152. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Washington, April 26, 1968.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. IX, Cables and Memos, 3/68-5/68. Secret; Nodis. Rostow sent this memorandum to the President on April 26 with an attached note summarizing the conversation. (Ibid.)

PARTICIPANTS
W. W. Rostow
Ephraim Evron
Harold H. Saunders

Israeli Ambassador Rabin on March 20 had asked Mr. Rostow "at Prime Minister Eshkol's request" about the status of our decision on Phantoms as discussed at the Ranch. Mr. Rostow, on the basis of memos from Secretary McNamara, Mr. Nitze and General Wheeler, and Mr. Helms, reported to the President where staff work stands and asked permission to tell Evron informally. Not wishing to provoke a strong reaction in Jerusalem, Mr. Rostow with the President's approval passed the information informally in order to give Evron and Rabin a chance to decide how to handle it with their own Government.

Mr. Evron came in at 5:00 p.m. yesterday to hear this report. Mr. Rostow, speaking very precisely, told him the following:

1. Secretary McNamara had determined that the President could decide as late as December 31, 1968, and still begin delivering Phantoms in January 1970 at the production-line rate of about 4 per month.

2. General Wheeler, after discussion with General Hod and his team, had determined that US training can be done beginning January 1969 provided the Israelis do preliminary training (English, electronics basics) in Israel.

3. Mr. Helms has reviewed the intelligence exchanges [less than 1 line of text not declassified]. There's no major disagreement on numbers. We interpret these numbers differently with Israel taking the gloomier view. However, Mr. Helms sees no new evidence that would change his estimates.

Mr. Rostow also said that we had carried out our intention, discussed at the Ranch, to approach the Soviets with the following results:

--We've made two serious approaches.

--The Soviets say they're willing to discuss arms limitation after Israeli withdrawal.

--We have never assumed that a direct Soviet answer was the only possible response. We have always assumed that the only Soviet response might be a de facto slowdown of shipments. We are watching this closely.

Mr. Evron in response said he knew his government would be quite concerned. One of the things General Wheeler at the Ranch had said the US would specially watch was France's decision on the Mirages. Not only have the French still not delivered them, but they have signed a contract with Iraq. Iraq, from this deal alone, will end up with more Mirages than Israel now has in its inventory. Evron admitted that Soviet shipments to the Arab countries at the moment seemed to have leveled off and that absorptive capacity is a limiting factor. However, he said, noting that he could not be exact, that Israel has information that the training level of Egyptian pilots had increased to something like 50-100 a year.

In sum, Evron felt there were elements in the situation which called for an earlier decision than waiting until the end of 1968. He conceded that it is technically accurate to say that the President's option will remain open until the end of 1968, but he noted that there are both "psychological and political" elements in the situation which make an earlier decision desirable. In fact, he felt that a public decision was called for, although he did not press that. He then spelled out his notion that the Arabs will only negotiate when they are thoroughly persuaded Israel is so strong that no military solution is possible. In conclusion, he said he could only tell us that the continued uncertainty would worry Jerusalem and urge a prompt decision.

With that subject covered, Mr. Rostow turned to the broader subject of a political settlement, emphasizing that he was speaking entirely personally. He felt a tremendous sense of foreboding and saw the area teetering between the breakup of Jordan and the prospect some day of a bigger war. He felt that "what we and the Israelis owe to our grandchildren transcends hardware." He felt it is absolutely essential that the Israelis give some encouragement to King Hussein to negotiate a settlement. He realized that Nasser seems unwilling at the moment to go that route, but Hussein is grasping for any straw that would permit him to negotiate a bilateral settlement. Mr. Rostow felt that what is necessary is for the Israelis to give Hussein some glimpse of the kind of settlement they might expect on the West Bank, but particularly in Jerusalem.

Mr. Evron agreed that Hussein is desperately trying to persuade Nasser to give him the blessing for making his own settlement. Hussein--and here Evron cautioned the utmost sensitivity-is using the West Bank notables to try to persuade Nasser to give Hussein a free hand. He did not disagree with Mr. Rostow's line, although he did indicate that there already is communication through the notables with Hussein.

In conclusion, Evron reiterated his argument that a decision on the Phantoms now would both increase Eshkol's maneuverability with his own government and would give Hussein further evidence with which to convince Nasser that the political solution was the only one possible.

H. H. S.

153. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State/1/

Amman, April 27, 1968, 1130Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 ARAB-ISR/SANDSTORM. Secret; Nodis.

4555. Subj: Sandstorm. Ref: USUN 4785./2/

/2/Telegram 4785 from USUN, April 26, reported on an Israeli appreciation of the situation in the Middle East, as conveyed by Permanent Representative Tekoah. Israel saw the UAR as intransigent and waiting for a more favorable opportunity to achieve a settlement on its terms. Israel viewed Jordan as potentially more flexible, and Tekoah indicated that Israel would continue to explore the possibility that Jordan might adopt an independent policy. (Ibid., POL 27 ARAB-ISR)

1. Reftel and other recent messages on Israeli thinking about Jarring Mission give more than hint that GOI may now concentrate on making separate arrangements with Jordan. I would not be surprised to find they will seek contacts with Hussein during his forthcoming visit to Europe. We have already reported signs that some members of the Jordanian "establishment" may be considering separate talks with Israel.

2. For all of reasons set forth in Amman 3770/3/and 4119,/4/ I think we must be extremely careful in how we use (or acquiesce in Israelis using) this last asset for a peaceful settlement because if a separate peace effort should blow up, Hussein and Jordan will stand to lose everything. Israel will only have lost another move in its chess game with the Arabs.

/3/Document 109.

/4/See footnote 3, Document 126.

3. I therefore think our own interests in the Middle East require:

(A) That we obtain a clear and enforceable bilateral understanding with Israel on what we consider a minimum floor for Israel to offer Jordan for negotiations, with understanding Israel might have to give more in actual bargaining with Jordan. This will be essential in case of Jerusalem aspect of problem.

(B) That we give careful and detailed consideration to politico-military contingencies that might arise and be prepared to move firmly and definitively (1) to underwrite any mutually acceptable arrangement Israel and Jordan might reach, or (2) to assist GOJ in maintaining public order and security particularly if efforts reach separate agreement should fail, and (3) to prevent any outside interference that might be threatened or undertaken by other states in the area.

4. Jordan and Israel may move to separate talks without our knowledge. Such talks could fail, and it would then be too late for us either to help influence the parties to final agreement or to protect Jordan and our Middle Eastern interest from the blowup that may ensue.

5. Foregoing ideas were developed in greater detail in Amman 3770 and 4119 which I hope will be reread in conjunction with this message.

Symmes

154. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson/1/

Washington, April 27, 1968.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East, Vol. II, 4/68-1/69. Secret.

SUBJECT
Middle East Situation

We are taking a fresh look at the present situation in the Middle East in light of the continuing differences between the Arabs and Israelis which have made it impossible for Jarring to get talks started and with a view to seeing whether we can recommend to you additional steps to give effect to the policy objectives of your June 19, 1967 speech. However, we have a more immediate short-range problem in the Security Council which begins Saturday to consider the problem of Jerusalem at the request of Jordan. Israel is holding an Independence Day parade which violates provisions of the Armistice Agreement/2/ and previous UN resolutions by introducing military forces into Jerusalem beyond those permitted in the Agreement.

/2/Reference is to the General Armistice Agreement between Israel and Transjordan signed at Rhodes on April 3, 1949.

The Jordanian objectives are threefold: (a) to get the Security Council to call on Israel to cancel the Independence Day parade of May 2; (b) to reinforce the Armistice Agreement framework, which is an anathema to the Israelis; and (c) to mobilize Security Council opinion against Israeli unilateral measures in Jerusalem which in the Jordanian view amounts to de facto annexation prejudicial to any ultimate settlement. Jordan has requested our support. (We persuaded Eban to say at the United Nations last summer that Israeli administration of Jerusalem is not an annexation, but municipal administration by the occupying power.)

There are basically two approaches we can take in the Security Council.

First, on the assumption we cannot develop sufficient common ground between the United States and Jordanian positions on Jerusalem, we could decide not to try to influence the Jordanians. In these circumstances, they would develop a resolution which would certainly go beyond what the United States could support. We would abstain in the vote, as we have on the two past General Assembly resolutions on Jerusalem, while restating in the Council the basic principles of our policy in essentially the same terms as in the past. Such a result would not disturb Israel too much since it attaches more importance to the United States vote than to the Security Council result. Israel would disregard such a resolution. It would go ahead with the parade and refuse to alter measures already taken in Jerusalem extending its control.

Such a United States abstention would be exploited by the Soviets against our position in the area; it would further disillusion and weaken King Hussein; it would be played by the Arabs and his own people as another example that the King's friendship with the United States is not paying off for him; it would further aggravate the difficulties which have prevented Jarring from getting a dialogue started.

We believe, and Ambassador Goldberg concurs, there is a second approach which should at least be tried even though its chances of succeeding are slim.

Second, we would have Ambassador Goldberg meet with the Jordanians and probably the Pakistanis to see whether agreement can be achieved or a resolution based on the attached principles which are consistent with our present policy on Jerusalem.

We would have to vote "yes" on the resolution if it stayed within the limits of these principles, and we would have to give the Jordanians this assurance at the outset of the Security Council discussions.

Ambassador Goldberg wishes in the first instance to make a major effort to convince the Jordanians to limit the resolution to principle 1: A Call on Israel to cancel the parade because it would aggravate tension and make the Jarring Mission more difficult. This would be consistent with past policy.

Ambassador Goldberg would also be given discretion to support principles 2 through 6 in a Security Council resolution if he thought it would be helpful. The reason we are being so gingerly about principles 2 through 6 is not because they are inconsistent with our policy but because an indication to the Jordanians of a willingness on our part to discuss them could lead to touchy and intricate political and legal issues being raised in the Security Council resolution. Israel is particularly anxious to avoid references to the Armistice Agreement in a resolution since their objective is to replace the unstable Armistice Agreement framework with a durable and stable peace by means of a negotiated settlement. We share this objective. We would leave it to Ambassador Goldberg's judgment as to whether and when to inject principles 2 through 6 in the discussions. We agree with him that we should not support a resolution that has the effect of bulwarking an Armistice Agreement system that has proved unworkable in the past. 

If we succeed along these lines we would avoid being isolated, it would be helpful to our position in the area, and it would help maintain an atmosphere in Jordan in which Jarring could continue his efforts. Both Eban and Jarring intend in the next ten days to concentrate in particular on the possibilities of Israeli-Jordan talks, since the recent hardening of the UAR position makes early progress in Cairo unlikely. As you know, Jordan and Israel are close together on Jarring's approach while the UAR has thus far been very negative.

You should be aware there will be Israeli grumbling with this second approach. There will also be some domestic reaction in certain quarters, but it should be manageable since the recommended course does not involve any sharp change from past policy. We have long agreed to disagree with the Israelis on Jerusalem. We could balance this somewhat by reaffirming strongly the five principles you stated on June 19, 1967.

The fact is that the Israelis have acted very badly on this Jerusalem matter and have put us in a position of near isolation in the United Nations which in turn is having adverse repercussions on our overall position in the area. Those favoring a settlement in Israel would be strengthened by our position.

Recommendation:

That you authorize Ambassador Goldberg (a) to proceed along the above lines in the knowledge we would vote "yes" if the resolution is consistent with the attached principles; (b) to include a frank discussion with the Israelis, as well as the Jordanians, so that they understand our position clearly.

Dean Rusk

Enclosure

PRINCIPLES CONCERNING JERUSALEM

1. A call on Israel to cancel the parade because it would aggravate tension in an already inflamed situation and make the Jarring Mission more difficult.

