1. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Davies) to the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach)/1/

Washington, November 25, 1967.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, NEA Files: Lot 72 D 39, Jordan. Secret. Drafted by Robert B. Houghton and Davies.

SUBJECT
Arms for Jordan

There is attached a telegraphic memorandum from Ambassador Symmes [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]./2/

/2/Dated November 24 and addressed to Assistant Secretary Battle.

Ambassador Symmes is concerned that one of the first matters of business which the King will take up with him when he returns to Amman November 26 is to ask what further response the USG may have made to his request for arms. The Ambassador is certain that Hussein feels that the passage of the U.K. resolution/3/ was facilitated by his own diplomatic efforts. In addition, the Ambassador points out that it will be indispensable to Hussein in continuing to work for a political settlement to have his Army solidly behind him. The Army, according to reports reaching our Embassy, has been generating pressure on the Government to resupply equipment lost during the June war. Ambassador Symmes believes that the November 21 incidents, with the bombardment of the Karama refugee camp and the Israeli air attack, will heighten this pressure. The Ambassador fears that if the King becomes suspicious that we will not be able to help him out, he could quickly become so frustrated that he might decide to go to the Soviets for arms.

/3/Reference is to Resolution 242, adopted by the UN Security Council on November 22. (UN doc. S/RES/242 (1967)) For documentation relating to the adoption of this resolution, which outlined the basis for a settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, volume XIX.

The Ambassador reports that the Embassy expects within the next day or so a list of those items whose delivery the Jordanian military command considers absolutely essential.

The Ambassador concludes his message by stating that our willingness to lift our embargo on arms for Jordan and to exert efforts to help Jordan obtain arms from other suppliers may soon become critical to our relationship./4/

/4/In telegram 74860 to Amman, November 25, the Department responded that the question of arms for Jordan was under intensive review, but in view of the complexity of the problem it was impossible to predict an outcome. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 12-5 JORDAN) On November 27 the Embassy reiterated the pressing need for a positive response to the Jordanian Government's request for a recommencement of arms supplies to Jordan. (Telegram 2395 from Amman; ibid.)

Comment:

We subscribe to the Ambassador's analysis of the pressures which are working on the King to procure arms to re-equip his Army and the likely consequences if we are not in a position to help him. As soon as we have received the list of items which the Jordan Army considers absolutely essential, we will recommend to you a course of action with regard to the shipment of arms to Jordan. In the meantime, we intend, as an interim measure, to query the King as to the status of his efforts to obtain some of his requirements from European sources in the event that we might be able to facilitate his efforts. The Ambassador would make clear that in so querying the King we were trying to be helpful and in no way indicating that we had decided not to supply arms to Jordan.

2. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel/1/

Washington, November 25, 1967, 2218Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 12-5 ISR. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by Alfred L. Atherton, Jr.; cleared in substance by Harry H. Schwartz and Richard B. Parker; and approved by Rodger P. Davies.

74858. Ref: Tel Aviv 1611./2/

/2/In telegram 1611 from Tel Aviv, November 24, Ambassador Barbour reported that Prime Minister Eshkol asked whether the U.S. position on military supplies for Israel remained as stated by Battle on October 6. (Ibid.) Documentation concerning the position taken by Battle on October 6 is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, volume XIX.

1. You may inform Eshkol that status Weizman request remains as conveyed to GOI representatives here. We continue actively to staff out request within USG but unable say at this time when our internal procedures will be completed. With respect to additional A-4's, Eshkol may be assured that we are aware of special lead time problem on

Douglas A-4 production line and are taking this factor fully into consideration. More generally, we are sensitive to Israel's need retain adequate defensive capability and remain convinced that Israel retains sufficient margin of safety for foreseeable future to permit orderly completion of thorough and deliberate analysis Weizman request which we are still in process of making. Our decision to unfreeze sizeable backlog of orders for parts and components, to give continuing case by case consideration to new pipeline requests, and to confirm delivery of A-4's under 1966 contract--a decision which was not politically easy for us--should reassure GOI of our continued sympathetic view of Israel's security requirements. FYI. SIG is scheduled consider Near East arms policy, including Weizman request, week of November 27, and we hope have decision one way or other, at least with respect to additional A-4's, soon thereafter. JCS say that, with arrival 48 A-4's already promised, Israeli military superiority over any combination of Arabs will be assured for three to five years, even without additional 50 Mirages from France. Israeli MilAtt here has conveyed some sense of urgency about A-4 add-on request, largely related to fact Douglas Aircraft must soon make decision about future production line programming. On other hand, MilAtt fairly relaxed about other components of Weizman request. In addition, he has indicated Israel no longer pressing for M-113 APC's approved May 23 and wishes instead early USG approval for GOI purchase of used APC's from European surplus stocks for cannibalization purposes. We are now giving active consideration to this request as well as to pending IDF orders for Piper Cub aircraft and $11 million in additional tank parts. End FYI.

2. Following is for your guidance should Eshkol raise Nasser speech./3/ While speech does not augur well for early progress toward political settlement, we have never felt progress would come easily and assume GOI has not thought so either. It is not without precedent for Near Eastern political leaders to strike hard line public bargaining pose and remains to be seen how much of what Nasser said about settlement terms is for bargaining purposes. This should become clearer once UN Special Representative becomes active./4/ Meanwhile, we do not discount potentially serious implications of Nasser speech--particularly references to Suez Canal, withdrawal terms, and military preparations--which, at very least, will make job of UN Rep more difficult. At same time, it important to bear in mind that main purpose of speech appeared be to boost domestic morale in context of somber review of enormity UAR military defeat in June. On future course of Arab-Israel problem there are number of ambiguities and contradictions in speech which could, if Nasser chooses, leave door open for some compromise. For example, he (a) describes UN resolution as "insufficient" but does not reject it, and (b) while speaking of need to prepare for new military round, acknowledges possibility that political settlement may make this unnecessary. In latter connection, possibly significant is Nasser's statement that "We believe that reaching a sufficient degree of strength may be a substitute for using it in fact." Given past experience, we are not inclined take comfort from any of this. At same time, we assume GOI will agree it would be mistake to assume on basis one speech in essentially domestic context that Nasser's position completely inflexible and that he is irretrievably launched on path to new war. Negotiating process has dynamic of its own which must be allowed develop before any final conclusions are reached.

/3/Reference is to the State of the Union message delivered by President Nasser to the UAR National Assembly on November 23. The speech was summarized in telegram 1015 from Cairo, November 24. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 15-1 UAR) Excerpts from this speech are printed in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1967, pp. 619-620.

/4/Security Council Resolution 242, adopted on November 22, called on the UN Secretary-General to designate a Special Representative to proceed to the Middle East "to establish and maintain contacts with the States concerned in order to promote agreement and assist the effort to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement" in accordance with the principles and provisions of Resolution 242. (UN doc. S/RES/242 (1967)) On November 23 the Secretary-General informed the Security Council of the appointment of Gunnar Jarring, Swedish Ambassador to the Soviet Union, as the Special Representative. (UN doc. S/8259)

3. Re present state of UAR military preparedness, we prefer base our judgment on what we know to be case and not on such ambiguous, unsubstantiated and contradictory statements as were contained in Nasser's November 23 speech. For example, while he says in one place that "the real power of our armed forces exceeds the real power prior to the start of the battle," he says in another that "our armed forces have restored a considerable part of their military strength" and that "we must realize that we cannot achieve everything all at once." In context, Nasser's comments about his armed forces make clear that he envisages and is preparing his people for a fundamental and long drawn-out process of reorganization and rebuilding. Again, we do not discount potentially serious implications of this, but we see in it no basis for altering our assessment of present relative military strengths in area and time factors involved which, in our judgment, remain in Israel's favor for foreseeable future.

Rusk

3. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State/1/

Tel Aviv, November 27, 1967, 1730Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 12-5 ISR. Secret; Immediate; Exdis.

1638. Ref: State 74858./2/

/2/Document 2.

1. As expected, in meeting with me today, PM Eshkol began by referring to Nasser speech of Nov 23. He likened Hussein-Nasser relationship to see-saw, with Hussein making encouraging noises in world capitals only to have his efforts frustrated by warlike pronouncements by Nasser. He described speech of Nov 23 as dagger in back of cause of peace. Eshkol said he had hoped with some confidence that Six-Day War would be followed by real peace in Middle East and he still hopes so but with considerably less confidence. The "superlatives" of Nasser's expression did not augur well. In any event, Israel must be careful and remain on guard.

2. Israeli military capability is adequate on ground. "Center of gravity" is the Air Force and there Israel is very vulnerable. Without repeating details, which had been given by Gen Weizman, Eshkol mentioned only that effective fighter strength now is some 90 planes, and they are no "spring chickens."

3. PM Eshkol said he is pessimistic about getting the 50 French Mirages. In any case, even if he gets those, his estimate is that Israel will be in a ratio of one to three in light of Soviet replacements to Egypt, worse if Algerian reinforcements should be forthcoming, and this only after arrival of last of 48 A4s which not scheduled until 1969. He thinks this ratio is too dangerous for Israel to contemplate with equanimity.

4. PM noted he aware US desire not become sole Israeli supplier and GOI also would prefer have more than one source. But, with French out of picture, US is only one to which Israel can turn. He has thought of alternative of building planes here but expense and time involved such a project make it most unattractive.

5. In circumstances, Eshkol wishes make most earnest plea for two steps by US: A) Agree to provide 27 more A4s and 50 Phantoms and B) expedite delivery 48 A4s already agreed. He urged we make this

decision with minimum delay, although he appreciated processing through governmental machinery of US magnitude time consuming. He noted Gen Weizman's report that his representations had received most cordial and sympathetic hearing, for which GOI grateful. But, he begged in most eloquent terms he could muster that GOI also get the hardware.

6. I gave Eshkol full substance State's most helpful reftel (obviously without FYI section). He made no particular comment, except to reiterate his growing doubts as to Nasser's intentions. I also urged that, despite his present uneasiness about the attainment of a peaceful settlement, he should not abandon hope of success at the end of what would be a hard road. He agreed. Further, I remarked that as the events of May and June receded in peoples' memory, Israel will have to give increasing attention to her image in the world. Her position as the victim of an attempt by her neighbors to annihilate her becomes less credible the longer she sits in her present posture as an occupying power in large areas. She must exercise the "magnanimity of the victor" in her own interest. Eshkol concurred, reminding me that I had once commented that Israel is now the power in the Middle East and has additional responsibility in the search for peace. He concluded that all this is dependent on Israel having real security, to which his present requests are directed.

FYI. Various readers of this message will recall that this air force imbalance has given me concern since the Soviet replacement program to Egypt began, and I had several occasions to mention it when in Washington recently. I do not take issue with our military experts' conclusion that for some time to come, Israel will be superior overall in military capability to any likely combination of powers which may be ranged against her, and this probably whether we make the additional 77 planes requested available or not. But I submit that, if the Israelis themselves do not think so, their increased nervousness will be likely to make them at worst tend toward more adventurous courses to avoid possibly imaginary Arab efforts to exploit such imbalance, and at best more difficult to persuade to take steps involving increases to their security risks, which may be necessary if progress is to be made toward final peace. Also, despite expert assessments, I would like to see from a strict consideration of US interest in stability in the region, that additional margin of safety to be provided by these airplanes in the hands of responsible (also could read, non-Soviet) Israelis. Accordingly, as heretofore, I continue to endorse these requests and urge US agreement as soon as possible.

Barbour

4. Information Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, November 28, 1967, 7:40 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Arab Republic, Vol. VI, Memos, 8/67-7/68. Secret.

