43. Telegram From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson in Texas/1/

Washington, January 10, 1968, 1720Z.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Jordan, Vol. IV, Memos, 5/67-2/68. Secret.

CAP 0247. Subject: PL 480 Agreement for Jordan.

Secretary Freeman, Bill Gaud and Charlie Schultze recommend you approve a $2.1 million wheat agreement for Jordan. Treasury concurs. This would cover 30,000 tons for dollars over twenty years.

This agreement will partly substitute for aid dollars. Since Jordan for the moment is receiving all the foreign exchange aid it needs, we suspended our budget support as of the final quarter of 1967. Our strategy is to combine this PL 480 deal and $3 million in aid technical assistance funds as a substitute for that last quarter of budget support to cushion the transition to no support in 1968. We plan to use the aid money for feasibility studies that will help the Jordanians use the Arab money they have to good permanent advantage.

This would be useful politically, too. It is one of the few positive things we've been able to do. The Jordanians are upset that we are ending budget support, and we are just barely scraping through on the military side. We got our response on arms out the day after Hussein had agreed to receive Soviet mission. Harry Symmes had to persuade Hussein to withdraw a letter stating that our response had come too late and to put off the Soviet visit. He succeeded, but we may still have a hard enough time responding adequately to his arms requests. A move on the economic side would help a little. Now that we have Israeli acquiescence to our blocking the Soviets in Jordan, I think we need to get back into business in every way we reasonably can. Fortunately, PL 480 is one of the few resources we can use relatively freely.

You should know that this is the first substantial agreement to be processed under the new "Symington amendment"/2/ to the aid bill which requires the President to "take into consideration" whether such aid will be diverted to military ends or enable the recipient to support unnecessary military expenditures. As you know, we have kept the Jordanian military budget within agreed limits. The percentage of total expenditures has been quite high but declining. The Jordanians are the only Arab combatants in the June war that have not purchased substantial replacements for their loses.

/2/The Symington Amendment was Section 620 (s) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1967. (P.L. 90-137; 81 Stat. 445)

We would like to get this out as quickly as possible since a Soviet economic mission is already in Jordan./3/

/3/The approve line is checked to indicate the President approved the recommendation. A handwritten note by Jim Jones reads: "Jones told Rostow." Telegram 97470 to Amman, January 11, informed the Embassy that the Texas White House had announced approval to negotiate a P.L. 480 program for Jordan. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, (US) 15 JORDAN)

44. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel/1/

Washington, January 12, 1968, 8:46 p.m.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Precht; cleared by Battle, Atherton, and Houghton, and in L in draft by Neuman; and approved by Acting Secretary Katzenbach. Repeated to Amman, Beirut, London, Cairo, Paris, Jerusalem, and USUN.

98261. Deliver to action officer Saturday morning. Ref: Tel Aviv 1980./2/

/2/In telegram 1980 from Tel Aviv, December 31, 1967, the Embassy commented, as background to the Eshkol visit, on a December 20 article in the Washington Post reporting that Eshkol had stated that a number of government departments and several hundred Israeli families would be relocated to the Arab section of East Jerusalem by the end of December. The Embassy stated that the report was oversimplified and misleading. (Ibid., POL 7 ISR)

1. Front page NYTimes today reports GOI "expropriation" 838 acres in crescent reaching from Mount Scopus to Sanhedrin sector of Israeli Jerusalem. About 225 acres privately owned by Arabs, remainder GOI property. GOI Finance Ministry said property destined for public institutions, roads, parks and 1,400 housing units, including 400 residences for Arabs who were removed from Old City. Requisition order signed by Pinhas Sapir as Acting PM. Land assigned to GOI Land Administration for lease according to need.

2. NYTimes Jan 10 reported GOI announced detailed plans for restoration of Jewish Quarter of Old City. Projected work now begun will take more than a year for completion and will include restoration of buildings, construction of urban facilities and transfer of religious institutions. About 75 Arab families remaining on site will be moved and compensated. Compensation grants of $25,000 have already been paid. Article also reported Mayor Kollek as saying master plan for city will be completed by midsummer. Plan will call for reduction in congested Old City population.

3. On urgent basis request you verify these statements and supplement them with any additional pertinent information.

4. Unless NYTimes reports are false, you should at earliest opportunity express to Foreign Minister Eban deep concern of USG over these Israeli measures, which ignore and directly conflict with often stated USG position on Jerusalem. We have repeatedly made clear that we do not recognize unilateral action affecting the status of Jerusalem and that its status must necessarily be considered in the context of all problems arising out of the recent conflict. Of particular pertinence, the President and Prime Minister privately in their Texas talks instructed the Secretary and Eban to consult on ways of advancing the cause of peace, and the Secretary plans to write Eban shortly in this connection. Israeli actions appear to undercut that assignment before it has begun. Further, Israeli actions affecting status of Jerusalem have direct bearing on chances for success of Jarring negotiations and are thus inconsistent with language of joint statement of the President and Prime Minister endorsing UNSC Resolution and mission of Ambassador Jarring. As Israelis should be aware, Jerusalem will be a critical issue in any peace settlement. Consequently Israeli measures described in NYTimes article will further strengthen Arab suspicions that Israelis are not serious about an equitable peace settlement and will discourage Arabs from a serious posture towards negotiation./3/

/3/Katzenbach returned to this issue on January 20 in a personal message to Ambassador Barbour. Katzenbach stated that Israeli measures in East Jerusalem were creating a situation in which a decision to annex East Jerusalem was becoming increasingly irreversible. He felt that some modification of Israeli policy was essential if there was to be an agreed Arab-Israeli settlement. He was concerned that the Israeli Government might be underestimating the strength of the U.S. views on this issue, and he instructed Barbour to take every opportunity to stress the U.S. position. (Telegram 102224 to Tel Aviv; ibid., POL 27 ARAB-ISR)

Katzenbach

45. Telegram From the Department of State to the U.S. Interests Section of the Spanish Embassy in the United Arab Republic/1/

Washington, January 13, 1968, 2:17 p.m.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret. Drafted by Parker and approved by Davies. Repeated to Tel Aviv, Amman, Beirut, London, Jidda, USUN, and Jerusalem.

98453. 1. Ashraf Ghorbal, newly arrived officer in charge UAR interests section Indian Embassy, called at Department for marathon discussion January 12. Burden his remarks was that Arabs had come a long way to meet our requirements since last summer but US continued unalterably pro-Israel and upped the ante every time Arabs showed any sign of reasonableness. Said he had seen both Zakariyah Muhieddin and Mahmoud Riad on eve his departure and was authorized by both of them to say UAR sincerely interested in peaceful settlement and would like to remove Palestine problem from agenda. Toward this goal they thought they following Secretary's advice to be wise and reasonable, but they genuinely perplexed to know what USG wanted.

2. Ghorbal maintained that since last June there had not been one public statement of US appreciation for moderation being shown by Arabs. Furthermore we had announced we were giving offensive aircraft to Israel immediately following its inhuman attack on Suez, and now President Johnson had told Eshkol he understood latter's problems in trying to obtain peace in Middle East, because he was having same sort of problem in Viet-Nam. This was unfortunate comparison. Fact was Israelis were ones who did not want peace and it had been Israelis who invaded Egypt, not vice versa. Egypt had been looking for peaceful way out of dilemma and had been ready to send Muhieddin to Washington, when Israelis had attacked. Egyptians had listened to our warnings not to attack, but Israelis had not heeded them. Now Egypt wanted peaceful settlement but Israelis were consolidating their gains and US not doing anything to stop them. For Egyptians, sine qua non of peaceful settlement was Israeli withdrawal, and only US could effect that. If we not prepared exert our influence to that end, entire area would be irretrievably lost to West.

3. Deptoff replied we still prepared put our full weight behind settlement within terms November 22 UN resolution, but we could not impose solution on any of parties. Package must be something everyone could live with. It quite true we had put no pressure on Israelis to withdraw, and would not do so in absence reasonable proposals for settlement. Israelis maintained with reason that they could not be expected to fight war of national survival every ten years and could not return to unstable status quo ante. They had also indicated however that their stated positions not inflexible and there was room for bargaining. We saw Jarring's task as that of exploring positions of both sides and establishing outlines of settlement. We hoped he would come up with something workable, but had taken decision not to get involved ourselves at this stage because we did not wish to affect chances of settlement by having proposals identified as ours. Although questions of Jerusalem, Suez and Gaza posed difficulties, we thought honorable global settlement was possible. Settlement would include non-belligerency and withdrawal to agreed boundaries. We had reached no firm position on what those boundaries should be, but assumed armistice lines would be basis. There would have to be some rectifications however and there would have to be some demilitarization. Essential element in getting such settlement was that UAR have some faith in our intentions.

4. Ghorbal said Deptoff remarks confirmed Egyptian suspicions we were in fact supporting Israelis in their efforts to dictate terms. We were saying in effect that Israelis would not withdraw until they had what they wanted, and that we supported them in this. We could not expect Egyptians to put any faith or trust in us under these circumstances. Comment: Ghorbal personally somewhat depressed by problems setting up house in Washington and dealing with American public opinion and his remarks reflect this. They also appeared reflect however genuine sense of frustration on part UARG that implementation UN resolution proceeding at such leisurely pace and that Jarring not showing more dynamic approach to problem.

Katzenbach

46. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Helms to President Johnson

Washington, January 16, 1968.

[Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Harold H. Saunders, Israel-Nuclear-Dimona-Desalting, 1/1/67-2/29/68. Secret. 1 page of source text not declassified.]

47. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel/1/

Washington, January 17, 1968, 1930Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 32-6 TIRAN. Secret; Exdis. Drafted on January 16 in NEA/ARP by Brewer; cleared by Atherton, Battle, and in the White House by Saunders; and approved by Rusk. Repeated to Jidda.

99998. State 97760, Dhahran 464./2/ Tiran.

/2/Neither printed.

1. Ambassador requested deliver following personal message in written form from Secretary to FonMin Eban re Tiran problem:

"Dear Mr. Minister:

As you know, the continued presence of Israeli troops on the island of Tiran was one of the matters we discussed during the President's recent cordial discussions with Prime Minister Eshkol in Texas./3/

/3/See Documents 39-41.

We noted to the Prime Minister the desirability that Israel provide public indications of its willingness to reach understandings with the Arabs and suggested that withdrawal of your troops from Tiran would be one example of what we had in mind. The Prime Minister expressed understanding of this view but indicated that it would be difficult for your government to contemplate withdrawal from Tiran in the absence of assurances regarding the consequences of this act for Israel.

Encouraged by these exchanges, I subsequently instructed the US Ambassador to Saudi Arabia to explore this question further with King Faisal. Our Ambassador had a frank and detailed discussion of this subject with His Majesty on January 13. The King's comments made clear: (a) that he regards Tiran Island as part of Saudi territory, and that, for example, his government has granted a concession covering the island; and (b) that he has no plan to militarize Tiran or to use it to impede freedom of navigation into Tiran Strait.

I am greatly encouraged by His Majesty's position. On the basis of his assurances to our Ambassador, I believe that the problems the Israeli side foresaw if your government withdrew will not arise. Specifically, I would expect neither alienation of this portion of Saudi territory, its militarization nor its use in any way to interfere with freedom of navigation through the Straits of Tiran. I would therefore hope that your government would now consider that its troops can be withdrawn from the island without incurring adverse consequences for Israel.

