Washington, November 4, 1968, 1902Z.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt W. Rostow, Vol. 103, 11/1-4/68. Secret.

CAP 82679. Herewith Eban's meeting yesterday with Secretary Rusk.

1. In mtg with Secretary Nov 3, Eban said Government of Israel defining its position on territorial question vis-a-vis UAR in "functional" rather than geographical terms. GOI position would be governed by security including shipping through Straits of Tiran. While dealing through Jarring with UAR in tactical phase, Israel would make clear expansion not its purpose and that troops would be disposed according to secure and recognized boundaries and security arrangements.

2. Eban said substantive position Israel would take if UAR willing to talk peace. He wanted US and US alone to know re Sinai, it all comes back strongly and sharply to Sharm el-Sheikh, the focal point of two wars. Israel could not accept something which might mean Israel would once again have to send men out to open Straits. Israel would want arrangement enabling Israel to be in Sharm el-Sheikh in order to protect Israeli shipping, with direct communication between Eilat and Sharm el-Sheikh. Rabin added: "Direct land communication." Eban said he had not discussed this in juridical terms; control of territory without sovereignty had been factor in Japan-USSR and Japan-US agreements and in Cyprus settlement. Eban said especially if UAR asked for enclave positions for one reason for another, Israel would want to be there and in direct land communication with Eilat.

3. Eban said what UAR might propose would be another matter, but Israel would not want to prejudice matters before negotiations begin. Therefore, Israel will give functional not territorial definition. Israel does not think UAR has right to stop Israel from asking for this; they can say no and then talk. This all Eban could say on Sinai. It was functional statement relating to security and navigation (in Tiran), but functional requirements could have territorial implications. Eban said UAR doesn't raise question of Gaza, but he thinks they understand they not coming back to Gaza.

4. Secretary said he thought what Eban outlined on Sinai non-starter. Alternative was in direction of improved international arrangements which were workable. Eban said UAR hadn't suggested that or anything else. Israel's experience with UN and any arrangement with veto unsatisfactory. Secretary said it important that there not be veto. He could understand Israeli dissatisfaction with arrangements to date, but Israeli presence would be point of infection such that there would be tension thereafter and hard to see how there could be peace. Wiggins said international presence would have to be such as to be terminated only by action of Security Council. Eban said he didn't see if local sovereignty said international presence should terminate what country, including US, would stand against it. Secy referred to arrangements in Panama Canal and Okinawa where local sovereignty modified. Eban and Rabin said Israel ready to have such treaties.

5. Eban said no point in going into this in detail now since not in negotiating situation. It necessary to hear what UAR would propose. Secy reiterated that as far as US attitude concerned, he had to put in reservation about Sharm el-Sheikh idea: US does not feel it could support that under present circumstances.

6. Israelis asked that foregoing be very tightly held.

304. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State/1/

Amman, November 4, 1968, 0720Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 23-8 JORDAN. Confidential; Flash. Also sent to Tel Aviv and repeated to Beirut, London, Cairo, USUN, and CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA.

7323. Subject: King's request. Sitrep No. 5.

1. King Hussein telephoned Emb officer who at home owing curfew to state following: (a) he is trying hard to "clean up the mess";/2/ (b) requested that US promptly inform Israelis that Fedayeen organizations may try diversionary moves by causing incidents on ceasefire line; advise Israelis be patient because he, Hussein, cannot have too many things on his plate at this critical time. (c) King also urged that all parties move forward as promptly as possible today in New York to secure Israeli acceptance of Nov resolution.

/2/The domestic crisis began on November 2 when a crowd of demonstrators attacked the U.S. Embassy in Amman on the anniversary of the signing of the Balfour Declaration. A number of windows in the Embassy were broken, one vehicle was damaged, and the U.S. flag was torn down. Police and security units dispersed the crowd. (Telegram 7315 from Amman, November 2; ibid.) On November 3 the Jordanian Army arrested 70 members of the Tahir Dadlan Fedayeen group and held them responsible for instigating the attack on the Embassy. (Telegram 7321 from Amman, November 4; ibid.) Heavy fighting between Fedayeen units and the Jordanian Army broke out following the arrests. (Telegram 7322 from Amman, November 4; ibid.) The Embassy reported that, in addition to the arrests, the government informed al-Fatah leaders that no uniformed Fedayeen would be permitted in Jordanian towns, that all Fedayeen organizations would be interdicted from firing across cease-fire lines, and that any infiltration operations into Israel or occupied territory would have to be coordinated with the Jordanian Army. (Telegram 7328 from Amman, November 4; ibid.) On the afternoon of November 4 the Embassy reported that most Fatah leaders and PLO leader Yasir Arafat were cooperating with the army in an attempt to defuse the situation. (Telegram 7333 from Amman, November 4; ibid.)

2. Fact that King personally made these requests can of course be cited.

Symmes

305. Information Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, November 4, 1968, 5 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Walt W. Rostow, Arab-Israeli Private Talks. Literally Eyes Only.

Mr. President:

Herewith an account of latest secret Israeli-Jordan exchange:/2/

/2/[text not declassified] (Ibid.)

--top level meeting postponed until Nov. 19;

--strong Jordanian arguments for simple Israeli acceptance of November Resolution/3/--which they should do.

/3/King Hussein asked that President Johnson be informed that he was doing everything he could to bring about peace. He felt that Israel's public acceptance of Resolution 242 was critical to the peace process, and he asked that President Johnson use whatever influence he had to get Israeli Foreign Minister Eban to convey Israel's acceptance of the resolution to Jarring during the current discussions at the United Nations. (Ibid.)

I do believe it is not impossible we can move the Middle East around the corner in the weeks ahead--if we try very hard.

Walt

306. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Washington, November 4, 1968, 2-2:45 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. X, Cables and Memos, 6/68-11/68. Top Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Murray and approved by Warnke. The meeting was held in Warnke's office at the Pentagon.

SUBJECT
Negotiations with Israel-F-4 and Advanced Weapons

PARTICIPANTS

Israeli Side
Ambassador of Israel, Lieutenant General Yitzhak Rabin
Minister Shlomo Argov, Israeli Embassy
Brigadier General Hod, Commander, Israeli Defense Force Air Force
Brigadier General David Carmon, Defense and Armed Forced Attache
Mr. J. Shapiro, Director, Ministry of Defense Mission, New York

United States Side
Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), Paul C. Warnke
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), Harry H. Schwartz
Deputy Director, NESA Region (ISA), Robert J. Murray

Ambassador Rabin opened the conversation by referring to his meeting on 30 October with Ambassador Hart, in which Hart had asked Rabin to write a proposed Memorandum of Understanding incorporating the provisions Israel considered necessary to the F-4 sale. This was written and delivered to Ambassador Hart./2/ "We put in it what we thought was necessary, following the precedent of the prior agreement (A-4 aircraft)." Last Friday, 1 November, Rabin said he received a call from Department of State to the effect that "in principle, the answer is yes" with regard to Israel's request for F-4s and that he was to get in touch with Mr. Warnke. Ambassador Rabin said that today he would like to get agreement on how we proceed but not go into details.

/2/See footnote 2, Document 298.

Mr. Warnke said that he would like at the outset to set forth the United States' position. The President agrees in principle to the sale. It is a difficult decision, not because we are not interested in Israel's security, but precisely because we are interested. Heretofore, we have avoided becoming the principal arms supplier to Israel. Wherever possible we have urged that Israel acquire its arms from other Western countries. We felt that this was to our mutual benefit for it lessened the risk of US-USSR confrontation in the Middle East and therefore lessened the dangers to the security of the United States and Israel. We would prefer to continue that policy; however, the Europeans apparently have opted out, and the French particularly seem reluctant to supply the Mirage aircraft Israel has purchased.

Mr. Warnke stressed that with a decision to go ahead on the sale of F-4 aircraft we will have a different set of circumstances concerning our supply relationship to Israel. We will henceforth become the principal arms supplier to Israel, involving us even more intimately with Israel's security situation and involving more directly the security of the United States.

Mr. Warnke reminded Ambassador Rabin that Secretary Rusk had talked with Foreign Minister Eban about the problems and the dangers of strategic missiles and nuclear weapons. Mr. Warnke referred specifically to the paragraph in the standard sales contract which permitted cancellation "under unusual and compelling circumstances"; he suggested that Israeli acquisition of strategic missiles and nuclear weapons would comprise such circumstances. Mr. Warnke told Ambassador Rabin that because the security of the United States was clearly involved we must seek from the Government of Israel certain assurances:

(1) that Israel will not test or deploy strategic missiles,

(2) that Israel will not develop, manufacture, or otherwise acquire strategic missiles or nuclear weapons,

(3) that Israel will sign and ratify the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

At a subsequent point in the conversation, Mr. Warnke mentioned the inspection arrangement at Dimona as a precedent that might be required here.

Mr. Warnke noted that we had not sought such specific assurances in our prior agreements because, based on the information we had at that time, these developments were not imminent. Our present information, however, indicates that Israel is on the verge of nuclear weapons and missiles capability. This development would seriously and adversely affect the security interests of the United States; it involves the Soviet Union and risks a US-USSR confrontation; it dramatically changes the situation in the area.

(Ambassador Rabin did not dispute in any way our information on Israel's nuclear or missile capability, nor did he comment directly on the assurances we requested. He did not seem particularly surprised or upset at Mr. Warnke's presentation. He referred to the fact that the Israeli position on the question of Israeli nuclear and missile programs had been conveyed to Ambassador Barbour.)

Ambassador Rabin observed that this question (of missiles and nuclear weapons) had been raised two weeks ago, and that an answer was given by the Israeli Government to the United States Embassy in Israel. "I don't have anything to add to my Government's position." Rabin said he was asked to draft a Memorandum of Understanding which he had done and which we have. Rabin said that "if you wish to suggest changes or additions to that memorandum you of course may do so." Rabin remarked that, when he saw Secretary Rusk on Sunday, the Secretary said that the American acceptance in principle "did not mean that we accept your draft Memorandum of Understanding."

Commenting more generally, Ambassador Rabin said that Israel did not come to the United States for military equipment when it could go elsewhere; with other governments Israel did not have the problem of "conditions" that it has with the United States. In any case, we do not see, said Rabin, that your selling us 50 Phantoms changes things appreciably.

Mr. Warnke said that it is not just 50 Phantoms, but 50 Phantoms plus 100 Skyhawks plus the great variety of other equipment that Israel is requesting that makes the policy we are entering upon a distinct change from our prior policy. Nevertheless, the United States is interested in doing what is necessary to assist Israel. Opinions vary on how best to do this but our goal is the same. It is for this reason that we are so concerned with Israel's missile and nuclear plans and intentions and this is why we need to "up-date" your assurances to us on these matters.

Mr. Warnke told Ambassador Rabin that we would prepare by tomorrow for his review a revised Memorandum of Understanding incorporating the kinds of assurances we require. Mr. Warnke asked if there were other questions that Ambassador Rabin would like to speak about today.

Ambassador Rabin said that he would like to call to our attention the current Israeli intelligence appreciation of the build-up of Soviet aircraft in Egypt and Syria. He said that the figures General Weizman had presented us in September 1967 had proven to be entirely too low. The inventories that Weizman had projected for those two countries by 1970 had in fact already been exceeded on 1 November 1968. The Ambassador undertook to provide details separately./3/ Rabin went on to say that a number of technical terms needed going into, for example, Israel would like a certain number--the more the better--of F-4s delivered in the first half of 1969 (he later put the number at 25 aircraft). He attributed the urgency to "what was happening on the other side." Rabin said that they would like credit arrangements if possible, preferably on the same terms as the first Skyhawk sale (10 per cent down, 3-1/2 per cent interest, 10 years repayment). Rabin said they would like the F-4E configuration generally, but wish to include in the 50 aircraft 6 RF-4Es. Ambassador Rabin and General Hod asked if they could begin discussions on the F-4E with the Air Force. Mr. Warnke said he would inform them when this was possible.

/3/Rabin subsequently provided a comparative chart of Arab air forces, under cover of a November 4 letter to Warnke. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Harold H. Saunders, Israel Arms, 10/1/68-1/20/69)

307. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State/1/

New York, November 5, 1968, 1650Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, Cairo, and Amman.

7571. Jarring Mission.

Summary: In meeting with Wiggins last night Jarring said he expects written Israeli reply today and in addition piece of paper for Jordan. Thought Israeli reply would not go far enough, said Arabs would continue to insist on Israeli statement of willingness to withdraw from "all" Arab territories; said Riad intended to reply very promptly; thought Riad and Rifai both then likely to return home for consultations, would not break talks off but was doubtful if they would come back; feared protracted period of diplomatic stalemate (several months) would result during which military engagements likely to increase in area; said new factor of Syrian participation in settlement had been introduced (presumably by UAR); and expressed concern at greater rigidities in situation he had experienced with all parties yesterday. While expressing above views he also indicated he did not believe situation had come to an end, and gave no indication he intended to throw in towel himself. Jarring listened carefully but made no commitments to our suggestions (a) that key effort now was to assure UAR reply contained some substantive comments on UAR position, and (b) that he might consider putting forward questions to parties himself, possibly with suggested answers, as next round of negotiating process if this one comes to an end. Did say he would speak to Sovs again today (with view to their help in keeping Fon Mins here if possible and in encouraging constructive UAR response).

1. Jarring asked to see Wiggins yesterday afternoon after talking to Eban, Riad and Rifai because things were "not very good." Arrangements made to meet late last night after respective dinners. Sisco and Pedersen accompanied Wiggins.

2. Jarring had talked to all three Fon Mins yesterday and was concerned with rigidities he had detected and probability early departure Arab Fon Mins accompanied by extended diplomatic stalemate and danger increasing military incidents in area.

3. He said his conversation with Eban had been cordial, and he believed Eban was doing his best. Eban had promised written reply today/2/ and also to deliver paper for Jordan as well. Nevertheless, Jarring knew Israeli reply would not be satisfactory to Arabs. Eban had not talked of "functional" approach to Jarring but had said Israel would express its interests in Sinai as being security and "guarantees" of freedom of navigation in Straits. He had left it to Jarring to "guess" what guarantee they might require, which he did not intend to do. From conversation with Riad he was clear UAR would oppose any "guarantees," while saying UAR would be willing to commit itself to freedom of navigation. Eban had also spoken of connection between withdrawal and secure and recognized boundaries. When queried whether Eban had used word "withdrawal" Jarring said yes, but when he had told Tekoah at elevators they must use it in written reply, Tekoah said they would have to speak of "disposition of forces." At our urging Jarring said he would make another effort on this directly with Eban. Jarring said Arabs had clearly shifted emphasis from implementation to withdrawal, and from "all" Arab territories. He felt though that they might accept Israeli statement of willingness to withdraw "in principle."

/2/The text of the Israeli paper handed to Jarring on November 5 was transmitted to the Department in telegram 7582 from USUN, November 5. The Israeli position outlined in the paper was in essence as presented by Eban to Rusk on November 3; see Document 302.

4. Jarring said Rifai was particularly discouraged and in a difficult situation. He did not want to return to Amman to have to make a public report of no progress. On other hand he had been sitting here with little to do. If Riad returned Rifai would be in even more difficult situation. Jarring thought he could then stay here only if King told him to do so.

5. Jarring said he had urged Riad to hold any reply to Israeli note until after his consultations in Cairo (in context Riad insistence on returning) with hope this would produce more considered reply. Riad made clear he would reply to Israeli note promptly and before he returned./3/

/3/On November 6 Wiggins, Sisco, Buffum, and Pedersen met with Foreign Minister Riad to urge that the UAR view the Israeli paper in the most positive light and respond accordingly. They pointed to the specific Israeli reference to withdrawal to secure and recognized boundaries and also noted the Israeli emphasis upon security as the governing principle relating to the question of withdrawal. Riad was inclined to dismiss the Israeli paper as another "Israeli maneuver," but agreed to consider returning a substantive reply. Riad indicated that he was planning to return to Cairo on November 7, but that did not mean that the UAR was breaking off the talks in New York. He said that the UAR wanted the Jarring Mission to continue and would cooperate with Jarring to that end. (Telegram 7604 from USUN, November 6; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR) A UAR paper, addressed to Jarring and handed to him on November 7, indicated that the UAR found nothing in the Israeli paper to move the search for a peace settlement forward. The UAR took the position that Israel still refused to implement Resolution 242 and was actively attempting to integrate captured Arab territory into Israel. Until Israel was prepared to withdraw from all captured Arab territory, the UAR did not see that peace was possible. The text of the paper was transmitted to the Department in telegram 7628 from USUN, November 7. (Ibid.)

6. Jarring also said it was clear in last few days that Syria again being brought into picture by Arabs as part of settlement. He did not speculate why but obviously regarded this as complicating factor.

7. Again expressed view Israeli Govt would not give him any details on their boundary ideas, though as victors it should be their obligation to make first move on this, because of Cabinet divisions and because any statement on UAR front would require shortly thereafter statement on Jordanian border.

8. Wiggins told Jarring we had been making major effort with Israelis. We did not know any more than he did about Israeli position at this point. We would have liked to see them more forthcoming on boundaries and on res. UAR military operation on Canal on 26th had been highly unfortunate complicating factor which had interfered with Cabinet discussions and Eban's effort to get more negotiating room. Sisco added that Arabs should of course understand that Israel would not put forward its final position at outset. Jarring replied that Arabs accepted that US was making serious effort with Israelis and felt this was change from earlier US attitude. Question was whether results would be enough.

9. Pedersen commented that we now seemed to be faced with situation where whatever influences could be used on Israeli reply had been expended. While Eban written document would not meet Arab views it was likely to go some distance beyond last document, and the two together would contain considerable amount of substantive statements of Israeli views. To keep issue moving it was now critical to influence UAR reply to include not just a new demand for Israeli views on withdrawal but as much substance as possible. Otherwise it would be most difficult to make any further progress in Israel. Suggested Rifai, who had been helpful to get final para in last UAR reply, might be helpful. Jarring indicated this was general intention behind his effort to get Riad not to reply right away. Said he expected Israeli reply to "accept" res along lines March 10 formula and to include something on implementation and agreement, with emphasis on latter. Still felt Arabs would insist on Israeli commitment to withdrawal.

