Amman, September 17, 1968, 1624Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 19-8 US-ISR. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to Tel Aviv, London, Cairo, and USUN.

6654. Subj: Phantoms for Israel. Ref: Amman 6653./2/

/2/In telegram 6653 from Amman, September 17, Symmes reported on a conversation that day with King Hussein in which Hussein described the upcoming UN General Assembly session as perhaps the last chance to achieve a peaceful settlement in the Middle East. He stressed that he had authorized Foreign Minister Rifai to take advantage of all opportunities to promote a settlement, including meeting privately with the Israelis if given an incentive to do so. The King complained that the United States had not taken an active enough role in promoting a settlement. He also said that possible U.S. supply of Phantom aircraft to Israel made it difficult for him and others in the area to defend their relationship with the United States. (Ibid., POL 27 ARAB-ISR)

1. After the King raised the possible sale of Phantoms to Israel (Amman 6653), I commented that as of yesterday the White House Press Secty had stated no decision has been made to supply them. The Israeli request is still "under consideration," as stated last Jan. Nine months have gone by since the President met with PriMin Eshkol. During this time some Arab leaders have been making statements that fall just short of calling for "another round." Some of them were boasting about the degree to which they had been able to obtain new arms from the SovUnion. The presence of thousands of Soviet instructors in the UAR and Syria has become well known to the general public. I wondered sometimes if the Arab public remembered the bellicose statements of Arab officials when they reacted to statements about Phantoms for Israel. In any case, it seemed to me personally that the administration has shown great restraint in so far avoiding steps that could be interpreted as upsetting arms relationships in the Middle East.

2. The King then asked me if Washington had given any thought to what might be provided to Jordan as an offset in the event that Phantoms were sold to Israel. I replied I was not aware that this hypothetical possibility had been considered. I jokingly commented that our thinking generally revolved around avoiding sales of arms. The King then said he had thought about having Gen Khammash go to Washington to request earlier delivery of eighteen additional F104s and other essential equipment, including 155s. I commented that I thought such a visit would be inappropriate at the present time. With regard to the outstanding request for 155s, I thought that the climate for its consideration might be improved if there were a cessation of artillery exchanges in the Beisan area.

3. At one point the King interjected that the Soviets have indicated they are prepared to supply a "much more sophisticated aircraft with offensive capability" to the UAR if the US supplies Phantoms to Israel. He obviously thought that he had made a slip and asked me not to report what he had said about the Soviets.

Symmes

254. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, September 17, 1968, 6 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Walt W. Rostow, Middle East and Vietnam Negotiations, Sept. 1968. Secret; Sensitive; Literally Eyes Only.

Mr. President:

I put to Sect. Rusk the five questions you raised with me on the telephone when I had a meeting in my office.

[Here follow two paragraphs unrelated to the Middle East.]

3. On the other hand, Sect. Rusk is taking personally in hand Dobrynin's urging that we make a reply on the Middle East. He will have a long personal talk with Rabin tomorrow./2/

/2/The nub of the problem is the fear of our Middle East experts that if we get into a negotiating posture with the Soviet Union, the Arabs will draw back from Jarring and leave the task for the U.S. and the USSR, which is just what they want in the first place. The art of working out something to give to the Russians is to do it in a way which would strengthen, not weaken, Jarring. In my initial judgment, that, in turn, requires building into our scenario direct Arab-Israeli contacts at a relatively early stage on certain specific issues. Like the Russians, we, too, could give our paper to Jarring and make it clear both to him and the Russians that we are counting on him to move forward and that we and, we hope, the Russians will be trying to be helpful from the rear. This is the message we would also get across to the Arabs. [Footnote in the source text added by Rostow.]

W. W. Rostow/3/

/3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

255. Information Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, September 18, 1968.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt W. Rostow, Vol. 94, 9/12-18/68. Secret; Exdis.

Mr. President:

Herewith George Ball's account of his meeting with Jarring in Paris Monday. Paragraph 5 on page 3 describes what many of your advisors feel is the nub of the current Arab-Israeli impasse./2/

/2/Telegram 20891 from Paris, September 16, was attached. The telegram reported on a conversation that Ball and Sisco had with Jarring in Paris that day. They found Jarring somber over the prospects for a Middle East settlement, but determined to make a major effort with the Foreign Ministers at the UN General Assembly. He emphasized the need for Israel to define what it meant by secure and recognized borders or to publicly accept and agree to implement Resolution 242. Paragraph 5 of the telegram detailed Jarring's conviction that the crux of the problem lay in promoting an agreement between Israel and the UAR, not between Israel and Jordan as the Israelis seemed to believe. Jarring did not feel that Jordan was strong enough to reach an agreement with Israel that could stand unless there was a prior agreement between Israel and the UAR. In his view, agreement between Israel and the UAR was dependent on Israeli willingness to define what the Israelis meant by secure and recognized boundaries. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR)

In Jarring's view--which many of your advisors share--the main roadblock is Israel's inability to state its view of where boundaries should be. Israel cannot do this until the Cabinet makes a decision. Eshkol has delayed forcing that decision until the Arabs enter direct negotiations. The Arabs will not surrender that trump card-symbolizing recognition of Israel-until they believe the Israeli government has committed itself to withdrawal.

Many of your advisors feel that we can't hope for progress on any front until we tackle Israel on this issue. For instance, they feel that any response to the Soviet initiative--desirable as a response may be--will be academic until we can bring Israel along behind a counterproposal. This is why we recommended as the centerpiece of your B'nai B'rith speech: ". . . put their views on the table--begin talking the substance of peace."

The Israelis would argue vigorously that they are ready to put their views on the table only when they are convinced Nasser is ready to talk real peace. And they don't think he is. While no one has any illusions about Nasser, Jarring believes the UAR is ready to end belligerency. We're not sure, but we think there's enough in the UAR position to be worth probing.

Where we disagree with Israel is that they're holding out for a complete Arab cave-in right from the start--open borders, full recognition, reconciliation. We see the road to that goal made up of a series of stepping stones, and we see a settlement not as "instant peace" but as a framework within which attitudes can change. We think Israel is holding out for too much and losing sight of substantial gains within its grasp--permanent boundaries and passage through the Canal.

Therefore, many of your advisors--while agreeing we must treat the Soviet proposal seriously--would hate to see us pin too much hope on it by itself. They believe we must concentrate primarily on moving the Israelis to make their commitment to withdraw clear by stating their position on boundaries. If you were to go ahead with Phantoms, they would consider this a fair return.

W. W. Rostow/3/

/3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

256. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Washington, September 18, 1968.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. X, Cables and Memos, 6/68-11/68. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Davies on September 19.

SUBJECT
A Near East Peace Settlement

PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary
Rodger P. Davies, Deputy Assistant Secretary, NEA

H.E. Yitzhak Rabin, Ambassador of Israel
Mr. Shlomo Argov, Minister of Israel

The Secretary said that we would shortly enter on intensive discussion with other powers in New York on the Near East problems and he hoped that we could keep closely in touch with Israel. It was important that we know what the Israeli position is on the Security Council resolution and on such questions as boundaries, Jerusalem, procedures, etc. It was important also that we know whether Israel considers the problem as one to be solved in its entirety as a package or whether it might be broken down into parts which might then be negotiated. The Palestine problem made a large and complex package but it might be possible or desirable to break it up and deal with the components in different contexts. The Secretary thought we also ought to consider whether the best approach to settlement was to aim for an Egyptian settlement first leaving the more difficult Jordanian problem aside.

Ambassador Rabin said it was important to distinguish between the parliamentary situation in the United Nations and the real life situation on the ground. The Government of Israel is convinced that in the course of Nasser's stay in the Soviet Union an agreement was reached on a UAR-Soviet strategy. Both governments are interested primarily in restoring the status quo ante June 5, 1967 with only minor modifications. Neither power was interested in a real peace. The Egyptian position of rejecting reconciliation and of a termination of state of belligerency with continued isolation of Israel in the Near East could provide the seeds for the next war.

Ambassador Rabin said the present Soviet strategy is to gain time to strengthen the UAR militarily and to seek a settlement which would leave the Arab-Israel problem extant. During Nasser's second visit to Russia an agreement had been reached to provide 100 additional new aircraft, 550 new tanks and an additional 100 Soviet pilots for the Egyptian Air Force. The UAR has agreed to tailor its policy to Soviet objectives. The UAR now supports guerrilla warfare as a means of supporting Soviet-UAR political aims in the area. The Soviet strategy to return the situation to pre-June 1967 includes, first, bringing all parties to accept the UK resolution and, second, through Jarring or through international consultation to fix a date for withdrawal of Israeli forces to the June 4 lines. As next phase, the states involved would deposit documents recognizing such things as the right of nations to national existence and a termination of the state of belligerency. Makeshift measures for transit through the Straits of Tiran, a UNEF force in Sinai and at Sharm ash-Shaykh, a phased withdrawal to permit Egyptian forces to take over and clear the Suez Canal would also be included.

The Soviets also proposed that the Security Council issue a guarantee for the boundaries. As the Israelis understand it, such problems as refugees, Jerusalem and Israeli use of Suez Canal would be put aside for later Security Council action.

The Secretary said this was a Soviet presentation of an Arab plan. Ambassador Rabin replied this is not an Arab plan but rather a Soviet plan which has been coordinated with Nasser. There is "no peace in it." It is significant that the Soviets propose to leave the refugee problem for consideration after Israel withdraws completely from occupied territories. The refugee problem is the Palestine problem and the Soviets and the UAR desire to keep the refugees as such in order to continue to threaten the existence of Israel.

There is no question, said the Ambassador, of the background of hate that exists against Israel, nor is there a question that this will be eliminated by an agreement, but it cannot start to be eroded without a peace agreement and "open boundaries." Peace must involve recognition and contacts to reduce hatreds.

The Secretary said that he was struck by the Soviet reference to "multilateral documents" as a means of registering agreement. Would this be acceptable if the document were signed by all the parties to the recent conflict. Ambassador Rabin replied that Israel was not dealing with a coalition but with neighbors, with each of which it had distinct and special problems. The Soviet plan, he said, avoids a contractual arrangement between the parties.

The Secretary asked whether Israel is prepared to make a public and categoric declaration that it is prepared to withdraw from occupied territories to secure and recognized boundaries in a context of peace. Ambassador Rabin said that Mr. Eban is in a much better position to answer this question, but that personally he did not find difficulty with such a statement. The problem was that of the line of withdrawal. Dayan had told Ball and Sisco that the Security Council Resolution could be interpreted as calling for withdrawal to the June 4 line. Ball and Sisco had argued that this was not so but Dayan was not convinced.

The Secretary said that the U.S.G. is not in favor of substantial changes from the former armistice lines but feels that discussions between the parties should lead to a definition of boundaries that each side would find acceptable.

Ambassador Rabin stressed that to Israel there was a major difference between "elimination of war" (termination of belligerency) and peace. Peace did not equate with an end to the state of war. The Soviets have agreed to help the UAR regain its territory without entering into a state of peace. The Secretary said that Arab concern that Israel would not budge from occupied territories might lead them to seek solutions other than that provided by the Jarring Mission. He said the U.S.G. has no reason whatsoever to believe the USSR wants to see the destruction of Israel.

Ambassador Rabin agreed but said that a condition less than peace would permit the Soviets to continue to exploit Arab-Israel tensions. The Secretary replied that the Soviets would find that the Arabs are not easy to control. Ambassador Rabin said that, nevertheless, by exploiting Arab animosity, the Soviets were deriving more and more concessions from them.