Other Principles if Desirable

2. Unilateral actions by any of the states in the area cannot be recognized as governing the international status of Jerusalem.

3. Issue of Jerusalem should be considered in the context of a settlement of all the problems arising out of the June conflict.

4. A satisfactory solution for Jerusalem must take into consideration the religious, economic, and political interests at stake, including those of Israel and Jordan. Its future status must be worked out in consultation with all parties having an interest in the special character of the city.

5. Israel is obligated to observe the provisions of international law governing the rights and obligations of an occupying power in the newly-occupied sections of Jerusalem, as it is in the other occupied territories.

6. Pending a settlement, Israel should refrain from actions in the newly-occupied sections of Jerusalem which are prejudicial to the future status of the city or which impede progress toward a settlement.

155. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel/1/

Washington, April 28, 1968, 1707Z.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. IX, Cables and Memos, 3/68-5/68. Secret; Priority. The text of a Presidential message was received from the White House for revision as a letter from Secretary Rusk. The telegram was approved by Rusk and Davies. Repeated to USUN and Geneva.

154625. 1. Please deliver following message to Foreign Minister Eban from the Secretary.

"Dear Mr. Minister:

We have in the past discussed the dangers to mankind of a further spread of nuclear weapons. The current resumed session of the United Nations General Assembly will have the opportunity in this respect to take a major step by endorsing a treaty to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons. It is the strong feeling of my government that the General Assembly should endorse the treaty and ask that it be opened immediately for signature by as many countries as possible so that it may enter into force at the earliest possible date.

To assure prompt and widespread support for the treaty, parallel action will be necessary on the part of certain nations and groups of nations which have an understandable desire to assure themselves that their neighbors will also adhere to the treaty. The Middle East is clearly an area which stands greatly to benefit from the enhanced security which this treaty will provide. In this area, parallel action by Israel and the Arab states will be required for such a benefit to be realized.

The Government of Israel, which, as the most technologically advanced state in the Middle East, has made clear its intention not to be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the area, is therefore in a position to assure that the treaty will effectively encompass the nations of the Middle East. That is why I urge, Mr. Minister, that your government as early as possible in the General Assembly make clear its readiness to join in supporting the treaty at the resumed United Nations General Assembly session. This, I trust, will shortly be followed by an announcement that Israel is prepared to sign the treaty.

As you know, we are keenly aware of the many problems you face in assuring Israel's security. We recognize your concern over the buildup of conventional weapons in the states surrounding Israel. I can assure you again, as President Johnson told Prime Minister Eshkol in January, that we will press every opportunity to achieve satisfactory limitation of shipments from the Soviet Union. I can also repeat what the President said in January about our determination to keep Israel's needs under active and sympathetic review.

In that context, I believe this treaty is crucial to the ultimate security of Israel. While we will work to limit the conventional arms race or keep it in appropriate balance, it is absolutely essential to prevent that race from leaping into weaponry against which Israel cannot be defended. The consequences of its use in your country would be catastrophic.

Because we do not expect any Arab nuclear capability in the foreseeable future, Israel's objective must be to prevent, insofar as is possible by political arrangements, the transfer of such weapons to its neighbors. While the gains to Israel through adherence to the NPT would be vital, the only cost to Israel would be self-denial of the questionable deterrent of an unknown nuclear capability.

However, I must also tell you that I consider this treaty to transcend even these crucial national issues. Its potential contribution to the safety and survival of all mankind--as well as to the survival of each nation large or small--is so great as to compel its separate consideration. I am confident that Israel will not ignore the worldwide significance of this act. I hope, therefore, that the United States can count on your government's initiative in supporting this treaty in the coming session of the United Nations General Assembly.

Sincerely yours, Dean Rusk."

Rusk

156. Action Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, April 30, 1968, 6:40 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. IX, Cables and Memos, 3/68-5/68. Secret; Exdis. A notation indicates that the memorandum was received at 6:45 p.m.

SUBJECT
Inspecting Israel's Nuclear Reactor

Secretary Rusk has approved instructing Ambassador Barbour to ask Prime Minister Eshkol for another visit by US experts to the Israeli nuclear reactor at Dimona. Our last visit was in April 1967. Eshkol has acquiesced in periodic visits every 12-13 months, although he has never been enthusiastic.

The visit this year is more important than ever. Up through last spring, we were reasonably confident that the Dimona reactor was being used only for research and that the Israelis were making no attempt to produce weapons-grade plutonium. The reactor used fuel elements from France which had to be returned to France when used. Late last year, however, there were indications that Israel was processing ore obtained without safeguards from Argentina. This could be to make their own fuel elements so they wouldn't have to depend either on France or on safeguarded material.

We have no evidence that Israel has facilities for separating significant amounts of plutonium from irradiated fuel--the next step toward weapons production. But our experts say that last winter's activity could portend a decision to build such a plant. They estimate it would be only two years from that decision to Israel's first weapons test. Eshkol's response to our request could be an important clue to his intentions (though his political difficulties with the visit will also play a role).

Secretary Rusk has already sent the message we showed you urging Israel to support the NPT./2/ Eban's staff says Israel won't make up its mind till toward the end of the year. This visit to Dimona will provide another avenue for reminding them that we're serious about opposing their going nuclear. Since Barbour will be making this request without reference to you, I should think this would carry minimum risk for the time being./3/

/2/See Document 155.

/3/President Johnson approved Rostow's recommendation.

Walt

157. Letter From the Israeli Ambassador (Rabin) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/

Washington, April 30, 1968.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence File, Israel 3/1/68-7/31/68. No classification marking.

The Ambassador of Israel presents his compliments to the Honorable the Secretary of State and has the honor to transmit the following communication from His Excellency the Prime Minister of Israel Levi Eshkol to His Excellency the President of the United States, Lyndon Baines Johnson:--

"Dear Mr. President:

"On receiving your letter of April 6,/2/ I gave Ambassador Barbour a full explanation of my views on both of the subjects you raised. The activities of terrorist organizations, openly encouraged by Arab Governments, present grave problems for our security. It is axiomatic that the solution does not and cannot lie in giving them free rein or impassively suffering their assaults on life, limb and property in Israel. No government could ever be expected to accept such a course. We are adopting various methods to cope with this terrorist campaign, bearing in mind the considerations which you have explained to me. We are also doing our best to secure international understanding of our dilemma and of the motives and necessities which govern our response. In the last resort our responsibility for the lives and security of our people must be overriding.

/2/See Document 134.

"In response to your message of April 6, I acted promptly to reassure Jordan in connection with Ambassador Jarring's efforts. My impression is that King Hussein is aware of our attitude on this matter, but is inhibited by Nasser from moving ahead. The fact is that Ambassador Jarring's conference proposal for meetings with our government was accepted by Israel, rejected by the U.A.R. and has not been accepted by Jordan.

"The critical state of the Jarring Mission is thus due to Cairo's attitude. We have made every reasonable attempt to promote a negotiated settlement. We offered a broad agenda for discussion. We agreed to negotiate on all the matters included in the Security Council Resolution within the framework of the establishment of a permanent peace. We stated that the boundaries are negotiable in peace talks. We accepted the procedure suggested by Ambassador Jarring in the hope that his presidency of a peace conference would give assurance to the U.A.R. and Jordan and ensure an equitable procedure as well as an agreed neutral venue. Nasser's response was to reject all these openings, to insist on our commitment to return to the June 4 situation, for which there is no international authority whatever, and to reiterate that he wished to 'implement' a Security Council resolution while rejecting its central principles--namely, peace, agreement and recognition. His public utterances as well as the views conveyed to Ambassador Jarring make it clear that he is not seeking an honorable and peaceful settlement with Israel.

"On April 23, Ambassador Jarring told Foreign Minister Eban that by 'implementation' the U.A.R. means unconditional withdrawal of Israel forces in the first place to the June 4 lines. This is the very proposal which you, Mr. President, through your official spokesman, have described as a prescription for the renewal of hostilities. Nasser's attitude is dictated by the negative principles of the Khartoum Conference: no peace, no agreement, no recognition. His policy is thus to refuse all progress towards peace, to accumulate armed strength, and to bide his time until he is in a position to renew his aggression which he unsuccessfully organized in 1967. This policy is totally opposed to that which you, Mr. President, proposed on June 19, 1967. So long as the U.A.R. policy is so sharply contrary to yours and ours, I doubt if any formulation can bridge the gap. There has to be a will for peace, and the test for such a will is readiness to negotiate.

"The question which we are now exploring is whether Jordan is willing, on its own account, to discuss a settlement with us. We are energetically seeking to clarify and promote this prospect. I do not know yet if it is a realistic one. I have myself had several talks with Palestine Arab leaders who wish Jordan to take a positive step. We are also trying every means including the good offices of Ambassador Jarring to bring about meaningful negotiations which, as Secretary Rusk wrote to Minister Eban on February 13, are the crux of our problem. Despite disappointment, it is important that Ambassador Jarring remain available in the coming weeks while efforts are under way to clarify the possibility of a Jordan-Israel negotiation. King Hussein seems to be oscillating between two pressures--that of Cairo and the terrorist movements which desire to escalate the present tension, and that of his own objective interests. He has not always acted in his own true interests, as we all learned last June.

"The central cause of the deadlock created by Cairo is Nasser's intention to launch a successful war as soon as he is ready. So long as he believes this, he will not allow any peaceful process to mature. It follows that our principal aim should be to diminish his belief in the prospect of Israel becoming weak. We come back to the fact that the balance of strength in the coming months is the critical issue. Is it not a matter for further action and concern? This issue is immediate. It is Nasser's conviction that he is in the process of overtaking Israel's armed preparedness that leads him to refuse negotiation and to work for the frustration of the Jarring Mission. As we survey the Middle Eastern scene, we cannot forget for a moment the threat to Israel's very existence which developed overnight last May and June against all the prevailing estimates at the time that Nasser would not and could not raise the tension in the area for some years.

"The matter which we discussed in your home in Texas last January has thus become very acute. When we spoke of the Phantom aircraft, you said that you would make a decision on the matter, one way or the other, during the course of 1968, in the light of developments, if necessary, even within the next few months. At the same time, you requested a review of the requirements for the training of personnel and information on the latest date on which you could make a decision to supply Israel with Phantoms and for Israel to be in a position to fly them in January 1970.

"On the broad Middle Eastern level, you told me that you were investigating Nasser's posture and situation, the Soviet role, and the French policy on the supply of 50 Mirage aircraft ordered by us.

"I hear that these three questions have now been clarified with disturbing results. Nasser has refused peace and opted for war preparations, with his eyes fixed on a growing decline in Israel's deterrent power. The Soviet Union has rejected all approaches designed to induce restraint in arms supplies to Arab states. The U.S.S.R. is certainly not promoting attitudes of peace. The French Government, to our deep regret, has made it clear that we have no reason to expect delivery of the Mirage aircraft. Moreover, they have lately decided to supply Iraq with 50 Mirage aircraft. In these circumstances, Nasser's policy of refusing peace and preparing for a new round of war derives a certain rationality from the concrete prospect of a changing balance in air strength. The postponement of a United States decision on the Phantoms now becomes very grave. The decision is vital on logistic grounds, but it is even more urgent for political and psychological reasons which affect the immediate prospect of a peaceful accommodation.

