Scranton Visit.

1. This is report of meeting Dec 9 between Gov Scranton and Prime Minister Eshkol, cleared by Gov Scranton./2/ Asst DirGen MFA Bitan and Yaakov Herzog, Director General of Prime Minister's office, were also present.

/2/Scranton met on December 10 with Allon and Dayan. A report on those meetings was transmitted to the Department in telegram 6447 from Tel Aviv, December 11. (Ibid.)

2. Eshkol said he extremely anxious US understand Israel wants peace. He somewhat concerned Israel beginning to give impression even to friends that it may really be expansionist non-peaceful nation. On other hand he was not going to make any kind of arrangement with anyone which he thinks not in best interests of Israel for real agreement. This is Israel's first and perhaps last opportunity for such settlement.

3. GOI thinks it essential for Israel to have arrangements militarily secure in area where so much trouble, so many years, day in and day out. This was reason for "arms" (i.e. projections from north and south from Israeli territory along Jordan River) in Israel proposal. Israel had been more than lenient in its suggestions re Jerusalem and if this whole proposal was not acceptable he (Eshkol) would only be able to throw up his hands. Three times he asked Scranton "What would you do?"

4. Eshkol's whole attitude on Nasser was completely different. He did not entirely rule out possibility that agreement might some day be reached with Nasser, but almost. Eshkol spent some time going over with Scranton maps of Israel-Jordan and Israel-UAR areas and discussing each in turn. Said Israel admitted territorial problems with UAR would be easier to settle. Israel knew UAR did not want Gaza. GOI had no objection to giving back all Sinai except for Sharm el Sheikh and access thereto. Israel had to have control over Tiran Strait and Eshkol dwelt on history of troubles at Tiran.

5. Eshkol continued that he particularly did not trust what UAR would say about Suez Canal. UAR knew it would take a long time before Canal could be cleared and reopened and they might make promises to get concessions now only to renege later on when Canal opened. Eshkol did not think that Hussein could make an agreement at this stage without approval of Nasser but did not rule out possibility his doing so at some later time. Eshkol inclined to think Hussein far more honest man than Nasser but "if he really is honest why does he tie himself to Nasser?"

6. Gov Scranton told Eshkol that in his own opinion the longer Israel continued to hold on to territory without peaceful settlement the more American public opinion would change away from overwhelming sympathy for Israel to a questioning of her motives. Scranton made this point in some depth. Fair to say Eshkol was somewhat impressed by this statement.

7. Continuing, Eshkol said openly he needed support America and American public opinion and, although to a lesser degree, support of Western Europe. Noted he had "lost" de Gaulle.

8. Eshkol made it clear from his heart that he had no confidence in any UN force or UN visibility and absolutely no confidence in any guarantee from anyone, "including US."

9. Dept repeat other posts as desired.

Barbour

348. Information Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, December 11, 1968, 8:55 a.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. XI, Cables and Memos, 12/68-1/69. Secret. A handwritten notation indicates that the memorandum was received at 2:25 p.m.

Mr. President:

I forward this working level information on the history of Phantom financing-about which you will no doubt be hearing from Abe Feinberg, etc.

Abe Feinberg came in yesterday to complain again that Clifford is offering only $60 million in credit to the Israelis in a sale of fifty aircraft, whereas the Iranians received $100 million in credit in a sale of thirty-two./2/

/2/Feinberg sent a memorandum to Jim Jones on December 11 outlining the Israeli case for better credit terms. Feinberg asked Jones to show the memorandum to the President. (Ibid., Files of Harold H. Saunders, Israel Arms, 10/1/68-1/20/69)

I have reported Feinberg's view to Clifford; but it seems clear that only the President's intervention is likely to alter the Defense Department terms-if you wish to do so.