The Secretary said it was very important that the Israelis get into the territorial questions. Wasn't it possible for Israel to indicate to the UAR that its territory could be returned almost completely? The Ambassador replied that Sharm ash-Shaykh was a critical issue. Twice it had brought war. In addition, Israel must avoid the situation where one side by moving troops and making threats could force Israel into war. The Secretary asked whether a four-power force at Sharm ash-Shaykh might be reasonable assurance for Israel. Ambassador Rabin replied that great powers have their own global interests which could lead them to compromise on matters of vital interest to Israel. He said Israel had too long relied on vague assurances, assurances on territorial integrity, and even more specific ones. When the chips were down, Israel discovered it could only rely on itself. It is better to rely on specific capabilities than on guarantees that might be interpreted differently in critical periods.

The Secretary replied that Israel had been told that if it went it alone, it would be alone and Israel had attacked without consultation. Israel had not relied on the guarantees and it is unfair now to charge that they were worthless. In addition, Israel had told us it would not resort to war.

Ambassador Rabin asked whether the Strait would be open now if there had been no war. The Secretary replied that Israel had not given the time necessary to test other solutions. If Israel had waited through Wednesday, the answer might well have been "yes." However, Israel had made its own judgment on what it would do.

Israel was in a strange position, Ambassador Rabin said. It was the only country not part of an alliance system which was surrounded by enemies daily threatening it with destruction. At the same time, however, Israel was asked continually to demonstrate that it wanted peace.

Ambassador Rabin said Israel was concerned with Soviet-Arab reaction to the lack of U.S. response to the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, the delay in providing the Phantom aircraft, and the delay in rejecting the Soviet proposal for a Near East settlement. These developments were interpreted as signs of U.S. weakness and tend to stiffen the UAR position and erode U.S. policy as expressed to Israel and generally understood. Sisco and Battle had told him that the U.S.G. was considering proposals which are clearly incompatible with stated U.S. policy.

The Secretary replied that the Soviet proposal was a "mixed bag" with some good elements among the bad. We could not reject out of hand an approach by a major power which avowed an attempt to cooperate in bringing peace to the area. The President's position on the Phantom was as given in January.

The Ambassador replied that the approach was a stratagem designed to bring about a break between U.S. and Israeli policy.

Reverting to the Secretary's question as to seeking agreement first with the UAR, the Ambassador said that the basic difference between Jordan and Egypt was that Hussein is now ready even for a peace treaty; the UAR seeks to avoid peace. The extent to which the King is capable of entering a separate peace is doubtful as is the question of his authority within Jordan. Peace, therefore, is the principal point of difference between the UAR and Jordan.

The Secretary asked whether there would not be considerable advantage to King Hussein if the UAR could move first toward settlement. The Ambassador replied that neither the UAR nor the Soviets are interested in the kind of peace that Israel wants. The Secretary replied that if this were indeed the case, then it is up to Israel to expose their positions. One way to do this would be for Israel to come forward with a reasonable plan for peace. The Ambassador said that Israel had tried this in contacts with both states, and it had not worked. The Secretary questioned whether the "nuts and bolts" of a settlement had indeed been tackled.

The Secretary said it was going to be necessary for the U.S.G. to become more specific in interpreting the President's Five Points and the Security Council Resolution. It would be of value to us to know what Israel's views are with respect to these matters. He hoped that when Eban met with him he would be prepared to be more specific on Israel's views. This would be extremely important before we talk to other governments, as we must.

Ambassador Rabin said that the first purpose of any effort must be to demonstrate that peace is attainable. The Secretary asked what this meant. Doesn't peace rest on a multitude of things that must be spelled out in detail? Ambassador Rabin replied that it was useless to spell these out in detail when the other side did not want peace. The Secretary thought that this was the whole purpose of the exercise in which we had been engaged over the past months: to move the situation in the direction of peace. Israel had not been specific on the underpinnings of peace either in talks with Jarring or in what was imparted to the Arabs. It was not enough to chant "Peace." Both in Hanoi and in Washington peace was the cry. Yet peace would not be attainable until we got down to the specifics of what must underlie it.

Ambassador Rabin questioned whether any UAR leader had stated that Egypt desires peace. The Secretary responded that this was a difficult thing for a leader to do publicly when the enemy sat on a considerable piece of his territory. For over seven years he had been assuring Arab governments that Israel had no territorial ambitions. What could he say now?

Ambassador Rabin replied that before the war Israel sought peace on the basis of the ADL's. Israel had not wanted war; it had been forced on her. Now, the situation had changed. Israel's security must be uppermost, and peace was the only alternative to measures necessary to insure Israel's security.

The Secretary asked that Mr. Eban be informed that he would desire to resume with him the discussion on the NPT and on Israel's missile program which, apparently, Deputy Prime Minister Allon had not wished to get into.

The Ambassador left the enclosed Aide-Memoire reflecting the Foreign Minister's views on the Soviet proposals with the Secretary./2/

/2/The Israeli aide-memoire, dated September 18, is ibid.; it is summarized in Document 257.

257. Information Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, September 19, 1968, 1:40 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. X, Cables and Memos, 6/68-11/68. Secret. A handwritten notation indicates that the memorandum was received at 1:50 p.m.

SUBJECT
Secretary Rusk's Talk with Ambassador Rabin

The Secretary had a vigorous talk with Rabin last night. He said it's up to Israel to make its position clear--to move beyond generalities and get into specifics. When Rabin said this is impossible until Israel knows whether the Arabs want peace, the Secretary replied that this must be possible because it is the whole purpose of the exercise. The only way to find out what the Arabs want is to test them with specific proposals.

Rabin left the attached Aide-Memoire./2/ It says, in essence, that Israel wants real peace--not just the end of belligerency. To Rabin "real peace" means open boundaries and full recognition. But the Aide-Memoire does not go that far; it speaks of permanent boundaries, agreed security arrangements, and the other issues in the UN Resolution.

/2/See footnote 2, Document 256.

The Aide-Memoire argues that the Soviet proposal is "totally and drastically opposed" to Israel's policy and ours, because it aims only at withdrawal and not at permanent peace. The Israelis somehow know the full details of the Soviet proposition. They urge us to reject it out of hand. Rabin argued that the US response to the Czech crisis, failure to make the decision on Phantoms, and indication that it might even consider the Soviet plan have all created a Soviet and Arab impression that the US is weak and is about to back down.

The Secretary did not say how we planned to respond to the Soviet plan. He told Rabin only that the Soviet proposition was a mixed bag--one that we could not reject 100% out of hand.

This was a fairly tough conversation and highlights our main problem in moving toward peace. We don't really disagree with the Israelis that the Soviet proposal is generally unacceptable. We do disagree with their definition of "peace." They seem to be holding out for a complete Arab "change of heart" whereas we have thought more of the step-by-step evolution of peace through a series of practical arrangements. We've thought of a settlement as a framework within which peace could evolve. The Israelis seem unwilling to launch that process until they are assured that the Arabs have caved, but the Secretary is right in saying there will be no progress until they do.

Walt

258. Telegram From the U.S. Interests Section of the Spanish Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State/1/

Cairo, September 19, 1968, 1121Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Repeated to Amman, Tel Aviv, and London.

3424. From Battle./2/

/2/Battle was in Egypt to represent the United States in ceremonies winding up the project to keep Abu Simbel and other monuments from being covered by the water rising behind the Aswan Dam.

1. Accompanied by Bergus I called today on Foreign Minister Riad for one hour frank, very warm exchange views. After lengthy pleasantries, I said that I felt my visit should be one in which we looked not to past but to the future. I was concerned at increased tension in area which underlined need for getting on with an inevitable job before us. All of us had important roles to play. These roles vary. If there is no progress, we cannot forgive ourselves nor will history forgive any of us who might have contributed to progress. So far, no one had done as much as he could. The upcoming General Assembly with the key Foreign Ministers in New York was an opportunity which we must not lose. I asked what the Minister saw ahead of us.

2. Riad agreed we must make special effort next few weeks. A critical stage has been reached and something must be done. Jarring is doing his best but what can be expected? The UAR has refused him nothing and the Israelis have insisted on direct negotiations and a peace treaty which no one in the Arab world can accept. This means Israelis don't want settlement. Everyone talks about peace and a settlement but the meaning of these words, plus particularly the phrase "secure boundaries," [is?] remote with everyone giving his own interpretation. While all express approval Jarring Mission, what it needs is "fuel." Implementation of the resolution has been refused by Israelis and only Washington can tell Israel what to do. More and more arms are going to Israel from US. More and more planes are promised them. Both candidates are committed. How can there be movement if US insists Israelis must have air superiority. They can occupy and destroy and are in a happy position from which they can threaten others. They get all the money they need. Why should they withdraw? They hope to destroy the regime in UAR and in Syria. Riad hopes they can be convinced to find a just solution but he is not expecting much at UN. He had made suggestions at Stockholm which called for a timetable, a program, or call it what you will. The result in the Arab world has been critical and there had been suggestions for Arab summit to review position he had taken which underlines political problem in UAR and in Arab countries.

3. I replied that we had both heard all arguments perhaps too many times about the past. I must underline that neither side had done as much as it could or as much as was necessary. There had been moments when it seemed to us the sides were close to a situation in which movement was possible but each side had passed the other in the night. Riad referred to US leverage; I must refer to Egyptian leverage. He said the world looked to the US; I said that the world looked to UAR and to Israel. There had been too much talk of modalities and inadequate testing by either party of the real substance  of the position of the other party. I must point out that the Israelis now talked a great deal less about direct negotiations and peace treaty, indicating more flexibility on a key issue. In my opinion, for the UAR to continue to insist on no negotiations was as unrealistic as for Israelis to insist negotiations could only take one form. We had repeatedly stated our position on this matter, most recently in a very important speech by President Johnson which I wished to leave with him and which I hoped he would read with great care. Riad's statement that he expected nothing in New York unless the US moved is in effect to dodge the issue and shatter hopes of mankind. Basic issue is whether Arabs and Israelis are willing to live with each other. What the Israelis want is acceptance of their existence and a contractual arrangement in a form the world can understand and support resolving the issue once and for all. This does not necessarily mean exchange of Ambassadors or diplomatic acceptance but it did mean willingness to live and let live.

4. With respect to arms the US had over many years avoided being major supplier arms to area. We continued to follow this policy. We had both before and after the present war supplied arms but in much smaller quantities than requested. When UAR rearms itself in great quantities and increases personnel other countries this had resulting effect on US and on imbalance in area. We had shown great restraint and continued to do so. While I regretted such issues found their ways into domestic campaigns, I must point out that no statements by political parties confined themselves to issue of arms. In each statement there was strong expression need for settlement and peace and statements must be read in totality.

5. US interests clearly dictated need to find road to peace and stability. There was essential requirement for parties find means accommodation. US has a role to play but, as in past, UAR tended believe our leverage greater in any situation than it was in fact. We wished find way to help and we want and need peace in area but such leverage as we had in situation not being utilized when both parties focused on modalities and when issues substance not dealt with in manner in which we could press parties effectively toward middle and common ground between their two extreme positions. Both sides, in absence negotiations, permitted their own public opinion to drift and positions harden and cheated themselves of leverage international community might exert towards settlement. Neither the Arabs nor Israelis could afford another round of military action. That Israelis must withdraw in context settlement had always been US position but we cannot say what boundaries would be agreeable. There are many forms negotiations and many forms of peace, as President Johnson's speech so clearly recognized. Riad had referred to fact Israel "happy." No one could find happiness in present situation and certainly not US.

6. Riad replied there was no end to the arguments each side made. He agreed that there was need for boundaries although doubted term "secure boundaries" capable clear definition. When territorial claims Israel public and maps published by them reflected Sinai part Israel, difficult to believe Israelis had good intention. One had to only read public statements Dayan and others to be convinced Israeli intentions.