"May I submit, Mr. President, that it is vital your decision be made now. May I urge that the 50 Phantoms be supplied from the middle of 1969, and not from the beginning of 1970, in batches of 8 to 10 a month and not of 4 to 5 a month. Training arrangements should be replanned accordingly. We wish to avoid another war just as ardently as we wanted and tried to avoid the last one. If we are to succeed, our deterrents must be credible, and if deterrence fails, our strength must be adequate. An American decision of this kind, far from disrupting any attempts at peacemaking, would by demonstrating the futility of further war, give the peace effort the stimulus which it is now objectively lacking. I do not believe that we shall get peace unless we move to foreclose the other alternatives.

"Mr. President, I write to you on the eve of Israel's 20th anniversary. Israel came into being against the background of the destruction of a third of our people at the hands of the Nazis. In the twenty years of its existence, it had to fight three wars for its survival. Throughout this period only the maintenance of the minimum arms balance has saved it from destruction. I appeal to you on behalf of my people to grant us the weapons necessary to prevent further war and to encourage the process towards peace which though it tarries will-with God's help-surely come.

"In conclusion, Mr. President, may I send you my fervent wishes for the success of your statesmanlike effort to bring an honorable peace to Southeast Asia and to the world. History will salute your efforts and bless your toil."

"Yours sincerely,

Levi Eshkol

Prime Minister"

"Jerusalem

30 April 1968"

The Ambassador of Israel avails himself of this opportunity of renewing to the Honorable the Secretary of State the assurances of his highest consideration.

Y.R.

158. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Washington, May 1, 1968.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. IX, Cables and Memos, 3/68-5/68. Secret; Nodis.

PARTICIPANTS
Israeli Ambassador Rabin
Mr. Ephraim Evron
Mr. Walt Rostow
Mr. John Foster

Ambassador Rabin called on Mr. Rostow to deliver a copy of a letter from Prime Minister Eshkol to the President./2/ He had delivered the letter to the State Department earlier.

/2/See Document 157.

The Ambassador stated that since the June War, the USSR has almost completely rearmed the Arabs, and in some cases they have more and better equipment than before the war. In addition, the French have agreed to deliver Mirages to Iraq. Not only have the French refused to deliver previously promised Mirages to Israel, but Israel has received nothing from other sources. Logic does not govern in the Near East--even in Israel--and war could break out at any time. Therefore, Israel needs an immediate decision on Phantoms.

Mr. Rostow said that he had already read the letter. Because an agreement between Israel and Jordan appears to be one of the few hopes for peace, we are puzzled by Israeli activities, especially in Jerusalem. They can only make it harder for Hussein to conclude a separate peace. The President is very concerned about the long run prospects for Israel if peace proves impossible.

Ambassador Rabin said that Israel must be in a position to defend itself. In January it was agreed that the Arabs would be able to resume hostilities in eighteen months, so even the proposed Phantom delivery schedule would have the first aircraft arriving six months too late. Mr. Rostow corrected the ambassador, saying that it was agreed that the Arabs might be in such a position in eighteen months.

The Ambassador continued that Israel is doing its best to make it possible for Hussein to negotiate, but that he was unable to resist pressure from Nasser. He could say with assurance that Israel's Jerusalem parade had not affected Hussein's ability to negotiate. When Mr. Rostow said it affected the political atmosphere Rabin said that the strengthening of Prime Minister Talhouni in the recent cabinet shuffle was far more significant in limiting Hussein's freedom of action.

The Ambassador returned to his main point: As the Arabs see Israel growing weaker, they become less inclined to make peace. Israel is weaker now-relative to the Arabs-than it was in June. The question, he said, is how finely a nation can cut its margin of security when its existence is at stake; "I'm sure your margin is far wider."

Mr. Rostow promised to send the letter to the President immediately.

John W. Foster

159. Telegram From the U.S. Interests Section of the Spanish Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State/1/

Cairo, May 1, 1968, 1246Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL US-USSR. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Repeated to Amman, Tel Aviv, and USUN.

2275. 1. Knowing full well Russians would be giving UAR their version Sisco/Dobrynin lunch (State 154986),/2/ I telephoned Mohamed Riad of FonOff this morning offering to brief him. Offer was accepted with alacrity. Mohamed took extensive notes of conversation.

/2/Telegram 154986 to Moscow, April 29, summarized a luncheon conversation that day between Ambassador Dobrynin and Assistant Secretary Sisco. The conversation ranged over a number of UN issues and focused on the Jarring Mission. Dobrynin indicated that the UAR continued to tell the Soviet Union that the principal difficulty in getting peace talks started was Israeli unwillingness to agree to implementation of Resolution 242. (Ibid.)

2. At conclusion of conversation I said I wanted to say a few words on my own and could assure Mohamed that I was entirely uninstructed in the premises. I viewed events of the last few weeks with increasing concern. UAR seemed to be walking trance-like down ever diminishing corridor of labyrinth from which there seemed no practical exit. I was frankly fed up with stale slogans, accusations that my government was practicing deceit and UAR tendency hide behind sterile phraseology. If this was true in case of myself, who was personally committed to improvement of US-UAR relations, Mohamed could imagine effect on others in USG who did not feel so personally involved. I would not be at all surprised, I continued, if Jarring were getting equally fed up with GUAR attitude and tactics.

3. I had been extensively briefed by McCloy on his conversation with President Nasser. I had noted with interest Nasser's statements which envisaged a process whereby various instruments respecting cessation of belligerency, withdrawal, etc., were arrived at and then put in escrow until whole package was ready for simultaneous implementation. Perhaps this did not represent any basic change in UAR position but it did have some refreshing nuances and implicit recognition that some kind of negotiating process was essential. Mohamed referred to FonMin's three proposals re implementation of resolution after Israel had agreed to implement. I said this was all very well but it was negative, stale and sterile. It seemed to me that if someone in GUAR could say to Jarring what Nasser had said to McCloy, it was just possible Jarring would have some new elements to work with. I recalled that in absence any real progress, it quite likely Swedish Government would be inclined ask UNSYG release Jarring return to his normal diplomatic duties.

4. Mohamed undertook to convey foregoing to his Minister.

5. Mohamed said Nasser had highest regard for McCloy and had thoroughly chewed out both FonOff and Fawzi's office for almost letting his visit to Cairo fall between stools.

Bergus

160. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan/1/

Washington, May 1, 1968, 2359Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 ARAB-ISR/SANDSTORM. Secret; Nodis; Sandstorm. Drafted and approved by Eugene Rostow. Repeated to Tel Aviv, London, and USUN.

156687. For Ambassador. In a private meeting, Ambassador Rabin told Under Secretary Rostow that he hoped to have something tangible to report about private talks with Hussein within a week. Thus far the contacts have been preliminary. FYI. Rostow had suggested to Evron several weeks ago that we thought the time might be approaching for Israel to make secret contact with Hussein. In view of reports from Amman of Jordanian interest in such talks, and indications that there was motion on that front, we had been carefully studying your telegrams on the subject, and considering various contingencies. We prefer to wait until asked before offering our good offices. End FYI.

Rabin also gave Israeli evaluation of recent Cabinet changes in Jordan [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. In sum, Israelis believe King sought to dismiss Talhouni, who refused to resign. Cabinet changes stem from Hussein's backing down before Talhouni threat. GOI reads changes as replacement of key officials loyal to King by men primarily connected with Talhouni.

Rusk

161. Letter From President Nasser to President Johnson/1/

Cairo, May 1, 1968.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence File, United Arab Republic-Presidential Correspondence. No classification marking. The letter was sent through the UAR Interests Section of the Indian Embassy in Washington. According to telegram 2280 from Cairo, May 2, the text of the letter was sent by Nasser to all chiefs of state represented on the UN Security Council. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL UAR-US)

Dear Mr. President:

I have the honour to convey to you my deep appreciation for the position you have taken by supporting the Resolution of the Security Council on April 27, 1968,/2/ which called upon Israel to refrain from holding the Military Parade which it intended to hold on May 2, 1968.

/2/On April 27 the Security Council discussed a letter from the Permanent Representative of Jordan protesting the proposed Israeli parade through East Jerusalem. A resolution proposed by the Delegations of India, Pakistan, and Senegal, which called upon Israel to refrain from holding the military parade scheduled for May 2, was adopted unanimously. (UN doc. S/PV.1417)

I have no doubt that your position was based on your disapproval of the actions taken by Israel in the City of Jerusalem and its refusal to comply with the Resolution adopted by the General Assembly at its special session on July 4, 1967/3/ and upon your conviction that such an action by Israel is an illegal act. This illegal act on the part of Israel has its adverse effects on the efforts of the Special Representative of the Secretary General aiming at the realization of the peaceful settlement of the serious crisis in the Middle East which resulted from the Israeli aggression against Arab countries and the people of Palestine on June 5, 1967.

/3/Reference is to Resolution 2253 (ES-V) in which the UN General Assembly registered its disapproval of measures taken by Israel affecting the status of Jerusalem. (UN doc. A/RES/2253 (ES-V))

Israel's defiance of this Resolution which you have supported and which was adopted unanimously by the Security Council, and Israel's declaration of its intention not to implement that Resolution is a grave matter which seriously affects the prestige of the United Nations and its effectiveness, and in fact its future as an international organization set up for the maintenance of peace and justice. Israel's persistence in its defiance of the resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly underlines its insistence on pursuing the policy of force and the imposition of the fait accompli resulting from aggression to realize territorial expansion and perpetuate the disregard of the rights of the people of Palestine.

I would urge you, Mr. President, to exert all efforts to compel Israel to respect the resolutions of the United Nations, the organization which we all strive to strengthen, and thus insure the preservation of its prestige and the increase of its effectiveness and at the same time contribute to checking any further deterioration of the situation in the Holy City and the Middle East./4/

/4/Rostow passed this letter to President Johnson on May 2 under cover of a note in which he observed: "It gives us an opening for a response at a critical moment." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence File, United Arab Republic-Presidential Correspondence)

May I take this opportunity to renew to you, Mr. President, the assurances of my very high consideration.

Gamal Abdel Nasser/5/

/5/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

162. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Washington, May 2, 1968.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret. Drafted by Davies on May 6 and approved in S on May 7.

SUBJECT
Letter from President Nasser on Jerusalem Problem

PARTICIPANTS
The Secretary
Dr. Ashraf Abdel Latif Ghorbal, Minister, United Arab Republic Interests Section
Rodger P. Davies, Deputy Assistant Secretary, NEA

Dr. Ghorbal said he had been instructed to deliver a letter from President Nasser to President Johnson either to the President or the Secretary as expeditiously as possible. (A copy of the letter dated May 1 is enclosed.)/2/ In response to the Secretary's questions, Dr. Ghorbal said he was not certain whether the text would be published and that he had no instructions other than to deliver the letter. Mr. Davies said we understood from Mr. Bergus that letters from President Nasser to the heads of government represented on the Security Council would be published the following day.

/2/Document 161.

Dr. Ghorbal asked permission to make a few comments on the Arab-Israel situation. The ten months since the war and the five months during which Ambassador Jarring sought solution represented a long and agonizing period for peoples whose lands were under harsh occupation. The United States had a great interest in peace in the area and Arab governments looked to it to exert its influence to force Israel to accept and implement the U.K. resolution.

The Secretary commented that invariably other governments felt we had greater influence in third capitals than we actually had. It puzzled him that when governments could discount U.S. influence in their own capitals they ascribed such power to the U.S. in other capitals. It would be refreshing if for a change a government would say "What should we do in the U.S. view?"

Dr. Ghorbal said the Secretary was deeply mistaken if he felt the U.S. lacked influence in Cairo. Despite the lack of diplomatic relations, words and actions of the U.S. were taken most seriously. He noted that in the days immediately following passage of the U.K. resolution his government had taken the position that Israeli withdrawal from all occupied territories was a prerequisite to further action. The fact that his government changed its position to view the package as a whole could be attributed to U.S. efforts in Cairo and Washington.