As we have earlier indicated to your government, such action will remove a serious embarrassment in our own relations with the Saudi authorities. I therefore look forward to receiving a favorable response from your government. It will, of course, be immediately communicated to King Faisal and will, I am sure, have a useful and helpful impact./4/

/4/In a conversation with Battle on February 5, Ambassador Harman stated that Foreign Minister Eban was prepared to take up the issue of Tiran Island with the Israeli Cabinet but first needed a U.S. response to a number of "clarifications." Harman asked if the United States could obtain Saudi Arabian acknowledgment that the Straits of Tiran was an international waterway. Israel also asked whether the United States could obtain from Saudi Arabia a "binding written undertaking" that Tiran Island would remain permanently uninhabited. Israel also asked whether the United States would underwrite any such Saudi undertakings by making them a matter of U.S. "responsibility and commitment" as regards Israel. Harman indicated that he was instructed to stress the need for "absolute precision" in these assurances. (Telegram 111432 to Tel Aviv, February 7; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 32-6 TIRAN) Ambassador Eilts in Jidda assessed the Israeli response to Secretary Rusk's letter as "very disappointing," and noted that Israel was proposing conditions that King Faisal could not accept. Eilts felt that the Israeli conditions raised the question of whether Israel had any intention of leaving Tiran unless forced out. (Telegram 2776 from Jidda, February 10; ibid.)

Sincerely yours, Dean Rusk"

2. Since much of good effect of forthcoming Israeli position on Tiran would be vitiated by public disclosure of King Faisal's attitude, we assume that FonMin will agree that this aspect should receive no publicity. For record, we will take a similar line with Saudis when conveying Israeli decision.

Rusk

48. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, January 17, 1968.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East, Vol. I, 6/65-3/68. Secret; Exdis.

SUBJECT
Mid-East Arms Limitation Approaches

During your talks with Prime Minister Eshkol, you instructed Secretary Rusk to approach both the Soviets and the Arabs to urge restraint on further arms shipments and to see whether we can avoid another round in the arms race.

The Secretary raised this with Dobrynin before he returned to Moscow. Now, to make sure everyone understands this is a serious effort, he recommends two more steps:

1. Instruct Ambassador Thompson to follow up with Dobrynin in Moscow, giving him the broad outlines of our aircraft decision, underlining your desire to avoid a new round in the arms race and urging some indication of his Government's reaction. (Tab A)./2/

/2/The proposed draft cables at Tabs A and B are not printed.

2. Instruct our ambassadors in Arab capitals to make clear our restraint and to let Arab leaders know that further decisions will depend on what they and the Soviets do. (Tab B). State would follow this up with specially tailored stronger approaches in Cairo and one or two other key capitals, perhaps urging them to talk with the USSR.

We believe it is important to lay it on the line that we have decided to sell a few more Skyhawks. If we don't, both Russians and Arabs can throw this back at us when it comes out formally, saying we've already voided our plea for restraint and pushed the arms race a step further. We will try to say we've deferred our decision on Phantoms in such a way as to preserve the deterrent value of a decision still to be made.

While I realize this describes to a pretty broad audience the simpler elements of your decision, I think this is necessary if we're going to put real substance in a major pitch for limitation. I recommend you approve the attached.

Walt

Approve Tabs A and B
See me/3/

/3/This option is checked.

49. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Warnke) to Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/

Washington, January 17, 1968.

/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 72 A 1498, Jordan, 000.1-333. Secret.

SUBJECT
Visit of Major General Amer Khammash, Chief of Staff, Jordan Arab Army

General Khammash arrives in Washington today for talks beginning Friday./2/ King Hussein has asked us to receive him to discuss Jordan's military requirements. Hussein expects us "to come to a meeting of the minds" with Khammash on what arms we are willing to supply to Jordan. Our Ambassador in Amman states categorically that we must be prepared to do so or risk Hussein's acceptance of Soviet arms offers. (Relevant cables are at Tab D.)/3/ The kinds of arms that Khammash probably will be looking for are tanks, artillery, APCs, and a continuous flow of support items.

/2/January 19.

/3/Not found attached. An apparent reference to telegrams 2912 and 2913 from Amman; see Document 42 and footnote 3 thereto.

A draft position paper prepared by State, and cleared by Under Secretary Katzenbach, is at Tab A./4/ In brief, it says:

/4/Reference is to a January 17 memorandum from Battle to Katzenbach that outlined the Department's position on the impending negotiations with Khammash. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 12-5 JORDAN)

1. The President has agreed to resume limited arms shipments to Jordan and has approved a $6.5 million package. This decision has been communicated to Hussein. (Package details are at Tab B.)/5/

/5/Not printed.

2. The King and Khammash consider that this modest amount ($6.5 million) is insufficient to demonstrate to their army that progress is being made in reequipping the Jordanian forces. Hussein wants a commitment on major ground force items and continuing support items.

3. The King is prepared to forego Soviet arms offers (his assurance to this effect is at Tab C)/6/ but unless Jordan can get equipment from the West "there seems little doubt but that the King will turn to the Soviet bloc."

/6/Not printed; see footnote 3, Document 29.

4. In our discussions with Khammash, we should:

a. Confirm and provide details on the Presidential decision on the $6.5 million package; also tell him we will consider sympathetically in the coming months further requests for similar-type equipment.

b. Try to get him to agree to meet requirements for tanks, artillery, APCs, and similar items in Europe, offering to support him in this endeavor; but if this proves unacceptable to Khammash,

c. Agree to meet Jordan's arms requirements from the U.S. if they are not obtainable elsewhere.

d. Discuss the modalities of cancelling the F-104 contract at the lowest possible cost to Jordan.

e. Make no commitments on credit.

I agree in general with the State paper. I think, however, it overstates the probability of Hussein going to the USSR for military equipment: he continues to depend upon us to help him in negotiations with Israel for his lost territory, he surely wants our continuing economic assistance, and his physical security depends on his association with the West, particularly the United States, and with the moderate Arabs, particularly Faisal of Saudi Arabia. While there certainly is a risk that he will go to the Soviets for military equipment. I believe we have more leverage with Hussein than the State paper implies.

I think also that it ignores the implications of the Conte-Long Amendment/7/ for any decision we make concerning Jordan. This requires further discussion and analysis with State.

/7/Reference is to the Conte-Long Amendment to the Foreign Assistance and Related Appropriations Act of 1968. The amendment was adopted as Section 119 of the Appropriations Act on January 2, 1968. The amendment directed the President to withhold economic assistance in an amount equivalent to the amount spent by any underdeveloped country other than Greece, Turkey, Iran, Israel, the Republic of China, the Philippines, and Korea for the purchase of sophisticated weapons systems. (P.L. 90-249; 81 Stat. 936)

The State proposal (subparagraph c, above) of course goes beyond what the President has already approved. State is not seeking approval for this position now, but recommends waiting until after at least the initial discussions with Khammash. I agree.

Khammash will begin substantive discussions with State on Friday afternoon. Harry Schwartz, in my absence, will carry the subsequent and more detailed discussions for DOD. I strongly recommend you see Khammash briefly, and have tentatively blocked your calendar for 1700 hours, 23 January 1968./8/

/8/McNamara's handwritten response, dated January 19, reads: "I believe we must be forthcoming--c is a minimum. After we obtain agreement on c as the govt's position, I will see him."

Paul C. Warnke

50. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State/1/

Amman, January 18, 1968, 1715Z.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Jordan, Vol. IV, Cables, 5/67-2/68. Secret; Priority; Nodis; Roger Channel.

3040. For INR Hughes and NEA Battle. Subj: Terrorist plans to assassinate Israeli officials.

1. At the end of our conversation today, King Hussein said there was a very sensitive matter that he felt he should mention to me. He then explained that when he was in Saudi Arabia last week he had heard from a "high level" that "some of the Arab terrorist organizations" are planning the assassination of certain Israeli officials, with Moshe Dayan being a principal target. (The King said he had voiced his strong disapproval of such a course of action, and implied that his source also disapproved of these alleged terrorist plans.) With some embarrassment he said he left it to me as to how or whether these reports should be brought to the attention of the GOI. He said he wanted to make it absolutely clear that he is opposed to terrorism in general and to assassination of individuals in particular.

2. In connection with terrorism, King Hussein said his intelligence information is that the situation is becoming much worse. More terrorists are coming from Syria and others are coming in from Gaza and Iraq. He has issued orders to insure that the situation in South Jordan is cleaned up completely. He believes that terrorist threats can be handled more easily in that region but the situation opposite the West Bank remains difficult. He volunteered that one purpose of his forthcoming trip to Baghdad (which will now be delayed until early February) will be to speak to the Iraqis about getting PLO and terrorist elements out of Jordan. He noted parenthetically that he expects he and others may also become terrorist targets.

3. Comment: From the way the King spoke to me about the terrorist plans against Israeli officials, I judge that he had received some fairly hard information that some of the terrorist groups may try hard to get Dayan. I leave to the Dept how best to get this information conveyed to the Israelis without compromising King Hussein as source.

Symmes

51. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, January 18, 1968.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. XII, 1965-1968. Secret; Nodis.

SUBJECT
Your Understanding with Prime Minister Eshkol

PM Eshkol asked Ambassador Harman to clear up any misunderstandings before he briefs his political intimates. He arrives home tonight. Luke Battle has drafted the attached notes,/2/ checked them with Secretaries Rusk and McNamara and compared them with Ambassador Harman's. There are two points of disagreement.

/2/Reference is to a 3-page undated memorandum headed "Notes on Meeting Between President Johnson and Prime Minister Eshkol January 7-8, 1968."

1. View of the threat. The Israelis believe General Wheeler and Hod agreed that the Israeli air force will not be adequate, if certain things happen, to meet the Arab threat 18 months from now. Wheeler says his point was that Israel faced no problem for the next 18 months but in the period after that might have a problem, depending on what the Soviets and others did. Unless you intended to state a different point of view from Wheeler's, we will stick with the Wheeler-McNamara view. These two views are in brackets at "A" on the attached text.

Approve US language/3/
Approve Israeli language

/3/This option is checked. The proposal Israeli language reads: "would not be adequate to meet its needs 18 months from now." The McNamara-Rusk language reads: "may not be adequate to meet the threat in January 1970." Rostow added another option that reads: "No language-via telephone."

2. Number of Phantoms in January 1970. Did you say that, if you decide to sell Phantoms, you would prepare to deliver in January 1970 a batch of say 30, 40 or 50 planes? Or did you have in mind starting the production line rolling then with delivery at the normal rate of about 4 a month thereafter?

The Israelis interpreted you as implying the possible delivery of a batch of planes in January 1970 if the situation required. They know Secretary McNamara had in mind normal production line delivery, but they thought you expressed a different view which indicated that you would even pull planes out of inventory and deliver in a batch if the threat required. These two views are represented in the brackets at "B" on the attached.

Approve US language/4/
Approve Israeli language

/4/This option is checked. The U.S. language reads: "Delivered to Israel beginning in January 1970."

Secretary Rusk isn't enthusiastic about this exercise, but he admits that we owe Eshkol some help in describing your understanding accurately to his colleagues. If you agree, Luke Battle could just share these notes with Evron. I think either he or I should call Harman and say that, while we've argued over language, no one here intends to dilute in any way the spirit of your talks.

Walt

Call me/5/

/5/This option is checked. The draft notes on Johnson's meeting with Eshkol, as approved by the President, were sent to Tel Aviv on January 19 in telegram 101300, for delivery to the Israeli Foreign Ministry. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL ISR-US)

52. Special National Intelligence Estimate/1/

SNIE 11-9-68

Washington, January 18, 1968.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, NEA Files: Lot 71 D 384, Special Documents-1968. Secret; Controlled Dissem. According to a note on the cover sheet, the estimate was submitted by Deputy Director of Central Intelligence Rufus Taylor, and concurred in by the U.S. Intelligence Board on January 18.