I pointed out to Feinberg that Eshkol had told you he would be delighted to pay cash on the barrel-head./3/ Abe acknowledges this but says the Israeli foreign exchange position has deteriorated and Israel should not now be treated worse than rich Iran./4/

/3/In a December 9 memorandum to Rostow, Saunders put the total cost of the purchase at $275-300 million. (Ibid., Memos to the President, Walt W. Rostow, Vol. 109, 12/1-9/68)

/4/There are two handwritten notes by Jim Jones under Rostow's signature. One reads: "Jones told A.K." A.K. was Arthur Krim, a lawyer and president of United Artists corporation, and a Democratic Party fundraiser and adviser to the President on politics and Middle East policy. The other note indicates what Jones told Krim, which apparently was President Johnson's reaction to Rostow's memorandum: "A.K.-Everybody mad-suppose to be cash. May blow whole deal."

Walt

349. Information Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, December 12, 1968, 12:30 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence File, Israel, 8/1/68-12/12/68. Secret; Nodis.

Mr. President:

You will wish to be aware of the attached letter from Eshkol on the NPT./2/ It tells us nothing new.

/2/Not printed. Prime Minister Eshkol sent the letter to President Johnson on December 4 in response to Johnson's November 15 letter to him urging Israel to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Eshkol wrote that Israel was still giving careful consideration to the long-term security implications of the treaty and would take into account the considerations advanced in Johnson's letter.

Rabin, in the Phantom negotiations, reaffirmed Israel's assurance "not to be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the area." But it became clear in Warnke's discussion with him that the Israelis feel they could develop a nuclear device but would feel correct in claiming they had not "introduced" it so long as they had neither tested it nor made its existence public. Needless to say, that view leaves a lot to be desired from our viewpoint.

Walt

350. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State/1/

Moscow, December 17, 1968, 1310Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Priority; Exdis.

6853. 1. Jarring said he assumed the UN Secretariat has informed Department of his reports of his recent round of consultations. He did give me in writing the following excerpt from the paper the Israelis had given him for Jordan which he said contained the gist of the document: "Having accepted Resolution 242 for the establishment of a just and lasting peace, we are ready to enter into discussions with Jordan under your auspices in an effort to achieve mutual agreement on ways to implement it. The resolution, being not self-executing, should be subject for discussion and agreement between the parties. This is a legitimate and affirmative formulation, fully consistent with international law and national rights. The essence of our position is that only things that are agreed can be implemented. This is the purpose and intention of Chapter 6 of the Charter as well as of the resolution itself as expressed in paragraph 3, para. on the boundary question. Israel's position is that within the framework of peace, the cease-fire lines will be replaced by agreed, secure and recognized boundaries and the adequate disposition of forces will be carried out in full accordance with what is agreed between the parties. These boundary and security questions are open for negotiation in the context of a transition to a permanent peace which should have treaty form."

2. Jarring said the Arabs at first read the word "replaced" to mean that Israelis would keep all territory they now hold. He assured them this not the case which Israelis confirmed to him. He did not think the document had advanced matters at all.

3. He also said that the exchanges through him between UAR and Israel while very long had in effect merely said the same old things.

4. On Secretary's seven points Riad told Jarring that the leak in Paris had been unfortunate and had forced him to make his own position clear. Riad said he would reply in writing as requested but pointed out that in written document he would have to be more careful than he could be in an oral discussion. He cited Sharm el Shaikh as an example saying his reply would have to say that UAR could not accept a UN force there for an unlimited time. He would also demand similar arrangement for El Auja. In conversation with Jarring, however, Riad indicated that a fixed period of time for UN occupation of Sharm el Shaikh could be acceptable and under Jarring's prodding indicated this might be for as long as 15 years. For the present I gathered he was not willing that the Israelis be informed of this.

5. Jarring thinks both Arabs and Israel will wait advent of new American administration before making any further moves. He thought Governor Scranton's visit had been very useful.

6. Jarring was impressed with Sapir who he thought saw the problem realistically. Jarring is worried about the escalation between Israel and Jordan and the Israeli policy of four eyes for one.