The Secretary asked whether the U.A.R. was cooperating fully with Ambassador Jarring and had accepted his proposals.

Dr. Ghorbal said that he believed he could answer affirmatively. The U.A.R.G. had suggested three possible venues for discussions under Ambassador Jarring's auspices: the Security Council, discussions in New York with Ambassador Jarring, or specific proposals for implementation by Jarring with the various governments.

The Secretary assured Dr. Ghorbal that President Nasser's letter would be transmitted immediately to the President and would be duly considered.

163. Action Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, May 2, 1968.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence File, Israel 3/1/68-7/31/68. Secret; Nodis.

SUBJECT
Letter from Eshkol/2/ and Some Personal Thoughts

/2/See Document 157.

Ambassador Rabin has just delivered to me the attached letter from Prime Minister Eshkol. He supplemented it with a strong pitch for making our decision on Phantoms now. State and Defense will have to staff this carefully since it reopens the whole Phantom decision.

Secretary Rusk asked that he meet with you before a Phantom decision is made. However, I promised to pass this to you immediately and wish to add some purely personal views.

Eshkol's letter replies to yours of April 6./3/ In brief, he argues that Israel has "made every reasonable attempt" to facilitate a political settlement (most of us would not agree) and that the UAR is the main obstacle (true). He says that Israel is investigating fully the chance for a bilateral settlement with Hussein, but he does not know yet whether this is realistic. (In fact, Rabin was pessimistic.) Finally, he argues that Nasser will turn to political settlement only when he is convinced that he has absolutely no hope of a military victory. He urges that we begin delivery of the Phantoms in mid-1969 at the rate of 8-10 a month.

/3/ See Document 134.

I agree with Eshkol and Rabin that Israel's security margin is thin. Our intelligence people are probably right in estimating that Israel could handle any Arab threat at least through 1969. But with the French refusing to deliver Mirages and literally no other suitable source of supply left but us, I can understand why Eshkol is worried about seeing our decision held up when delivery is still a year off at best.

Moreover, he faces real political pressures in his Cabinet to exert maximum pressure on us--a point Eppie made yesterday when I called, at your instruction, and told him pressure on the President was most unwise.

I also agree that Nasser no longer seems inclined to reach a political settlement. Hussein (and McCloy) say Nasser's internal base is too shaky to permit it. Some think he might have moved if the Israelis had been more forthcoming with Jarring in January; but we'll never know whether our not pushing them harder then lost a major opportunity. (I doubt this because I have come to the reluctant conclusion that Nasser is constitutionally incapable of settling down to peace.)

This raises two questions:

--whether we should now do all in our power to bring about an Israel-Jordan settlement--the next possibility;

--and whether our aircraft decision could play a role.

Although he asked not to have his name associated with it, Evron has hinted twice to Hal Saunders and me that if we strengthened Israel (with Phantoms) Eshkol might be able to stick his neck out farther in reaching toward a political settlement with Hussein.

Theoretically, it might be possible to use the Phantoms to bargain for enough of a marginal shift in Israel's position to improve chances for a settlement with Hussein. We could not expect Israel to give up anything major, and we could not guarantee success. But it is at least worth considering whether any US move would help.

Some of us believe that it would improve chances for a settlement with Hussein if Israel would:

--commit itself via a Cabinet decision to withdraw from most of the West Bank in the context of a Jordanian settlement and permit Hussein a civil as well as religious role in Jerusalem (Eban unhelpfully told Jarring Jerusalem is not negotiable; although there is some reason to believe that Israel might, in the end, be more flexible);

--let Hussein know of this decision;

--back off from its insistence on direct open negotiations and a formal peace treaty, at least at the beginning of negotiation.

I have been trying for several weeks to get State at least to judge whether these or any other such steps are worth our pressing on Israel. Nick Katzenbach is completing a review this Friday. So far, the State Department seems so divided that no concrete recommendation seems likely to emerge. Yet almost everyone agrees that positions are hardening and another round of fighting--perhaps with Soviet involvement--seems the most likely outcome.

I must also report that some responsible people feel it would be a major mistake to decide now to sell Phantoms. They point out that the Arab-Israeli military balance is no less favorable for Israel than it was last June. They also point out that Soviet arms shipments have leveled off and that our Phantom decision would risk pushing the Soviets into additional shipments and ruin our best chance of getting a grip on the arms race. (You will have a paper from General Wheeler tomorrow and one from us.)

It will take State and Defense some days to review again all elements in the Phantom decision. I feel strongly, however, that we are approaching-if we have not already passed-a critical period in realizing our hopes for a political settlement.

You may wish, therefore, to consider a special meeting to go over this whole situation and, in particular, to hear argument on three points:

--should we press Israel to make a maximum try for a settlement with Hussein?

--should we relate the Phantoms to such an effort, as Evron suggests?

--if so, should we send a special emissary to Eshkol to put the proposition?

Walt

Set up a meeting
No
Call me/4/

/4/None of the options is checked.

164. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler) to President Johnson/1/

CM-3275-68

Washington, May 3, 1968.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. IX, Cables and Memos, 3/68-5/68. Top Secret. A copy was sent to Secretary McNamara. Rostow forwarded the memorandum to the President on May 3 under cover of a memorandum in which he noted that "the JCS remains relatively complacent about the balance even after taking into account the French decision on the Mirages for Israel." (Ibid.)

SUBJECT
Israeli/Arab Military Balance

1. In response to the query posed by Walt Rostow, I am providing you my assessment of the relative military balance between Israeli and Arab forces now and 12 to 18 months hence.

2. At Enclosure A/2/ is a summary of present and projected Israeli and Arab equipment inventories. Except for aircraft, the Israelis probably have as much equipment now as at the beginning of the June war. The Soviets have not delivered fighter aircraft to the UAR since September or October of last year which places Egypt about 65 fighters short of the pre-war level. Deliveries to Syria and Iraq have increased those countries' inventories above the pre-war level. Soviet arms shipments to the area are now continuing at about the pre-war level and no new-type materiel is known to have been delivered. Including total deliveries to date, the Arabs are at about 75% of the pre-war level. Eighteen months from now, Israel will have an aircraft inventory 15% to 20% above pre-war levels while the Arab inventory will remain essentially at its pre-war strength; however, a greater disparity in high performance aircraft numbers to the detriment of Israel will develop. Ground equipment inventories on both sides will remain at approximately pre-war levels. Israel's relative naval capability will have improved due to the addition of guided missile patrol boats.

/2/Not printed.

3. Our previous estimates on the Arab-Israeli balance have accounted for not only equipment levels, but the qualitative superiority of Israeli forces in such areas as training, intelligence, logistics, motivation and morale, and leadership. In these areas, the Israeli forces are still far superior to the Arabs and will remain so in the months ahead. In addition, the territory the Israelis control places them in better defensive position than they previously occupied, and they now have more combat-seasoned personnel. The Arabs do not currently possess the capability effectively to operate or maintain Soviet equipment. The Soviets, through their training and advisory efforts, (see Enclosure B)/3/ are attempting to improve the situation but face many drawbacks such as educational deficiencies and poor morale. The Soviets believe that at the present rate of progress, it will take the UAR at least until the Spring of 1969 to achieve any significant degree of combat readiness. No major qualitative improvements in Syrian capabilities are expected over the next 18 months.

/3/ Enclosure B, not printed, is a 1-page assessment of "Soviet Training Assistance to the Arab Bloc."

4. While we note increased Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean, it is our conclusion that the Soviets wish to avoid any direct involvement which could lead to a widening of a resumed Arab-Israeli conflict or confrontation with the United States. In this connection, there is still no Soviet air in support of their Mediterranean naval forces. A miscalculation on their part cannot be discounted, but we believe that Soviet efforts would be limited to materiel and advisory assistance such as we have seen in the past. In February we exchanged information on the Middle East situation with the Israeli Director of Intelligence. While there were several differences, we were in general agreement on our assessments of Arab capabilities and Soviet activity in the area. We plan to continue this intelligence interchange and any significant new developments will serve as basis for a joint reassessment of the Israeli position.

5. A significant factor in Israel's growing imbalance of high performance aircraft, mentioned above, continues to be delivery of 50 French Mirage V's. Although France is continuing in effect an embargo on these aircraft, there are indications that there is a fair chance that Israel will eventually get delivery. The French have now agreed to sell 54 Mirages to Iraq; however, the delivery of these aircraft, not scheduled to begin until late 1969 or early 1970, would not affect the relative balance in the period under discussion. Non-delivery of Mirage aircraft to Israel handicaps Israel's air-to-air capability now and in the future as discussed below.

6. At Enclosure C/4/ is a comparison of the current and projected high performance aircraft (MACH 2) capabilities of Israel and those Arab states likely to participate in a resumption of hostilities. This disparity in high performance aircraft inventories is the principal cause of Israel's concern. The comparison shows that the inventory of these aircraft for the contiguous Arab states will increase over the next 18 months by close to 70% (230 to 390) while the Israeli capability of 55 Mirage IIIs remains relatively constant. Thus, Israel would be handicapped in the battle for air superiority unless early bombing attacks on Arab airfields were exceptionally successful. Arab experience last June is not likely to allow the Israelis the degree of success in destroying aircraft on the ground that they enjoyed at that time. If Algeria's capability of 29 aircraft by the end of the estimate period is added to the Arab total, numerically, Israel would face a potentially unfavorable ratio of about 8 to 1. This raw ratio must be adjusted by the aircraft ready status, 50% to 70% for the Arabs versus 80% to 85% for the Israelis, and the qualitative factors such as skill, leadership, and command and control mentioned above. Delivery of the French Mirages to Israel would reduce the unfavorable raw ratio to 4 to 1 with further balance being approached through use of the same adjustment factors.

/4/Not printed. Harold Saunders also prepared an assessment of "The Arab-Israeli Air Balance" on May 3. His conclusions closely paralleled those put forward in Wheeler's memorandum, although he put the projected ratio between Arab and Israeli high performance aircraft by mid-1969 at 3 to 1. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. IX, Cables and Memos, 3/68-5/68)

7. Considering all these factors, it is my judgment that Israel currently, and probably for the next 18 months, has the capability to defend itself effectively against the Arab forces. This judgment is based on an estimate that the outlook for significant overall improvement in Arab military capabilities, despite Soviet assistance, is only poor to fair. The most imprecise element in this judgment is the relative high performance air strength, hinging in part on actions by the French. Even here, the time at which an imbalance would become critical, in the event of a continued French embargo, allows us to continue to withhold a decision on additional aircraft sales to Israel until late this year. A decision can be made as late as 31 December 1968 and delivery of F-4E aircraft started in January 1970 at the rate of approximately 4 per month from production presently scheduled for the USAF. This would get the F-4E aircraft in the hands of the Israelis at approximately the same time Iraq would receive Mirage aircraft. Necessary training could be commenced as late as 1 January 1969 in order that Israel would have a capability to maintain and operate the aircraft upon delivery.

8. I consider that we should keep the matter of numbers of high performance aircraft in Arab inventories under continuing review. Should the USSR or other sources provide additional high performance combat aircraft to the radical Arab states during the next 6 to 12 months, should deliveries of such aircraft be expedited, or should the French definitely back out of their agreement to provide 50 Mirages to Israel, the relatively favorable forecast set forth above would be invalid.

Earle G. Wheeler

165. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State/1/

Tel Aviv, May 3, 1968, 1202Z.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. IX, Cables and Memos, 3/68-5/68. Secret. Repeated to USUN and the Mission in Geneva.

