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 | FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968 Volume XVII Eastern Europe Department of State |
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| 20. Memorandum for the Record/1/ Washington, April 24, 1968. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings File. Confidential. Drafted by Davis on April 26. A copy was sent to Rostow. SUBJECT Secretary Rusk opened the meeting by observing that the Eastern European societies had, in one sense, the opposite problem from our own. Our tradition has been individual rights, and we have recently had to concern ourselves with collective problems. The Communist societies depart from the collective view and are only recently facing the problem of the individual. This produces a pull of attraction to the West. A second tie to the West is provided by the desire of Eastern European intellectuals to pursue professional contacts with their Western colleagues. A third tie is the desire of the Eastern European states to assert their independence against the Soviet Union. Secretary Rusk warned against the danger that the East Germans might react to the changes going on in Czechoslovakia and elsewhere by provoking additional tensions with the West. The Secretary said he had Berlin particularly in mind, and mentioned the recent problems of travel and Bundestag meetings. So far as U.S. policy is concerned, the Secretary thought we were right in playing the Eastern European question in low key. We should maintain our public posture of non-intervention. The Secretary said we should bear in mind the classic distinction between rape and seduction. Secretary Rusk expressed regret that so many of our policy tools had been taken or withheld by the Congress. In particular, it is a pity the East-West Trade bill was not passed earlier. A drive to pass the East-West Trade bill now might be a mistake. Secretary Rusk said that, because of circumstances and policy, the Western Europeans may have to be out in front in efforts to exploit Eastern European developments. However, we have opportunities in the fields of trade and cultural contacts. The Secretary went on to mention that he had just sent over a package on the Romanians' desire to purchase a heavy water plant, with his recommendation that the President approve it. The President asked Deputy Under Secretary Bohlen if he had anything to add. Ambassador Bohlen observed that the Communist parties in Eastern Europe have usurped an all-encompassing role and this has had a stifling effect on Eastern European societies. The original Marxist idea was that the parties should exert ideological leadership. They have become both the keeper and prisoner of ideology, and thereby increasingly ineffective in leading these societies forward. Ambassador Bohlen expressed concern that Czech developments go too far, and provoke a Soviet reaction. He seconded the Secretary's advocacy of quiet diplomacy. The President, noting that he was making a brief digression, asked Ambassador Bohlen why he thought DeGaulle made his recent gesture to Hanoi. Ambassador Bohlen said DeGaulle had tipped his hat to the President's acts of renunciation on March 31,/2/ and probably felt he needed to redress the balance in Hanoi's direction. Ambassador Bohlen said DeGaulle's general attitude has not changed, and we can expect continued obstruction and hostility on gold, British entry into the Common Market and NATO. /2/For text of the President's statement, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1968-69, Book I, pp. 469-476. The President asked Secretary Fowler if he had any observations on the gold question and Eastern Europe. Secretary Fowler said the Yugoslavs were cooperating with us, and the Soviets were not playing the market to our disadvantage. The Red Chinese, on the other hand, were heavy takers. Secretary Fowler briefly discussed the possibility that the Eastern European countries might seek membership in the Bank and Fund. He noted Yugoslavia's creditable role and recent feelers from Czechoslovakia and Hungary. While noting these were constructive developments, he warned that we would have to be careful that membership in international institutions did not enhance the Communist countries' ability to penetrate and influence the free world. He suggested we might think about using the Eastern European countries' interest in the Bank and Fund as a way to encourage them to reduce military aid to the developing world and loosen economic coordination with Moscow. The discussion shifted to Soviet interest in regional development banks. Secretary Rusk said the Soviets had hinted they might do something in connection with the Asian Development Bank, but nothing had come of this. Secretary Fowler noted that we should be careful to observe international strictures on credit (the Berne limits). The President asked what added steps in our Eastern European policy we can take without having to go to the Congress. Secretary Rusk observed that the recent set of restrictive amendments (Findley, Belcher, etc.) hampered us considerably. Nevertheless there are things we can do. For example, a Bulgarian Trade Delegation is coming shortly, and the Secretary himself participated in the Bulgarians' efforts to promote the sale of wines. The Secretary said we should look