Mr. President:

Bob Anderson dropped in to see me this afternoon to chat about the Middle East and told me the following:

1. While seeing his Arab friends in New York, he found the Egyptian Foreign Minister Riad and Dr. Kahouli disappointed that we have not moved to reestablish diplomatic relations with Cairo, as have the British.

2. When he pointed out that Arthur Goldberg had told Riad Secretary Rusk would be glad to see him in Washington, Riad had said that he wanted a more explicit invitation and some assurance that the U.S. was in fact willing to move forward toward normal diplomatic relations.

3. When Kahouli raised the question of whether President Nasser should write to President Johnson and asked how such a letter could be delivered, Bob Anderson said: Why not deliver it in Cairo via Don Bergus? The response was: He is only a clerk. How can a Presidential message be delivered through a clerk?

4. Kahouli then asked if Anderson on his next trip to the Middle East (which is soon--to Iraq on sulphur) could stop in Cairo. Anderson said flatly: No.

5. Kahouli then said: If I delivered a letter for President Johnson to you in Beirut, would you receive it? Anderson told him: I would receive it, but only as a messenger boy. That is how it was left.

6. I asked Bob what he thought the Egyptians would do about acknowledging that we were not involved in the war and reparations. He said they took the view that their official newspapers have already published in Cairo the fact that we were not involved and it would be very difficult for them to go further. As for reparations, they would be made when diplomatic relations were established, but not immediately, because they were terribly short of money. Bob Anderson's view was that this could be the first issue we raised after diplomatic relations were established.

7. Bob showed great sensitivity to the fact that we must do absolutely nothing to interfere with UN Representative Jarring and his contacts and negotiations in the Middle East.

8. Bob underlined his view that we are likely to have to deal with Nasser for some time; that he believes from his long personal discussions that Nasser has learned a painful lesson; and that it is in our national interest to establish relations with him soon.

9. His mission to Iraq is to get American firms involved in exploiting the biggest sulphur deposits in the world. A personal letter to the Iraqi President from de Gaulle had been sent urging that French firms take the contract. Bob is reasonably confident that his more experienced firms will win out.

I talked with Luke Battle, who is very doubtful that Nasser will in fact send a letter to you via Anderson; although a resumption of diplomatic relations is obviously much on their minds, and should be on ours also.

Walt

5. Memorandum From the Country Director for Lebanon, Jordan, Syrian Arab Republic, and Iraq (Houghton) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Battle)/1/

Washington, November 29, 1967.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 12-5 JORDAN. Secret. Drafted by Houghton and Marshall W. Wiley of NEA/ARN and cleared by Davies.

SUBJECT
Arms for Jordan

Ambassador Symmes' Position

We strongly urge that you discuss the problem of Jordan arms at the SIG meeting scheduled for November 30. Ambassador Symmes has urgently recommended that we make available to Jordan certain military equipment which the Jordan Army considers essential. In support of his request, the Ambassador points out that it will be indispensable to Hussein in continuing to work for political settlement to have his Army solidly behind him. The Army, according to the Embassy, is not pressing for full replacement of equipment lost last June, but is seeking reassurance that the King has a plan to obtain certain priority items. The Ambassador believes that the November 21 incidents with the bombardment of the Karama Refugee Camp and the Israeli air attack will heighten Army pressure on the King. The Ambassador fears that if the King becomes suspicious that we will not be able to help him out he will quickly become so frustrated that he might go to the Soviets for arms. The Ambassador further argues that our willingness to lift our embargo on arms for Jordan and to exert efforts to help Jordan obtain arms from other suppliers may soon become critical to our relationship. King Hussein informed the Ambassador on November 28 that the Jordan Army leadership was pressing him very hard and stressed that the need for him to take some action was "becoming a matter of days."

Jordan Requirements

The Ambassador has discussed Jordan's requirements with General Khammash, Chief of Staff of the Jordan Army, who maintains that the list which he gave Colonel Jordan last August represents the Army's current minimal essential requirements. Ambassador Symmes and the Defense Attach have come up with a sanitized version. It includes items from the Khammash list which they consider least likely to cause us problems. They make clear, however, that the sanitized list does not meet Jordan's complete desires nor it requirements. The Ambassador does believe that the revised list would meet Hussein's main need to hold the loyalty of the Jordanian Army and at the same time would avoid serious embarrassment at the forthcoming Arab Summit, reportedly scheduled around the beginning of December.

A detailed list, which we estimate would cost approximately $9 million, is enclosed./2/ The main elements of the list are as follows:

/2/Not printed.

(1) 106 mm recoilless rifles with truck M151A1C.

(2) Ammunition primarily for small arms and antiaircraft with some light artillery and antitank ammunition.

(3) Communication equipment, including 340 radios and 1,000 telephones.

(4) 40 2-1/2-ton trucks. M35A2.

(5) Aerial target drone system and ancillary equipment.

(6) Automotive, weapon, and communication spare parts and medical supplies.

Discussion

Our short-term stake in Jordan is clear. Hussein has taken the initiative and leadership on the Arab side in seeking a settlement with Israel. He can probably do this only with Nasser's support. Dubious as the prospects for a settlement are now, they may well become nil should Hussein fall or be forced into a more radical posture. To a large extent he has staked his lot on working with the West and particularly the US. Consequently he is seeking arms from us not only because he needs them but also because of the tangible evidence of US support which the supply of such arms would give him. There would be a gap between the time of our informing him of our willingness to supply him arms and the delivery of these arms. The announcement itself, however, would tend to strengthen Hussein's position vis-a-vis the Army as well as bolstering his position vis-a-vis the radical Arabs. It would have a stabilizing influence in Jordan at the time the UN Special Representative begins his important mission.

He has been trying since last June to secure arms from the US. He was given in August what a reasonable man could interpret as a US commitment to supply him arms. He asked again when he was recently in Washington. Jordan is the only Eastern Arab state which considers it has legitimate arms requirements and is making little or no progress in meeting them. It is difficult for Hussein to justify to his people his continued reliance on the West. Those who have worked with the Soviet Union can more convincingly prove the benefits from their association.

Our position in Jordan has declined since the war. The Embassy reports increasing frustration and bitterness by the Jordanians against the US. The Jordanians consider our Near Eastern policy discouragingly under the influence of the Zionists and the Israelis. Nonetheless we still have resources in Jordan but their strength is waning. The pattern of our relationship is being steadily whittled away.

The few arms which Ambassador Symmes recommends we provide/3/ could help arrest this trend. The quantity is small and could hardly constitute a threat to Israel or alter the arms balance in the area. The Joint Staff considers the ammunition requested as minimal in both quantity and type. The most deadly item, the 106 mm recoilless rifle, is primarily an anti-tank gun and lacks the protection needed for offensive deployment. The arms requested are replacements for a portion of the arms lost in fighting and not additions to Jordan's arsenal.

/3/Some of this equipment would be sold to the GOJ and some items could be provided under the MAP as previously scheduled. [Footnote in the source text.]

We shall encourage the GOJ to seek European suppliers for some of its requirements particularly in the heavy weapon and aircraft fields. We do not think we should do so for this list. As a matter of fact, for some of the items such as spares it is not practical. In general, procurement of this type of ground equipment from West European sources would create further problems for the Jordanian Army as its training, maintenance facilities and tactical doctrine are now based primarily on US weapons. More important, however, is the impact that a refusal to carry out our previous commitments would have on USG-GOJ relations. A ruler in Hussein's position has an obvious need for a reliable source of external support--both economic and military. If we tell the King that he is on his own and should shop for weapons wherever he can obtain them from Western sources, he will feel that we are opting out of the role of external supporter. The USSR has offered to take over this role and there is a real danger that the King, under pressure from Nasser and the radical Arabs, may decide that Soviet sponsorship, with all its drawbacks, is the best of the options left open to him. The actual weapons involved are of less significance than the symbolic value to Hussein and to his Army of our continued willingness to play the role of supporter.

Recommendation

The only valid reason why such small sales cannot be made available is because the Zionists and Israel, unless otherwise persuaded, can cause difficulties in Congress and elsewhere if we send any arms to Jordan.

We think that our own interests in this matter are of sufficient importance to justify a difference of opinion with the Israelis and their domestic partisans here. We strongly urge that we go ahead on arms for Jordan. If you agree, we suggest (a) that you consult again with Congress and (b) that Mr. Katzenbach or Rostow inform the Israelis. It should be made clear, however, that whereas we would endeavor to persuade Western Europeans to supply arms to Jordan, we, in our own interest, should continue to provide small quantities ourselves. Our rationale would be the strengthening of Hussein's position to permit him to proceed on the path of settlement with the Israelis and to maintain his moderate pro-Western position.

We recommend that:

(1) You raise the issue of Jordan arms along the lines discussed in this paper and seek the SIG's concurrence in your taking the necessary steps to enable us to release the arms requested by Ambassador Symmes.

6. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel/1/

Washington, December 4, 1967, 2338Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Confidential. Drafted by Henry Precht in NEA/IAI and Atherton, cleared by Joseph J. Sisco and Director of the Office of United Nations Political Affairs Elizabeth Ann Brown (IO), and approved by Battle. Repeated to Beirut, Amman, London, Jerusalem, Paris, and USUN.

79148. Subj: Discussion with Comay on Refugees.

1. At GOI suggestion as follow-on to Secretary's discussion of refugees with Eban October 23,/2/ Comay had lengthy conversation December 1 with Battle, Sisco and other Department officers. Discussion of UNRWA debate tactics reported septel. Detailed memcon being pouched./3/ Highlights follow:

/2/This conversation is summarized in telegram 58735 to Tel Aviv, October 24, scheduled to be printed in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, volume XIX.

/3/A memorandum of this conversation was transmitted to Tel Aviv as an attachment to circular airgram CA-4218, December 14. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, REF ARAB)

2. In general, we were reassured by Comay's presentation of Israeli tactical approach. With exception attitude on new refugees, their thinking on delicate pre-settlement period conforms to ours. Comay repeatedly stressed GOI belief refugee problem could and should be solved and importance it attaches to overall political settlement for achieving this objective.

3. New Refugees--In response to our inquiries and arguments re return of post-June refugees, Comay indicated that for all practical purposes movement from East to West had stopped for time being. Although family reunification scheme could help (and Comay attributed poor performance to GOJ), substantial movement of refugees must await movement on political front following progress of Jarring's contacts. (Comay will also have GOI responsibilities for negotiations with Jarring.) Comay gave customary GOI line on refugee return, detailing August and September operations and asserting that, for reasons of family ties, income sources and political uncertainties, bulk of refugees did not really wish to return.

4. GOI Activities During Pre-Settlement Period--In addition to ascertaining GOI thinking on refugee planning, object our discussion with Comay was to forewarn against statements or activities which could prejudice chances for settlement. Comay cited careful GOI contingency planning for eventual refugee solution but said there would be no formal, public announcement of master plan. GOI thought such plan would have dramatic and for GOI beneficial public relations effect but also knew publicity would cause adverse Arab reaction seriously damaging chances for settlement. Neither would GOI undertake any specific projects which would similarly jeopardize negotiations with Jarring.

5. GOI concern during interim period would be to promote economic well-being of refugees. Comay mentioned stepped-up vocational training as non-controversial program which would prepare refugees for better life in situ or elsewhere but which would not arouse Arab fears. Refugees would benefit from 100 million pounds being budgeted for civilian administration in occupied territories in current GOI fiscal year ending March, 1968. Comay emphasized that GOI had moved quickly to restore normalcy in occupied areas and had developed effective cooperation with UNRWA with only minor difficulties arising mainly from security requirements, i.e. restricted movement of Arab personnel in Israel.