SOVIET INTERESTS AND ACTIVITIES IN ARAB STATES

The Problem

To assess Soviet policy toward Middle East since the June war, and to estimate Soviet intentions, particularly with respect to the UAR, Yemen, and Jordan.

Conclusions

A. The main Soviet objective in the Middle East remains essentially the same as before the June war--to win for the USSR a position as dominant foreign power in the area. The Soviets face both new problems and new opportunities. Nonetheless the radical Arabs are now more dependent on the USSR, and the Soviets probably judge that the new opportunities will compensate for such losses as they suffered as a result of the Arab defeat.

B. The Soviets are not likely to make binding military commitments to any Arab states, and they will almost certainly remain wary of direct involvement even in limited conflicts in the Middle East. They probably do not intend to establish actual Soviet military bases in the area, but will seek instead to help the Arabs develop ports and air bases which might be used by Soviet forces on a limited basis. The Soviets will improve the capabilities of their naval forces in the Mediterranean and of their sea and airlift capabilities in general. They will probably continue to use their forces in the Middle East for essentially political purposes-to influence events and to improve their position in the region. Nonetheless, resumption of Arab-Israeli hostilities would produce a dangerous and essentially unpredictable situation, in which the risks of Soviet involvement, by accident or miscalculation, might be greater than before.

C. The Soviets will probably continue to give strong, though not unlimited, backing to Nasser, whom they continue to regard as their chief Arab ally. Despite some mutual irritants, and despite Nasser's desire to maintain independence, Soviet and UAR policies on important issues are congruent-notably, opposition to US influence in the area, a cautious policy toward Israel, and at least short-term accommodation between Arab radicals and moderates.

D. In Jordan, the Soviets are attempting to extend their influence by generous offers of military aid. We believe that Hussein will accept Soviet arms if the Western Powers fail to offer an acceptable alternative. He would still try to maintain countervailing ties with conservative Arabs and the West, but over time revolutionary forces in Jordan would be strengthened.

E. In Yemen, Soviet military aid and activity is probably aimed at preventing the collapse of the Republican regime. But the Soviets have now moved to limit their involvement, possibly because they have revised their estimate of Republican prospects, and they are encouraging a negotiated settlement. They will, however, probably continue some aid as long as the Republican regime can make use of it, hoping in this way to preserve some influence in Yemen and eventually to promote Soviet interests in South Yemen. In doing so, they will probably try to avoid the kind of overt bid for dominance which would kindle adverse reactions in the area, particularly among their Arab clients.

[Here follows the 7-page Discussion section of the estimate.]

53. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Washington, January 19, 1968.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Harold H. Saunders, Visit of Prime Minister Eshkol of Israel, January 7-8, 1968. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Saunders and cleared by Rostow.

Late January 18, Mr. Walt Rostow called Israeli Minister Evron to discuss our final decision on "Notes on the Meeting Between President Johnson and Prime Minister Eshkol",/2/ which had been passed to Mr. Evron. Mr. Rostow made the following points:

/2/See footnote 2, Document 51.

1. On the question of when the Israeli air force might face a serious threat, the President felt that was an issue for Generals Wheeler and Hod to settle. He did not commit himself to any particular intelligence assessment. The President had said he was concerned with Israel's security, and we should leave it at that.

2. What concerned the President was to make sure he would be in a position, if he delayed a decision on supplying Phantom aircraft to Israel, to deliver those aircraft, if he decided later to do so, as if he had made a decision the day he talked to Prime Minister Eshkol. He recognized that normal lead times would require him to decide right now; he wanted to delay decision and yet still preserve the option to deliver as if he had decided today.

3. The question he did not address is how we might deal with some emergency-for instance, a sudden influx of Soviet arms. That is a separate problem. That wasn't the problem he was confronted with at the Ranch. That was outside the scope of decisions made there.

4. We do not have a formal record of the President's views on delivery schedules. He knows the normal production schedule of aircraft, but this point was not addressed by the President, and it is not wise to try to force him to decide now.

At this point, Mr. Evron asked whether he might tell Prime Minister Eshkol that the President had instructed Secretary McNamara to keep open the option of delivering an unspecified number-20, 30, 40-of aircraft in January 1970. Mr. Rostow replied, "I can't say that. We didn't address the question. We were thinking of normal build-up. The only question the President addressed was allowing himself some turnaround time before having to decide and still be able to meet a normal schedule."

5. In conclusion, what we need to do is (a) get the intelligence people working hard and steadily and (b) get the latest date for decision from Generals Wheeler and Hod (on training) and from Secretary McNamara (on production). But on the issue of emergency diversion from existing production, don't raise this contingency matter until you have reason to raise it. The President has not now addressed rates of delivery.

Harold H. Saunders

54. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State/1/

Amman, January 19, 1968, 1320Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 23-8 JORDAN. Secret; Nodis.

3047. Subj: Jordanian request for help with anti-terrorist measures.

1. In conversation with Emboff Jan 9 MajGen Muhammad Rasoul Kilani, Chief of GOJ GA General Intelligence Directorate (GID), requested assistance from the USG in the field of terrorist interdiction and suppression. Gen. Kilani stated that the GOJ wishes to accomplish two things: (A) completely stop the flow of terrorists through Jordan and break up their organizations; and (B) do this in such a way that it will not incite the people of Jordan (who are generally pro-terrorist) to insurrection against the regime.

2. Gen. Kilani said that one of his main concerns is that if the terrorists build an effective organizational structure, sooner or later this could be used against the GOJ instead of the Israelis. King and PM already believe this intent. He added that he had been exposed to some of the philosophy and tactics of counterinsurgency when he had been a student at the counterinsurgency school at Fort Bragg, he felt that between the US Army and CIA there could be developed a set of tactics which would help Jordan in this problem.

3. Rasoul said that he was not asking for "experts" to be sent TDY from the US, but rather asking for a thorough review of the Jordan/Israel cease-fire line situation which would make some concrete recommendations. He expected that the recommendations might very well entail use of some new and sophisticated technical devices, which he would then request and employ operationally. While he would not shrink from using armed force when necessary, he would like as much as possible to be able to keep the anti-terrorist campaign "under cover" and avoid alerting the people to the GOJ's real intent.

4. Emboff agreed to report Kilani's request. Emboff later asked Rasoul's deputy whether GID was having serious problems with villagers and refugees when it worked against various terrorist groups, and he answered that the problem was quite serious and promised to become more so if this political settlement issue remained stagnated.

5. Emboff understanding was that Rasoul thinking along lines of installing anti-infiltration devices on Jordanian side of the cease-fire line under some pretext which would convince people that these were protective devices. He also seemed to be searching for new ideas to use in convincing the population that anti-terrorist activity was either not going on or was in fact aimed at another target. Rasoul gave no hint to suggest he would consider cooperating with Israel in this activity.

6. Comment and Recommendations: (A) Jordanian leadership has consistently maintained anti-terrorist posture. Best recent evidence that this posture is genuine has been provided by obvious dismay over Eilat incidents which they fear can trigger reprisal against Aqaba, with both political and logistical damage to Jordan. (B) At the same time, popular support for spirit of resistance personified by infiltrators is growing along with continued frustration of hopes for peaceful solution. Capacity of leadership to enforce anti-terrorist infiltration campaign is correspondingly being eroded. (C) On top of this complication, physical problems of policing cease-fire line which provides good infiltration access at many points impose practical limits on what can be done even with the best of will. (D) Also it is only realistic to recognize that will to enforce measures will vary down through the rank and file and that there will be loopholes. (E) Given prospects for continued slow progress toward a solution (assuming continued progress), the problem of infiltration and terrorism promises to increase. (F) We are not in a position to judge the practical merit of sophisticated infiltration measures which might be employed pursuant to Rasoul's thinking. We believe this should be evaluated and that we should respond as constructively as possible to this overture. Over and above the possible practical effects on reducing terrorist infiltration, we have major concern for reducing tensions on both sides over issue and moves such as this may help. Incidentally, GOJ would likely find future use for such equipment along any permanent frontier with Israel for some time to come as well as along Syrian frontier.

7. Suggest Dept may wish repeat to Embassy Tel Aviv.

Symmes

55. Action Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, January 20, 1968, 3:45 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Arab Republic, Vol. VI, Memos, 8/67-7/68. Secret. A handwritten notation indicates the memorandum was received at 5:20 p.m. Another handwritten notation reads: "Mr. Saunders notified 1/22/68."

SUBJECT
Resuming Relations with Nasser

Nasser was pleased with your message,/2/ and I think on the whole your exchange improved the atmosphere. Bergus' account of his talk with Nasser is attached./3/

/2/See Document 31.

/3/Document 34.

The main question now is our next step. Bob Anderson has volunteered to see a representative of Nasser in either Geneva or Malta next week, and Gene Black will be in Cairo on a regular visit January 31 to February 6. Do we want to use either?

There are two issues:

--Do we ask to discuss details of resumption? You have already told Nasser that you share his desire to resume relations and that Don Bergus is prepared to discuss details. From Nasser's failure to have the Foreign Office get down to cases with him, we begin to assume that he wants us to initiate discussions so they can say we came begging. Commissioning Anderson or Black to offer to begin talking specifics would lay you open to the kind of news stories the Cairo press launched during Anderson's last mission picturing you as running after Nasser.

--How do we handle retraction of the false charges that we took part in the June war? Nasser told Bergus he didn't make any, but those charges were the reason Nasser gave for breaking with us. We probably can't expect Nasser himself to retract, and a casual retraction in one of their newspapers wouldn't help us too much. But it might be possible for us to say unilaterally we assume that, by resuming relations, Cairo had acknowledged that the basis for breaking was unfounded./4/ Or we could say Egyptian officials had told us they acknowledged the charges were wrong. We'd have to pre-arrange this with the Egyptians, but I assume you still feel we ought to get some satisfaction on this subject.

/4/Bergus proposed this formula for breaking the impasse on the issue of the "big lie" in a conversation on January 18 with Foreign Ministry official Mohamed Riad. Riad saw some merit in the suggestion, and Bergus recommended it to the Department. Bergus and Riad also reviewed other aspects of Bergus' January 6 conversation with Nasser. Bergus made the point that since the United Arab Republic had broken relations the initiative for the resumption of relations should come from Cairo and that relations, if restored, should be substantive rather than formal. Riad noted that his government feared that an initiative from Cairo might meet with an embarrassing public rebuff from Washington. Bergus responded that President Johnson's response to President Nasser's message should put to rest any concerns that the United States was setting a trap for the UAR. Bergus and Riad also discussed the issue of compensation for U.S. property damaged during the June war and agreed that it should not pose a problem. (Telegram 1413 from Cairo, January 20; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL UAR-US) Rostow sent a copy of this telegram to President Johnson on January 21 under cover of a memorandum in which he stated: "It is clear we are beginning to communicate." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt W. Rostow, Vol. 57, 1/16-24/68)

I would vote against using Bob. He could take this line: We're ready; talk to Bergus. But that seems hardly worth a trip from Cairo to Geneva and back. Besides, a special meeting of this kind might attract more publicity than we want.

I think Gene Black could serve a useful purpose in Cairo. I would recommend authorizing him to say two things:

--Urge Nasser to have his Foreign Office get down to specifics with Bergus. You are ready to resume.

--You have a political problem that requires setting the record straight on the false charges. Can't we work out a formula that will meet both your needs and Nasser's?