10. Sisco raised question of next steps if current round of written exchanges came to end through deficiencies of Israeli reply and another unsatisfactory UAR reply like last one. For example, had Jarring thought about possibility posing questions himself to both UAR and Israel, possibly also with suggested answers. Key issue to Israel was nature of permanent peace; this might be put to UAR. Key issue to UAR was boundary and withdrawal; this might be put to Israel. Jarring said he had of course thought about this possibility a lot. In fact he had put number of questions in past but not formally. Indicated he would think about matter, though did not commit himself.

11. Wiggins asked whether Jarring had seen Sovs recently, indicating they might be helpful in encouraging Riad to remain in New York and/or responding constructively to Israeli paper. Jarring said he had not talked to them in last few days but agreed they might be helpful at this point and indicated he would ask to see Semenov.

12. At conclusion of meeting Wiggins expressed continued concern about critical nature of present situation and about Jarring's assessment of current state of mind on both sides. Jarring then assured Wiggins he had asked for early meeting in order to share his concern. Stressed he did not believe Riad would "break off" talks with him, but repeated his concern rather was that situation could go into protracted diplomatic stalemate for several months, which would be hard to break, and that consequences in area would be increased violence and military clashes. He felt, for instance, that UAR reaction to Israeli success in recent retaliation more likely to be to hit back itself than to make more determined effort for settlement. He did not refer at all to possibility he might himself throw sponge in.

Wiggins

308. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Washington, November 5, 1968, 2:10-2:40 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. X, Cables and Memos, 6/68-11/68. Top Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Murray and approved by Warnke. The meeting was held in Warnke's office. The memorandum is marked "Second Session."

SUBJECT
Negotiations with Israel--F-4 and Advanced Weapons

PARTICIPANTS

Israeli Side
Ambassador of Israel, Lieutenant General Yitzhak Rabin
Major General Hod, Commander, Israeli Defense Force Air Force
Brigadier General David Carmon, Defense and Armed Forces Attache
Mr. J. Shapiro, Director, Ministry of Defense Mission, New York

United States Side
Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), Paul C. Warnke
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), Harry H. Schwartz
Deputy Director, NESA Region (ISA), Robert J. Murray

Mr. Warnke told Ambassador Rabin that what he had done was to set out in a Memorandum of Agreement the points discussed yesterday./2/ Mr. Warnke then passed the memorandum to Ambassador Rabin to read.

/2/A copy of this undated draft is ibid.

Ambassador Rabin, having finished reading the memorandum said: "As I understand it you put three basic conditions to the sale of F-4s."

Mr. Warnke said that the word "understandings" would perhaps be more appropriate.

Ambassador Rabin said "I prefer to put it in my words: First, Israel will not test or deploy strategic missiles; second, we will not acquire strategic missiles or nuclear weapons; and third we would sign and ratify the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. You also ask to make inspections, making a fourth condition." Ambassador Rabin asked: "Is this the official United States position, that without these conditions we do not get Phantoms?"

Mr. Warnke: "That would be my recommendation." Ambassador Rabin said he was not in a position to give his Government's answer.

Mr. Warnke said we understood that. He would like to say that the words of the memorandum were his. It is the assurances we seek, not the form.

Ambassador Rabin restated that he could not give his Government's position, but that his reaction was: "I don't believe Israel is going to accept conditions within a Memorandum of Understanding about selling the Phantoms. We were told more than once that there would be no conditions--at least not these kinds of conditions." The Ambassador then added, haltingly: "It would be a pity--all these conditions on paper--just for 50 Phantoms."

Mr. Warnke said that he did not consider what was being discussed was "just 50 Phantom aircraft." He said that if we sold these 50 Phantom aircraft to Israel, our position would have changed markedly to one of the principal supplier of arms to Israel and he thought that the significance of this change is something that should be thought about very carefully by the Israeli Government as well as by our own. It is of great importance to Israel on the one hand and it is of significance to the United States on the other because it means that the security of the United States is more closely involved in the area. It is this larger matter which should be considered concurrently with the assurances for which we have asked.

Ambassador Rabin said that it would be possible to have discussions on each of the items. But he again said, as his personal reaction, that "to have these conditions just for selling of 50 Phantoms, I don't think it is right."

Mr. Warnke repeated that the Department of Defense would consider any other form which would give us similar assurances that Israel would care to propose. Ambassador Rabin asked for time to study the memorandum more carefully. He asked also whether, in the meantime, it would be possible for Major General Hod to talk with the U.S. Air Force.

Mr. Warnke said that he had spoken with Mr. Hoopes, Under Secretary of the Air Force, who agreed to arrange for a F-4E briefing for General Hod and would expect a call from Hod tomorrow.

Mr. Warnke said that we had drafted the Memorandum of Agreement so that Israel could see clearly the things that trouble us. Whether the assurances we receive are contained in separate documents or whether we come to separate understandings is, to our way of thinking, irrelevant. We feel we must know what missile and nuclear developments are going on in the Middle East. These vitally affect the national security interests of the United States. There has been a long and strong relationship between our two countries. We must have mutual trust and confidence. [8-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

Mr. Warnke said that he would be gone for the next several days, but if it was necessary to have further discussions in this period that the Ambassador should contact Mr. Nitze or Mr. Schwartz./3/

/3/Warnke sent a memorandum following this meeting to Secretary Clifford in which he described Rabin's reaction to their conversation as "disturbed." Warnke recommended that Clifford inform President Johnson and Secretary Rusk about the nature of his two exchanges with Rabin. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 73 A 1351, Chronology of F-4s for Israel, 10 Oct 68-5 Sept 69, Folder 1)

309. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Washington, November 8, 1968, 6:10-6:40 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. X, Cables and Memos, 6/68-11/68. Top Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Murray and approved by Warnke. The meeting was held in Warnke's office. The memorandum is marked "Third Session."

SUBJECT
Negotiations with Israel--F-4 and Advanced Weapons

PARTICIPANTS

Israeli Side
Ambassador of Israel, Lieutenant General Yitzhak Rabin
Minister Shlomo Argov, Israeli Embassy
Major General Hod, Commander, Israeli Defense Force Air Force
Brigadier General David Carmon, Defense and Armed Forces Attache

United States Side
Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), Paul C. Warnke
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), Harry H. Schwartz
Deputy Director, NESA Region (ISA), Robert J. Murray

Ambassador Rabin began the conversation by asking whether Mr. Warnke had changed his mind with respect to the assurances we had requested of the Israeli Government. Mr. Warnke replied in the negative.

Ambassador Rabin, saying his words might not be diplomatic, read from a prepared talking paper/2/ as follows:

/2/Rabin left a copy of his talking paper with Warnke. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 73 A 1351, Chronology of F-4s for Israel, 10 Oct 68-5 Sept 69, Folder 1)

"I wish to address myself first to Article 3 of your proposed Memorandum of Agreement. I am now in a position to confirm that my original personal reaction upon first reading this paragraph--namely, that it is completely unacceptable to us--is indeed my Government's official position. We have come here for the purpose of purchasing 50 Phantoms. We have not come here in order to mortgage the sovereignty of the State of Israel, not even for 50 Phantoms. Furthermore, I wish to state that we consider Article 3 to be in the nature of a very major condition precedent to the sale of aircraft and it is therefore not acceptable to us also as a matter of principle. My Government's position is that the matters raised in Article 3 are extraneous to the question before us, namely, the terms for the sale of 50 F-4 aircraft. These matters have been the subject of separate discussions between our two Governments. Most recently, 28 October 1968, we submitted through the U.S. Ambassador to Israel a comprehensive statement concerning these issues, the contents of which I can make available to you now.

"Accordingly, I should like to propose that Israel's assurances in connection with the theoretical question of the use of the planes for the delivery of nuclear weapons remains as submitted to you in our original proposal, namely, that the Government of Israel agrees not to use any aircrafts supplied by the U.S. as a nuclear weapons carrier. I am also authorized to reaffirm, in this connection, that it is Israel's long-standing policy not to be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the Middle East. Assurances to that effect can be incorporated into the agreement.

"May I also comment on the Preamble to Article 3 and state that the Government of Israel does not consider itself qualified to express an opinion on what constitutes an endangerment of the security interests of the U.S. This is the exclusive prerogative of the Government of the U.S. Similarly, with reference to subsection 2 of Article 2, the Government of Israel does not feel that it is qualified to comment on what is or is not a major tenet of U.S. policy. Again, this is the exclusive prerogative of the U.S. Government.

"This is my Government's position and the only basis on which we consider it possible to conduct negotiations for the purchase of military equipment--in this case, 50 Phantoms."

Ambassador Rabin, having finished reading from his prepared text, observed that paragraph 1 of the American draft Memorandum of Agreement is an exact wording of the 1965 Memorandum of Understanding,/3/ and therefore adds nothing new. He reiterated that Israel did not believe that they were qualified to comment or to make judgments concerning the points covered in Article 2. Ambassador Rabin also thought that Article 5 on secrecy was not even as favorable as the paragraph on secrecy in the A-4 Agreement, which he thought was "more mutual." Rabin said, however, that this was not a major point.

/3/For text of this memorandum of understanding, dated March 11, 1965, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XVIII, Document 185.

 (At this point, Ambassador Rabin passed to Mr. Warnke a copy of the Government of Israel's statement which had been given to Ambassador Barbour on 28 October 1968./4/ Mr. Warnke glanced at it, confirmed that we already had a copy, and returned it to Ambassador Rabin.)

/4/See footnote 2, Document 292.

Ambassador Rabin said that General Hod had met with the Air Force. General Hod said that, while he had one briefing, nothing more was being done, the Air Force was waiting for Mr. Hoopes. Mr. Schwartz explained that Mr. Hoopes had forwarded the Israeli requests to Mr. Warnke, but, because Mr. Warnke had just returned from Europe, he had not yet seen Mr. Hoopes' memorandum./5/

/5/Not found.

Ambassador Rabin said: "So there we are." Mr. Warnke said: "Yes, Mr. Ambassador. We have managed to isolate a major difference."

Mr. Warnke said he would like to take issue with two points raised by the Ambassador: first, that our request for assurances in connection with the sale of the F-4 aircraft is extraneous. What Israel does with strategic missiles and nuclear weapons affects the national security of the United States. "It is the national security of the United States that I am charged with protecting. By law I am required to consider the impact of the sale on the United States. You, from your vantage point, do not have to accept my judgments, but I am required to make them." Second, the assurances we have requested are not, and are not intended to be, an invasion of sovereignty. All international agreements impinge on absolute sovereignty. Our request is no different than other international agreements.

Mr. Warnke said that however these negotiations come out he has felt that this dialogue has been useful. "I have felt it was important to get across to you how we feel about Israel's acquisition of strategic missiles and nuclear weapons. As you know, there is a provision in our sales contract that permits cancellation of the contract by the United States for 'unusual and compelling circumstances.' To me, if Israel goes ahead with its missile and nuclear programs this would involve that paragraph; and while I can not speak for the next administration, I feel sure they will feel the same way too. Therefore, to a considerable extent, the arguments we are having about the wording of assurances are mere words and not substance. The substance remains the same."

Ambassador Rabin said: "I can understand you would like to have assurances about the way your hardware is going to be used--not as a nuclear weapons carrier." But in Article 3 you ask for all the rights to know and for us to give agreement for you to inspect in our country. We were very careful not to use the word "inspect" with respect to Dimona. We see in the two words quite a difference. The word "visit" means you are a guest in our country--not an inspector.

Mr. Warnke said: "I would be prepared to accept an amendment to our memorandum substituting 'visit' for inspection."

Ambassador Rabin said: "We have an agreement today."

Mr. Warnke said: "Yes, but that applies only to Dimona, not to the sites where missiles are being produced" (nervous laughter from Israelis).

Ambassador Rabin asked: "What do you call strategic missiles in the Arab-Israeli context?" Mr. Warnke replied: "Those capable of reaching the Arab capitals." Rabin agreed, saying: "At least we have the same definition." He also commented that the missiles "would not reach all the Arab capitals."

Mr. Warnke observed that the F-4 aircraft would be part of Israel's total defense environment; that they would be used, as the General well knew, to protect strategic missile sites as well as other possible targets. It is the totality of Israel's defense that we are involved in; it is not just a question of aircraft.

Ambassador Rabin said: "You are only selling arms. How do you feel you have the right to ask all these things?"

Mr. Warnke said: "I think I do. Otherwise I wouldn't bring it up."

Ambassador Rabin said: "We have promised not to carry nuclear weapons and that we would not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the Middle East."

Mr. Warnke replied: "We will think about what you have said and talk with Secretary Clifford and Secretary Nitze. I will talk with you again tomorrow."

310. Information Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, November 8, 1968, 11:10 a.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt W. Rostow, Vol. 104, 11/5-8/68. Secret.

Mr. President:

You will be interested in this Soviet approach in the wake of Eban's memorandum./2/

/2/A note on the memorandum indicates that telegram 7630 from USUN, November 8, was attached. Telegram 7630 reported on a November 7 conversation between Ambassador Buffum of USUN and Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister V. S. Semenov. In his analysis of the prospects for a peace settlement in the Middle East, Semenov put a positive reading on the latest Israeli position (see Document 302). Semenov agreed with Buffum that the next step was to persuade all parties to the conflict to give Jarring more to work with while seeking to maintain an atmosphere in the Middle East that was conducive to negotiations. Semenov also suggested that in approaching the next phase of the Jarring Mission, the United States and the Soviet Union should begin a systematic exchange of views on the key problems involved in a settlement. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 ARAB-ISR) A more extensive record of this meeting was transmitted to the Department in airgram A-2600 from USUN, November 8. (Ibid., POL 27 ARAB-ISR) Under Secretary Rostow took up Semenov's suggestion in a luncheon meeting with Ambassador Dobrynin on November 8 when they discussed prospects for the Jarring Mission at length. (Telegram 269827 to Tel Aviv, November 9; ibid.)

Despite contrary noises in the press, I do believe that, if we put our shoulder to the wheel, we have a chance of turning the corner in the Middle East in the next several months. Quiet collaboration with the Soviet Union in getting behind the next phase of the Jarring mission could be important and useful.

Interestingly enough, our people have been discussing in the last few days how to weave U.S.-Soviet consultation into the next stage of the Middle East peace effort.

W. W. Rostow/3/

/3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

311. Draft Memorandum for the Record/1/

Washington, November 9, 1968.

/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 73 A 1351, Chronology of F-4s for Israel, 10 Oct 68-5 Sept 69, Folder 1. Top Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Harry Schwartz.

SUBJECT
F-4 Negotiations with the Israelis

Ambassador Rabin came to see Mr. Warnke last night and flatly and rather brutally rejected our request for assurances with respect to strategic missiles and nuclear weapons. He read from a talking paper,/2/ a copy of which he left with us. This is attached. The Memorandum of Conversation is attached./3/

/2/See footnote 2, Document 309.

/3/Document 309.

The background for the Israeli performance, as I understand it, is as follows: On November 7, Secretary Clifford and Secretary Rusk met with the President on this subject./4/ As recounted by Mr. Clifford to Mr. Warnke, both Secretaries argued with the President in favor of insisting on additional assurances from the Israelis on the grounds [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] that nuclear weapons in the Middle East were extremely dangerous for the national security of the United States. The President apparently said that he had promised the F-4s without any conditions, and that was his position. He did not even wish to accept Mr. Rusk's position that we had at least to obtain the same assurances that we had previously received from the Israelis in connection with the A-4 negotiations.

/4/According to the President's Daily Diary, this was a luncheon meeting with the President which also included Generals Maxwell Taylor and Earle Wheeler, CIA Director Helms, and Walt Rostow. (Johnson Library)

Mr. Warnke was in Germany at this time, returned to the Pentagon at 5:00 p.m. on November 8, and was told of the President's position by Mr. Clifford just before the Israelis arrived. When Ambassador Rabin and his colleagues walked into Mr. Warnke's office just after 6:00 p.m., it was abundantly clear that they had been told of the President's position and of his instructions to the Secretaries of Defense and State.

312. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan/1/

Washington, November 9, 1968, 0111Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Seelye, Paganelli, and Jones; cleared by Sisco, Atherton, Davies, and Harold Saunders; and approved by Katzenbach.

269779. Subject: Your Audience With King Hussein. Ref: Amman 7393./2/

/2/In telegram 7393 from Amman, November 8, Symmes cabled that he intended to seek an audience with King Hussein at the earliest opportunity. He asked whether the Department had any guidance for him with regard to the following issues: "1. Next steps for the Jarring mission? 2. Internal defense. 3. Possible interest of Hussein in visiting U.S. for talks with President-elect. 4. Possible Arab summit conference in November." (Ibid.)

Following may be used by Ambassador in audience with King Hussein:

1. Next steps in Jarring Mission. Re Jarring Mission, you may draw as appropriate on telegrams reporting developments in New York. Suggest you state that, while there has not been as much progress as we had hoped for, we think indirect exchanges between parties and various bilateral conversations have been very useful. Most important thing at this stage is to maintain and accelerate what momentum has developed and keep Jarring exercise going. In this connection we pleased that, although Rifai and Riad leaving New York both have indicated they and govts intend continue cooperate with Jarring. Jarring seems determined make no move that would jeopardize continuation his mission. We plan continue maintain closest contact with Jarring and parties. You may also repeat assurances given King in New York Nov. 1967 concerning territorial aspects of settlement, including point that U.S. prepared support return of West Bank to Jordan with minor boundary rectifications. In discussing foregoing, you requested ascertain from King his views re ways in which Jordan might justify Israel's security requirements on West Bank. What formula would GOJ be prepared to accept? For example, would GOJ accept proposition of joint GOJ-GOI patrols perhaps made up of security police rather than military? Assure King that you are only making informal probes on this subject and that you are only seeking his preliminary views./3/

/3/Ambassador Symmes met with King Hussein on November 9 and made the points and offered the assurances authorized in paragraph 1 of this telegram. Hussein expressed gratitude for the reassurances, and said that with respect to exchanges with Israel, there was not much that Jordan could do unless Israel came forward with enough substance to justify proceeding to the next steps. (Telegram 7409 from Amman, November 11; ibid.)