6. Long-term Refugee Planning--Comay said GOI was drawing up recommendations from studied conducted by various technical teams (water, land, economics, etc.) for presentation to Cabinet in near future. Perhaps early next year GOI could have contact with US experts. GOI recognized, however, that long-range plans for refugees could not be divorced from question of political future of area. Even within GOI, opinions were divided on such questions as what size, shape and future borders of Israel should be. GOI waiting to see what its options were. It could make no decisions until these were clearer. Meanwhile, it was doing its homework to fill gaps in its knowledge of refugees and of economic potential of occupied areas. It realized that what it could do on its own to solve refugee problem was limited not only by economic factors but by political and juridical considerations as well. When time came, GOI would be prepared cooperate to fullest extent in finding solution to refugee problem, but unable say now what this might involve. Comay made point of emphasizing that, notwithstanding appeal of West Bank from sentimental and security standpoints, GOI had made no decision to incorporate area in Israel, and it was mistake to draw general conclusions to this effect from specific actions taken by occupation authorities for local reasons.

7. Without commenting on specifics of GOI planning, we emphasized that these and other elements of any meaningful refugee solution must come in context of general settlement. Comay agreed and said refugees should in GOI views have "top priority" in settlement. We noted important contribution which well-staffed GOI refugee plan could make to settlement and Comay agreed it would be useful and important approach Jordan with proposals on refugees when negotiations under way.

8. Comay emphasized GOI working hard on planning and aware US also developing ideas on refugees. He expressed great willingness exchange views with us on preliminary, non-committed basis.

Rusk

7. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow)/1/

Washington, December 4, 1967.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt W. Rostow, Vol. 53, December 1-10, 1967. Secret.

SUBJECT
Nasser's November 23 Speech and the Mood of the Arabs

Ten days after Nasser's November 23 "State of the Union" speech, it's worth reflecting on where it leaves us.

Speech Consistent with Khartoum

The Israelis see the worst in it. Eshkol described it to Barbour as a "dagger in the back of the cause of peace" (and then went on to stress his need for more aircraft). Foreign Minister officials--some more relaxed than others--see it as bearing out their interpretation of the Khartoum meeting that Nasser's ultimate aim is war.

Politically conscious Arabs from New York to Saudi Arabia interpret it as a "moderate" speech consistent with Nasser's effort since Khartoum to keep the initiative away from extremists. They all say it "didn't slam any doors." A few lump his harsher statements with Israel's as a prelude to bargaining.

Everyone (including Federenko) agrees that Nasser soured the atmosphere, but Arabs and Israelis alike agree that the speech did not depart from Nasser's position at Khartoum as he has interpreted that position to both King Hussein and Robert Anderson.

This is borne out by two subsequent official UAR clarifications which slightly soften the initial hard impact of the speech in our press:

--The official text of the passage on "never" allowing Israel to pass through the Canal indicates that the following qualifying sentences were lost in applause: "Passage through the Canal is an indivisible part of the original Palestine question. It is not part of the problem of eliminating the effects of the aggression." In the official text, the word "never" becomes "will not." Whatever Nasser actually said, official UAR policy still links the Canal to a refugee settlement.

--Nasser's official spokesman on November 26 qualified Nasser's statement that there could be no "peace" with Israel by saying he had not rejected a peaceful settlement but only a "peace treaty." The Israelis put no stock in this distinction, but the Egyptians have carefully maintained it since Khartoum and seem to think it increases their flexibility in arriving at a settlement.

Khartoum Position: A Two-phase Strategy?

The main argument over Nasser's position, then, boils down to interpretation of the position he took at Khartoum, not of the 23 November speech.

The Israelis say their reports on Khartoum show a two-phase strategy: Nasser's long-run objective remains the destruction of Israel. Their short-run aim is to get Israel out of occupied territories. They can't push Israel out by force, so they're ready to make marginal political concessions to get their land back. At the same time, military preparations continue for a future second stage-war against Israel. They quote Hussein at Khartoum: "Once the Israelis withdraw, we will return to our previous ways."

We agree that Nasser at Khartoum took to the political track because he has neither the military nor the economic power to get the conquered lands back by force. But our transcript of the Khartoum conference reveals no consciously conceived two-phase plan. In fact, the radical leader of the Palestine Liberation Organization tried to force the leaders there to focus on solution of the overall Palestine problem, and they literally shouted him down. They insisted that the only subject they were discussing was how to get the Israelis out. They talked abut rebuilding military strength, but mainly so they don't have to negotiate flat on their backs and in order to use force eventually if political means fail.

The truth about Khartoum, I think, is that Nasser hasn't really thought beyond Israeli withdrawal one way or another. There was almost no talk at Khartoum about the "lasting peace" we talk about. And the Israelis are probably right in fearing that leopards don't change their spot. But for the moment, we don't think they're talking about a second phase, if any.

The same, incidentally, is true of the Israelis. Yaacov Herzog, Eshkol's Chef de Cabinet, told me two weeks ago that Israeli leaders are deeply divided over whether they should risk a political settlement, if the right terms can be negotiated, or sit tight on their expanded boundaries and rely for survival on the added military security they provide. He says he won't know for sure what Israeli strategy is until the Cabinet votes on a specific proposal (though he thinks "peace" will win).

Operational Significance

There may be small comfort in saying that Nasser for the moment is so preoccupied with Israeli withdrawal that he's not focusing right now on longer range objectives. But there are two important operational points here:

1. No one should trust Nasser. He broke his word to us last May. He's trying to recoup his losses at the lowest cost. His main objective is to be Mr. Big in the Arab world, and anti-Zionism will continue to be his one reliable rallying cry. He honestly believes we're to knock him off and would happily see us cut down to size--even though he knows he needs our power in the area to push Israel back and to hold the USSR at bay and preserve his freedom.

2. But no one should assume that Nasser is so irrevocably committed to a two-phase strategy that no reasonable deal is possible.

a. Some Israelis would like an excuse for not having to face up to the tough decisions they'd have to make to achieve a real settlement.

b. Some Americans assume that, since the odds seem against a settlement, we shouldn't invest too much more in pressing the parties--especially Israel in an election year--toward a settlement. They believe realism suggests we wash our hands of the whole process as much as possible now that the UN representative has the ball.

The danger in working exclusively from this assumption is that we would give up an honest effort to build something on the President's June 19 foundation. It's one thing to be on our guard against the worst in both the Arabs and the Israelis and to assess our chances realistically. It's another to decide that we should fold our tents with all the consequences for our interests in the Middle East.

Hal

8. Information Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, December 6, 1967, 11:30 a.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East, Vol. I, 6/65-3/68. Secret. A handwritten notation on the memorandum indicates that it was received at 11:55 a.m.

Mr. President:

At my request, our Hal Saunders did these two thoughtful memos on:

--the choice of ahead in the Middle East;/2/

/2/Saunders sent a memorandum on this subject to Rostow on December 5. It was a covering memorandum for his assessment of the meaning of Nasser's November 23 speech, and essentially summarized that memorandum. (Ibid.)

--the meaning of Nasser's Nov. 23 speech./3/

/3/Document 7.

My view is: the Arabs are still confused, humiliated, looking for revenge in part of their minds. But they have no long-term plan. Therefore, we must:

--struggle for an Arab-Israeli settlement:

--then follow through with policies to strengthen moderate Arabs so that, with the passage of time, the attractiveness of economic and social development gradually, slowly overtakes the passion for revenge.

Walt

9. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State/1/

Amman, December 6, 1967, 1350Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 12-5 JORDAN. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to CINCSTRIKE, Moscow, London, and Tel Aviv.

2530. Subject: Arms for Jordan. Ref: State 79171./2/ Amman 2519/3/ and 2528./4/

/2/Telegram 79171 to Amman, December 5, informed the Embassy that the question of resuming the supply of arms to Jordan was under active high-level discussion. The question would have to be explored with Congressional leaders, however, so a decision was not imminent. The Department instructed the Embassy to try to persuade the Jordanian Government to be patient. (Ibid.)

/3/Not found.

/4/In telegram 2528 from Amman, December 6, the Embassy reported that King Hussein was being pressed by the Soviet Union to continue a military dialogue begun during the King's recent visit to Moscow. The Soviet Union planned to send a military delegation to Amman to explore Jordan's military requirements, and the Soviet Ambassador in Amman had told the King that his government was prepared to supply Jordan's arms need at bargain prices and under favorable terms. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 12-5 JORDAN)

1. By prior agreement I stayed on with King Hussein following Senator Ribicoff's audience for a brief discussion of arms situation. Arms question had already come up in general way during meeting with Senator.

2. I said I was pleased His Majesty had had opportunity mention Jordan arms requirements to the Senator, who had seemed quite sympathetic to Jordan's needs as described by the King. I had been concerned, however, to learn through EmbOff on 4th (Amman 2528) that Soviet economic survey mission scheduled to come to Jordan later this month would, at Soviet request, include three Soviet military officials. I could appreciate sense of frustration felt by His Majesty. I felt obliged nevertheless to say I personally believed presence in Jordan of Soviet military, if it became known, would tend prejudice our efforts gain approval for resumption of U.S. arms shipments to Jordan as well as for our general efforts in support of Jordan. I had noted Jordan press article that morning stating that Soviet survey mission would not arrive until after first of year. I hoped this was true because it would allow time for USG to arrive at what I believed would ultimately be favorable decision on resuming some arms shipments to Jordan.

3. His Majesty responded that he was not sure when Soviet mission would arrive. It might be before end of year. Soviet Ambassador in informing him only a few days ago of mission's coming had stated mission would include three senior military officials but that latter would not be identified as such in order to avoid embarrassing Jordanian Govt. King said he had been taking line with Soviets that he still intended obtain his arms from usual sources. Nevertheless, he had not felt he could tell Soviet Amb to delete three military from survey mission. For one thing, Soviets had been taking very moderate line recently. They were supporting U.N. resolution in talks with Jordan and had stressed Israel's right to existence. Soviet Amb had also spoken of Soviet efforts to dampen Syrian extremism. He considered Soviets, despite some outward appearances, had been playing a generally constructive role with regard to Arab-Israeli problem. This factor also led him to feel he could not tell Soviets not to send mission at this time or not to bring military personnel if they did. On other hand, it was his intention to see that Soviet military only looked around in general way and that they did not get into any specific discussion of Jordan's requirements. This was understood, he emphasized.

4. I commented that His Majesty was, of course, best judge of GOJ interests in this respect. Some of us, however, still have suspicions about Soviet motives in the Near East. Only in last few days Soviets had been making noises of willingness to discuss some form of arms limitation in area; yet with Jordan they were pursuing what could only be considered a significantly new arms supply role in Near East. Although Soviets more cautious and seem to recognize danger of escalation of Arab-Israeli incidents, some of us still believe they will pursue their spoiling operations in Near East wherever possible. I personally was suspicious enough of their motives to wonder if they could be counted on to keep presence in Jordan of three military personnel quiet.

5. Conversation concluded with my telling His Majesty I had new word from Washington indicating high level USG officials fully appreciate urgency GOJ requirements and actively reviewing matter. I was therefore hopeful of a favorable decision on Jordan arms shortly after Congressional action is completed on foreign aid appropriation bill. I thought this could be before Christmas. King seemed to appreciate these assurances. He said earlier in morning he had spoken to assembled senior JAA officers to tell them he expects soon to be able to provide them with specifics regarding military equipment supplies.