again at the Czech gold question, as we ought to try to resolve it. He added that the Czechs were offering us something like $2 million on a $72 million claim. (Actually the U.S. Government has already distributed $9 million to claimants from a $17 million steel mill which the Czechs once purchased and did not get delivery on.) Secretary Rusk mentioned our negotiations for a consular convention with Hungary and Poland, and the possibility of revising our visa forms for tourists, to accommodate Eastern European sensitivities. Secretary Fowler raised the question of Comecon, and Soviet insistence that the Eastern European countries import raw materials from the Soviet Union at inflated prices. He said this anomaly should present us with opportunities under PL 480. (Use of PL 480 would require legislation.) Secretary Rusk said we might take a look at revising Comecon controls to allow Eastern European scientists who study here, with our high-quality equipment, to bring that equipment home for their own use. Ambassador Bohlen noted that the Secretary was probably referring more to U.S. export controls than to Comecon. The Vice President noted the usefulness of trade fairs. He said he thought we didn't do as well as we should with these opportunities. Secretary Rusk observed that our funds were limited, and suggested that Commerce's view would be useful in this regard. The President added: "So would Rooney's views." The President asked the Secretary of Defense if he had any comment. Secretary Clifford observed that nationalism was spreading like a virus. He raised the question whether the Soviet Union would consider using force in Eastern Europe and suggested some contingency planning would be useful. Ambassador Bohlen said that the Soviets would be reluctant to resort to direct military intervention on the Hungarian pattern, and had, in fact, refrained from doing so against Romania. Mr. Helms observed that Czechoslovakia's move towards independence had started as a result of economics. Dependence on the Soviet Union had produced a degradation of the Czech economy, which led to resentment throughout that society. The President thanked the participants. ND
21. Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Bohlen) to the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach)/1/ Washington, April 28, 1968. /1/Source: Department of State, SIG Records: Lot 70 D 263, SIG Memo No. 66. Secret. This memorandum was circulated to members of the Senior Interdepartmental Group for Europe as an attachment to SIG Memorandum No. 66, May 9. SUBJECT At my direction, EUR, INR and G/PM have concerted in an examination of two contingencies which could arise should the Soviet Union consider it necessary to intervene to protect its interests in Eastern Europe. At Tab A is a discussion of the contingency involving Soviet military intervention. A discussion of possible Soviet economic sanctions on one or several Eastern European countries is at Tab B. Both papers concur in the necessity of approaching with discretion these contingencies, as well as the actual situation in Eastern Europe. On the other hand, there are steps we can and should take both to clear the deck in anticipation of the above contingencies, and, given the present circumstances, to seek to expand our economic ties with Eastern Europe, particularly Czechoslovakia and Romania. Accordingly, I recommend: (a) that the Departments of State and Defense undertake a formal review of existing orders to troops on the eastern borders of the FRG and arrangements for border security; (b) that we consult with FRG authorities concerning the contingency of Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia; (c) that, depending on the responses of the FRG, the attitude of the British and French, and recommendations from Amembassy Bonn, we review in the Bonn Group existing contingency plans and instructions concerning Soviet military intervention in Eastern Germany; (d) that approval be given to the general policy guidelines on pages 12-22 of Tab A covering the contingencies of (1) the immediate future, (2) a clear threat of Soviet military intervention, and (3) actual Soviet intervention; (e) that we ease licensing restrictions, including granting to Czechoslovakia the privileged licensing status of Poland and Romania; (f) that we support Eastern European membership in international economic bodies such as GATT and the IMF/IBRD; (g) that we make clear our continued willingness to expand scientific and technical exchanges; (h) that we make known our continued willingness to finance agricultural exports with CCC credits to the extent that Eastern European countries are interested therein; (i) that we continue consultations with key members of Congress in behalf of an East-West trade bill (we could use the forthcoming hearings scheduled by Senator Sparkman's Subcommittee on International Finance for this purpose); (j) that we expand our efforts to identify specific points of vulnerability to Soviet sanctions in Eastern European economies; (k) in the event of a changed political climate, particularly in the event of the actual application of Soviet economic sanctions, that we actively seek to secure from Congress discretionary Presidential authority to extend MFN treatment and Export-Import Bank guarantees to key countries such as Romania and