NOTE: External links to other Internet sites should not be construed as an endorsement of the views contained therein.
| The State Department web site below is a permanent electronic archive of information released prior to January 20, 2001. Please see www.state.gov for material released since President George W. Bush took office on that date. This site is not updated so external links may no longer function. Contact us with any questions about finding information. NOTE: External links to other Internet sites should not be construed as an endorsement of the views contained therein. |
 | FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XVIII Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1964-67 Department of State |
 The President met with Secretary of State Rusk, Secretary of Defense McNamara, Walt Rostow, and George Christian from 6:43 to 7:45 p.m. on April 20, 1967. (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary) An agenda for the meeting sent to the President by Rostow includes the following item: "Aid to Israel--(Sect. Rusk) "a. You have a State memorandum on aid which was sent you as a basis for your discussion with Mr. Feinberg. "b. Sects. Rusk and McNamara have been asked for their views on the Israeli policy paper which I sent to them this morning. You have my views on the paper. "c. A new Israeli proposal: US engines for a French fighter. (Sect. McNamara)" (Ibid., National Security File, Files of Walt Rostow, Meetings With the President) The "State memorandum on aid" apparently is a reference to Katzenbach's April 17 memorandum (see footnote 5, Document 406). The "Israeli policy paper" is a reference to the memorandum cited in footnote 5, Document 407. Rostow sent partial copies to Rusk and McNamara with covering memoranda of April 20 stating that the President wanted to have their personal views at the meeting that day. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 72 A 2468, Israel 092) McNaughton commented in an April 20 memorandum to McNamara. (Ibid., Israel 091.3 MAP) Battle commented in an April 21 memorandum to Rusk. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 19-8 US-ISR) The Israeli request to purchase U.S.-made engines for French interceptor/fighter bombers was made by Israeli Deputy Minister of Defense Zvi Dinstein at an April 17 meeting with Vance. (Memorandum of conversation, filed with an April 21 memorandum from Hoopes to Vance; Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 72 A 2468, Israel 091.112) No record of the meeting has been found. The copy of the agenda with Rostow's marginal notes (cited above) bears the following notes next to this agenda item: "Dimona. Post-trip." and "Italians? APC's. R.McN."
411. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Lebanon/1/ Washington, April 21, 1967, 5:34 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL LEB. Confidential. Drafted by Gamon and approved by Davies. 180013. Beirut 9598./2/ /2/Document 408. 1. We are encouraged by President Helou's interest in considering CCC and PL-480 proposals as reported reftel. Reaction not as negative as anticipated. We therefore are looking forward to results your subsequent conversation with Foreign Minister Hakim. We are anxious move ahead as fast as possible./3/ /3/Telegram 9663 from Beirut, April 21, reported that Hakim informed Porter on April 20 that Helou wanted to accept the U.S. offer. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, AGR 12-3 LEB) After further negotiations, Porter informed Hakim on May 18 of U.S. approval of a $12 million line of CCC credit for purchase of up to 150,000 metric tons of wheat between May 1967 and June 30, 1968. (Ibid.) 2. On other hand, we are disturbed by Helou's analysis of Lebanese political situation. In particular, his apparent assessment that moderates might be relinquishing initiative to anti-Western elements seems unduly pessimistic. We tend to feel that Helou failed to mention those groups in Lebanon (including military) whom, we feel, would not stand by idly in face of bid for power for Left. We recognize that Lebanon is probably now in a political drift and that continued reluctance to stand up to those who seek to undermine its integrity might entail a relinquishment of that integrity. However, we feel situation need not necessarily lead to disintegration of forces which have held Lebanon together, particularly if moderates are given positive leadership. It had been our understanding that most political leaders were in agreement that extremism must be contained for sake of Lebanon's future welfare. 3. We would therefore appreciate receiving the Embassy's analysis of President Helou's assessment, and its projection of Lebanon's political future in the light of that analysis. In particular, (a) will responsible political leaders allow the present drift to get out of hand? (b) Is existing power structure seriously threatened? What are the alternatives? How would these alternatives affect U.S. interests? (c) Will those who have benefited most under Lebanon's system of private enterprise be unwilling to accept larger degree of control over their power and wealth as insurance against extremism? (d) Will net effect of knowledge of "massive Soviet aid offer" referred to by Helou be strengthening or weakening of moderates? (e) What would be political impact in Lebanon if Soviet projects carried out? (f) Would existing power structure accept a significant Soviet bloc influence in Lebanon?/4/ /4/Telegram 9869 from Beirut, April 27, conveyed the Embassy's analysis. It stated that although most Lebanese political leaders preferred to follow a pro-Western neutrality, this was a difficult task when the Egyptians, Syrians, and Soviets were attacking the United States for a variety of reasons, including policy toward Israel, Vietnam, and aid to the UAR; it would be impossible if the Soviets offered sizable aid to Lebanon and the United States did nothing. The Embassy thought no Lebanese Government could survive turning down Soviet aid under those circumstances. It concluded that if the United States sought to retain the advantages it derived from Lebanon's free economic and political systems and pro-Western stance, it would have to provide support along the lines requested by the Lebanese leadership. (Ibid., POL LEB) Rusk
412. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, April 26, 1967, 4:30 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL UAR-US. Confidential. Drafted by Bergus and approved in U on May 4. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS The Acting Secretary asked jocularly if Mr. Younes had discovered any oil on his visit to the United States. Mr. Younes had said that he was trying to discover more American explorers for Egypt's oil. The TENNECO Company was interested in two areas in the UAR. Some difficulties had cropped up in the TENNECO/UAR negotiations but Mr. Younes felt that these could be reconciled. The UAR had a great interest not only in oil production but in such related enterprises as petro-chemicals, insecticides, and fertilizer industries. Mr. Younes had also talked to the leadership of Phillips and Standard of Indiana. With the latter, studies were going forward as to how the best use could be made of the gas which would be a byproduct of the oil operations at el-Murgan Field. He acknowledged that Standard of Indiana had had a mixed experience with the UAR. There had been lengthy delays in previous negotiations. Mr. Younes said he was now in full charge of oil matters in the UAR. There was a brief discussion of the type of arrangement being made between the Egyptian Oil Authority and Phillips. Although the joint company would have three Egyptian and only two American members, it had been agreed that no vote would be binding unless at least one American were in the majority. Mr. Younes said that as result of his talks with the oil companies he had the feeling that they would like some kind of statement of support and encouragement from the US Government. The Acting Secretary was then briefly called out of the room. In his absence a discussion between Ambassador Nolte and Mr. Younes ensued as to the practicability of a semi-autonomous Tourism Authority, along the lines of the Suez Canal Authority, which could make binding cost-plus contracts with foreign investors and management organizations in the tourism field. Mr. Katzenbach then returned and asked Mr. Younes how he viewed the economic picture in the UAR. Mr. Younes replied that the UAR would need two or three years to balance its situation. The Americans could play a great role in this through their oil companies. The UAR hoped to double its oil production next year, achieving an additional 7-1/2 million tons from the Murgan Field. Then Phillips would follow and UAR production would shortly be tripled. Ambassador Kamel commented that what was crucial was what we did in the meantime. Perhaps it would be as long as five years before the UAR could stand on its feet economically. Ambassador Kamel gave a lengthy expose of his "plan" for the improvement of US-UAR relations. This involved a) CCC roll-over,/2/ b) encouragement of US private banks to enable the UAR to implement its stabilization agreement with the International Monetary Fund, c) IBRD loans and d) some kind of a consortium to look into the UAR's external debt situation. Throughout Kamel's presentation ran the theme that the USSR could only stand to benefit from continuing poor relations between the US and the UAR. He felt that political difficulties between the US and the UAR could be "frozen" while economic cooperation was increased. /2/An April 28 memorandum from Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs Anthony M. Solomon to Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Eugene V. Rostow enclosed a draft telegram to Cairo authorizing the Embassy to inform the UAR Government of U.S. willingness to negotiate an agreement based on its offer to pay $40 million in principle and interest due in 1967 to the Export-Import Bank, AID, and the Department of Agriculture in exchange for a new $24 million CCC credit. The memorandum states that the Department of Agriculture was concerned that the proposal would open the Department to charges of trying to finesse Congressional constraints on aid to the UAR. It asked Rostow to call Secretary of Agriculture Orville Freeman to try to obtain his clearance. A handwritten note on the memorandum notes that talks within the U.S. Government were aborted by the outbreak of hostilities in the Near East. (Ibid.) Mr. Katzenbach agreed that ways of cooperation must be found. He did not feel that relations between the United States and the USSR were the principal problem in US-UAR relations. He saw the situation more in terms of problems between the UAR and the United States. He was delighted that Egypt had reached an agreement with the Fund. He could not comment on what the International Bank might do. He felt that the Egyptians would have real problems with regard to their current economic situation. These problems entered even into the question of the CCC roll-over. He felt that measures which the Egyptians might take to stimulate private investment were important and was all for them. But US ability to assist had to be considered in terms of the political difficulties between the two countries. These could not be wished away. The US wanted good relations with the UAR. Mr. Younes felt that this made it the right time for both sides to move forward. Mr. Katzenbach referred to the need for Congressional support for many of the actions which the UAR would like us to do. This could be difficult to obtain. Ambassador Kamel stated there was a need in the UAR for a new start in US-UAR relations. He had carefully explained to Cairo the complexities of US constitutional processes, but now some moves were required on the part of the United States. Presently there existed a genuine vacuum of cooperation. Mr. Katzenbach pointed out that the improvement of relations was a two-way street. Mr. Kamel stated that the US as a big power should exercise more patience.
413. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, April 29, 1967. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. VI. Confidential. A handwritten note on the memorandum indicates that it was received at 3:55 p.m. SUBJECT /2/Israel's annual Independence Day parade was to be held in Jerusalem on May 15. We are in the midst of our annual hassle over whether Ambassador Barbour should go to Israel's parade in Jerusalem. He would go if both the French and British Ambassadors were going. But London has decided at Cabinet level that its Ambassador should not go this year, and Paris has agreed. The issue is where we draw the line in lending our presence to ceremonies which further recognize Jerusalem as Israel's capital. UN resolutions of 1949-50 recommended that Jerusalem be placed under international administration. We have gone along with this position. Although we do business with Israeli government offices in Jerusalem, we have refused legally to recognize it as Israel's capital and have kept our embassy in Tel Aviv. While the conditions that led to our initial position have changed, we don't believe we should change that position unless in the context of some Arab-Israeli settlement. Doing so otherwise would kick off a tremendous Arab reaction. State really doesn't feel our presence makes that much legal difference because we've been to other such functions in Jerusalem. But it does fear that the Israelis and Arabs would read great significance if we broke with the British and French on the issue. We could probably get Eshkol to promise not to exploit our presence, but we can't stave off some Arab reaction. The Jordanian Foreign Minister has already formally asked us not to attend. He feels that Jordan is especially vulnerable to Arab criticism because of Jordan's close relationship with us. The issue is not the parade itself but the fact that the Israeli government uses this kind of thing to nibble away at the Western position. The British have decided--at the Cabinet level after two reviews and considerable Jewish pressure--that they must draw the line somewhere and that this is the place. In 1965, they attended a tattoo in Jerusalem after the Israelis assured them they'd make nothing of it and then six weeks later Eshkol cited British and American presence as a significant step toward Western recognition of Israel's status in Jerusalem. The British were burned up, and there's a good bit of their annoyance in this year's decision. The Israelis are telling us informally that our refusal to attend will provoke a crisis in our relations. That's nonsense, and we can probably talk them out of that line. But unfortunately they can read our absence as the kind of aloofness that doesn't help you here at home. Personally, I can't get excited about whether we go to the parade or not, and I think the British may be drawing the line at the wrong place. But they do make one important point. There's no question that every Israeli move like this is calculated "salami tactics." Unhappily, there is no such thing with this tough-minded, always-negotiating government--much as I love the Israelis as people--as just making a nice gesture without having them attach significance to it. The main issue in this as in the aid package is whether we're now ready to throw open the gates to Israel or whether we're still willing to draw the line somewhere to preserve some balance between our Arab and Israeli policies. They think they've made a breakthrough with you on the tank and planes sales, and they're trying to exploit it to the hilt. I hate to see something like this cause you trouble, and I think the British have made a wrong decision. But Secretary Katzenbach has decided we ought to go along with them and the French, and if there were no domestic concern, I wouldn't even bother you with this. He has not asked our review, but I asked to put this before you. You can either let his decision stand, or I can ask him to take a second look if you are concerned. Walt Let the decision stand /3/This option is checked, and a handwritten note states that this was done on May 1. Katzenbach renewed his recommendation in a May 2 memorandum to the President, which Rostow forwarded with a May 4 memorandum endorsing it and recommending a low-key approach to the Israelis to urge them not to make an issue of it. Johnson's response is conveyed in an attached May 4 note telling him to talk to David Ginsburg and "see if you can get him aboard" and to have Harry McPherson talk to Evron. An attached May 6 note from Jim Jones to Johnson conveyed Rostow's query whether this meant approval of Katzenbach's recommendation. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. VI) Apparently it did; telegram 193643 to Tel Aviv, May 12, states that the Department informed Evron that day that Barbour would be unable to attend the parade. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 8 ISR)
