Washington, August 6, 1968.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence File, Israel, 8/1/68-12/12/68. Secret. A handwritten notation indicates that the memorandum was received at the LBJ Ranch on August 8 at 10:15 a.m.

SUBJECT
Letter from Prime Minister Eshkol

Ambassador Rabin today delivered the attached message from Prime Minister Eshkol./2/ It is mainly an answer to your note which Ambassador Ball carried to Eshkol./3/ However, it reiterates the familiar Israeli view that Nasser does not want a real peace and that one reason he refuses to face reality and settle with Israel is that he still thinks he can win the arms race. This leads Eshkol to hope there will soon be a favorable decision on Phantoms.

/2/Attached was an August 5 letter from Ambassador Rabin to Secretary Rusk conveying a message from Prime Minister Eshkol to President Johnson.

/3/See Document 212.

Since Eshkol seems to pass over rather lightly the prospects for progress through Jarring in the near future, we may recommend a quick response to this letter. The danger we want to avoid is that the Israelis will feel they've placated us now in their talks with Ball and won't follow up seriously. If there is to be any progress the Israelis will have to begin talking substance with Jarring.

Eshkol's jab in his final paragraph at our Jordan arms program/4/ is hard to understand except as a general reminder that he's keeping his eye on us. Our program is just as we explained it to the Israelis after you approved it. We can't believe the Israelis really see it as a threat.

/4/Eshkol expressed concern that Jordan's rearmament would prove to be more formidable than anticipated and that King Hussein's interest in a final peace settlement would be correspondingly weakened.

New subject.

Just for your information, Rabin in a separate note/5/ has requested twelve more Skyhawks. These would be added to the end of the present production line before it is modified to put out a new model for our Navy. The Israelis want these mainly to cover normal attrition over the life of the planes. With the original 48 and the 40 more you released after Eshkol's visit, this would bring their total to 100. We will have a recommendation for you later.

/5/Not found.

Hal

232. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan/1/

Washington, August 7, 1968, 1844Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Marshall W. Wiley, cleared by David L. Gamon (NEA/ARN), and approved by Battle. Repeated to Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, Beirut, USUN, and London.

216436. 1. Ambassador Sharaf of Jordan called on Assistant Secretary Battle on August 6 and expressed his deep concern that the continuation of the present trend of events would make it increasingly difficult for King Hussein to justify his close relationship with the United States. He said that the recent Israeli air attacks had created a strong public reaction in Jordan. Almost all Jordanians believed United States could prevent such attacks if we wished to do so. In fact, the air raids had been carried out partially with US Skyhawk aircraft which had been delivered to Israel after Israel had occupied Arab territory in June 1967.

2. The Ambassador said that Jordan had accepted the November 22 resolution in toto even though the resolution had included almost all of Israel's objectives. Jordan had done so in light of US assurances that the USG would use its full weight to support the resolution. Unfortunately the Israelis had blocked the implementation of the resolution by arguing over modalities of agreement and the United States has not used its influence with Israel to bring about an agreement. The Arabs therefore concluded that the USG is retreating from its assurances, both in respect to our support of the UN resolution as well as our earlier assurances on territorial integrity for the nations of the Middle East. In addition to all this, the Ambassador continued, USG is now attempting to balance a few sporadic acts of resistance carried out by individual Arabs in the occupied territories with the calculated and destructive air raids carried out by the armed forces of Israel in the heartland of Jordan. The obvious disproportion between the provocation and the response has made the US posture appear insincere to the Arab world. United States actions are creating a situation in which it is increasingly difficult for King Hussein to justify his relations with the United States, and in fact, such ties are becoming more dangerous for the King in a "concrete sense".

3. Mr. Battle said that he could dispute many of the specific points made by the Ambassador but this ground had been covered many times. He was now more interested in hearing any ideas the Ambassador might have on how the trend of events could be reversed. Ambassador Sharaf replied that despite our protestations the US could use its leverage on Israel. We had done so in 1957 and we could now withhold arms shipments. Both Dayan and Eshkol have said that they do not care about the rest of the world as long as the United States continued to back Israel. The US could also show more balance and understanding for the Arab position in the statements made by USG leaders. Even the Vice-President had recently made statements favoring the delivery of Phantom-jet aircraft to Israel.

4. Mr. Battle pointed out that the situation in 1967 was different from that in 1957. The rights and wrongs were clearer in 1957 and the failure of the arrangements negotiated at that time were a major reason for our present difficulties. It is also a fact that many observers could see a causal relationship between Arab terrorism and Israeli reprisals. Our position on both has been clearly stated and we still believed that the November 22 resolution and the Jarring mission offer the best opportunity to check the present unhappy course of events. Ambassador Sharaf said that he was afraid that the Israeli rigidity on negotiations and their policy of armed reprisals would soon make the November 22 resolution irrelevant.

5. Ambassador Battle pointed out that the USG found both the Arab and Israeli positions on modalities to be unrealistic and asked why Jordan resisted the stationing of UN observers along the ceasefire lines. Ambassador Sharaf replied that Jordan did not trust Israel and believed that the Israelis wished to convert the ceasefire line into a permanent boundary. In any case, UN observers would not answer the real problem. The real problem was how to implement the Security Council resolution. The three "noes" of the Khartoum conference were a necessary concession to Arab public opinion and provided the framework which made Arab acceptance of the November 22 resolution possible.

6. Ambassador Sharaf ended the conversation with a plea that USG at least make some gesture indicating a greater understanding of the Arab position as we have already gone far down the road towards severing meaningful contact with the Arab world. The United States' abstentions on the UN Jerusalem resolutions had probably hurt US prestige more in the Arab world than our arms sales to Israel.

Rusk

233. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson/1/

Washington, August 8, 1968.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East, Vol. II, 4/68-1/69. Secret; Nodis. A handwritten notation indicates that the memorandum was received at the LBJ Ranch on August 9 at 1:45 p.m.

SUBJECT
Ambassador Ball's Report on Middle East Trip

We have already described for you the results of Ambassador Ball's Mid-East talks, so you do not need to read his long report (attached)./2/ However, you may wish to read the main personal conclusions which are scattered through his report:

/2/A 12-page report on the trip from Ball and Sisco to President Johnson and Secretary Rusk, dated August 6, was attached.

1. Some movement on the part of Israel is perceptible. However, without substantial and continuing pressure from the United States on both the Israelis and the Arabs, the Jarring Mission is not going to produce any significant movement toward settlement.

2. Unless compelled to move affirmatively either by events or external pressure the Israeli government is quite ready to live with the present situation of neither peace nor war for an indefinite time.

3. King Hussein desperately wants a settlement since he has lost half his country and is under terrible pressure; however, his freedom of action is severely limited not only by the Palestinian Arabs who constantly threaten him, but by the UAR.

4. Nasser is in a weak position and will almost certainly take no initiative toward a settlement. While the UAR economy is a shambles he continues to live off a dole from the Saudis, Libyans, and the Kuwaitis, which he can probably continue to exact so long as the Canal remains closed.

5. King Faisal is driven by religious passion, and deeply preoccupied with the protection of the Muslim Holy Places in Jerusalem. Hussein must certainly consult Faisal on any Jerusalem settlement, and, if not satisfied, Faisal would try hard to persuade Hussein not to go ahead. Ambassador Eilts believes, however, that if Hussein were to accept a settlement, even though it fell short of what Faisal would like Faisal would grumble but do nothing about it.

6. Kosygin told Jarring recently that he wants a political settlement. While the prevailing "no-war, no-peace" situation is not unattractive to the Soviets, we should not take this for granted--particularly in view of their interest in opening the Suez Canal. It seems doubtful that we can deflect the Soviet Union from its one-sided support of the Arabs, but we should at least make an effort, if for no other reason than that 100 countries will expect us to do so.

In addition, Ambassador Ball reports that the UAR and USSR are under great pressure to see the Suez Canal opened, as are the British, Italians and French to decreasing degrees. Regarding our interest, Ball concludes: "We should make a study in depth to determine our position with regard to the opening of the Canal. If that study should show--as it well might-that our interests are best served by keeping the Canal closed--thus frustrating Soviet strategic ambitions and raising the cost of Soviet supplies to North Vietnam--then we should be quite tough-minded in not joining in efforts to separate this issue from an overall settlement, in spite of the continuing expense to our British, German and Italian friends. Alternatively, if the study should show that these strategic considerations are only marginally important, we might make a real effort to trade our support for the reopening of the Canal for Soviet support of an acceptable final settlement of the Middle Eastern problem."

Jarring begins his next round of talks by meeting Eban in London August 9. We have urged Eban to show enough new flexibility so that Jarring will tell the Egyptians he is ready to start talking about substantive issues. Our objective is to pave the way for serious talk when the U.N. General Assembly meets in late September.

Hal

234. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State/1/

Tel Aviv, August 9, 1968, 0900Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to Amman, London, Jidda, Jerusalem, Cairo, and USUN.

4847. Subj: Jarring Mission: Jordanian comments on Eban's points. Ref: State 215386./2/

/2/Telegram 215386 to Tel Aviv, August 5, instructed Barbour to convey to Eban Rifai's comments as reported in telegram 6014 from Amman, Document 227. In doing so, Barbour was instructed to urge Eban to make the most of the opportunity presented by his impending meeting with Jarring in London to help Jarring get the negotiation process going. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR)

1. I saw Eban Aug 8 at his office in Jerusalem and gave him full rundown on Rifai's comments as contained in Amman 6014, adding additional points made in reftel by Dept. Noted, of course, Amb Symmes conversation with Rifai was prior Aug 4 raid.

2. Eban said it was certainly helpful to have this report of Symmes talk with Rifai. Welcomed indication that Rifai remains of the same disposition as in May when he expressed desire to find way for Jordan and Israel to meet under Jarring's chairmanship. Thought this willingness on Jordan's part was most important thing that has come from Jarring Mission. Eban thought there should be no further American approach to Jordan until he, Eban, had seen Jarring. He would ask Jarring to tell Rifai that if the Jordanians find a way to meet with the Israelis under Jarring's chairmanship they would then not any longer hear generalities about Israel's position but specifics. Whether GOI could give them anything more specific before such a meeting, however, would depend. If a meeting such as Rifai envisaged with Jarring present could be arranged, then the speed of progress would increase by geometric proportions, so speedily as to bear no relation to the pace of progress up to now. He would ask Jarring to tell Jordanians, however, that if they want detailed GOI views it must be done in a situation in which Israel can also obtain Jordan views.

3. Eban went on to say that the current situation on the frontier might be said to offer great obstacles to negotiations. Certainly it was hard to try to make peace with a country which maintains anti-ceasefire organizations on its territory. Some members of GOI say that Jordan should be required to take strong action against El Fatah before Israel would be willing to negotiate, but the GOI is ready to proceed without this. Nevertheless, relationship of GOJ to El Fatah is an important element. One alternative would be to say that the local security situation is an obstacle which must prevent negotiations from the point of view of both sides, but another, which he thought more realistic, would be to disassociate the two. Noted Jordan had not yet said that security situation would influence peace moves.

4. His feeling, Eban said, was that if Israelis got around a table with Jordanians there would be a great deterrent on both sides against security situations which might adversely affect negotiations and both countries would take pains to avoid them. Said he would do everything to get Jarring to work for a meeting at UNGA because this would be the first time since Jarring's appointment for the Foreign Ministers to be together under one roof. The speed of liaison would be immensely improved, with Jarring able to go from room to room to make meeting arrangements rather than have to fly from country to country with attendant delays. Whatever Jarring does for next month to keep pot boiling will be fine, but his aim should be for a meeting at GA.