7. I replied Israelis had repeatedly informed us they had no territorial ambitions for UAR territory, at which point Riad said "we don't believe them." I replied that it was impossible for me to believe all public statements made either in Cairo or Tel Aviv and that what was told to us privately often was at variance with public statements both sides. I urged UAR find a means test intentions.

8. Riad agreed too much had been said. He pointed to Jordan as country which had attempted test intentions without success. Riad spoke in some detail with equanimity and indeed sympathy re contacts that had been going on between Israelis and Jordanians. He referred specifically to Israeli contacts Palestinian leaders. In response Israel had declined to discuss substance. At present Jordanians feared another Israeli attack. This could mean complete deterioration.

9. I replied that some means must be found break circle of El Fatah activity and response by Israelis. UAR largest and most influential country in area and must find way help.

10. Riad repeated that he had refused Jarring nothing. I knew emotions and feelings of people from my own residence in area. US had public opinion problems which led leaders to have to write letters or make statements to Zionists every day. UAR also had its problems. Only UAR and Jordan had accepted November 22 resolution. Algeria and Syria had refused and Algeria had abstained in Security Council vote yesterday because of reference to resolution which it had not accepted. UAR has accepted resolution but cannot go too far too fast or its voice in area would be of no value and would help nobody. In New York perhaps there will be more time. There must be more talk in New York and Riad hopes for concrete ideas from the US on how to deal with problem. We must not move in wrong direction.

11. I replied that we had refrained thus far from offering plan and that we had no blueprint for settlement. I was not sure what lead Jarring would take in New York but we wished to help in any way possible in supporting him and anticipated he would take very active role.

12. Riad said he was not asking for concrete plan but hoped that we would go beyond generalities to specifics. We need more frank discussions and must "dot the i's." The meeting ended with expressions some hope for New York. On way to car Mohamed Riad, who had been present, remarked that Foreign Minister had pointed some new directions, apparently referring desire concrete thoughts from USG.

13. Comment: Both Bergus and I considered talk very useful although not changing course history. Excellent rapport existed and there was obvious pleasure that Riad had opportunity for such talk. There was also clear indication he wished continue explorations with us in New York and prepared make effort facilitate consultations Ambassador Ball.

Bergus

259. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan/1/

Washington, September 19, 1968, 2208Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 ARAB-ISR. Confidential; Immediate. Drafted by Thomas J. Carolan, Jr. (IO/UNP); cleared by William H. Gleysteen (IO/UNP), Atherton, Popper, and in draft by Parker and Seelye; and approved by Davies. Also sent to Tel Aviv and Cairo and repeated to USUN and London.

241705. Subj: Ceasefire Violations in ME. Ref: USUN 6562./2/

/2/In telegram 6562 from USUN, September 19, Buffum followed up a telephone conversation with Department officials the previous day to warn that Israel's circulation at the UN of a compendium of cease-fire complaints against Jordan should be seen as presaging major military operations against Jordan in light of past experience with similar Israeli diplomatic initiatives. Buffum recommended a high-level U.S. approach to Israel urging restraint. (Ibid., POL 27 ARAB-ISR)

1. Dept shares USUN's view that situation along Israel/Jordan and Israel/UAR ceasefire lines is ominous and may encourage additional violent acts by parties leading to further deterioration of situation in immediate future. Accordingly, ME addressees should approach host govts soonest to urge utmost possible restraint and rigorous observance of ceasefire, pointing out (inter alia) irreparable harm that additional strife in coming weeks could do to Jarring's ability continue his peacemaking efforts in what could be decisive phase.

2. For Tel Aviv: In approaching GOI along lines para 1, Embassy should say we impressed by evidence of recent Israeli restraint and we intend to remind other parties of this important fact in urging similar restraint on them. We would hope that recent warnings delivered by Prime Minister and other GOI spokesmen do not presage lessening of Israeli forbearance in days to come, particularly in any manner that would tend to undercut our approaches to other parties.

3. For Amman and Cairo: In addition to making points outlined para 1 above, you should state our belief that recent Israeli actions along ceasefire lines have been relatively restrained and our desire see this continue, although we clearly unable give any assurances this will be the case. We hope GUAR and GOJ would see fit to respond helpfully, rather than by undertaking or allowing acts calculated to try Israeli patience to its uncertain limits.

4. For London: Embassy requested inform HMG of our approaches to parties and urge UK undertake similar representations, especially in Cairo.

5. Dept will make parallel approaches here.

6. Reuters report just received re death six Israelis in ambush on Israel/Jordan cease-fire line adds urgency to above.

Rusk

260. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, September 24, 1968, 5:25 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. X, Cables and Memos, 6/68-11/68. Confidential.

Mr. President:

Abe Feinberg is just back from seeing Eshkol. His message is as follows:

1. The reason the Israelis took the UAR incidents to the Security Council was so as not to complicate your life while the Czech crisis was on.

2. The Israelis say that Nasser has already made an arms deal with Moscow involving some:

--150 MIGs;
--450 tanks;
--the training of 200 pilots in the USSR;
--the sending of an additional 200 pilots to Egypt in mid-1969.

3. While Abe was here, I checked with our intelligence people and found:

--we have no independent confirmation of the alleged Soviet-UAR deal;
--the Israelis have reported the deal to us but not shared the source or quality of the intelligence.

4. In the light of the arms deal, Eshkol is worried about the Soviet proposal to confer with us about a Middle Eastern settlement. I explained to Abe that there was a good deal of nonsense in the Soviet proposal, but two points that deserved serious consideration:

--the Arabs signing a "multilateral document;"
--the notion of a 4-power guarantee which might be the best security Israel could ever get if the Senate would buy it, since the Senate does not appear about to buy a bilateral security treaty with Israel.

5. Abe said he would advise the Israelis to share with us fully their intelligence on the Moscow-Cairo deal. He said he was relieved that we were not "buying" the whole Soviet document.

6. I was in the midst of talking about the importance of the Israeli's clarifying their border position when I decided I ought to get this memo up to you.

W. W. Rostow/2/

/2/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

261. Summary Notes of the 591st Meeting of the National Security Council/1/

Washington, September 25, 1968, 12:05-1:40 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings File, NSC Meetings, Vol. 5, Tab 13, the 23rd UNGA. Top Secret; Sensitive; For the President Only. Drafted by Bromley Smith. An attached list indicates that among those attending, in addition to the President, were Rusk, Ball, Sisco, Clifford, Nitze, Fowler, Helms, Wheeler, Walt Rostow, and USIA Director Marks.

The 23rd UN General Assembly

The President: The purpose of the meeting of the Council is to review the issues before the current United Nations General Assembly and to discuss our position on these questions. Secretary Rusk will comment in general on the General Assembly meeting and Ambassador Ball will deal with the specific problems.

Secretary Rusk: Suggested that Ambassador Ball lead off and he would comment later.

Ambassador Ball: The session of the General Assembly meeting in New York will probably be the most routine in UN history, barring some unforeseen event. (See copy of State Summary of UNGA issues attached.)/2/

/2/Not found attached.

The following major issues will be raised:

[Here follows discussion unrelated to the Middle East.]

2. The Middle East

a. We have the last clear chance for an Arab-Israeli settlement in the next few months.

b. Ambassador Jarring will be in New York and will be meeting with Arab foreign ministers and the Israeli foreign minister. The work on the Middle East will be done in hotel rooms, not in the United Nations Assembly.

c. Currently, the Arabs appear to the public to be readier to settle than the Israelis.

d. There is very small chance for settlement unless we push on the Israelis and the Russians push on the Arabs. Even if this were done, a settlement is doubtful because the two sides are so far apart. This is a sad prognosis.

e. Unless action comes within the next few weeks, Jarring will be ending a year of activity without results. If he cannot advance toward accomplishing the objectives of the November 22 resolution, he may quit. The problem then becomes even more difficult for us because it will be returned to the UN Security Council. The subject is complicated by the U.S. election.

[Here follows discussion unrelated to the Middle East.]

Bromley Smith

262. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Washington, September 25, 1968.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL ISR-US. Top Secret; Exdis.

PARTICIPANTS
Yitzhak Rabin, Ambassador of Israel
Shlomo Argov, Minister of Israel
W. W. Rostow
Harold H. Saunders

Ambassador Rabin came in this afternoon to discuss Israel's concerns about the Soviet memo to the US on the Middle East./2/

/2/See Document 245.

Rabin began by presenting the Israeli view, for which he says there is evidence from a "very reliable" intelligence source, that Nasser and the Soviet leaders had made the following deal when Nasser was recently in the USSR:

1. The USSR would build Nasser's armed forces into an effective military machine. This would involve the shipment of additional military equipment (Rabin mentioned 100 new aircraft, 550 new tanks, 100 more Soviet pilots-the same numbers he had used with Secretary Rusk reported in State 241839/3/ and then rattled off a number of additional items and quantities). Rabin admitted that he could not say how long the delivery period would be--"it might be a year and a half, it might be four years." He acknowledged that Egyptian absorptive capacity would control the timing of these shipments, but he maintained that the Soviets were committed to this arrangement and were working hard at training.

/3/Not printed.

2. In return, Nasser agreed to follow the USSR's political strategy. The Soviets will try for a political solution-not peace, but a political settlement which involves return to June 4 boundaries, and leaving unsettled the issues of passage through the Canal, the refugees, and Jerusalem. All these are issues designed to perpetuate tension between Arabs and Israelis which the USSR can exploit. The Soviets have agreed to back the Arab guerilla movements and to a limited Egyptian increase of tension along the Suez Canal. They have done this to heat up the area and to worry the US. At the same time they have come to the US with their notion of a political settlement, which Rabin said bore no relationship to either the Israeli or the US concept of a lasting peace. Rabin said, "There is no peace in it." This is the Soviet design and Nasser has subscribed to it.

Mr. Rostow said he wasn't at all sure the Egyptians were in any position to follow a coherent strategy, but he agreed that the Ambassador had outlined a serious hypothesis which we would look at carefully. However, he had two outstanding reservations:

1. We have no collateral evidence to confirm that this deal was made. We have received the Israeli information but Israel had not shared its evidence with us so that we could make our own judgment. It is a serious matter for the US to accept as a working hypothesis one for which it has no independent evidence whatsoever. In response, Rabin said it is very difficult to share intelligence sources, but indicated that this information came from a highly reliable source. (Comment: From his hedging, it appeared that he might be referring both to intercept and to an agent in Cairo.) At another point, however, he admitted that there was some Israeli deduction involved too.

2. The Israeli hypothesis seemed internally consistent until it came to one point in the Soviet memo-the suggestion of a four-power guarantee. If the Soviet aim is to perpetuate tension in the Middle East, it seems highly unlikely that the Soviet Union would invite the US to guarantee whatever settlement develops. The Soviet Union is fully aware that the US keeps constitutionally accepted commitments. Vietnam has proved that. If the Soviets were not serious about a final settlement, the last thing they would want would be a US commitment to make the details of a settlement stick.

Moving to a related point, Mr. Rostow as much as said that it is preposterous for the Israelis to think that we have bought the Soviet proposal lock, stock and barrel. He acknowledged that the Soviet document proposed return to the situation of June 4, 1967. He recalled that the US had fought that position in New York and everywhere else since the second day of the June war. The President had reiterated our position just two weeks ago, and there was no question of our moving away from that policy. However, that was not to say that a Soviet document contained nothing worth looking at.

There was one item in the Soviet proposal which especially interested the Israelis--the Soviet suggestion of a four-power guarantee. Mr. Rostow said that if he were an Israeli, he would think very seriously about the advantages of a guarantee backed by the Congress of the US. From the Israeli point of view, this would be infinitely better than some treaty signed by an Arab leader. Nobody can guarantee that the Congress would go along with such a proposal, but it is worth thinking about. Mr. Rostow added that there are other points of flexibility in the Soviet document, though he reiterated that, of course, the basic proposal was a non-starter.