I think it's worth using Gene. I don't have any illusions about changing our relations with Nasser much, though I do think we're better off with a U.S. presence in Cairo to show we're not abandoning the field to Moscow. But resumption with Cairo would pave the way for resuming business in other Arab capitals-a first step toward repairing the damage to our position throughout the Arab world. No one will move till Nasser does.

We don't honestly know whether Nasser really wants to resume. He believes we're 100% behind Israel, and he frankly admitted to Bergus that suspicion of us is so great that it is not yet possible to move into a new period of friendship based on trust. But another probe by Gene Black seems to risk little for the chance of a worthwhile gain.

Walt

Approve Black talking to Nasser about this subject/5/
I would prefer that Black just listen and stick to generalities
Approve the line you have suggested
Call me

/5/Johnson checked this option.

56. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan/1/

Washington, January 20, 1968, 1756Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Wiley on January 19; cleared by Atherton, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs David H. Popper, and Houghton; and approved by Battle. Repeated to Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, London, Beirut, and USUN.

102185. Ref: Amman 3043./2/

/2/Telegram 3043 from Amman, January 19, reported on a conversation on recent terrorist incidents between an Embassy official and the head of Jordanian intelligence. The terrorist incidents which prompted U.S. concern included a mortar attack by Palestinian infiltrators on the Israeli airfield at Eilat on January 13 and a Palestinian attack the following day on the Israeli border settlement at Neot Hakikar. According to Jordanian intelligence, both incidents were the work of the Al-Fatah organization. (Ibid.)

1. Department increasingly concerned that recent outbreaks of terrorism in areas of Israel near Jordan and on West Bank may lead to further escalation of hostilities. We are particularly concerned that incidents such as that of Eilat will strengthen in Israel the hands of the advocates of retaliation as an answer to terroristic activity. We have been persistently urging restraint on the Israelis but we are not sanguine about consequences if tempo of incidents continues. We cannot overemphasize the crucial importance of the GOJ's doing everything within its power to restrain terrorist activity. You should again take up this subject at appropriately high level of GOJ drawing on the following as you deem appropriate:

(a) USG deeply concerned over possible escalation of hostilities between Israel and Jordan sparked by terrorist activity.

(b) We are strongly urging Government of Israel not to take countermeasures which could escalate into armed hostility between Jordan and Israel.

(c) We realize that GOJ has been making a major effort to interdict saboteurs on Jordanian territory. We hope these efforts will continue and be intensified.

(d) We commend GOJ initiative in suggesting talks on terrorism with Israelis and hope that some way can be found to hold these meetings. For example, would it be possible to arrange meetings along lines suggested by Tekoah in USUN 3411?/3/ Israelis appear to be dissatisfied with rank of officer who has previously met with them at bridge. Has GOJ given consideration to having higher ranking officer accompany Twal for preliminary meetings with Israelis?

/3/In telegram 3411 from USUN, January 19, the Mission reported on a January 17 meeting between Ambassador Pedersen and Israeli Permanent Representative Tekoah. In the course of the conversation, Tekoah stressed the importance of the direct contacts between Israel and Jordan that had taken place at the Allenby bridge without a UN presence, and added that such contacts were viewed by his government as particularly important in light of the terrorism problem. (Ibid.)

(e) Present period while Jarring consultations are under way is especially critical for future of area and it would be a tragedy for all concerned if actions of terrorists, although not representative of responsible Arab opinion, were to jeopardize chances of working out more stable relationships.

Rusk

57. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union/1/

Washington, January 20, 1968, 2156Z.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt W. Rostow, Vol. 57, 1/16-24/68. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted in EUR/SOV by Malcolm Toon and in S/S by Walsh; cleared by Battle, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs John Leddy, Rusk, Secretary McNamara, and Bromley Smith at the White House. Repeated to London.

102228. For the Ambassador. Request you seek early appointment with Kosygin to make following statement: (If Kosygin not available within next day or so, you should see Gromyko and ask him to transmit to Kosygin soonest.)

Begin Text. [Here follows the portion of President Johnson's message to Chairman Kosygin dealing with the proposed non-proliferation treaty.]

On the question of arms to the Middle East, the Chairman will have received by now Ambassador Dobrynin's report of his conversation with Secretary Rusk on January 9. This matter, too, is urgent and the President has asked me to stress his deep concern at the impact that continued arms traffic may have on the Middle East situation. We know from past experience that resort to arms is an ever-present danger in the Middle East. Not only does such action not resolve the problem, but it poses the danger of the spread of war beyond the confines of the area. The President has watched with growing concern the extensive delivery of arms to the area from the Soviet Union. The United States is under considerable pressure, as a consequence, to take matching action. Despite this pressure, my Government has exercised great restraint, most recently in its agreement to provide Israel with only limited numbers of aircraft, without new models, and only in continuation of our agreement with Israel of 1966. By agreeing only to this limited extension of the 1966 agreement and by deferring decision on the introduction of new advanced aircraft into the area, we have exercised restraint and it is the President's earnest hope that this will be reciprocated by the Soviet Government. In this way our two governments could assist Ambassador Jarring in carrying out his vital mission and thus make a substantial contribution to prospects for a just and peaceful settlement in the Middle East. End Text.

For Ambassador Bruce: You should bring this message to the attention of Prime Minister Wilson prior his departure for Moscow.

Rusk

58. Information Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, January 22, 1968, 4:40 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt W. Rostow, Vol. 57, 1/16-24/68. Secret.

Mr. President:

Herewith Kosygin responds to your message:/2/

/2/See Document 57.

--He will let us know later about ABM-ICBM's;

--He wants the U.S. and USSR to join together to force a Middle East settlement, with special emphasis on getting the Israelis to go back to their borders.

Despite the lack of balance in his position, I have a feeling we ought to explore this a bit further.

W. W. Rostow/3/

/3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

Attachment/4/

/4/Secret; Nodis.

Copy of Moscow 2529 from Ambassador Thompson, Jan. 22, 1968

Ref: State 102228./5/

/5/Document 57.

1. I saw Kosygin at 11:30 a.m. today and delivered message per reference telegram.

2. Kosygin said the Soviets would study message and express their views later. However, he could make a few preliminary comments.

3. Re the NPT, Kosygin said the Soviets are also gratified with the progress achieved. They had done everything to expedite a solution of the outstanding issues and believed the NPT should be signed as soon as possible. Thus, on this question, the Soviet and US views coincided.

4. Re strategic weapon systems, Kosygin said the Soviets are still studying the problem. They would also study points made in the President's message and give their views later.

5. Turning to the Middle East, Kosygin asserted everything depended on US and the President. There was, of course, a UN resolution in existence. When he talked with the President, such questions as opening of canal, recognition of Israel, and Israeli withdrawal from occupied territories had been discussed. As regards Soviet aid, he wished to point out that the Soviets never rendered assistance to aggressor, always to victim of aggression. One could not equate Arabs and Israelis, since the Israelis had launched aggression. The Middle East problem could be solved easily if the occupied territories were vacated by the aggressors. Kosygin said he felt that time had come for the US and USSR to join their efforts to achieve Israeli withdrawal. This could be done through various contacts and through joint pressure on Israel. Jarring mission was, of course, proceeding, but he was concerned it was becoming a routine operation. If US and Soviets did what he was suggesting, the canal could be opened and other elements of the problem resolved. His impression was that some people in the US wanted the Middle East tension to continue. While he did not want to mention any names, the Soviets did have some information about attitudes in the US. Thus, Israeli withdrawal from occupied territories was required. The US and USSR should join their efforts to this end, and he wanted me to convey this to the President. Kosygin continued that the Soviets are very concerned about the Middle East situation. On the other hand, while saying it did not want continued tension in the area, the US is doing nothing about removing it. For example, the US did not seem to be concerned about the plight of Arab refugees. If roots of conflict were removed, i.e., if the problem of occupied territories were resolved, other things, including the question of armaments, would fall in place. What the US was raising were subordinate questions, although Soviets knew that US is helping Israel.

6. I said I would inform President of Kosygin's remarks. Noting that origins of present situation are well known, I said I saw no need to discuss them again at this time. Stressing our concern about the situation, however, I pointed out the President's restraint in his discussions with the Israeli Prime Minister was an effort to help the Jarring mission and implementation of UN resolution so that a successful solution of the problem could be achieved. I also pointed out that the problem involved not only question of occupied territories, but also status of Israel, refugees, etc.

7. Kosygin concluded the conversation by repeating that if the question of occupied territories were resolved, i.e., if troops returned to their original positions, the whole problem could be settled.

Thompson

59. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State/1/

Tel Aviv, January 24, 1968, 1020Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Nodis.

2264. Subject: Jarring Mission. Ref: Tel Aviv 2257./2/ Subsequent to conversation between DCM and Argov in which latter gave details Eban's meetings with Jarring January 17 and 22nd reported reftel, I had occasion meet with Eban separately. He referred to report he had of meeting between W. Rostow and Battle and Evron on 22nd in which U.S. side said we detect signals of unfreezing in Arab attitudes and hope for something significant to happen, perhaps January 25th. Evron's telegram said the specifics were not available. Eban said he very interested this possibility. Referring to his conversation with Jarring on the 22nd, he said was somewhat discouraged since Arabs seemingly maintaining hard and fast position that first step towards settlement must be Israel's withdrawal to June 4th lines. Eban had emphasized to Jarring that the November resolution contained seven or eight provisions, that no priorities had been established by that resolution, and that it disappointing that Arabs refused discuss anything except withdrawal. Eban stated British interpretation that resolution to be taken as a whole and that unilateral action not required of anybody. Jarring felt he could only succeed in his mission by personal contact, that he does not regard himself as an itinerant salesman and there no hope unless procedural problems can be sorted out so that negotiations will in fact take place. Eban said he suggested possibility secret emissaries proceed to Jarring's Cyprus headquarters but Jarring thought that procedure premature. Jarring said there three possibilities, (1) he could conclude the parties too far apart for any progress and report failure to the UN, (2) one side might change its position, or (3) some kind of negotiations could continue to be sought. So far Jarring still prepared to keep at it in hope latter alternative materializes.

/2/Telegram 2257 from Tel Aviv, January 24, reported on information received from the Foreign Ministry on Eban's meetings with Jarring on January 17 and January 22. (Ibid., POL 27 ARAB-ISR)

Barbour

60. Information Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson

Washington, January 25, 1968.

[Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Jordan, Vol. IV, Memos, 5/67-2/68. Secret. 1 page of source text not declassified.]

61. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow)/1/

Washington, January 26, 1968.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. VIII, Cables and Memos, 12/67-2/68. Secret.

SUBJECT
Where Jarring Is Now and What We Do About Him

There seem to be two schools of thought about Jarring's performance. One considers him a skilled diplomat, tackling the easier problems first to stay in business while he gets a grip on the harder ones. The other notes his refusal to describe himself as a mediator or to propose solutions himself. One feels he is beginning to bore in; the other talks of "stalemate" and "impasse."

We are trying to help him break through his first roadblock by leaning on the Israelis to say they accept the November resolution./2/ We're doing this on our own because it's so obviously important. But how much we get into his act generally is a tougher problem.

/2/According to a memorandum for the record prepared by Saunders on January 26 of a meeting that day between Walt Rostow and Ambassador Harman, Rostow urged that the Israeli Government accede to the Arab request made through Ambassador Jarring that Israel accept the November 22 UN Security Council resolution as the basis for negotiation. Rostow pointed out that the United States had "bled in the halls of the UN" to establish the position that all elements of the resolution must be treated as a package. (Ibid., Files of Harold H. Saunders, Israel, 11/1/67-2/29/68)

Before he left, Jarring told us he would not contact us in the field, so we feel some constraint against contacting him. Without consulting him, we hesitate to get too involved in passing positions back and forth--as Eppie suggested-lest we undercut some phased presentation he wants to try. We're trying to come to terms with this problem in New York via Bunche so we can make Rusk's letter to Eban/3/ on peace initiatives as useful as possible, but preoccupation with North Korea has slowed us.