Czechoslovakia; (l) that we move rapidly to establish a position on the Czechoslovak gold/claims problem. Ambassador Beam's recommendation is at Tab C./2/ /2/Document 58. These studies were commissioned for possible SIG action. I believe the action recommendations are unexceptionable. What is now required, however, is a detailed action scenario implementing the recommendations of the type IRG/EUR could most readily develop. You may wish to consider having the SIG approve this package and endorse it to IRG/EUR for this purpose. Tab A/3/ /3/Secret. SOVIET MILITARY INTERVENTION IN EASTERN EUROPE I. Summary 1. Eastern Europe is presently in the highest state of flux--in terms of domestic change and the weakening of Soviet authority--since the events of 1956. In many ways, the Soviet Union faces even greater problems than it did then. 2. On the basis of current estimates, it is unlikely that the USSR will intervene militarily to reestablish its authority in one or another country in the area. There are, however, unpredictable elements. The present situation--particularly the reformist revolution in Czechoslovakia and the deterioration of Romanian-Soviet relations--is progressing, not ebbing. Moreover, the volatile developments in individual countries interact upon one another, and could have side-effects on other, presently stable, regimes in Eastern Europe. No one can say with assurance what the end result will be. It is possible, under circumstances not now expected, that the Soviet Union would feel compelled to intervene militarily in Czechoslovakia or even Romania; intervention in Poland or the now quiescent GDR is a more distant possibility. 3. Given the present set of circumstances and expectations, the US and its Allies should assume as axiomatic that we wish to avoid a Soviet military intervention. At the same time, we should carry forward our existing policy, that of bridge building, by which we seek to normalize and expand our relations with Czechoslovakia, Romania, and other countries of Eastern Europe in the field of trade, cultural and scientific exchanges, ideas and tourism, to the maximum extent possible within existing limitations. By continuing this policy, we will be doing all within the means given to us to encourage further the constructive developments that have been taking place. The efforts should be made discreetly, without provocative public comments by the US Government or its information media. We should also be careful not to arouse unrealistic expectations concerning the degree of support which the US may be willing or able to provide these countries. 4. These actions should also be accompanied by quiet preparations for the contingency of Soviet military intervention, particularly in Czechoslovakia and possibly the GDR which border on the FRG. Through a formal State-Defense review, we should confirm the findings of a preliminary study that standing orders to US border troops in the FRG are in basic conformity with the guidelines set forth in existing quadripartite agreements (BQD-EG2, BQD-EG-2A)/4/ covering the contingency of a Soviet intervention in East Germany, but which would generally apply to the Czechoslovak contingency as well. In essence, these guidelines provide (a) that there be no intervention across the FRG border by our troops, and (b) that asylum and protection be provided for refugees gaining Federal Republic or West Berlin territory. (See Annex A.) We should also consult with the FRG to establish that orders to West German troops along the Czechoslovak border are based on the same general principles. Finally, we may at some point wish to review in a quadripartite forum existing contingency plans and current instructions to troops in regard to Soviet military intervention in East Germany. /4/BQD EG-2, "Western Attitude in Event of an Uprising in East Germany or East Berlin," December 4, 1961, and BCQ EG-2A, "Report of the Bonn Quadripartite Group on National Orders Pursuant to the 'Rules of Conduct' of EG-2," August 15, 1962, were attached as annexes to the source text, but are not printed. 5. If a Soviet military intervention should actually occur, our principal aim would be to avoid any deliberate or spontaneous military involvement by the US and its Allies, save to preserve order on the FRG side of the border. Diplomatic action and public statements would be designed to mitigate, if possible, the effect of the Soviet intervention on the country concerned, and to confine if possible, the adverse impact of the action on other Eastern European countries. A central element of our public posture would be to demand the cessation of Soviet military intervention, though it would hardly be expected that Moscow would heed this call. The UN would presumably be the central forum for diplomatic action, though much would depend on the circumstances of the Soviet intervention, i.e., whether it was undertaken against an established government or at its invitation. 