414. Memorandum From the Representative to the United Nations (Goldberg) to President Johnson/1/ New York, May 1, 1967. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Israeli Aid, 5/67. Secret. Filed as an attachment to Document 416. MILITARY AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO ISRAEL As requested I have reviewed the recommendations from the Department and it is my own recommendation that you respond to Israel's request as follows: I. Military A. You authorize the sale rather than grant of 100 APC's to Israel, half the number Israel has requested on a grant basis--on current non-concessional credit terms. The delivery schedule should be based simply on availability rather than stretched-out delivery. Israel should be requested to limit or avoid publicity on the transaction. Key congressmen should be briefed, using modernization needs as the basic justification for the sale. In my view there will be no difficulty with the Congress on this point. This is in essence the fallback recommendation of the Department except for the delivery schedule which the Department would stretch out and which in my view is unnecessarily harsh on Israel. B. I agree with the Department's recommendation that if manufacturing facilities for the Skyhawk A-4H aircraft make a speed up impossible, we will not be able to grant this request. It should be recalled, however, that at the time of the Jordan proceedings in the Security Council we did commit ourselves to an expedited schedule for delivery of these airplanes. C. I agree with the Department's recommendation that we agree to Israel's request to establish "fifth echelon" facilities for the Hawk missile system insofar as such facilities relate to maintenance rather than production or resale of missiles. D. I recommend that we agree, as a one time exception to policy, to provide $4 million credit for Hawk spare parts and $10 million for tank spare parts, this latter figure being the figure mentioned in the original deal. The Department's fallback position calls for a $9 million credit. I believe we can meet Israel's request for an additional $5 million credit, since a credit rather than a grant is involved and the difference is relatively small. The terms should not be the more onerous terms proposed by the Department but rather the terms of the original deal; i.e., a 3-1/2% interest rate and a pay back period of 10 years. To overcome the objection that this would establish a precedent in a supplementary credit deal, the original contract could be re-written to make this credit part of the original commitment. II. Economic A. Israel has requested development loans of $20 million. The Department would deny this request and refer Israel to the Export-Import Bank. I recognize the difficulties involved here but perhaps we could consider settling this request, as was done last year, by a $10 million development loan and by a $10 million Export-Import Bank loan, or if this is not possible, by assuring prompt and favorable consideration of the $20 million loan by the Bank. B. I agree with the Department's recommendation that we agree to Israel's request for permission to bid on AID supporting assistance purchases of potash and phosphate fertilizers primarily for South Viet Nam and South Korea for a period not to exceed 12 months. This is also to our advantage since it involves Israel in aid to South Viet Nam. C. I recommend that we agree to Israel's request for commodities under the Food-for-Freedom Program by providing commodities, excluding wheat, of $26.5 million on the basis of Israel's requirements and our own availabilities. Israel has asked for $35-36 million including wheat. The Department recommends a range of $19 to $23.5 million. I believe the figure I suggest $26.5 million is a good compromise. The Department's proposals, moreover, are too severe with respect to payment and Israel's are too liberal. I suggest a compromise, i.e., 50% local currency and 50% dollar credit sales to be paid over twenty years but at the same interest rate as last year, i.e., 2-1/2%. D. I agree with the Department's proposal that we give sympathetic consideration to further support of Israel's assistance programs in Africa along the lines of past support for programs which indirectly benefit us (Central African Republic, Chad, and Dahomey), within the limitations imposed by the revised strategy for United States aid to Africa. General Comment: What I have suggested, in my view, is a reasonable compromise which will be acceptable to the Israelis and to American public opinion and would not prejudice our relations with Arabic states. Finally, I should like to suggest as a replacement for Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker as your representative on the American-Israel Joint Nuclear Desalinization project that you consider the appointment of Jack Valenti. This would follow the tradition of Presidents Truman and Eisenhower who appointed Jack's predecessor at the Motion Picture Association, Eric Johnston, as a special Ambassador in this area. Jack Valenti shares your concern, vision and foresight in this vital area and would bring a practical rather than a bureaucratic approach to the solution of the problems involved. This, I know, would be a highly agreeable appointment to all concerned. Respectfully submitted,
415. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, May 1, 1967. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Israeli Aid, 5/67. Secret; Exdis. Filed as an attachment to Document 416. No drafting information appears on the memorandum, but another copy indicates that it was drafted by Sterner and cleared in draft by Rochlin, Deputy Assistant Director of ACDA for International Relations Culver Gleysteen, Raymond L. Garthoff of G/PM, Vladimir Toumanoff of SOV, Director of Atomic Energy Affairs in SCI Donovan Q. Zook, Edward A. Padelford of NEA/RA, Director of INR/RNA Granville S. Austin, Bergus, Battle, and Deputy Assistant Secretary in NEA Stuart W. Rockwell. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR) An undated memorandum from Battle, forwarding the memorandum for Katzenbach's signature, states that it was prepared at the request of the White House staff. (Ibid.) SUBJECT Conventional Forces. Israel has a safe margin of superiority over any combination of Arab forces likely to attack it and can be expected to maintain that position for at least the next five years. Arab numerical force superiority is more than matched by Israel's superiority in training, leadership, military doctrine and maintenance of equipment. Moreover, the Arab states have made little progress in military coordination among themselves. Recent border clashes have demonstrated that short of general hostilities, or Israeli occupation of Arab territory, the Arab states will not rush to one another's assistance. In practical terms, therefore, Israel's security must be measured by its ability to maintain military superiority over the UAR, the strongest single Arab state that can challenge Israel. Nuclear Weapons. Concerned that over the long run the Arabs will achieve superiority in conventional forces, Israel is carefully preserving its option to acquire sophisticated weapons, including, we believe, nuclear weapons. We have no evidence that Israel is actually making a bomb, but we believe Israel intends to keep itself in a position to do so at reasonably short notice should the need arise. The Israeli reactor at Dimona is capable of producing enough plutonium to make one or two bombs a year, but thus far our periodic inspections of this facility (most recently on April 22, 1967) have uncovered no evidence of weapons activity. Our inspectors emphasize, however, that their visits cover only the Dimona site and there can be no assurance that the Israelis are not pursuing a clandestine weapons program elsewhere./2/ Our suspicions that we do not know the full story have been heightened by the Israelis' unwillingness to tell us what happened to 80-100 tons of unsafeguarded uranium concentrate that they bought from Argentina 4 years ago. We have also had reports that Israel has acquired a nuclear chemical separation plant, which--if true--would be a significant step toward a weapons capability. These reports are being urgently investigated. /2/A "Preliminary Report of the Visit to Atomic Energy Sites in Israel, April 20 to April 24, 1967: Summary and Conclusions (Only)" is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Harold Saunders, Israel-Nuclear-Dimona-Desalting. On the Arab side, no state is anywhere near a nuclear weapons capability. The UAR has a small 2-megawatt research reactor which cannot produce significant amounts of plutonium. Both Eshkol and Nasser are on record as saying that their countries will not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the area. Beyond this, however, neither the Egyptians nor the Israelis have accepted IAEA safeguards over their entire nuclear programs, in spite of our urging them to do so. The UAR's position is that so far they have nothing that requires safeguarding whereas Israel does and should therefore be the one that takes the first step. Israel's position is more complex. Israelis have stressed to us their concern that information obtained by IAEA inspectors, which might be available to the UAR, could aid the latter in planning a military or sabotage operation against Dimona. In terms of their long-range security the Israelis may also have decided that they will not accept limitations upon their sophisticated weapon option in the absence of Arab arms control undertakings in the conventional field. Ballistic Missiles. Israel has contracted with the French firm of Dassault to purchase an unknown quantity of surface-to-surface ballistic missiles. These missiles are capable of carrying nuclear warheads and would not be militarily cost-effective unless so used. The missile (designated the MD-620) is now being flight-tested by the French. None have apparently been delivered to Israel as yet, but initial deliveries could take place sometime in 1968. Latest evidence indicates that, despite some difficulties with the guidance system, the MD-620 program is moving forward. Israel is also pursuing an indigenous SSM R&D