2. Internal Defense. You may reassure King of our desire be as helpful as possible re strengthening GOJ's internal defense capability. In this connection you may wish mention inter alia our intention dispatch on TDY specialist in riot control, our continued willingness assist in training, and our readiness sell and expedite shipment of equipment which GOJ may wish purchase from U.S. King might be advised to order needed equipment promptly view lapse of shipping time. FYI. Appears to us that the ball is now in GOJ's court. AMC's message No. 38135 and DA message No. 884553/4/ gave Embassy information on price and availability of various items of equipment for use by security forces. We await GOJ response in wake your further consultations. We note parenthetically that the GOJ has not yet responded to price and availability quotations which UK provided expeditiously in August (London 13887)./5/ End FYI.

/4/Neither found.

/5/In telegram 13887 from London, October 29, the Embassy reported that it had received from the Foreign Office a list of the items that made up the final element of the arms procurement package that Saudi Arabia was prepared to finance for Jordan. The arms were to be purchased from British sources. Major items included 100 Centurion tanks and 100 105-mm "up-gunning" kits. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 12-5 JORDAN)

3. Possible interest of Hussein in visiting U.S. for talks with President-elect. You should not raise subject but if Hussein expresses interest in visiting U.S., you should indicate that you will seek advice from Department on question of visits to President and President-elect in period prior to inauguration. FYI. Mr. Nixon's wishes on receiving foreign dignitaries prior to inauguration not yet known. End FYI.

4. Possible Arab Summit Conference in November. If King seeks your advice re convening of Arab Summit, suggest you seek discourage such a move at this time. You might note tendency of most past Arab summits to adopt extreme Arab positions and point to risk that Summit decision in context Arab-Israeli problem likely reduce Arab negotiating flexibility in connection Jarring effort. FYI. We propose you not make too strong a case against convening Arab Summit since this, after all, is King's business, not ours. He may have his own strong views and, if so, we would not wish make an issue out of this. We recall Hussein's desire over past several months to convene another Arab Summit conference for purpose of renewing mandate for Arabs to seek political solution to Middle East crisis. We also recollect that Hussein hoped to use such a conference to achieve Arab intergovernmental coordination on bringing fedayeen under control. We seriously doubt that an Arab Summit would achieve these laudable goals. We fear that another summit at this time is more likely to harden Arab public positions on an approach to a settlement with Israel, thereby further reducing Hussein's and perhaps Nasser's negotiating flexibility at this particularly critical juncture in Jarring mission. Hussein, of course, must make his own decision on pros and cons of calling for the convening another Arab Summit. We note that other Arab leaders, particularly King Faysal, have consistently opposed convening of another Arab Summit. End FYI.

Rusk

313. Memorandum for the Record/1/

Washington, November 9, 1968.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 12-5 ISR. Secret; Nodis; Sensitive.

At about noon Walt Rostow told me that Abe Feinberg had told him that the morning meeting with Paul Warnke on F-4s had gone well./2/ He believed the discussions would be concluded on or by next Tuesday. Although there are now no preconditions to the sale, the Israelis are prepared to reaffirm their pledge not to be the first in introducing nuclear weapons into the Middle East and to pledge not to use the F-4s to carry nuclear weapons.

/2/No other record of this meeting between Warnke and Rabin has been found.

Rostow told Feinberg that the Israelis should realize that Secretary Rusk, Secretary Clifford and he have a deep sense of foreboding that Israeli policies could lead to a nuclear tragedy. Feinberg, in response, said he agreed that Israel should not go further down the nuclear road. He urged Walt to recommend to the President that he heavily emphasize the gravity of this issue when Prime Minister Eshkol visits Washington.

John P. Walsh/3/

/3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

314. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Washington, November 10, 1968.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL UAR-US. Confidential. Drafted by Parker.

SUBJECT
US-UAR Relations; Phantoms; Jarring Mission

PARTICIPANTS
Muhammad Riad, UAR Foreign Ministry
Ashraf Ghorbal, U.A.R. Interests Section, Embassy of India
Richard B. Parker, Country Director for NEA/UAR

Mr. Parker asked if he could interpret President Nasser's congratulatory message to President-elect Nixon/2/ as a sign the UAR wanted to resume relations. Muhammad smiled and said he did not know. Ashraf said the ball was now in our court. Muhammad said he hoped that if there was progress towards resumption it would not be derailed again. He then confided that the UAR had been moving towards resumption last February but had changed its mind because of remarks and actions of Ambassador Goldberg, who had given complete credence to the Israelis but had refused to believe anything the Egyptians said. He referred specifically to Ambassador Goldberg's acceptance of the Israeli contention that the Egyptians were insisting on withdrawal first in spite of Egyptian assurances to us to the contrary.

/2/The text of the congratulatory message sent by Nasser to Nixon on November 7 is ibid., POL 15-1 US/NIXON.

Mr. Parker said there had been a good deal of confusion as to the Egyptian position because of the elliptical statements issuing from the Egyptians themselves. He himself had gotten into trouble with the Egyptians for pointing out that Jarring apparently thought they were insisting on withdrawal first. He had only been trying to do a service by pointing out that there was a communications failure. All he had succeeded in doing was making people mad, but he had been vindicated when Jarring subsequently told Mahmoud Riad he understood the UAR was still insisting on withdrawal first. Ambassador Goldberg could certainly not be blamed if he reported what the Israelis told him. He also reported what the Egyptians and Jordanians told him.

Phantoms

Ashraf raised the Benjamin Welles story in the November 7 New York Times/3/ again and asked for a fuller explanation. Mr. Parker said the Welles story was not accurate. The Department's spokesman on November 7 had said negotiations on the Phantoms were still continuing. This was correct. He would not try to mislead them; Israel would get the Phantoms sooner or later. But the terms of the deal were still under discussion and no agreement had been reached, nor had any decision been taken as alleged by Welles. Ashraf asked where Welles had gotten the story then. Mr. Parker said he believed it had come from someone in the aircraft industry.

/3/Citing "responsible American sources," Welles reported on November 7 that the United States had agreed in principle to sell Israel 58 Phantom jet fighters.

Ashraf asked whether the last sentence of the article, which referred to the possibility that delivery could be expedited if conditions in the area warranted, was not really the most important thought in it and the real reason for its appearance at that particular juncture. Mr. Parker explained that newspaper stories were usually written in discrete groups of paragraphs so that they could be cut down to fit available space without destroying the completeness of thought. The least important paragraphs were usually at the end of the story.

Jarring Mission

Muhammad said that he had told Mr. Sisco one should not exclude the possibility (laa yistaba'ad) that Foreign Minister Riad would reply to the seven points of the Secretary. Mr. Parker said he had understood that Muhammad had said categorically that the Foreign Minister would be replying. Muhammad said he hoped he would be, but could not be quite that categorical.

315. Editorial Note

President Johnson met with President-elect Nixon at the White House on November 11, 1968, to provide him with a briefing on foreign policy issues. Included in the meeting were Secretaries Rusk and Clifford, General Wheeler, CIA Director Helms, and Walt Rostow. Rostow described the situation in the Middle East as "very delicate," and Rusk noted that Israeli Prime Minister Eshkol was "fighting for his political life." Rusk added that the crux of the problem was that the Arab states thought that Israel was interested in territorial expansion and Israel thought that the Arabs were interested in exterminating Israel. Rusk also told Nixon that he would have to face the problem of how to keep nuclear weapons out of the Middle East. If the Israelis developed nuclear weapons, Rusk felt the Soviet Union would respond by putting nuclear weapons into Egypt. President Johnson said that he had hoped to get the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which Israel had not yet agreed to sign, approved before he authorized the sale of Phantom jet aircraft to Israel. (Meeting Notes, November 11; Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Walt W. Rostow, Nixon and Transition)

The issue of Israel's adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty came up again in a November 24 telephone conversation between Walt Rostow and Robert D. Murphy, who was advising President-elect Nixon on foreign policy issues. Rostow told Murphy that he had a message for Nixon from President Johnson. The Johnson administration was negotiating the sale of the Phantom jets with Israel and was trying to factor into the sale as much "nuclear restraint" on Israel's part as Israel would agree to. The United States was pushing Israel to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty. To that end, President Johnson was considering calling a special session of Congress at the beginning of December devoted to the issue of the treaty, which would have the effect of putting additional pressure on allies, such as Israel, which had not yet signed the treaty. Johnson felt that Nixon's endorsement of calling such a special session was important, and implied that he would only go forward with Nixon's endorsement. (Memorandum of telephone conversation, November 24; ibid., Murphy, Robert D) Murphy replied on Nixon's behalf in a telephone conversation with Rusk on November 29. Murphy said that Nixon felt that until he succeeded to the presidency the management of the effort to win approval of the Non-Proliferation Treaty was President Johnson's responsibility. Noting that Nixon had problems with members of his own party on the issue, Murphy said that Nixon would not take an active part in the debate over the treaty, nor would he express hope of ratification in a special session. (White House telegram CAP 82813 from Bromley Smith to President Johnson in Texas, November 29; ibid., Nixon and Transition)

316. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel/1/

Washington, November 11, 1968, 1857Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL ISR-US. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Drafted by Sterner; cleared by Atherton, Davies, and Walt Rostow; and approved by Rusk. Rostow also cleared the telegram with President Johnson. (Memorandum from Rostow to Johnson, November 10; Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Harold H. Saunders, Israel-Nuclear-Dimona-Desalting, 11/1/68-1/20/69)

269999. 1. You should deliver this as a personal message from the President to Prime Minister Eshkol:

2. "Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I am writing to you, first, to welcome the prospect of your visit here later this month,/2/ and secondly, to raise with you again a subject that has become of increasing importance to me as I enter the closing days of my Administration.

/2/On November 12 the Israeli Embassy informed the Department that Prime Minister Eshkol had been advised by his doctor to defer the U.S. trip scheduled for November 25. The Embassy indicated that Eshkol hoped to make a brief trip in December to meet with the President. (Telegram 271424 to Tel Aviv, November 14; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL ISR-US) Walt Rostow sent a memorandum to President Johnson on November 13 informing him of Eshkol's change in plans and inquiring about a suitable date for an Eshkol visit in December. The President responded with a handwritten note on Rostow's memorandum that reads: "Let's Forget Visit." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. X, Memos, 6/68-11/68)

As I look back over my five years in office, I find that one endeavor overshadows all those that have called upon my time and energy. This has been the search for peace. Central to it has been our effort to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. The United States has assumed a special responsibility for this endeavor. It is at the heart not only of my own nation's security interests but also of the security of every nation in the world. As you know I am personally deeply committed to this task.

My deep concern on this subject was expressed to you personally as long ago as June 1964. Since then there has been no slackening of the arms race in the Near East, and the weapons introduced into the area have grown increasingly sophisticated. It would be a tragedy--an irreversible tragedy--if this arms race extended into the field of nuclear weapons or nuclear weapons delivery systems.

Secretary Rusk emphasized these points last month to Foreign Minister Eban when he stressed the United States' concern that Israel's continued delay in signing the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty will have the effect of increasing, rather than reducing, pressures for other area states to develop or acquire nuclear weapons.

We have carefully studied your Government's paper handed to Ambassador Barbour on October 28./3/ We welcome the reaffirmation of your Government's assurances that Israel will not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the area. It is our strong conviction, however, that with a Non-Proliferation Treaty now in existence, only Israel's adherence to that Treaty can give the world confidence that Israel does not intend to develop nuclear weapons.

/3/See footnote 2, Document 292.

I therefore welcome the statement in your Government's paper that you are engaged in intensive study of the implications of signing the Treaty. It is my earnest hope that this study will result in a decision to sign the Treaty at an early date. Israel's failure to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty would be a severe blow to my Government's global efforts to halt the spread of nuclear weapons. The United States would also be deeply troubled if operational strategic missiles were to appear in the Near East. I hope you can give me an encouraging response on these matters when we talk later this month.

It will be good to see you here. You are welcome not only as a distinguished and esteemed colleague but as a close personal friend.

Sincerely, Lyndon B. Johnson"

Rusk

317. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Washington, November 12, 1968, 3:30-4:30 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. X, Cables and Memos, 6/68-11/68. Top Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Murray and approved by Warnke. The meeting was held in Warnke's office. The memorandum is marked "Fourth Session."

SUBJECT
Negotiations with Israel-F-4 and Advanced Weapons

PARTICIPANTS

Israeli Side
Ambassador of Israel, Lieutenant General Yitzhak Rabin
Minister Shlomo Argov, Israeli Embassy
Major General Hod, Commander, Israeli Defense Force Air Force
Brigadier General David Carmon, Defense and Armed Forces Attache

United States Side
Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), Paul C. Warnke
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), Harry H. Schwartz
Deputy Director, NESA Region (ISA), Robert J. Murray

Mr. Warnke opened the meeting by saying that, as he had indicated in a previous discussion, we are interested in substance and not form in the matters we have been addressing. We believe it is your feeling that Israel will not and cannot accept our request for advance assurances concerning strategic missiles and nuclear weapons as preconditions to the contract. You propose alternative formulations to be included in the contract which are essentially reaffirmations of earlier agreements: not to use American aircraft to carry nuclear weapons, and not to be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the area. In our discussions I believe I have made clear to you our interpretation of "unusual and compelling circumstances" which would require that we cancel the F-4 contract. The contract would provide that action inconsistent with these assurances would constitute such circumstances. On these bases I believe we can draft an agreement that will be acceptable to you and which will meet your requirements--although not fully meeting mine.

Mr. Warnke observed that he could not find in the record any understanding of what Israel means by the provision: "Israel will not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the area." Mr. Warnke asked the Ambassador what was meant by this term?

Ambassador Rabin said that "it means what we have said, namely, that we would not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons." Mr. Warnke asked what specifically was meant by the word "introduce." Ambassador Rabin said, "you are more familiar with these things than we are. What is your definition of nuclear weapons?" Mr. Warnke said that there are two aspects to the question: the definition of what is and what is not a nuclear weapon, and what is and what is not introduction into the area. Regarding the first, if there are components available that could be assembled to make a nuclear weapon--although part A may be in one room and part B in another room--then that is a nuclear weapon. As for introduction, that is your term and you will have to define it. Does it mean no physical presence? Ambassador Rabin said, "I suppose so."

Mr. Warnke said: "what if you have access to nuclear weapons that are in another country? Is that then 'introduction'"? Ambassador Rabin asked if we believed that this was the situation. Mr. Warnke replied that he was just trying to find the Israeli definition. He noted that the same situation could apply the other way around: for example, what if another country in the area had access to nuclear weapons but had not brought them in? Ambassador Rabin said, continuing the example, that if China said they had nuclear weapons for Egypt stored in China, he didn't know what the Israeli reaction would be. He hasn't given the matter a great deal of thought. He believed that "introduction" would require their physical presence in the area.

General Hod asked if the term "introduction" had an accepted usage in international law. Mr. Warnke replied that it had not. General Hod said that throughout the world the experience was that introduction of a weapon could only mean after testing. You could not introduce a weapon until after it actually became a weapon.

Ambassador Rabin asked: "Do you consider a nuclear weapon one that has not been tested, and has been done by a country without previous experience"? Mr. Warnke: "Certainly. China with a strategic missile capability would be assumed to have nuclear weapons even had it not tested these weapons." Ambassador Rabin said: "All nuclear powers-the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, China--have tested nuclear weapons. Do you really believe introduction comes before testing"? Mr. Schwartz said that what the Ambassador was talking about is reliability. Ambassador Rabin disagreed saying that based on his experience with conventional weapons, he would not consider a weapon that had not been tested to be a weapon.

Mr. Warnke asked whether, if the UAR had missiles with nuclear war heads but had not actually tested them, would Israel consider that the UAR had not introduced nuclear weapons? He said that testing by other nuclear powers is very relevant to a potential nuclear power if the latter is developing weapons based on existing technology.

Ambassador Rabin said that, "weapons serve policy, not vice versa. Since the UAR's goal is to destroy us I would take it with very great concern. Our policy is not to destroy the UAR. You must combine the weapon with the policy." General Hod observed that a very good example of introduction was when Egypt introduced missiles into the area in 1963, claiming they were capable of hitting anything south of Beirut. Ambassador Rabin said: "My concern with Egypt is with missiles with chemical rather than nuclear war heads. If Egypt were to hit our densely populated areas, even in a limited way, it could be disastrous."

Mr. Warnke said, as he understood it, Ambassador Rabin applied two prerequisites to the word "introduction"--notoriety and pretesting.

Ambassador Rabin, saying that "I don't know what the Prime Minister said, but" there must be public acknowledgment. The purpose of nuclear weapons is not to use the weapon itself, but to use their deterrent power. "I don't believe any powers that have nuclear weapons plan to use them, although you cannot ever be sure." Ninety-nine per cent of their value is deterrence. Mr. Schwartz said: "You mean deterrence against governments, to deter governments from specific actions." Ambassador Rabin agreed: "The fact that you have got it must be known."

Mr. Warnke said that the Ambassador also introduced the factor of intent: if the UAR has missiles, Israel would be concerned; if Israel has them, there is no cause for concern. The purpose of strategic missiles for Israel would be for deterrence.

Ambassador Rabin said: "You are trying to combine strategic missiles and nuclear war heads. This is not necessary in the Middle East. To my mind, in the Middle East, missiles with war heads which are not nuclear weapons can play a role." Mr. Warnke asked, "What sort of role"? Ambassador Rabin said: "It depends on the other side. What we are concerned about in Egypt is their chemical warfare capability. As I explained in 1963 when I was here, one of our thoughts was that Egyptian missiles, even with conventional war heads, might contribute to their success if they made a surprise attack on our cities. They could interfere with the mobilization system under such circumstances, and this might play a great role in determining the outcome. Seventy per cent more or less of Army capability, although less for the Air Force, is based on mobilization, not just on manpower but vehicles, transport, supplies, and so forth. During the six day war we had mobilized so much of the resource of our cities that we had to devote a portion of our military effort to resupplying the cities."

General Hod observed that Egypt has sea borne (Styx) missiles with 35 mile range and may have or may be receiving even more sophisticated missiles. Although these have a short range, they can be used sea-to-shore as well as sea-to-sea, and therefore can raise havoc with coastal cities such as Tel Aviv.