The discussion then turned to the process of peace-making. Rabin said that Israel wants the Egyptians to define what it means by peace. By Israeli definition, peace is "reconciliation, open borders, and recognition." Mr. Rostow said that the problem is for each side to define its objectives in a negotiating process of some sort.

For instance, rather than complaining about the fact that the US was looking at a document the USSR had given it, he would like to see the Israelis produce a document of their own. They had not. As far as Mr. Rostow could tell, there were no serious boundary problems between Israel and the UAR, although we could not say so with any confidence because the Israelis had not told us what their position is. Rabin indicated that Israel would have boundary problems with the UAR, but he did not elaborate.

The conversation turned to Jordan, and Mr. Rostow said that any settlement with Jordan would involve much more than a peace treaty because Jordan and Israel would have to live in economic intimacy if there were peace. Jerusalem is the sticking point. Mr. Rostow reminded the Ambassador that General Tzur had defined the problem this way: "We can't give Hussein enough in Jerusalem for him to live with." Rabin said that Israel would give Hussein a role in the Moslem Holy Places. He said that they had even considered building an overpass or a tunnel to give the Jordanians unhampered access to Jerusalem.

Mr. Rostow said that wasn't good enough. If there was going to be a peace settlement, they would have to show more imagination than that.

H. H. S.

263. Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Information Cable/1/

[document number not declassified]

Washington, September 25, 1968.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Arab Republic, Vol. VII, Cables and Memos, 6/68-1/69. Secret; Routine; No Foreign Dissem.

COUNTRY
UAR/USSR/ISRAEL

DOI
Late August 1968

SUBJECT
Possible Provision of Advanced Aircraft to UAR by the USSR

ACQ
[less than 1 line of source text not declassified]

SOURCE
[3 lines of source text not declassified]

1. Lieutenant General Amir Khammash, Jordan Arab Army Chief of Staff, was informed during a visit to Cairo in late August 1968 by both War Minister Muhammad Fawzi and UAR Army Chief of Staff Major General Abd-al-Munim Riyad that the Soviet Union had promised to provide the UAR with advanced aircraft to offset any sale of U.S. Phantom aircraft to Israel. (Field Comment. Source did not have any details as to type or number of aircraft.)

2. Field Dissem. CINCMEAFSA (also sent Cairo.)

264. Action Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, September 27, 1968, 4 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. X, Memos, 6/68-11/68. Secret. A handwritten note indicates that the memorandum was received at 4:03 p.m.

SUBJECT
Twelve More Skyhawks for Israel

Secretaries Rusk and Clifford recommend that we accede to an Israeli request for 12 more Skyhawks.

You will recall that our 1966 agreement sold 48 and that you added another 40 after Prime Minister Eshkol's visit last January. Now the Israelis have asked for 12 more, since the production line is going to close down by April 1970 and they would like to have a few extras to cover possible losses over the next few years.

Secretaries Rusk and Clifford recommend you go ahead. The Arab world is still unaware of the total number of Skyhawks going to Israel, and a few more added to the end of the delivery line would make little difference on the diplomatic front. While this wouldn't reduce pressure for the Phantoms, it would give us additional evidence for proving that we are not totally insensitive to their security requirements. That plus our general interest in Israel's defense are the main reasons for going ahead; I don't think there's much room for a bargain here.

The only reason this comes up for decision now is that we must notify Douglas Aircraft by September 30 to avoid a break in the production line which would add to the price. If we're going to do it, we might as well keep the line going.

Walt

Approve/2/
Disapprove
Call me

/2/President Johnson checked this option.

265. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, September 27, 1968, 6:10 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt W. Rostow, Vol. 96, 9/26-30/68. Secret; Sensitive.

Mr. President:

You may wish to know that Dobrynin came in at 5 p.m. to see Sect. Rusk on one question: Is the U.S. likely to respond to their note on the Middle East? He wanted to know if newspaper accounts of a complete brush-off by the Israelis of the Soviet proposal was shared by the U.S.

Sect. Rusk told him that it was likely that we would be getting a response to him in the next several days. The Soviet paper gave us certain problems, but our response was not a complete brush-off.

W. W. Rostow/2/

/2/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

266. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Washington, September 29, 1968.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Battle on September 30 and approved in U on October 9.

SUBJECT
Views of the United States Government Regarding the Communication Presented by the Government of the USSR

PARTICIPANTS
The Under Secretary
His Excellency Anatoliy Dobrynin, Ambassador of the USSR
Lucius D. Battle, Assistant Secretary, NEA

The Soviet Ambassador called on Mr. Katzenbach, at the latter's request, at his residence on Sunday, September 29, at approximately 8:15 p.m.

Mr. Katzenbach handed to the Soviet Ambassador the attached paper which the Under Secretary described as the views of the United States with respect to the recent communication presented by the Government of the USSR to the United States./2/ Mr. Katzenbach emphasized that the paper contained the views of the United States and did not represent the views of the Government of Israel or any other country in the area. Mr. Katzenbach pointed out that Ambassador Jarring has worked long and hard and that he has a chance in the weeks ahead with the Foreign Ministers present to make progress under the resolution of November 22, 1967. The United States expects to exercise all influence possible on the situation and hopes to get substantive discussions underway in what will be an important period. It is particularly important, Mr. Katzenbach emphasized, for all pressure possible to be placed upon the countries concerned and in particular the UAR, Jordan, and Israel. The longer there is no move toward peace, the greater the difficulty, and the United States hopes very much that progress will be possible during the New York meeting.

/2/The attached paper was summarized in telegram 254018 to Tel Aviv, October 11. (Ibid., POL 27 ARAB-ISR)

The Soviet Ambassador asked what the main point was of the communication. Is it merely to assist Ambassador Jarring?

The Under Secretary replied that this was the main point and that the United States was making every effort to support him in his efforts.

The Ambassador asked what was new in the paper. The USSR considers that there must be concrete proposals if there is to be progress.

Mr. Katzenbach replied that we considered proposals for a solution should be advanced by Jarring in an effort to promote agreement of the parties. One of the most difficult points would be to arrive at a definition, for example, of agreed and secure boundaries.

Ambassador Dobrynin said that the Soviet Union agrees that adjustments in these lines are the business of the parties and not the business of the Soviet Union. However, he felt that it was necessary to make concrete proposals and that the Soviet Union, while wishing to help Jarring, considered that its more detailed suggestions had been a move in that direction. The USSR did not wish to press its paper. If the United States does not like the Russian proposal, the Russians would welcome steps by the United States to offer its own plan. France has a practical approach, and other countries must be equally practical.

Mr. Katzenbach replied that the question of timing was an important element. We consider it important to get the parties down to discussion of issues and substance. We believe that we have a common purpose with the Soviet Union of getting a settlement and ending a dangerous situation. We are reluctant, however, to tell Ambassador Jarring what to do. He must make that decision.

Dobrynin replied that Jordan was, he understood, depressed and may give up. What can be done that is practical and will help? The USSR is not trying to impose a settlement because of the Czech situation. It, too, wished to help Ambassador Jarring.

Mr. Katzenbach said that he had not brought up the Czech matter, that the Ambassador had mentioned it first.

There was general talk of the problems of the area with Mr. Katzenbach emphasizing that the Arabs primarily wanted withdrawal while the Israelis primarily want peace arrangements based on recognition of their existence and a permanent arrangement. The United States, of course, is aware that a peace treaty would be difficult, but there were other forms of settlement that could accomplish the same goal.

The Ambassador agreed to present to the Government of the USSR the views contained in the memorandum.

Attachment

September 29, 1968

1. The United States Government has noted the views of the Soviet Government concerning a Middle East settlement presented by Ambassador Dobrynin to Secretary Rusk on September 4, 1968./3/

/3/See Document 245.

2. The United States takes the view that peace in the Middle East is not the concern only of the countries of the region and that the persistence of tension in that area, and the absence of peace, threatens the general peace.

3. While sharing Soviet concern over the situation in the Middle East, the United States cannot accept the description contained in the Soviet document of the causes of that situation and the positions and actions taken by the parties since the cessation of hostilities. Moreover, it must reject as totally unfounded the allegation that the United States Government has supported a negative and deliberately obstructionist policy on the part of the Government of Israel. This statement is unwarranted and untrue. On the contrary, it is the view of the United States Government that the level of the flow of arms from the Soviet Union into the area has been a major factor in obstructing meaningful peace negotiations between the parties.

4. The views of the United States have been set forth by the President and other senior U.S. Government representatives on a number of occasions and are well known to the Government of the Soviet Union. The five principles enunciated by the President in his address of June 19, 1967, as reiterated by him on September 10, 1968, remain the basis for United States policy concerning a Middle East settlement.

5. Since the adoption of the Security Council resolution, the United States has given its full support to the efforts of Ambassador Gunnar V. Jarring to fulfill his mandate "to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles" in the Council resolution. The United States Government believes that its primary effort, along with that of the Soviet Union and other governments, should be directed at supporting Ambassador Jarring and in doing nothing that would in any way detract from or interfere in his activities. This attitude is reflected in the Security Council's resolution of September 18, 1968,/4/ to which both the United States and the Soviet Union gave their support.

/4/On September 18 the Security Council adopted a resolution reaffirming the principles of Resolution 242, urging the fullest cooperation with the Jarring Mission, and stipulating that the cease-fire ordered by the Security Council in several resolutions be respected. (UN doc. S/RES/258 (1968))

6. The United States, on its part, will make a renewed effort to encourage the parties to engage in the fullest and freest exchange of substantive proposals under his auspices and to accept such procedures as he may suggest to promote agreement as required by the resolution. It is hoped the USSR will do likewise. Just as we have felt that insistence upon direct negotiations as a pre-condition to serious substantive exchanges is unrealistic, so we believe the view that no joint talks can take place under Jarring's auspices is equally unrealistic. We hope the USSR will give this critical point the serious attention it deserves; for it is most difficult for us to conceive that stable peace can be achieved in this area without negotiations involving the parties at some stage, given the complexity of the issues.

7. The Soviet document requests the views of the United States Government concerning steps which in its view must be taken for a prompt settlement of the Middle East problem. In response to that request, the United States Government would like to seek certain clarifications and present the following observations, which inter alia could be explored in future consultations:

(a) The Soviet document refers in paragraph (a) to the readiness of the parties to implement the Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967. The United States wishes to point out that an essential part of the obligation to implement the resolution is the obligation to cooperate fully with Ambassador Jarring in the carrying out of his mandate as set forth in paragraph three of the resolution to promote agreement among the states concerned. It does not regard the Security Council resolution as self-implementing. It believes, on the contrary, that under the resolution the parties must take responsibility for an agreed settlement and that a settlement cannot be imposed upon the parties by others. The United States would welcome further clarification of the Soviet views on this point.

(b) The United States notes with interest that the Soviet document refers in paragraph (a) to the possibility of consultations "through Jarring or in some other form." The United States believes that consultations involving the parties will be essential to the development of agreement on a peaceful settlement envisaged by the November 22, 1967 Security Council resolution. Does the Soviet Union share this view?

(c) The United States agrees that it may be desirable for United Nations forces to be employed to assist in the carrying out of the terms of a settlement agreed by the parties and notes in this connection that the Soviet document makes a number of suggestions in this regard. While not being able to accept some of the concepts reflected in these suggestions, the United States would be prepared to discuss with the Soviet Government the idea of use of United Nations forces in connection with an agreed settlement.