5. Re UAR, Eban said he understood Jarring had not officially transmitted his questions since he found El Kony frustrating to deal with and preferred to keep questions for direct talk with Riad. Eban said GOI estimates Egypt in state of ideological immobility. Result of GOI's questions would not be to make progress towards peace but to show who is responsible for lack of progress. If the primary goal cannot be attained at least the secondary one can. As long as the UAR-

Jordan ideological gap remains, with one refusing all of the things to which the other agrees, he did not see how progress could be made.

6. I told Eban we certainly agreed that next step is between him and Jarring. Since he had mentioned question of El Fatah, I had to say again that we deplore both El Fatah and GOI moves, and regard GOI response as unfortunate. I added for myself that I was sorry to see that Israel found no response to infiltrators but offensive military force on a scale all out of proportion to the infiltration. Eban replied that it was important to meet infiltrators on the ground but also important to pursue them to their home bases. Failure is what influences them most, and they will be emboldened if they can maintain their bases with immunity on the acquiescence of GOJ. Even if it could not entirely prevent Fatah operations, GOJ could at least create conditions to make them hard.

7. I told Eban that GOI puts enormous efforts into offensive military tactics. I wondered if they were prepared to take the same sort of risks in the search for peace. Eban replied that the parallel was not valid because their efforts on the peace front get no reactions from the other side.

8. I believe conversation gave Eban a good understanding of how strongly we feel that opening towards substantive talks represented by Rifai's comments should not be lost. At same time, basic situation seems to remain that Jordan wants specific proposals before it will sit down with Jarring and Israelis, while Israelis say they cannot get down to specifics until they are actually sitting around a table with Jarring and GOJ. In spite of this difference, I think there is room for Jarring to maneuver and to seek to extract a little from each side to meet the needs of the other with the hope that, as Eban says, the final steps to bring them together can be taken when they are at the UN.

Barbour

235. Telegram From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to the President's Special Assistant (Jones) in Texas/1/

Washington, August 12, 1968, 1444Z.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. X, Cables and Memos, 6/68-11/68. Secret.

CAP 81937. Please hold this Hal Saunders memo for me, but show to the President if, in fact, Robert Anderson or any other private individual should seek to get in touch with the President on this sensitive issue.

"I would not bother you with this except that the President may be approached on this subject. The American company involved has engaged Robert Anderson as a 'consultant.'

The Israelis are trying to press Standard Oil of Indiana to cut back operations in UAR oil fields in the Gulf of Suez off the Sinai or to take Israel into partnership on any expansion of production. Production in this major field is increasing steadily, so the Israeli request amounts to pressure to deal Israel in or stop normal growth.

The State Department Legal Adviser says Israeli occupation extends to the water's edge of the Sinai but not into the Gulf of Suez. He says there is little question about continued UAR sovereignty over the Gulf's underwater oil. More important, oil advisers are seriously concerned about the implications for our oil interests throughout the area-not to mention our political position-if Arab governments felt that we were now willing to stand aside and let Israel use an American company to consolidate its conquest of the Sinai.

State believes the Israelis are just seeing now much they can get away with and intends to advise Israelis strongly to drop the idea. But we probably have not heard the last of this."/2/

/2/Telegram 218916 to Tel Aviv, August 10, instructed Ambassador Barbour to see the highest available official in the Foreign Ministry to convey the deep U.S. concern about proposed Israeli actions with respect to oil in the Gulf of Suez. (Ibid.) Under Secretary Rostow took up the issue with Ambassador Rabin on August 12, stressing the potentially explosive character of the issue raised by Israel with respect to the El-Morgan oil field being developed by Standard Oil of Indiana. Rostow noted that the United States did not accept the Israeli legal justifications for their position, and added that, at a delicate and crucial stage in the Jarring Mission, Israeli pressure on this issue could intensify doubts about its interest in a peaceful settlement and its long-term intentions with regard to the Sinai. (Memorandum of conversation, August 12; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Rostow Files: Lot 69 D 196, EUR Chron, August 1968) Battle also discussed the issue with Rabin on August 15, in the company of the Department's Legal Adviser Leonard Meeker. Meeker outlined the U.S. legal position in opposing Israel's assertion of rights in the Gulf of Suez, and Battle stressed the adverse political consequences. (Telegram 222928 to Cairo, August 16; ibid., Central Files 1967-69, POL 33 GULF OF SUEZ)

236. Telegram From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson in Texas/1/

Washington, August 14, 1968, 2334Z.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. X, Cables and Memos, 6/68-11/68. Secret.

CAP 81991. Secretary Rusk has had the following memorandum from Katzenbach, Ball, Battle and Sisco on the resolution pending in the Security Council on the recent Israeli retaliation raids on Jordan. The Secretary hopes to discuss this with the President by phone Thursday morning at the President's convenience.

"1. The attached resolution is substantially the same as that adopted by the Security Council in March following the Israeli raid on Karameh. This is the case despite the fact that whereas there were general and well-documented prior incidents which provoked the Karameh raid, the same cannot be said for the present situation. The incidents that preceded the Israeli air raid on Salt were of a relatively minor character which could be expected in a situation where there is military occupation of territory. Tekoah (Israel) has made no real case in the Security Council concerning the prior provocations to this latest raid, and we nevertheless have succeeded in injecting balance in the resolution even though the Israelis have made a weak case. The fact of the matter is that this latest Israeli raid was a preventive raid rather than one that was sparked by any prior serious incident. Moreover, it is all the more embarrassing to us that evidence indicates that the Skyhawks we gave to Israel were involved.

2. We have worked very hard behind the scenes in order to make the text more balanced than in any of its earlier forms. We have succeeded in two principal ways: (A) the sponsors, pursuant to our pressure, have eliminated any language which might form the basis for future sanctions against Israel; and (B) while the text condemns the Israeli counter raid, it also makes explicit reference to the prior acts of terrorism.

3. Friendly members of the Security Council, after concerted and extensive efforts on our part (UK, Canada, Denmark, Brazil and Paraguay) have helped us achieve this result. They have concluded, as we have, that this is as well as we can do on any text. They are prepared to support the text, and we would be isolated if we were to stand out by abstaining. This would have adverse effects on our overall position in the area and give the Soviets an opportunity to exploit the situation to their advantage.

4. A U.S. abstention would encourage the Israelis to feel that there were no restraints regarding similar future raids and that it could disregard entirely the views of the Security Council.

5. Last March Israel put the best face on the Security Council resolution by stressing that both the prior terrorist raids and the Israeli counter action were criticized by the Security Council. They discounted its importance in Israeli public opinion, and we can expect the Israelis to play it essentially the same way this time. Our informal discussions with the Israelis indicate they expect condemnation and a resolution similar to the one adopted last March, and that this result they would not find greatly disturbing.

6. We do not expect the adoption of this resolution to have any appreciable effect here at home. We have had no expressions of concern from the Jewish community, and there has been little interest in our press in the SC proceedings. The editorials on the latest incident in our papers have been balanced and have linked the provocations with the counter action, so that I do not anticipate any major press problem.

7. Our affirmative vote would be coupled with a statement by George Ball in the Council which would stress that the SC resolution applies both to the prior terrorist raids as well as to Israeli counter action. George has already made such a speech in the Security Council, but it would be worth repeating.

Draft Resolution

The Security Council,

Having heard the statements of the Representatives of Jordan and Israel,

Having noted the contents of the letters of the Representatives of Jordan and Israel in documents S/8616, S/8617, S/8721, S/8724,/2/

/2/UN docs. S/8616 and S/8617 are both dated June 5. S/8616 is a letter from the Jordanian Permanent Representative calling on the Security Council to consider Israeli aggression against Jordan in the Israeli raid on Karameh, and S/8617 is a letter from the Israeli Permanent Representative rebutting the Jordanian charges and holding Jordan accountable for terrorist activity against Israel. UN docs. S/8721 and S/8724, dated August 5, were again letters to the President of the Security Council from the Permanent Representatives of Jordan and Israel with similar charges and counter-charges following the Israeli air raid on Salt.

Recalling its previous Resolution 248 (1968)/3/ condemning the military action launched by Israel in flagrant violation of the United Nations Charter and the ceasefire resolutions and deploring all violent incidents in violation of the ceasefire,

/3/Adopted on March 24. (UN doc. S/RES/248)

Observing that all the massive air attacks by Israel on Jordanian territory were of a large scale and carefully planned nature in violation of Resolution 248 (1968),

Considering that premeditated military attacks of this kind seriously prejudice the achievement of peace in the Middle East, and that all violent incidents and other violations of the ceasefire should be prevented,

Gravely concerned about the deteriorating situation resulting therefrom,

1. Reaffirms its Resolution 248 (1968), in particular its paragraph 2 which condemns the military action launched by Israel in flagrant violation of the UN Charter and the ceasefire resolutions, and paragraph 3 which deplores all violent incidents in violation of the ceasefire and declares that such actions of military reprisal and other grave violations of the ceasefire cannot be tolerated and that the Security Council would have to consider further and more effective steps as envisaged in the Charter to ensure against repetition of such acts;

2. Deplores the loss of life and heavy damage to property;

3. Condemns the further military attacks launched by Israel in flagrant violation of the United Nations Charter and Resolution 248 (1968);

4. Warns that if such actions were to be repeated the Council would duly take account of the failure to comply with the present resolution;

5. Calls for full cooperation with the Secretary General's Special Representative."/4/

/4/The Security Council unanimously adopted this resolution on August 16. (UN doc. S/RES/256 (1968))

237. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow)/1/

Washington, August 14, 1968.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. X, Cables and Memos, 6/68-11/68. Secret; Nodis.

SUBJECT
Ball Mission Down the Drain?

I may be guilty of over-dramatizing, but the Barbour-Eban and Eban-Jarring meetings last Thursday-Friday seem to confirm that the flexibility we thought Ball found in Jerusalem was just a sop the Israelis threw us. I'm attaching the cables which describe the post-Ball Israeli position in detail./2/

/2/The attached telegrams were telegrams 4842 and 4847 from Tel Aviv, both August 9, and telegram 220328 to Tel Aviv, August 13. For telegram 4842, see footnote 3, Document 230. For telegram 4847, see Document 234. Telegram 220328 transmitted to Tel Aviv an account of the August 9 meeting between Eban and Jarring in London, as conveyed to Sisco by the Israeli Embassy. In discussing the possibility of direct contacts between Israel and Jordan, Eban indicated that Jordan could not expect to receive any further clarification of Israeli territorial assurances without engaging in direct talks. Sisco noted that this was at variance with the impression he and Ball had received in Tel Aviv. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR)

Ball's understanding was that the Israelis would exchange real substance through Jarring. Eban now says the generalities he's passed are all the Jordanians are going to get, at least through Jarring, until they meet directly. Nor did Eban give Jarring anything encouraging to take to Cairo, as we suggested he do.

Joe Sisco has already reacted, and State has instructed Ball and Barbour to react similarly. This is a fair start, but I think we ought to arrange a small explosion. If we let them get away with this without more than a passing comment, we can write off right now most of the progress Ball achieved.

I am trying to stir State to sharpen and broaden its expression of dismay so the Israelis will get the point. Luke will do so with Rabin and will suggest Nick Katzenbach follow suit. He also agrees that we should include this theme in the President's reply to Eshkol, but that's still a few days off. If Eppie were here, I'd suggest you call him, but I guess we've lost that channel for the moment. Anyway, you can keep this theme in the back of your mind-the Israelis are slipping away from the position they took with Ball.

Hal

238. Memorandum From John W. Foster of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow)/1/

Washington, August 16, 1968.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Syria, Vol. I, Cables and Memos, 4/64-10/68. Secret.

SUBJECT
The Situation in Syria

You asked what is going on in Syria. Although much of our information comes from poor sources, we can see the general outlines. What we can't judge is the relative strength of the contending groups. The people in Damascus could be over-reacting to a largely imaginary threat, or they could be one step from defeat.