3562. Ref: State 154625./2/

/2/Document 155.

1. In meeting with FonMin Eban on May 2 I took occasion stress importance US attaches to NPT as indicated by Secretary's message to him of April 29, and urged that GOI give full support toward endorsement of treaty in GA and that Israel announce its preparedness to sign treaty.

2. Among others, I used argument that this problem transcends other issues that Israel has everything to gain in being forthright in supporting treaty and nothing to lose by doing so. Adverting to position advanced by some responsible Israelis that uncertainty as to Israel's intentions in a nuclear field constitute a deterrent to the Arabs and that consequently Israel's interests dictate that it be one of the last and not one of the first to sign, I said this seemed entirely fallacious argument to me. It inconceivable that Israel with its history would ever contemplate using a nuclear bomb and that consequently the deterrent of uncertainty was greatly diminished. On the contrary the risks of uncertainty are high and to achieve Arab renunciation of the nuclear threat the best tactic would be for Israel to be the first to endorse and sign the treaty. In any event if such tactic did not lead to Arab response the favorable political effect for Israel in the councils of the world would be very great.

3. Eban acknowledged importance of the matter and his appreciation that Secretary's message confirmed our determination to do everything we can to obtain support. He did not take issue with the US position. On contrary at end of somewhat lengthy conversation he expressed agreement that Israel should support the treaty and should make known that support at an early stage of the GA debate. Whether he can convince his Cabinet colleagues to approve such a course is more problematical.

Barbour

166. Action Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, May 4, 1968, 1:30 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Jordan, Vol. V, Memos, 3/68-1/69. Confidential. A handwritten note indicates that the memorandum was received at 2:05 p.m.

Mr. President:

The Jarring mission is running out of steam.

We have two choices: (1) We can make a last-minute effort to get negotiations going under Jarring; or (2) we can wait and face the problem of what to do when he resigns after he has submitted his final report. Doing anything significant either now or later will require some sort of heart-to-heart talk with Israel.

I believe that the situation has now reached a stage where no one but you should decide our course. Doing nothing now may well be a decision to let the Jarring mission die.

Unless you are confident that we are on the right course, I recommend a special meeting soon to hear argument on what our course should be.

Walt

Set up a meeting
No

Call me/2/

/2/None of the options is checked, but an attached note, dated May 7, indicates that the President instructed that a meeting be set up to consider the problem.

167. Telegram From the U.S. Interests Section of the Spanish Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State/1/

Cairo, May 6, 1968, 0701Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL UAR-US. Secret; Priority; Exdis.

2321. Following from Anderson:/2/

/2/Robert Anderson visited Cairo in the course of a private business trip to the Middle East. He was briefed in Washington on the progress of the Jarring Mission and was asked to stress to Nasser U.S. efforts to facilitate the success of the mission. (Telegram 157034 to Cairo, May 2; ibid., TRV ANDERSON ROBERT B) Anderson also met in Cairo on May 4 with Foreign Minister Mahmoud Riad; a report of that meeting was transmitted to the Department in telegram 2320 from Cairo, May 6. (Ibid., POL 27 ARAB-ISR)

1. I met this morning (May 5) with President Nasser for more than an hour and a half. He made the following points.

2. We must very clearly understand that he has a severe internal problem. He and his Cabinet are completely opposed to war. He does have elements in the armed forces who would welcome a return of fighting because of the humiliation of the June war and because they now have better training and "technical help." He does not agree and has told his officers in a recent meeting that he would not be willing to risk war again and felt that we should make every effort to achieve peace. It is clear, however, that he must give some lip service to the attitude of his soldiers.

3. He also said that there were "other elements" in the country who would welcome a return of hostilities and that we must understand that he had to deal with these elements in his own way.

4. He said the restoration of diplomatic relations with the U.S. was, from his point, desirable but it ran contrary at this moment to public opinion until there was at least some signal from our side that we wanted to implement the Security Council resolution and would not continue to talk in such terms as "in the context of" or other terms which he described as vague and as supporting the Israeli view. He said "I am not asking arms nor aid. I am simply asking a clear unequivocal statement that the U.S. supports the resolution and the propositions in President Johnson's statement."

5. He discussed the Jarring formula but was undoubtedly not entirely familiar with its wording because he asked me twice to lend him a copy and spent several minutes reading it carefully and finally said "There is nothing in this formula that I can object to." He also stated, however, that he would not want to oppose amendments offered by Jordan if they were insisted upon. Again, he regards statements by the U.S. as being equivocal and of trying to unilaterally define the meaning of the November resolution of the Security Council in a manner consistent with Israeli ambitions.

6. He stated that he would "plan to see" Jarring on his return to Cairo on the 10th and that he would discuss tonight with his Cabinet the acceptance of the Jarring formula. Nasser said "I am not going to quibble about words in the Jarring formula if both sides will approach it in good faith. However, I must make it abundantly clear that neither I nor any other Arab leader could possibly have direct talks with the Israelis in New York, although they were perfectly willing to work through Jarring."

7. He asked me if I thought my country was prepared to have a constant state of tension in the Near East simply because the Israelis demanded directed negotiations.

8. I replied by saying that it was not in my power to express my country's policy and certainly not to express an opinion about the position of the Israelis.

9. Nasser reiterated the same points made by Riad as to territory and stated his willingness to open the Canal to Israeli goods and finally to Israeli ships but by stages.

10. He spoke for several minutes on the unrest and frustrations of the youth of the country, not only here but elsewhere, and [stated?] that for the first time in his administration internal problems had to dictate a substantial part of his policies.

11. He also stated that he wanted me to make very clear that his country "was not going Communist." He said "If I am gone, the probable result will be either a new war with Israel or a complete unwillingness to make peace on any terms." Both the President and Riad emphasized their concern about their growing economic dependence on the Soviets and Riad stated "We have sold our cotton so far in the future that I don't know how we will meet all our obligations." The President emphasized that he would welcome any attitude on our part that would give him an excuse to turn away from the Soviets, although he said "I am not asking you for military equipment." He informed me that Ali Sabri had left his government and he knew that Ali Sabri had been regarded as a Communist but he said "For your information, even he deplores the involvements which are forced upon us by your attitude with the Eastern bloc because our natural friends are the West."

12. We talked considerably about commercial activities and he stated he had told his Cabinet before and would mention it again that there must be much greater emphasis on private enterprise in this country. Our talks went to petroleum, fertilizer, land reclamation, the resumption of the tourist trade and a host of other similar subjects indicating his great concern with Egypt's economic condition.

13. He has gained weight since I saw him last, has restored his sense of humor and appears much more relaxed.

14. He urgently said that in the absence of any other more formal communications between our countries he hoped that I would come frequently and asked if I couldn't stay a few days to continue our talks. I told him I was leaving tomorrow for London./3/

/3/Rostow sent a copy of this telegram to President Johnson on May 7 under a covering note in which he noted that it showed Nasser at his most conciliatory. He also sent the President a copy of the cable reporting Anderson's conversation with Riad (Document 168) with a covering note in which he observed that the conversation represented "the first gleam of hope we've seen in the Middle East." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Arab Republic, Vol. VI, Memos, 8/67-7/68)

Bergus

168. Telegram From the U.S. Interests Section of the Spanish Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State/1/

Cairo, May 8, 1968, 1325Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Exdis.

2353. 1. Mohamed Riad called me to FonOff today to make following presentation on behalf his Minister.

2. FonMin has received telegram from El Kony reporting conversation at social gathering in New York between Ambassador Battle and El Kony on or about May 6.

3. El Kony reported Battle had made eleven points:

A. He recalled US commitment to Israel re Aqaba in 1957 which Egypt had accepted but later violated. This limited US role in Middle East crisis.

B. There had been understanding since submission of SC Nov 22 Resolution that it implied sort of negots between Arabs and Israelis at some stage and in some form under Jarring auspices. Therefore Israel's insistence on direct negots was wrong and UAR's insistence on no negots also wrong.

C. He does not understand UAR position exactly since it obscure. Israel position also obscure.

D. SC res is based on fact that it one entity but Arabs insist only on withdrawal.

E. Solution Jerusalem problem very difficult. US recognizes neither Jordan sovereignty nor Israel annexation. It must have special status.

F. Arabs accept many important concessions only after the opportune time which in fact affects those concessions.

G. Question secure and recognized boundaries would be clarified when negots start between two parties.

H. Battle showed interest and concern in demilitarized zones and rectification of frontiers between Jordan and Israel.

I. Declarations by Arab leaders now do not show they desire a peaceful solution.

J. US position is to support what Arabs and Israelis accept.

K. If SC seized again of question it will confine itself to adoption of res similar to that of Nov 22.

4. Mohamed said FonMin had read this account and wanted me be informed he very surprised at Battle's position. Reason for his surprise and astonishment was that he believed we had already crossed period of generalities and reached period of defined positions. FonMin had heard exactly what Battle was saying now six months ago when situation still fluid and before adoption SC resolution.

5. Battle said GUAR position obscure and he didn't understand it. If such was case, why didn't he ask Bergus ask FonOff for clarification? If there any obscurity, GUAR not responsible for it.

6. FonMin regretted even more what Battle said on point D above. Battle must know UAR position on that point. Does this mean Ass't Sec'y NEA does not read all records our conversations in Cairo in which we have consistently told Bergus that UAR accepts resolution as whole and as one entity? FonMin says this raises fundamental question as to how GUAR could cooperate with USG. FonMin would like ask Battle through Bergus if USG being fair or just? Would actions of this kind inspire confidence?

7. Mohamed then said that of course we have something in mind. At this point he read from lengthy memorandum submitted by Ashraf Ghorbal.

8. Memorandum states that Tekoah met Goldberg March 18. Tekoah reported that Eban met Jarring March 8. Jarring said Jordan refused his formula in its present form but might accept it if it indicated readiness parties accept and implement resolution. Eban said to Jarring that aim of UAR was withdrawal without peace, negots, agreement, or navigation. Eban quoted Jarring as saying that was exactly UAR position. Eban suggested two alternatives: A) acceptance of Jarring formula in its present form with indication Israel would accept if Egypt accepted; or B) "to seek agreement re its implementation and accordingly come to conference."

9. Memorandum continues that Goldberg told Washington of foregoing and Washington sent report to "all of its Missions including Jordan." On March 20 Symmes met Rifai and told him of Tekoah-Goldberg conversation. On same day Jarring arrived Jordan and spoke to Rifai who indicated Jordan did not accept his formula. Jarring did not refer to any alternative by Israel.

10. Memorandum continues that Symmes then informed Washington as Dept suspected that Jarring had not conveyed Eban's suggestions for one reason or another. Dept sought clarification through two channels: A) Bunche who stated Jarring had reported he had never heard this language; B) Israel which indicated Eban did not really submit any suggestions or alternatives but was thinking out loud.

11. Mohamed said FonMin's conclusion was that Tekoah gives info which USG distributes to all its missions. It is wrong information and US reps under false impressions.

12. Mohamed then returned to Ghorbal memorandum to report that Israelis told Barbour March 10 that Jarring had told them March 7 that Egyptians did not accept his formula and insisted on withdrawal as preceding anything else. Eban then met Barbour March 16 and said Egyptians trying by all means affect withdrawal without any conditions and then to open Canal for all ships except Israel. Eban said Washington had made Israelis believe UAR's position was more tolerant than reality.

13. Memorandum continues that in discussion March 15 Rifai told Symmes: A) Jarring had stated that he had not conveyed to Israel any negative position as set forth by UAR FonMin; B) "Cairo stressing not only implementation but also that Israel must accept putting resolution into action and want withdrawal start before anything else." (End of memorandum.)