program. The UAR's SSM program, though widely advertised for many years, has reached a virtual standstill. Most of the West German scientists who were assisting this effort have departed. Flight testing of the UAR missiles has been suspended, and it is estimated that the missile program, at its present level of activity, could not be successfully completed within the next decade. Soviet Policy. Although the Soviets have gained much from their large sales of conventional weapons to certain Arab countries, we believe it unlikely that they will help any Arab state toward a nuclear weapons capability. There is similarly no hard evidence of Soviet assistance on the UAR's missile program. U.S. Initiatives. The coming months may well offer our best opportunity in years to press for our arms control objectives because of two possible forms of additional leverage--first, a non-proliferation treaty, and second, U.S. willingness to finance desalting plants in the area. We plan to pursue our objectives along the following lines. 1. Safeguards and the NPT. We hope the non-proliferation treaty will prove to be a vehicle to help us get both Israel and the UAR to accept safeguards over their nuclear programs. Much will depend on whether the treaty emerges with a strong safeguards clause. As soon as the U.S. is ready to table a draft treaty at the ENDC, we plan to discuss it with the Israelis and the UAR. We are also exploring ways of overcoming Israel's suspicions of the IAEA, including the possibility of getting Israel a seat on the IAEA Board of Governors. 2. Ballistic Missiles. In May last year we raised with Eshkol our concern over Israel's plans to acquire ballistic missiles. Eshkol said Israel would not acquire SSM's "for two, maybe three years." He indicated that if Nasser "abandoned" his missile program, Israel would do likewise. Since the UAR's program has remained inactive in the intervening year, we plan to raise this again with Eshkol in the near future. Our objective is to try to achieve a tacit understanding with the Israelis and Egyptians for mutual forebearance in the further development of their SSM programs. If Eshkol is receptive, we are prepared to approach Nasser. 3. Talks with the Soviets. Our probes of the Soviets concerning arms control in the Arab-Israel context have elicited little show of interest thus far. We do not expect that the Soviets will be receptive to an approach on controlling the supply of conventional weapons. However, depending on the course of U.S.-Soviet negotiations on the nonproliferation treaty, we may have a renewed opportunity to take up the problem of nuclear weapons and missiles in the Near East. 4. Put More Punch Into Our Arms Control Discussions with the Israelis. We are disappointed not only in the lack of progress of our arms control discussions with the Israelis but in the lack of Israeli candor that has characterized them. There is a large area of Israeli activity and planning that is a closed book to us. During the coming year we would like to see arms control results linked more directly to Israel's requests for military and economic aid. Continuing Intelligence Surveillance. While our inspections of Dimona can reassure us concerning activities there, they leave open the possibility of Israeli weapons activity somewhere else in Israel. For this reason continuing surveillance of Israel by every means at our disposal must remain a high priority intelligence requirement. We intend also to keep a watch on Israeli efforts to acquire in other countries equipment and technology related to nuclear weapon and missile programs. Nicholas deB. Katzenbach
416. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, May 8, 1967. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Israeli Aid, 5/67. Secret; Sensitive. A handwritten "L" on the memorandum indicates that it was seen by the President. SUBJECT We now know enough informally about the AEC's inspection of Dimona to wrap up the Israeli aid package. Secretaries McNamara and Katzenbach have acquiesced (Tab A)/2/ in most of Arthur Goldberg's proposals (Tab B)./3/ I have outlined the resulting package on the attached chart./4/ It gives the Israelis almost everything they want, except on APC's. /2/Tab A is a May 5 memorandum from Katzenbach to the President. /3/Document 414. /4/The chart, entitled "Israeli Aid Package," dated May 8, not attached, listed the various elements of the package in three columns, headed "Israeli Request," "Katzenbach-McNamara-Goldberg Proposal," and "Your Decision." A copy is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel Aid, 5/67. The one major difference between Arthur's recommendation and the Secretaries' indicates the Secretaries' continuing concern over providing APC's. They propose only that we license sale of 100 APC's for cash, while Arthur recommends credit sale on no-concessional terms. The main issue remains how closely we should identify ourselves with Israel in view of its unclear nuclear intentions and our interests in the Arab world. I understand--and share--your