(d) The United States further notes that paragraph (b) 5 of the Soviet document provides that the declarations of the Arab countries and Israel on the cessation of the state of war and the establishment of peace would become effective "either through the instrumentality of the Security Council or through the signing of a multilateral document." The United States believes that the peace must be based upon arrangements which directly bind the parties. Is this what is intended by the reference to a "multilateral document"? The United States believes that a document signed jointly by the parties is the most desirable, if not the only, means of obligating the parties to carry out the agreement worked out in accordance with the resolution of November 22, 1967. It believes, also, that Security Council endorsement of the terms of a settlement agreed by the parties could serve a useful purpose. The United States is not clear what a Four Power guarantee would add to such a Security Council endorsement of the agreement of the parties, but it is willing to examine the possibility at the appropriate time.

(e) Concerning the above point on the cessation of the state of war, does the USSR share the view of the United States that a termination of the state of belligerency would mean that there would be complete freedom of passage through international waterways, including the Suez Canal, for all vessels?

8. The Soviet document comments at some length on the desirability of a plan or timetable for implementation of the Security Council resolution. The United States has no objection to the concept of a plan under which the steps required for carrying out the peace settlement agreed to by the parties, and the timing of those steps, would be spelled out. It may be that the parties would find such a detailed plan necessary since, as the Soviet document also notes, the actions to be taken by the parties in carrying out their agreed settlement would inevitably be interrelated and in some degree interdependent. It is in light of this interrelationship that the United States firmly adheres to the view that all elements of a settlement must be dealt with in arriving at the terms of a settlement. It is the understanding of the United States, moreover, that the parties, including the UAR, all recognize that the Security Council resolution requires a "package" which would settle all the problems left open for negotiations by the resolution, whatever the chronology for implementation on which they might agree. In our view this position represents a proper interpretation of the resolution.

9. There is one specific aspect of the program outlined in the Soviet document which in particular merits comment: the idea of Israeli withdrawal to the pre-June 5 line. The essence of the United States policy since June 5, 1967, has been and remains that the state of armistice among the parties must be replaced, as the resolution of November 22, 1967, states, by a condition of peace. The armistice agreements of 1949 called for a transition to peace and specifically contemplated the possibility of agreed changes in the armistice lines of 1949 as part of that transition. The Security Council resolution calls for withdrawal of Israeli armed forces to secure and recognized boundaries, free from threats or acts of force, but does not specify that those boundaries should be precisely the lines held prior to June 5, 1967, or on any other date. In view of the complexity of this question, the United States believes that this is a matter which requires the priority attention of both the parties and Ambassador Jarring.

10. The United States believes it important that the Soviet and United States Government continue to consult on all possibilities for a settlement of the Middle East situation. It expects to be in contact with Ambassador Jarring in the days immediately ahead and, of course, there will be further opportunity for the two governments to exchange views during Minister Gromyko's forthcoming visit to New York during the General Assembly session.

267. Information Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, September 30, 1968, 11:35 a.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Walt W. Rostow, Arab-Israeli Private Talks. Secret; Sensitive. A handwritten notation indicates that the memorandum was received at 11:45 a.m. Attached is a September 30 memorandum to the President from CIA Director Helms with a subject heading that reads: "Israel-Jordan Secret Talks." See also Document 186.

Mr. President:

[1 paragraph (2 lines of source text) not declassified]

Jerusalem

Jerusalem is the major sticking point. I see no agreement if the Israelis limit Jordan to access to Moslem Holy Places and no agreement if Jordan tries to apply principle of "no territorial acquisitions" to Jerusalem. The best suggestion I know is from an Israeli junior minister: rebuild every church, synagogue, and mosque there ever was in Jerusalem and gradually put 60,000 or so Arabs on West Bank, making old city a tri-religion monument.

Secure borders

It is very difficult to think of Jordan accepting Israeli outposts permanently on its territory along the Jordan. The other alternatives are:

--joint patrols;
--joint patrols plus UN presence;
--UN presence, about which Israel would be very skeptical.

Israel might well give on Gaza, as the outlet for a transit road across Israel, leaving the Gaza refugees with Jordan.

To make anything constructive out of these initial positions will take a very great effort in the weeks ahead by Jarring--but, in fact, by us.

It's the best hope, despite the gap./2/

/2/Rostow added a handwritten postscript that reads: "Helms tells me a supplementary report will be along shortly." The supplementary report, in the form of another September 30 memorandum from Helms to the President, [text not declassified]. (Ibid.) Rostow commented on this supplementary report in a note he sent to the President on September 30. [text not declassified] Rostow concluded that "there may be some play for negotiation on the two really critical issues (Jerusalem and secure borders) in the weeks ahead." (Ibid.)

Walt

268. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State/1/

New York, October 1, 1968, 1915Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 ARAB-ISR/SANDSTORM. Secret; Priority; Nodis; Sandstorm. Repeated to Amman, Cairo, London, and Tel Aviv.

6764. Secto 05. Subject: Secretary-Eban Mtg (I)--Arab-Israeli settlement./2/ Following based on uncleared memcon, noforn and FYI subject to revision upon review.

/2/Eban and Rusk also discussed the Israeli request for F-4 Phantom aircraft and the Israeli position on the Non-Proliferation Treaty during this conversation. Eban renewed the Israeli request for action on the request for Phantoms, pointing to the danger that the UAR might act assuming that it had achieved air superiority. On the question of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, Eban said that Israel had not "gone nuclear" and had not decided not to sign the treaty. He stated that for the present Israel wanted "to swim in the international current" and work with those states seeking greater security assurances. (Telegram 6760 from USUN, October 1; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 12-5 ISR)

Begin summary. In meeting with Secretary September 30 Israeli Foreign Minister Eban: (a) sought to discredit recent Soviet Middle East initiative, expressing concern re differing US and Israeli interpretations; (b) welcomed President's September 10 speech, expressing view that reports on US-Israeli differences on approach to settlement were exaggerated; and (c) made clear Israel continues adhere to position that it will withdraw from ceasefire lines only following signature of contractual agreements negotiated face to face at some stage, either under Jarring's auspices or otherwise. Eban discounted possibility of early progress toward settlement with UAR due UAR determination not make peace. Eban said Israel therefore now gives priority to agreement with Jordan. He outlined in more specific terms than heretofore concepts which Israel believes should govern settlement with Jordan, which he said have been conveyed authoritatively to GOJ outside Jarring context. Concepts as described by Eban suggest some variation of an Allon plan, though he did not so categorize them. Eban expressed hope for progress with Jordan while in New York, looking ultimately Jordanian-Israeli meetings under Jarring's auspices. At the same time, Eban said Israel will continue for tactical reasons to probe UAR position. Eban indicated that effort will also be made to improve Israel's public image. To this end, while not surfacing any concrete "peace plan," he will seek make clear before General Assembly Israel's concept of peace with respect to such issues as boundaries, recognition and security.

Secretary made clear that US not buying "imposed solution" approach but did not think Soviet positions necessarily frozen, and stressed importance of maintaining contact with USSR on Middle East and other major problems. Eban seemed reassured by Secretary's comments including US response to Soviet approach as outlined by Secretary. Secretary urged Israel to pursue both direct and indirect routes as feasible, to continue utilize Jarring and not to give up on UAR. Failure find early solution could have serious consequences and provide further opportunity for Soviets in Middle East. End summary.

1. FonMin Eban, accompanied by Ambassadors Tekoah and Rabin and Minister Argov, had one and one-half hour meeting with Secretary afternoon September 30. Ambassador Buffum, Assistant Secretary Sisco and Atherton (NEA) also present.

2. Eban said he had clear picture of USG views from President's September 10 speech and accounts of Secretary's meetings with Allon and Rabin. Israeli Cabinet had met several times to consider what Eban could say to give others, including world opinion through General Assembly, clear idea of Israel's position.

3. To begin with, however, Eban said he wished to focus on ways of keeping US and Israel together. Israel found President's speech clear reiteration of June 19 principles with some welcome additions, particularly emphasis on concept that Security Council resolution not self-executing but only a basis for parties to reach agreement. This went to heart of diplomatic deadlock, given UAR position that resolution could be carried out by declamation. Behind diplomatic deadlock, however, lay political deadlock arising from UAR determination not to make peace.

4.  Eban continued that, while there was broad area of agreement between Israel and USG on approach to Arab-Israel settlement, he was not sure we shared common view of international setting which was inseparable from area problems. Specifically Eban thought US and Israel had differing views of Soviet policy. Soviet action in Czechoslovakia had caused wide concern in much of world and some friends of United States were troubled by our reaction. Israel believed Soviets had seriously prejudiced their position in world and that it was a mistake to act as though normal relations with USSR could be maintained. Israel believed Soviet intentions should be exposed, including their increasingly truculent position in Middle East and new Arab arms buildup. Czech invasion should be on GA agenda. Israel found incongruous and demoralizing the idea that US would welcome Soviet signature on ME settlement. USSR should not be invited into ME. In Israel's view, USG should not continue contacts with Soviets on ME.

5. Re specifics of Soviet proposal which Israel knew in detail, Eban saw no merit in proposal for some kind of multilateral document. Such document wld merely be substitute for Arab-Israeli agreement and provide Soviets basis for later intervention. Israel also viewed negatively proposal for four-power guarantee, especially in absence of agreement among parties. We should not afford USSR statutory basis to intervene in ME.

6. In summary, Eban said Soviet approach did not constitute peace proposal but merely proposal for return to situation of June 4, 1967, with better basis than previously for Soviet penetration. In Israel's view, role for great powers should be to insist that responsibility rested with the parties. Once agreement reached, it would be natural for there to be international endorsement on pattern of 1949 armistice agreements, of which SC took note after they had been negotiated by parties under UN auspices.

7. Turning to status of Israel's exchange of views with the parties, Eban reviewed past efforts to initiate negotiations with Cairo. UAR had backed away from every effort, beginning with period before Jarring Mission and continuing through Jarring's efforts to organize joint meetings last March and latest Israeli effort to begin indirect negotiating process in July through Sept this year. Latter exercise, Eban said, represented change of Israeli policy. Israel had begun by asking UAR to define its concept of peace and had hinted that it would not be dogmatic about form of peace settlement. UAR had replied with conventional abuse when Israel had asked what Cairo meant by proposal to record agreement in declaration to SC.

8. Eban said Israel had concluded that UAR was in state of ideological rigidity, unable to negotiate in any form. Eban disagreed with argument of some USG officials that UAR was unaware Israel would withdraw from occupied territories. UAR knew that it would recover its territories in context of peace. Israel's concern in Sinai was security and free navigation, and UAR has already made clear that it did not want Gaza. Problem, Eban said, was that UAR wanted return of territories without peace and may believe this is possible, either through 1957-type political solution or military solution based on buildup of UAR air force in absence replacement of Israeli air losses. Israel had concluded that it not feasible to begin with Cairo, though for tactical reasons it should continue to probe UAR in order to expose Egyptian responsibility.

9. Eban said that logical approach therefore was to give priority to settlement with Jordan. Palestine Arabs and Jordanian Government in any case more involved since Palestine was heart of problem. Exchanges with GOJ, which began in April through Palestinian leaders, had recently become more intensive, concrete and authoritative. Israeli-Jordanian dialogue existed with respect to peace, population and boundaries. While Israel had drawn no lines on map, Jordan had detailed conceptual picture of what Israel wanted. Israel sought maximum security with minimum change of territory and population. Those responsible for Israel's security believed changes were needed in uninhabited areas of Jordan Valley. This could be accomplished without breaking territorial link between East and West Banks. Essential conditions, however, were that there be no Arab army West of Jordan River and that boundary be a "community boundary" mutually open as at present, with Mediterranean port facilities for Jordan through Israel and access for Israel to places of religious and historical interest to Israelis in Jordan. On Jerusalem, Israel envisaged Jordan as custodian of Moslem holy places with access agreements to be negotiated.