6. Actions Recommended: a. That approval be given to the general policy guidelines set forth in this paper (Section IV) covering the contingencies of (1) the immediate future, (2) a clear threat of Soviet military intervention, and (3) an actual Soviet intervention. b. That the Departments of State and Defense undertake a formal review of existing orders to troops on the borders of the FRG and arrangements for border security. (Paragraph IV.A.6) c. That we consult with FRG authorities concerning the contingency of Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia. (Paragraph IV.A.7) d. Depending on the response of the Federal Government, the attitude of the British and French, and recommendations from Embassy Bonn, that we review in a quadripartite forum (Bonn Group) existing contingency plans and instructions concerning a Soviet military intervention in East Germany. (Paragraphs IV.A.8-9) [Here follow the body of the paper and the annexes.] Tab B/5/ /5/Secret. EXECUTION OF RECOMMENDATIONS IN CONTINGENCY PAPER ON POSSIBLE SOVIET ECONOMIC SANCTIONS The paper recommended that under existing conditions, that is, unless Soviet economic pressures are substantially stepped up, we should (a) continue our present efforts to expand trade and other relations and (b) plan for other contingencies. Under (a), the following specific steps were recommended: 1. We continue to express approval of trade in peaceful goods. 2. We continue to express support and to make educational efforts for an east-west trade bill. (Congressman Findley and Senator Mondale have separately introduced legislation making the restoration of MFN status to Czechoslovakia possible. The Department is not opposing these moves, but is expressing a preference for a general east-west trade bill.) 3. We continue to oppose restrictive trade measures to the extent possible. 4. We support as actively as possible east European membership in GATT and the IMF/IBRD. Romania's application to join the former is progressing; Czechoslovakia is already a member. No concrete steps toward IMF/IBRD membership are being taken at the moment by any eastern European country; however, Messrs. Schweitzer and McNamara are reported to be planning visits to Bucharest and other eastern European capitals in June. 5. Commerce is prepared to give Czechoslovakia the licensing status of Poland and Romania, subject to receipt of Czech assurances against unauthorized exports; this action should be completed in a few days. 6. We continue to be willing to expand scientific and technical exchanges. 7. We are willing to finance agricultural exports under CCC credits. There is some possibility that the drought conditions which have hit Romania and Bulgaria may make some action on this front more likely than seemed probable a month ago. An Agriculture trade mission is to go to eastern Europe later this spring to investigate possibilities. EUR has not been assigned responsibility for the planning recommended under (b). The CIA has drafted a study of Czech dependence on the USSR. This is now being circulated for comments preparatory to publication later this month. The paper also recommends avoiding making gratuitous suggestions of support. This policy has been carefully followed.
22. Paper Prepared in the Department of State/1/ Washington, undated. /1/Source: Department of State, SIG Records: Lot 70 D 263, SIG Memo No. 70. Secret. Drafted by Toumanoff on May 21. The paper was an attachment to SIG Memorandum No. 70, circulated on June 3. STATUS REPORT ON ACTION RECOMMENDATIONS OF SIG PAPER, "SOVIET MILITARY INTERVENTION IN EASTERN EUROPE"/2/ /2/The paper is printed as Tab A to Document 21. The paper with policy guidelines covering various contingencies concerning Soviet intervention did not receive formal SIG approval as an action document. Nevertheless, its recommendations for action have been largely fulfilled as appropriate to the course of developments in Eastern Europe. The recommendations, taken from Section IV of the paper, and corresponding actions are reviewed below. IV.A.1 The paper recommends restraint in official public comment on developments in Eastern Europe. Official comment by the Department has been restricted essentially to little more than "we are watching the situation closely" (but note press report of Clifford's testimony May 17 before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee)./3/ Appropriate US Missions and foreign governments have been cautioned not to speculate to the press about US reactions or intentions. Selective deep backgrounding by the Department has resulted in at least one column (Marquis Childs, Washington Post, May 17) on the adverse consequences of a Soviet military intervention in Czechoslovakia. /3/For text of Clifford's testimony, see Foreign Assistance Act of 1968, Hearings, Part 2, Ninetieth Congress, Second Session (Washington, 1968), pp. 428 ff. IV.A.2 The paper recommends that US Government-controlled media (VOA, RFE) should exercise restraint but continue to carry factual reports. Corresponding instructions have gone to US-controlled broadcast media in Europe, and Embassy Bonn has been instructed to suggest to the FRG Government that broadcast stations under its control exercise equivalent restraint. EUR/P is in daily contact with VOA personnel at the working level who are operating under similar restraint. IV.A.3 Developments in the economic field are covered by separate memorandum to you./4/ /4/Attached to the source text but not printed. IV.A.4 The paper recommends consultation as appropriate with the FRG, UK, and France regarding the possibility of Soviet military intervention. Informal consultations have been initiated and are continuing with the FRG and UK. For the present