desire to do everything we can to help the Israelis. On the other hand, we know that every request they make is not only a request for help but part of an effort to maneuver us into closer and closer identification. They feel they've made a breakthrough in the tank and plane sales and are pushing hard to exploit it. The AEC team found no evidence that Israel is using Dimona to produce material for use in nuclear weapons. While this conclusion is encouraging, it can't tell us one way or the other whether Israel may be pressing a clandestine weapons program elsewhere. Secretary Katzenbach concludes (Tab C)/5/ that Israel is carefully preserving its option to produce nuclear weapons on short notice if it needs to. Our intelligence proves nothing, but there are enough unanswered questions to make us want to avoid getting locked in too closely with Israel. /5/Document 415. In addition, State and Defense worry about our substantial interests in the Arab world. I know you are keenly aware of our oil interests ($2.75 billion investment, $750 million in yearly profits in production alone plus downstream operations) and of our obligations to our Arab friends. Our greatest single liability there--and one of the USSR's greatest assets--is the sincere Arab belief that the "Zionists exercise a veto on US policy." These important concerns account for the rough passage this package has had. The alternative to selling APC's now would be to tell the Israelis that our agreement to their full requests for credit on military spares ($14 million) is all we can do this year but that we'll consider the APC's along with other requests they've already made for the next generation of Israeli weapons. In fact, that $14 million alone is a substantial concession--larger than the whole cost of the Jordan package ($12 million) including airlift costs. If you approve APC's, we will need to control publicity. I've set up the attached chart as your decision document./6/ We might gain some points by giving the Israelis our decision before their Independence Day (15 May), especially if we don't go to their parade. Secretary Katzenbach will send a separate memo on desalting./7/ /6/Handwritten notations on the chart cited in footnote 4 above indicate the President's decisions, which he made at a May 23 luncheon meeting with Rusk, McNamara, Rostow, Christian, and Helms. (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary) A list attached to a May 23 memorandum from Rostow to the President states that the President approved a cash sale of 100 APCs for $3.7 million, preferably the sale of 100 Italian APCs with U.S. license, with a direct U.S. sale only if that arrangement was not workable, a $2 million cash sale of tank spare parts, $14 million military credit at 5 percent interest for Hawk and tank spare parts, sale of $27.5 million in food at 2-1/2 percent interest, $20 million in Export-Import Bank loans, $5 million for special Africa assistance, agreement to establishment of facilities for Hawk missile maintenance, and agreement to offshore procurement for U.S. aid programs. (Ibid., National Security File, Country File, Israel, Israeli Aid, 5/67) /7/A May 10 memorandum from Katzenbach to the President recommended Jack Valenti as a possible Coordinator on Israeli and UAR desalting plants. (Ibid., Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 27) Walt
417. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, May 10, 1967. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Arab Republic, Vol. V. Secret. A handwritten notation on the memorandum states that it was received at 5:20 p.m., and a handwritten "L" indicates that it was seen by President. SUBJECT Nasser's Foreign Minister promises that our two AID men in Yemen will be out of jail by 15 May./2/ We've evacuated all but a skeleton crew there. If we get these two out safely, our main loss will be some CIA material the Egyptians filched from one of the safes left behind when our people were dragged off. /2/An April 27 note from Rostow to the President states that two Americans at the AID mission in Yemen had been charged with attempting to destroy the city of Taiz. It comments that in both Cairo and Yemen, some groups wanted to get rid of connections with the United States, and that those groups appeared to have won. It states, "We shall be announcing tomorrow that the charges are without foundation--which they are." (Ibid., Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 26) The two men were released on May 17. For further information concerning this episode, see the Yemen compilation in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, volume XXI. We don't think Nasser staged the incident in Yemen to get us out. However, once Egyptian mishandling on the scene created an opening, Cairo gave vent to its emotions and played it out for its full propaganda and intelligence advantage. Their readiness to see us humiliated and their duplicity illustrate the bitterness they feel toward us, while their willingness to set limits against harm to our people suggests