7. Jarring met yesterday with Semenov and Kuznetsov who were interested in his report but appeared disinclined to discuss matters of substance. Jarring continues to think however that Soviets desire a solution and are pressing the Arabs.

8. Jarring did not think Soviets and Israelis were likely to reestablish relations soon. He said Israelis had repeatedly warned him that if he put forward his own plan his mission was finished. Jarring is thinking of sending a cable to the parties about January 10 proposing further talks but has not yet decided on where he would propose they be held.

9. My impression is that Jarring realizes patience is required and will give it another good try but will not go on indefinitely if no progress is made.

Thompson

351. Telegram From the Department of State to the U.S. Interests Section of the Spanish Embassy in the United Arab Republic/1/

Washington, December 17, 1968, 2204Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL UAR-US. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Drafted by Parker, cleared by Ambassador Leonhart in S/NL, and approved by Davies.

288486. Ref: Cairo's 4135./2/

/2/In telegram 4135 from Cairo, December 14, Bergus noted that President-elect Nixon indicated that he was prepared to receive the Amir of Kuwait and Israeli Defense Minister Dayan prior to the inauguration. This was contrary to the earlier position taken by Nixon that he would receive no foreign dignitaries before the inauguration. Bergus suggested that Nixon should express a willingness to receive an emissary of the UAR as well. (Ibid.)

1. FYI. President-elect's decision receive Amir of Kuwait and General Dayan was temporary suspension of rules. All previous requests for meetings were turned down, including Iranian request that Mr. Nixon receive Prime Minister Hoveyda. Exception was made in case of Amir and Dayan for various reasons, but we are informed that rule has now been re-imposed and there will be no further exceptions. If Egyptians wish to follow up Governor Scranton's recommendation that Nasser go ahead with his plans to send letter to Mr. Nixon, and if they wish to send it with an emissary, we believe Mr. Nixon would be glad to delegate appropriate representative to receive him. Simplest solution, of course, would be to have letter delivered by Ghorbal. End FYI.

2. You authorized tell Khouly that while exception was made for Amir of Kuwait and Dayan, firm policy of President-elect is not to receive any foreign representatives prior to his inauguration. If, as we understand from various sources, President Nasser wishes send special emissary carrying personal message to Mr. Nixon, latter would be prepared designate appropriate personal representative to receive him.

3. You may tell Heikal we regret he has erroneous impression we seeking humiliate him. No personal slight intended.

Rusk

352. Action Memorandum From Harold Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson/1/

Washington, December 18, 1968.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Desalting Projects, Vol. II. Confidential; Exdis. Saunders sent this memorandum to the President under a December 18 covering memorandum in which he indicated that Walt Rostow had asked him to forward it to the President in his absence. (Ibid.) The President wrote the following instruction to Jim Jones on the covering memorandum: "Hold until I'm back & Walt returns." On December 23 Jones sent the memorandum to Rostow with the suggestion that Rostow take it up with the President after luncheon on December 24. (Ibid.)

SUBJECT
George Woods' Proposal on Israeli Desalting

In short, George proposes (Tab A)/2/ that we stop thinking for the moment in terms of a large 100-150 million-gallon-per-day (MGD) desalter and concentrate on a 40 MGD plant. He fully shares your goal of becoming able over the next 10-15 years to desalt seawater on a large scale, and he believes we should push ahead with this plant "as a matter of priority." He has two main reasons for recommending a smaller plant than we initially considered:

/2/Document 319.

1. He believes that the next logical step in developing the technology of large-scale desalting would be to build a 40 MGD plant. This would be enough larger (more than 5 times) than present plants to provide an important test of new technology at reasonable cost (about $58 million). We would gain almost as much in technological knowledge as we would from the $100 million plus that would be needed at a minimum from us to help build the $250 million larger plant.

2. Taking this smaller bite, he feels, is the only way to cut through the highly emotional argument we've had for several years between the crusaders and those who don't believe the time is ripe yet for a $100-250 million leap of faith. Everyone--except possibly AEC--believes this has been George's main contribution.