we have not considered it appropriate to raise the subject at a high level with the French Government. In any case our periodic assessments of the situation are being made available to all three governments in capitals and are briefed by Cleveland in NAC. IV.A.5 and 7 The paper recommends confirmation with the FRG Government of the BQD EG-2 general rules of conduct,/5/ orders to allied troops in West Germany, and arrangements for liaison between West German and US military contingents. Embassy Bonn, together with appropriate US military authorities, has undertaken the necessary consultations with FRG officials. /5/See footnote 4, Document 21. IV.A.6 The paper recommends formal joint State-DOD review of orders issued to US troops along the Czechoslovak and East German borders to assure conformity with the principles of BQD EG-2 and US political-military interests. It also recommends that the review encompass orders to the troops of other nations stationed on the FRG border, along with other arrangements for border security. EUR has met with ISA and JCS for this purpose. IV.A.8 and 9 The paper recommends a quadripartite review at some point of planning and instructions to troops against the contingency of Soviet military intervention in East Germany. No such review has been initiated because it was not considered desirable at this time. IV.A.10 The paper recommends continued normal consultation in NATO. This consultation is under way. IV.B.1 and 2 Against the contingency of a clear threat of Soviet military intervention, the paper recommends that border guards and troops in the FRG should be alerted but that military steps which would suggest a US intention to intervene be avoided. Appropriate JCS instructions have been sent General Burchinal. No military actions that would suggest a US intention to intervene have been undertaken, and the FRG Government has been assured that the US has no intention of taking unilateral military action from the FRG which could exacerbate the situation. IV.B.3 and 4 The paper discusses possible US diplomatic action at the UN. EUR has given IO a memorandum/6/ listing the possible forms of military intervention which may occur, and on this basis, IO is developing contingency plans for US action at the UN. /6/Not found. IV.C The paragraphs under this section address themselves to action in the event of various forms of Soviet military intervention. In addition to the IO planning mentioned in the paragraph above, contingency press guidance has been developed. Embassy Bonn has briefed FRG authorities on USAREUR contingency planning for increased border surveillance and refugee handling. I understand Mr. Katzenbach has asked Barbara Watson and Graham Martin to prepare additional contingency refugee plans./7/ /7/Not further identified.
23. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Interdepartmental Regional Group for European Affairs (Leddy) to the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach)/1/ Washington, October 1, 1968. /1/Source: Department of State, SIG Records: Lot 70 D 263, SIG Memo No. 87. Secret With Top Secret Attachments. Drafted by Beaudry. SUBJECT The attached papers review the issues confronting us in Europe as a result of the Czechoslovak affair with particular reference to Rumania, Yugoslavia, Austria, and Berlin. The papers have been prepared for use by the SIG members in their review of status of contingency planning in the aftermath of the Czech crisis./2/ /2/Attachment 5, "Report on Berlin Task Force Planning," October 1, is not printed. Attachment 1 Paper Prepared in the Department of State/3/ Washington, undated. /3/Secret. Drafted by Dubs (EUR/SOV) on September 30. AFTERMATH OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA--ISSUES AND PLANS The military intervention in Czechoslovakia indicates the lengths to which the Soviet Union is prepared to go to subjugate a neighboring ally to the national interests of the Soviet Union and the interests of international communism. 1. Doctrinal Justification The ideological foundation for this intervention was set forth in the Warsaw Letter of July and more recently in Pravda of September 26./4/ These documents stated that internal affairs in any socialist state become the affair of all when the international communist system is thereby threatened. Ambassador Dobrynin's oral statement to Secretary Rusk/5/ underlines this determination in concluding that "it would be a mistake to suppose, however, that showing its care in this respect [i.e., improved US-Soviet relations]/6/ the Soviet Union would neglect its primary responsibility--the defense of the position of socialism wherever and in whatever form, should a threat to the fraternal socialist countries emerge." Implicit in these theoretical statements is the assumption that the Soviet Union, as the most powerful member of the camp, will be the final arbiter in determining who has become a deviant requiring punishment and rescue. /4/Reference is to the Brezhnev Doctrine, originally propounded by Soviet Communist Party spokesman Sergei Kovalev in an article entitled "Sovereignty and International Responsibility of Socialist Countries" in Pravda, September 26, 1968. A translation is printed in Current Digest of the Soviet Press, October 16, 1968, and Remington, Winter in Prague, pp. 412-416. /5/See Document 91. /6/Brackets in the source text. 2. Assessment of Soviet "Rationality" The Soviet military intervention in Czechoslovakia should thus be understood as a rational act of an orthodox majority which decided that it was necessary to undertake limited risks and to assume certain political costs in order to prevent the further disintegration of the communist order in Eastern Europe and to ensure the preservation of the existing balance of forces in Europe as a whole. It should not be seen as the first in a succession of reckless moves by the USSR which could ultimately engage NATO forces. The Soviets, we believe, will continue to avoid moves risking serious confrontation with the West so long as NATO maintains its essential military strength and political cohesion. 