14. Mohamed said UAR had spoken to Amman re para 13. Rifai believes there contradiction between points A) and B). Rifai had asked Symmes about this. Symmes expressed belief there had been misunderstanding.

15. Mohamed said all these reports make FonMin very uneasy. He returned to what Battle had said. In point B he said both Egypt and Israel were wrong. What did this mean?

16. FonMin could not understand Battle's point F. He reiterated that UAR had accepted resolution. Before acceptance, UAR had insisted on unconditional withdrawal, it now accepted withdrawal under conditions. UAR had accepted SC res which involved important concessions.

17. FonMin turned to point I. It is again regrettable because in every speech Nasser made he spoke of a peaceful solution, even in his speech to the military. Battle should be aware that whenever Nasser met important American personalities he insisted on a peaceful solution. Whenever FonMin met Jarring he spoke of peaceful solution.

18. As to Battle's point J, what does this mean when it is said at a time that the potentialities of both sides are not equal? Israel is occupying Arab land and has declared its annexation of Jerusalem and Gaza. US position as expressed by Battle can only mean supporting Israel's imposition of its demands. Arabs cannot accept cession of parts of their lands.

19. FonMin asks if in these circumstances he concludes US supporting Israel. Is he wrong? Such declarations and actions do not help in bringing peace to the area and do not help at all in establishing better relations between US and the Arabs. FonMin concluded that he reacted so strongly to this report because it quoted Battle for whom he has highest personal regard. If it had come from somebody else in USG, he would not have cared.

20. I said I greatly regretted being subjected to this confusing mass of detail. I detested arguments ad personam. They could only lead to difficulties in personal relationships which were essential to improving relations between states. I was at least glad that this time GUAR chose to complain directly to us. I was extremely tired of hearing complaints re US position and actions made to third countries. What bothered me most about foregoing was timing of this demarche.

21. At this point Mohamed said "Stop right there." He said, "I know you are going to say Jarring is coming tomorrow. I say to you again stop right there. All I will say about Jarring is that I will give you a full briefing not later than Saturday morning."

22. Comment: I think above tirade shows tendentious, neurotically suspicious, and basically pedestrian mentality of FonMin. I think we should respond to it briefly, and in general and high-flown terms, if at all./2/ It may be something like the present Vietcong offensive on the eve of the Paris talks. The only legitimate gripe Egyptians have is alleged remark that Arabs insist only on withdrawal, if such remark was really made. On March 21 I conveyed, under instruction, gratification USG that UAR no longer insisting on withdrawal as condition precedent. (State 133802/3/ and Cairo 1949./4/)

/2/Battle instructed Bergus to convey to Mahmoud Riad Battle's surprise and regret that "what had seemed to me to be extremely useful and friendly conversation with al-Kony on May 6 has been intrepreted by him as evidence of US hostility to UAR." Battle declined to address the questions raised by Riad. (Telegram 162710 to Cairo, May 11; ibid.)

/3/Telegram 133802 to Cairo, March 21, instructed Bergus to tell Mohamed Riad that the United States was grateful that the UAR had not reverted to insistence on withdrawal as a condition precedent and welcomed reassurances that the UAR was prepared to work toward a settlement based on Resolution 242. (Ibid.)

/4/Dated March 21. (Ibid.)

Bergus

169. Information Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, May 10, 1968, 11:55 a.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Arab Republic, Vol. VI, Memos, 8/67-7/68. Secret. A handwritten note indicates that the memorandum was received at 12:09 p.m.

Mr. President:

Conceivably this could be a turning point in the Middle East. The UAR has accepted talks in New York with Jarring./2/

/2/Bergus reported this development in telegram 2370 from Cairo, May 10, which was attached to Rostow's memorandum. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR)

Beyond that fact, what gives us hope is in para. 5: Cairo now interprets "implementation" as a package deal to be implemented via a time table.

We shall have a draft letter to Nasser up to you during the day.

Walt

170. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, May 10, 1968, 12:45 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence File, United Arab Republic-Presidential Correspondence. Top Secret.

SUBJECT
Reply to Nasser's Letter

You will recall Nasser's letter (Tab D)/2/ thanking you for our Security Council vote against the Israeli parade in Jerusalem and urging you to compel Israel to respect UN resolutions. He sent the same letter to other members of the Security Council, and the British and Canadians have already sent substantive replies.

/2/Document 161.

Secretary Rusk recommends (Tab B)/3/ you write back, urging that Arabs and Israelis not lose this chance for peace; reaffirming that you stand by your five principles; and offering to help if Jarring can start "serious discussion."

/3/Not attached. A copy of this May 9 memorandum from Rusk to Johnson is in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR.

These points are deliberately general to avoid their being overtaken by Jarring's latest talk in Cairo, but they are basic. Nasser's most revealing comments to Bob Anderson were:

--"I am not asking arms nor aid. I am simply asking a clear unequivocal statement that the US supports the UN resolution and the principles in President Johnson's statement."

--Nasser would welcome any attitude on our part that would give him an excuse to turn away from the Soviets.

--Nasser asked if we will accept constant Near East tension simply because Israel demands direct negotiations.

It looks now as if Jarring will move to New York and continue his talks there in hopes of getting substantive talks started. This letter encourages Egypt in a general way to participate.

The main issue has been whether to reply at all since this was a circular letter (though delivered personally to Secretary Rusk). Most of us feel that this is a ready-made opportunity--not only for making the move toward Nasser we have long thought desirable but also for restating your commitment to your five principles of last June 19. (Most Arabs feel we've moved away from them to back Israel's insistence on direct negotiations, a peace treaty and territorial gain.)

I have no illusions about winning Nasser over. However, if there is to be any hope of a political settlement, the Arabs must see some hope that we, at some point, will at least take a fair middle position between Arab and Israeli claims. This letter would not solve the problem but it would be a useful start.

You will be interested in the attached intercept (Tab C)/4/ which describes how Bob McNamara hopes to move into the Egyptian situation. He has a report from his staff saying that the Egyptians don't know how to make the most of the Aswan Dam's water and power and the Soviets aren't helping. Bob feels there may be a chance for him to move in there in the right political context, and he has obviously begun exploring.

/4/Not attached.

The letter at Tab A/5/ is for your signature if you approve. It is pretty much as Secretary Rusk sent it over, except that I have added the personal touch in the final paragraph.

/5/For text of this letter, see Document 171.

Walt

171. Telegram From the Department of State to the U.S. Interests Section of the Spanish Embassy in the United Arab Republic/1/

Washington, May 13, 1968, 2341Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted at the White House; cleared by Battle, Goldberg, Sisco, and Eugene Rostow; and approved by John P. Walsh (S/S). Repeated to USUN, Amman, and Tel Aviv.

163325. The following message for President Nasser has been received from President Johnson at the Texas White House. You should deliver it to Foreign Minister Riad in the course of your call tomorrow:

"May 13, 1968

Dear Mr. President:

I have just received and read your letter of May 1./2/

/2/Document 161.

For years we have regretted the failure of the parties to find a settlement to the Arab-Israel problem which would command general satisfaction. Now, for the first time since 1948, there is an opportunity to move toward peace. For the sake of all peoples concerned, that opportunity should be seized.

For far too long, a tragic proportion of Egypt's and Israel's national resources have been devoted to armaments for use against each other. There has been far too much reliance on force to settle problems in the Middle East--a region which cries out for economic and social development and which could organize the resources for the task.

It is time for a change, and the Security Council Resolution of November 22 states the purposes and principles which should govern it.

As you know, we have strongly supported that resolution as consistent with the statement I made on June 19, 1967. That statement and the resolution embodying its essential principles have been, and will remain, the firm basis of our policy. We believe a settlement consistent with the principles set forth in my statement and the resolution can be reached if the parties concerned can arrive at an agreement on substantive details within the terms of the resolution. To this end we have encouraged all parties to cooperate with Ambassador Jarring and believe that his mission provides the best means for reaching an agreed solution.

In this regard, I have been encouraged by the indications of your readiness to cooperate with Ambassador Jarring. When he is able to organize a serious discussion of substantive issues, it should be possible for the United States and other interested nations to use their influence in the interest of a just and durable peace in accordance with the resolution of November 22.

Success will require our most energetic personal efforts. As you know, Mr. President, I recently made the decision not to seek another term as President of the United States because I believed I could do more in this way to advance the cause of peace--in the Middle East as well as in Vietnam. But you and I know that, important as the efforts of my country may be, peace with justice will not come unless the parties to this long conflict themselves want peace badly enough to struggle for it.

With every good wish,

Sincerely, Lyndon B. Johnson"

Rusk

172. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson/1/

Washington, May 13, 1968.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. IX, Cables and Memos, 3/68-5/68. Secret.

SUBJECT
UN Security Council Consideration of Jerusalem

The UN Security Council for the past several days has been giving further consideration to the question of Jerusalem; Jordan has been pressing for a Security Council resolution that would call upon Israel to rescind measures which Israel has taken in Jerusalem over the past months which Jordan believes are prejudicial to an ultimate settlement.

Ambassador Goldberg reports that, while he has worked hard in trying to convince Jordan and other Security Council members to avoid further formal action by the Council, it will be necessary for the United States to acquiesce in a resolution if we are not to be almost totally isolated in the Security Council. Both we and Ambassador Goldberg are agreed that a Security Council proposal calling on Israel to rescind past measures would be strongly objected to by Israel and would be totally disregarded. We therefore have taken a strong stand against such a proposition. However, with prospects better that there will be discussions under Ambassador Jarring's auspices in New York on the question of an over-all settlement, we believe the Council's work should be directed towards a resolution consistent with our policy and past public pronouncements and one which would not prejudice either side's position on Jerusalem. Ambassador Goldberg made a strong statement in the Council to which the Israelis reacted favorably, stressing that the Council should not pronounce itself substantively on the Jerusalem issue in such a way as to prejudice an ultimate settlement or prejudge the final and permanent status of Jerusalem. He also stressed that the Jerusalem problem, like other aspects, should be part of the over-all agreement between the parties.

The U.K. has drafted a resolution based on the approach taken by Ambassador Goldberg in this statement, which we believe the U.S. should support./2/ Caradon, the U.K. representative, believes it may be necessary to include references to previous General Assembly resolutions and to add some specificity, in particular references to exploitation of land and legislative and administrative actions, in order to achieve agreement in the Council. While we should continue major efforts to avoid such language, we believe we could agree, if necessary, to support an appropriate preambular reference to past General Assembly resolutions as well as more specific language regarding actions in the City. References to past Assembly resolutions would avoid an explicit obligation on the part of Israel to rescind earlier measures as called for in those resolutions. Israel would have preferred no formal Security Council action, and in particular would prefer to avoid reference to the previous Assembly resolutions. While we cannot be categoric, we are inclined to feel the Israelis would not make a major issue of a U.S. vote for such a resolution, however, particularly in light of the fact that we would be totally isolated if we did not do so. We note, for example, that their attitudes regarding the present proceedings in the Security Council have been largely in tactical terms in the context of Goldberg-Tekoah talks. No major demarches have been made here.

/2/This draft is attached but not printed.

Ambassador Goldberg concurs in this memorandum.

Recommendation

That you authorize giving discretion to Ambassador Goldberg to support a resolution along the lines described above./3/

/3/President Johnson wrote in the margin next to this paragraph: "OK L."

Dean Rusk

173. Telegram From the U.S. Interests Section of the Spanish Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State/1/

Cairo, May 14, 1968, 1335Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Repeated to Amman, Tel Aviv, and USUN.