The coup in Iraq a month ago, which brought a right-wing Baath government to power, encouraged the exiled Syrian Baathists in Beirut and frightened the radical Baath rulers in Damascus. Damascus is taking the reports of plotting in Baghdad and Beirut seriously. We know that there is plotting, but we don't know where it will lead or how much support the plotters will get from Iraq.

To counter the threat, Damascus has cracked down--we aren't sure how much--on potential opponents in Syria. One result has been an increase in suspicion within the government and a decrease in domestic support.

The crackdown--rather than coup plotting--was probably the reason the former Army Chief of Staff fled to Beirut, and this could also be the reason the Syrian pilots flew to Israel but it is more likely that they just got lost.

Because most of the plotters are in Beirut, the Syrians have tried to put pressure on Lebanon. Their main effort was a transit tax which hurt the Lebanese, but also hurt the Jordanians, Saudis and Kuwaitis. The major result so far has been an increase in Syria's isolation in the Arab world.

The Syrian rulers have never been popular, but most Syrians don't think the alternatives to the present regime are much better. If the exiles try to seize power, they will find neither popular support nor popular opposition. The only question is whether they are strong enough to seize key positions in the government. The answer to the question is in Baghdad and Damascus. Our sources are in Beirut and Amman. If the exiles win, Syria is likely to be less radical, but it would still be among the Arab extremists.

Our main concern in all this is the effect on Jordan. There are indications that the plotters hope to overthrow Hussein as well as the Syrians. The Jordanians believe that Hussein is becoming increasingly vulnerable, and that our "pro-Israeli" policies contribute to radical strength.

John

239. Telegram From the Department of State to the U.S. Interests Section of the Spanish Embassy in the United Arab Republic/1/

Washington, August 17, 1968, 0124Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by Sisco, cleared by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Stuart W. Rockwell and Eugene Rostow, and approved by Katzenbach. Repeated to Amman, Beirut, London, Tel Aviv, USUN, and Moscow.

223116. You will have received London's 11823/2/ as a supplement to State's 222134/3/ as well as USUN's 6213/4/ reporting Ball's luncheon session with Gohar, et al at which no new ground was broken. We suggest you draw on following in your discussion with Mohamed Riad:

/2/In telegram 11823 from London, August 14, the Embassy reported that it had received from the Foreign Office the text of three questions that the United Arab Republic had asked Jarring to pass to the Israelis. The questions, which were conveyed to the Foreign Office by the UAR Embassy, read as follows: "A) Is Israel ready to accept four-power or SC guarantee of overall area settlement along lines of November 1967 SC resolution? B) Would Israel withdraw its troops 30-40 kilometers from Suez Canal in return for unrestricted passage of Israeli cargoes through canal if this arrangement were regarded as one stage in putting entire settlement package into effect? C) If it were also regarded as simply one stage in an overall settlement package, would Israel be ready to withdraw from Gaza strip in favor of a UN administration?" (Ibid.)

/3/In telegram 222134 to Tel Aviv, August 16, Barbour was instructed to try to find out if the three UAR questions had been conveyed to Israel and if Israel had answered them. If not, Barbour was instructed to ask the Israeli Government to consult with the United States before doing so. The Department explained the necessity for a more specific U.S. role in helping to influence the substantive exchanges between the parties in order to "encourage positive and constructive responses." (Ibid.)

/4/Telegram 6213 from USUN, August 16, reported on a luncheon meeting that Ball, Sisco, and Buffum had on August 12 with Ghorbal, El Kony, and Gohar of the UAR. Ball offered his impressions on the Jarring Mission, based on his recent trip to the Middle East, and tried to draw out the UAR officials on prospects for negotiations. The meeting was described by the Mission as "not particularly fruitful" with the UAR representatives cleaving to established positions. One point that emerged from the discussion was that the UAR representatives denied that there was anything to the article written in The New York Times on August 12 by Eric Pace purporting to describe new UAR proposals for a peace settlement. (Ibid.)

1. We have been primarily responsible for getting some flexibility in GOI position; they now in process of exploring substance indirectly and we are continuing urge them to be as flexible and forthcoming as possible. We believe process of posing questions represents a good start, but it must be built upon, not only with additional questions but further and fuller explanations by all parties of their substantive positions. (In this connection, you should seek to ascertain just when UAR conveyed three questions reported in London 11823 and what UAR understanding is as to whether Jarring will put them to Israelis.)

2. We think time has long passed for any of the parties to stick to doctrinal rigidities. We hope that UAR will respond fully and constructively to questions Jarring has posed to them, and not limit themselves to countering with questions of their own. While we have no intention of blueprinting substantive replies to be made by respective parties, we believe it would promote progress if all parties, including UAR, could begin to clarify their positions in more specific terms re key elements of Security Council resolution.

3. For example, a positive reply by UAR to question of whether it prepared in context of a peace settlement to put a complete end to state of belligerency with State of Israel would be helpful. At best, we would like UAR to respond with a categoric "yes," coupling such affirmative reply with indication of willingness to embody such an obligation in binding commitment with Israel not with some third party as SC. SC endorsement of any agreement would obviously be very useful, but it is not a feasible substitute for a binding undertaking between principal parties. UAR could be reminded that when they say they accept SC Res of Nov. 22 from A to Z as a package, para. 3 calls for "agreement."

4. A further example can be cited re second question: recognition of political independence, territorial sovereignty and integrity of Israel. Again we feel that if in fact UAR is interested in a fundamental settlement then it must begin to indicate now that it is willing to consider a binding commitment between GOI and UAR. This would be clearest indication that UAR had in fact adopted a live-and-let-live policy, and is willing work out a modus vivendi with Israel. Is UAR ready for this? Statement on its part that "it accepts SC resolution of November 1967" are useful, but have become part of doctrinal rigidity which has contributed to impasse. What is required is indication of UAR willingness to enter into binding understanding with GOI on crucial point of this kind, as required by para. 3.

5. Similarly, distinction which UAR has been trying to make between freedom of passage of Israeli cargoes and Israeli flag ships strikes us as unrealistic and casts doubt on UAR willingness to achieve a fundamental settlement.

6. In short, we feel you ought to smoke out Riad on specifics. We suspect you will not get very far. We recognize UAR has been conveying piece-meal reactions to specific points in resolution which in our judgment have been designed largely to improve UAR position tactically and publicly. Answers or lack of answers or partial answers by UAR will help clarify whether their reaction is primarily tactical for public relations purposes or whether in fact they want to come to grips with the elements of a fundamental political settlement in accordance with SC Res. In this connection, we have had this week two New York Times articles by Eric Pace./5/ At the time of the Ball luncheon with Gohar (August 13), we inquired whether there was anything to August 12 article and got only quick denials from all three UAR representatives present at the luncheon. We feel you ought to get across to Riad our feeling that positions adopted by UAR to date have been primarily for public relations purposes rather than a serious attempt to face realities of a settlement. We say this not in sense of trying to make a judgment as to which of the parties is responsible because there has been plenty of rigidity on both sides. But we feel there is genuine opportunity to test real intentions of parties, and that it is a matter of high urgency to prepare the way for constructive exchanges among Fonmins in New York.

/5/On August 12 Pace, citing "well-informed Arab diplomats," reported that the UAR was prepared to accept a settlement that included internationalizing the Gaza strip, waiving past demands for the repatriation of Palestinian refugees, and demilitarizing the Sinai peninsula. In another article on August 15, Pace cited "highly placed Western diplomats" as revealing that the UAR was pressing for a peace settlement based on "declarations of peace" that would be endorsed by the UN Security Council, and separately by the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, and France.

7. We note also that UAR has been very careful in avoiding any indication as to whether Foreign Minister Riad intends to be present in opening days of the General Assembly. This too, in our judgment, will be a test. Rifai of Jordan obviously wants to go there, but we detected caution on part of GOJ in absence of knowing what UAR is going to do. You might explore this point as well.

8. With reference to UAR statements of "acceptance of the SC resolution" and its insistence GOI has not, fact of matter is all three have accepted resolution, but each has expressed its acceptance with its own reservations. UAR, for example, has accepted SC resolution, but it does not draw attention to fact that acceptance is subject to reservation that it interprets SC resolution to mean withdrawal of Israeli forces to pre-June lines. Jordan has probably been most categoric in acceptance of resolution, though it too has expressed its reservations. And Israel is also on record as accepting resolution within context of its own reservations. (Tekoah's May 1 SC statement, reaffirmed publicly by GOI Cabinet on June 23.)

9. Finally, a simple statement to Jarring from UAR that it is willing to try to achieve a "binding agreement with Israel" in accordance with SC resolution of November 1967 would certainly move things forward. You may wish to explore this also on personal basis.

Rusk

240. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel/1/

Washington, August 17, 1968, 0129Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by Sisco on August 16, cleared by Rockwell and Eugene Rostow, and approved by Katzenbach. Repeated to Beirut, Amman, Cairo, London, USUN, and Moscow.

223117. For Barbour.

1. You will be seeing Rafael on Aug 18th, and we hope he will be able to give you additional information regarding three UAR questions (State 222134 and London 11823)./2/ You should feel free to discuss possible GOI reply along lines FYI section of State 222134.

/2/See footnotes 3 and 2, Document 239.

2. In addition, we believe it is important that you get across to Eban upon his return our concern that flexible approach he described to Ball and Sisco in Israel be maintained./3/ You will recall that Eban made clear in those conversations a willingness to explore substance indirectly, and this was reflected in questions posed to UAR and Israeli ideas passed by Ball to GOJ re possible shape of a settlement. We understood clearly, though there was no time period put on it, that indirect process would be pursued seriously in hopes that it might set stage for serious explorations in the opening days of the General Assembly, including possibility of joint meetings, most likely in presence of Jarring. We have expressed concern to Israelis here and in New York that reports of Eban's Aug 9 conversation with Jarring indicate a less flexible posture than we were led to believe existed. We want to be specific in this regard. Reports are that Eban told Jarring that while Israel remained flexible, "Jordan cannot have specific clarification of Israel's intentions without some kind of direct contacts." (This is precisely as Argov reported it to us here, see State 220328.)/4/ This sounds to us like direct negotiations again becoming an end in itself. If this is a correct report, Eban statement is all more distressing in circumstances where he had available Jordanian response as contained in paras 3 and 4 of Amman 6014/5/ in which GOJ invited specific GOI territorial rectification proposals and reaffirmed willingness to "enter into joint meetings (with Jarring present) if it finds there are substantive matters that can profitably be discussed."

/3/Under Secretary Rostow also stressed this point in an August 17 meeting with Ambassador Rabin. (Telegram 223182 to Tel Aviv, August 17; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR)

4See footnote 2, Document 237.

/5/Document 227.

3. We feel it is untenable for GOI to take view it unwilling to be more specific unless there is direct contact. We therefore want you to press Eban to keep substantive dialogue going by being directly responsive to Jordanian request for more specificity. We realize this might entail difficult decisions on which Israeli Cabinet divided. But we are reaching watershed, and parties must begin to face up to realities. We felt ideas Ball and Sisco conveyed to GOJ on behalf of GOI were useful starting point. While Rifai's response has certainly a number of elements which are unacceptable to Israelis, nevertheless GOJ has said explicitly that it is willing to get together in joint meetings with Jarring present if it finds there are substantive matters that can be profitably discussed. We therefore urge that Eban respond more specifically to GOJ during his next discussion with Jarring.

4. While we have no intention to blueprint what GOI substantive reply ought to be, it should be possible to formulate answer in more specific territorial terms as it relates to West Bank, possibly coupling this with a renewed indication of a GOI willingness to discuss such new specifics at joint meetings under Jarring's auspices during opening days of the General Assembly.