Symmes

10. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts/1/

Washington, December 7, 1967, 0122Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Deputy Director of the Office of United Nations Political Affairs Arthur R. Day, cleared by Sisco and Brown in UNP, and approved by Battle. Sent to Amman, Beirut, Jidda, Kuwait, Tripoli, Tunis, Rabat, Cairo, Algiers, Khartoum, and Aden, and repeated to Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, and USUN.

80712. Deliver to Ambassadors at opening of business. Subj: UN Representative Jarring Mission.

1. Timing of departure from NY to UN Rep Jarring following consultations there with SYG and Staff, parties and others, including USUN, not yet definite due to complications related to projected Arab Summit. However, he will probably proceed to area within next week or two. His headquarters will be in Cyprus.

2. Jarring faces formidable difficulties. Issues themselves are so numerous and complex that even with generally cooperative spirit from parties, it is not to be expected that agreement will come quickly on any problem. In addition, of course, there is danger that either or both sides will be so intransigent as to bring negotiations to stalemate.

3. In light these difficult circumstances, we have considered what activity on our part might be useful in improving chances Jarring's success and have concluded that US approaches to parties concerning general US attitude would be useful. Prospect of new Arab Foreign Minister and Summit meetings provide additional reason for us to urge moderation and flexibility on Arabs at this time, since stand meetings take will probably have important influence on progress of Jarring Mission. Action posts should therefore unless they see serious objections seek opportunity to discuss our current views with appropriate host govt official. Posts should make it clear we are making similar approach to Israelis./2/

/2/The Embassy in Tel Aviv was instructed on December 9 to urge the Israeli Government to be as forthcoming as possible in dealing with the Jarring Mission. (Telegram 82248 to Tel Aviv; ibid.)

4. In making any approaches it is very important that posts avoid giving any impression that we are directly involved in Jarring's mission or seeking to impress our views on him concerning either his methods of operation or substance of his discussions. It will be for Jarring to carry on substantive negotiations with parties. Our purpose at present should be to urge that all parties extend fullest cooperation to achievement of a peaceful solution. FYI. At later stage, depending on developments, we will have to consider whether and how we should support specific proposals. There may well be a time, as when issues have crystallized into clear bargaining situation, when diplomatic support of US and others may be necessary to bring parties to agreement. In such cases we will be prepared to act in accordance with Amb Goldberg's Nov. 22 pledge in SC./3/ End FYI.

/3/In his November 22 statement before the UN Security Council, Goldberg pledged U.S. support for the Special Representative and urged other nations to make a similar pledge. For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1967, pp. 617-618.

5. Approach should draw on following:

(a) SC res,/4/ which is best possible in circumstances, provides opportunity to set in motion a peace-making process with which both sides can in good conscience cooperate. Res is balanced and nonprejudicial to positions of any of parties. Its adoption culminated most difficult period during which it often appeared that effort to find means of progress toward a settlement would end in complete stalemate. Opportunity provided by Jarring's mission may well be one-time chance, therefore, since it would appear most unlikely that same or similar conditions as those which made possible agreement on SC res could be recreated at any future time. That opportunities, once lost, do not return has, as Arabs know too well, been one of lessons of past twenty years; it could well be so again if present opportunity missed.

/4/Reference is to Security Council Resolution 242.

(b) We consider SC res entirely consistent with policy of USG as set forth by President Johnson in June 19 statement/5/ and by Ambassador Goldberg in statements in UN since then. We are prepared, therefore, to support the UN's efforts fully. As Ambassador Goldberg said in SC Nov. 22: "The Special Representative will need all the help and support he can get--both from parties and from international community. I have already given my Government's pledge on this score--and I wish to reiterate it again today--a pledge to this Council and to parties concerned that the diplomatic and political influence of USG will be exerted in support of efforts of UN Rep to achieve fair and equitable and dignified solution so that all in the area can live in peace, security and tranquility."

/5/In a speech before the Department of State Foreign Policy Conference for Educators on June 19, President Johnson outlined five principles for peace in the Middle East which the United States would support. See Department of State Bulletin, July 10, 1967, pp. 31-34.

(c) Res itself only provides framework of principles for peace-making efforts. Success in that effort will depend ultimately on parties themselves--spirit in which they receive and work with UN Rep, willingness to reach accommodation, and respect for others' vital interests and legitimate grievances. Need for good will on both sides extends beyond negotiations themselves to general posture and actions of parties. Policies and actions leading to mistrust and tension in area can be just as detrimental to chances for success as positions taken in negotiations themselves. Posture assumed and policies embraced by govts at Arab Summit very important in this regard.

(d) Res will not bring instant peace. We do not expect any early or easy success. There is no question of expecting immediate acquiescence by any of the parties. But we do urge all of them to avoid talking intransigent positions, either in private or public, which could close doors to settlement that may now hopefully be opening.

(e) US has no blueprint for settlement. We continue to believe that, in final analysis, secure, just and lasting peace must rest upon agreements between the parties, whatever form they make take or whatever modalities are used to reach them (i.e. direct negotiations or some form of intermediary). It is only the parties in the last analysis who can determine whether just and lasting peace can be achieved through a settlement which will endure.

6. In view of Arab moderate leaders' helpful role in period leading up to adoption SC res, posts should as appropriate show appreciation for assistance rendered by host govts; Embassies in Arab countries not directly involved should encourage moderate leaders to work toward objective that UN Mission receive fullest possible cooperation from states directly involved.

7. FYI. When Jarring comes to area, posts should leave to him initiative in contacts. If he should seek help, they should provide all appropriate assistance in furtherance his mission, referring to Dept for guidance any requests about which they may have some question. He will probably not initiate formal contacts, although we would not expect him to avoid casual contact with American or other officials whom he might meet at social affairs./6/

/6/There is extensive reporting from Cairo, Tel Aviv, Amman, and Beirut on Jarring's initial efforts to promote a settlement in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Jarring's efforts through December are summarized in Document 30. Jarring's initial efforts are also summarized in the report Secretary-General Thant made to the UN Security Council on the Jarring Mission on January 5, 1971. See Public Papers of the Secretaries-General of the United Nations, Vol. VIII, U Thant, 1968-1971.

Rusk

11. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel/1/

Washington, December 9, 1967, 0136Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 12-5 ISR. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Atherton and approved by Battle. Repeated to Amman, USUN, London, Moscow, Paris, and Cairo.

82331. 1. Ambassador Harman called on Assistant Secretary Battle December 7 to present GOI study/2/ updating data and rationale for Israeli aircraft request presented by General Weizman in September. Summarizing highlights of study, Harman made following points:

/2/A copy of this study was given by Harman to Deputy Secretary of Defense Nitze when he discussed the issue with him on December 8. A memorandum of Harman's conversation with Nitze is in the Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 71 A 4919, 333 Israel. The study is ibid., OSD Files: FRC 72 A 2468, 452 Israel.

A. Study points up seriousness of Soviet resupply of Arabs in terms of quantity, quality and strike capacity of Arab airforces. For example, UAR, Syria, Iraq and Algeria now have 550 fighter aircraft and 62 bombers against total of about 155 for Israel;

B. Concept of joint air operations against Israel now incorporated into Arab planning, and Israel must assume it would in future face coordinated Arab air attack; and

C. Arab air bases have increased in number and have been rendered less vulnerable to attack.

2. Harman said that, while Weizman had made clear his request looked to future and not based on fear of imminent attack, latest information on Arab capabilities, coupled with increasingly bellicose Arab statements, now gave request added sense of urgency. Any indications of Israeli weakness would encourage attack. Israel therefore needed additional aircraft to provide credible deterrent or, in event irrational Arab actions in face of such deterrent, to assure its survival. Further factor was French arms policy which not only deprived Israel of aircraft it had already contracted for but, if latest press reports re lifting of French embargo for Iraq were correct, indicated Iraq might get planes originally intended for Israel. Harman said two schools of thought existed in Arab world, one favoring resort to force and other urging moderation. Israel needed strength to convince Arabs that force would not work. This would bolster moderates and contribute to success of Jarring mission.

3. Battle asked if Israel was convinced French would not deliver on Mirage contract. Harman said he feared this was the case. In any event Israel must now base its planning on assumption it would get no aircraft from France. In response further question from Battle, Harman said Israel had found no possibility of obtaining Mirage aircraft through third countries. Further disturbing factor was new info that Soviets to supply Arabs all-weather MIG-23's in 1968.

4. Harman stressed that Weizman request looking toward inventory of 250 modern aircraft by late 1968 had shaved margin very fine. That request had assumed French would deliver, and failure receive Mirages would thus aggravate already serious situation. Harman said he detected tendency in USG to overrate Israeli ability and hoped we would not give Israel benefit of too many doubts. In response Battle comment that we based our assessment on past Israeli performance, Harman said that previous success had come from knocking out Arab airforces on ground. Arabs were aware of this and now planning accordingly. Fifty planes could literally make difference between life and death of Israel.

5. Battle commented that we shared Israeli concern about Soviet resupply and other activities in area and were watching them carefully. We did not believe Soviet resupply had brought Arab forces above pre-war levels or had altered their basic nature. Views might differ on relative strengths of Arab and Israeli forces and we might not agree with Israeli assessment, but we remained sensitive to Israel's security needs. Weizman's request was receiving urgent consideration and we hoped to have reply soon.

6. Battle said we were particularly concerned about arrival of Soviet bombers in Egypt and about Soviet airlift of equipment to Yemen. Re former, we had no indications that bombers to remain in Egypt permanently, but if such visits became a pattern this was nevertheless a serious development. Harman asked whether we had considered raising this question at high level with Soviets. Battle said we had not. On other hand, we had raised arms control problem in general with Soviets on number of occasions. We were not discussing this subject with Soviets at the moment but wouldn't rule out possibility should right moment come.

7. Re Yemen, Harman thought situation difficult for Soviets whose only access was by air. He speculated that advantage lay with those who had strength on ground and thought Royalists therefore might have upper hand. This was factor which various forces in Yemen should be able to exploit.

8. Turning to new subject and emphasizing that he knew Israeli views and did not expect Harman to comment, Battle said Israel should know that we still had question of arms for Jordan under consideration. We had not reached decision, and if we did decide go forward, it would be on modest scale. We had evidence, however, that Soviets were prepared to provide Jordan anything it wanted. Situation in Jordan was extremely delicate and we would need to come to decision in next few weeks. In response Harman's question whether Jordan exploring France as source of supply, Battle said there had been some talk of this but to best our knowledge it had gotten nowhere and French had in fact made no offer to Jordanians.

Rusk

12. Letter From President Nasser to President Johnson/1/

Cairo, December 9, 1967.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Arab Republic, Vol. VI, Memos, 8/67-7/68. No classification marking. The letter was delivered to President Johnson by James Birdsall on December 18; see Document 21.

Dear Mr. President:

I take this opportunity to extend my best wishes to you and your family.

At this time which is sacred to both our people I feel that good relations should exist between our people.

I have sent a special message through Mr. Birdsall. I trust you will receive it in the spirit which I send it.

With highest personal regards.

Sincerely,

Jamal Abdul Nasser

13. Telegram From the U.S. Interests Section of the Spanish Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State/1/

Cairo, December 10, 1967, 0915Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL UAR-US. Secret; Priority; Exdis. The Spanish Government assumed protection of U.S. interests in the United Arab Republic following severance of diplomatic relations between the United States and the United Arab Republic on June 6. Rostow transmitted the text of this telegram to President Johnson on December 10 in White House telegram CAP 671037 along with the following assessment: "With the Russians trying to take over from Nasser in the Yemen, it is, indeed, possible that he wants to get close to us to keep independence from Moscow." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Arab Republic, Vol. VI, Memos, 8/67-7/68)

1136. 1. Birdsall/2/ saw Nasser for over two hours last night and I debriefed him this morning.