Ambassador Rabin said that they had heard of a plan, although they could not know for certain, to sell to Egypt missile destroyers with missiles of about 100 miles range which, although normally sea-to-sea, could also be used sea-to-shore. Rabin said Israel was worried that Egypt might launch sea borne missiles during the six day war, "but they did not dare to do this." Rabin said he also understands that there is a Cannon missile on the TU-16s now in Egypt that can hit the centers of our cities. "Therefore, we look at missiles somewhat differently than you. It is not necessary to have nuclear war heads on our missiles. There are war heads between high-explosive and nuclear."

Mr. Warnke said: "Then in your view, an unadvertised, untested nuclear device is not a nuclear weapon." Ambassador Rabin said: "Yes, that is correct." Mr. Warnke asked: "What about an advertised but untested nuclear device or weapon. Would that be introduction?" Ambassador Rabin said: "Yes, that would be introduction." Mr. Warnke said he would interpret mere physical presence in the area as constituting, in itself, "introduction".

Mr. Warnke concluded the discussion by saying that he would talk with Mr. Hoopes, that we would have a Memorandum of Understanding prepared within a few days incorporating the provisions we have discussed, and that General Hod could in the meantime meet with the Air Force to continue the technical discussions that we are at this time prepared to go ahead with. Mr. Warnke said that we ought to continue these discussions so that we might try to arrive at some understanding between us as to the problems of missiles and nuclear weapons. At this time, with respect to "introduction," Mr. Warnke said there was not much clarity and no agreement.

318. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State/1/

New York, November 12, 1968, 0246Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to Tel Aviv, Amman, and Cairo.

7729. Subject: Middle East.

1. Buffum called on Jarring Nov 11 and, in accordance with Sisco telecon, orally conveyed 7 points outlined by Secretary as describing our attitude toward Israeli settlement with UAR./2/ Buffum informed Jarring we had conveyed these points both to Riad and to USSR.

/2/See Document 301.

2. Jarring thought it was of great importance that US had taken stand in favor of Israeli withdrawal from UAR territory and said further that other 6 points in our position should be acceptable to UAR although it would be difficult get their agreement to an international presence at Sharm el-Sheikh which could not be removed without consent of SC or GA. Jarring commented that in view of this forthcoming attitude by US, he was surprised and disappointed Riad had not been more forthcoming with him during past week.

3. Jarring reported having spoken several times over week-end with Eban. In these talks he pressed Israelis further for unqualified statement on acceptance of Res 242 and on withdrawal of Israeli forces. He said he thought Eban had softened a little bit, at least to extent of indicating willingness to take fresh look at problem.

4. At same time, Jarring was distressed by news report just recd from Jerusalem to effect Eshkol delivered policy statement today indicating Israeli intent to maintain forces not only at Sharm el-Sheikh but in Sinai. He thought this would have most adverse repercussions in Cairo and predicted UAR would be asking us how this squares with our attitude toward Israeli withdrawal.

5. Jarring has clearly not yet decided how to proceed in next phase of his mission. While disappointed at the lack of movement on substance, he is heartened that all parties continue to wish his services. This desire is very strong on part USSR, said Jarring, who had lengthy conversation this A.M. with Semenov. Jarring was satisfied Sov Union will make efforts with Arabs to try and move his mission forward.

6. Buffum said Russians are talking to us in same vein and pointed out that concerted efforts on our side with Israelis, if coupled with Sov pressure on Arabs, could combine to give new impetus to his efforts.

7. Jarring seems disposed to stay on in NY at least for a while until he sorts out results of most recent exchanges with Fon Mins here. He is assuming he will have to make another trip to their respective capitals but does not want to do so until he thinks there is a chance it will produce movement.

8. Buffum pressed Jarring again to consider taking initiative in putting questions to both sides together with indication of kind of answer he expects from them. He remains somewhat skeptical he can get kind of answers he wants but is still open-minded about pursuing this route. Buffum said we would wish to resume discussion of such possibility with him in detail in near future and Jarring said he would be pleased to do so.

Buffum

319. Letter From George D. Woods to President Johnson/1/

Washington, November 12, 1968.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Harold H. Saunders, Israel-Nuclear-Dimona-Desalting, 11/1/68-1/20/69. Confidential.

Dear Mr. President:

In May, 1968, my terms of reference as your coordinator on the Israeli power and desalting project were approved, and you said in a letter to me dated May 6/2/ that I was "to feel free to manage this in the way that makes the most sense."

/2/Not found.

I have attempted to be responsive to the terms of reference, although I have also proceeded in this complicated and highly sensitive problem as seemed to make the most sense to me in the present circumstances. My observations, conclusions and recommendations have been transmitted in the form of a memorandum to Mr. Walt W. Rostow, a copy of which is enclosed./3/ The principal recommendation is to concentrate on a 40-million-gallon-per-day (MGD) water desalting plant in Israel; and, in my judgment, work on this should proceed as a matter of priority if the goal of massive desalting-plant capability is to be achieved within the next ten to fifteen years.

/3/Also dated November 12, not printed.

I applaud your desire to lay as much groundwork as possible for progress in desalting, to paraphrase your May 6 letter, and the above recommendation is put forward with this objective in mind. With the knowledge and experience which will accumulate with the construction and operation of a medium-sized desalting plant, it will be possible to see more clearly down the road toward the 100 MGD projects and, ultimately, toward the even larger plants of the future.

Respectfully,

George D. Woods

320. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel/1/

Washington, November 13, 1968, 2218Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Atherton, cleared by Davies and Sisco, and approved by Katzenbach. Repeated to Amman, Beirut, Cairo, Jidda, London, Moscow, and USUN.

270935. Begin summary: Under Secretary Katzenbach called in Israeli Ambassador Rabin November 12 for review of recent US contacts, in context Jarring Mission, with UAR and Soviets. Under Secretary also expressed our concern at indications GOI thinking in terms of peace settlement involving territorial acquisitions by Israel in Sinai and West Bank--a position we could not support. Under Secretary said we have based our position on understanding that Israel seeks adequate security arrangements and recognition of boundaries but, leaving aside Jerusalem and Gaza as special problems, seeks no territory from UAR and only minor adjustments, with compensation, in pre-June 1967 lines with Jordan. At same time Under Secretary made clear we continue firmly support position that Israel should only withdraw in context of contractually binding peace settlement embodying clear guarantees for Israel's security and navigation rights, termination of belligerency and recognition of Israeli boundaries. Rabin argued that Israel's security requirements dictated some territorial changes and expressed view that position outlined by Under Secretary represented change in US stand; Israel was being asked make further concessions and its bargaining position was being undermined while UAR had given no indication it wanted peace. Under Secretary said our position was that settlement must be agreed among parties and we had therefore avoided expressing views on specifics. Nevertheless, we had consistently made clear we could not go along with Israeli efforts acquire Arab territory, given our long standing policy of support for territorial integrity of all states of area. End summary.

1. Under Secretary Katzenbach called in Israeli Ambassador Rabin November 12 to review recent US activities with respect to Jarring Mission and our views on where we go from here. Assistant Secretary Sisco, Davies (NEA) and Israeli Minister Argov also present.

2. Under Secretary reported that Soviets have been interested in continuing discussion with USG. We remain willing carry on dialogue with Soviets, making clear that it must be in Jarring Mission context. Dialogue so far had not gone far beyond our expressing concern re slow pace of Jarring Mission and inquiring of Soviets how they thought it might move forward. We had told Soviets we considered November 4 Israeli note to Jarring more responsive than UAR note which we had found disappointing. We had also had some discussion of arms control problems. In general we had not found Soviets pessimistic about Jarring's prospects. Sisco added that Soviets had reiterated desire see Jarring continue and had not interpreted latest Israeli and UAR notes as terminating Jarring Mission.

3. Under Secretary then summarized Secretary's November 2 conversation with UAR Foreign Minister Riad along following lines, noting that we did not consider it totally negative: Riad had said UAR wanted Jarring to continue but had expressed concern that Israel not prepared to withdraw from Egyptian territory to pre-June 5 lines. Secretary had stressed that withdrawal to international borders must be in context of state of peace and had noted that while UAR said it wanted peace, it had given no concrete ideas re kind of peace document it would accept. Riad had indicated UAR would sign some kind of document but had said neither that it would nor that it would not sign same document as Israel. Secretary had emphasized view that UAR should sign document to which Israel would also be signatory. He had also said that Resolution in our view was not self-executing and details would have to be negotiated. Re refugees, Secretary had stressed need for solution based on individual and secret refugee choice without results of that choice being binding in advance on any state. (Under Secretary noted in this connection Secretary's view that not many refugees would choose repatriation to Israel if choice were truly personal and secret.) Finally Secretary had stressed that there must be free passage through Straits of Tiran and Suez Canal with some kind of international peace keeping machinery at Sharm al-Shaykh. In stating these views to Riad, Secretary made clear he could not speak for Israel and was presenting US ideas.

4. Under Secretary continued that, as we saw it, most difficult questions related to territory on one hand and nature of peace on other. It was difficult for UAR and Jordan to say what they meant by peace without their having an idea of Israel's views on territorial question. On basis of our many discussions with GOI, USG assumed Israel's position was that, in context of peace, it would withdraw substantially to pre-June 5 lines, leaving aside Jerusalem and Gaza which were special problems. We had assumed there need be no changes with respect to UAR and with respect to Jordan only "really minor" changes on security grounds, with compensation for Jordan. Arabs had interpreted Israel's concept of changes for security reasons, however, as involving significant territorial acquisitions by Israel. This caused problems for USG, given our basic position on territorial integrity. We had held this position consistently without going into details of how a peace settlement could be arranged. Instead, in light of 1957 experience and origins of 1967 war, we had based our position on need for peace agreed to among parties. As President made clear in his September 10 speech, however, we had assumed territorial question would be resolved without transfer of significant areas to Israel. We recognized that it would be difficult to devise adequate security arrangements but believed this was possible without territorial transfers.

5. Rabin asked for clarification--was it the US position that leaving Jerusalem aside, Israel should withdraw to June 4 boundaries? Under Secretary said this was our position, allowing for adjustments of the kind contemplated in General Armistice Agreements, providing there were satisfactory security arrangements and a context of peace. In response to Rabin's comment that this was news to him, Under Secretary said this had been our position throughout. Ambassador Goldberg had said as much to King Hussein in November 1967 and had so informed Foreign Minister Eban at the time.

6. Rabin replied that Israel believed secure and recognized boundaries would require some territorial changes. Israel's guideline was security; it was not seeking real estate for its own sake. Eban had made clear to Secretary that Israel did not interpret "withdrawal" to mean withdrawal from all occupied territories. With respect to UAR, Israel needed to provide full protection for free passage through Straits of Tiran and would require land communications to Sharm al-Shaykh and Israeli presence there. Re Jordan, certain territorial changes would also be required but their precise nature had not yet been decided, although principles governing such changes had been agreed upon within GOI. To counter Arab arguments that Israel would not withdraw, Israel had been pressed to accept principle of secure and recognized boundaries to be agreed upon among parties. Now USG was asking Israel to accept principle of settlement practically to June 4 lines even though UAR had refused indicate that it wanted peaceful settlement or that it would sign document with Israel. UAR could now conclude that, having succeeded in getting US to accept position that withdrawal should be to pre-war lines without itself having given up anything, it should now see what more it could get. GOI had made concessions in latest note to Jarring whereas UAR had given up nothing since passage of November 1967 Security Council Resolution when it had dropped insistence on prior withdrawal. UAR was seeking to erode the meaning of peace. Furthermore, it was clear there was no US-Israeli understanding on what peace means.

7. Under Secretary replied that USG had avoided speaking of June 4 lines since this would be misleading with respect to Jerusalem and kind of adjustments we have in mind. To us the words "recognized and secure" meant "security arrangements" and "recognition" of new lines as international boundaries. We had never meant that Israel could extend its territory to West Bank or Suez if this was what it felt its security required. We had always thought new map would look very much like pre-war map but with Israel's security assured. We had assumed Israel had no territorial problems with UAR-only problems of security. If more than that was involved then US and Israel would be on divergent courses. Rabin read relevant portion of General Armistice Agreement to make point GAA placed no limitations whatever on territorial changes which could be made. Under Secretary said if it was Israel's position that all territories were negotiable, such position on Israel's part would confront USG with difficulties and we could not support it. Putting aside Jerusalem, Gaza and Syrian Heights for now, since they presented different kind of problem, we sought security for Israel not territory.

8. Under Secretary said he would put question another way: if Israel were satisfied with guarantees of demilitarization and navigation and obtained contractual agreements plus termination of belligerency plus recognition of boundaries, would Israel withdraw to the old lines?

9. Rabin said he did not believe Israel would be satisfied. In response to Under Secretary's question whether Israel sought permanent presence at Sharm al-Shaykh or simply absence of any presence plus the right to assure the latter, Rabin said the lesson of the early 1950s and of May 1967 was that there should be Israeli presence at Sharm al-Shaykh. Otherwise, as experience had shown, UAR could deploy troops and thereby change situation without firing a shot. This put onus on Israel to fire first which caused it problems with big powers. Israel wanted to be in position to prevent interference with its navigation without having to shoot. Israel could not rely on UAR and international forces were of no use.

10. Under Secretary said he thought clear cut arrangements for Israel's security could be made--e.g., terms of settlement could provide that presence of any country at Sharm al-Shaykh would be regarded as act of war justifying self defense under Article 51 of UN Charter. Rabin responded that 1957 arrangements were almost that precise but violation by UAR had only led to international debate. Lawyer could always find counter arguments to any legal device. In response to Sisco's comment that this line of Israeli reasoning undermined Israel's entire concept of peace based on treaties, Rabin said there was big difference between violation of boundaries, which would be clear to all and violation of security arrangements, which could be interpreted in various ways. To cite another example, Rabin said Jordan had promised USG not to deploy tanks on West Bank but this arrangement had been violated. Davies commented that there was important difference between Jordan's telling US Ambassador it would put no tanks on West Bank and Jordan's making formal commitment on demilitarization to Israel or Security Council.

11. Under Secretary said his main concern was that US and Israel not find themselves on divergent courses. Having taken position that Israel had no territorial demands if Arabs made peace, we would be in difficult position if it developed this was not the case. Time might come when Jarring would feel he should put forward proposals for settlement. Point had already been reached where USG, in pressing UAR to be more forthcoming, had said we did not anticipate territorial problems if UAR was prepared for peace. Sisco noted that Israel had told us many times there would be no territorial problems with UAR if latter agreed conclude binding contractual peace settlement. We were concerned that Israeli position had changed and that security needs were being linked with substantial territorial acquisitions.

12. Rabin asked what USG had received from UAR in return for giving UAR US position. Under Secretary replied that we had made clear to UAR that we were not speaking for Israel. Israel remained in occupation and this seemed to us a good bargaining position. Israel's bargaining position depended on fact of Israeli occupation, not on question of how much or how little it wanted to retain.

13. Argov said he thought USG and GOI had agreed, in context of our discussion of Soviet approach in September, that USG did not endorse Soviet proposal for total withdrawal "except for a few miles here and there." He feared position taken by USG with UAR had undermined Israel's bargaining position. Under Secretary said this would be the case only if Israeli position was to seek territorial acquisitions. We had made clear to UAR where we thought responsibility for 1967 war lay and that our position as stated to UAR was premised on need for peace. Sisco added that Israeli bargaining position could not be undermined by US position based on binding peace and fulfillment of Security Council Resolution; Israeli leverage results from fact it is in occupied territories. US is not asking Israel to withdraw to international boundary in circumstances other than a satisfactory peace binding parties. Under Secretary expressed hope we could now proceed to useful discussion with Israelis of what the concept of peace means to Israel in specific terms.

14. Rabin concluded conversation by saying he had clearly understood Under Secretary's message and would report to his government.

Katzenbach

321. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Washington, November 14, 1968.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Harold H. Saunders, Israel, 10/1/68-1/20/69. Secret; Nodis. Prepared by Harold Saunders. Copies were sent to Walt Rostow, John Walsh, Philip Heymann, Rodger Davies, and Roy Atherton.

PARTICIPANTS
Shlomo Argov, Minister, Israeli Embassy
Harold H. Saunders

During lunch at his invitation--"to tell you my tale of woe"--Shlomo made a middle-sized speech covering the following points to make clear his (and, he said, Ambassador Rabin's) reaction to the November 12 Rabin-Argov talk with Under Secretary Katzenbach:/2/

/2/See Document 320.

1. Either the Israelis have been "living in a fool's paradise" or the US has changed its position. He believes it's the latter. He and Rabin agree (once Shlomo "explained the term") that we're practicing "salami tactics" on them. First we knocked them off direct negotiations. Then we got them to "accept the resolution." Then made them use the word "withdraw" (Comment: Joe Sisco will be pleased at his success!). Now we're pushing them to accept "June 4 lines."

2. The Israelis aren't going to take this demarche seriously because we "speak out of both sides of our mouths" and the various positions we've stated are inconsistent with each other. For example:

--One American says Jerusalem is "the key question." Another says it can be set aside for the time being, "implying Israel has a case."

--One American says there's no such thing as "instant peace." Another says Israel can withdraw when it gets a peace treaty because there will be peace then.

3. The US has undercut Israel's bargaining position without offering anything in return. The US has "made concessions" to the Arabs without getting anything in return.

4. The US is playing fast and loose with Israel's security without taking Israel into its confidence. Worst of all, the US "will not talk to us" about its view of what the Soviets are up to in the Middle East. Israel physically faces Russians across the Canal; they're "the real menace to Israel--physically breathing down our necks." Yet the US won't even tell the Israelis exactly what we think Soviet objectives are. What's more, "we've watched how you worked this deal with Vietnam and we're inclined to think there's some sort of stratospheric deal with the Russians, maybe including the Middle East. That just won't work with us."

5. Above all, if the US wants Israel to take it seriously, it will have to make clear what it means by peace. "To put it bluntly, we don't have any confidence that you've thought through the relationship that should exist after a settlement. Given your 'salami tactics', we think you'll ask us to compromise next--now that you've asked us to compromise on territories--on Israeli ships through the Canal (you'll say Israeli cargoes in foreign bottoms are OK); then you'll say we don't need a 'peace treaty'; then you'll tell us we're unrealistic in the way we define peace."