3. Possible Further Threats Nevertheless, the instinct and determination to nail down the status quo has a dynamism of its own and could lead to further repressive measures and actions in Eastern Europe. Yakubovskiy's tour to East European capitals is reportedly motivated by an attempt to strengthen Warsaw Pact defenses. Parallel moves to tighten economic links within the framework of CEMA may also be underway. Such moves beg the question of how far the Soviet Union intends to go to impose its brand of orthodoxy in the Warsaw Pact camp and to protect what the Soviet Union determines to be its vital interests. Even now Romania feels threatened despite the fact that it, unlike Czechoslovakia, has a party which is in absolute control and a frontier which does not border on "revanchist" West Germany. Similarly, Yugoslavia, even though it is not and has never been a member of the Warsaw Pact, is uncertain enough of Soviet intentions to believe that a Soviet military move against it is possible. Despite these fears, there is as yet no hard evidence to suggest that the Soviet Union intends to intervene militarily in these two countries. The danger of intervention would appear to increase if the Soviets, for example, felt it necessary to impose a harsh occupation regime in Czechoslovakia. Such an act would suggest that a hard-line majority was willing to escalate its military actions to stamp out heresy and would foreshadow increased impatience with "deviationism" in Romania, especially in the foreign policy arena, and critical, polemical attacks from the side of Yugoslavia. Moves against Romania and Yugoslavia would further pose the question whether the Soviet Union would consider violating Austrian neutrality for one reason or another to protect and advance its interests in Central Europe. Should such a chain of events take place, dangerous actions against Berlin could not be excluded, although in this instance the Soviets would have to consider more than in the other cases the likelihood of a Soviet military confrontation with the US and its allies. 4. General Issues and Strategy In the foregoing cases, i.e., Romania, Yugoslavia, Austria and Berlin, NATO faces a range of challenges to the security and vital interests of its member countries. Although we would wish to deter a Soviet move against Romania, for example, the fact is that an invasion and occupation of that country would not seriously affect the vital interests of NATO or result in a significant shift in the strategic balance between NATO and Warsaw Pact forces. It could be argued that invasion of Romania might weaken the Warsaw Pact war potential since additional Soviet forces would be required to neutralize the Romanian divisions--as in Czechoslovakia. Yugoslavia would be of a totally different dimension, and the challenge at the far end of the spectrum, Berlin, would be much more acute and require an entirely different series of political and military responses. In each case, however, NATO countries face two problems. The first is how best to combine political, psychological, economic and military moves to deter aggressive actions by the Soviets and their allies. Thus in the case of Yugoslavia, political assurances must be matched by higher and more visible stages of alert and action by NATO than in the case of Romania. This suggests that some NATO actions included in the Romanian contingency papers would be more credible if incorporated in contingency plans for Yugoslavia. The second question posed in each case is what action NATO should actually take in the event an invasion occurs or Berlin is physically threatened. The attached papers discuss these issues and policy questions in detail and provide a basis for revising and fleshing out the contingency arrangements now incorporated in the general Romanian package. Attachment 2 Paper Prepared in the Department of State/7/ Washington, undated. /7/Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text. ROMANIAN CONTINGENCY Summary: A Soviet invasion of Romania, while always possible, appears less likely than it did a month ago. Although NATO and the US have no security commitments vis-á-vis Romania, an invasion by the Soviet Union would be a matter of concern to the West. It would signify further Soviet willingness to resort to military force in international affairs. Such a move would also suggest an increased numerical strength in combat-ready Warsaw Pact forces and pose an increased threat to Yugoslavia where NATO strategic interests are more directly concerned. NATO military counter-intervention in Romania is unlikely since it could be the touchstone for World War III. NATO and US efforts should therefore focus primarily on political actions. Consideration would, however, have to be given to assistance of some kind should the Romanians resist. Every possible pressure would have to be brought to bear to forestall further military aggression and threats to European security. 