/2/James Birdsall was a lawyer who practiced in New York and had developed contacts in the United Arab Republic in his capacity as attorney for ALCO Products. His contacts in Egypt were facilitated by the Geneva representative of ALCO, a Mr. Siddiqui, who was Pakistani. In October 1966 Nasser invited Birdsall to Egypt to discuss his desire to improve U.S.-UAR relations and his belief that the United States was determined to overthrow his government. See Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XVIII, Document 341. Birdsall's visit to Cairo in December 1967 was again at Nasser's invitation. (Telegram 78791 from Cairo, December 4; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR)

2. Birdsall says he was given "formal message" by Nasser to be delivered to no one except President Johnson. (Nasser told Birdsall that not even his Foreign Minister aware Birdsall's presence Cairo.)

3. From Birdsall's subsequent long and rambling conversation feel fairly sure about contents of "formal message." Nasser believes that Russians are increasing their pressure on him and that in absence any ties with USG he increasingly powerless to resist. Nasser hinted at strong Russian pressure re use of Alexandria, possibly involving permanent fueling facilities and barracks for Soviet naval personnel. Nasser also complained about magnitude of Sov concentration in UAR armed forces.

4. Nasser said he willing accept non-belligerency with Israel with all that implies. If Israel will pay just and adequate compensation to Palestinian refugees, Nasser will exchange Ambassadors with Israel.

5. Nasser was quite contrite for the grave mistakes he made in May and June, and acknowledged that Egyptians had been soundly defeated, mostly because they did not know how to use Soviet weapons. Nasser also expressed regret for past speeches he made accusing U.S. of "war of starvation" and so forth, indicating some of these statements had been made to please Soviets.

6. Nasser wishes resume diplomatic relations with the United States. He wants some time to consult with other Arabs but feels he can encourage other Arab states which broke relations he has no influence whatsoever.

7. Nasser said he fully understood that there no question resumption any form U.S. economic aid to UAR for foreseeable future.

8. Re big lie, Nasser made ingenuous statement that he had never accused USG of military participation in June war. He claims that all he did was quote Hussein directly on this point. (Comment: If that is case, why did UAR break relations with U.S.?)

9. Birdsall leaving Cairo today for London and plans return New York December 14. He will upon arrival request meeting with President Johnson. His thesis will doubtless be that USG cannot afford stand idly by in face of Soviet takeover of UAR and ultimately other Arab states in Eastern Mediterranean.

10. Recommendation: I would hope that if all possible President Johnson could receive Birdsall if only for a few moments before turning him over to White House or Departmental advisers./3/

/3/Bergus telegraphed his assessment of Birdsall's conversation with Nasser from Cairo on December 13. He believed Birdsall's report because he thought Nasser was desperate to enlist the United States as a counterbalance to the Soviet Union. Bergus recommended a reassessment of U.S. policy toward Nasser and the UAR in light of Nasser's dmarche. He felt that Nasser might speak for Egypt and much of the Arab world for some time, and he could not envision a settlement of the Middle East crisis that did not presuppose tolerable relations between the United States and Egypt. (Telegram 1149 from Cairo; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL UAR-US)

Bergus

14. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow)/1/

Washington, December 11, 1967.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Arab Republic, Vol. VI, Memos, 8/67-7/68. Secret.

WWR:

I know Luke Battle has talked with you about the attached./2/ State today is working on its final recommendation on how we should handle Birdsall's request for an appointment with the President when we get it.

/2/Telegram 1136 from Cairo, Document 13.

Although we certainly don't want to cut off any reasonable communication, I have the following reservations about this exercise.

--Nasser is sending whatever this message is without even the knowledge of his Foreign Minister. Given our questions about who speaks for the UAR today, I wonder how much credence we could give to whatever Birdsall says even if he is reporting accurately.

--Nasser's reported comment that he will exchange Ambassadors with Israel is so far out of line with everything else we have that it causes me to question either the accuracy of Birdsall's reporting or Nasser's mental consistency and stability.

--As you said when we talked about this a couple of weeks ago, the time has come when the Egyptians have to stop giving us vague signals under the grandstand and give us their requests through a reasonable channel. In retrospect, it is clear that we could have gotten ourselves in a terrible bind by responding to one set of signals last summer that could have tied us into the whole Amer conspiracy. Coupled with our worries is the request to Don Bergus when he arrived that we consider him our main point of contact to the exclusion of all others.

State will have its recommendation for us shortly but I wanted to give you these thoughts in case Birdsall should get home early.

Hal

15. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Katzenbach to President Johnson/1/

Washington, December 11, 1967.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East, Vol. I, 6/65-3/68. Secret.

SUBJECT
Arms for Jordan and Israel

The attached memorandum (concurred in by Rusk and McNamara) sets out alternative courses of action for dealing with the priority arms problem in the Middle East./2/ We have deliberately given you these various options, although I am sure you will recognize that the choices on Jordan are narrow indeed.

/2/Attached was a December 11 memorandum from Katzenbach to President Johnson, with the same subject heading. The memorandum laid out to greater length the policy options and recommendations and posed the option of whether the President wanted the Department to proceed with consultations with Israel and Jordan on the basis of those recommendations. There is no indication on either memorandum of the President's response.

It may be useful to you, in making this difficult decision, to have my views on how you might play it--particularly in light of the potential domestic problems.

Israel has asked for 27 A-4 Skyhawk aircraft, to be delivered in 1969. (These are in addition to the 48 Skyhawks now scheduled for delivery in 1968). It has also asked for 50 F-4 Phantom jets, to be delivered in 1969-70.

The military balance is in Israel's favor and should remain so for at least a year. But I believe there is a legitimate Israeli concern about their continued air superiority beyond 1968.

King Hussein is pressing hard for some arms deliveries--both as evidence of our continued support and to meet minimum equipment needs for his defeated army.

Hussein's position is threatened by his efforts in favor of a settlement, his association--in Arab eyes--with the West, and his resistance to attractive Soviet arms offers.

If it can be done without endangering Israel's security, it is in our national interest--as well as Israel's--to avoid further substantial US arms commitments until we know more about the chances for a negotiated settlement.

I therefore conclude that:

1. The US should tell Hussein before Christmas that we are willing to supply certain of Jordan's minimum requirements. But doing something for Jordan, no matter how little, will almost certainly be strenuously opposed by Israel. This will mean some political trouble for you on the domestic front.

2. We must give some indication now to the Israelis on how we propose to deal with their requests. We should:

--assure Israel that a delay in committing ourselves to sell them A-4s does not mean that the 1969-70 delivery date would slip (assuming we decide to go ahead with the sale);

--indicate that the US would be prepared to divert F-4s from other contracts in order to meet a clearly demonstrated Israeli need (i.e., French cancellation of Mirage deliveries; delivery of substantial numbers of Mirages to the Arabs, escalation of Soviet aircraft supplies to Arabs).

3. In terms of dealing with the domestic situation here, and the likely Israeli reaction to our moving on Jordan, I do not believe we should tell the Israelis more than the foregoing. By withholding firm word on our intentions until Eshkol's visit in February, we may be able to dampen Israeli opposition to Jordan sales.

Nicholas deB. Katzenbach

16. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel/1/

Washington, December 11, 1967, 1747Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 32-6 TIRAN. Secret. Drafted by George B. Lambrakis; cleared by Atherton, William D. Brewer, and Davies; and approved by Eugene Rostow. Repeated to Jidda and USUN.

82530. Subject: Tiran Island.

1. At lunch December 6 Undersecretary Rostow raised with Ambassador Harman continuing Israeli occupation Tiran Island./2/ Rostow suggested cooperative relations with King Faisal of great importance in period ahead, not only for Yemen but also because of Faisal's influence on UAR, Jordan and elsewhere in process of settlement. He said continuing Israeli presence political irritant to US relations with Saudis and unnecessary due to presence Israeli forces at Sharm al-Sheikh. Our Ambassador in Jidda believed it would be possible arrange that Saudis not occupy island if Israelis withdraw. He (Rostow) would appreciate answer to our several approaches in Tel Aviv this subject.

/2/Israel occupied Tiran Island in the Straits of Tiran during the Six-Day War in June. The island was the territory of Saudi Arabia and, after Israeli occupation of the island was confirmed in August, the United States on several occasions encouraged Israel to withdraw from Tiran Island and the neighboring Saudi island of Senafir. Documentation on these initiatives on Saudi Arabia's behalf is ibid.

2. Harman took note of Rostow's request. He asked why Saudis had allowed Egyptians occupy island and asserted categorically that Egyptian troops had been on island just before arrival of Israelis in June.

3. Tel Aviv may wish refer to this conversation in further sounding out Israelis as opportunity arises./3/

/3/Under Secretary Rostow returned to the subject of Tiran Island in a conversation with Ambassador Harman on December 21. Rostow again urged Israel to withdraw from the island, a move that he argued would not affect Israel militarily and which would be very helpful politically with Saudi Arabia. (Telegram 88486 to Tel Aviv, December 21; ibid.)

Katzenbach

17. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel/1/

Washington, December 12, 1967, 0125Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret. Drafted by George B. Lambrakis; cleared by Davies, Atherton, Houghton, Robert H. Neuman (L/NEA), and Day; and approved by Eugene  Rostow. Repeated to Amman, Jerusalem, Beirut, London, Paris, USUN, and CINCSTRIKE.

83026. Subject: Terrorism and Reprisals. Ref: State's 72151 and 75924./2/

/2/Telegram 72151 to Tel Aviv, November 20, noted that the Embassy had taken up with the Foreign Ministry reports of destruction of West Bank settlements by Israel, which the United States found "most disturbing." In telegram 75924 to Tel Aviv, November 28, the Department reported that the Israeli Embassy explained that the West Bank villages were destroyed because they had been abandoned during the June war and had subsequently become centers for infiltrators from Jordan into Israel. (Both ibid.)

1. During lunch tour d'horizon with Ambassador Harman December 6, Under Secretary Rostow reviewed sequence of border violations, terrorist raids, and Israeli reprisals. He said we concerned about destruction of villages, which raises serious questions international law. Our legal adviser had come to view that some of these episodes probably violated accepted principles of international law and Geneva Convention of 1949,/3/ to which both Jordan and Israel were parties. There were no military operations justifying razing of villages. Referring to Atherton-Yaish conversations (reftel) Rostow said episodes were having adverse political effect on Israel's reputation and on general political atmosphere. He said he had found feeling in Europe that Israeli position is "hardening," even among officials who knew that Israel's official goals for negotiation have not changed.

/3/Reference is to the conventions signed at Geneva on August 12, 1949, on the protection of victims of war. (6 UST 3114, 6 UST 3116, and 6 UST 3117)

2. Harman commented that problem of terrorism--all, in his view, emanating from Syria--could be dealt with only in three ways. Jordanians could interdict terrorists within Jordan (he said there had recently been a raid coming directly into Israel from Syria; the others all crossed via Jordan). Or Israelis could interdict in territory held by Israel. Or, after a time, if that didn't work, Israelis might have to undertake another raid to cool situation a bit. In retrospect, worst mistake Harman had to reproach himself with, he thought, was the recommendation that Israel to go Security Council in fall of 1966 rather than strike directly against Syria. The Soviet veto in the instance and the weakness of the Western position, led straight to Samu, and then to May and June. Could war have been prevented by a hard blow against Syria a year ago?