/3/See Document 79.

The case for prodding Jarring into action isn't clearcut. He has made some progress:

--Movement toward release of ships trapped in the canal.

--Egyptian-Israeli prisoner exchange, apparently including six Israelis long held by the UAR (the main Israeli goal in the exchange and one which the USG and private American groups have long tried to achieve).

--Enough lessening of Egyptian resistance to talks so that there are vague reports that some sort of Rhodes-type negotiations/4/ are in the wind. (The UAR official position is still pretty hard, however.)

/4/Reference is to the negotiation of armistice agreements between Israel and the Arab states January-March 1949. The negotiations took place at Rhodes with Ralph Bunche serving as UN Acting Mediator. The negotiations involved separate meetings by Bunche with each delegation on substantive items until discussions reached an advanced stage, whereupon joint informal meetings were held.

--Israeli proposals to the Arabs through Jarring and without direct talks, and possibly a vague agreement that there are other ways to get at the problem than a formal peace conference.

--Probably most important, enough weakening of the Jordanian position so that Hussein is proposing methods of getting around the withdrawal-direct talks impasse.

The difficulty with Jarring's method is that he is running out of gap-fillers. If he can win Israeli acceptance of the resolution, he will have climbed his first range of mountains. That would increase the flow of ideas, at least from the Arabs. However, he would still have one more procedural obstacle to handle-the mechanics of talks.

The main question for us is how to encourage the parties to move from the general to the specific without pushing either them or Jarring too hard. This depends in part on whether we believe Jarring will come out of his shell or will remain essentially a telephone booth. How much perseverance he has, we just don't know yet.

My own feeling is that he is digging in gradually and that we owe him a little more time. That doesn't mean we can't weigh in on obvious issues like Israeli acceptance of the resolution, and we must go ahead with our Rusk-Eban initiative stemming from Eshkol's visit. But I'd be inclined not to push him yet.

Hal

62. Telegram From the Department of State to the U.S. Interests Section of the Spanish Embassy in the United Arab Republic/1/

Washington, January 28, 1968, 2005Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL UAR-US. Secret. Drafted by Parker on January 24; cleared by Walt Rostow, Battle, Davies, and Eugene Rostow; and approved by Rusk. Walt Rostow also cleared the telegram with the President on January 28. (Memorandum from Rostow to President Johnson; Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Arab Republic, Vol. VI, Memos, 8/67-7/68)

106083. Ref: Cairo's 1413./2/ Subject: US-UAR Relations.

/2/See footnote 4, Document 55.

1. Following for use in your next discussion of subject with Muhammad Riad.

2. Although frequent repetition UAR line that we are being negative about resumption relations is beginning raise question whether Egyptians trying use issue as stick with which to beat us, we are prepared accept at face value Riad's assertion that UAR desire for resumption is genuine. For our part, as we have made clear to UARG on number of occasions, we believe diplomatic relations most useful in difficult times and would be glad to see them resumed. We are ready to agree in principle to formal resumption now and to work towards restoration of friendly and cooperative relations thereafter. We have conveyed our interest in resumption to highest levels UARG and have as yet received no specific proposals. If Egyptians want to resume, they should get down to cases.

3. Question of who is taking initiative no longer seems relevant, given statements of interest made by both sides already. We willing settle for joint statement along lines proposed para 10.C of Cairo's 1413/3/ and if UARG wishes proceed on that basis it should authorize appropriate official to inform us, privately if it wishes, that it is prepared resume relations and is ready to negotiate details. (We need some official confirmation, as opposed unofficial expression of opinion, that UARG in fact ready to resume. We have already indicated our willingness to resume relations. UARG should reciprocate.)

/3/In paragraph 10C of telegram 1413, Bergus proposed the text of a joint statement to be released in Washington and Cairo signaling a determination to reestablish diplomatic relations.

4. With respect to UARG allegation that British and American planes were involved in June war, we set no conditions and have asked for no apologies. We do, however, stand on our position that public misapprehensions regarding events of last June should be clarified and that it is inconsistent with good relations to leave an impression that the United States engaged in military actions against Egyptian people when in fact we had no part in them. In the perspective of Egypt's good relations with the American people, which both governments desire rebuild, it would be wise now officially to make it clear that the charges of American and British involvement were based on mistakes and misinformation. UARG should realize that American people saw and heard spokesmen for Egypt repeat these accusations daily on TV and radio and that these accusations have done a great deal of harm to our mutual interests. Hussein's dignified statement on subject won him much respect in the United States and cleared the air. We have no particular formula to suggest, and we reject none in advance. We would welcome suggestions from UARG.

5. FYI. Your suggestion of unilateral statement by us that UARG acknowledged last June's allegations based on misinformation has merit and in final analysis we would be prepared settle for such a formula. Before doing so, however, we believe we should endeavor get UARG take action of its own to clarify misapprehensions. If it appears there no hope of getting UARG over a multilateral hurdle, you may discuss idea of unilateral statement, but you should not propose specific language or reveal our willingness to accept such formula. End FYI.

6. Compensation--Total amount involved is not large. Although impossible make accurate estimate without survey of buildings in Alexandria and Port Said, we believe total damage for which we should expect restitution from UARG is under $1 million, most of which probably payable in local currency. We do not propose make agreement on amount condition precedent for resumption, but before resumption we should have agreement in principle to payment of compensation. We assume UARG will be prepared give us such an undertaking in response to our taking a leaf from British book as suggested para 10.E your 1413,/4/ but undertaking should be explicit, such as personal assurance from Fonmin Mahmoud Riad that compensation will be forthcoming.

/4/In paragraph 10E of telegram 1413, Bergus suggested that the United States state in the course of negotiations that it assumed that upon the resumption of relations timely and adequate compensation would be paid for the damage to U.S. property.

7. If question is raised about representation once agreement on resumption is reached, you may say that while we plan to resume at Ambassadorial level, we do not now envisage immediate exchange of Ambassadors but would plan to keep our representation at Charge level initially. Our reasons for this are administrative rather than political.

Rusk

63. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan/1/

Washington, January 30, 1968, 2113Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL JORDAN-US. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Houghton and Day on January 25; cleared by Deputy Assistant Administrator in AID's Bureau for Near East and South Asia Joseph L. Wheeler, Sisco, Davies, Handley, Eugene Rostow, and Katzenbach; and approved by Rusk.

106935. Ref: Amman's 2815./2/

/2/Document 27.

1. Embassy should deliver the following letter from the Secretary to Prime Minister Talhouni:

2. "Dear Mr. Prime Minister: I am writing with respect to some of the concerns about US Government policy towards Jordan you expressed in recent discussions with Ambassador Symmes. I want to confirm his assurances of our support for Jordan in meeting the problems that confront Your Excellency's Government in these days.

3. The record of American-Jordanian relations over the past two decades manifests the support which my Government has consistently provided to the Kingdom. While I know I need not dwell on the high regard which President Johnson has for His Majesty King Hussein, underlying those friendly ties between the leaders of our two countries is a strong fabric of friendship between Jordanian and American officials as well as the private citizens of our two countries. The recent Arab-Israel hostilities have created problems in our relations, but these are not insurmountable and are, in fact, being overcome.

4. By now you are aware of our decision to resume arms shipments to Jordan. We are now negotiating a PL-480 program for Jordan. We are continuing our technical assistance programs and are anxious to assist Jordan in aggressively pursuing its economic development program. These actions constitute concrete evidence of our firm intention to continue our traditional policy toward Jordan.

5. In this connection, I regret the interpretations that may have been placed on the discontinuance of budgetary support at this particular time. Let me assure you that our decision was based solely on fiscal considerations, i.e., pledges of Arab financial assistance for Jordan reached at the Khartoum Conference, other contributions received by Jordan, and Jordan's very strong foreign exchange position. Congress has cut back our foreign aid resources and we would jeopardize our other AID programs to Jordan if we were to provide budget support that does not appear to be currently needed. As Ambassador Symmes has confirmed to Your Excellency, we continue our interest in Jordan's financial well being and are prepared to review your Government's budgetary situation whenever you consider that such a review is warranted.

6. The major problem in the area is the establishment of a peace which is just and lasting. Its achievement is of critical importance to all of us, and both of our countries are dedicated to this goal. Let there be no doubt, Your Excellency, that our efforts in this regard have been and will continue to be unremitting. We welcome as a first step the Security Council's adoption on November 22 of the resolution under which UN Special Representative Jarring was appointed. Ambassador Jarring's mission provides an opportunity to work toward settlement which is not likely to recur. It is of great importance that the parties make the most of this opportunity by cooperating energetically and with as much flexibility as possible in the negotiating process.

7. The United States, for its part, is fully committed to supporting Ambassador Jarring's efforts. Ambassador Goldberg said in the Security Council on November 22 'the diplomatic and political influence of the United States Government will be exerted in support of the United Nations Special Representative to achieve a fair, equitable and dignified settlement so that all in the area can live in peace, security and tranquility.' Jordan can count on the United States to do all it can to further a just and reasonable settlement. We are deeply conscious of the importance which the two issues of Jerusalem and the West Bank have for Jordan. When King Hussein recently visited the United States, we explained to him our position on these problems. Our policy on this has not changed.

8. Your Excellency and your Cabinet colleagues have done much to help maintain an atmosphere enhancing the prospects for a political solution of the Middle Eastern situation. I have noted in particular the actions your Government has taken in seeking to prevent terrorism and in encouraging the resumption of normal activities on the West Bank, such as the operation of schools and commercial traffic.

9. I am keenly aware of the many serious problems facing Your Excellency and the Kingdom as a whole, including the major one of alleviating the tragic plight of the refugees. My Government has, of course, continued its very substantial contributions to meet the more recent emergency situation. We have also supported the United Nations General Assembly and Security Council actions on this problem that were taken during recent months. These included resolutions calling upon the Government of Israel to facilitate the return of those inhabitants who had fled following the outbreak of hostilities, resolutions which we continue to believe must be implemented to the fullest extent possible. We have repeatedly made clear to all concerned, both publicly and privately, our position on the 'new refugees', as well as on the need for an overall solution to the refugee problem. I can assure you that my Government remains dedicated to the principle that a just settlement of the refugee problem should and must be found. The present efforts to establish conditions of peace afford an opportunity to come to grips with this problem at last.

10. In closing, let me say that we recognize Your Excellency's appointment as Prime Minister last October as a reaffirmation of the special confidence that King Hussein has long placed in your leadership. We continue to wish you success as Jordan grapples with the many difficult problems resulting from the June war. We want to help wherever and to the extent possible. I hope that Your Excellency will continue the frank and friendly dialogue that you have already established with Ambassador Symmes in whom I repose complete confidence. Sincerely, Dean Rusk."

11. We assume that the GOJ will treat this letter as classified and will not release any part of it without our consent.

Rusk

64. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, January 30, 1968.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. VIII, Cables and Memos, 12/67-2/68. Secret. A handwritten notation indicates the memorandum was received at 1:10 p.m.

SUBJECT
Israeli Approaches on the Suez Canal

Attached is a memo from Dick Helms saying that the [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] sees a new crisis brewing over the Suez Canal./2/

/2/Not printed. The attached January 29 memorandum is a covering memorandum forwarding a memorandum prepared in the CIA, also dated January 29, with the subject heading: "Israeli Position on Opening the Suez Canal To Permit the Exit of Trapped Ships."