Trying to respond in roughly parallel sequence to this extended oration, I made the following points:

1. Our policy has not changed. We've talked consistently about territorial integrity (May 23 and June 19, 1967); about withdrawal (June 19); about Jordan getting the West Bank back (November 1967 to Hussein and Eban); about the inadmissibility of the conquest of territory by force (November 22); about boundary changes only as they're agreed in "honest negotiation" as parts of a "just compromise" not dominated by "the weight of conquest" (September 10, 1968). I said we had heard Israelis describe the Dayan plan, the Allon plan, the corridor-to-Sharm-el-Sheikh plan and the keep-all-of-Jerusalem plan. Each time we have heard one of these, we have said repeatedly and at all levels that none of these is good enough to produce peace. As a matter of principle, our position has been clear. What we are doing now is not to tell anybody where to draw his boundaries; we are saying very simply that it is a fact that there will be no peace if Israel tries to hold onto large chunks of territory.

I could not accept his charge of "salami tactics" for one very simple reason--our policy has not changed. If anything has changed, it has been a step-by-step Israeli perception of our position. We never agreed on direct negotiation (June 19: "exclude no method;" Shlomo acknowledged that.). We never agreed to their border schemes, but they never took us seriously; they just turned off their hearing aids. What has happened in the last 4-5 months is that the tactical situation has reached a crucial point where we could no longer afford to let the Israeli Government go on deluding itself that it had a blank check from the US.

This is especially important if negotiations with Jordan are coming to a head. Everything Mr. Katzenbach had said about our territorial position on the Israel-UAR border applies in principle to the Israel-Jordan border, and if Israel plans to offer Jordan the Allon plan, we don't want anyone--especially the Israeli Government--to think the US will support that. We want Israel to know-as we told Allon here--that that's a non-starter.

2. On inconsistency, there's nothing inconsistent in saying that Jerusalem is the "key issue" and in saying it's so difficult that it may have to be negotiated apart from the rest of the territorial settlement.

3. We haven't undercut Israel's bargaining position. Israel's main bargaining counter is occupation. We haven't proposed to anyone that Israel withdraw except to a condition of peace. But when two parties are trying to start negotiating, their positions have to be somewhere in the same ballpark--close enough so that it at least seems remotely possible to bridge the gap between them. What we've urged Israel to do is to drop the absolutely impossible and untenable elements in its position to test whether the Egyptians will come to meet a half-reasonable position. If they don't then we'll at least know who stands where. But with Israel's position not even in the ball park, there was no way to put Egypt to the test.

4. We have taken Israel into our confidence. But frankly, we don't feel Israel has listened very attentively or taken our views seriously.

5. They were asking a fair question in asking us our definition of peace. I thought we had done this but felt it worthwhile to take another stab at doing it more precisely.

HS

322. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, November 15, 1968, 1:05 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East, Vol. II, 4/68-1/69. Secret; Nodis.

SUBJECT
Recent Steps in the Mid-East

You should be aware of several recent steps Secretaries Rusk and Katzenbach have taken to clarify our position on a Mid-East settlement (Nick's memo attached)./2/

/2/Reference is to a November 15 memorandum from Katzenbach to the President with the subject heading: "Present Status of Middle East Peace Efforts."

In his last talk with UAR Foreign Minister Riad, Secretary Rusk summarized his interpretation of the UN resolution as it applies to a UAR-Israel settlement this way:

--Israeli withdrawal from UAR territory. [We never thought Israel had territorial designs in the Sinai.]/3/

/3/Brackets in the source text.

--Formal termination of the state of war.

--Suez Canal open to ships of all flags.

--Refugee settlement on the basis of personal and secret choice of individual refugees on where to live (including return to Israel as one possible choice).

--International presence at Sharm el-Sheikh which could not be removed without consent of UN Security Council or General Assembly.

--UAR should sign something in writing to which Israel also is a signatory.

--General understanding about level of arms in the area (though this not required in the first instance).

Nick spelled these out for Rabin a couple of days ago. Rabin feels we've changed our position and undermined Israel's bargaining position.

The fact is that this has been our consistent position for over a year, but the Israelis have turned off their hearing aids on us. As for undermining their position, we can't afford to go along with their bazaar haggling if we're going to have any chance of peace. What's more, we really would have undercut them if we had let them think we'd given them a blank check. It's especially important as negotiations with Jordan reach a climax that they know where we stand.

Nevertheless, you may hear some strong protests.

Walt

323. Telegram From the U.S. Interests Section of the Spanish Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State/1/

Cairo, November 16, 1968, 1295Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 15-1 US/NIXON. Secret; Flash; Exdis.

3912. For Robert B. Murphy from Robert B. Anderson.

"Have just had long meeting with Hassan Sabri al-Khouli at Presidency who informs me President Nasser seriously concerned by not receiving reply to his message to President-elect Nixon/2/ which President Nasser purposefully intended be generous and friendly./3/ I am informed rumors are spreading in this part of world that President Nasser has been ignored by President-elect Nixon. Recommend you send urgent message from President-elect Nixon acknowledging Nasser telegram and responding in a manner as friendly as President-elect Nixon is agreeable. For your information I will be seeing President Nasser late this afternoon or tomorrow and I would hope to have some reply in hand when I see him if that feasible."

/2/See footnote 2, Document 314.

/3/Bergus reported that Presidential adviser Hassan Sabri al-Khouli had placed the same emphasis on the importance of a reply from President-elect Nixon during a conversation on November 14. Khouli had returned from New York convinced of the good will toward Egypt of many important people in the United States, but when Bergus raised the question of the seven points that Rusk had outlined to Riad as the basis for a peace settlement in the Middle East, Khouli said that the UAR response would depend on Nixon's response to Nasser's congratulatory telegram. (Telegram 3900 Cairo, November 15; ibid., POL 27 ARAB-ISR) For text of Nixon's response, see Document 324.

Bergus

324. Telegram From the Department of State to the U.S. Interests Section of the Spanish Embassy in the United Arab Republic/1/

Washington, November 16, 1968, 2100Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 15-1 US/NIXON. Confidential; Immediate. Drafted by John P. Walsh.

273043. Please convey following message to President Nasser from President Elect Nixon in manner you deem most appropriate:

"President Gamal Abdul Nasser

Cairo

Dear Mr. President:

Your friendly message of congratulations on my election is much appreciated./2/ I too recall with pleasure our meeting in Cairo in 1963 and remember the very warm Egyptian hospitality shown us by your government and your people.

/2/See footnote 2, Document 314.

With regard to your expression of hope that my election may create an opportunity for progress on some of the world's problems, let me assure you that the United States Government under my administration will continue to give a high priority to the search for a just peace and amicable relationships in the Middle East as well as elsewhere.

With my best personal wishes for your good health and prosperity, and with best regards to your family./3/

/3/Bergus reported that he delivered the message on November 17 and that it was given front-page treatment by all of the Cairo newspapers on the following morning. Bergus described the text as "just right." (Telegram 3915 from Cairo, November 18; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 15-1 US/NIXON)

Sincerely, Richard M. Nixon"

Katzenbach

325. Information Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, November 18, 1968, 2:40 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Walt W. Rostow, Arab-Israeli Private Talks. Secret; Sensitive; Literally Eyes Only.

Mr. President:

These two special CIA messages on Israel-Jordan negotiations have just arrived via Dick Helms./2/

/2/Reference is to two memoranda sent by CIA Director Helms to President Johnson on November 18 reporting on secret negotiations between Israel and Jordan; neither printed.

As you will see:

--The Israelis have agreed to proceed with the secret 19th November meeting, although they sought a week's postponement. The Jordanians believe the postponement was requested because of Israel's difficulty in obtaining a Cabinet consensus on their negotiating position.

--[3-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

--You will recall from earlier messages that, if the meeting with the Israelis were successful, Hussein envisaged that the positive results would be surfaced through Jarring and carried forward by Jarring from that point. If the result of the 19th November meeting were negative, Hussein envisaged surfacing his own position through Jarring and letting Jarring carry the matter from that point forward so that for the first time Jarring would be able to deal with both the UAR and Jordanian aspects of the problem.

[4 paragraphs (16 lines of source text) not declassified]

Walt

326. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State/1/

Tel Aviv, November 19, 1968, 1400Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to Amman, Cairo, and USUN.

6153. Israel-Arab settlement.

Begin summary: Eban told Ambassador Nov. 18 that Under Secretary Katzenbach-Amb Rabin Nov 12 conversation and other talks connected therewith were most remarkable episode in negative sense, in US-Israel relations. Absurd for Israel and US to get into a dispute which was not real, which concerned a third party which was not interested in reaching agreement. Fact that US had expressed views to UAR and USSR weakened Israel negotiating position. US formulation totally unacceptable to Israel and conflicts with President's Sept. 10 speech. Previous US statements had been broad and provided flexibility for interpretation, which Israel had thought intended. Proposal had been made in Israeli Cabinet to withdraw or at least not repeat GOI acceptance SC resolution. International presence at Sharm el-Sheikh would not be viable, and UN would have no power to keep it there. Private poll of refugees would place individual desires above national sovereignty and not acceptable to Israel. Contractual agreement which US talked of seriously with GOI was referred to contemptuously as mere piece of paper in talk with UAR. US alleged GOI policy had changed but this not so. It was US views which had changed. Eban hoped to hear US policy remained as previously delineated by President. Ambassador noted US policy remains as determined by President and recent conversations not in conflict therewith. Keystone remains agreement between parties and form of compact less important than substance. US involved because extremely concerned over future of Jarring Mission. If our moves did not achieve forward movement toward settlement, they might at least smoke out Arab views. US had talked only for itself and had not given away Israeli positions or made negotiations more difficult. US supported idea that some presence needed at Sharm el-Sheikh but not Israeli. Re refugees, US view was that not many would opt to return and it no derogation of Israeli position to agree to accept return of few. End summary.

1. Fon Min Eban asked Amb to call at Foreign Ministry late afternoon Nov. 18. DirGen Rafael, Asst Dir Gen Bitan and Elizur present. Amb accompanied by DCM. Eban began by saying Nov. 12 conversation between Under Secy Katzenbach and Amb Rabin, amplified by other conversations such as that between Buffum and Tekoah and others constituted a most remarkable episode in our relations in a negative sense. What the US had told Israel was not recognizable in terms of our previous relations. Eban was puzzled why whole exercise necessary. UAR was no closer to peace than US was to putting man on moon (immediately corrected himself and noted latter might be taking place soon). It was rather absurd for US and Israel to be in dispute about something which was not real while the other party concerned was not even interested. If Israel and the UAR had been close to negotiations, he might have understood US intervention. It was a serious matter that US views had been put to UAR and USSR since this had weakened the negotiating position of Israel. He could not understand reasons for our having done this.

2. Eban continued that US formulation was totally unacceptable to Israel. It appeared US had proposed or submitted to UAR certain principles which should apply to a settlement. One was that the SC resolution was not self-implementing. Israel agreed with this, and it had almost been accepted by UAR which has stopped calling for withdrawal as first step.

3. US proposal called for total Israel withdrawal from UAR territory. This certainly conflicts with President Johnson's speech of Sept 10 in which President said US was not the one to say where others should draw lines but that it was clear there should be no return to June 4. Israel had no difficulty in accepting President's two points, including idea that territory should not be gained simply by weight of conquest, but what Katzenbach said was completely different. In all other US statements, June 4 had been spoken of negatively as something to which we should not return, but Katzenbach had now said that this is what should be returned to, with minor adjustments. This was completely at variance with previous US pronouncements.

4. Gravity of situation, Eban continued, was that Israel had placed great faith in President's pronouncements and would like to be able to continue to do so. If they were broad statements which provided flexibility for interpretation in previous US pronouncements, Israel had assumed this had been intended by US. On this basis, Israel had announced its acceptance of SC resolution in US identical words. Israel had done this because it accepted the Nov. 15, 1967 statement by American UN representative that neither 1948 nor 1967 lines were boundaries and boundaries had to be agreed to by parties concerned. If US meant Israel had to return to June 4 line, this could not be accepted. There had been a proposal in Israeli Cabinet to withdraw acceptance of resolution or at least not to repeat they accept. If US position had remained a formula giving Israel room to maneuver this would have removed one element of Israel's consternation.

5. Eban said he was astonished by another matter. US had said to UAR Suez Canal should be opened to ships of all flags. This had no meaning unless Israel were specified by name. UAR always says Canal open to ships of all flags but nevertheless rejects Israeli ships.

6. US proposal for solution of refugee problem, Eban said, was a private poll. However, individual desires of refugees were the only criterion. Sovereignty of state was overriding.

7. US had proposed international presence at Sharm el-Sheikh, said Eban, which would not be removable except by UNSC or UNGA. Israel had said many times Sharm el-Sheikh was crux of problem with UAR. Israel could not have a war over Tiran Strait every few years. Had had experience with international presence. There was no ability in UN to remain at Sharm el-Sheikh 24 hours after Egypt asked for removal. U Thant said last year UNEF had no alternative but to leave since they could always be driven out by Egyptian military forces. What states would have their troops remain over objections of sovereignty? Next year UAR and USSR will gain majority in SC for their views. Of 15 SC members, only 4 with whom Israel can even talk. There will be authentic majority for Soviets and Arabs in GA and will certainly be majority for giving priority to national sovereignty. Israel had told US frankly Israeli presence at Sharm el-Sheikh only real guarantee that there would be no renewal of blockade. Israel knew of no assurance contrary to its belief that any international forces could be physically removed by the Egyptians or by a majority vote in the UN in favor of Egypt.

8. Eban continued that he was even more astonished by the extraordinary formulation of US views on the necessity for Egypt to sign "something in writing." Never had the idea of a contractual agreement been more contemptuously expressed. Israel had given up on the idea of a formal peace treaty and had agreed that something like USSR-Japan agreement might be suitable.

9. UAR position was that they would sign a copy of UN resolution and so would Israel. Israel's position was that it is essential there must be a contract between the parties. While Israel had said it could accept something other than a classic treaty, US proposal was complete acceptance of Arab and Soviet view.

10. Eban said when Katzenbach statements compared with those of President Johnson and US Security Council representatives, there was a depletion of US position. He wanted to ask now the status of President's Sept. 10 pronouncement. In discussions in Washington it had been intimated that Israel's position had changed. Certainly US statements as compared with those previously made by President and in SC indicated a change on part US. Eban hoped Amb could assure him this not so and recent statements were only paraphrase of previous policy.

11. It was not true Israel's policy had changed, Eban said. Israel had not wanted to bind itself to territorial changes before negotiations. He could not understand why it was considered more moderate to formulate and transmit positions in advance of negotiations. He had thought Ambassador Ball agreed when he had said that one should not start negotiations with the most flexible position but with the hardest. Therefore Israel had told UAR through Jarring that security and navigation concerns would govern its positions. Israel had no encyclopedic interest in Sinai but was functionally concerned with security and navigation. Israel had not said anything about Suez (though it wanted freedom of transit of Canal) since this was not linked to territorial settlement. Nobody had showed Israel how anything other than Israeli presence at Sharm el-Sheikh would provide security. It was not true that Israel had now said this for the first time. Eban had made this position clear to the Secretary and to Ball and Sisco. Eban had told Secretary in Sept Israeli presence needed at Sharm el-Sheikh and this had been Eban's position in last talk with Secretary. It certainly undermined Israeli negotiating position for great power to tell UAR in advance they could wash out Israel. US should let Egypt try to persuade Israel or Israel to persuade Egypt how to dispose of this vital interest. GOI thought it had been approaching US views in its last document. It had hinted to UAR they would have to assure Israel on security and Sharm el-Sheikh. This not unprecedented. After war, countries try to maintain interest. This was true of USSR and US after WWII. US had also said it needed to maintain forces in and administration over certain places which it had occupied.

12. Eban then turned to Jordan. Said he did not know whether anyone had told Jordan Israel should return to the boundaries of June 4. If so, this would be even more difficult. Jordan seemed interested enough to continue talks through Jarring. Israeli position would be utterly undermined if someone intervened against it. If US wanted to do something, it should urge Jordan to be forthcoming./2/

/2/In a separate telegram, Barbour reported that Eban expanded on his concern about negotiations with Jordan. Eban said that Israel had put forward territorial terms to Jordan, which Eban felt would command international support. Israel's proposals included the demilitarization of the West Bank with only certain unpopulated areas to remain as Israeli territory while the remainder of the occupied territory and all of the affected population would revert to Jordan. Eban noted that his government was concerned that the progress made in negotiations with Jordan would be undermined if the United States were to state to Jordan, as it had to the UAR, that it supported the Arab demand for a return to the June 4 boundaries. (Telegram 6152 from Tel Aviv, November 19; Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. X, Cables and Memos, 6/68-11/68)

13. Eban concluded his presentation by saying he could not remember many occasions which had been so disconcerting. In all frankness and friendship he had to say he regretted the whole exchange. He hoped the US would not talk with Israel's enemies before talking with Israel on matters of such vital concern.

14. Amb replied he not aware any US conversation with Jordan similar to that with UAR. He thought Eban read too much into US talk with Riad. US policy still remains as enunciated by President June 19 and Sept. 10. Keystone of our view is insistence on necessity for agreement between parties. Form of contract is minor compared with substantive content of agreement. On major points he did not think US position differed from that of Israel. US not asking Israel to go back to June 4. We had proposed some time ago that Israel offer to return to the former border with special regimes for Sharm el-Sheikh and Gaza. Israel had not gone along with that proposal. Its statement to Jarring did not mention withdrawal but did hint that Israel would give up Sinai.

15. Amb continued that US had felt it must be involved because we were extremely concerned that Jarring negotiations were getting virtually nowhere. We had stayed out of the negotiations except for general statements of policy to which US still adhered. We had thought that if we talked with UAR and USSR we could smoke them out even if we did not achieve actual movement toward a settlement. He did not think US had given away Israel's position or had made negotiations more difficult. We were working for peace and peace was in Israel's interests. Our insistence on agreement meant insistence on negotiations. We do have a definite difference of opinion on Sharm el-Sheikh. We envisaged support for arrangements for Israel's freedom of navigation through Tiran Strait, but do not support these arrangements being made by Israel. If votes can be gotten in UN to put a force in it may be possible to make that force permanent and not subject to Egypt's veto.