3. Rostow said we recognized full gravity of problem of terrorists. We were inclined to think that for moment a stronger U.N. presence between Israel and Jordan could be helpful.

4. Harman dismissed the idea. U.N. forces had done no good. Problem was too large to be dealt with by a border patrol. It had to be met within Jordan, or, if saboteurs penetrated the West Bank, by Israel within the area. Israel was getting good cooperation from West Bank people, who were more and more disenchanted with Amman, and inclined to help Israelis. In any event, U.N. forces had proved their inadequacy. Right procedure was that of cooperation between the Israeli and Jordanian forces. When Jordanian interests were involved, Jordanians met Israelis at Allenby Bridge. But when issue was that of stopping terrorism, Jordanians raised an issue of political principle. With Security Council Resolution passed, Jordanians should begin to take a less belligerent posture, and forget absurd idea that they cannot talk with Israelis.

5. Re para 1 above, following is basis of our conclusion that Israeli destruction of Jiftlik and other villages is violation of Geneva Convention Relative to Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War:

(A) Article 2 provides that Convention applies to cases of partial or total occupation of territory of a Party;

(B) Article 33 states that "no protected person may be punished for an offense he or she has not personally committed. Collective penalties . . . are prohibited. Reprisals against protected persons and their property are prohibited;" and

(C) Article 53 specifically prohibits destruction by occupying power of real or personal property belonging individually or collectively to private persons or public authorities, except where such destruction is rendered "absolutely necessary by military operations." Israeli measures such as destruction of Jiftlik do not constitute "military operations," since hostilities are ended and cease-fire is in effect.

We think it would be useful for Embassy, drawing on foregoing, to seek appropriate opportunity in discussions with GOI to follow-up Under Secretary Rostow's comments to Harman in this connection.

Katzenbach

18. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State/1/

Tel Aviv, December 12, 1967, 1606Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Exdis.

1796. 1. At outset meeting this morning arranged by mutual request (I had another matter, reported separately, to raise with him on instructions), FonMin Eban gave me following aide-memoire which he described as summarizing the views he wished to present:

"Aide-memoire

December 12, 1967

The Soviet military presence in the Middle East is becoming progressively more blatant and intense.

A. Rearmament of the U.A.R.

Since June the USSR has replenished over 80 percent of Arab losses in equipment and stores. At the present rate the resupplying of Egyptian forces to pre-June strength will be completed in approximately five months. Some of the equipment will be qualitatively superior to that being replaced. SU-7 aircraft will be in greater proportion than before. T-34 tanks are being replaced by T-54 tanks; howitzers by new field guns. Ground to ground missiles are being introduced in numbers and quality yet to be determined.

B. Naval presence

Since June the Soviets have established a naval force in the Mediterranean second only to the Sixth Fleet. The present ratio between the two forces is estimated at upwards of 5.3. The coordination between this force and those of the Government of the UAR marks an escalation of Soviet involvement in the affairs of the region.

C. Aerial demonstration

Following after these naval developments the Soviets yet despatched a squadron of TU-16 bombers to Egypt for a visit of unspecified duration. It is reported that other such visits will follow. The motives may be to strengthen the Nasser regime on the eve of the summit conference and of Ambassador Jarring's visit. The Egyptian interpretation is exuberant. Cairo is becoming less convinced than ever of the necessity to seek a settlement.

D. South Arabia

The Soviets have just taken the unprecedented step of intervening actively in the Yemen war by employing Soviet-manned aircraft against Royalist forces. In Arab eyes this gives further credibility to the prospect of Soviet direct intervention elsewhere.

The question is whether this escalation in the Soviet involvement should remain unchallenged. If it does Arab policy will be based on the assumption of eventual Soviet supremacy. It is earnestly recommended that the Soviet Government be apprised of the U.S. Government's concern and serious reservations over these far reaching maneuvers. The absence of any United States reactions will encourage further Soviet intrusions. The psychological effects of passivity will be grave both in the Soviet and Arab context. At the present stage the political effects are stronger than the strictly military effects. The tendency noticed in November for Arab governments to attach decisive weight to United States influence will be dissipated.

Furthermore we strongly urge the U.S. Government to come to an early and positive decision on Israel's pending request for additional military aircraft. Such a decision would have the following positive effects:

1. It will help redress the political and military gains achieved by the Soviets through their recent actions.

2. It will have a sobering effect on Egyptian planners and policy-makers. They know that hundreds of aircraft have reached the UAR while not one single aircraft has reached Israel. It would be extraordinary in such a context if the UAR were to show a conciliatory front.

3. It is essential to demonstrate the U.S. determination to ensure a viable balance of armament in the area. The French defection has helped to create an impression that Israel can soon be intimated. It is astonishing to record such a position so soon after the June fighting. The chances of progress in the United Nations conciliation effort are considerably less than they were a few weeks ago, as a result of these cumulative disturbances in the existing and prospective balance of power. To allow this derangement to proceed without counterbalancing action would, in our view, be an error of great scope.

Experience shows that decisions of war or peace in this region are determined not so much by the reality of strengths as by the impression and appearance of it. The significance of the above developments would not be greatly affected by an objectively positive analysis of American power or Israel's strength. The danger lies in the impression that American and Israeli strength have for some months been static, while Soviet and Arab capacities have been growing in swift momentum."

2. In the ensuing conversation Eban elaborated on this presentation with particular reference to the psychological and political effects he sees resulting from the increased Soviet presence in the Middle East. Reiterating the Israeli assessment reported on various occasions that Nasser and the Egyptians appear embarked on a two-pronged policy (A) an effort to achieve a political solution on their terms if possible and (B) at the same time rebuilding their military potential to such an extent that if a political solution fails or they ultimately decide that they prefer a renewal of hostilities they will be in a position to defeat Israel at the next attempt, Eban said that he felt in November Nasser was definitely emphasizing the desirability of alternative (A), a political solution, but that there are now serious indications that he is less dedicated to that course. This change Eban attributes to the psychological impact of recent moves in the area. Eban is apprehensive that if this is the case the Egyptians will be less anxious to reach agreement politically than they would have been heretofore. His particular concern is not a real imbalance in US-Soviet force in the area in the favor of Soviets but rather the appearance of additional Soviet activity which might have such an effect on Arabic thinking as to influence them in direction of unrealistic further adventures or, obviously a lesser but still serious course, might persuade them toward adamancy in political negotiation. Turning to a question of arms supply to the Middle East and particularly US arms for Israel, Eban again stressed the psychological importance of a favorable decision on the Weizman requests as a demonstration of U.S. determination to counter effectively Soviet moves. He assumed that Israel would not get French Mirages. But he stressed that even if they did eventually it would not affect the validity of Israel's present request to the U.S. As for numbers, even before the June hostilities Israel assessed its requirements until 1970 as 75 A-4's and 100 Mirages. The first 50 of the latter to be acquired 1968 to be followed by additional 50 in '69. With the rearming by the Soviets of Egypt and other this Israeli requirement still remains valid. Thus the 27 A-4's and 50 Phantoms requested by Weizman are necessary regardless of whether the 50 Mirages come from France or not. Eban concluded by expressing view that he hoped firmly, based on the Weizman conversations and his own subsequent ones in Washington, that U.S. would not argue about numbers perhaps on a theory which would not make sense to him that a few more or less would have some useful effect in lightening the impact of U.S. supply. On contrary, if we should do so the psychological counter to the USSR would be diminished and Israel would in effect be left in dangerously short position on these essential defense items.

3. I said that while I did not have anything in addition to what he has been told in Washington as to the present state of U.S. consideration of this matter, it is my understanding that the problem is being actively pursued. I added that I felt Israeli concerns have been clearly enunciated and brought to the attention of appropriate authorities in Washington/2/ but that I would of course report the additional comments he had set forth today.

/2/On December 13 Ambassador Harman called on Acting Secretary Katzenbach to reinforce the points made by Eban with respect to Israeli concerns about growing Soviet influence and involvement in the Middle East and to emphasize the pressing need for arms to enable Israel to meet the threat posed by the influx of Soviet arms into the area. (Telegrams 84998 and 84999 to Tel Aviv, both December 15; ibid.)

Barbour

19. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, December 13, 1967.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East, Vol. I, 6/65-3/68. Secret.

SUBJECT
Arms for Jordan and Israel

The attached memos from Nick Katzenbach/2/ lay out the trickiest Mid-East arms decisions we face--Jordan and Israel.

/2/Reference is to the two December 11 memoranda from Katzenbach to the President; see Document 15 and footnote 2 thereto.

We don't believe we can string King Hussein along much longer. A Soviet economic delegation with a few military members is in Jordan now. The King feels he has to give his army some assurance that US equipment will be available or consider Soviet offers.

Nick thinks we should do something before Christmas. He recommends a small package from pre-war programs (roughly $6.5 in spares, automotive and commo gear, some anti-tank guns and ammo). He knows the Israelis won't like this, but says it won't affect the arms balance. He proposes letting the key members of Congress know what we plan to do and then informing King Hussein./3/

/3/Rostow sent another memorandum to President Johnson on December 13 in which he noted that Assistant Secretary Battle had been summoned to testify before the Middle East subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Rostow asked if Battle could inform the subcommittee of administration thinking about pressures to respond to requests from Israel and Jordan for arms. Johnson responded: "Just say no decision on acct Cong aid provisions etc." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East, Vol. I, 6/65-3/68)

That would leave us with the problem of how to handle Israeli aircraft requests. As you know, they've asked for (a) 27 additional A-4 Skyhawks to be delivered in 1969 on top of the 48 that will be delivered in 1968 and (b) 50 F-4 Phantoms for delivery in 1969-70.

The questions with Israel are not so much "whether" but "when" and "how many."

In principle, Secretaries Rusk and McNamara believe we should Jarring's peacemaking mission or trigger a new round of Arab demands on Moscow. He would like to hold off at least until Eshkol's visit in early February. To meet predictable Israeli pressures, he'd assure them that we can't decide for another month or two but we will take steps to be sure that this delay will not delay eventual delivery of the aircraft if we go ahead. He would also say that, if the military balance tips sharply against Israel, we would be prepared to divert aircraft from other contracts to meet Israel's needs quickly.

The alternative is to go ahead with 27 Skyhawks now to balance our move with Jordan. With the substantial Soviet resupply to the Arabs over the summer, no one could argue seriously that 27 aircraft to Israel would upset chances for peace. The Israeli pressure is beginning to build up here.

Therefore, the following decisions are before you:

1. Can we go ahead with a limited program for Jordan in the next week or two, after appropriate Congressional consultation?

Yes
No
Hold for discussion/4/

/4/President Johnson checked this option.

2. If so, which is the better way to handle the Israelis?

--Delay decision but assure Israelis our delay won't delay delivery?/5/
--Or tell the Israelis now we'll go ahead with the 27 additional Skyhawks and talk about the rest later?

/5/President Johnson checked this option.

This situation is complex enough that you may want to talk it over with Secretaries Rusk and McNamara and Nick Katzenbach before your decide. However, this will give you a chance to consider the problem beforehand.

Hold for discussion/6/

/6/President Johnson checked this option.

Walt

20. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, December 15, 1967.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East, Vol. I, 6/65-3/68. Secret.

SUBJECT
Arms for Israel and Jordan

You have asked to discuss these decisions: (1) Shall we resume now a limited ($6.5 million) program for Jordan to keep the USSR out? (2) When should we answer Israel's aircraft requests?

I. Time is running out on our stringing Hussein along without resuming military shipments. We would go ahead in a minute except for one problem--reaction from Israel, our Jewish community and Congress. But we still feel Israel is better off with a controlled number of US arms in Jordan than with unrestrained Soviet shipments. This is a painful decision, but the Secretaries feel we must go ahead.