10. Eban said most of world would consider this Israeli position magnanimous, given Jordanian responsibility for hostilities last year. Israel awaited with interest Jordanian reaction and looked for progress in October. In response to Secretary's question whether Israeli-Jordanian negotiations would be outside Jarring Mission context, Eban said Israel thought Jordan wanted to pursue informal contacts but also wanted to see if it could get in position to have direct contacts. Major question was whether Hussein had green light from Cairo. Meanwhile, Eban said he had not yet considered what to say to Jarring about contacts with Jordan. He thought Jarring understood why Israel preferred deal with specifics in private channels in order avoid either side's becoming locked into fixed positions.

11. Re negotiations with UAR, Eban said Jarring had suggested two possible ways to break deadlock: (a) Israel could define its views on secure and recognized borders; or (b) parties could make declarations in SC on carrying out principles of resolution while reserving territorial questions for separate negotiations. Eban had told Jarring Israel had no objection to latter procedure but doubted Arabs would agree. Israel also suspected that UAR would want to formulate any declaration in general terms, avoiding specific recognition of Israeli sovereignty, Israeli rights, etc.

12. Secretary noted information we had received from London to effect that King Hussein had told British Jordan would enter negotiations with Israel under Jarring's auspices if Israel would indicate acceptance of November Security Council resolution with qualification. Hussein had also said he had UAR green light to do this. (Eban noted that British had also passed this information to him.) In response to Secretary's query whether it possible to get into specifics with UAR through Jarring as Israel said it was doing directly with Jordan, Eban expressed skepticism. Ambassador Rabin added that the basic difference was that Jordan was ready for peace and UAR was not; it was thus logical to move to second phase with Jordan.

13. Turning to US-Israeli relations, Eban said he believed reports of US-Israeli differences in Israeli press and elsewhere were exaggerated. Some alleged that US saw no need for negotiations--an interpretation which Eban did not accept. It was clear that peace could not be achieved without parties setting eyes on each other. Historically, transitions from war to peace always involved contacts. Opinion in Israel did not favor perpetuating ceasefire lines, but Israel could live with those lines if it could not have peace. Sacrifices of recent war had sharpened Israeli awareness of need for negotiated peace. Israel would multiply and diversify its contacts, however, putting concrete ideas on table. Israel also understood US argument that it must improve its public image. Eban said he had no "peace plan" to present to General Assembly but would use GA to clarify Israel's concept of peace with respect to boundaries, acceptance of its right to exist and security. Re territorial questions, Eban noted that Goldberg's formulation of November 15 and President's statement on September 10 were close to Israel's ideas.

14. Eban emphasized that all of foregoing still in tentative stage. He planned to devote October and, if necessary, some of November to these efforts and hoped for more detailed discussions with USG. He also hoped public polemics could be avoided.

15. Referring to Eban's comments about Soviet policy, Secretary recalled that he had told NATO Ministers in Iceland that we faced dangerous summer. Even then USSR appeared moving away from peaceful coexistence. Given threat of Czech developments to maintenance of Soviet position in Eastern Europe, strong Soviet reaction was predictable. Soviets must have anticipated adverse world reaction although extent of condemnation of Soviet invasion was surprising. Secretary said USG not impressed by demands from others that US do something about Czechoslovakia while they continued business as usual.

16. With respect to situation in Mediterranean and Middle East area, Secretary said Soviets could be expected to attempt improve their position at expense of both Israel and moderate Arab states. Best way to contain Soviets in the Middle East was to find solution to Arab-Israel conflict.

17. Secretary continued that Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia had interrupted aspects of US-USSR dialogue. Other problems such as Middle East and Viet-Nam had not disappeared, however, and it important to maintain contact on these issues. Secretary then summarized US reaction to Soviet Middle East approach as conveyed by US to USSR (septel)/3/ and undertook to have Israeli representatives more fully briefed later. In general, Secretary said, we believed parties must find their own answer; solution could not be imposed. We would welcome it if progress with Jordan could be made through direct contacts. Jarring had role to play, however, and we would also welcome it if he could help with UAR. If solution not found, consequences could be serious and we therefore hoped there would be progress while Foreign Ministers were in New York.

/3/See footnote 2, Document 266.

18. Eban said US reply to Soviets as described by Secretary seemed close to Israeli views. Noting recent New York Times story on Soviet approach, Eban asked whether we intended to comment publicly. Secretary said we would limit public comment and were waiting to hear Soviet answers to our request for clarification of some points in their approach. He thought many issues were being re-examined in Moscow and, while not overly optimistic about the outcome, did not have impression that Soviet positions were fixed and frozen.

Rusk

269. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State/1/

New York, October 2, 1968, 1258Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 ARAB-ISR/SANDSTORM. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to Amman, Cairo, Tel Aviv, and London.

6786. Secto 12. Following based on uncleared memcon,/2/ Noforn and FYI, subject to revision upon review.

/2/A memorandum of this conversation is ibid., Conference Files: Lot 69 D 182, CF 320.

1. Begin summary. Secretary and UAR Foreign Minister Riad met for hour and fifteen minutes October 1. Both agreed next two weeks at UN critical and expressed hope Jarring could begin to make progress. Secretary tried to elicit from Riad clear statement what Egyptians were prepared to accept with regard signing peace document, terminating state of war, Israeli transit of Canal, refugees and form of negotiations. Riad's responses did not add anything new to what we know of Egyptian position with possible exception his remarks on refugees and willingness sign document. He seemed accept idea refugees be allowed express privately their desires re resettlement and indicated procedural question of signing peace document not as important as details therein and guarantee of implementation. Secretary asked whether Egypt could accept Rhodes formula for negotiations and Riad dodged question. End summary.

2. Secretary received UAR Foreign Minister Mahmoud Riad in his suite at Waldorf Astoria afternoon October 1. Riad accompanied by Mohammed Riad, Hassan Sabry al-Khouly and Ashraf Ghorbal. Sisco, Buffum, Pedersen and Parker (NEA) also present. Secretary opened substantive discussion by asking for UAR view of situation and where it thought progress could be made. Riad said there had been no significant progress since their previous meeting a year ago. He gave review of developments since then, noting that King Hussein had understood from our assurances that passage of November 22 resolution would mean Israeli withdrawal. Egyptians had doubted this at time and events have proved them right. UAR had cooperated fully with Jarring, but Israel had not. Jarring had said that he had a beautiful car but had no fuel for it. We had to decide how to give him a push. If Jarring failed he would issue a report and the matter would revert to the Security Council. This question had to be faced in the next two weeks.

3. The Secretary agreed that next two weeks would be critical. Jarring and the Foreign Ministers concerned were in New York and we needed intensive work by everyone to get some genuine motion. US would do everything to encourage them. We fully supported November 22 resolution. Secretary sometimes wondered, however, whether there were not several resolutions, given differing interpretations of parties. These differences were important because resolution was not self-implementing. We had hoped parties would avoid a procedural impasse and had not believed that Israel should insist on bilateral negotiations, nor that the Arab side should exclude them for doctrinaire reasons. We thought there should be talks at some stage. We ourselves did not attach tragic importance to procedure and the Secretary himself had engaged in negotiations with representatives of Peking and Hanoi, two governments we did not recognize. We had exercised flexibility and hoped the parties in the Middle East would do the same.

4. Secretary said November 22 resolution was a package, but it was made up of many parts. This was classical problem of diplomacy. The whole may be too big to deal with, but pieces could not be separated from it. We had hoped that by this time Jarring would begin to put pieces together to find out where problems are. Secretary then asked what Egypt's main problems were from a national point of view, leaving aside the interests of Jordan and Syria. We had the impression problems between Israel and Egypt were not all that formidable. Where were the real difficulties for Egypt? Were they bilateral or did they involve Jordan and Syria?

5. Riad said greatest problems were between Israel and Egypt because Israel had manifested territorial claims to Sinai since 1956. Egyptians could not take at face value declarations by Israeli leaders that they wanted peace. Problem was one of security, not of procedures. He then reviewed familiar Egyptian version of Israeli perfidy regarding the Rhodes and Lausanne Agreements./3/ Given this history, problem for Egypt was how to guarantee a solution.

/3/On February 24, 1949, Egypt and Israel signed an armistice agreement at Rhodes. For text, see UN doc. S/1264/Corr.1 and Add.1. On May 12, 1949, representatives of the UN Conciliation Commission for Palestine and the Governments of Israel, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria signed a protocol at Lausanne which provided that talks on a peace settlement should commence based upon a map showing the 1947 partition lines. For text, see Foreign Relations, 1949, vol. VI, p. 998.

6. Secretary said he gathered part of problem not so much procedure but of insured implementation. Egyptians were not rejecting procedures in themselves, but saying results of any agreed procedure must be carried out. Riad said after two experiments it clear a piece of paper signed by the Israelis was worthless. Secretary said he could understand UAR concern that agreement be carried out, but could not understand why it not prepared sign agreement either multilateral or bilateral. Riad said UAR not refusing to sign document. UAR said it had obligations and must honor them.

7. Secretary said he did not wish to be critical but with regard importance of signature he recalled that President Eisenhower had undertaken commitments regarding navigation in the Straits of Tiran. Egypt had not objected but in 1967 had pointed out that it had not signed the commitment and was not bound by it. We were thus left high and dry by an action we took on behalf of Egypt. Signatures were important. Secretary then asked if there were text of agreement worked out by Jarring and it were nailed to the wall for those who wished to sign and Egypt signed it one day and Israel signed the next, would the UAR accept?

8. Riad said question of wall or table irrelevant. UAR was ready to sign in accordance with its obligations. Whether on same page or a different copy was not real question. He had not thought it through, but the UAR was ready to sign a document which constituted a full plan for settlement./4/

/4/Mohamed Riad, on instructions from the Foreign Minister, subsequently clarified the UAR position on this issue to stipulate that the UAR was not prepared to sign the same document with the Israelis, but was prepared to sign identical, separate documents that would have a binding effect. (Telegram 6802 from USUN, October 2; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 ARAB-ISR/SANDSTORM)

9. Secretary said leaving question of signature aside for a moment and assuming withdrawal taken care of, what were the other problems? Was the UAR ready for the elimination of state of war? Riad said it was in the resolution. The Secretary said that was not his question. Riad said insofar as non-belligerency is in resolution UAR was ready to give statement, as he had told Jarring, to end state of belligerency. It would be effective when Israelis withdrew.

10. Secretary said assuming it was agreed to end the state of belligerency simultaneously with withdrawal, how could Egypt deny Israel passage through Suez once belligerency ended? Riad said if state of war ended, UAR would have to fulfill obligations regarding international traffic through Canal, but Israeli use of the Canal had been linked to refugees since 1951. Israelis must respect rights of others if they want their own rights respected. Secretary said he could understand organic connection between state of war and use of Canal, but not between use of Canal and some third question. As maritime nation interested in free transit we were concerned that such transit might be denied solely for political reasons. Egyptians might deny use of Canal to us some day because of Viet-Nam problem or some other political issue. Riad said this not problem because Americans had not killed people of Canal, as Israel had. There were two aspects of the Arab-Israel problem, one of refugees and one of expansion. Refugees were humanitarian problem which Israel had refused to consider to date. Canal was unimportant to Israel in material terms, but refugee issue was of great importance to Arabs. Secretary remarked that elimination of state of war had no substance without free passage. Riad said he had told Jarring that once there was agreement on refugee settlement Israeli cargo could transit Canal. Once that settlement was implemented the Egyptians would permit Israeli flag to use it.