they want to stop short of an open break. Nasser summed up the reason for this bitterness in his 2 May speech: ". . . you do not consider us your friends." To him, our cutting back food aid is the final evidence that we are working against him and want to see him crushed under his economic burdens. But above all, he sees CIA's hand behind everything that goes wrong for him. In his final talk with Luke Battle, he admitted he is a "suspicious man," but he also claims he has evidence that CIA is working to topple him. It was natural for him to see a sinister hand behind AID's roadbuilding work in southern Yemen where Egyptians are training the "liberation army" for South Arabia. We've held our tempers so far, but getting our men out of jail may take the lid off strong pent-up desire to wash our hands of Nasser. The Egyptians have maddeningly violated every code of diplomatic practice--despite Secretary Rusk's strong statement on the "rights of legation"--and they've used more poison gas in Yemen. Yet on the constructive side, they have reached agreement with the IMF, entertained American businessmen, are negotiating with another American oil company and are trying to avoid defaulting on debt repayments to us. While the temptation to break will be greater than ever, cooler heads will probably prevail. With the South Arabian problem reaching center stage, we'll badly need someone on the scene in Cairo. Walt
418. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel/1/ Washington, May 12, 1967, 6:02 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL ARAB-ISR. Confidential. Drafted by Wolle; cleared by Paolozzi, Davies, and in substance by Robert H. Flenner in EUR/SOV; and approved by Battle. Repeated to Amman, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, London, USUN, CINCSTRIKE, Jerusalem, and Moscow. 193481. 1. Israeli Ambassador Harman called on Asst Secretary Battle evening eleventh with instructions from Fonmin Eban to register serious GOI concern over terrorism northern Israel. In summary, Eban's view is that Syrians creating dangerous situation, without any restraint. In reviewing recent series incidents, Harman emphasized that Syrians are making increased use Lebanese territory to hit at Israel, are penetrating region hitherto quite free from terrorism (the area immediately north of Lake Tiberias), and are suddenly putting mines on major metalled roads. Fact there have been no casualties fortunate but does not diminish Syrian guilt and obvious terrorist intention include women and children among victims. 2. Harman said though he had not seen text May 11 statement by U Thant on situation,/2/ he understood it contained very helpful language. In particular, it contained one "very accurate" point that recent incidents showed greater expertise than before. GOI convinced, said Harman, that signs pointed definitely to involvement Syrian Army. /2/The text of the statement made by Secretary-General U Thant during a May 11 press conference is in telegram 5263 from USUN, May 12. (Ibid.) 3. Harman said he did not want speculate on what GOI response might be if terrorism continues. He hoped that situation would not arise. Said GOI hoped Syria under no illusions that tactic of terrorism bestows on it some immunity from Israeli response any more than in cases like April 7 when other tactics such as interference with cultivation and shelling of villages from fixed positions are introduced. 4. Battle said he deeply regretted situation of terrorism, which we agree is alarming, and appreciated problems it poses for GOI. He could only commend calmness and restraint./3/ He agreed SYG's statement might be helpful. Said Dept thinks Lebanese Govt. doing its best to stop terrorism, but one should remember Lebanese internal problems recently fanned by tumult surrounding proposed Sixth Fleet visit, and in any event would be most difficult attain 100 percent success. He was glad to note from Harman's presentation GOI recognized dangers if situation got out of hand. Also to be kept in mind is that Syria having problems internally with regime's critics in disorganized and tumultuous way trying to show disapproval. /3/Telegram 190856 to Tel Aviv, May 9, expressed concern at the flurry of terrorist incidents in the previous 10 days and instructed the Embassy to counsel restraint. (Ibid., POL 32-1 ISR-LEB) Telegram 191818 to Tel Aviv, May 10, summarized a conversation that day between Davies and Evron in which Davies reiterated this and urged that alternatives to military reprisal be sought. (Ibid.) 5. Harman said that while no question Syria is main culprit, Lebanese nonetheless had permitted their soil be used for terrorism seven occasions in short period time. Said GOL is responsible under GAA for taking forthright action against terrorism. 6. Harman agreed with Battle's statement that increased GOI success recent months in intercepting infiltrators is encouraging note. Rusk [end of document] Volume XVIII Index | Foreign Relations Online | Historian's Office | Department of State | Secretary of State |