II. We must provide Israel with some aircraft (Tab C),/2/ but we're divided on two issues--how many? and when? The Arab-Israeli balance today is at least as favorable to Israel as on June 5. The question is how quickly we must act to keep pace with Soviet resupply. The 48 Skyhawks we are already delivering will replace Israel's war losses by the end of 1968 and bring Israel's air strength qualitatively somewhat above its June 5 level. General Weizman asked for 27 more Skyhawks and 50 F-4 Phantoms to increase that level (from 200 to 250) and permit modernization. Everyone agrees that we should go ahead with the 27 added Skyhawks soon and hold on the Phantoms until the need is clearer (e.g. French decision on 50 Mirages). But a debate on timing ranges between these choices:

/2/Tab C is Document 15.

--Nick Katzenbach (Tab A)/3/ would hold our decision until the Eshkol visit. He believes that we should not jeopardize Jarring's mission and that we can keep the Israelis quiet about Jordan by assuring them we'll avoid lead time delays and will divert aircraft from other contracts if Israel needs help quickly.

/3/Tab A is a December 14 memorandum from Katzenbach to Rostow, not printed.

--Gene Rostow (Tab B)/4/ believes we must go ahead now, mainly to disabuse the Arabs of any false hopes that rapid supply of Soviet equipment has given them.

/4/Tab B is a December 13 memorandum from Rostow to Katzenbach, not printed.

I doubt we can hold domestic pressures comfortably until Eshkol comes. I'd be inclined to go ahead now with the 27 Skyhawks, both to balance our Jordan move (if you approve) and to show we mean it about wanting Israel to be militarily self-sufficient./5/

/5/Rostow sent a follow-up memorandum to President Johnson on December 16 in which he reported on a conversation he had had the previous evening with Israeli Minister Evron on the issue of arms for Jordan. Evron indicated that his government would understand and be helpful if the United States felt it had to go ahead with arms for Jordan. Rostow added that he felt that Evron was assuming that the United States would simultaneously agree to provide the additional 27 Skyhawk aircraft to Israel. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East, Vol. I, 6/65-3/68) On December 17 Rostow reported in a memorandum to the President that he had, on the President's instructions, discussed the question of the Skyhawk aircraft for Israel with McGeorge Bundy. Bundy felt, on balance, that it would be better to proceed with the decision to provide the aircraft rather than postpone it until Eshkol's visit. (Ibid., Israel, Vol. XII, 1965-68)

Walt

21. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Washington, December 18, 1967.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Harold H. Saunders, United Arab Republic, 4/1/66-12/3/67. Secret; Nodis. No drafting information appears on the memorandum, which is dated December 19.

PARTICIPANTS
President Lyndon B. Johnson
Mr. Walt Rostow
Mr. James E. Birdsall
Assistant Secretary of State, Lucius D. Battle

Mr. Birdsall called on President Johnson at approximately 4:15 p.m. on December 18.

Mr. Birdsall presented to President Johnson a letter from President Nasser,/2/ a copy of which is attached. Mr. Birdsall also said he had an oral message for the President./3/ President Nasser had asked him to convey expressions of the highest personal esteem for President Johnson. President Nasser also wished President Johnson to know that he regrets the break in relations between the United States and the United Arab Republic. President Nasser desires to resume relations and will endeavor to induce other Arab countries who broke with the United States to resume relations.

/2/Document 12.

/3/In a December 14 memorandum from Executive Secretary Benjamin Read to Rostow, the Department of State recommended that Birdsall be encouraged to deliver the oral message to Rostow and Battle rather than directly to the President. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Arab Republic, Vol. VI, Memos, 8/67-7/68) On December 18 Rostow sent a memorandum to the President in which he stated that Birdsall felt obligated to deliver Nasser's message directly to the President. If he could not follow Nasser's instructions, Birdsall told Rostow and Battle that he would have to report to Cairo that he had failed in his mission. Rostow noted that Nasser would be certain to regard such a failure as a personal rebuff, and he therefore recommended that the President meet with Birdsall. (Ibid.)

President Nasser hopes that President Johnson will use his influence to bring about an Israeli withdrawal. At the same time President Nasser would permit himself to accept a "state of nonbelligerency" between the United Arab Republic and the Government of Israel.

President Nasser hopes that after resumption of relations, President Johnson will make a gesture of friendship to the Arab nations. At the same time he understands United States relations with the Government of Israel.

President Nasser would appreciate an invitation to visit the United States.

President Nasser hopes that President Johnson will acknowledge the messages conveyed by Mr. Birdsall to President Johnson.

President Johnson expressed his gratitude to Mr. Birdsall and said he would consider the messages as well as what form an appropriate reply might take./4/

/4/Birdsall supplemented his oral message with a 9-page memorandum, dated December 19, in which he detailed the background to his meeting with Nasser, as well as the meeting itself. (Ibid.)

22. Letter From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Nitze) to the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach)/1/

Washington, December 19, 1967.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 12-5 ISR. Secret; Sensitive.

Dear Nick:

We have looked into the problems involved in delaying a final decision on the sale of A-4H Skyhawk and still making delivery, if it later seems desirable to do so, within a reasonable period of time. We have also looked again at the availability of F-4 aircraft.

We have several possible lines of approach to the problem of A-4Hs.

A. First, we could postpone any decision for up to a year and deliver the first of the additional 27 A-4Hs 24 months after a final contract and agreement with the Israelis. This would be the normal delivery lead time.

B. Second, we could postpone any decision until after Prime Minister Eshkol's February visit and still deliver the first of the additional 27 A-4Hs in January, 1970. This would require a commitment of from $1.1 to $9.4 million in funds, either U.S. or Israeli, for procurement of long lead time items, if a final decision and agreement is not made by April 1968.

C. Third, we could make a tentative decision before 1 January 1968, and commit from $7.6 to $12.3 million in DOD funds to advance procurement of long lead time items. We could then delay a final decision until May, 1968 and still deliver the first of the additional 27 A-4Hs in May or August 1969.

This third alternative, however, would require that the Israelis agree to a stretch-out into 1969 of the delivery of the latter portion of the 1966 buy of 48 A-4Hs. Also, the commitment of DOD funds for such an advance procurement of long lead time items will present some problems, especially if we cannot reach a final decision and agreement with Israel by May, 1968. There would also be some loss to DOD if the tentative decision and commitment of funds were not followed by a sale, but this may be partly offset if the Israelis were willing to buy some of the items peculiar to the A-4H for maintenance of the 48 A-4Hs they are now receiving.

More specific information on the second and third alternatives (B and C) analyzed by DOD are attached./2/

/2/Not found attached. The attachments to this letter are attached to a copy of the letter in Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 72 A 2468, Middle East 400.

The crucial points as I see them are whether we are prepared to commit from $7 to $13 million in DOD funds by 1 January 1968 for advanced procurement of long lead items; how important it is to be able to deliver the first of the 27 additional A-4Hs before 1 January 1970; and when we will be ready to make a final decision and agree with Israel to sell the 27 additional A-4Hs.

With respect to F-4 Phantoms, we can delay the decision for a year or more and still deliver the first F-4s 24 months from point of contract. Delivery to Israel in less than 24 months from date of final agreement would mean either diversion from active U.S. Navy or Air Force units or from U.S. production earmarked for these units; or advance procurement of long lead time items as in the case of the A-4H.

We continue to believe that to introduce F-4s into the Near East in the foreseeable future may well escalate the arms race, is not now necessary from a military point of view, and could hurt our overall position in the area. The major difference between Arab and Israeli military effectiveness, as was demonstrated last June, is in the intangibles of leadership, organization, training, maintenance, logistics, morale, and unity of action rather than numbers of aircraft. But should the French fail to deliver the Mirage V to Israel or should Arab capabilities rise appreciably as a result of Soviet supply and training assistance, we may wish to reverse this recommendation. We will continue to watch the military situation closely./3/

/3/On December 19 the JCS sent to Secretary McNamara an assessment of the Arab threat to Israel which drew the conclusion that "There have been no significant new developments in the Middle East which would require further increases in the Israeli aircraft inventory." They added, however, that the situation could change if the Soviet Union continued aircraft deliveries to the Arab states, or if France failed to deliver the Mirage aircraft Israel had contracted to receive. (Ibid., Israel 452) Nitze forwarded a copy of this memorandum, JCSM-700-67, to Walt Rostow on December 29. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. XII, 1965-1968)

Sincerely,

Paul

23. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Battle) and James Birdsall/1/

Washington, December 20, 1967.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, NEA Files: Lot 71 D 79, 1967-1968. No classification marking. Drafted by Battle.

Mr. James Birdsall called me on Wednesday, December 20, to report that he had received a call from Mr. Siddiqi who wanted to know whether Mr. Birdsall had been able to deliver the communication from President Nasser to President Johnson. Mr. Siddiqi had received a call from Mr. Hafiz in Cairo who indicated once again that he had spoken for President Nasser. Hafiz apparently had stated that Mr. Nasser was eager for a reply as soon as possible and intended to issue a statement praising President Johnson as a man of peace, assuming a favorable reply was forthcoming to the communication. It was suggested also (by whom was not clear) that Mr. Birdsall return to Cairo and give his reaction to President Johnson [Nasser?], as well as convey any reply. Mr. Birdsall, while he repeatedly said that he wished to do whatever we wanted him to do, obviously would like nothing better than to make another trip to convey the message. I informed him that the reestablishment of diplomatic relations between two countries always required detailed negotiations, paperwork, etc., and it was also imperative that we get the matter, assuming agreement in principle, into governmental channels. Mr. Birdsall agreed and then made a series of arguments in favor of his own continued involvement. I told Mr. Birdsall that in view of the President's trip to Australia he would not have an opportunity to deal with this matter for at least a week. Mr. Birdsall had already conveyed to the Egyptians that the President was away and that he (Mr. Birdsall) could not possibly make a trip before the early part of January. I agreed to be back in touch with Mr. Birdsall when we had had an opportunity to consider the matter further.

Mr. Birdsall said that he had informed the Egyptians that the President had received him warmly and that both Mr. Rostow and I had been very constructive in our approach to the matter. He also had told the Egyptians that he was sure a reply would be forthcoming and that it would be both polite and helpful.

24. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow)/1/

Washington, December 26, 1967.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. VIII, Cables and Memos, 12/67-2/68. Secret.

SUBJECT
Israel's Changing Focus on the Middle East

A distinct shift in Israeli attitudes has become apparent in recent weeks. It's hard to know whether the new attitude derives from a new appraisal of the situation or whether the Israelis have decided that their new line will serve better in pushing us toward an arms decision.

The new line seems to be to emphasize Soviet activity in the Middle East above all else. The unexpected Soviet moves in Yemen--on which Israeli intelligence is almost as good as ours--and the Soviet bomber visit to Cairo have at least coincided with this shift, if not caused it.

The main operational result of the shift in emphasis is that the Israelis seem more resigned to our resuming some military assistance to Jordan. It is impossible for them to say that the biggest threat facing them is this increased Soviet activity and yet still say that they don't care whether Jordan accepts a substantial Soviet presence. Even Evron is now willing to conceive that resumption of some military aid to Jordan appears the lesser of evils.