11. Secretary said we very concerned about refugees. Why not let some reliable person go to each refugee privately and individually and ask him where he wanted to live? Would that work? Riad said this was in the UN resolution and could be done through a referendum or a plebiscite. Secretary said he was not thinking of a referendum where everyone would be told to vote one way or have his throat cut. Riad said that if the refugees had free choice, very few of them would go back to Israel and said that if money could be invested in, for instance, the West Bank for economic development projects this would attract many of them. He did not know why we had not tried this approach in past. Secretary said he would agree, of course, that new refugees, i.e. those who had fled since June 1967, must be allowed to return. Riad said this would come about naturally once Israel withdrew. Secretary noted that he did not think money would be a problem if there was a serious solution in sight.

12. Secretary said we had no problem with agreement on a sequence of events which might be called a timetable. We were concerned, however, with original idea put forth by Kosygin last year that withdrawal must precede everything else. We did not know if the Soviet view had changed, but we were wary of withdrawal first. This was, frankly, our problem in Paris. We had no objection to stopping the bombing, but Hanoi insisted that everything else must be held in abeyance until that happened.

13. Riad asked who was to set forth the timetable. Secretary thought it would take care of itself once there was agreement on substance. Riad said UAR had made its position clear on substance, but Israelis refused to discuss details. Secretary said he thought this might be because of procedural points. If Arabs did not exclude direct talks and Israelis did not exclude indirect talks as matter of doctrine, progress could start. Riad said he did not understand. Talks could either be direct or indirect. Secretary remarked that they could also be a combination of the two. Riad said Israelis insisted on direct negotiations, which Egypt could not accept. Rhodes talks had been indirect until the end, but the Israelis were refusing this combination now. The Jordanians had told the Israelis they were ready for such negotiations but Israel must first accept resolution unequivocably. Israel had refused.

14. Secretary asked if UAR was ready to accept Rhodes formula. Riad said Egyptians had tried it twice and it didn't work. Jarring was now engaged in indirect negotiations in effect. He was going from one party to the other, in same way Bunche did. All this talk of negotiations was rhetorical. Israelis simply did not want to reach agreement./5/

/5/Mohamed Riad subsequently clarified this position to establish that the UAR was not prepared to accept the Rhodes formula. (Ibid.)

15. Buffum said perhaps there was some confusion arising from Khartoum formula. We understood it to mean that there could be no formal peace treaty. Did we understand correctly that UAR did not exclude eventual face-to-face encounter and signature of a document if it could be assured that Israel would keep its part of the bargain? Riad said at Khartoum it was agreed there would be no direct negotiations, no peace treaties, and no diplomatic recognition. It did not mean UAR could not sign piece of paper stating it would honor obligations and send it to SYG or SC. UAR's responsibility was not only to Israel but also to UN. It also wanted Israel to be responsible to UN. It wanted a better guarantee of Israeli performance than it had in the past.

Rusk

270. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State/1/

New York, October 2, 1968, 2333Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Conference Files: Lot 69 D 182, CF 319. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Drafted at USUN by Buffum.

6805. Secto 17. Subject: Middle East: Phantoms.

1. At conclusion of lengthy discussion on Middle East with Sisco and Buffum Oct 2,/2/ Amb Jarring raised what was obvious purpose in his asking for such quick follow-up discussion to his mtg with Secretary Oct 1./3/

/2/See Document 271.

/3/Rusk's October 1 meeting with Jarring was reported in telegram 6767 from USUN, October 1. The meeting was devoted to a review of the current status of Jarring's efforts. Jarring indicated that no new decisive elements had emerged from his initial round of discussions with Foreign Ministers. Rusk encouraged Jarring to intensify his efforts and not to give up on his mission. (Ibid.)

2. Jarring said he feared he had gained impression from one comment made by Secretary that announcement to sell Phantom aircraft to Israel might be made soon. He also recalled Secretary had asked what we cld do to help him. Jarring said he was most disturbed about effect such an announcement would have on his mission. While it wld obviously not be proper for him to take position on substance of matter, he indicated strong hope US wld find it at least possible to delay any such announcement during immediate future, which he considers is critical period in determining fate of his mission./4/

/4/Rostow sent a copy of this telegram to President Johnson on October 3 with a covering note stating that he wanted to make the President aware of Jarring's position on the Phantom aircraft. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt W. Rostow, Vol. 97, Oct. 1-4 1968)

Rusk

271. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State/1/

New York, October 3, 1968, 1552Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Repeated to Tel Aviv, Amman, and Cairo.

6819. Subj: Middle East.

1. In lengthy conversation held by Buffum and Sisco with Jarring at latter's request Oct 2, Jarring advanced new and interesting concept of approach to settlement for US informal consideration, indicating he not yet prepared to advance this to parties and requesting we discuss these ideas with no one, particularly Israelis.

2. Jarring said he now inclined believe most productive approach wld be to separate out key elements of problem which are susceptible to early agreement, putting others like Jerusalem and refugees aside for further study and agreement at later stage. (He noted Sovs have similar idea re Jerusalem and said he has not yet raised it specifically with Jordan because he regards it as most intractable of all elements in problem.) He envisaged possibility of breaking out following elements; withdrawal of troops; secure and recognized boundaries; free passage through international waterways. He thought there might be some hope in such combination since so many nations, particularly UAR and Asians, keenly interested in reopening Suez Canal. Moreover, he felt territorial issues between UAR and Israel were minimal. Therefore, he conceived of approach which would include Israeli withdrawal from UAR, with Sinai demilitarized (possibly with UN presence) with UAR undertaking binding commitment (not clear whether between parties) to terminate belligerency and permitting Israeli free passage through Suez and Gulf of Aqaba.

3. Jarring seemed more sure than before that he could get UAR signature on some kind of a document that would in effect legally bind them to carry out their obligations under the agreement. He also felt that UAR might be able to swallow agreement to let Israeli ships through Suez provided Israelis would not make an ostentatious display when their first ship goes through. As part of above arrangement, Israelis would be expected as first step to withdraw about 30-40 kilometers from Suez. As for Gaza, he adheres to earlier thought that this might be put under UN supervision for lengthy period, possibly going later to Jordan. Latter could capitalize on acquisition of Gaza to prove that even if some of their territory goes to Israel they wld not suffer a net loss of land in process. He did not consider Israelis would have legitimate claim in saying Gaza constitutes security problem if Sinai demilitarized. Gaza of course consists primarily of refugees, and solution of Gaza cld be considered largely as refugee problem rather than territorial or security problem. He considered that such approach would give Israelis most of what they want vis-a-vis UAR.

4. Jarring recognized that at moment Israelis not disposed to seek separate agreement with Cairo since they consider UAR does not sincerely want peace and that they are giving priority to efforts at an accommodation with Jordan. Re latter, he complained that whereas Israelis say Jordanians have clear picture of what they mean by secure boundaries with Jordan, they have refused to tell him what they mean by it, which continues to preclude him from playing significant role in advancing that aspect of problem.

5. Sisco recalled Israelis had authorized us to tell Jordanians they cld expect to get back most of West Bank, although he pointed out statements by Allon and others may well have left Jordanians confused as to what Israelis' real intentions are.

6. Jarring indicated he keeps pressing Eban for info on this, saying he cannot face Rifai again, who is in increasingly pessimistic mood unless he has clearer notion of Israeli intentions. He said Eban yesterday asked to be given "two more days."

7. Dept should be aware that Jarring is in the beginning of an intense round of consultations. He is really in high gear; yesterday delegates poured in and out of his office. He sees next few weeks as critical and made plain he will probably want our specific help on specific points with Israelis in next few days.

8. He feels strongly that now that he is so deeply in middle of substantive exploration, that to revert back to a formula such as Caradon's/2/ would be to return to the previous procedural impasse. For example, he does not see the Caradon formula really different from his own March 10 proposal. He also in last day has looked to see whether the May 1 Tekoah acceptance formula could be reworked and reused and has concluded it would be hopeless to move back this way./3/

/2/On October 2 British Permanent Representative Lord Caradon told Secretary Rusk that, based on soundings taken by the British Embassy in Jordan with King Hussein, he felt certain that Jordan was prepared to negotiate with Israel if Israel would make a simple declaration that it was prepared to implement the November 22 resolution. (Telegram 6804 from USUN, October 2; ibid., POL 27-14 ARAB-ISR/SANDSTORM) Foreign Secretary Stewart subsequently revised this formula, proposing a joint U.S.-British effort to press Israel not only to make a statement declaring its intention to implement Resolution 242 but also to declare a willingness to discuss with Jarring a timetable for implementation. (Telegram 6949 from USUN, October 8; ibid., POL 27 ARAB-ISR)

/3/The Department applauded the proposed initiative by Jarring. In telegram 251458 to USUN, October 8, the Department expressed the hope that Jarring's vigorous initiative would lead to a breakthrough and proposed an extensive list of suggestions and revisions to the approach Jarring had outlined. There is no evidence that Jarring adopted the suggestions. (Ibid.)

Buffum

272. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Lebanon/1/

Washington, October 4, 1968, 2218Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret. Drafted by Bryan H. Baas (NEA/ARN), cleared by Michael Sterner (NEA/IAI), and approved by Talcott W. Seelye. Repeated to Amman, Tel Aviv, and USUN.

250484. Subj: Lebanese View on Imposed Solution. Ref: Beirut 13089 (Notal)./2/

/2/Telegram 13089 from Beirut, October 1, reported that President Helou had designated Simon Boulos as a member of the Lebanese Delegation to the UN General Assembly and charged him with responsibility for discussing with U.S. officials Lebanon's fears about an Israeli attack against Lebanese territory in response to real or imagined infiltrations across Lebanon into Israel. Boulos was also instructed to try to promote an Arab-Israeli settlement at the United Nations. (Ibid.)

1. In call on Department Officers October 4, Simon Boulos,/3/ President Helou's unofficial emissary, stated that Helou (as well as other Arab leaders) firmly convinced that only possible ME settlement is one imposed on Arabs and Israelis by US and USSR (but not Big Four or UN). Leaders could not justify to Arab people anything other than imposed settlement. Boulos added that although danger of later repudiation exists, imposed settlement is only way of getting issue off dead center at this time.

/3/Boulos called on Seelye and Baas. A memorandum of the conversation is ibid., AID(US)LEB.

2. Boulos also stated Helou has hard intelligence indicating Syrian Government planning sharply increased infiltration of fedayeen through Lebanon into Israel. Purpose is to provoke Israeli reprisals which would in turn cause serious internal difficulties in Lebanon. Boulos expressed hope Israelis will not retaliate in case occasional terrorist slips through Lebanon, since Lebanese forces doing everything possible to interdict fedayeen. Memcon follows.

Katzenbach

273. Information Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, October 5, 1968, 2 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. X, Cables and Memos, 6/68-11/68. Secret. A handwritten notation indicates that the memorandum was received at 2:40 p.m.

Mr. President:

The attached letter from Eshkol to you/2/ says, in effect:

/2/This letter, dated September 29, was delivered by the Israeli Embassy to the Department of State on October 5 and forwarded to the White House under cover of a memorandum from Executive Secretary Read to Rostow, also dated October 5. (Ibid., Special Head of State Correspondence File, Israel, 8/1/68-12/12/68)

--the UAR doesn't want peace; please don't get in bed with the Soviet Union on the Middle East;
--the Israelis are trying to do something with Jordan;
--please give us the Phantoms;
--may I come and see you in December in the course of my trip to Latin America?

In the course of this, he has praise for your speech of September 10 (as he interprets it).

You may wish to know that Joe Sisco will be in touch with both the Jordanian and Israeli Foreign Ministers to establish whether the right words spoken by Eban on the November Resolution in his speech scheduled for next Tuesday/3/ would, in fact, open up negotiations between the two countries under Jarring.