The Israelis agreed via Jarring to allow the Egyptians to clear the southern half of the Canal enough to let 15 trapped ships out. The UN is now pressing Israel to let the Egyptians begin surveying the northern half. This could lead to re-opening the whole Canal. Eban has warned U Thant that Israel will oppose that, and this morning's firing along the northern portion of the Canal gives credence to [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] statement that they will oppose by force if necessary. They see any Egyptian moves without their approval as a violation of the August cease-fire agreement.

[less than 1 line of source text not declassified] says the UAR is working secretly to clear the whole Canal without Israel's approval. He suggests that the Egyptians may provide information on the remaining obstacles in the Canal to permit Soviet vessels in Port Said to transit the Canal and present Israel with a "fait accompli."

He then said he believes Israel and the US have a common interest in keeping the northern part of the Canal blocked to keep the Soviet navy away from Yemen, Aden and the Persian Gulf.

Eppie Evron came in late last evening to state the same case and ask us informally to help relieve the pressure on them from New York to let Egyptian surveying go ahead in the northern part of the Canal./3/ I asked him whether he was proposing keeping the Canal closed "forever" to keep the Soviets out of the Red Sea or whether Israel's desire to keep the Canal closed would end if Egypt offered to let the Israeli flag through. He said he couldn't answer.

/3/A memorandum of this conversation, prepared by Saunders on January 30, is in The Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. III, Cables and Memos, 12/67-2/68.

This is serious business, and I am passing Eppie's request to Secretary Rusk./4/ We have to be careful with the way the Israelis [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] and the strategy of containing the USSR with their own bargaining interest in keeping the Canal closed. For the moment, I just want you to have this background against which to read today's stories of firing on the Canal.

/4/In his January 30 memorandum to Rusk, Rostow noted that the immediate operational question posed by the Israeli request was whether the United States should approach the UN Secretariat to urge strict adherence to the August 1967 cease-fire agreement relating to the Suez Canal. (Ibid.) On February 3 Battle and Sisco sent a memorandum to Rusk recommending against such an initiative, noting that the UAR had halted all operations connected with the release of the ships, and had indicated, through the semi-official al-Ahram newspaper, that such operations would not be resumed until there was a settlement of the Middle East crisis. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, NEA Files: Lot 72 D 39, UAR-Jan 1 through June 30, 1968)

Walt

65. Action Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, January 31, 1968.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. VIII, Cables and Memos 12/67-2/68. Secret. A handwritten notation indicates the memorandum was received in the President's office on February 1 at 9 a.m.

SUBJECT
PL-480 Program for Israel

Attached is a Freeman-Poats-Fowler-Schultze recommendation on Israel's PL-480 request./2/ There are two separate issues to decide:

/2/Not printed. Secretary of Agriculture Freeman and Acting AID Administrator Poats put their joint recommendation to President Johnson in a January 24 memorandum. (Ibid.) On January 27 Director of the Bureau of the Budget Schultze sent a supporting memorandum to the President, noting that the Agriculture-AID recommendation was also supported by Secretary of the Treasury Fowler. (Ibid.)

1. Quantity. Israel requested a $33 million program. The Departments recommend $27 million (same as last year) because Israeli and US experts differ over Israeli requirements, even after we sent a specialist to Tel Aviv. Our problem is not selling so much that we hurt our markets. This is a technical disagreement with some Israeli bargaining thrown in. If you go ahead, three courses are open:

a. Approve the Departments' $27.1 million program

b. Approve the Departments' program but tell Israel we'd consider adding later if they need more/3/

/3/President Johnson checked this option.

c. Give the Israelis what they ask for and write into the agreement safeguards to protect our program

2. Terms. Last year you approved a 50-50 split between dollar credit and local currency. Israel requests the same terms this year. But everyone agrees that 100% dollar credit for 20 years are the softest terms justifiable on economic grounds, since Israel is doing well. These are the terms we give Jordan, which is in much worse shape. If you wish to make a concession, your advisors recommend at least 75% dollar credit to continue progress toward 100% dollar sale as the Congress has asked. Your choices are:

a. 100% total credit (20 years at 2-1/2%)/4/

/4/President Johnson checked this option.

b. Compromise at 75% dollar credit

c. Approve Israeli request for 50% dollar credit

I agree that Israel can afford hard terms and is just trying to get aid wherever it can. But I also recognize your needs and personally would suggest the middle course-75% dollar credit this year (2b) for the $27 million program with the promise of a little more later if the Israelis need it (1b). If you wish to tighten up just a bit more, we could more easily justify a move to 100% dollar sale than being tight on quantities.

Walt

66. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State/1/

Amman, February 3, 1968, 2145Z.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. VIII, Cables and Memos 12/67-2/68. Secret. A handwritten notation indicates the memorandum was received in the President's office on February 1 at 9 a.m.

3270. Subject: Actions needed to forestall further Jordanian moves toward Soviets.

1. After sending King's message to General Khammash today through special channels (in essence King told Khammash that if USG does not meet his requirements he will buy Soviet arms), I arranged meeting with King's private secretary and confidante Zaid al-Rifa'i to try to obtain better insight into King's current mood. I also wanted to get Zaid's advice on whether it would be wise for me to try to see King before Khammash returns with arms package.

2. Zaid told me that Hussein himself had drafted message to Khammash. He said that King has become increasingly convinced about the correctness of his view of larger context in which he now sees USG policy toward Middle East. Zaid then explained King's analysis very much along lines King had taken with me on Jan 25 (Amman 3129)./2/ US is tied down in Far East and other areas and has little flexibility or, for that matter, will to act constructively to promote just peace in Middle East. Soviets have been moving in, particularly since June war and, rightly or wrongly, are credited by Arab leaders with right motives and sympathetic policies in Middle East. USG is judged to be both unwilling and unable to control Israel. Thus, moderate Jordanians agree with King Hussein that time has come to "stay a step ahead of situation by moving toward Soviets."

/2/Not printed. Secretary of Agriculture Freeman and Acting AID Administrator Poats put their joint recommendation to President Johnson in a January 24 memorandum. (Ibid.) On January 27 Director of the Bureau of the Budget Schultze sent a supporting memorandum to the President, noting that the Agriculture-AID recommendation was also supported by Secretary of the Treasury Fowler. (Ibid.)

3. King feels he has gone "ninety percent of the way" with the US. After June the US seemed to forget completely all that he and other moderate Jordanians had done over past decade and more to help preserve stability and moderation in Middle East. US had done nothing to help Jordan out since June. To the contrary, we had in effect, voted against Jordan on Jerusalem question; we had posed continuous difficulties about matters of mere words in Security Council resolutions; we had finally lifted arms embargo for Israel and certain other Arab states but pointedly excluded Jordan; and then we had discontinued budgetary support which had become symbol of our relationship. Although subsequently we had affirmed our continued support of Jordan in general way, fact was that totality of our actions toward Jordan had been negative rather than positive. Finally, King's reception in US in November, particularly in contrast to later reception of Eshkol, had been serious psychological blow.

4. Zaid explained that he separately and later together with PriMin Talhouni today had argued at some length with King to effect he should accept US arms package, even if it provides only 50 percent of Jordan arms strength as of June 4. They had urged it would be better go along with us in present situation because Soviet arms deal would not contribute to solution Middle East problem and, in their view, would further obstruct solution. King had pressed his own analysis in paragraph 2 above in response to this advice.

5. In Zaid's view there is much to what King says. He said he believes that if US arms package proves inadequate in King's view, only way to keep King from going to Soviets for arms is to be able to cite something tangible and dramatic to indicate that US does have continuing positive interest in Jordan and does in fact intend "use its muscle" to prevent Israelis from carrying off a massive fait accompli. Zaid said that "statements without practical effect" simply are not enough. Jordan must be able to point to something tangible to show that USG intends to implement its statements about Jerusalem and the Jarring Mission. It is not enough to say USG will exert pressure; USG must actually exert pressure and point to results. In the past decade and more the King felt that Jordan had given everything and gotten nothing in trying to live with Israel. USG had spoken a great deal about human and legal rights in Viet Nam. What about Arab rights? What about villages that had been levelled on West Bank by Israel? What about people who had been evicted from their homes in Gaza, Jerusalem, and West Bank? What about UN decisions that had been consistently flouted? What about recent US statements about not accepting unilateral Israeli actions? Fact is that USG is accepting Israeli actions and doing nothing about them.

6. Throughout this conversation Zaid emphasized that these are things King is thinking. This is his reading of situation. Actually his advisers are trying without much hope of success to convince him to make no drastic moves. Yet, many Jordanians now believe the Soviets can call the tune in the Middle East and the Mediterranean. They are beginning to believe the Soviets [garble--are able?] to challenge the US Sixth Fleet in the Middle East and that the Soviets also have Marines and helicopters to land in Middle East if necessary. Thus, many Jordanians and other Arabs now see a possibility of Security Council or other UN action to face Israel with sanctions similar to those that had been put on Israel in 1956 by the US. But in this case it would be the Soviets that would take the credit for forcing the Israelis to respect world opinion, not the US.

7. I shall not detail rejoinders and comments I made to Zaid with regard to foregoing. I sought his reaction to idea I might seek an audience with Hussein tomorrow or Monday before Khammash returns in order to try to dispel some of King's apparent misinterpretations of our policies and actions. Zaid counselled me against seeing King but said he would let Hussein know I was available whenever he wanted to see me. (I will in any case accompany Eugene Black in call late on sixth.) He thought it would be better for me not to see King until Khammash has returned with "package," but he emphasized it would be essential for package to be approximately what King wanted and for it to be placed in best possible light. More important, however, would be some kind of US action with regard to Jerusalem or Jarring Mission that could be cited as real evidence of US intentions to use its muscle to bring about a peaceful settlement.

8. As Zaid was leaving he said he and PriMin Talhouni had obtained King's grudging agreement to let King Faisal know if he finds US package unacceptable. According to Zaid, Talhouni had said to King that even he, who had never had good relationship with Americans, believed it would be in Jordan's interest to do everything possible avoid changing "political balance" in area at this time. Zaid and Talhouni, however, are not sanguine Hussein will go again to Faisal if US package appears too far short of his requirements. (Dept may wish inform Ambassador Eilts of most recent developments.)

9. Comment: A. At this stage we need something more than a gimmick. We need an earnest of our intentions with regard to Jerusalem and the UK resolution. Jordan accepted the UK resolution and has categorically stated this to Jarring. Jordan is willing to make a public statement to this effect as soon as Israel similarly commits itself to Jarring and publicly accepts resolution. In my opinion even more important than giving Hussein double the arms he has requested would be a clearcut public statement with practical effect of our intentions re Jerusalem and Jarring (or failing that, unpublicized evidence through Jarring or otherwise that Israelis will cease their unilateral actions in Jerusalem and will accept UK resolution as basis for negotiations). In this regard, I must emphasize that Jordanians immediately picked up and began to suspect phrase "in spirit of" in reference to Israeli attitude toward Jarring Mission as carried in Eshkol-Johnson communique.

B. I think we also might consider giving immediate publicity to our decision supply arms to Jordan thus making it more difficult for King to more towards Soviet arms relationship. This statement would have to be to effect we have decided satisfy legitimate requirements of Jordan because of our long and cordial relationship, because of its moderate views, and because we think Jordan is entitled satisfy its defensive requirements.