5. You might tell Eban our judgment continues to be Hussein wants to make a settlement, but that he needs more specificity from Israelis and reassurance that a deal he can live with is possible if he is to make decision for joint meetings with them in New York.

6. We hope therefore you can have a full discussion with Eban and press him hard on this matter./6/

/6/Barbour was also instructed to remind Eban that he had said that by early August he would provide the United States with an assessment of the prospects for progress in the channel that Eban had referred to as the "Jordanian flirtation." (Telegram 223140 to Tel Aviv, August 17; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 ARAB-ISR/SANDSTORM)

Rusk

241. Telegram From the U.S. Interests Section of the Spanish Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State/1/

Cairo, August 19, 1968, 0915Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Repeated to Tel Aviv, Amman, and USUN.

3193. 1. In Aug 17 conversation with Mohamed Riad, I waited until he had completed briefings on Jarring visit and Vinogradoff conversation (septels) before touching on some of the points in State 223116./2/

/2/Document 239.

2. First of all Mohamed denied that three questions discussed between UAR Embassy London and UK FonOff had any status within GUAR. Only questions GUAR had put to Israel via Jarring were those raised by FonMin Riad on Aug 17./3/

/3/According to a briefing given to Bergus by Mohamed Riad on August 17 of a meeting held that day in Cairo between Foreign Minister Riad and Jarring, Riad had asked Jarring to convey four questions to Israel: "A) Did Israel intend to implement resolution and withdraw to June lines? B) In light of many statements of Israeli leaders re annexation of Arab territory would it continue to be Israel policy to annex territories or would Israel renounce that policy? C) What, in opinion of Israel, are secure and recognized boundaries? D) Did Israel intend to implement UNGA resolution 1947?" (Telegram 3192 from Cairo, August 19; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR)

3. As was to be expected, Mohamed expressed resentment at our tarring GUAR with brush of doctrinal rigidity. He said acceptance Nov 22 res represented basic and fundamental UAR policy decision. He noted mention of "20 year state of war" in question put by Rafael to UAR through Jarring. UAR understood Israel's concern was that UAR only interested in "removing traces of aggression" i.e. returning to pre-June 5, 1967 situation. This definitely not case. GUAR had, and would continue respond with categoric "yes" to question as to whether UAR prepared in context peace settlement put complete end to state of belligerency with Israel.

4. Mohamed said Jarring was of opinion that "agreement" called for in Nov 22 res did not have to be agreement between parties. Jarring felt, according Mohamed, that agreement between each party and SC coupled with pledge by each party before SC would fulfill requirements of para 3 of SC res.

5. As to live-and-let-live and modus vivendi with Israel, Mohamed said GUAR prepared give binding pledge, to be guaranteed by SC, on each and every element in Nov 22 SC res.

6. I said UAR position on Suez Canal, i.e. differentiation between Israel cargoes and flag not understandable. If UAR meant what it said re readiness terminate state belligerency with Israel, then there no basis for any kind of discrimination against Israel flag. Either you had belligerency or you didn't. It didn't come in packages of varying size. Mohamed said agreement which UAR envisaged would culminate in total implementation of SC res. Same agreement which opened Canal to Israel cargoes "as a first step" would also spell out circumstances in which state of belligerency would be terminated and Canal opened to Israel flag.

7. I mentioned denial of Kony, Gohar, and Ghorbal of Eric Pace NY Times story of Aug 12. Mohamed said GUAR stood on FonMin-Jarring Stockholm conversation which remained its firm position. (Mohamed also said Gohar had been greatly impressed by Ball.)

8. As to proposition that UAR, Israel, and Jordan acceptance of Nov 22 res exists subject reservations each party, Mohamed said UAR content leave this to Jarring to determine. Jarring felt he had acceptance of all three to first two paragraphs of his March-May formula.

9. When I talked about possible UAR readiness tell Jarring that it willing to try to achieve a binding agreement with Israel, Mohamed said words "with Israel" were the ones that created the problem. This recalled Washington conversations in which Dept officials had talked about Egypt's having to "sign on the dotted line." He reverted to proposition that UAR agreement with SC would fulfill terms of Nov 22 res. He kept saying, "Jarring not only accepts but advocates our viewpoint," "Jarring volunteered agreement with us on this," etc.

Bergus

242. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel/1/

Washington, August 21, 1968, 0205Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Bahti (NEA/IAI), cleared by Day, and approved by Battle. Repeated to Amman, Beirut, Cairo, London, Moscow, and USUN.

224669. Subj: Jarring Mission. Ref: Tel Aviv 5004./2/

/2/Telegram 5004 from Tel Aviv, August 20, reported on Foreign Minister Eban's reaction when Ambassador Barbour taxed him with following an inconsistent policy, as Barbour was instructed to do in telegram 223117 to Tel Aviv. Eban "responded vehemently expressing surprise and resentment" that the United States had concluded on the basis of insufficient facts and faulty understanding that Eban had gone back on the policy he had outlined to Ball and Sisco of Israeli willingness to deal indirectly on substance with both Jordan and the UAR. Eban insisted that Israeli policy had not changed and that he had outlined the policy precisely in his conversation with Jarring in London. (Both ibid.)

1. Israeli Min Argov called to convey to Asst Secty Battle following oral communication:

Begin Text:

The FonMin is surprised by the assumption expressed by US officers that there has been any change in the position which he and his colleagues outlined to Amb Ball and Asst Secty Sisco in Jerusalem. There is not the slightest justification or foundation for this assumption. In his conversation with Amb Jarring in London on Aug 9 Mr. Eban gave an account of Israel's views on the Jarring Mission in terms which were identical verbatim with those expressed to Amb Ball in Jerusalem. Indeed he read the relevant part of the Protocol of the Jerusalem talks. It is disturbing that a totally inaccurate view about a change of position should have been propagated within the US Administration, and even outside.

Israel's position remains precisely as stated to Amb Ball and Asst Secty Sisco. We do not believe that binding engagements will be reached and signed on the basis of obstruction and refusal to meet. On the other hand our belief in the principle of normal negotiation does not exclude the preliminary exchange of views and clarifications through Jarring and otherwise of some of the main principles involved in the establishment of peace. Thus we have tried to initiate a dialogue with the UAR on the juridical and political implications of the term "just and lasting peace." We shall try to maintain this dialogue and to avoid a diplomatic vacuum. This principle applied to Jordan as well. We have noted Jordan's reported willingness to hold joint meetings with Israel in Jarring's presence. On the other hand Jordan wishes to learn Israel's approach to the problem of "secure and recognized boundary." As was said to Amb Jarring we are ready to clarify our conception of this point to Jordan through various channels and procedures well before the opening of the GA.

FonMin Eban has very recently ascertained that these opportunities have not been affected by recent frontier clashes. It is however essential that the utmost discretion be maintained on Israel's efforts to diversify its methods of informal communication and that what was said to Amb Ball be taken on trust. Israel did not share the view expressed in April that the Jarring Mission was in danger of early liquidation and we do not now believe it impossible to carry the mission on to the UNGA when greater possibilities of meaningful communication may present themselves. End Text.

2. Battle said he would see that Amb Ball and Asst Secty Sisco were apprised of the message. He emphasized, however, that important thing was that Jarring have clear understanding GOI position. Argov asked if we believed Jarring had different view of GOI position than that given Ball and Sisco by Eban. Battle said this was our impression. From what we understood, Jarring seemed not to see degree of flexibility in GOI position that Ball and Sisco had believed existed following their talks with Eban. Battle urged that Israelis see that Jarring fully understands their position in this respect.

3. Argov asked whether matter now cleared up. Battle said he couldn't say that it was, as neither he nor Argov present at Ball-Sisco-Eban talks. We would be in touch after matter discussed with Ball and Sisco.

Rusk

243. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan/1/

Washington, August 30, 1968, 2131Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 23 JORDAN. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Drafted by Robert P. Paganelli (NEA/ARN); cleared by Director of AID's Office of Near Eastern Affairs John Eddison, Assistant AID Administrator for Near East and South Asia Maurice J. Williams, Murray and Colonel Bradburn (DOD/ISA), Seelye, Senior Regional Adviser for Regional Affairs in NEA John Buckle, Battle, and Claus W. Ruser of the Senior Interdepartmental Group; and approved by John P. Walsh.

230885. Joint State/Defense/AID Message. Subj: Jordan's Internal Defense. Ref: Amman 6263./2/

/2/In telegram 6263 from Amman, August 22, the Embassy reported that King Hussein and his advisers had asked the United States to consult informally on measures to strengthen Jordan's internal security arrangements. The Embassy noted that the Fedayeen constituted a growing threat within the country. (Ibid.)

1. Embassy authorized to respond to Jordanian overtures for more substantive discussions of problems of Jordan's internal defense. Begin FYI. Jordan's potential qualification for internal defense assistance will be subject to mid-September SIG meeting. Discussions should not be postponed on this account. End FYI.

2. Public Safety Assistance. Believe it important early in discussions with GOJ to make clear stringency of USG funding situation and hence likelihood that any acquisition of PSF equipment or commodities would be on purchase basis. In this connection you may wish to call attention to deep cuts in FAA authorizations and current high levels of Jordanian foreign exchange reserves. You may also wish to refer to substantial grant assistance previously provided under public safety program which has not yet been fully utilized by PSF. At this stage discussions should be limited to Jordanian requirements under various contingencies that may arise in coming months.

3. Other Internal Defense Assistance. Following represents our current thinking. We agree that most immediate threats to GOJ are popular rioting and fedayeen action. In controlling these threats additional equipment and manpower may be less important than improved training and deployment of personnel and equipment assets now available to regime. We also believe that it is not unreasonable to assume that in certain circumstances the regime may be required to reduce its static border defenses in order to deal with internal disturbances. The forces available for internal security cited in reftel, twelve battalions or equivalent totaling over 6,000 men, should represent an effective security force without additional increases. Should these not prove adequate in any given situation, redeployment of other forces would be normal and expected next step. We assume that some of equipment we now delivering (e.g. APCs) will be made available for internal security forces.

Rusk

244. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State/1/

Amman, September 4, 1968, 1130Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 23 JORDAN. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to London, Tel Aviv, and CINCSTRIKE.

6463. Subj: The Fedayeen problem and Jordan's internal security. Ref: State 230885 (Notal)./2/

/2/Document 243.

1. On third I told King Hussein the Embassy had been authorized to engage in working level substantive discussions of Jordan's internal security problem. I therefore wanted to have a general discussion with him before our working levels got into details. I wanted him to know we regard the Fedayeen problem as a primary cause of incidents between Jordan and Israel. These incidents place strains on US-Jordanian relations, and they create an impossible climate for progress toward a peaceful settlement. Perhaps even more important, the Fedayeen pose a real threat to the integrity of the Jordanian regime itself. Beyond that, the Fedayeen groups almost inevitably could be counted on to create disorder when and if some tangible progress toward a peaceful settlement was achieved and publicized. We therefore want to do all we can to help Jordan deal effectively with the Fedayeen problem both in the short and long term. Our discussions with his people would be for the primary purpose of determining Jordan's requirements. I had to make clear I was not promising grant aid. In principle, we would expect Jordan to purchase material it needed. We would determine how we could best assist Jordan's own internal defense efforts. I added that I assumed he would have no objection if I kept the British Ambassador generally informed of our efforts. I asked the King what general strategy he had in mind especially with regard to the timing of his efforts to deal with the Fedayeen problem.