It may simply be that we have convinced the Israelis that the Jordan arms decision is tied to their aircraft decision and that the aircraft override all other considerations for them. In this case, we can consider that we've worn them down. It may be however that the Israelis also genuinely fear the implications of being surrounded by Soviet-influenced governments./2/

/2/A list at the bottom of the page indicates that telegrams 1763, December 11, and 1886, December 21, from Tel Aviv were attached to this memorandum. Both telegrams reported on conversations between the DCM and Foreign Office officials who expressed concern about the visit of Soviet bombers to Egypt. The Soviet Air Force visit was represented as part of a Soviet "grand scheme" to surround Israel with hostile forces.

Hal

25. Action Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, December 27, 1967.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. VIII, Cables and Memos, 12/67-2/68. Secret.

SUBJECT
Surplus APCs for Israel Instead of New Ones

You will recall approving last May the sale to Israel of 100 new Armored Personnel Carriers.

The Israelis have now said they don't intend to buy these new APCs if we will release 375 surplus World War II half-track personnel carriers for them to cannibalize. Apparently they captured enough new equipment in June to hold them for the moment and are mainly concerned with keeping their present inventory operational. The old APCs they want originally went to our NATO allies and are now back in our control as surplus in French and Italian depots. Of the 375, 143 are the balance of a sale we had already authorized last March but suspended when war broke out.

Secretaries McNamara and Katzenbach recommend that we go along with this Israeli proposal. This would avoid introducing a new and modern piece of heavy equipment into the Israeli inventory, and the deal would attract less attention from the Arabs. Our approval would be consistent with your recent decision to supply spare parts to the Israeli military since these would be cannibalized. From the Israeli side, the half-tracks have the advantage of immediate delivery and cost only about $130,000, contrasted to the 18-months lead time and $3.5 million for new vehicles.

I am checking this with you mainly because of your personal battle for the new APCs last spring. I assume, however, that you would have no problem with this suggestion since this is what the Israelis want and it is easier for us.

The only question is whether we go ahead now or wait till you've seen Eshkol. Since we get the better end of this deal, I'd be inclined to tuck it under our belts right now. We don't get a great deal of credit for letting them have what everybody else has now laid aside as military junk. However, even though aircraft will be the main focus of your talk with Eshkol, you may want to give the impression of a hiatus in decisions before he comes.

Walt

Approve now
Approve now but hold until after Eshkol visit/2/
Call me

/2/Johnson checked this option, but added a handwritten note which reads: "I have some reservations. Let's talk."

26. Telegram From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson in Texas/1/

Washington, December 28, 1967, 2341Z.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Jordan, Vol. IV. Memos, 5/67-2/68. Secret.

CAP 671220. On your instruction we passed the following message to King Hussein:/2/

/2/Sent to Amman on December 26 in telegram 89454. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 19-8 US-JORDAN)

"The President has indicated that he will make decision on Jordan arms recommendation by New Year's. He is inclined to be sympathetic to Jordan's needs, and hopes the King will not make a major decision before hearing from us."

We continue to get reports from Jordan that time is running out and that King Hussein feels it necessary to make some decision on Soviet arms by the first of the year. We have strung him along since mid-August and doubt we can do so much longer.

The package which Nick Katzenbach recommends would total about $6.5 million of spare parts, automotive and communications gear, some anti-tank guns and ammunition. We all know the Israelis won't like this but we have been interested to note in the last few weeks a much more relaxed Israeli attitude toward Hussein. In any case, this equipment will not affect the Israeli-Jordanian arms balance.

Since this is a token move to reopen the door and block the Soviets. I should think we could sell it to the Israelis who will not want to jeopardize their aircraft requests by making a fuss over such an inconsequential package from Jordan.

If you are ready to go ahead, the next step would be to authorize Ambassador Symmes to offer this package to Hussein./3/

/3/There is no indication of the President's approval or disapproval. An attached note, dictated by telephone at 9:30 p.m. on December 28 by Jim Jones to Rostow, gives the President's response as follows: "Make the views expressed in the first paragraph my views. Let's get their reaction first. I'm not going to hug him to give him some arms."

27. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State/1/

Amman, December 29, 1967, 1600Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL JORDAN-US. Secret; Priority; Limdis.

2815. Ref: Amman 2795./2/ Subj: Demonstrating US support for Jordan.

/2/Telegram 2795 from Amman, December 28, reported on a December 27 conversation between Ambassador Symmes and Prime Minister Talhouni. Symmes reported that Talhouni "let down his hair" and stated that he regarded the U.S. decision to discontinue budgetary support for Jordan as another sign of U.S. disapproval of him personally. Talhouni added that some leading members of his government felt that discontinuing budgetary support, like the failure to resume arms shipments to Jordan, was meant to punish Jordan for its role in the June war, and constituted economic pressure to force Jordan to agree to a Middle East settlement on Israel's terms. (Ibid.)

1. Amman 2795 reporting PriMin Talhouni's reaction to our decision to discontinue budget support highlights psychological considerations that require us to move quickly if we want to prevent further deterioration of our relations with Jordan. We believe it is generally accepted that a moderate Jordanian regime with which we can maintain a constructive dialogue will be a highly important, perhaps decisive, element in a viable solution to the Arab-Israel dispute. In the longer term, moreover, a moderate Jordan with a reasonable Western orientation should be an asset in dealing with the now greatly expanded Soviet presence in the Middle East. Conversely, an unfriendly, unstable Jordan would tend to contribute to further Soviet gains and would generally undermine the force of moderation in this area.

2. We still have a chance--however fragile--to achieve a reasonably stable solution of the Arab-Israel impasse, yet in Jordanian eyes we appear at this same time to be diminishing sharply the material evidence of our support that has been the basis for our relationship and influence with Jordan. We have continued the ban on military supplies for Jordan--even a minimum of spare parts and logistic equipment--while we have released major arms, including aircraft, to Israel and other Arab countries. We suddenly (albeit with sound economic rationale) cut off budget support to Jordan. We have carried forward a minimum program of technical assistance and have only one smaller development loan project going. A major American company (Grace) pulled out of Jordan's potash scheme on "political" grounds, thereby putting the entire complex package in jeopardy. We have not yet been able to authorize commencement of negotiations of an estimated $3 million PL 480/3/ wheat sales agreement--more than a month after a formal note of request was submitted. In contrast to the British who in very straitened circumstances are paying their budget support through 1967, we propose not to fulfill the total of $27 million budget support in 1967 (as we had previously indicated). Instead we propose to substitute a grant for up to $3 million for feasibility and sectoral studies and the aforementioned PL 480 sales agreement for the expected $6.2 million fourth quarter payment.

/3/Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954; 68 Stat. 454, as amended.

3. The Jordanian reaction to such actions as discontinuance of budget support must be evaluated against the very real and growing vulnerability of both the regime and the country to political and economic deterioration. The Jordanians argue they are far from self supporting economically, and they have past experience of the unreliability of Arab aid. We are well aware of their innate fiscal conservatism from our discussions with them in brighter periods. Now this conservative fiscal approach makes them distinctly reluctant (particularly in the present murky political climate) to spend to the limit of current liquid resources or to start down the slippery slope as they see it of internal borrowing to meet major, chronic budget gaps. The Jordanians are fully aware they can meet their foreseeable cash outlays in the coming twelve months; but they see themselves being cut afloat with a very uncertain future and no basis for future planning.

4. The seriousness and immediacy of our problem, however, lies in the cumulative psychological effect of our several actions and reactions as summarized in reftel particularly paras 4 and 6.

5. State 89149/4/ informing us of imminent approval of the PL 480 program and indications of elements of existing loans and other aid that might be suggested for inclusion in the GOJ budget document is helpful. We believe, however, that considerably more of a positive nature is going to be needed if we are to deal adequately with the psychological problems we face. We see a real need to move quickly on number of fronts.

/4/Dated December 23. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, AID (US) 15 JORDAN)

6. Release of military shipments is an essential first step. (This may also facilitate the dialogue on budget support.) While we must continue and expand the dialogue we have already started on the shift from budget support to more effective evidence of our continued support for Jordan. As noted above, urgent action on the PL-480 program (we hope by the new year) and offer of a grant of $3 million for specific development purposes will be helpful. However, these two elements--especially the latter--unfortunately will tend to be caught up in probable recrimination over our failure to pay the total 1967 budget support as promised. Something more is clearly needed. Tangible progress on the potash scheme is perhaps the most promising possibility. We should encourage Tenneco to make a move as soon as possible to confirm its interests and intention. At the same time, we should take the initiative to get the World Bank to express willingness to move ahead on the overall scheme without private partner if Tenneco does not intend to proceed. On the problem of showing US support in published budget, reference to existing loan availabilities may help. Even more useful would be the possibility of saying something in the budget document about our intention to make the potash loan in calendar 1968 (thus either USFY 68 or 69).

7. On the budget support question itself, perhaps we could suggest to the Jordanians a specific timetable for review of Jordan's fiscal situation, e.g. August-September 1968. This might be more concrete evidence of continuing concern for their economic situation and thus ease their feelings of uncertainty. We would reaffirm readiness to review earlier in event of unforeseen developments or need.

8. The most valuable assistance we can afford Jordan in the period immediately ahead is support for certain necessary elements in the political settlement with Israel as envisaged under the UN resolution, especially a viable arrangement on Jerusalem. The King and his advisors have already shown unease as to the actual meaning of the support we have promised. Their adherence to the moderate course directed at political settlement--no matter how much they desire it--is conditioned by the extent to which they believe it is possible. Both the establishment and the Jordanian public see the US role as critical, and they continue to look for something tangible to confirm the US intention to provide this support. A strong public or even private statement consistent with our even-handed policy, or a position that favored Jordan on some key issues, preferably Jerusalem or possibly on refugees, could have significant favorable effect. If we can find some way to make our promise of support for an acceptable settlement more credible, or if we can take some action that will clearly demonstrate our ultimate intentions and capacity to deliver, the problem of developing a rational and mutually satisfactory overall relationship will be greatly simplified. Conversely, if our demonstration of our capacity effectively to support a satisfactory settlement is inconclusive in the immediate future, the achievement of understanding and acceptance of our posture including aid will be much more difficult.

9. With the foregoing in mind, therefore, we recommend that the following courses of action be considered on a priority basis:

A. Release of military shipments followed by authorization to begin talks with the Jordanians about force goals taking into account the disappearance of the UAC and compatible with a peaceful solution of the current crisis.

B. Telegraphic authorization to begin negotiations of PL 480 sales program.

C. Authorization to offer up to $3 million for development (including feasibility studies).

D. Urgent attention to moving potash project forward.

1. State/AID approach to Tenneco to obtain firm statement of intention proceed with potash project.

2. State/AID approach to IBRD to gain agreement in principle that potash project can move ahead with appropriate technical and management assistance on contract basis in lieu of private partner.

3. Obtain any necessary approvals sign project agreement for test pans construction.

E. Approval of mention in GOJ budget presentation of contemplated development loan operations, to include potash as well as existing loan availabilities. (This will need to be authorized urgently since printing of this final section of the GOJ budget document is scheduled momentarily.)

F. Propose to the GOJ a definite date to review their fiscal position in the light of situation after mid-1968, expressing also readiness to examine earlier if circumstances warrant.

G. Explore what encouraging indications we could give to show our support for an Arab-Israel settlement with which Jordan can live, e.g.

1. A letter from Secretary to PriMin Talhouni reaffirming our intention to lend all diplomatic and other support for a settlement and providing reassurance on our support for Jordan's well-being on the basis of sound economic development and political stability. (Suggested draft by separate message.)

2. A public statement reciting established Arab rights in Jerusalem and environs (such as private property ownership) and expressing disapproval of measures pretending to change these.

3. Revival of pressure on Israel for repatriation of significant numbers of newly displaced persons prior to settlement.

Symmes