To simplify our financial problem, George believes we should concentrate on desalting and get away from the idea of financing an Israeli electric power plant as part of a dual purpose water and power plant. The Israelis will be building new power plants right along to meet increasing demand for electricity. He doesn't see why they shouldn't provide the steam from one of these power plants as part of their contribution while we concentrate on the desalter to turn that steam into water.

Therefore, George proposes we take the necessary steps to get Congressional authorization for Interior to spend up to $40 million on this plant. In addition to the steam from the power plant, Israel would provide $18 million using a loan from the World Bank or some other such loan agency. While the cost of water would still be very high, George believes the total Israeli contribution would not exceed the actual value of the water to Israel. Since the power plant would cost around $20 million, this would add up roughly to a 50-50 split between us.

Walt asked Secretary Rusk to pull together the views of State, AID, Interior and AEC on George's proposal (Tab B)./3/ With some variations, I think it is fair to say that each of them but AEC would go along with George's general proposal that we try to move ahead with a smaller plant and that you put it in your legislative program.

/3/The reactions of the Departments of State and Interior, AID, and the AEC were summarized by Benjamin Read in a November 29 memorandum to Walt Rostow, attached at Tab B.

AEC has no objection to going as far as George proposes but objects (especially Jim Ramey) strenuously to:

--George's strong words about "abandoning" or "holding in abeyance" the plan for a big dual purpose plant. They believe it is important to preserve the idea that this is just the first step toward a later expansion into a larger plant. Secretary Udall goes along with presenting this to the Congress as Phase I of a larger project, but he would say that Israel must fund later expansion by itself. George says he didn't mean to close any doors--just to re-focus for a moment.

--George's unwillingness to insist that the plant use nuclear fuel. His investigations persuade him that there's no economic advantage to nuclear over fossil fuel and that, if we ask the Israelis to provide the steam-producing plant, the choice of fuel ought to be theirs. AEC believes we have a strong interest in nuclear desalting. AEC further feels we should keep our strings on that Israeli decision to be sure they buy US nuclear equipment with safeguards. AEC believes it could justify a contribution of $10-15 million to the power (not desalting) plant if it were nuclear, and if our own California plant doesn't go ahead. Secretary Udall believes we should leave the choice of fuel open. (The Israelis, like the rest of us, would like to leave the choice of fuel open until they can decide what is most economical.)

--George's judgment that it's "not possible at this time to obtain financing in the amount [$244 million]/4/ on the terms which would be necessary." AEC feels there would be "extensive Congressional support" for a big nuclear desalting plant because of the sympathetic attitude of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy which would review the proposal along with the two Interior Committees. George's proposal for an Interior contribution would only go before the two Interior Committees which would be less cordial.

/4/Brackets in the source text.

On this last point, Secretary Udall thinks the Senate Interior Committee would be receptive but is less sure about the House. However, he points out that the FY 1970 expenditure would be only $5 million and remaining costs would be spread over five years. Only about $1 million of the FY 1970 figure would be needed for Israeli planning. The rest would go for testing some promising new technology which should go into the Israeli plant. Interior should proceed with this testing in any case, and that would cost about $4 million. AID feels Congress might see even $40 million as "just another aid spigot" and thinks Israel should foot even more of the bill than George recommends. State recommends that we pick up about $30 million of the $40 million, leaving the rest to Israel.

In searching for a reasonable compromise, I would stand with George in saying that the fuel is an Israeli decision, but I would be a little less emphatic in "abandoning" the goal of a larger plant. I don't believe we are ready to commit ourselves yet, but I don't see why we shouldn't be quite honest in saying we're neither opening nor closing that door at this stage.

We asked both Don Hornig and Charlie Zwick to look at this package:

--Don feels that desalting technology has reached a stage where it's time to test a prototype of a large plant. He believes the 40 MGD size George proposes is reasonable. Given the apparently indefinite delay in building the large plant in California, he thinks it's sensible to try the experiment in Israel. He accepts George's recommendation that we concentrate on the desalter and let Israel provide the power plant to produce the necessary steam. He does not believe we should commit ourselves to future expansion of the Israeli project.