1. Assessment of Invasion Possibility: These factors are pro-invasion: a. Having taken the step in Czechoslovakia, the Soviets are clearly capable of a second invasion. Romanian nationalistic communism, a chronic thorn in the Soviet side, would be eliminated or neutralized. b. With the Romanians brought to heel, Warsaw Pact territory would once more come under complete Soviet control. c. Soviet doctrine as articulated in the September 26 Pravda article effectively legitimizes such an action as far as the present Soviet leadership is concerned. Anti-invasion signs: a. In contrast to Czechoslovakia, the Romanian party is in complete control. b. Unlike Czechoslovakia with its long common border with West Germany, Romania offers virtually no foreign security problems. c. There is no hard, verifiable military or diplomatic intelligence indicating the likelihood of a Soviet invasion. d. The Romanians have already made conciliatory noises and will doubtless be trying to convince the Soviets that they are not dangerous. Conclusion: Given their present apprehensions, the Romanians will avoid giving the Soviets any pretext for intervention. The probable result: a low-key war of nerves for several months with the Romanians sensitive and generally accommodating to Soviet demands. 2. The NATO Stake: a. Aggression anywhere in Europe is of concern to NATO. b. Pressures on the rest of Europe would be greatly intensified. c. An increased threat to Yugoslavia and, by extension, to the NATO southern and southeastern flanks would be posed. Conclusion: These are important concerns. While eschewing military intervention, NATO should remain vigilant and weigh extremely carefully responses and reactions open to it to forestall a further deterioration in matters affecting European security and stability. 3. The US Concern: Increasingly independent foreign policy moves by Romania since 1964 have coincided with our more substantial post-war efforts to improve our relations with the USSR and Eastern Europe. The gradual improvement in our relations with the Romanians has been a solid plus in our Eastern European policy. It cannot be forgotten, however, that we have no commitment to the Romanian communist leadership which has not hesitated to use repressive measures to control the population. Against this background, our concern over a Soviet invasion falls into these categories: a. The remnants of hope for East-West détente which still existed following the Czechoslovak invasion would be further damaged by a second invasion. b. The possibility of implementing the non-proliferation treaty or of opening new business in related fields would be substantially deferred. c. A second invasion would further inhibit the bridge-building policy, at least in the foreseeable future. It would be extremely difficult to engage in "normal" economic, cultural or scientific exchanges with the Soviets or with regimes which had either collaborated in a Soviet invasion of a second Eastern European country or were themselves under increasingly inhibiting Soviet control. d. A more direct and immediate threat of an invasion of Yugoslavia than now exists would have been created. 4. US Action Objectives: Our dominant objective must be to forestall further aggression. We could at least partially achieve this if we were disposed to use military means. This course is impracticable for the following reasons: a. If NATO were to act militarily, this could trigger World War III since it would involve us in a direct military confrontation with the Soviet Union in an area where we have no security commitment and in which the Soviet Union considers its interests paramount. b. Even if military intervention by NATO were considered desirable or necessary, it is doubtful that sufficient ground forces could be brought to bear soon enough to affect the complete takeover of Romania by Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces. c. Public opinion would perhaps have a difficult time believing that the security of the West should be endangered to save a communist regime which has not been above using Stalinist methods against its population. In the mind of the public, the Czechoslovak experiment to evolve a more democratic and humane form of socialism would have been more worthy of fighting to save than the Romanian nationalist form of communism. d. Unlike Yugoslavia, there has been no precedent for tangibly supporting Romania's independence and integrity by means of significant military aid and economic assistance. 5. Our Options: Although military intervention is inadvisable, this should not foreclose considerable US, NATO, and UN activity in other areas. The President's August 30 speech/8/ and the Secretary's three meetings with Ambassador Dobrynin (August 23, 30 and 31)/9/ all conveyed a message of deep US concern over the possibility of a Soviet invasion. /8/For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1968-69, Book II, pp. 917-920. /9/See Documents 87, 90, and 167. As a general proposition, we should (a) assume an escalated national posture of moral outrage, (b) cease all but the most urgent bilateral contacts with the aggressor powers, (c) consult urgently with our NATO allies, (d) have recourse to the Security Council, and (e) consider carefully types of assistance which could conceivably be of some help should the Romanians in fact put up a stiff resistance. 