/3/October 8.

Walt

274. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

SecDel/MC/16

New York, October 6, 1968, 7:30-10:45 p.m.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Conference Files:  Lot 69 D 182, CF 321. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by William D. Krimer and approved in S on October 17. The meeting took place over dinner in Suite 42A at the Waldorf Towers. The conversation was summarized in telegram 6889 from USUN, October 7. (Ibid., Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 ARAB/ISR)

SECRETARY'S DELEGATION TO THE TWENTY-THIRD SESSION
OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY
New York, September-October 1968

SUBJECT
Middle East (Part VIII of VIII)

PARTICIPANTS

US
The Secretary
Deputy Under Secretary Charles E. Bohlen
Ambassador J. R. Wiggins
Wm. D. Krimer, Interpreter

USSR
Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrei Gromyko
Ambassador Ya. Malik
Ambassador A. Dobrynin
V. Sukhodrev, Interpreter

The Secretary referred to a proposal that a multilateral document settling the Arab-Israeli dispute in the Middle East be signed by all the parties, including Israel, Egypt and Jordan. He did not care what such a document might be called, a Treaty or any other designation would do, as long as it was signed at a minimum by Israel, Jordan and the UAR. If substantive questions were resolved, the parties could sign the same document, not necessarily at one and the same time; thereby they would assume certain obligations which they would undertake to carry out. Mr. Gromyko inquired whether the Secretary had discussed this possibility with Riad. The Secretary indicated he had, although at the time Riad was accompanied by some other Arabs. He said that if an Arab has an Arab for an audience things have a tendency to become difficult. Riad had thought, however, that perhaps the various parties could sign different copies of the same document. Mr. Gromyko proposed that such a document be signed first by one side, and then Mr. Jarring could take it to the other side, so as to get it signed by all parties. Then, after all had signed it, suppose the members of the Security Council also signed, at least the permanent members. The Secretary thought such a procedure might be possible. In any case, said Mr. Gromyko, we should not let a comma stand in the way of peace if there is agreement on substantive issues. The Secretary said that he was interested to see a reference to a multilateral document in Mr. Gromyko's statement and suggested we see what could be done in this respect. A second problem had to do with passage through international waterways. Our understanding of the Soviet position was that the USSR had no objection to international waterways being open. We take the same view; both our countries are maritime powers. If the Arabs said that they were prepared to end the state of war with Israel, it would seem that the obstacle to the passage of Israeli ships through the Suez Canal would also have been removed; for over the years the only justification for barring the Canal to Israeli shipping had been the state of war. It follows then, that if the UAR now says that it is prepared to end the state of war, but would postpone consideration of the question of opening the Suez Canal, then these are merely words without any real substance. Riad had said that Suez would be dealt with in connection with the refugee question. The Secretary had suggested to him that each refugee be asked where he wanted to live, whether he wanted to return to Israel or live in other countries, and that this be done in a most confidential manner so that he would not get his throat cut for having chosen one option over another. He was interested in the fact that Riad did not turn down this idea. Perhaps we could make progress on this basis, with the help of the Swiss or someone else. Mr. Gromyko asked for the Secretary's estimate of the number of refugees who would elect to return to their former territory. The Secretary guessed that number to be no more that 10 per cent of all the refugees. If this were really so, Israel would be prepared to receive them; it could not, however, commit itself to receive unlimited numbers. Mr. Gromyko then inquired as to the possible sequence of steps concerning the Canal and the refugees, once such a poll among the refugees had been taken and Israel had agreed to accept those who wanted to return. The Secretary thought that one possibility was to have UNRWA or the Swiss or some other neutral carry out the job of polling the refugees, possibly Jarring or some such person. If we could get this arrangement made and on the basis of that unlock the problem of opening the Suez Canal, that in turn would unlock the problem of the state of war; then we could take up territorial matters and troop withdrawal. The Israeli cabinet had not as yet reached any firm conclusion on the subject; but it was the Secretary's impression that there were no territorial problems that could not be solved between Israel and Egypt; there were none between Israel and Lebanon: the territorial problems between Israel and Jordan, he was sure, could be solved by quiet, behind the scenes negotiations. There was also not much of a problem in this respect between Israel and Syria. Jerusalem, however, did indeed present a very thorny problem. Replying to Mr. Gromyko's inquiry, the Secretary said that while he would not object to the Gaza Strip being classified as Arab territory, it was not Egyptian territory. He did not know what solution could be found for the Gaza Strip, possibly a UN solution; of course, he knew that Jordan wanted Gaza; but this problem would perhaps be eased once the refugee problem was out of the way. Thus he took the view that the solution of each point at dispute made the solution of other points easier.

Mr. Gromyko said that it would be good for each of our two sides to try to work with the appropriate sides for the purpose of influencing them toward a solution. But, could we be sure that this work would not be in vain, that Israel perhaps would then come out with a statement saying it did not agree with the US position?

The Secretary emphasized that he was presenting the US view of these problems; he did not, however, have any way of guaranteeing that Israel would see things the same way as we. In this connection he also said that in June 1967 we had received Israeli assurances that they would not be the first to take military action, yet they had done so. On the other hand, the Arabs were exaggerating; he was convinced that Israel was not engaged in a major campaign of territorial expansion. Mr. Gromyko asked if we had any good grounds to believe in a successful settlement of the various disputes if we worked in this direction. The Secretary suggested that we keep in close touch during the next three or four weeks as Jarring explores all of these possibilities first hand. Mr. Gromyko asked if the Secretary was suggesting that we keep hands off during that period of time. The Secretary replied that Jarring needed the support of the US and the USSR to be successful in his efforts. To Mr. Gromyko's question whether the Secretary was in touch with Israel directly, the Secretary replied that he was. Mr. Gromyko then said that we should work in parallel to get all possibilities considered while Jarring was proceeding with the matters he was working on. The Secretary called attention to a statement by Eban, in which he had strongly commended and supported Jarring's efforts. We would also support Jarring's work by talking with Israel and the Arabs, although he was sure Mr. Gromyko knew that our influence with the Arabs was not very great. Ambassador Malik remarked that it seemed to him our influence was not very great with Israel either. Secretary Rusk repeated that Jarring was working and said "let us work behind the scenes." Mr. Gromyko asked that we keep in touch through the respective ambassadors; everything should be done to find a solution--such was the view of the Soviet Union. The Secretary added that we seemed to have common views on the points mentioned although we disagreed on the most important point of view of arms limitation in the Middle East. Mr. Gromyko reminded the Secretary of the assurances the USSR had given several times to the effect that when the problem of Israeli troop withdrawal was resolved, the USSR would be willing to consider the question of arms limitation. The Secretary said he hoped it would not be too late for that by then. Mr. Gromyko said we should be realistic; who would be causing trouble, surely not Nasser or Syria. The Secretary thought both sides sometimes acted as if they were crazy. Ambassador Malik objected that the Arabs were victims of aggression. To that the Secretary said that in the same vein we could then proceed to mention the Straits of Tiran, the Arab Holy War and so on; we could argue all the way back to 1945. The fact is that we have to start where we are and try to make some sense. Mr. Gromyko said that in the meantime it would be good if both sides could be prevailed upon to refrain from any acts which could inflame the situation. He thought that the US could strongly advise Israel not to stir up trouble. The Secretary said frankly that we had been doing so almost every week; we get back reports of terrorist acts by El Fatah, etc. As concerns Lebanon and Jordan, these two countries have been trying to restrain the terrorists and Israel knows that. We would like to see a situation where there were no incidents in any direction. He agreed that at times Israeli reaction to terrorist acts was too violent. Mr. Gromyko said that he was glad to know the Secretary would talk to the Israelis. For his part, he was sure the Secretary knew that he had made many private as well as public statements counselling restraint. The Secretary said it would be good if Syria could be prevailed upon to cooperate with her Arab neighbors, Lebanon and Jordan. Mr. Gromyko said that Syria's position, with part of her territory occupied, had to be understood. To that the Secretary replied that the Syrians had been engaging in hostile acts long before June 1967. Syria had even then been a center for El Fatah. He asked the Foreign Minister to keep in touch.

The meeting ended with a brief discussion of what to say to press inquiries. It was agreed to mention the subjects and areas which had been discussed but also to state that no definite conclusions had been reached.

275. Telegram From the Department of State to Selected Posts/1/

Washington, October 9, 1968, 1008Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 19-8 US-ISR. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Country Director for Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Yemen, and Aden William D. Brewer and Atherton; cleared by Davies and Country Director for Ethiopia, Somali Republic, and Sudan Affairs John F. Root; and approved by Katzenbach. Sent to Aden, Algiers, Amman, Beirut, Cairo, Dhahran, Jerusalem, Jidda, Khartoum, Kuwait, London, Moscow, Paris, Rabat, Tel Aviv, Tripoli, Tunis, and USUN.

252286. 1. At about 1:00 p.m. EDT today the White House put out the following statement by the President made in connection with his signing of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1968:/2/

/2/P.L. 90-554, 82 Stat. 960, enacted October 8 and signed by the President on October 9.

"I have taken note of Section 651 concerning the sale of planes to Israel.

In the light of this expression of the sense of the Congress, I am asking the Secretary of State to initiate negotiations with the Government of Israel and to report back to me."

2. FYI. Section 651 of the Aid Authorization Act reads as follows:

"Section 651. Sale of Supersonic Planes to Israel-It is the sense of the Congress that the President should take such steps as may be necessary, as soon as practicable after the date of enactment of this section, to negotiate an agreement with the Government of Israel providing for the sale by the United States of such number of supersonic planes as may be necessary to provide Israel with an adequate deterrent force capable of preventing future Arab aggression by offsetting sophisticated weapons received by the Arab States and to replace losses suffered by Israel in the 1967 conflict." End FYI.

3. At their discretion addressee posts may wish to point out to local contacts that President's statement was made in context of clear expression Congressional views on subject and in light continuing Soviet deliveries of arms to certain Arab countries. While we recognize Arabs will be prone to jump to unjustified conclusions, simple fact is that arms limitation in current volatile Near Eastern situation cannot be onesided. You should emphasize fact that USG/GOI discussions may take some time and agreement will have to be reached on a range of points before there will be any actual aircraft dispatched to the area.

4. Although you should avoid discussing comparison of aircraft, you may wish to note that since June 1967 war Soviets have delivered many supersonic jet military aircraft to Arab countries on or near Israel's borders . . . several times the number of Phantom aircraft Israel has requested. Furthermore, with French embargo on Mirages, Israel has had no source of supply for aircraft in this category to replace its wartime losses. Supply of supersonic jets to Israel by USG thus fully consistent with our long-standing policy of assuring Israel has adequate defense capability and represents no change in our basic approach to political problems of area.

5. We will continue work for resolution complex Arab/Israel issues in peaceful atmosphere which would render provision additional arms to either side no longer necessary./3/

/3/On October 9 Rusk called Ambassador Wiggins at USUN to instruct him to do what he could to reassure Jarring that a decision on the planes was not imminent. (Memorandum of telephone conversation; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Conversations, Box 930) Ashraf Ghorbal called on Richard Parker at the Department of State on October 9 in response to the White House announcement and stated that "he was at a loss for words to describe how catastrophic this action of ours was." (Memorandum of conversation, October 9; ibid., Central Files 1967-69, DEF 19-8 US-ISR) The Jordanian Charge called at the Department on October 10 and expressed similar dismay. (Telegram 253602 to Amman, October 10; ibid.) Prime Minister Eshkol sent a letter to President Johnson on October 10 to indicate his "deep appreciation" for the decision to initiate negotiations for the sale of Phantom aircraft. (Ibid., DEF 12-5 ISR)

Rusk