2. Hussein proceeded to review the Fedayeen problem in general terms pointing to the differences between the present situation and the situation before the June war when he had been able generally to control Fedayeen activities in Jordan territory. In connection with more recent developments he went over the ground covered in NJA-7030,/3/ Amman 6371, 6368, 6426,/4/ and other recent Embassy reporting. He said he is now due to have another meeting with the Fedayeen groups. He is holding off on this meeting until he has assessed the results of FonMin Rifai's tactics in the Arab League Council meeting. (He mentioned parenthetically that the formation of the Eastern Arab Command, which has now been formalized, was from his standpoint important as a means of asserting a degree of control over Fedayeen activities in Syria and Iraq.) See NJA-7040./5/

/3/Not found.

/4/Symmes reported in telegram 6371, August 28, that Foreign Minister Rifai had been instructed by King Hussein to seek the approval of the Arab League Council for Jordanian efforts to control the Fedayeen. In telegram 6368, August 28, Symmes reported that Prince Mohammad, acting as Viceroy in his father's absence from the country, had told him that Jordan planned to seek the support of other Arab countries in its efforts to control the Fedayeen. Telegram 6426, August 31, reported on Symmes' meeting with Foreign Minister Rifai prior to Rifai's departure for the Arab League Council meeting in Cairo. Symmes, encouraged Rifai to pursue his stated intent to seek the Council's support for Jordanian efforts to deal with the Fedayeen problem. (All in National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27 ARAB-ISR)

/5/Not found.

3. The King said he is confident that the army is loyal to him and, if required, would be able to deal with the Fedayeen. He has issued new orders to insure that army units take even stricter measures to control Fedayeen irregular activities in the Beisan area. In his view the Israelis could not expect perfection from him and his forces any more than they were able to get it from their own in suppressing Fedayeen activities. (I stressed to him during this part of our conversation that we see Fedayeen activity against civilian settlements in the Beisan area as the chief irritant to the Israelis and that I could not emphasize too much our hope that the Jordan army would exert greater control over the Fedayeen in this region. I commented that the Israelis seemed able pretty well to defend themselves in other parts of the ceasefire line. The vicious circle could be broken if some means could be found to prevent or significantly to diminish the Fedayeen attacks on Israeli civilians across the old ADL. We do not question the need to improve public security capability for coping with the Fedayeen, but on the old ADL front the problem seemed to be the army's responsibility. The King acknowledged this point and said he had issued new orders to the JAA in this area.)

4. The King said he wanted to make it clear that his plans for improving the capability of dealing with the Fedayeen and internal disorder generally were based on public security forces rather than the army for specific reasons that he proceeded to explain. Psychologically speaking, it was impossible for him to give the army an internal security mission when troubles were taking place along the frontier, the Israelis remained in occupation of the West Bank, and generally hostile Israel-Arab confrontation existed. The presence of Iraqi troops in Jordan and the situation in Syria also made it important for him not to divert the army from its primary mission of defense from outside aggression. While he recognized that if Fedayeen incidents diminished there would be less threat from Israel, the psychological difficulties he had described would remain for some time to come. Therefore, he must rely on public security forces as distinguished from military forces in order to deal with the Fedayeen and other internal security problems. In the event of GOJ's moving toward a peaceful settlement with Israel, the Fedayeen would probably seek to promote internal disturbances in protest. Mobile Bedouin police forces had proved themselves over the years the best means of dealing with this kind of security problem. He said he would like for Embassy officials to discuss the requirements with General Ma'an Abu Nuwar and other officials under Abu Nuwar. He stressed, however, that the mobile Bedouin forces would be separate from the police although under Abu Nuwar's over-all control.

5. The King said he thought it would be important for me to stay in touch with the British Embassy on this matter and he thought coordination between the two Embassies would be helpful.

6. With regard to timing, the King says he does not anticipate an immediate confrontation with the Fedayeen. On the other hand, he must be prepared to move if his tactics at any moment should provoke outright confrontation. The optimum solution, in his eyes, would be agreement from the other Arabs to order all Fedayeen forces supported from the outside to place themselves under his control. This would enable him to clamp down on Fedayeen activities, assuming that there could be some progress toward a peaceful settlement. In the latter circumstance, he would be able to deal effectively with any Fedayeen confrontation with his control measures and would have the blessing of the other Arab countries. He regards it as unlikely, however, that the other Arabs will agree at this stage to this kind of control. Depending on how FonMin Rifai's tactics come out in the Arab League Council meeting, he intends to visit Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the UAR to persuade them to agree to his asserting control over the Fedayeen in Jordan. He anticipates a real problem with Saudi Arabia. He observed that the Saudis at present are subsidizing Fatah on condition they not coordinate with any Arab govt, including Jordan.

7. Comment: I did not take issue with the King on the somewhat contradictory elements in his thinking, primarily because I was encouraged by these further signs that he has been trying to get a grip on the Fedayeen situation. A good deal of what he said was, as will be obvious to the Department, in the thinking aloud category. I will of course keep in touch with his thinking as it crystallizes further, and adopt my tactics with him accordingly. Meanwhile, we will explore Jordanian requirements at the working level.

Symmes

245. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Washington, September 4, 1968.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Charles E. Bohlen.

SUBJECT
The Middle East

PARTICIPANTS
Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, USSR

The Secretary
Deputy Under Secretary Charles E. Bohlen

Dobrynin said he had come in on the Middle East and read a statement from the Soviet Government, copy attached. He added that although not included in the document the Soviet Government would be prepared once Israeli troops had withdrawn to discuss arms limitation with the U.S.

The Secretary said that this was an important communication and would have to be studied and he would refer to it later on./2/

/2/In a September 4 meeting with President Johnson, Secretary Clifford, Walt Rostow, and Generals Wheeler and Taylor, Rusk described the Soviet proposal as a very important communication and a significant move in Soviet policy toward the Middle East. He noted that some parts of the proposal appeared to be constructive, and added that it provided evidence that the Arabs were not pressing for a solution to the Jerusalem problem. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Meeting Notes File, 7/68-12/68) On September 9 Rusk discussed the Soviet proposal in a telephone conversation with Ball. Ball said that his staff at the United Nations viewed the proposal as largely Egyptian in derivation with little new in it, but he felt that it offered an opportunity to use it as a basis for bargaining. Ball suggested that the United States respond with a proposal of its own. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Rusk Telcons)

Dobrynin confirmed that this was a confidential document not intended for publication.

The Secretary asked if similar communications had been made to the British and the French. Dobrynin said he did not know about the British but the French had approached the Soviet Union two or three weeks ago on the Middle East. The Soviet reply to the French, of which he had a copy, expressed the same views as in the present document. There were in addition some answers to particular French points.

The Secretary inquired if the Soviet Government had been encouraged in this by the Arab countries. Dobrynin said he had no instructions on this point but he was under the impression the Soviet Government had been by its contact with the Arabs.

Attachment/3/

/3/The note is a translation from the Russian prepared at the time by the Division of Language Services.

The Soviet Government as heretofore considers its contribution to the achievement of a Middle East settlement to be one of its principal foreign policy tasks. This unchanging and consistent course of ours is well known to the Government of the USA. It finds its concrete expression in our active support of the just cause of the Arab states striving to liquidate the consequences of Israeli aggression by peaceful, political means.

In Moscow there is a conviction that a Middle East settlement does not concern the countries of this region only. Undoubtedly the great powers are also interested in this settlement. The persistence of tension in the Middle East and the continued illegal occupation by Israel of indigenous Arab terrorists cannot fail to cause concern to the Soviet Government, since such a situation threatens the general peace.

At the same time it is impossible to deny the obvious fact that while the Arab states recognize the Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967 and are prepared to seek ways for a political settlement in the Middle East on the basis of that resolution, Israel stubbornly refuses to recognize it, demanding direct negotiations with the Arab countries, which is clearly unrealistic under present circumstances.

On the basis of contacts with the governments of the Arab states, above all that of the UAR, it appears to us that now it is already possible to speak of the presence of concrete considerations of the Arab states regarding the content of a possible plan and time-table for a Middle East settlement.

If we were to summarize the thoughts about the content of such a plan and timetable which were expressed at different times by the various statesmen of the Arab countries, including President Nasser, then in our view they would appear to be approximately as follows:

(a) Israel and the Arab countries declare that they recognize the Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967 and that they are ready to implement it. In this connection they agree that through Jarring, or in some other form, dates would be established by means of consultations (within the framework of the Security Council or outside of it) for withdrawing the Israeli troops and, depending on this, a plan will be outlined for implementing the other provisions of the Security Council resolution.

(b) The purpose of these consultations could be to co-ordinate the following concrete measures for implementing the Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967:

1. Israel declares its readiness to begin the withdrawal of troops from the occupied Arab territories on the date set;

2. On the day of the beginning of Israeli troops withdrawal, carried out by stages under the observance of UN representatives, the Arab neighbor-countries of Israel who will agree to take part in such a plan, as well as Israel, will deposit with the UN a statement (declaration) on the cessation of the state of war, on respect for and recognition of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of each state in that region and their right to live in peace, within safe and recognized borders, i.e., in accordance with the aforementioned resolution of the Security Council.

3. During the course of one month (as agreed) the Israeli troops will withdraw from part of the Arab territories to definite lines on the Sinai Peninsula, on the western bank of the Jordan River (as well as from Syrian territory, from the El-Qunaytra area). On the territories evacuated Arab administration is reestablished and police forces of the Arab states are brought in. On the day when the Israeli troops will have reached the previously stipulated intermediate lines on the Sinai Peninsula (for example, 30-40 km. from the Suez Canal), the UAR Government brings its troops into the Canal zone and begins to clear the Canal for resumption of navigation.

4. During the course of the following month (as agreed) the Israeli troops are withdrawn to the positions which they occupied prior to June 5, 1967.

On the first day of the second stage of Israeli troop withdrawal, the UAR and Israel (or only the UAR, in case its government agrees) declare their consent to the stationing of UN troops near the line prior to June 5, 1967, on the Sinai Peninsula, in Sharm Ash-Shaykh and in the Gaza sector, i.e., the situation existing prior to June 5, 1967, will be re-established.

The Security Council adopts a decision to send UN troops in accordance with the UN Charter, and confirms the principle of freedom of navigation through the Straits of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba for the ships of all countries.

5. After completion of Israeli troop withdrawal to the lines of demarcation between the states, the previously deposited declarations of the Arab countries and Israel will finally become effective, either through the instrumentality of the Security Council or through the signing of a multilateral document.

The Security Council, relying on provisions of the UN Charter, adopts a decision on guarantees of the Arab-Israeli borders (the possibility of another version--guarantees by the four powers who are permanent members of the Security Council--is not to be excluded).

(c) With the participation of the interested parties the Security Council continues to seek a solution to the problems of Palestine refugees, of free passage of Israeli vessels through the Suez Canal, as well as of the status of Jerusalem.

It is our deep conviction that such a plan and timetable is of important practical significance as a suitable basis for further steps in reaching a settlement. This plan and timetable is sufficiently realistic and specific; in the event of its implementation it would not in any way infringe upon the prestige or interests of any party drawn into the conflict. It is also very important that this plan completely corresponds to the provisions of the unanimously adopted Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967, and that the implementation of each of its stages inevitably leads to the implementation of the next one.

This interrelationship and interdependence, it seems to us, stems from the meaning of the resolution of November 22.

Finally, such a plan and timetable will to some degree apparently be able to facilitate the mission of the special representative of the UN Secretary General, Jarring, which is supported by the governments of our countries.

In this connection we should like to note that against the background of concrete proposals and the sufficiently clear position of the Arabs on the problems of a Middle East settlement, the position of the Government of Israel does not indicate that it has any concrete proposals for reaching a Middle East settlement, but, on the contrary, being sure of the support of the Government of the USA, Israel persists in its negative and deliberately obstructionist position, actually ignores the decisions of the General Assembly and of the Security Council of the UN, tries to consolidate for itself the annexed Arab territories and does nothing to lessen the tensions in the Middle East. The time has come to put an end to this position of the ruling circles of Israel.