2421. 1. In meeting today with FonMin Riad, latter, after receiving President's May 13 to Nasser/2/ and oral message from Battle,/3/ made lengthy presentation re Jarring's next steps and UAR ideas re "time-table."

/2/See Document 171.

/3/Not further identified.

2. Riad picked up language in both President's and Battle's messages re UAR communication to Jarring of May 9.

3. Riad said he did not attach too much substance to another piece of paper added to Jarring Mission. Jarring's own formula already subject to three interpretations: UAR's, Israel's and Jarring's. He had given note to Jarring because Jarring said it would be helpful and because he wanted to show that UAR could play with words just as adroitly as could Israel. "Eban gives an interview to Le Monde, I can give an interview to Le Monde." If present situation continued, Jarring would move to New York and game of words would continue. El Kony would merely read Jarring telegrams from Cairo and Tekoah would doubtless pass on messages from Tel Aviv.

4. Something new must be added, said Riad. GUAR felt timetable was the answer. Riad made it clear that timetable proposal had no elements of "imposition" in it. He views it as a catalyst to get meaningful discussion going. He feels that if Jarring, or big powers, or single country, or group of countries could propose timetable for implementation of resolution, then UAR and Israel would be in position comment on it, state what is acceptable, what is not and in this way finally arrive at an agreed settlement. He thinks process of negotiating out timetable would probably take months. But end result would be "accepted settlement" and peace in the Middle East which GUAR strongly desired. While this process of establishing agreed timetable was being carried out, continued Riad, it would be natural for Jarring to advise and consult with SC members and UNSYG as well as parties. Riad made it clear that process would not succeed without fullest support from USG.

5. Riad said UAR continued maintain its position it would not negotiate in same room with Israel. "Separate rooms," he said. Nor would it sign a piece of paper with Israel. "We have learned not to trust Israel signature."

6. This is where ultimate role of SC or great power guarantee came in. Once timetable established by process of discussion and bargaining set forth above, either SC or great powers should guarantee the result.

7. I thanked FonMin for his lucid exposition which, I said, cleared up a number of questions in my mind. I would report thrust of his remarks as accurately as I could and I was certain USG would take considerable interest in them.

8. Comment: I find considerable movement in UAR position as set forth above. I think we should express interest in UAR ideas and seek clarification and enlargement. I believe this movement is emanating from Nasser and Riad personally. It is quite possible that neither Kony or Ghorbal are being kept fully up-to-date. For that reason, would hope that any further discussion of UAR "timetable" proposal be confined to Cairo for time being. Mohamed Riad leaving tomorrow for two weeks in Rome thence four weeks New York. He has made effective liaison arrangements for me at FonOff during period his absence. Moreover, I see no difficulty in my seeing FonMin again if Dept thinks would be useful.

Bergus

174. Telegram From the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State/1/

Beirut, May 15, 1968, 1647Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Amman, Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, USUN, CINCSTRIKE, and DIA.

9257. Subject: Lebanese-Israeli border tension. Ref: State 163324./2/

/2/Telegram 163324 to Beirut, May 13, reported that Lebanese Charge Farah called at the Department to express Lebanese concern over recent incidents along the Israel-Lebanon border. Farah emphasized that Lebanon was doing everything possible to prevent illegal crossings into Israel and expressed his government's concern that Israel had designs on Lebanese territory. Acting under instructions, Farah requested the United States to take steps to show disapproval of Israeli actions along the border. (Ibid.)

Summary: President Helou deeply disturbed over implications for Lebanon's future of Israeli attack on Houle May 12. Given present tension in Lebanon connected with delicate internal political situation following Parliamentary election, pressures by Lebanese radicals in support of Arab commandos, and Syrian machinations for infiltration terrorists through Lebanese territory, Helou considers situation very serious and is contemplating request for formal UNSC action against "unprovoked" Israeli attack on Houle in order gain international support for Lebanon. Helou made clear he will do everything possible to prevent terrorist infiltration through Lebanese territory. He asked for US support Lebanese position.

1. During my meeting with President Helou May 14, Helou expressed deep concern over deteriorating situation on Lebanese-Israeli borders. Very existence of Lebanon as independent state was in jeopardy as result latest Israeli military reprisal against Lebanese village of Houle. Helou claimed Israeli attack was unprovoked and there was no infiltration of Arab commandos from Lebanese territory into Israel.

2. Helou fears Israelis bent on deliberate campaign to provoke incidents on Lebanese-Israeli border in order to alter border to their advantage and possibly gain control Litani River waters. He referred to Israeli public statements after June war by MinDef Dayan (Israel has ideal borders with Arab neighbors except for Lebanon), PriMin Eshkol (re unproductive use Litani River waters), and FonMin Eban (Lebanon declared war on Israel "in good old fashioned way"). Helou stated Houle incident proof that Israel not satisfied with present Lebanese-Israeli border.

3. Helou explained that delicate political balance exists in Lebanon in wake of Parliamentary elections, and he doing everything possible to maintain national unity on political and confessional planes. Border troubles with Israel aggravate current political tension in Lebanon and allow (in an obvious reference to Syria) interested foreign powers to intrude into Lebanese internal affairs. Helou dismayed by Israeli action which he said permits Syrian radical regime "pushed by its Russian sponsors" to promote political instability in Lebanon by encouraging Arab extremist groups to pressure GOL to adopt more militant stance against Israel. He convinced Syrians will attempt dispatch commandos through Lebanese territory to (A) open another commando front with Israel, (B) create instability in Lebanon, and (C) indirectly attack Lebanon's pro-Western orientation and attempt break Lebanon away from ties to US.

4. Helou commented that border incident has already caused serious political pressures on GOL, political leaders in South Lebanon demanding GOL arm villagers in South Lebanon and there are reported demands for unrestricted passage Arab commandos through Lebanese territory. At same time, leftists and progressives taking advantage of GOL's vulnerable position and urging badly needed social reforms in South Lebanon (Beirut 9218)./3/ Helou admitted GOL's weakness in face such demands, since government does not have financial means to institute such reforms immediately; and of course he realized implication of providing arms to the population quite apart from financial aspects.

/3/In telegram 9218 from Beirut, May 14, the Embassy reported on uneasiness in the Jewish community in Lebanon over mounting tension between Israel and Lebanon. Social reforms were viewed as a means of alleviating some of the tension. (Ibid.)

5. Given serious implications situation, Helou states he determined to do everything possible as chief of state to prevent infiltration Arab terrorists and commandos across Lebanese borders.

6. Helou asked me US position concerning Israeli raids against Lebanon, I told Helou US policy opposed to any military actions which increase tension in ME, and as example US doing everything possible to restrain Israelis from retaliation along Israel-Jordan cease-fire line. I stressed GOL should continue to do everything possible to prevent use Lebanese territory by Arab commandos, even though such government action unpopular with large segment public opinion. Informed Helou per reftel that our Embassy in Tel Aviv already instructed inform GOI of serious Lebanese concern over Lebanese-Israeli border, and Israeli intentions re integrity of border. Stated we will also make clear our view to GOI that despite politically motivated statements by some GOL leaders, GOL has no interest in allowing Lebanon be used as base for terrorism against Israel, and that GOL doing everything possible to limit such activities. I told Helou we would seek reassurances from GOI that it would not be in anyone's interest to create instability and conflict along only peaceful Arab-Israeli border since June war. I mentioned PriMin Yafi's public statement in support of Palestinian terrorist organizations and stressed Israeli sensitivities to such statements. Helou assured me Yafi was misquoted but reluctantly agreed that Yafi's statement reflected temper of times.

7. Helou urged US keep close watch on Lebanese-Israeli border developments and asked that US support Lebanese position, especially if situation arises where, despite all efforts by GOL to prevent infiltration, another border incident breaks out. He also specifically asked that USG make statement citing Houle incident and opposing policy of reprisal raids as it has done in past. I responded US would closely watch border situation. However, I made clear situation could change radically if there were a series of border incidents resulting from terrorist activities launched from Lebanon. We will try exercise element of control insofar as isolated incidents are concerned such as Houle, but if situation got out of hand, US policy against Israeli retaliatory raids would have to be considered in light of increased tempo of terrorist incidents.

8. Comment: Even though Helou's view may have been presented in exaggerated form, Embassy basically supports Helou's analysis of situation. Helou made clear that he can be placed in the same dilemma as that of King Hussein concerning efforts to prevent terrorist acts when, at same time, there is strong public pressure on GOL to permit infiltration. We must recognize that Arab radical states such as Syria are exploiting commando activity to create instability in moderate Arab states of Lebanon and Jordan. It would seem neither in our interest nor in Israel's to create internal instability in these countries. Israel should, therefore, be discouraged from taking action which would force Lebanon into a militant stand permitting use of Lebanese territory [garble--by?] commandos. We [garble--also?] recommend USG urge Israel to respond affirmatively to Lebanon's request of last October for reactivation of ILMAC. (See septel re possible Lebanese approach to UNSC.)

9. If pressures mentioned by Helous continue to mount, and Israel continues disregard complex implications for [of?] Israeli retaliatory raids, political situation in Lebanon will be undermined and we would see further erosion of US position in Lebanon. We also think that USG statement citing Houle incident and expressing US opposition to such retaliatory measures would facilitate Helou's efforts to handle situation./4/

/4/The Department instructed Porter to weigh in strongly with the Lebanese Government against a resort to the Security Council concerning the border incident. The Department noted that the facts of the incident did not establish that the Israeli action was unprovoked and stressed that an appeal to the Security Council would come at a very unfortunate time with respect to the Jarring Mission. Lebanon could be assured of U.S. interest in the border situation. (Telegram 165812 to Beirut, May 17; ibid.)

Porter

175. Telegram From the U.S. Interests Section of the Spanish Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State/1/

Cairo, May 17, 1968, 1015Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Priority; Exdis.

2448. 1. With all due respect, I find our arguments against timetable concept as set forth para 3, State 165831/2/ pretty thin and unconvincing. I am certain UAR will assume, once they hear of these conversations from British, Italians and others (as hear they will), that real reason for US opposition to timetable concept is US support for Israel insistence on direct negots and peace treaty.

/2/Telegram 165831 to USUN, May 17, reported on a conversation between British officials and Under Secretaries Katzenbach and Rostow on May 16. The conversation dealt with the Jarring Mission, and Katzenbach and Rostow persuaded the British that the timetable concept favored by the UAR should be opposed. The Department viewed the concept as a "mechanistic approach," which deviated from the objective of promoting an agreed settlement between the parties, and saw the timetable concept as a device that could be exploited to substitute for negotiation and agreement. (Ibid.)

2. Think we would be well advised withhold comment on timetable concept until at least we get Jarring's views on it. It may be that Jarring himself considers it non-starter. Another possibility would be further discussions with FonMin Riad in Cairo with aim of expanding timetable concept to something more to our liking.

3. I am also troubled by reference in para 6 reftel to "Our understanding with Israel as to how we were proceeding on whole question of talks." This and other hints in other telegrams over past couple of months make me wonder if we have a secret agreement with, or have made secret commitments to, Israel which go beyond President's June 19 statement and our pledge of support for Nov 22 resolution. Would appreciate clarification on this point.

Bergus

176. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Washington, May 17, 1968, 1-3:15 p.m.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Leddy and approved in S/S. The memorandum is "Part II of V." The meeting was held in the Secretary's dining room.