C. Dept may wish repeat this on Nodis basis to USUN and Tel Aviv.

Symmes

67. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Battle) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/

Washington, February 5, 1968.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, NEA Files: Lot 72 D 39, Jerusalem. Secret. Drafted by Sidney Sober on January 31, and cleared in draft by Sisco (IO), Deputy Legal Adviser Carl F. Salans, and member of the Policy Planning Council John C. Campbell.

SUBJECT
Policy on Jerusalem

Discussion

We have been giving careful study for some months past to the question of Jerusalem, a "crunch" issue in any prospective settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute. Various Israeli statements and actions indicate a closed mind on Jerusalem, although we cannot be sure how much Israel's position may be tactical and how far it might be willing to recede as part of a settlement package. But in any event we cannot passively accept Israel's unilateral dominion over Old Jerusalem (actually the Old City plus adjacent areas). To do so would ignore the interests of Jordan and of the traditional Arab residents of Old Jerusalem, as well as the interests of the major religions.

Our IRG has considered a plan for the partial internationalization of Old Jerusalem, and has agreed that if offers a possible solution. This plan is described in the attached paper./2/ I believe the specifics of the plan are not as vital as the principles behind it, and that various details--such as the nature of the administration for the city or its precise boundaries--will have to be kept under review as time and negotiations progress.

/2/Not printed. The attachment is a paper marked IRG/NEA 68-4, January 23, entitled "Jerusalem--A Proposal for Partial Internationalization." The Interdepartmental Regional Group (IRG) had a subgroup that dealt the Middle East.

Whereas we need not tie ourselves to any specific formula for the City's future administration, we believe we should be guided by the following principles for a Jerusalem solution:

1. A plan for Jerusalem and the timing of its employment should contribute to, rather than impede, progress toward an overall settlement.

2. Greater Jerusalem should remain a city without barriers.

3. International interests in Old Jerusalem should be recognized, and specific provision made for protecting those interests.

4. There should be freedom of access from both Israel and Jordan.

5. The economic well-being of the residents of Old Jerusalem should be assured without prejudice and its economy closely linked to the economies of Jordan and Israel.

Scenario

The following steps seem appropriate:

1. Continue to keep pressure on the Government of Israel to avoid policy pronouncements and actions that tend to rigidify the present de facto situation in Jerusalem. Draw as desirable on the above points in explaining the principles which guide our approach to the question.

2. If Ambassador Jarring indicates a desire to discuss the question with us, inform him of the principles governing our approach; if he seeks specifics, tell him of the nature of our internationalization proposal, making it clear that we are not tied to any given plan.

3. At least so long as the Jarring mission remains active, hold back on surfacing the plan with the various interested governments. We should consider the utility, however, of some public statement of our principles on Jerusalem if it would be helpful in terms both of our relations with the Arabs and of the peace-making effort.

4. Continue to sharpen up our views on various alternatives for the Jerusalem regime, with an eye to eventual private discussions with the governments concerned, and perhaps public discussion (possibly in the UN), when and as appropriate.

Recommendation

I should like to have your approval for our proceeding along the lines of the above scenario. Joe Sisco, whose staff has worked closely with us in formulating this position, concurs. We should like also to have an early occasion to discuss these questions with you, particularly in regard to your views on internationalization and some of the alternative methods of dealing with an open Jerusalem./3/

/3/Rusk wrote "OK DR" in the margin opposite this paragraph. On a handwritten option line of "See me," February 8, 11 a.m., is written in an unknown hand.

68. Information Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, February 5, 1968.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, White House Central File, Meeting Notes File, 11/67-4/68. Secret.

SUBJECT
Background on Jordan Arms Package

The attached from Harry Symmes/2/ is the best background I could give you for your decision on the arms package for Jordan, which will be coming up in the next day or two. It also provides a useful backdrop for Harman's farewell call tomorrow.

/2/The attachment is telegram 3270 from Amman, Document 66.

What strikes me is not the familiar point about buying Soviet arms if we can't meet Jordan's needs but the increasing Jordanian conviction that we are bowing out of the Middle East and only the USSR can bring justice to the Arabs.

We told our Arab friends last fall that, if they went along with a balanced UN resolution, we'd do all in our power to help bring Israel around. Until last Thursday,/3/ the Israelis had refused to tell Jarring they accepted that resolution. In addition, they keep making their own changes in Jerusalem, either feeling they have us in their pockets or discounting our view entirely. The Arabs are beginning to believe that we aren't even trying to press Israel.

/3/February 1.

In fact, we can take some credit for Eban's acceptance of the resolution last week./4/ But we haven't made a dent on his Jerusalem position, and we are trying today to keep the Jordanians from calling a Security Council meeting on Jerusalem.

/4/Telegram 2396 from Tel Aviv, February 4, reported that Foreign Minister Eban in his February 1 meeting with Ambassador Jarring put forward the following formula with respect to UN Security Council Resolution 242 to be passed by Jarring to Cairo: "I can affirm that we are ready to seek agreement on the establishment of peace in a negotiation embracing all matters included in the S.C. res. 22 Nov which either side may wish to raise." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR)

Our dilemma is that it's hard to lean on the Israelis until negotiations produce a reasonable proposition to throw our weight behind. But if we can't persuade the Arabs now that we're willing and able to get some results, we may not get to negotiations because they may figure the Jarring mission is hopeless without our behind-scenes help.

Walt

69. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Johnson/1/

Washington, February 6, 1968.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, White House Central File, Meeting Notes File, Briefing Papers for Tuesday Luncheon, February 6, 1968. Secret.

You have asked that I inform you of "the latest date on which the President could make a decision to supply Israel with Phantom aircraft of appropriate configuration to be delivered to Israel beginning in January 1970."

If your decision is made on or before December 31, 1968, we can begin the delivery of Phantoms to Israel in January 1970. The Israeli request was for 50 aircraft. We would plan to deliver them at the rate of approximately 4 per month.

Robert S. McNamara

70. Information Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, February 6, 1968.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. VIII, Cables and Memos, 12/67-2/68. Secret.

SUBJECT
Aircraft Sale to Israel

Just to give you a full response to your queries Sunday, the Israelis and Defense signed the agreement on January 30 for 40 more Skyhawks./2/ They did this on the basis of your statement to Eshkol that you would add 27-30 Skyhawks to the present agreement-or another 10 if needed. Israel asked for 40.

/2/The text of this agreement, conveyed to the Israeli Embassy on January 30 in a diplomatic note from the Department of State, is in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, NEA Files: Lot 72 D 39, Israel-Jan 1 through June 30, 1968.

I think we get two things out of this:

First, for the first time we have made a 100% cash sale to Israel for arms--$60 million. They were in a hurry since the contract had to be signed by 1 February to take advantage of the production line arrangements Secretary McNamara worked out at your request.

Second, we will take advantage of your having gone the extra mile with Eshkol in our coming approaches to Eshkol and Eban to get the Jarring exercise off dead center.

Third, with this response and our generous handling of General Hod we seem to have bought a calm on the subject of aircraft for Israel. It remains to be seen, but we hope we may also have bought quiet-at least from the Israelis themselves-on our Jordan arms package.

In addition, you should know that Generals Hod and Wheeler had a good series of talks. Hod went back to Israel to do some homework and sent four of his officers back for technical discussions. If any cover was needed, the negotiations for the added Skyhawks provided it. Now General Wheeler is waiting for the final answers he needs from Hod to prepare the memo you asked for following the Eshkol visit.

One other point you should be aware of is that Secretary McNamara has married the current Skyhawk production line to the new one so as to slow the present one slightly but complete delivery of all Skyhawks by January 1970. This means that 4 were delivered in December; 28 will be delivered in 1968; 56 will be delivered in 1969 and January 1970. This pushes 16 originally scheduled for 1968 delivery into 1969, but the Israelis have agreed.

Walt

71. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk and Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Johnson/1/

Washington, February 6, 1968.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 12-5 JORDAN. Secret.

SUBJECT
Recommended Arms Package for Jordan as a Result of the Khammash

Negotiations

General Khammash, Chief of Staff of the Jordan Arab Army, arrived in Washington on January 17 as a result of our decision to resume arms deliveries in Jordan.

Since the June Arab-Israeli hostilities the Jordanians have pressed us to resume arms shipments to make up at least part of the losses they suffered in June. We were not responsive until January 7. You will recall that in December in an oral message to you King Hussein agreed that he would not purchase arms from the Soviet Union if the United States would meet his legitimate defensive arms requirements./2/ Not having heard from us, the King decided that the pressure for arms from his army was such that he could no longer resist persistent Soviet offers of military equipment. As a result of our Ambassador's intervention, Hussein postponed his decision until General Khammash could determine in Washington what we are willing to do. Unless we can convince the King that we are willing to resume our previous role of arms supplier to Jordan, there is little doubt that, in his present critical situation, he will turn to the Soviets for arms.

/2/See footnote 3, Document 29.

Upon his arrival, General Khammash presented us with a list of military requirements totalling approximately $200 million. (The details are outlined in Tab A.)/3/ We have met with him periodically during the last two weeks to discuss his requirements and we have explained to him our very serious problems in meeting them. He admitted that his requests were the maximum. Because of the critical situation in which Jordan now finds itself he maintains this list, which in fact exceeds Jordan's losses by a substantial amount, is necessary to restore the morale of the armed forces. It is apparent that he will stand on his original request until we make a counter proposal.

/3/None of the tabs is printed.

Khammash argues strongly that he must go back with explicit assurances of resumed US support for the Jordan armed forces; that he, Khammash, has continually assured his officers and men (based on discussions with us last summer) that American help was coming, but that his assurances are wearing dangerously thin; and that pressures on the King to meet arms needs, even from the USSR if necessary, are mounting. Our Ambassador confirms this assessment. We have also had disturbing reports of a deterioration in the internal security situation in Jordan.

It is clear that the very modest arms package we recommended to you in December will not meet the political objectives we have set ourselves, namely, (1) to shut off any further temptation on the part of the King to accept Russian arms; (2) to increase the morale of the armed forces and their loyalty to the King; (3) to increase his prestige and stature with respect to his Arab neighbors; and (4) to strengthen Hussein so that he can better carry out his role as principal proponent of a settlement with Israel.

The principal problems presented by the Khammash list, in addition to its size, are his requests for tanks and aircraft. Khammash wishes to pursue his pre-war plan of standardizing on American tanks and phasing out his British Centurions. He has asked for 200 M-48 A-4s with diesel engines and 105mm guns. He has also asked for 36 "multi-purpose, versatile jet aircraft."

Both the tanks and the aircraft are troublesome because of their high cost and relatively large numbers, and because we would then be almost the sole supplier of major equipment items for Jordan. The problems with Israel would be increased if we agreed to supply Jordan with tanks with 105mm guns as opposed to the 90mm guns with which their present tanks are equipped.

Recommendations

We have put together a counter proposal which we recommend that our negotiator offer to Khammash. The details of this proposal are at Tab B. In essence, we would: (a) Agree to deliver ground force items suspended after the war. These are a combination of cash sales and prior year grant MAP items totalling about $10 million. There are no major items of consequence included. (b) Make up Jordan's war losses not included in (a) with the exception of heavy artillery and some of the tanks. (c) Offer 88 M-48s instead of 200-and without the larger 105mm gun, and (d) Agree to go ahead with our F-104 contract by selling 18 F-104s now and, subject to certain conditions, consider a second 18 aircraft at some point in the future. We would plan deliveries and financing over two and a half fiscal years; actual deliveries after 1968 would be subject to an annual review of Jordan's military requirements, taking into consideration the political and economic situation then prevailing and particularly progress towards an Arab-Israeli settlement and progress of efforts towards arms limitations in the area. The considerations which would be the subject of the annual reviews are at Tab D.