The Soviet Government expresses the hope that the Government of the USA will carefully review the foregoing considerations and during the course of future consultations will express its opinions concerning steps, which, in its view, must be taken for the quickest possible settlement of the Middle East problem. The Soviet Government expresses its readiness to conduct on this question consultations between representatives of the great powers, including the USA and the USSR, as states primarily responsible for maintaining the peace throughout the world.

246. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow)/1/

Washington, September 4, 1968.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. X, Cables and Memos, 6/68-11/68. Secret; Nodis.

SUBJECT
Phantoms--What Do We Get for Them?

No one is prepared to recommend that the President release the Phantoms to Israel now. Israel's need is not significantly more urgent than it was in January, and the Israelis have shown little flexibility in moving toward a political settlement despite our steady low-key urging. Nevertheless there's general recognition that Israel will need some supersonics in the next year.

There is sharp disagreement over how much we could expect to get for the Phantoms if we did go ahead now. Those who most vigorously oppose releasing the planes feel we should ask the highest price--signing the NPT and renouncing surface-to-surface missiles--and hold out for it. Others believe the best we can try for are some marginal tactical shifts in Israel's position on negotiations with the Arabs. They remember how in 1965 we had to give up our efforts to trade the Skyhawks for a promise not to go nuclear and feel that Israel is just as unlikely today to trade for Phantoms any part of the position it won in the Six Day War.

In fact, the prevailing view in State is not to bargain directly with the planes at all. You'll recall that this was Eppie Evron's advice too--assure Israel's basic security and then tell them what we'd like them to do. The formula that has been put to Secretary Rusk reflects this two stage approach to Eshkol:

1. We understand Israel's need for security and therefore approve in principle release of the Phantoms.

2. Our interests require that this become known publicly only in the context of progress toward peace. Therefore, we ask the Israeli government to:

--State publicly without qualification its readiness to end 20 years of war and to withdraw to agreed and secure boundaries as part of a peace agreement.

--Declare publicly its readiness to participate wholeheartedly in a refugee settlement.

--Give Jordan a specific position on borders and make a concrete proposal on Jerusalem.

If we do go ahead soon, the choice will be between keeping these two as separate as possible and bargaining one for the other.

If we hold off, another range of options could open up if the President felt able to throw his own weight behind a more active U.S. role in getting negotiations started and in narrowing gaps. Several proposals have been made:

--Secretary Rusk's suggestion of dual emissaries to Cairo and Jerusalem to get a real exchange going.

--Arthur Goldberg's recommendation for an emissary to Jerusalem to pin down the Israeli position on peace arrangements.

--The idea of proposing a fair compromise to King Hussein and then trying to sell it to Eshkol.

--The possibility of some sort of joint Soviet-US diplomatic pressure.

If we were to make a major effort along any of these lines, the Phantoms could figure at any one of several points.

I have asked State for a memo detailing these options for the President's review, but it will not be ready for lunch today. With Jarring returning to New York at the end of the month for a final crack at negotiations during the UN General Assembly, September will offer just about the last chance the President will have to lay the foundation for a big push behind Jarring in October and November. I believe we should assure him a systematic review of these options as well as the shorter-term possibilities.

Hal

247. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Washington, September 9, 1968, 5 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. X, Cables and Memos, 6/68-11/68. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Battle on September 10. According to the President's Daily Diary, the meeting was held in the White House from 5:24 to 5:40 p.m. (Ibid.)

SUBJECT
Middle East Situation; Phantoms for Israel

PARTICIPANTS

The President

Deputy Prime Minister Yigal Allon of Israel
His Excellency Lt. Gen. Yitzhak Rabin, Ambassador of Israel
Mr. Shlomo Argov, Israeli Minister

Walt W. Rostow, Special Assistant to the President
Harold Saunders, National Security Council Staff
Lucius D. Battle, Assistant Secretary, NEA

The President received Deputy Prime Minister Allon for an off-the-record meeting on Monday, September 9 at 5:00 p.m./2/

/2/Allon was in the United States on a speaking and fund-raising tour. His meeting with President Johnson was at Allon's request. A summary of Allon's discussion with Rostow prior to his meeting with the President, prepared by Saunders, is ibid., Memos to the President, Walt W. Rostow, Vol. 113, 1/1-15/69. In that memorandum of conversation, Saunders briefly summarized the meeting between Allon and Johnson.

The President expressed pleasure at the opportunity to meet with Deputy Prime Minister Allon. Mr. Allon said that he was very grateful for an opportunity to call upon the President and to bring him the very warm regards of Prime Minister Eshkol. Mr. Eshkol had enjoyed greatly his visit to the LBJ ranch in January, and he "still carried hope that something would come from that meeting."

The President said that he, too, had found the talks useful. He said that he had great faith in the people of Israel, and he had little doubt that the Israelis would be able to survive their current difficulties and with flying colors.

The President asked Mr. Rostow to summarize the talks that had gone on prior to the time the President was able to receive us.

Mr. Rostow said that the group had been discussing various problems in the few minutes before coming into the President's office. Mr. Rostow said that it had been agreed that Jerusalem was perhaps the key problem. Mr. Allon had said that some role for the Arabs in Jerusalem could be negotiated with access guaranteed. There could be no change, however, in the civil and sovereign status for Jerusalem. No government in Israel could survive such a change. In fact, Mr. Allon had said that if any government attempted to, it might even bring civil war in Israel. There had been a brief discussion of the Allon plan for defensive enclaves and a consideration of the security problems the Israelis faced. Mr. Allon had stressed the need now for Phantoms. Mr. Allon considered that the Phantoms were necessary to show the Arabs that they could not win in the event of another round.

Mr. Allon then remarked that Mr. Rostow's summary was a fair one, but he would like to add a few points. The problem today is not how to secure victory. It is how to prevent another war. The supply of U.S. Phantoms to Israel would be a stabilizing factor with both the Arabs and with the Russians whose presence in the area is increasing.

The trouble along the Suez is serious,/3/ but Mr. Allon did not believe the Arabs would go to war unless they thought they could win. After the Czechoslovakia affair where the West had been incapable of responding, agreement to supply Phantoms might be a helpful reply to the Soviets. Once the Arabs realize that they cannot win a war, Mr. Allon believes that they will reconcile themselves to the existence of Israel.

/3/An incident that began on September 8 when an Israeli Army unit detonated an anti-vehicle mine discovered on the east bank of the Suez Canal 10 kilometers north of Port Tawfiq escalated quickly into an exchange of small arms fire across the Canal, followed by an exchange of artillery fire that spread across a front from Port Tawfiq to El Kantara. (USDAO telegram 1599 from Tel Aviv, September 8; ibid., Country File, Israel, Vol. X, Cables and Memos, 6/68-11/68)

The President told Mr. Rostow to talk to Secretary Clifford and to get his comments on the current situation. The President said that he would make the decision on Phantoms, but he was not sure whether that decision would be made before or after elections. He had already taken action to put the U.S. in a position to act without any loss of time in excess of the time that would have been required if the decision had been made in January. However, the U.S. wants to try to find a road to peace. We do not want to be charged with inciting another war. The U.S. will be cooperative in any efforts the Israelis are able to make toward peace.

Mr. Allon recalled that Ambassador Ball was told that the Israelis would work with Jarring or, for that matter, with others. Mr. Allon believes, however, that the UAR considers that it can risk more than before-not full war perhaps but greater risks without bringing about full war. The Arabs frequently do not act logically, and it was sometimes difficult to anticipate what their illogical acts would be.

The Russians must get tired of getting their supplies smashed and will one day perhaps want to slow down the flow of arms to the area. The Government of Israel is an important factor in the Middle East, and Mr. Allon hopes that the U.S. is aware of its importance.

When Mr. Eshkol left the U.S., he had the feeling that his request for Phantoms would be favorably considered. The Czechoslovakia situation and UAR actions on the Canal are both factors to be considered carefully. That the UAR acted on the Canal after the Czech incident is a very important fact. The UAR might well consider that it has a greater freedom of action. Its actions indicate a threat of continued terrorism.

Mr. Allon continued that he had read many statements and heard many speeches in the U.S. campaign. A statement by the President on the F-4's would, Mr. Allon thought, be better than an argument between candidates. Arabs respect firm policies. France's position in the area is weaker than it used to be, for example. The world should know that the U.S. is on the side of Israel, and an announcement on Phantoms would be great news for Israel and for many other countries all over the world.

After an exchange of pleasantries, the Deputy Prime Minister and his party departed.

248. Notes on President Johnson's Meeting With Congressional Leaders/1/

Washington, September 9, 1968, 5:45-7:24 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, Transcripts of Meetings in the Cabinet Room, September 9, 1968, 5:45 p.m. to 7:24 p.m. No classification marking. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room at the White House. The Congressional leaders including Speaker of the House John McCormack and Congressmen Carl Albert, Gerald Ford, Leslie Arends, and Melvin Ford. Also present were Secretary of State Rusk, Secretary of Defense Clifford, Walt Rostow, Budget Director Charles Zwick, Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers Arthur Okun, and Legislative Counsel to the President Harold Barefoot Sanders. A heading describes the notes as President Johnson's notes, but they were prepared from a tape recording by either President Johnson's secretarial staff or by his staff in Austin after the President left office and began his research for his memoirs. The tape recording on which the notes are based is ibid., Recordings and Transcripts of Telephone Conversations and Meetings. The notes have been corrected to accord with the tape recording.

[Here follows discussion unrelated to the Middle East.]

Secretary Clifford noted that both of these presidential candidates have been talking about the request of Israel for military equipment. He wanted to know if we have in the recent weeks a request for standard equipment from Israel. He said both candidates talked about it yesterday and what's the status of the situation?

Secretary Rusk said the President might want to comment on that.

The President said:

"Yes. In the last five minutes--there is a constant request from Israel. Vice President Nixon said day before yesterday he was going to give them jet planes. Well, we're giving them jet planes, a good many of them now. And they said, what kind of jet planes. He didn't specify what kind. I don't know--he may have spoken later on the facts. What they want is the Phantom plane. We have put ourselves in the position to sell them Phantom planes with a decision not later than January of this year by some adjustment in our production schedules if we conclude that by that time the military parity is such and the requirements of their security are such that it is desirable. We don't want to be in a position of just being arms merchants and starting an arms race with the Russians there, and we're also trying very hard to use this to try to bring about the success of the Jarring mission, to get both of them to do something themselves to find an area of agreement in that part of the world.

"The Russians have stepped up their supplies to the Arabs substantially and they have replaced a good deal of what was lost in the June conflict. I might say that the encouragement the candidates have given some folks in this campaign year is not unanticipated and unexpected. For that reason, we have put ourselves--they have really--are for giving them whatever is necessary to insure the favorable consideration at their hands. March 31st I took a step that didn't require that of me and we are going to look at it very carefully and be sure that we think that it is not only their interest and our interest but in the world interest before we act.

"And the Congress I think, the House indicated its approval of supplying the Phantom when it passed the Foreign Aid Bill. The Senate has also indicated its feelings to a somewhat more modified extent. The measure is still in conference. I'm not saying that we are going to supply them or not going to supply them, but that decision hasn't been reached now and our Joint Chiefs haven't passed on it. They think they have adequate security at the present time. The Israelis I think really demonstrated that they had it. Since then we have made available some very fine jet aircraft to them, but it is not the ultimate in the world and it's the ultimate they seek."

President Johnson observed that the Israeli Deputy Minister had been here and it was an off the record meeting. The Ambassador was with him and they took the position in the light of the events in Czechoslovakia that the reaction to the Middle East the last day or two with the skirmishes they have had to require very prompt action on the part of the United States. The President asked Walt Rostow to comment. Mr. Rostow reported that Deputy Prime Minister Allon was making a strong plea to the President for the 60 Phantoms. He said the arguments taken were--that after the Czech experience it had (a) made the Russians anxious to have us or somebody else take the light of the world publicity off them, and (b) possibly encourage the Egyptians to start probing across to the Canal because of the passivity of the Western reaction to the Russian entrance into Czechoslovakia, and he therefore urged, along with the conventional arguments that we advanced, not to be delivered until they announce them.