--Charlie suggests that you let this decision ride. He questions the need to spend tight resources on a large experimental plant where the economic benefits are uncertain, especially when we are straining to keep your budget down. If a large desalting demonstration is to be undertaken, he would prefer that it be done in the US where technological access to the plant is assured over time. He specifically questions the Israeli site in view of the risk of building and operating the plant in a war zone. He feels that AEC funds should not be used to put AEC in the "foreign aid" business on the scale contemplated by AEC.

For these reasons, Charlie feels that if we go ahead with the Israeli project the contribution be limited to $30 million, and like foreign aid, we should require that procurement, construction, and operation contracts be limited to US sources. Charlie agrees with Don that we should not commit ourselves to future expansion of the Israeli project. Charlie also agrees with Woods that we would get as much technology out of the 40 MGD plant as out of the big dual-purpose-plant-and at substantially less cost.

Yesterday, I had a visit from Yaacov Herzog--Eshkol's chief assistant whom you met at the Ranch--and General Ben Artzi--George Woods' Israeli counterpart. George has shared his thinking with them informally to see whether he was being realistic. Yesterday, Herzog gave me the following message for you in Eshkol's name: Eshkol deeply appreciates your continued attention to this project, even in the closing days of your Administration. He thinks Woods' proposal is quite reasonable, and he would be prepared to discuss details of how to proceed. Herzog felt it would be helpful if you were to include this in your legislative program.

The issues are:

1. Whether you wish to put George's proposal in your legislative program. The advantage in doing so would be to put yourself on record with a proposal for a feasible next step (a) in desalting and (b) in a program which you launched with Israel in 1964. The disadvantage is that the Congress may well disregard this proposal, leaving it in worse shape than if it had been left to a riper time. I personally feel that, after four years of pushing this, we should have a concrete proposal from President Johnson on the record.

Put it in the program/5/
No
Call me

/5/The first option under each of the three issues is checked. A marginal note in Rostow's hand reads: "approved by the President 24 Dec. 1968" On December 30 Rostow sent a memorandum to Rusk summarizing the President's decisions and asking Rusk to provide a recommendation on the organization best suited to coordinate and manage the project. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Desalting Projects, Vol. II)

2. Whether, if you put it in your program, you would seek authorization for a US contribution of the full $40 million George suggests or press the Israelis to pay even part of the desalting research costs and go for only $30 million. In either case, only about $5 million would need to be appropriated in FY 1970. The argument for the full $40 million is that Israel would build the entire power plant (roughly $20 million plus more than $1.5 million yearly for fuel) and assume the $18 million loan in addition as its fair contribution. This would be about a 50-50 split between us. The argument for $30 million is that Israel too will profit in future plants from the results of the research and should contribute to the desalter too.

$40 million
$30 million
Call me

3. Whether, if you go ahead, you make clear that nuclear fuel must be used. The only people pushing for this are the AEC. George and the rest of us think it makes sense just to leave the door open. Ben Artzi yesterday said he'd like the door left open until they can make studies to determine the most economical approach.

Leave door open on fuel
Nuclear
Call me

My own feeling is that, uncertain as our judgments are, we should go ahead with a plant like this soon. However, I recognize that there are still political questions to be considered and that we would probably not wish to begin construction if another war seemed likely. But these are questions for the next Administration. The main issue is whether you wish to propose this first step now or leave the issue entirely to the next team.

Hal

353. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State/1/

Amman, December 19, 1968, 1415Z.

/1/Source: National Records and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 ARAB-ISR/SANDSTORM. Secret; Nodis; Sandstorm.

7992. Subject: Next Steps In Moving Toward Arab-Israel Settlement.

Summary: The following report gives our views of the current situation and recommends tactics in the next stages. End summary.