16. Eban broke in that UAR could give a green light now to a UN force and then a red light later whenever it suited its fancy. Amb noted Secretary had made clear to Riad (and Amb thought Riad had accepted this point) that if UAR had agreed last year to what it now says it would agree to on Tiran Strait, there would have been no war last year. In any event, US had not repeated Israeli positions to UAR but its own, but he did not think these positions so different. Appreciate Eban's concern in tight negotiating position. On other hand, if Eban right that Egyptians are not interested in settlement at all, it would make no difference anyway. Safeguard for Israel's position was still necessity for agreement between parties. US was not introducing solution of its own.

17. On refugee question, Amb said there had never been agreement as to number of refugees who would want to come back to Israel. There were many reasons why refugees had left Israel, including unwillingness to live under Israeli state, and giving them choice would not erase reasons why they had left to begin with. Eban said there was difference between making this proposal to Israel and making it to Arabs. We were setting right of individual against right of sovereign state. Amb replied we did not think it disservice, but rather service to Israel to have some kind of census reflecting desires of refugees regarding return.

18. Amb went on to say important thing at this stage in Jarring Mission was that something had to be introduced into equation and this is what US had tried to do. Eban replied it meaningful that Riad packed up and went home few days after hearing US presentation. He continued that US had not talked with Israel about signing "some piece of paper" but about a permanent contractual arrangement binding on both parties for peace. Amb replied US had not talked to UAR either merely about piece of paper. Rafael interjected what affair was it of US to talk to other side about things which Israel and Egypt should talk about. Amb retorted US had sovereign right to talk with anyone about its position on matters of concern to it.

19. Eban continued that US formulation to Egypt made far less demands to UAR than on Israel. Amb said President's statements are policy and views expressed to UAR reflect that policy.

20. Bitan said Riad's reaction to proposal that Egypt sign a document of which Israel was signatory indicated Riad also had something else in mind other than a contractual undertaking between UAR and Israel. This showed Riad did not understand US proposal in same way Israel had done. Eban said what US ought to do was not protect UAR from proposals which Israel had made but to urge UAR to answer. What had actually happened was UAR had received impression from US that if they went on recalcitrantly long enough US position would get closer to that of UAR.

21. Rafael said he would review what had happened. US (in persons Ball and Sisco) had come to Israel and said throw out some bait to UAR on procedural matters. Israel had done so. Then US had come again to Israel and said throw out more bait. Fon Minister had done so. Then, instead of waiting for UAR to respond, US had proceeded to throw out more bait of its own, while other side had not moved an inch. On Nov 7 UAR had stated its position precisely: Israel must liquidate aggression and withdraw. In face of these concepts of enemy, US had carried Israel further along road with UAR and USSR. Eban said US spoke, on question of peace, only in terms of end of belligerency and said nothing about the just and lasting peace which Israel felt it required.

22. Amb replied there should be no misunderstanding on this point. We did not see a possibility in the first instance of full peace and diplomatic relations between Israel and the Arab states. We felt condition of non-belligerency and stability necessary which could develop over time into real peace. Peace was in interest of both Israel and US and US was not undermining Israel's interest in trying to work for peace.

23. Eban said if US had come to Israel and consulted about proposed approach to UAR he thought he could have persuaded US differently. He would not have asked US to follow Israel's policy but would have asked that US stick to its previous policy statements. Amb noted we had also sought consultation in advance with Israel on paper to be given Riad through Jarring, but in spite of repeated requests had seen paper only one and one-half hours before delivery. Eban said he frankly had wondered if US had wanted to be in position of being involved with Israeli paper. Noted he had given Secretary full account in advance and had followed US suggested wording.

24. Eban noted Sisco and others had said it would be tragic if there were divergences between Israel and US. He thought this not necessarily so. It only natural Israel should have more strengthened positions than US. He found it not tragic but disconcerting when policies formulated at highest levels, with which Israel could live, were suddenly reformulated. He would like to be able to inform his government that US policy remained as enunciated by President Johnson and US representatives in highest international councils./3/ Noted he was disappointed by Riad's last reply. Riad could have replied to Israel's question on Suez Canal, nature of peace, etc. but had refused bilateral negotiations, negotiations under Jarring auspices, and now even refuses to negotiate by messages exchanged through Jarring.

/3/Under Secretary Rostow called in Ambassador Rabin on November 19 to reassure Israel that there had been no change in the U.S. position concerning a peace settlement in the Middle East. Rostow reiterated that the United States would not support any settlement that fell short of a secure peace for which the Arab states took responsibility. He added that U.S. policy also remained as stated by President Johnson to Prime Minister Eshkol when he said that the further Israel went from the armistice lines the further it would be from peace. (Telegram 275224 to Tel Aviv, November 21; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR)

Barbour

316. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel/1/

Washington, November 11, 1968, 1857Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL ISR-US. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Drafted by Sterner; cleared by Atherton, Davies, and Walt Rostow; and approved by Rusk. Rostow also cleared the telegram with President Johnson. (Memorandum from Rostow to Johnson, November 10; Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Harold H. Saunders, Israel-Nuclear-Dimona-Desalting, 11/1/68-1/20/69)

269999. 1. You should deliver this as a personal message from the President to Prime Minister Eshkol:

2. "Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I am writing to you, first, to welcome the prospect of your visit here later this month,/2/ and secondly, to raise with you again a subject that has become of increasing importance to me as I enter the closing days of my Administration.

/2/On November 12 the Israeli Embassy informed the Department that Prime Minister Eshkol had been advised by his doctor to defer the U.S. trip scheduled for November 25. The Embassy indicated that Eshkol hoped to make a brief trip in December to meet with the President. (Telegram 271424 to Tel Aviv, November 14; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL ISR-US) Walt Rostow sent a memorandum to President Johnson on November 13 informing him of Eshkol's change in plans and inquiring about a suitable date for an Eshkol visit in December. The President responded with a handwritten note on Rostow's memorandum that reads: "Let's Forget Visit." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. X, Memos, 6/68-11/68)

As I look back over my five years in office, I find that one endeavor overshadows all those that have called upon my time and energy. This has been the search for peace. Central to it has been our effort to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. The United States has assumed a special responsibility for this endeavor. It is at the heart not only of my own nation's security interests but also of the security of every nation in the world. As you know I am personally deeply committed to this task.

My deep concern on this subject was expressed to you personally as long ago as June 1964. Since then there has been no slackening of the arms race in the Near East, and the weapons introduced into the area have grown increasingly sophisticated. It would be a tragedy--an irreversible tragedy--if this arms race extended into the field of nuclear weapons or nuclear weapons delivery systems.

Secretary Rusk emphasized these points last month to Foreign Minister Eban when he stressed the United States' concern that Israel's continued delay in signing the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty will have the effect of increasing, rather than reducing, pressures for other area states to develop or acquire nuclear weapons.

We have carefully studied your Government's paper handed to Ambassador Barbour on October 28./3/ We welcome the reaffirmation of your Government's assurances that Israel will not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the area. It is our strong conviction, however, that with a Non-Proliferation Treaty now in existence, only Israel's adherence to that Treaty can give the world confidence that Israel does not intend to develop nuclear weapons.

/3/See footnote 2, Document 292.

I therefore welcome the statement in your Government's paper that you are engaged in intensive study of the implications of signing the Treaty. It is my earnest hope that this study will result in a decision to sign the Treaty at an early date. Israel's failure to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty would be a severe blow to my Government's global efforts to halt the spread of nuclear weapons. The United States would also be deeply troubled if operational strategic missiles were to appear in the Near East. I hope you can give me an encouraging response on these matters when we talk later this month.

It will be good to see you here. You are welcome not only as a distinguished and esteemed colleague but as a close personal friend.

Sincerely, Lyndon B. Johnson"

Rusk

317. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Washington, November 12, 1968, 3:30-4:30 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. X, Cables and Memos, 6/68-11/68. Top Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Murray and approved by Warnke. The meeting was held in Warnke's office. The memorandum is marked "Fourth Session."

SUBJECT
Negotiations with Israel-F-4 and Advanced Weapons

PARTICIPANTS

Israeli Side
Ambassador of Israel, Lieutenant General Yitzhak Rabin
Minister Shlomo Argov, Israeli Embassy
Major General Hod, Commander, Israeli Defense Force Air Force
Brigadier General David Carmon, Defense and Armed Forces Attache

United States Side
Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), Paul C. Warnke
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), Harry H. Schwartz
Deputy Director, NESA Region (ISA), Robert J. Murray

Mr. Warnke opened the meeting by saying that, as he had indicated in a previous discussion, we are interested in substance and not form in the matters we have been addressing. We believe it is your feeling that Israel will not and cannot accept our request for advance assurances concerning strategic missiles and nuclear weapons as preconditions to the contract. You propose alternative formulations to be included in the contract which are essentially reaffirmations of earlier agreements: not to use American aircraft to carry nuclear weapons, and not to be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the area. In our discussions I believe I have made clear to you our interpretation of "unusual and compelling circumstances" which would require that we cancel the F-4 contract. The contract would provide that action inconsistent with these assurances would constitute such circumstances. On these bases I believe we can draft an agreement that will be acceptable to you and which will meet your requirements--although not fully meeting mine.

Mr. Warnke observed that he could not find in the record any understanding of what Israel means by the provision: "Israel will not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the area." Mr. Warnke asked the Ambassador what was meant by this term?

Ambassador Rabin said that "it means what we have said, namely, that we would not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons." Mr. Warnke asked what specifically was meant by the word "introduce." Ambassador Rabin said, "you are more familiar with these things than we are. What is your definition of nuclear weapons?" Mr. Warnke said that there are two aspects to the question: the definition of what is and what is not a nuclear weapon, and what is and what is not introduction into the area. Regarding the first, if there are components available that could be assembled to make a nuclear weapon--although part A may be in one room and part B in another room--then that is a nuclear weapon. As for introduction, that is your term and you will have to define it. Does it mean no physical presence? Ambassador Rabin said, "I suppose so."

Mr. Warnke said: "what if you have access to nuclear weapons that are in another country? Is that then 'introduction'"? Ambassador Rabin asked if we believed that this was the situation. Mr. Warnke replied that he was just trying to find the Israeli definition. He noted that the same situation could apply the other way around: for example, what if another country in the area had access to nuclear weapons but had not brought them in? Ambassador Rabin said, continuing the example, that if China said they had nuclear weapons for Egypt stored in China, he didn't know what the Israeli reaction would be. He hasn't given the matter a great deal of thought. He believed that "introduction" would require their physical presence in the area.

General Hod asked if the term "introduction" had an accepted usage in international law. Mr. Warnke replied that it had not. General Hod said that throughout the world the experience was that introduction of a weapon could only mean after testing. You could not introduce a weapon until after it actually became a weapon.

Ambassador Rabin asked: "Do you consider a nuclear weapon one that has not been tested, and has been done by a country without previous experience"? Mr. Warnke: "Certainly. China with a strategic missile capability would be assumed to have nuclear weapons even had it not tested these weapons." Ambassador Rabin said: "All nuclear powers-the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, China--have tested nuclear weapons. Do you really believe introduction comes before testing"? Mr. Schwartz said that what the Ambassador was talking about is reliability. Ambassador Rabin disagreed saying that based on his experience with conventional weapons, he would not consider a weapon that had not been tested to be a weapon.

Mr. Warnke asked whether, if the UAR had missiles with nuclear war heads but had not actually tested them, would Israel consider that the UAR had not introduced nuclear weapons? He said that testing by other nuclear powers is very relevant to a potential nuclear power if the latter is developing weapons based on existing technology.

Ambassador Rabin said that, "weapons serve policy, not vice versa. Since the UAR's goal is to destroy us I would take it with very great concern. Our policy is not to destroy the UAR. You must combine the weapon with the policy." General Hod observed that a very good example of introduction was when Egypt introduced missiles into the area in 1963, claiming they were capable of hitting anything south of Beirut. Ambassador Rabin said: "My concern with Egypt is with missiles with chemical rather than nuclear war heads. If Egypt were to hit our densely populated areas, even in a limited way, it could be disastrous."

Mr. Warnke said, as he understood it, Ambassador Rabin applied two prerequisites to the word "introduction"--notoriety and pretesting.

Ambassador Rabin, saying that "I don't know what the Prime Minister said, but" there must be public acknowledgment. The purpose of nuclear weapons is not to use the weapon itself, but to use their deterrent power. "I don't believe any powers that have nuclear weapons plan to use them, although you cannot ever be sure." Ninety-nine per cent of their value is deterrence. Mr. Schwartz said: "You mean deterrence against governments, to deter governments from specific actions." Ambassador Rabin agreed: "The fact that you have got it must be known."

Mr. Warnke said that the Ambassador also introduced the factor of intent: if the UAR has missiles, Israel would be concerned; if Israel has them, there is no cause for concern. The purpose of strategic missiles for Israel would be for deterrence.

Ambassador Rabin said: "You are trying to combine strategic missiles and nuclear war heads. This is not necessary in the Middle East. To my mind, in the Middle East, missiles with war heads which are not nuclear weapons can play a role." Mr. Warnke asked, "What sort of role"? Ambassador Rabin said: "It depends on the other side. What we are concerned about in Egypt is their chemical warfare capability. As I explained in 1963 when I was here, one of our thoughts was that Egyptian missiles, even with conventional war heads, might contribute to their success if they made a surprise attack on our cities. They could interfere with the mobilization system under such circumstances, and this might play a great role in determining the outcome. Seventy per cent more or less of Army capability, although less for the Air Force, is based on mobilization, not just on manpower but vehicles, transport, supplies, and so forth. During the six day war we had mobilized so much of the resource of our cities that we had to devote a portion of our military effort to resupplying the cities."

General Hod observed that Egypt has sea borne (Styx) missiles with 35 mile range and may have or may be receiving even more sophisticated missiles. Although these have a short range, they can be used sea-to-shore as well as sea-to-sea, and therefore can raise havoc with coastal cities such as Tel Aviv.

Ambassador Rabin said that they had heard of a plan, although they could not know for certain, to sell to Egypt missile destroyers with missiles of about 100 miles range which, although normally sea-to-sea, could also be used sea-to-shore. Rabin said Israel was worried that Egypt might launch sea borne missiles during the six day war, "but they did not dare to do this." Rabin said he also understands that there is a Cannon missile on the TU-16s now in Egypt that can hit the centers of our cities. "Therefore, we look at missiles somewhat differently than you. It is not necessary to have nuclear war heads on our missiles. There are war heads between high-explosive and nuclear."

Mr. Warnke said: "Then in your view, an unadvertised, untested nuclear device is not a nuclear weapon." Ambassador Rabin said: "Yes, that is correct." Mr. Warnke asked: "What about an advertised but untested nuclear device or weapon. Would that be introduction?" Ambassador Rabin said: "Yes, that would be introduction." Mr. Warnke said he would interpret mere physical presence in the area as constituting, in itself, "introduction".

Mr. Warnke concluded the discussion by saying that he would talk with Mr. Hoopes, that we would have a Memorandum of Understanding prepared within a few days incorporating the provisions we have discussed, and that General Hod could in the meantime meet with the Air Force to continue the technical discussions that we are at this time prepared to go ahead with. Mr. Warnke said that we ought to continue these discussions so that we might try to arrive at some understanding between us as to the problems of missiles and nuclear weapons. At this time, with respect to "introduction," Mr. Warnke said there was not much clarity and no agreement.

318. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State/1/

New York, November 12, 1968, 0246Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to Tel Aviv, Amman, and Cairo.

7729. Subject: Middle East.

1. Buffum called on Jarring Nov 11 and, in accordance with Sisco telecon, orally conveyed 7 points outlined by Secretary as describing our attitude toward Israeli settlement with UAR./2/ Buffum informed Jarring we had conveyed these points both to Riad and to USSR.

/2/See Document 301.

2. Jarring thought it was of great importance that US had taken stand in favor of Israeli withdrawal from UAR territory and said further that other 6 points in our position should be acceptable to UAR although it would be difficult get their agreement to an international presence at Sharm el-Sheikh which could not be removed without consent of SC or GA. Jarring commented that in view of this forthcoming attitude by US, he was surprised and disappointed Riad had not been more forthcoming with him during past week.

3. Jarring reported having spoken several times over week-end with Eban. In these talks he pressed Israelis further for unqualified statement on acceptance of Res 242 and on withdrawal of Israeli forces. He said he thought Eban had softened a little bit, at least to extent of indicating willingness to take fresh look at problem.

4. At same time, Jarring was distressed by news report just recd from Jerusalem to effect Eshkol delivered policy statement today indicating Israeli intent to maintain forces not only at Sharm el-Sheikh but in Sinai. He thought this would have most adverse repercussions in Cairo and predicted UAR would be asking us how this squares with our attitude toward Israeli withdrawal.

5. Jarring has clearly not yet decided how to proceed in next phase of his mission. While disappointed at the lack of movement on substance, he is heartened that all parties continue to wish his services. This desire is very strong on part USSR, said Jarring, who had lengthy conversation this A.M. with Semenov. Jarring was satisfied Sov Union will make efforts with Arabs to try and move his mission forward.

6. Buffum said Russians are talking to us in same vein and pointed out that concerted efforts on our side with Israelis, if coupled with Sov pressure on Arabs, could combine to give new impetus to his efforts.

7. Jarring seems disposed to stay on in NY at least for a while until he sorts out results of most recent exchanges with Fon Mins here. He is assuming he will have to make another trip to their respective capitals but does not want to do so until he thinks there is a chance it will produce movement.

8. Buffum pressed Jarring again to consider taking initiative in putting questions to both sides together with indication of kind of answer he expects from them. He remains somewhat skeptical he can get kind of answers he wants but is still open-minded about pursuing this route. Buffum said we would wish to resume discussion of such possibility with him in detail in near future and Jarring said he would be pleased to do so.

Buffum

319. Letter From George D. Woods to President Johnson/1/

Washington, November 12, 1968.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Harold H. Saunders, Israel-Nuclear-Dimona-Desalting, 11/1/68-1/20/69. Confidential.

Dear Mr. President:

In May, 1968, my terms of reference as your coordinator on the Israeli power and desalting project were approved, and you said in a letter to me dated May 6/2/ that I was "to feel free to manage this in the way that makes the most sense."

/2/Not found.

I have attempted to be responsive to the terms of reference, although I have also proceeded in this complicated and highly sensitive problem as seemed to make the most sense to me in the present circumstances. My observations, conclusions and recommendations have been transmitted in the form of a memorandum to Mr. Walt W. Rostow, a copy of which is enclosed./3/ The principal recommendation is to concentrate on a 40-million-gallon-per-day (MGD) water desalting plant in Israel; and, in my judgment, work on this should proceed as a matter of priority if the goal of massive desalting-plant capability is to be achieved within the next ten to fifteen years.