Mr. Rostow reported that in private conversation before the President came in, Luke Battle and Rostow probed them a bit on their position in Jerusalem which is critical to the possibility of a deal with Hussein, and he indicated considerable give on the press issue, our position with respect to religious monuments, but nothing on the sovereignty of the city as a whole. Rostow said that he and Battle had pressed them on the Jarring mission, and they said they were forthcoming with Jarring. Allon's main pitch was that the Arabs will not begin to make peace until they are convinced that Israel is unattackable, and that the Phantom delivery is the key to that.

[Here follows discussion unrelated to the Middle East.]

249. Information Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, September 10, 1968.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Walt W. Rostow, Chlodnik, Box 12. Top Secret; Sensitive; For the Eyes of the President and Secretary of State Only.

Mr. President:

Pursuant to my memorandum to you of yesterday (attached),/2/ Ambassador Dobrynin came to my home at 8:30 yesterday evening. We had a very long private conversation.

/2/In the attached memorandum to the President, Rostow reviewed his guidance from the President for his meeting with Dobrynin.

[Here follows a summary of a portion of the conversation unrelated to the Middle East.]

3. Dobrynin then turned to the Middle East and raised this question: In the wake of their paper to us on the Middle East,/3/ is there any way that a Summit meeting might push us towards peace in the Middle East? I then pointed out to him that the paper they had given us was interesting in structure, but it did not come to grips with the Israeli judgment that only direct negotiations could lead to a settlement which would be politically and psychologically stable. I told him we were taking the Soviet paper seriously, but there were problems with it, including the relationship of any views that might be developed between the United States and the Soviet Union on the one hand, and the Jarring mission on the other.

/3/See Document 245.

4. Dobrynin then made a long reply with the following points:

--After the Arab-Israeli war, the Soviet Union could have exploited the situation to set up bases and greatly to strengthen its military and political position in the Middle East. They had decided not to do so. This paper reflected an authentic desire for a stable settlement.

--We should be conscious of one particular point in the Soviet proposal; namely, the idea of a Four-Power guarantee of Middle Eastern borders. The idea had come to him through Dr. Nahum Goldman, an old Zionist. He, Dobrynin, and the Soviet Government had concluded that a Four-Power guarantee of the Middle Eastern frontiers was the most solid basis the Israelis could acquire for the continuity of their national existence--more solid than a peace treaty with the Arab states. He suggested that, perhaps, an agreement on this particular point might be a constructive item for a Summit meeting.

--As for the rest of the substance of the paper, he thought that Jarring might submit some such paper against the background of prior U.S.-Soviet agreement. Jarring had been running around the Middle East, but not making much progress. If he could put in a proposal backed by the U.S. and the Soviet Union, then his mission might move forward more rapidly.

He returned several times in the course of the conversation to a Four-Power guarantee as the critical element for Israel in the Soviet paper.

[Here follows a summary of a portion of the conversation unrelated to the Middle East.]

Walt

250. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel/1/

Washington, September 11, 1968, 2148Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 7 ISR. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by John D. Leonard (NEA/IAI), cleared by Battle and Atherton, and approved by Rusk. Repeated to Amman, Cairo, London, Jidda, and USUN.

236515. Subject: Allon Visit. Following summary FYI only and Noforn.

Summary:

Deputy Prime Minister Allon called on Secretary September 10 and urged USG decision soonest sell F-4 Phantoms to Israel as means deterring possible Soviet-inspired Arab aggression. Military deterrent only way to force Arabs talk peace. Asked about Israeli nuclear intentions Allon said Israel did not have nuclear weapons and he was authorized reiterate PriMin Eshkol's assurances that Israel would not be first to introduce new weapons into Middle East. Declared GOI had not yet signed NPT in order keep Egyptians uncertain as to Israel's capability. Allon said Israeli hopes for an SSM had vanished, declared MD-620 program dead and denied Israel currently making an SSM. Secretary suggested Israelis settle USS Liberty claims soonest and evacuate Tiran Island. According Allon, Liberty matter should be resolved in a few days. End of summary.

1. During September 10 call on the Secretary Deputy Prime Minister Yigal Allon, accompanied by Ambassador Rabin and Minister Argov, urged USG decision soonest sell F-4 Phantoms to Israel. Presentation emphasized theme that while Israel currently strong enough defeat Arabs (particularly in present geographical posture) the Phantoms would serve as a deterrent to war and encouragement to peace. Arabs would only give serious consideration to peace if the possibility of their military superiority removed. Soviet aggression against Czechoslovakia has convinced Egyptians that Soviets are no longer cautious and this, together with Egyptian postwar rearmament, has prompted Egyptians to initiate recent serious incidents along Suez Canal. USG decision now sell Israel Phantoms would convince Arabs of futility of seeking military solution to Arab-Israel dispute.

2. Secretary asked Allon about status of Israeli missile program. Allon replied that as far as a Surface-to-Surface Missile (SSM) was concerned, "Israeli dreams had vanished." Declared that if the proposed deal with the French for Mirage aircraft was "dead," the MD-620 program was "doubly-dead." Asked if Israel was not itself making an SSM, Allon replied: "No, not yet." Both Allon and Rabin declared they did not attach much importance to Israeli acquisition of an SSM since in discussing SSM's they were talking about missiles with "conventional warheads" and such missiles require extremely high degree of accuracy. On other hand, Egyptian possession of SSM's could prove dangerous threat to Israel's mobilization system.

3. Secretary asked what assurances GOI could give that Phantoms would not be used to deliver nuclear weapons and why GOI had not signed NPT. Allon replied: "I can assure you on behalf of the Prime Minister that what he has said about Israel not going to be the first to introduce new weapons into the Middle East still stands." He pointed to American inspection of Dimona reactor as giving additional assurances. When Secretary commented that these inspections applied only to Dimona Allon replied that Israel was a small country and was open to Americans.

4. In pursuing NPT matter Secretary described as unsatisfactory FonMin Eban's June 30 letter this subject./2/ Stated that letter was vague and failed to answer question. Both Allon and Rabin declared that GOI hoped leave question mark in Egyptian minds as to Israel's nuclear capability as a form of deterrent in current state of semi-war. Secretary stated that by leaving question mark in Egyptian minds GOI similarly placed doubts in mind USG as to its nuclear intentions. Allon commented that he felt sure that sooner or later GOI would sign and that Eban would be prepared discuss matter further with Secretary in October at UNGA.

/2/Transmitted in telegram 4354 from Tel Aviv, July 2; see Document 205.

5. Secretary asked Allon's reaction to a possible multi-power guarantee of negotiated Arab-Israel frontiers. Allon saw such a guarantee, even if given by the four permanent members of UNSC, as no substitute for a peace settlement.

6. Pointing out that security which rests on military means alone is a very fragile thing Secretary asked on what basis Allon sees a possible Israel-Arab peace. Allon replied that increased Jewish immigration to Israel plus a plausible military deterrent would eventually bring about a settlement. Opined that King Hussein seemed truly desirous of peace, but unable to move because of Egyptian objections. Added that GOI does not miss a single opportunity to communicate its peaceful intentions to all levels of the Jordanian Government. Stated that the plan he had proposed to Cabinet for disposition of West Bank takes into account Israel's security and demographic requirements while at the same time offering honorable conditions to Jordan. Israel was prepared make territorial concessions consonant with its security requirements.

7. In concluding conversation Secretary said Israel should expeditiously settle Liberty claims so as to remove unnecessary obstacle US-Israel relations. Allon indicated his complete personal agreement and said he hoped matter would be settled within few days. Secretary's suggestion that IDF should evacuate Tiran Island was countered by Rabin's argument that Israeli occupation was dictated by necessity ensure free passage Tiran Straits pending Israel-Arab peace settlement.

Rusk

251. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Washington, September 12, 1968.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Harold H. Saunders, UAR, 1/1/68-1/20/69. Confidential. Copies were sent to Walt Rostow, Walsh, Battle, and Parker.

PARTICIPANTS
Dr. Ashraf Ghorbal, Minister, UAR Interests Section
Harold H. Saunders

Ghorbal had asked on September 9 to see me, presumably to find out what the President had said to Israeli Deputy Prime Minister Allon. However, when he opened yesterday's conversation by asking what was new, I gave him a copy of the President's speech to B'nai B'rith/2/ to read and we spent most of our time talking about that. We covered the following ground:

/2/Reference is to the speech President Johnson made on September 10 at the Shoreham Hotel in Washington on the occasion of the 125th anniversary meeting of B'nai B'rith. Among those in attendance was Israeli Deputy Prime Minister Allon. For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1968-69, Book II, pp. 944-950.

1. Ghorbal's reaction to the President's speech was quite positive./3/ He said he hoped that this was a first step toward a more active Presidential role in attempting to move the Arab-Israeli impasse toward a settlement. He singled out the following points for initial comment:

/3/In a summary of Middle East reactions to the speech prepared for the President on September 16, Rostow noted that Ghorbal viewed it as a positive step. He added that the Jordanian Ambassador had called to congratulate the President on a "balanced" speech, and that Ambassador Rabin had said, "We are very satisfied." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East, Vol. II, 4/68-1/69)

--He "saluted" the President's call for the parties to get substance on the table and begin talking specifics of a settlement. He thought that was extremely important coming from the President and hoped Israel would take note and put an end to the sterile semantic exercises that Eban has been engaging in.

--He regretted that the President had not mentioned "withdrawal." When I said I thought that was implicit in the paragraph on territorial integrity, he said an issue as important as this should be explicitly handled.

--He started to object to the fact that the President had said we cannot return to the situation of June 4 in a paragraph having to do with territorial integrity. He felt this confused "boundaries" and "situation." However, when I marched him through a sentence-by-

sentence reading of the paragraph pointing out that we had always said there could be border rectifications in the context of an agreed settlement and that the President had also explicitly ruled out drawing boundaries on the right of conquest alone, he backed away. In the course of the discussion, he said that the GUAR accepted the concept that we could not return to the "situation" of June 4--that we should end the state of war, draw permanent boundaries and settle the other outstanding issues mentioned in the Security Council Resolution.

--He started to say that the Jerusalem paragraph was weak, and I pointed out that we had elevated it to the status of a separate principle. He immediately said it might be serious that we had removed Jerusalem from under the concept of territorial integrity. I said that was not our concept at all; in fact, we had never thought of it.

2. He asked whether I had drafted the speech. I said, "We consider this the President's speech."

3. When he asked about Allon's talk with the President, I said it was a short 15-20 minute call scheduled so that Allon could pay his respects. When Ghorbal tried to find out exactly who had said what, I said it was a short conversation in which there was no detailed substantive exchange. The Deputy Prime Minister had briefly outlined Israel's view of the current situation in the Middle East, and the President had stressed the importance of moving forward to peace. When Ghorbal asked whether Allon had raised the Phantoms, I simply smiled and said that it wouldn't be surprising if he had. Ghorbal said he certainly would have, had he been in Allon's place.

4. When he chided us for our role in helping Israel to bring the current Suez Canal incidents/4/ to the Security Council, I countered by asking him--since he had raised the issue--what inferences we should draw from the sudden increase in mining incidents on the Israeli-occupied side of the Canal. He made the following two semi-contradictory points:

/4/See footnote 3, Document 247. The exchange of fire across the Canal growing out of the original incident continued, and the United States called on both Israel and the UAR to exercise restraint. (Telegram 236892 to Tel Aviv, September 12, and telegram 237145 to Cairo, September 12; both in National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR)

--The Israelis are throwing up a smoke screen and manufacturing these incidents. According to his information from Cairo, the Egyptians had no knowledge of anyone crossing from the Egyptian side. He said the Israelis themselves were engaged in a "ridiculous little cops and robbers business" to draw attention away from their own failure to move toward peace.