1. Here in Amman we have a definite feeling of having arrived at an impasse in efforts to reach an Arab-Israel settlement. We have reported the gloomy attitudes of senior Jordanians caused by the hiatus in Jarring's activities and their increasing stress on the need for building up a stronger defensive military posture in order to deal effectively with Israel. Several of my diplomatic colleagues with good connections to the Palace and Prime Ministry share my own observations of the current purposeless drift in Jordanian policy--with its overtones of pessimism. The piece of paper handed to Governor Scranton by King Hussein (Amman 7822)/2/ graphically summarized Hussein's own conclusion that Jordanian contacts with Israel, both direct and indirect, have failed to produce progress towards a peaceful settlement. The King emphasized he could do no more. In effect, the Jordanians are now leaving the initiative to others.

/2/See footnote 2, Document 344.

2. My own reading of the present situation is that the Jordanians (with strong behind-the-scenes support from the UAR and other Arabs) are also clearly putting a challenge to the US, and particularly to the new administration. In many ways it is an unrealistic challenge and their expectations for policy changes and new initiatives certainly exceed the possibilities. Nevertheless, the seeming impasse coupled with this Arab challenge and expectation require us in our own interest to develop revised tactics.

3. Aside from the fact that our present tactics are not producing progress, there are other reasons suggesting a change:

A. Time is running out. In many respects, not just psychologically, we are farther removed from a settlement now than a year ago, in the first flush of enthusiasm for the Jarring Mission.

B. Judged realistically, we are not going to get a nice tidy settlement that will provide perfect security and all of the usual trappings of international intercourse for Israel. After the wave of realism following June 1967 conflict, the Arabs in recent months have become less, rather than more, willing to compromise on the acceptance of Israel as a state with which they will entertain normal international relations. (In many ways the Arabs do not have normal diplomatic relations with each other.) I share the opinion of Amb Barbour, as conveyed to FonMin Eban (Tel Aviv 6153),/3/ that there is no possibility in the first instance of full peace and diplomatic relations between Israel and the Arabs. In fact, while we have waited and watched Jarring wrestle with this problem, we may have missed opportunities to settle for less perfect arrangements.

/3/Document 326.

C. As seen from Amman, the Israeli Govt's continuing inability to develop a consensus not only makes it unlikely Jarring can succeed but is the major stumbling block in the path of a breakthrough in the purely Jordanian-Israeli context of a settlement. More and more Israeli spokesmen seem to define Israeli security concerns in terms of acquisition of territory. The Israelis seem unable to grasp that the Allon plan and its variations are not only unacceptable to Jordan but that it also represents the kind of arrangement that would perpetuate hostility. Similar arrangements elsewhere during the twentieth century have demonstrated they are more likely to breed subsequent trouble and irredentism than to guarantee security.

D. The Israeli "clarification process" with Jordan thus has been singularly unrealistic, unspecific, and unproductive. I have been baffled (and indeed suspicious) all along about what the Israelis have told us but have assumed it was because I was not privy to closely held details. Yet, if we are to take Hussein's comments to Gov Scranton seriously, then I think we must conclude that even if the Israelis have not just been pulling wool over our eyes, they have definitely moved too slowly and have failed to come to grips with the realities as far as Jordan is concerned.

E. Our assurances to Hussein (Amman 7548)/4/ seem embarrassingly explicit when, together with the principles of the Nov 22 resolution, they are put up against the position Eban outlined to Jarring early this month (Tel Aviv 6401)./5/ More ominously, however, the comments of Rafael (State 280109)/6/ indicate that Israel still has expectations that Jordan could agree to more substantial concessions on the West Bank and in Jerusalem than we have predicted. These expectations are unrealistic. Even in the unlikely event that Hussein did agree to such Israeli territorial demands, however, I question whether from our standpoint such an arrangement could constitute a lasting peace. Our assurances to Jordan and Jordan's own internal situation place very decided constraints on the bargaining situation. At the least, Hussein sees our assurances as his final, fallback position. We must accept this fact ourselves and continue to make it clear to the Israelis.