/3/Also dated November 12, not printed.

I applaud your desire to lay as much groundwork as possible for progress in desalting, to paraphrase your May 6 letter, and the above recommendation is put forward with this objective in mind. With the knowledge and experience which will accumulate with the construction and operation of a medium-sized desalting plant, it will be possible to see more clearly down the road toward the 100 MGD projects and, ultimately, toward the even larger plants of the future.

Respectfully,

George D. Woods

320. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel/1/

Washington, November 13, 1968, 2218Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Atherton, cleared by Davies and Sisco, and approved by Katzenbach. Repeated to Amman, Beirut, Cairo, Jidda, London, Moscow, and USUN.

270935. Begin summary: Under Secretary Katzenbach called in Israeli Ambassador Rabin November 12 for review of recent US contacts, in context Jarring Mission, with UAR and Soviets. Under Secretary also expressed our concern at indications GOI thinking in terms of peace settlement involving territorial acquisitions by Israel in Sinai and West Bank--a position we could not support. Under Secretary said we have based our position on understanding that Israel seeks adequate security arrangements and recognition of boundaries but, leaving aside Jerusalem and Gaza as special problems, seeks no territory from UAR and only minor adjustments, with compensation, in pre-June 1967 lines with Jordan. At same time Under Secretary made clear we continue firmly support position that Israel should only withdraw in context of contractually binding peace settlement embodying clear guarantees for Israel's security and navigation rights, termination of belligerency and recognition of Israeli boundaries. Rabin argued that Israel's security requirements dictated some territorial changes and expressed view that position outlined by Under Secretary represented change in US stand; Israel was being asked make further concessions and its bargaining position was being undermined while UAR had given no indication it wanted peace. Under Secretary said our position was that settlement must be agreed among parties and we had therefore avoided expressing views on specifics. Nevertheless, we had consistently made clear we could not go along with Israeli efforts acquire Arab territory, given our long standing policy of support for territorial integrity of all states of area. End summary.

1. Under Secretary Katzenbach called in Israeli Ambassador Rabin November 12 to review recent US activities with respect to Jarring Mission and our views on where we go from here. Assistant Secretary Sisco, Davies (NEA) and Israeli Minister Argov also present.

2. Under Secretary reported that Soviets have been interested in continuing discussion with USG. We remain willing carry on dialogue with Soviets, making clear that it must be in Jarring Mission context. Dialogue so far had not gone far beyond our expressing concern re slow pace of Jarring Mission and inquiring of Soviets how they thought it might move forward. We had told Soviets we considered November 4 Israeli note to Jarring more responsive than UAR note which we had found disappointing. We had also had some discussion of arms control problems. In general we had not found Soviets pessimistic about Jarring's prospects. Sisco added that Soviets had reiterated desire see Jarring continue and had not interpreted latest Israeli and UAR notes as terminating Jarring Mission.

3. Under Secretary then summarized Secretary's November 2 conversation with UAR Foreign Minister Riad along following lines, noting that we did not consider it totally negative: Riad had said UAR wanted Jarring to continue but had expressed concern that Israel not prepared to withdraw from Egyptian territory to pre-June 5 lines. Secretary had stressed that withdrawal to international borders must be in context of state of peace and had noted that while UAR said it wanted peace, it had given no concrete ideas re kind of peace document it would accept. Riad had indicated UAR would sign some kind of document but had said neither that it would nor that it would not sign same document as Israel. Secretary had emphasized view that UAR should sign document to which Israel would also be signatory. He had also said that Resolution in our view was not self-executing and details would have to be negotiated. Re refugees, Secretary had stressed need for solution based on individual and secret refugee choice without results of that choice being binding in advance on any state. (Under Secretary noted in this connection Secretary's view that not many refugees would choose repatriation to Israel if choice were truly personal and secret.) Finally Secretary had stressed that there must be free passage through Straits of Tiran and Suez Canal with some kind of international peace keeping machinery at Sharm al-Shaykh. In stating these views to Riad, Secretary made clear he could not speak for Israel and was presenting US ideas.

4. Under Secretary continued that, as we saw it, most difficult questions related to territory on one hand and nature of peace on other. It was difficult for UAR and Jordan to say what they meant by peace without their having an idea of Israel's views on territorial question. On basis of our many discussions with GOI, USG assumed Israel's position was that, in context of peace, it would withdraw substantially to pre-June 5 lines, leaving aside Jerusalem and Gaza which were special problems. We had assumed there need be no changes with respect to UAR and with respect to Jordan only "really minor" changes on security grounds, with compensation for Jordan. Arabs had interpreted Israel's concept of changes for security reasons, however, as involving significant territorial acquisitions by Israel. This caused problems for USG, given our basic position on territorial integrity. We had held this position consistently without going into details of how a peace settlement could be arranged. Instead, in light of 1957 experience and origins of 1967 war, we had based our position on need for peace agreed to among parties. As President made clear in his September 10 speech, however, we had assumed territorial question would be resolved without transfer of significant areas to Israel. We recognized that it would be difficult to devise adequate security arrangements but believed this was possible without territorial transfers.

5. Rabin asked for clarification--was it the US position that leaving Jerusalem aside, Israel should withdraw to June 4 boundaries? Under Secretary said this was our position, allowing for adjustments of the kind contemplated in General Armistice Agreements, providing there were satisfactory security arrangements and a context of peace. In response to Rabin's comment that this was news to him, Under Secretary said this had been our position throughout. Ambassador Goldberg had said as much to King Hussein in November 1967 and had so informed Foreign Minister Eban at the time.

6. Rabin replied that Israel believed secure and recognized boundaries would require some territorial changes. Israel's guideline was security; it was not seeking real estate for its own sake. Eban had made clear to Secretary that Israel did not interpret "withdrawal" to mean withdrawal from all occupied territories. With respect to UAR, Israel needed to provide full protection for free passage through Straits of Tiran and would require land communications to Sharm al-Shaykh and Israeli presence there. Re Jordan, certain territorial changes would also be required but their precise nature had not yet been decided, although principles governing such changes had been agreed upon within GOI. To counter Arab arguments that Israel would not withdraw, Israel had been pressed to accept principle of secure and recognized boundaries to be agreed upon among parties. Now USG was asking Israel to accept principle of settlement practically to June 4 lines even though UAR had refused indicate that it wanted peaceful settlement or that it would sign document with Israel. UAR could now conclude that, having succeeded in getting US to accept position that withdrawal should be to pre-war lines without itself having given up anything, it should now see what more it could get. GOI had made concessions in latest note to Jarring whereas UAR had given up nothing since passage of November 1967 Security Council Resolution when it had dropped insistence on prior withdrawal. UAR was seeking to erode the meaning of peace. Furthermore, it was clear there was no US-Israeli understanding on what peace means.

7. Under Secretary replied that USG had avoided speaking of June 4 lines since this would be misleading with respect to Jerusalem and kind of adjustments we have in mind. To us the words "recognized and secure" meant "security arrangements" and "recognition" of new lines as international boundaries. We had never meant that Israel could extend its territory to West Bank or Suez if this was what it felt its security required. We had always thought new map would look very much like pre-war map but with Israel's security assured. We had assumed Israel had no territorial problems with UAR-only problems of security. If more than that was involved then US and Israel would be on divergent courses. Rabin read relevant portion of General Armistice Agreement to make point GAA placed no limitations whatever on territorial changes which could be made. Under Secretary said if it was Israel's position that all territories were negotiable, such position on Israel's part would confront USG with difficulties and we could not support it. Putting aside Jerusalem, Gaza and Syrian Heights for now, since they presented different kind of problem, we sought security for Israel not territory.

8. Under Secretary said he would put question another way: if Israel were satisfied with guarantees of demilitarization and navigation and obtained contractual agreements plus termination of belligerency plus recognition of boundaries, would Israel withdraw to the old lines?

9. Rabin said he did not believe Israel would be satisfied. In response to Under Secretary's question whether Israel sought permanent presence at Sharm al-Shaykh or simply absence of any presence plus the right to assure the latter, Rabin said the lesson of the early 1950s and of May 1967 was that there should be Israeli presence at Sharm al-Shaykh. Otherwise, as experience had shown, UAR could deploy troops and thereby change situation without firing a shot. This put onus on Israel to fire first which caused it problems with big powers. Israel wanted to be in position to prevent interference with its navigation without having to shoot. Israel could not rely on UAR and international forces were of no use.

10. Under Secretary said he thought clear cut arrangements for Israel's security could be made--e.g., terms of settlement could provide that presence of any country at Sharm al-Shaykh would be regarded as act of war justifying self defense under Article 51 of UN Charter. Rabin responded that 1957 arrangements were almost that precise but violation by UAR had only led to international debate. Lawyer could always find counter arguments to any legal device. In response to Sisco's comment that this line of Israeli reasoning undermined Israel's entire concept of peace based on treaties, Rabin said there was big difference between violation of boundaries, which would be clear to all and violation of security arrangements, which could be interpreted in various ways. To cite another example, Rabin said Jordan had promised USG not to deploy tanks on West Bank but this arrangement had been violated. Davies commented that there was important difference between Jordan's telling US Ambassador it would put no tanks on West Bank and Jordan's making formal commitment on demilitarization to Israel or Security Council.

11. Under Secretary said his main concern was that US and Israel not find themselves on divergent courses. Having taken position that Israel had no territorial demands if Arabs made peace, we would be in difficult position if it developed this was not the case. Time might come when Jarring would feel he should put forward proposals for settlement. Point had already been reached where USG, in pressing UAR to be more forthcoming, had said we did not anticipate territorial problems if UAR was prepared for peace. Sisco noted that Israel had told us many times there would be no territorial problems with UAR if latter agreed conclude binding contractual peace settlement. We were concerned that Israeli position had changed and that security needs were being linked with substantial territorial acquisitions.

12. Rabin asked what USG had received from UAR in return for giving UAR US position. Under Secretary replied that we had made clear to UAR that we were not speaking for Israel. Israel remained in occupation and this seemed to us a good bargaining position. Israel's bargaining position depended on fact of Israeli occupation, not on question of how much or how little it wanted to retain.

13. Argov said he thought USG and GOI had agreed, in context of our discussion of Soviet approach in September, that USG did not endorse Soviet proposal for total withdrawal "except for a few miles here and there." He feared position taken by USG with UAR had undermined Israel's bargaining position. Under Secretary said this would be the case only if Israeli position was to seek territorial acquisitions. We had made clear to UAR where we thought responsibility for 1967 war lay and that our position as stated to UAR was premised on need for peace. Sisco added that Israeli bargaining position could not be undermined by US position based on binding peace and fulfillment of Security Council Resolution; Israeli leverage results from fact it is in occupied territories. US is not asking Israel to withdraw to international boundary in circumstances other than a satisfactory peace binding parties. Under Secretary expressed hope we could now proceed to useful discussion with Israelis of what the concept of peace means to Israel in specific terms.

14. Rabin concluded conversation by saying he had clearly understood Under Secretary's message and would report to his government.

Katzenbach

321. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Washington, November 14, 1968.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Harold H. Saunders, Israel, 10/1/68-1/20/69. Secret; Nodis. Prepared by Harold Saunders. Copies were sent to Walt Rostow, John Walsh, Philip Heymann, Rodger Davies, and Roy Atherton.

PARTICIPANTS
Shlomo Argov, Minister, Israeli Embassy
Harold H. Saunders

During lunch at his invitation--"to tell you my tale of woe"--Shlomo made a middle-sized speech covering the following points to make clear his (and, he said, Ambassador Rabin's) reaction to the November 12 Rabin-Argov talk with Under Secretary Katzenbach:/2/

/2/See Document 320.

1. Either the Israelis have been "living in a fool's paradise" or the US has changed its position. He believes it's the latter. He and Rabin agree (once Shlomo "explained the term") that we're practicing "salami tactics" on them. First we knocked them off direct negotiations. Then we got them to "accept the resolution." Then made them use the word "withdraw" (Comment: Joe Sisco will be pleased at his success!). Now we're pushing them to accept "June 4 lines."

2. The Israelis aren't going to take this demarche seriously because we "speak out of both sides of our mouths" and the various positions we've stated are inconsistent with each other. For example:

--One American says Jerusalem is "the key question." Another says it can be set aside for the time being, "implying Israel has a case."

--One American says there's no such thing as "instant peace." Another says Israel can withdraw when it gets a peace treaty because there will be peace then.

3. The US has undercut Israel's bargaining position without offering anything in return. The US has "made concessions" to the Arabs without getting anything in return.

4. The US is playing fast and loose with Israel's security without taking Israel into its confidence. Worst of all, the US "will not talk to us" about its view of what the Soviets are up to in the Middle East. Israel physically faces Russians across the Canal; they're "the real menace to Israel--physically breathing down our necks." Yet the US won't even tell the Israelis exactly what we think Soviet objectives are. What's more, "we've watched how you worked this deal with Vietnam and we're inclined to think there's some sort of stratospheric deal with the Russians, maybe including the Middle East. That just won't work with us."

5. Above all, if the US wants Israel to take it seriously, it will have to make clear what it means by peace. "To put it bluntly, we don't have any confidence that you've thought through the relationship that should exist after a settlement. Given your 'salami tactics', we think you'll ask us to compromise next--now that you've asked us to compromise on territories--on Israeli ships through the Canal (you'll say Israeli cargoes in foreign bottoms are OK); then you'll say we don't need a 'peace treaty'; then you'll tell us we're unrealistic in the way we define peace."

Trying to respond in roughly parallel sequence to this extended oration, I made the following points:

1. Our policy has not changed. We've talked consistently about territorial integrity (May 23 and June 19, 1967); about withdrawal (June 19); about Jordan getting the West Bank back (November 1967 to Hussein and Eban); about the inadmissibility of the conquest of territory by force (November 22); about boundary changes only as they're agreed in "honest negotiation" as parts of a "just compromise" not dominated by "the weight of conquest" (September 10, 1968). I said we had heard Israelis describe the Dayan plan, the Allon plan, the corridor-to-Sharm-el-Sheikh plan and the keep-all-of-Jerusalem plan. Each time we have heard one of these, we have said repeatedly and at all levels that none of these is good enough to produce peace. As a matter of principle, our position has been clear. What we are doing now is not to tell anybody where to draw his boundaries; we are saying very simply that it is a fact that there will be no peace if Israel tries to hold onto large chunks of territory.

I could not accept his charge of "salami tactics" for one very simple reason--our policy has not changed. If anything has changed, it has been a step-by-step Israeli perception of our position. We never agreed on direct negotiation (June 19: "exclude no method;" Shlomo acknowledged that.). We never agreed to their border schemes, but they never took us seriously; they just turned off their hearing aids. What has happened in the last 4-5 months is that the tactical situation has reached a crucial point where we could no longer afford to let the Israeli Government go on deluding itself that it had a blank check from the US.

This is especially important if negotiations with Jordan are coming to a head. Everything Mr. Katzenbach had said about our territorial position on the Israel-UAR border applies in principle to the Israel-Jordan border, and if Israel plans to offer Jordan the Allon plan, we don't want anyone--especially the Israeli Government--to think the US will support that. We want Israel to know-as we told Allon here--that that's a non-starter.

2. On inconsistency, there's nothing inconsistent in saying that Jerusalem is the "key issue" and in saying it's so difficult that it may have to be negotiated apart from the rest of the territorial settlement.

3. We haven't undercut Israel's bargaining position. Israel's main bargaining counter is occupation. We haven't proposed to anyone that Israel withdraw except to a condition of peace. But when two parties are trying to start negotiating, their positions have to be somewhere in the same ballpark--close enough so that it at least seems remotely possible to bridge the gap between them. What we've urged Israel to do is to drop the absolutely impossible and untenable elements in its position to test whether the Egyptians will come to meet a half-reasonable position. If they don't then we'll at least know who stands where. But with Israel's position not even in the ball park, there was no way to put Egypt to the test.

4. We have taken Israel into our confidence. But frankly, we don't feel Israel has listened very attentively or taken our views seriously.

5. They were asking a fair question in asking us our definition of peace. I thought we had done this but felt it worthwhile to take another stab at doing it more precisely.

HS

322. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, November 15, 1968, 1:05 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East, Vol. II, 4/68-1/69. Secret; Nodis.

SUBJECT
Recent Steps in the Mid-East

You should be aware of several recent steps Secretaries Rusk and Katzenbach have taken to clarify our position on a Mid-East settlement (Nick's memo attached)./2/

/2/Reference is to a November 15 memorandum from Katzenbach to the President with the subject heading: "Present Status of Middle East Peace Efforts."

In his last talk with UAR Foreign Minister Riad, Secretary Rusk summarized his interpretation of the UN resolution as it applies to a UAR-Israel settlement this way:

--Israeli withdrawal from UAR territory. [We never thought Israel had territorial designs in the Sinai.]/3/

/3/Brackets in the source text.

--Formal termination of the state of war.

--Suez Canal open to ships of all flags.

--Refugee settlement on the basis of personal and secret choice of individual refugees on where to live (including return to Israel as one possible choice).

--International presence at Sharm el-Sheikh which could not be removed without consent of UN Security Council or General Assembly.

--UAR should sign something in writing to which Israel also is a signatory.

--General understanding about level of arms in the area (though this not required in the first instance).

Nick spelled these out for Rabin a couple of days ago. Rabin feels we've changed our position and undermined Israel's bargaining position.

The fact is that this has been our consistent position for over a year, but the Israelis have turned off their hearing aids on us. As for undermining their position, we can't afford to go along with their bazaar haggling if we're going to have any chance of peace. What's more, we really would have undercut them if we had let them think we'd given them a blank check. It's especially important as negotiations with Jordan reach a climax that they know where we stand.

Nevertheless, you may hear some strong protests.

Walt

323. Telegram From the U.S. Interests Section of the Spanish Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State/1/

Cairo, November 16, 1968, 1295Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 15-1 US/NIXON. Secret; Flash; Exdis.