--People in the Arab world are becoming generally frustrated and an increase in incidents like this is exactly what we must expect from now on. When I said this sounded as if he were suggesting that there might indeed be a connection between an increase in the number of incidents and a conscious policy decision, he simply said that there were Arabs on the Israeli side of the cease-fire line who were frustrated too.

H. S.

252. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel/1/

Washington, September 14, 1968, 1913Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by Officer in Charge of UN Political Affairs Betty Jane Jones, cleared by Sisco, and approved by Battle. Also sent to USUN and repeated to Amman, Moscow, Cairo, and Paris for Ball and Sisco.

238798. Subj: Jarring Mission; Suez.

1. Summary. At his request Israeli Amb Rabin, accompanied by Argov and Raviv, called on Asst Secy's Battle and Sisco Sept 13 to discuss Sov ME approach to US and Jarring Mission. Rabin said description of Sov approach given him Sept 11,/2/ although lacking details, sounded like imposed settlement. It appeared US could have had two purposes in telling GOI of approach: to alarm and warn GOI in order erode Israeli policy, or to indicate USG considering change in its ME policy. Battle and Sisco emphasized they informed GOI of Soviet ideas in belief it should know of approach even though USG position on it not yet determined and could not, therefore, be given Rabin. Had also considered it important pass on our view that, regardless USG position, Sov ideas would have considerable appeal among 124 UN members. Soviet ideas would be evaluated within framework of US policy as stated by President in June 1967 and this week.

/2/In a September 11 conversation with Rabin, Battle and Sisco outlined some of the ideas put forward in the Soviet proposal conveyed by Dobrynin to Rusk on September 4. They noted that there was an indication that the Soviet Union was thinking in terms of four-power guarantees. (Telegram 236989 to Tel Aviv, September 12; ibid.)

2. In response Rabin's repetition of query what US thought GOI should do to help move matters ahead, Sisco pointed out in absence Israeli peace plan ideas of other side pre-empted situation and had considerable appeal to many countries. Battle said GOI international support eroding and reiterated past urgings that GOI keep before world its willingness to withdraw in context peace settlement, since world increasingly believes Israel has no intention of withdrawing and is insisting on direct negotiations as cover to avoid withdrawal. Rabin replied Israel stood firmly for achievement real peace. Until Arabs ready for peace, nothing more to say.

3. USReps reiterated US deep concern over worsening situation along Suez and fact actions of both sides could exacerbate it. Rabin responded that there no doubt of new UAR military policy but that GOI not worried. He said Israel had found Arabs always see Israeli move to SC as sign of weakness. End summary.

4. Rabin first asked about US-UK talks of Sept 12-13./3/ Battle said they had gone well and briefly indicated subjects discussed. He said we had reported Sov approach to UK in about same terms as to Israel. There had been review of status Jarring Mission and agreement to do all possible in its support.

5. Referring to Sept 11 meeting, Rabin said Israelis had given careful consideration to what had been said. He noted first that US had emphasized that time running out and there must be movement toward settlement. However, he had received no reply to request for specific advice or suggestions on what Israel should do.

6. Re Sov proposals, description given had been in general terms with no specific info on contents. Appeared US might be trying alarm and warn GOI with purpose of eroding policy. He wished make abundantly clear this would lead nowhere. Other possibility was US considering change in its ME policy as stated by Pres June 19, 1967 and reaffirmed by him Sept 10. It seemed strange conversation had come within 24 hours of President's restatement of US policy. He emphasized, however, even if there change in US policy, there would be no change in basic GOI policy.

7. Rabin expressed view Soviets by changes in "scenery," atmosphere and appearances trying make possible return to status quo ante the June war. Increased tensions along Suez, Sov approach to US, and UAR last message given Jarring supported this thesis and indicated effort to alarm USG and GOI. Israel, he said, was not at all alarmed. He saw no alternative to sticking to policy of no half measures or half solutions but real peace. This would call Soviet bluff. GOI had taken Ball/Sisco advice in Jerusalem and started indirect substantive exchanges; if this process stopped, it not Israel's fault. He realized there might be tactical problem in UN, and he prepared discuss this, but basically he was optimistic. He thought we should not worry about Sovs.

8. Sisco agreed Rabin had not been given specific advice he requested Sept 11. This was in part because we wished avoid making specific comments on one point or another contained in detailed substantive exchanges parties conducting through Jarring. Reason we had stressed that time running out was importance we attach to what attention GOI giving to moving Jarring Mission along at time GA convenes and FonMins in NY. This consistent with our view of importance supporting Jarring. We had emphasized that to extent no real progress made through Jarring by parties, initiatives-not necessarily helpful-will come from others. We thus remain very interested in getting progress through Jarring, and we continue to urge GOI to examine carefully what steps it can take to help Jarring make progress toward agreement called for in SC resolution.

9. We had tried give Israel some idea of Sov approach, Sisco continued, and repeated four principal elements around which Sov proposals revolved. We had explained we had made no value judgment and were studying proposals. He and Battle not authorized say more. Battle emphasized his view, shared by Sisco, had been that, in light US-Israel relationship, it desirable inform GOI of Sov approach even before able report definitive US judgment. Sisco added had tried do this while pointing out Sov ideas would have considerable attraction among 124 UN members. If UAR gives Jarring its peace plan and it bad from Israeli point of view, it nevertheless will have good deal of attraction to others if it not possible point to alternative Israeli peace plan. Even if not acceptable, UAR ideas would preempt situation. As for possible change in US policy, Sisco noted he had told Argov, and we reaffirming this again, that we, of course, studying Sov proposals in framework of President's policy, and Battle pointed out Sov proposals known to USG prior to President's Sept 10 speech.

10. Battle considered question about what Israel specifically should do a very legitimate one. In reply he said he would repeat what he had said many times before over past weeks and months, totally without regard to Sov move. He had warned Israel to look ahead and not underestimate degree to which international support eroding. He had pointed out that, quite apart from facts of matter, Arabs were doing better in world propaganda battle. GOI was failing to keep before world its willingness to withdraw in context of a settlement. World increasingly believed Israel had no intention of withdrawing and insisted on direct negotiations in order avoid withdrawal. If there was one single factor that had given Arabs propaganda advantage, it was this. Sisco noted Rabin had referred, as in past, to tactical problem in UN. We viewed matter in much more fundamental way, as basic to whole question of achieving progress toward settlement, not just question of UN tactics.

11. In reply to Battle's point, Rabin said perhaps Israel had nothing new to say and Arabs more capable of keeping headlines. But Israel had firm policy. It wanted peace settlement, and once this said there nothing more to add. He thought many understood need for achieving real peace. At urging of Ball and Sisco during ME trip, Israel had agreed try process of clarification through indirect exchanges but got no answer from UAR to question whether it ready for peace. If clarification process stopped, it not Israel's fault. Key problem not what newspapers and other media said but that US believe real peace is what should be achieved. Sisco pointed out there no doubt of US view on this. President had just reiterated this; we want real not illusory peace in area.

12. Rabin continued as long as other side did not cross this line, other points such as boundaries, not important. Israel had tried through Jarring and other means to get answer on basic question of peace, but had gotten nothing. If UAR had said it was ready for peace, meaning a, b, and c, on assumption there would be agreement on boundaries, refugees, etc. he would have understood, but there was no use avoiding fact main issue between Israel and UAR was still peace.

13. Sisco informed Israelis on confidential basis that he and Ball, en route Brussels to brief NATO on UN problems, would stop in Paris to get Jarring's latest assessment. He would find Rabin's assessment of where things stand helpful for this talk. Rabin said he did not yet have details of latest UAR message through Jarring though Eban had said it no reply and couched in vulgar terms. Rabin thought it pertinent UAR had tried to deny publicly that there had been exchanges through Jarring and at Arab FonMins meeting had described Jarring Mission as instrument to gain a little time.

14. Reverting to question of four-power guarantees, Sisco noted UK position known to Israel. UK concerned re Suez and much more disposed than we to have it handled as separate problem. French have long favored 4-power approach. Sov position on its role as major power also known. Therefore, 3 powers were already well-disposed to 4-power approach. Linking this to what he had said earlier, he suggested that to extent there no progress by parties, there will be growing stimulation of 4-power approach.

15. Rabin referred to question of withdrawal and direct negotiations, stating even if newspapers took position Battle had suggested, US and other govts and Jarring knew from GOI it not question of willingness to withdraw but of where lines should be. He saw no problem, therefore, with govts and their policies. Battle, however, said he had repeatedly made point to reps of many govts that Israel ready act on various issues in context of settlement. However, despite what GOI and USG said, many suspected GOI using modalities to cover up lack of will to achieve peace. If Israel wished to keep international support it had to take account of this.

16. Battle said he about to make trip to Cairo for Abu Simbel ceremony. Though we doubted much would come of it, he would like idea of what he could say to Nasser that would be constructive and helpful. Rabin replied Battle should ask two questions Israel put to UAR through Jarring: what is Nasser's interpretation of peace with Israel, and what sort of relations would Israel and UAR have when peace achieved. Heikal said UAR would ignore Israel, but GOI said they could not ignore Israel. Some said peace treaty just piece of paper but for Israel recognition, peace, open borders were only hope. Absence of war between neighbors not enough. There must at least be start to crossing Rubicon of recognition and open borders, otherwise war would come again after few years.

17. Argov said in US statements re Sov proposals one ingredient missing-that proposals unacceptable. He wondered if four categories mentioned weren't per se in sharp contrast to President's policy enunciated few days ago. Repeating we had no USG position to convey at this time, Sisco said question Argov raised was judgment USG had to make. Yardstick to be used to evaluate Soviet or other ideas would be President's policy. Rabin thought 4-power guarantees sounded like substitute for one element of US policy--need for contractual agreement between parties. Sisco explained it not clear whether Soviets have in mind that 4-power guarantees would be supplement or bulwark to agreement achieved in accordance with SC Nov 22 res or substitute for it. This was one point being studied. Battle emphasized again Israelis should not read into what was said things that were not said. When he gave Israeli reps USG position, they could be confident he not free-wheeling. In present case he unable give them USG position; ideas are being studied. Matter has been discussed with Secy, who will be happy talk to Rabin, probably early next week. There would be further consultations with Israelis when it possible provide clearer info. Rabin explained Israel simply wished make clear from very beginning where it stood and not be late in doing so.

18. Turning to Suez situation, Battle noted US had spoken earlier to Israel, as well as UAR, about dangers. We very concerned and wondered if Rabin had any new info. Rabin expressed view there could be no doubt UAR following new policy along Suez. This clear from quick reaction to slightest incident and declaration that Egyptian Army ready not only to defend but to conduct active offense. This was policy statement even if UAR preferred say it in newspaper rather than officially. Moreover, he thought Israel would face similar situation on other borders. Rabin analyzed reasons for change in UAR policy as effort gain confidence of army and public, to help Jordan and show participation against Israel, to regain prestige and position as defender of other members Arab world, and to create atmosphere of urgency for solution of basic question.

19. Battle emphasized US deeply concerned actions of both sides could exacerbate already bad situation. Both he and Sisco said US very worried. Rabin said Israel was not. In October 1966 it had made mistake of taking case of incident with Syria to SC instead of "doing something". Israeli move to SC always seen by Arabs as sign of weakness. Sisco admitted Israel not getting satisfaction from SC. Rabin said he had personally never expected it would.

Rusk