SUBJECT
Middle East

PARTICIPANTS

For the United  States:

The Secretary

G--Ambassador Bohlen

EUR--John M. Leddy

For the Soviet Union:

Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov

Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin

Min. Couns. Yuri N. Tcherniakov

Kuznetsov, referring to the latest statements by the UAR and Jordan, said that the Arabs had now made forward steps toward a political solution: (1) They had agreed with the essence of the resolution of the United Nations Security Council of November 22. (2) The UAR had indicated its readiness to continue consultations in New York. And, (3) the UAR had agreed to consider the entire scope of the November 22 resolution. Therefore, the other side should not miss this opportunity. But the position of the Israelis is not constructive. And the US has demonstrated no desire to take even a quarter of a step toward resolving the problem. The US should do more to take advantage of this favorable moment. Present tensions could lead to even greater tensions.

The Secretary said that the agreement of the Israelis, the Jordanians and the UAR to have talks with Jarring was at least a step, even though small. President Johnson had reaffirmed American support for the Security Council resolution on the occasion of the recent visit of Tunisian President Bourguiba. The US will support Jarring in New York. We do not insist upon the Israeli position that Israeli-Arab talks at this point must be face-to-face. There was haggling going on between the two sides, each trying to gain. The Secretary said that the US was disappointed with Kosygin's reply to President Johnson's letter on the control of arms to the Middle East,/2/ which Kosygin had tried to condition upon Israeli withdrawal. The US feels that the Arabs must show restraint. We know that countries other than the Soviet Union are supplying arms to the Middle East, but US/Soviet agreement on this subject is probably necessary to bring this traffic under control. The job now in the Middle East is to get both sides to agree to get down to talks on the substance if progress is to be made.

/2/For President Johnson's January 20 letter, see Document 57. For Kosygin's February 27 message, see Document 58.

Kuznetsov said that he had nothing to add to the Kosygin letter on the arms question. Regarding the Jarring Mission, the Soviets wished it success and would do their best to support it. The Secretary observed that we are somewhat disappointed that Jarring had proceeded so cautiously-so far he had not talked substance, only procedure. We hope for a better result from his activities in New York.

Kuznetsov said that the Soviets had given careful thought to the Middle East. They believe that the Israelis must now take a step and that the US must do something to pressure the Israelis.

Kuznetsov then referred to the proposal by the Security Council to establish a time-table for the achievement of a solution to the Middle East problem. The Secretary said that a time-table made sense only in relation to implementing a solution which had already been agreed upon. If a time-table is simply means for establishing pre-conditions, then all the same old difficulties would arise again. Therefore, it is important for Jarring to deal with the real issues.

177. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Washington, May 17, 1968.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. X, Cables and Memos, 6/68-11/68. Secret; Exdis.

PARTICIPANTS
Ambassador Rabin
Ephraim Evron
W. W. Rostow
Harold H. Saunders

Mr. Rostow opened the meeting by giving Ambassador Rabin the President's letter to Prime Minister Eshkol,/2/ saying that Mr. George Woods had agreed to take on the job as U.S. Coordinator on the Israeli desalting project. Both Rabin and Evron seemed pleased.

/2/Dated May 10. (Ibid., Files of Harold H. Saunders, Israel-Nuclear-Dimona-Desalting, 3/1/68-10/30/68)

Rabin opened the discussion by asking Mr. Rostow what he thought about the apparent shift in the Egyptian position toward talks in New York. Mr. Rostow replied that Israel should take it seriously, probe and make every effort to turn it into something useful.

When Mr. Rostow said that is what we are doing in the Paris talks on Vietnam, Ambassador Rabin jumped right in by pointing out that we were at least probing in direct negotiations. Mr. Rostow admitted that but said that he felt strongly that "this is not the time" for the Israelis to insist on direct negotiations. He said that we had had contacts with the North Vietnamese through third parties in nineteen countries before we got to Paris. He warned the Israelis against being "too theological" in pressing for direct negotiations.

Mr. Rostow went on to say that he fully understood Israel's requirement for a serious agreement between the parties at the end of the process. The President's position has been that we were not going to repeat the "Rube Goldberg chewing gum and tape" operation of 1957. We had been with the Israelis from the time of the hotline conversations on the point that, before Israel withdrew, there should be a serious political arrangement that could allow the parties to live together in peace. We had also felt that any such agreement at this time must come from the parties to the conflict themselves. At the same time, we had not been talking about what the Israelis seem to have in mind-something akin to the Congress in Vienna in 1815 "with striped pants, a big peace treaty, and all the trimmings."

Mr. Rostow returned to the question of why Nasser had made this change in course. He recounted some of the reasons suggested by Robert Anderson's conversation with Nasser--economic difficulties, political troubles, serious concern about Soviet influence in the UAR. Mr. Rostow said he had no evidence but could not exclude the possibility that the Soviet Union, recognizing the consequences for it of another round of fighting, had told the UAR to get on with the job of political settlement.

Ambassador Rabin asked what we thought Nasser's purpose is. He said Israel must know what is at the end of the process on which they are now asked to embark. Israel insists that it lead to a contractual agreement--an agreement between the parties and signed by them.

Mr. Rostow agreed that there must be an arrangement that binds the parties. But that can be achieved in any one of a number of different ways. The important thing is to get a process started that can lead to satisfactory arrangements.

The Ambassador voiced his fear that all the UAR had in mind was for Jarring to establish some sort of "timetable" and substitute that for the contractual arrangement Israel wants. He repeated that Israel must know what is at the end of the process. Mr. Saunders said that the Arabs had a similar requirement-to be assured that there is a deal for them at the end of a negotiation. Ambassador Rabin finally agreed, as long as Mr. Saunders was not talking about specific peace terms but rather about the general principle that Israel would withdraw in the context of a peace settlement.

Mr. Rostow cautioned against Israel's insisting on agreement on procedures at the outset. He could understand Israel's legitimate desire to know where it was headed, but he could not sympathize with any request from Israel to have the Arabs "like Huck Finn prick their fingers and sign in blood before talks could begin that they would sign a big peace treaty at the end of it." The important thing is to get Nasser engaged in the process of making peace. That, in itself, could help change the political atmosphere. We have no idea where the Paris talks will take us. We are hoping that when each side engages in the process of working out a modus vivendi, the atmosphere will begin to improve.

Mr. Rostow opined that Nasser himself probably doesn't know where all this is leading him. Israel has every right to be skeptical. Nasser has many different strands in his thinking, ranging from clear realism to the sort of thinking that took him to war last June. We have always known him to be this sort of schizophrenic individual, and, we can accept a healthy Israeli skepticism. What we cannot accept is the possibility that Israel might not even risk engaging in this process.

More important, Mr. Rostow said, was to get talking with Hussein. The move to New York may be mainly designed to give Hussein a cover for talking. Both Ambassador Rabin and Mr. Evron indicated-more by what they obviously weren't saying-that Israel had every intention of pursuing this course with Hussein.

Mr. Evron said he differed somewhat from Mr. Rostow as far as the Soviet Union's possible desire for peace talks was concerned. He felt the USSR's purpose is to spin out talks in New York until after the US election. Mr. Rostow cautioned against assuming that the Soviets are that well organized or that much in control of their Mid-Eastern clients. He said that we had had a number of contests with the USSR all around the globe. While we respect them as a capable adversary, we know they make their mistakes, and no one should overrate them.

Mr. Evron replied that he saw his explanation as the only way to account for the seeming illogic and unexpectedness of the recent Egyptian move--a new way of showing movement where actually there was none. Mr. Rostow said he thought, to the contrary, that there was a certain amount of Egyptian logic in this move. Particularly, the Egyptians are nationalistic enough not to want to have to continue their heavy dependence on the USSR.

In conclusion, Mr. Rostow said we don't expect Israel to jeopardize anything of its basic position. But we do expect Israel to try with all its ability-and that is a lot-to turn this Egyptian move into something worthwhile. Both Israelis agreed that this was the course they intended to follow./3/

/3/Ambassador Barbour followed up on this conversation in a May 20 meeting with Foreign Minister Eban in which Barbour stressed the importance of moving beyond procedural discussions in New York into discussions of matters of substance. (Telegram 3782 from Tel Aviv, May 20; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR)

H.S.

178. Telegram From the Department of State to the U.S. Interests Section of the Spanish Embassy in the United Arab Republic/1/

Washington, May 21, 1968, 1549Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Day and Davies on May 20, and approved by Eugene Rostow. Repeated to USUN.

167634. Ref.: Cairo 2448./2/

/2/Document 175.

1. Since term "timetable" can mean many things to many people, it would perhaps be useful define in other terms what we consider unacceptable and why, as well as what would seem unobjectionable.

2. We are opposed to attempting to arrive at settlement by imposing terms or by applying terms in phases. Unwillingness to consider imposed solution has been central to our policy toward settlement from beginning and was enunciated in President's June 19 statement. Our view on phased settlement has also been basic to our position and is fundamental to November 22 res.

3. Re imposed solution, aside from probable unalterable Israeli opposition to procedure which ab initio requires surrender on what to Israel are matters of substance, concept of externally imposed settlement is incompatible with USG position that an active association of the parties in some form of agreement essential if peace is to endure. The USG is not "signed on" to Israeli objectives of a peace treaty arrived at through direct negotiations but in light of experience with 1957 expedients believes that to abandon principle that Arabs should accept responsibility of entering into some form of negotiation leading to agreement in favor of "imposed arrangement" would make later disavowal by Arabs of such arrangement that much easier. Although the word "negotiation" appears nowhere in the Resolution, it has seemed inherent in the situation that there must be a negotiating process of some sort.

4. Genesis of timetable idea makes clear that at least some of major proponents intend that it provide alternative to common understanding and agreement among parties. In Egyptian usage it seems to be outgrowth of "protocol of implementation," which embodied whole concept expressed by slogan "implement the resolution." Latter idea we considered to be reflective of desire avoid acceptance of responsibility for negotiation and settlement. Re relationship to phased settlement, timetable of course contains phasing idea inherently. Moreover, as it was expressed in early stages (e.g., by UAR Amb. in Moscow), it seemed explicitly to include some form of phasing. From background information previously provided, you are also aware of role of French and Soviets in pushing idea of an imposed timetable for implementation of resolution.

5. Word "timetable" itself need not mean mechanistic procedure and could represent mode of operation compatible with our position. We note Jarring has referred to "calendar" he is considering using in next phase; he may have in mind something other than imposed or phased settlement in unacceptable sense. As pointed out in State 165831,/3/ timing of steps to be taken in implementing SC resolution must obviously be part of any agreement between parties. Emphasis here is on fact that timetable would be derived through discussions involving parties and would be result of common understanding. We have not given detailed consideration to precise manner in which negotiations could be carried on, but obviously one method could involve an initial outline of sequence in which elements of settlement would be dealt with. Drawing up of outline would, of course, have substantive impact and thus would have to be done by and with parties, whatever particular method might be chosen to initiate the process. To discuss timing of steps one must also discuss nature of steps, and in this sense also timing and substance are closely related.

/3/See footnote 2, Document 175.

6. We concerned that idea of timetable could become obstacle to progress if it actually constitutes new wrapping for old Arab position or if Israelis think it does--witness role of essentially harmless term "implement." We hope therefore that there will be no attempt by parties or others to get agreement on its adoption, in abstract, as way of proceeding. This in part is reason for our determined efforts to discourage what appeared to be mushrooming support for it. In last analysis acceptability of particular "timetable" proposal can only be determined by examining proposal itself as it emerges, if it does, in process of Jarring talks.

7. Re your query about "secret agreement," there is, of course, no such agreement with or commitment to Israel. We have made no secret of the fact that, as President said last June 19, we believe that ". . . the parties to the conflict must be the parties to the peace. Sooner or later it is they who must make a settlement in the area." It is essentially this concept which underlies understanding as to how we are proceeding on question of talks. It is understanding we have made equally clear to both Arabs and Israelis.

Rusk