3912. For Robert B. Murphy from Robert B. Anderson.

"Have just had long meeting with Hassan Sabri al-Khouli at Presidency who informs me President Nasser seriously concerned by not receiving reply to his message to President-elect Nixon/2/ which President Nasser purposefully intended be generous and friendly./3/ I am informed rumors are spreading in this part of world that President Nasser has been ignored by President-elect Nixon. Recommend you send urgent message from President-elect Nixon acknowledging Nasser telegram and responding in a manner as friendly as President-elect Nixon is agreeable. For your information I will be seeing President Nasser late this afternoon or tomorrow and I would hope to have some reply in hand when I see him if that feasible."

/2/See footnote 2, Document 314.

/3/Bergus reported that Presidential adviser Hassan Sabri al-Khouli had placed the same emphasis on the importance of a reply from President-elect Nixon during a conversation on November 14. Khouli had returned from New York convinced of the good will toward Egypt of many important people in the United States, but when Bergus raised the question of the seven points that Rusk had outlined to Riad as the basis for a peace settlement in the Middle East, Khouli said that the UAR response would depend on Nixon's response to Nasser's congratulatory telegram. (Telegram 3900 Cairo, November 15; ibid., POL 27 ARAB-ISR) For text of Nixon's response, see Document 324.

Bergus

324. Telegram From the Department of State to the U.S. Interests Section of the Spanish Embassy in the United Arab Republic/1/

Washington, November 16, 1968, 2100Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 15-1 US/NIXON. Confidential; Immediate. Drafted by John P. Walsh.

273043. Please convey following message to President Nasser from President Elect Nixon in manner you deem most appropriate:

"President Gamal Abdul Nasser

Cairo

Dear Mr. President:

Your friendly message of congratulations on my election is much appreciated./2/ I too recall with pleasure our meeting in Cairo in 1963 and remember the very warm Egyptian hospitality shown us by your government and your people.

/2/See footnote 2, Document 314.

With regard to your expression of hope that my election may create an opportunity for progress on some of the world's problems, let me assure you that the United States Government under my administration will continue to give a high priority to the search for a just peace and amicable relationships in the Middle East as well as elsewhere.

With my best personal wishes for your good health and prosperity, and with best regards to your family./3/

/3/Bergus reported that he delivered the message on November 17 and that it was given front-page treatment by all of the Cairo newspapers on the following morning. Bergus described the text as "just right." (Telegram 3915 from Cairo, November 18; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 15-1 US/NIXON)

Sincerely, Richard M. Nixon"

Katzenbach

325. Information Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, November 18, 1968, 2:40 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Walt W. Rostow, Arab-Israeli Private Talks. Secret; Sensitive; Literally Eyes Only.

Mr. President:

These two special CIA messages on Israel-Jordan negotiations have just arrived via Dick Helms./2/

/2/Reference is to two memoranda sent by CIA Director Helms to President Johnson on November 18 reporting on secret negotiations between Israel and Jordan; neither printed.

As you will see:

--The Israelis have agreed to proceed with the secret 19th November meeting, although they sought a week's postponement. The Jordanians believe the postponement was requested because of Israel's difficulty in obtaining a Cabinet consensus on their negotiating position.

--[3-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

--You will recall from earlier messages that, if the meeting with the Israelis were successful, Hussein envisaged that the positive results would be surfaced through Jarring and carried forward by Jarring from that point. If the result of the 19th November meeting were negative, Hussein envisaged surfacing his own position through Jarring and letting Jarring carry the matter from that point forward so that for the first time Jarring would be able to deal with both the UAR and Jordanian aspects of the problem.

[4 paragraphs (16 lines of source text) not declassified]

Walt

326. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State/1/

Tel Aviv, November 19, 1968, 1400Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to Amman, Cairo, and USUN.

6153. Israel-Arab settlement.

Begin summary: Eban told Ambassador Nov. 18 that Under Secretary Katzenbach-Amb Rabin Nov 12 conversation and other talks connected therewith were most remarkable episode in negative sense, in US-Israel relations. Absurd for Israel and US to get into a dispute which was not real, which concerned a third party which was not interested in reaching agreement. Fact that US had expressed views to UAR and USSR weakened Israel negotiating position. US formulation totally unacceptable to Israel and conflicts with President's Sept. 10 speech. Previous US statements had been broad and provided flexibility for interpretation, which Israel had thought intended. Proposal had been made in Israeli Cabinet to withdraw or at least not repeat GOI acceptance SC resolution. International presence at Sharm el-Sheikh would not be viable, and UN would have no power to keep it there. Private poll of refugees would place individual desires above national sovereignty and not acceptable to Israel. Contractual agreement which US talked of seriously with GOI was referred to contemptuously as mere piece of paper in talk with UAR. US alleged GOI policy had changed but this not so. It was US views which had changed. Eban hoped to hear US policy remained as previously delineated by President. Ambassador noted US policy remains as determined by President and recent conversations not in conflict therewith. Keystone remains agreement between parties and form of compact less important than substance. US involved because extremely concerned over future of Jarring Mission. If our moves did not achieve forward movement toward settlement, they might at least smoke out Arab views. US had talked only for itself and had not given away Israeli positions or made negotiations more difficult. US supported idea that some presence needed at Sharm el-Sheikh but not Israeli. Re refugees, US view was that not many would opt to return and it no derogation of Israeli position to agree to accept return of few. End summary.

1. Fon Min Eban asked Amb to call at Foreign Ministry late afternoon Nov. 18. DirGen Rafael, Asst Dir Gen Bitan and Elizur present. Amb accompanied by DCM. Eban began by saying Nov. 12 conversation between Under Secy Katzenbach and Amb Rabin, amplified by other conversations such as that between Buffum and Tekoah and others constituted a most remarkable episode in our relations in a negative sense. What the US had told Israel was not recognizable in terms of our previous relations. Eban was puzzled why whole exercise necessary. UAR was no closer to peace than US was to putting man on moon (immediately corrected himself and noted latter might be taking place soon). It was rather absurd for US and Israel to be in dispute about something which was not real while the other party concerned was not even interested. If Israel and the UAR had been close to negotiations, he might have understood US intervention. It was a serious matter that US views had been put to UAR and USSR since this had weakened the negotiating position of Israel. He could not understand reasons for our having done this.

2. Eban continued that US formulation was totally unacceptable to Israel. It appeared US had proposed or submitted to UAR certain principles which should apply to a settlement. One was that the SC resolution was not self-implementing. Israel agreed with this, and it had almost been accepted by UAR which has stopped calling for withdrawal as first step.

3. US proposal called for total Israel withdrawal from UAR territory. This certainly conflicts with President Johnson's speech of Sept 10 in which President said US was not the one to say where others should draw lines but that it was clear there should be no return to June 4. Israel had no difficulty in accepting President's two points, including idea that territory should not be gained simply by weight of conquest, but what Katzenbach said was completely different. In all other US statements, June 4 had been spoken of negatively as something to which we should not return, but Katzenbach had now said that this is what should be returned to, with minor adjustments. This was completely at variance with previous US pronouncements.

4. Gravity of situation, Eban continued, was that Israel had placed great faith in President's pronouncements and would like to be able to continue to do so. If they were broad statements which provided flexibility for interpretation in previous US pronouncements, Israel had assumed this had been intended by US. On this basis, Israel had announced its acceptance of SC resolution in US identical words. Israel had done this because it accepted the Nov. 15, 1967 statement by American UN representative that neither 1948 nor 1967 lines were boundaries and boundaries had to be agreed to by parties concerned. If US meant Israel had to return to June 4 line, this could not be accepted. There had been a proposal in Israeli Cabinet to withdraw acceptance of resolution or at least not to repeat they accept. If US position had remained a formula giving Israel room to maneuver this would have removed one element of Israel's consternation.

5. Eban said he was astonished by another matter. US had said to UAR Suez Canal should be opened to ships of all flags. This had no meaning unless Israel were specified by name. UAR always says Canal open to ships of all flags but nevertheless rejects Israeli ships.

6. US proposal for solution of refugee problem, Eban said, was a private poll. However, individual desires of refugees were the only criterion. Sovereignty of state was overriding.

7. US had proposed international presence at Sharm el-Sheikh, said Eban, which would not be removable except by UNSC or UNGA. Israel had said many times Sharm el-Sheikh was crux of problem with UAR. Israel could not have a war over Tiran Strait every few years. Had had experience with international presence. There was no ability in UN to remain at Sharm el-Sheikh 24 hours after Egypt asked for removal. U Thant said last year UNEF had no alternative but to leave since they could always be driven out by Egyptian military forces. What states would have their troops remain over objections of sovereignty? Next year UAR and USSR will gain majority in SC for their views. Of 15 SC members, only 4 with whom Israel can even talk. There will be authentic majority for Soviets and Arabs in GA and will certainly be majority for giving priority to national sovereignty. Israel had told US frankly Israeli presence at Sharm el-Sheikh only real guarantee that there would be no renewal of blockade. Israel knew of no assurance contrary to its belief that any international forces could be physically removed by the Egyptians or by a majority vote in the UN in favor of Egypt.

8. Eban continued that he was even more astonished by the extraordinary formulation of US views on the necessity for Egypt to sign "something in writing." Never had the idea of a contractual agreement been more contemptuously expressed. Israel had given up on the idea of a formal peace treaty and had agreed that something like USSR-Japan agreement might be suitable.

9. UAR position was that they would sign a copy of UN resolution and so would Israel. Israel's position was that it is essential there must be a contract between the parties. While Israel had said it could accept something other than a classic treaty, US proposal was complete acceptance of Arab and Soviet view.

10. Eban said when Katzenbach statements compared with those of President Johnson and US Security Council representatives, there was a depletion of US position. He wanted to ask now the status of President's Sept. 10 pronouncement. In discussions in Washington it had been intimated that Israel's position had changed. Certainly US statements as compared with those previously made by President and in SC indicated a change on part US. Eban hoped Amb could assure him this not so and recent statements were only paraphrase of previous policy.

11. It was not true Israel's policy had changed, Eban said. Israel had not wanted to bind itself to territorial changes before negotiations. He could not understand why it was considered more moderate to formulate and transmit positions in advance of negotiations. He had thought Ambassador Ball agreed when he had said that one should not start negotiations with the most flexible position but with the hardest. Therefore Israel had told UAR through Jarring that security and navigation concerns would govern its positions. Israel had no encyclopedic interest in Sinai but was functionally concerned with security and navigation. Israel had not said anything about Suez (though it wanted freedom of transit of Canal) since this was not linked to territorial settlement. Nobody had showed Israel how anything other than Israeli presence at Sharm el-Sheikh would provide security. It was not true that Israel had now said this for the first time. Eban had made this position clear to the Secretary and to Ball and Sisco. Eban had told Secretary in Sept Israeli presence needed at Sharm el-Sheikh and this had been Eban's position in last talk with Secretary. It certainly undermined Israeli negotiating position for great power to tell UAR in advance they could wash out Israel. US should let Egypt try to persuade Israel or Israel to persuade Egypt how to dispose of this vital interest. GOI thought it had been approaching US views in its last document. It had hinted to UAR they would have to assure Israel on security and Sharm el-Sheikh. This not unprecedented. After war, countries try to maintain interest. This was true of USSR and US after WWII. US had also said it needed to maintain forces in and administration over certain places which it had occupied.

12. Eban then turned to Jordan. Said he did not know whether anyone had told Jordan Israel should return to the boundaries of June 4. If so, this would be even more difficult. Jordan seemed interested enough to continue talks through Jarring. Israeli position would be utterly undermined if someone intervened against it. If US wanted to do something, it should urge Jordan to be forthcoming./2/

/2/In a separate telegram, Barbour reported that Eban expanded on his concern about negotiations with Jordan. Eban said that Israel had put forward territorial terms to Jordan, which Eban felt would command international support. Israel's proposals included the demilitarization of the West Bank with only certain unpopulated areas to remain as Israeli territory while the remainder of the occupied territory and all of the affected population would revert to Jordan. Eban noted that his government was concerned that the progress made in negotiations with Jordan would be undermined if the United States were to state to Jordan, as it had to the UAR, that it supported the Arab demand for a return to the June 4 boundaries. (Telegram 6152 from Tel Aviv, November 19; Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. X, Cables and Memos, 6/68-11/68)

13. Eban concluded his presentation by saying he could not remember many occasions which had been so disconcerting. In all frankness and friendship he had to say he regretted the whole exchange. He hoped the US would not talk with Israel's enemies before talking with Israel on matters of such vital concern.

14. Amb replied he not aware any US conversation with Jordan similar to that with UAR. He thought Eban read too much into US talk with Riad. US policy still remains as enunciated by President June 19 and Sept. 10. Keystone of our view is insistence on necessity for agreement between parties. Form of contract is minor compared with substantive content of agreement. On major points he did not think US position differed from that of Israel. US not asking Israel to go back to June 4. We had proposed some time ago that Israel offer to return to the former border with special regimes for Sharm el-Sheikh and Gaza. Israel had not gone along with that proposal. Its statement to Jarring did not mention withdrawal but did hint that Israel would give up Sinai.

15. Amb continued that US had felt it must be involved because we were extremely concerned that Jarring negotiations were getting virtually nowhere. We had stayed out of the negotiations except for general statements of policy to which US still adhered. We had thought that if we talked with UAR and USSR we could smoke them out even if we did not achieve actual movement toward a settlement. He did not think US had given away Israel's position or had made negotiations more difficult. We were working for peace and peace was in Israel's interests. Our insistence on agreement meant insistence on negotiations. We do have a definite difference of opinion on Sharm el-Sheikh. We envisaged support for arrangements for Israel's freedom of navigation through Tiran Strait, but do not support these arrangements being made by Israel. If votes can be gotten in UN to put a force in it may be possible to make that force permanent and not subject to Egypt's veto.

16. Eban broke in that UAR could give a green light now to a UN force and then a red light later whenever it suited its fancy. Amb noted Secretary had made clear to Riad (and Amb thought Riad had accepted this point) that if UAR had agreed last year to what it now says it would agree to on Tiran Strait, there would have been no war last year. In any event, US had not repeated Israeli positions to UAR but its own, but he did not think these positions so different. Appreciate Eban's concern in tight negotiating position. On other hand, if Eban right that Egyptians are not interested in settlement at all, it would make no difference anyway. Safeguard for Israel's position was still necessity for agreement between parties. US was not introducing solution of its own.

17. On refugee question, Amb said there had never been agreement as to number of refugees who would want to come back to Israel. There were many reasons why refugees had left Israel, including unwillingness to live under Israeli state, and giving them choice would not erase reasons why they had left to begin with. Eban said there was difference between making this proposal to Israel and making it to Arabs. We were setting right of individual against right of sovereign state. Amb replied we did not think it disservice, but rather service to Israel to have some kind of census reflecting desires of refugees regarding return.

18. Amb went on to say important thing at this stage in Jarring Mission was that something had to be introduced into equation and this is what US had tried to do. Eban replied it meaningful that Riad packed up and went home few days after hearing US presentation. He continued that US had not talked with Israel about signing "some piece of paper" but about a permanent contractual arrangement binding on both parties for peace. Amb replied US had not talked to UAR either merely about piece of paper. Rafael interjected what affair was it of US to talk to other side about things which Israel and Egypt should talk about. Amb retorted US had sovereign right to talk with anyone about its position on matters of concern to it.

19. Eban continued that US formulation to Egypt made far less demands to UAR than on Israel. Amb said President's statements are policy and views expressed to UAR reflect that policy.

20. Bitan said Riad's reaction to proposal that Egypt sign a document of which Israel was signatory indicated Riad also had something else in mind other than a contractual undertaking between UAR and Israel. This showed Riad did not understand US proposal in same way Israel had done. Eban said what US ought to do was not protect UAR from proposals which Israel had made but to urge UAR to answer. What had actually happened was UAR had received impression from US that if they went on recalcitrantly long enough US position would get closer to that of UAR.

21. Rafael said he would review what had happened. US (in persons Ball and Sisco) had come to Israel and said throw out some bait to UAR on procedural matters. Israel had done so. Then US had come again to Israel and said throw out more bait. Fon Minister had done so. Then, instead of waiting for UAR to respond, US had proceeded to throw out more bait of its own, while other side had not moved an inch. On Nov 7 UAR had stated its position precisely: Israel must liquidate aggression and withdraw. In face of these concepts of enemy, US had carried Israel further along road with UAR and USSR. Eban said US spoke, on question of peace, only in terms of end of belligerency and said nothing about the just and lasting peace which Israel felt it required.

22. Amb replied there should be no misunderstanding on this point. We did not see a possibility in the first instance of full peace and diplomatic relations between Israel and the Arab states. We felt condition of non-belligerency and stability necessary which could develop over time into real peace. Peace was in interest of both Israel and US and US was not undermining Israel's interest in trying to work for peace.

23. Eban said if US had come to Israel and consulted about proposed approach to UAR he thought he could have persuaded US differently. He would not have asked US to follow Israel's policy but would have asked that US stick to its previous policy statements. Amb noted we had also sought consultation in advance with Israel on paper to be given Riad through Jarring, but in spite of repeated requests had seen paper only one and one-half hours before delivery. Eban said he frankly had wondered if US had wanted to be in position of being involved with Israeli paper. Noted he had given Secretary full account in advance and had followed US suggested wording.

24. Eban noted Sisco and others had said it would be tragic if there were divergences between Israel and US. He thought this not necessarily so. It only natural Israel should have more strengthened positions than US. He found it not tragic but disconcerting when policies formulated at highest levels, with which Israel could live, were suddenly reformulated. He would like to be able to inform his government that US policy remained as enunciated by President Johnson and US representatives in highest international councils./3/ Noted he was disappointed by Riad's last reply. Riad could have replied to Israel's question on Suez Canal, nature of peace, etc. but had refused bilateral negotiations, negotiations under Jarring auspices, and now even refuses to negotiate by messages exchanged through Jarring.

/3/Under Secretary Rostow called in Ambassador Rabin on November 19 to reassure Israel that there had been no change in the U.S. position concerning a peace settlement in the Middle East. Rostow reiterated that the United States would not support any settlement that fell short of a secure peace for which the Arab states took responsibility. He added that U.S. policy also remained as stated by President Johnson to Prime Minister Eshkol when he said that the further Israel went from the armistice lines the further it would be from peace. (Telegram 275224 to Tel Aviv, November 21; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR)

Barbour