The installation for the first fiscal year would cost approximately $32 million in cash sales for both ground and air force items. Of this amount, $10 million has already been paid under the previously concluded F-104 contract. The installment for the second fiscal year would cost approximately $36.3 million while the third would be $10.3 million. The estimated cost of the total program would be approximately $49 million for ground force items and $33 million for air force items, a total of $82 million inclusive of shipping and related charges--a substantial reduction from the cost of his request. About $3.8 million of this would be in prior year grant MAP and the balance in cash sales. Jordan can pay cash for the 1968 tranche; neither we nor they can promise anything definite about availability of funds thereafter. We believe cash sales will cause less opposition in Congress than credit sales. (See financial summary at Tab C.)

We propose the F-104 aircraft for the following reasons: (a) By resuming arms shipments to Jordan we are in effect placing it in the category of countries for whom we selectively lifted our arms suspension on 23 October. The suspension for Jordan specifically included the F-104's, and we would thus be doing for Jordan now what we did for the other "moderates" last October. (b) Jordan has on deposit $10 million against the F-104 contract. Spares, ground support and other equipment were shipped to Jordan prior to June. Twelve aircraft are currently in storage awaiting delivery. Some Jordanian pilots and technicians have been trained and others are now in training, and (c) the delivery time for the F-104 is almost immediate. If the morale of the armed forces is the key political factor in our aid to Jordan, they should have on their airfields some US planes as soon as possible.

We could put to Khammash a counter proposal which included 18 F-104's but excludes any tanks, making him meet his tank requirements in Great Britain. We consulted the British last week and they could make available their Centurion tank at a price comparable to our M48A1, in quantities of up to 200, with deliveries beginning in six months. They could, in about two years, upgun these Centurions to 105mm.

This proposal is not, however, likely to meet Jordan's minimum requirements; Jordan would want at least a partial fulfillment of its tank needs from American sources. Part of their reasoning is military: they now have a mixture of American and British tanks, but very few of the latter are in operable condition. It would be less expensive and more efficient to standardize, at least for their two armored brigades, on American tanks. An offer of about 88 US M48A1 tanks would permit them to equip their two brigades with American tanks. (Their total inventory of American tanks would then be 181, 64 less than pre-war.) The more important reason is political. Tanks are the most important element of their ground forces and consequently they want them to be American, as evidence of our continued support.

The King's mood is one of increasing frustration. In spite of his efforts, there has been no significant progress towards a settlement. His army is the only one in the area which has not been substantially re-equipped since the June war. The King wants the assurance of continued American support which our supply of major military items would imply. Given our traditional close relationship with Jordan, Hussein's demise or his acceptance of Soviet arms would be a serious blow to US prestige and interests in the area and would be interpreted as a significant Soviet victory.

In the circumstances, we recommend that you approve the recommendation below. If you approve, the Secretary of Defense will present this proposal to General Khammash.

Recommendation: That you authorize us to negotiate on the basis of the arms package outlined in Tab B on the understanding that we would first try to persuade the Jordanians to accept British tanks. We would plan deliveries and financing over two and a half fiscal years; actual deliveries after FY 1968 would be subject to an annual review of Jordan's military requirements, taking into consideration the political and economic situation then prevailing. If you approve, we would consult with members of Congress. Should they raise strong objections, we would return to you./4/

/4/There is no indication of the President's approval or disapproval of the recommendation.

Dean Rusk
Robert S. McNamara

72. Action Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, February 6, 1968.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, White House Central File, Meeting Notes File, 11/67-4/68. Secret.

SUBJECT
Jordan Arms Package

In the attached,/2/ Secretaries Rusk and McNamara recommend/3/ what they feel is the minimum package that King Hussein might see as meeting his legitimate needs. This poses two separate issues: (1) whether you are now ready to go ahead with a substantial program; and (2) if so, how to handle the difficult Conte-Long amendments./4/

/2/Document 71.

/3/A handwritten note by Dorothy Territo indicates that the attachment was not attached when the memorandum went forward to the President. She added another note in which she stated that Rusk and McNamara had not yet signed their memorandum to the President. Rostow apparently summarized that memorandum from an advance copy.

/4/See footnote 7, Document 49.

I. The package contains 18 F-104 aircraft, 88 M-48 A-1 tanks, medium artillery and a range of support equipment. This $82 million (FY 1968-FY 1970) package contrasts to Hussein's $200 million request, which included 36 aircraft and 200 M-48 A-4 tanks. Our rationale for paring his request is to help replace war losses except for some planes and tanks and heavy artillery. We would have to be willing to consider something beyond this package later but would suggest starting with this.

Our paring may leave this too little to meet what Hussein considers his needs. He lost 179 tanks in June, and we are offering half that. He wants tanks with a diesel engine (greater range) and a 105 mm. gun (which we sold the Israelis). We couldn't supply what he wants for two years. Our plane offer has a better chance, since we would just pick up our 1966 contract where it was suspended but offer half the number of planes now.

Our two hopes for flexibility are (a) that he can get British tanks to his specifications much sooner (they're available) and (b) that he might take some British aircraft if the Saudis would give them and we would supply a few more tanks instead. But the Secretaries feel we have to offer to supply both if neither of these deals works out.

Jordan could pay cash for the FY 1968 installment (about $32 million, of which $10 million already paid under the 1966 contract). The cost in FY 1969 would be $36.3 million and in FY 1970 $10.3 million. Neither Khammash nor the USG yet knows definitely how the FY 1968 and FY 1969 tranches might be financed, so we would have to feel our way.

This package will be painful to approve, but the alternative is accepting the probable consequences of not going ahead now. Eshkol acknowledged to you that he wished no one had to give arms to Jordan but he'd rather see us there than the USSR. Dayan in a published interview on January 19 said: "We shall not profit by it in any way if the Americans lose their influence in Jordan."

I should hate to see this presented to you simply as selling arms to block Soviet military aid, because the issue is now much broader. We have reached the point in Jordan where the question is whether they think they have a better chance of achieving their objectives with US or Soviet help. If we are ending our aid relationship and are unable to press Israel toward a settlement, then Hussein is wondering whether a Soviet ring around Israel wouldn't better bring Israel to terms. This is, of course, the thinking of an increasingly desperate man who sees his choices diminishing. It would just about end chances for the kind of settlement we'd like.

There are other things we must do on the diplomatic front such as presenting a clearer position on Jerusalem and helping get the Jarring exercise moving. But unfortunately, this military aid decision has become a symbol to Hussein. We have strung him along since last June, and Khammash has been here since January 17. Now Hussein has told you he would continue to avoid Soviet arms if he could be sure of meeting his legitimate needs in the US. That is the purpose of this exercise.

Approve Secretaries' approach/5/
Disapprove
Call me

/5/There is no indication of the President's response to the options. Telegram 111563 to Amman, February 7, however, informed the Embassy that the President had agreed in principle with the recommended arms package, subject to Congressional consultations. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 19-8 US-JORDAN)

II. The Conte-Long amendments require you to withhold aid from Jordan in an amount equal to its expenditure for sophisticated weapons unless you waive on the ground that the Jordanian purchases are "vital to the national security of the United States." The airplanes, the tanks, and the howitzers in this package are pretty clearly sophisticated weapons. If you do not waive, we would have to eliminate all economic aid to Jordan for at least the next two years.

It would be possible to weave a complicated legal argument which might allow you to maintain aid without a waiver. But it would be very dubious and would certainly cause serious trouble on the Hill. Therefore, Rusk and McNamara recommend that you make the waiver.

This will be the first use of the waiver provision. I think the Secretaries have a strong case, but you may want to have some fast checking done on the Hill. I don't think we should seek agreement from Conte, Fulbright, Morse, Church and the others most interested in this topic, but you may want to be able to say that you notified them beforehand. (The law requires you to make formal notification of waiver to the Congress within 30 days.)

III. If you approve this package, Secretary McNamara would go over it in detail with Khammash. In view of the importance of your personal intentions as Hussein sees them, there could be great advantage in your inviting him in before he leaves for a heart-to-heart talk.

I'll see him
I'd rather not/6/

/6/Neither option is checked.

Walt

73. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Washington, February 7, 1968.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. VIII, Memos, 12/67-2/68. Secret; Nodis. Prepared by Saunders.

PARTICIPANTS
President Lyndon B. Johnson
Ambassador Avraham Harman

Ambassador Harman opened his farewell call on the President yesterday by expressing his appreciation for the honor of having worked with the President and of having represented his country in the United States for this past eight years. He thanks the President for his understanding.

The President responded by saying he had Israel's deepest interests at heart. The President said he felt this deeply and personally. If at any time we reached different conclusions it was because of our different viewpoints rather than because of any lack of interest in Israel's future.

The President went on to express his deep concern over the odds working against Israel. He knew the Israeli people were superior in ability to their neighbors, but he feared they might not be superior to the Soviets. The President recalled how the Soviets had poured arms into the Arab countries after the war. He said he was not sure what Soviet intentions were. He had thought after talking to Premier Kosygin that they wanted to live at peace with us, and now after the summer of arms shipments into the Mid-East and events in North Korea, he was not so sure.

The President said, however, that he could not afford to give up hope. He had agreed with Premier Kosygin to talk about the Middle East and nothing has happened. Kosygin has moved on the NPT, and the President hopes something can be done to achieve arms limitation in the Mid-East. He is not confident, but he can not afford to give up hope. He intends to make every effort to reach some sort of understanding before he makes any more decisions on aircraft. Ambassador Harman nodded his understanding.

In the context of discussing Soviet penetration of the Middle East, the President said, "I am going to do something for Jordan. I told your Prime Minister that and I am just going to have to go ahead." Ambassador Harman again nodded his understanding.

Of Nasser, the President said he had come into office with the hope of getting along with the Egyptian leadership. He had found, however, that Nasser was unreliable, untrustworthy, and undependable. He hoped we could achieve some sort of working relationship but did not know exactly what we could work out.

The President described the problem created for him by the depth of opposition in the United States to our extensive international commitments. The President suggested that what the Israeli Ambassador and his Minister ought to be doing is to tell their American friends at every turn that the United States cannot play a responsible role in the world if they pull out on obligations like Vietnam. The President said he didn't see how Americans could live with their consciences unless they met these obligations around the world, but he was having a very difficult time persuading many Americans on that point. He said many Americans believe that our problems would end if we got out of Vietnam, but he knew it "wouldn't be 24 hours before we faced new ones."

The Ambassador said a few kind words about his successor. The President said that he did not know how the Israelis could improve on Ambassador Harman's work but that he looked forward to working with General Rabin and said he would find the President just as receptive as Ambassador Harman had.

He told Ambassador Harman that he liked all the Israelis he knew. He was fond of Eshkol and liked to do business with him. He would not like to do anything to hurt his feelings. Then he said he would like to see Moshe Dayan when he visited the United States, but did not know how to do it without hurting Prime Minister Eshkol's feelings. Ambassador Harman said that, with the President's permission, he would see whether he could do something to ease the President's problem. The President reiterated that he fully understood Eshkol's sensitivities on this subject and would have the same ones if their positions were reversed. But he, the President, would like to know as many Israeli leaders past, present or future as possible.

In parting, the President asked the Ambassador to take his warm wishes to Mrs. Harman. He also asked the Ambassador to tell Prime Minister Eshkol, "I may not worry as much as Prime Minister Eshkol does about Israel, but I worry as deeply."

H.H.S.