/4/Document 328.

/5/Eban met with Jarring in Nicosia on December 2 and told him that specific territorial proposals as a basis for an agreement between Israel and Jordan had been put to high-level Jordanian officials. Eban outlined the Israeli proposals, which closely paralleled the Allon plan. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 ARAB-ISR/SANDSTORM)

/6/Not found.

F. I finally come back to the point that in stressing that "the parties to the conflict must be the parties to the peace," we may have sometimes been bemused into forgetting that we are a very interested party, with high stakes of our own. The past year has demonstrated that if we leave this peacemaking process to the Israelis and the Arabs, there is going to be virtually no forward movement.

G. Unless we capitalize on the existing possibilities in the parties' stated attitudes towards the Nov 22 resolution, we may well drift further into the situation that Hussein foresees: an increase in incidents, tensions, and extremism (which Hussein was careful to explain would occur "on both sides"). Unfortunately, the fact that this tragedy has already played to a full house for twenty-one years does not mean it may not have an even longer run.

4. In proposing revised US tactics, I am not suggesting US intervention in the meaningless or negative sense often advocated by the Arabs (e.g., economic pressure on Israel). Another consideration is that Jarring might be finished with the Israelis if he put forth his own plans. This constitutes an added reason for us to move ahead in a more enterprising fashion--to communicate a muscular sense of urgency--but in a manner that would not undercut Jarring. This can be done as outlined below:

A. During the past year we have not talked substance enough with the parties on a regular and continuing basis. We perhaps have been overly cautious about giving any impression of undercutting the Jarring Mission. At sporadic intervals in New York or Washington we have gotten down to the heart issues, as in the Secretary's Nov 2 meeting with Riad. But there has been virtually no movement in the interims. Amb Barbour's question whether to pass certain Israeli comments to the Jordanians (para 5 of Tel Aviv 6404)/7/ suggests a need to decide whether the Ambassadors on the spot should become more actively involved in an exercise from which we heretofore have been relatively detached. I believe as far as Jordan is concerned we have missed several strategic opportunities for more intensive, substantive probing and that these need not have endangered Jarring's mission. Given the organization and conduct of the Jordan regime, inevitably we must deal with Hussein and one or two close advisers if we are to get anything done at all. I personally would like to discuss with Hussein, for example, whether he could seriously entertain the idea of Israeli security enclaves or security corridors on the West Bank, and where, and for how long. I would recommend ascertaining whether Hussein could accept some kind of phased withdrawal by which Israeli military enclaves, perhaps under UN aegis, might remain on the West Bank temporarily while a regime of peace and security was being established. Similarly, I think we need to elicit Hussein's views regarding the Israeli concept of "open borders" and "free access" to the Mediterranean. We stand to lose more time and opportunities if we leave entirely to the Israelis the probing of the Jordanian position (particularly in the light of the exercise of the last several months which Hussein categorically says has failed).

/7/The telegram citation is incorrect. The correct citation has not been further identified.

B. I also recommend that we undertake more intensive discussions with the parties on the outlines of a pragmatic and honorable solution to the Jerusalem problem. This is a key. I think we should aim at a solution which, at a minimum, removes from unilateral Israeli jurisdiction the Arab inhabitants of Jerusalem.

C. I do not know whether there is a Washington task force on the Arab-Israel problem in being, but it seems to me the proposed shift in our policy and tactics would require a tightly controlled group in Washington to work full time on this problem in the same manner as has been done for Viet-Nam or Berlin. The mere formation of a task force would have substantive impact of some dimension.

D. Finally, I recommend that consideration be given to publishing or "leaking" specific and detailed USG views on what we would consider would be a fair and reasonable implementation of the Nov 22 resolution. I would see the objective of this frankly to put public pressure on the more stubborn of the three parties--the UAR and Israel.

5. Dept please pass Tel Aviv./8/

/8/A note on the telegram indicates that it was not passed to Tel Aviv.

Symmes