6. Contingencies and Responses: The Soviet capability to invade Romania in any desired strength and by any military means or mixes of means from any or all of four directions--Ikraine-Moldavia, Hungary (plus forces based in Czechoslovakia), Bulgaria, and the Black Sea--is impressive. This is the basic contingency, and the responses we are likely to make are those cited earlier. Gradations in style, timing, manner of orchestration, political preparations, or others may create contingencies demanding somewhat different immediate reactions. The subsequent list of such possibilities and recommended US actions is by no means exhaustive: a. Continuing Evidence of Soviet and Warsaw Pact Military Buildup: We and our NATO allies--as well as concerned governments anywhere--should maintain constant top-level pressure on the Soviets, preferably through their Ambassadors, along lines already exercised in the US. b. Advance Warning and Request for US Assistance: The timing of a Romanian request for military or economic assistance is unpredictable. Military aid is likely to prove impracticable. The decision as to whether and how to grant economic assistance would depend on type, terms, need, and availability (reserves and pipeline). But even extending US economic assistance of any kind to Romania could be considered provocative by the Soviets. c. Severe Economic Warfare Against Romania by the Soviets: There has been some evidence, notably in formal Romanian requests that Western European countries step up purchases of Romanian goods, that some traditional markets in the USSR and Eastern Europe are at least temporarily closed to Romanian merchandise. Interestingly, the Romanians have not approached us. If they do, we should promise to look into possibilities for an early expansion of trade. d. Soviet-Directed Coup d'Etat in Romania: There is little we could do. We can and should, however, exploit such a development in our propaganda output. We should also recall our Ambassador until an "election" is held and a new regime "legalized" and the situation is assessed. e. Czechoslovak-Style Invasion: The scenario of political actions suggested in the existing contingency papers should be followed closely. Military measures such as an increase in vigilance should be screened carefully, however, to insure against giving false signals either to the Soviets or to our Western allies as to the nature of our intended reaction. In a meeting with Dobrynin, the Secretary should warn against any further moves by the Soviets and make clear that any encroachment on Yugoslavia, Austria, Berlin or Germany would be of a totally different dimension and would risk triggering World War III. f. Unexpectedly Strong Romanian Resistance: Neither the capacity of the Romanian military nor the experience of Romanian history suggests the likelihood of protracted military resistance, guerrilla warfare, or even, in fact, harassments of the type executed by the Czechoslovaks in the early days of the Soviet invasion. In the unlikely event that any of these materialize, however, we could not ignore considering whatever options may be open that entail limited risks. g. Dismemberment of Romania: The Soviets might conceivably detach Transylvania and hand it to loyal Hungary. They should be criticized harshly for perpetrating such an action. Attachment 3 Paper Prepared in the Department of State/10/ Washington, undated. /10/Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text. YUGOSLAV CONTINGENCY Summary: The immediate possibility of a Soviet invasion of Yugoslavia is sharply limited. Our concern is based on the threat posed to the NATO area. We are also interested in preserving Yugoslavia's independent and relatively liberal image. If an invasion materializes, we should extend the Yugoslavs maximum political support and selective economic assistance upon request. If military conditions permit and the Yugoslavs ask for help, we should grant them conventional small arms, transport equipment, and spare parts, if we have them. 1. Assessment of Invasion Possibility: Advantages for the Soviets: a. The Soviet military and strategic position would be superb. It would also force an expansive redeployment of NATO forces. b. A long-standing irritant, the peculiar but successful Yugoslav brand of socialism, would be reshaped and brought back into line. c. Dramatic proof of Soviet supremacy in Eastern Europe would have been demonstrated--and would provide a ready answer to doubters in both parts of Europe. Anti-Invasion Factors: a. An invasion of Yugoslavia would be long, costly, complex, and probably more trouble than it would be worth. b. It is possible that an invasion attempt would not be entirely successful. c. Yugoslavia has long since been written off as part of the Soviet-dominated world. It has never been in the Warsaw Pact or CEMA and has been identified as a leading neutral for close to 20 years. Although they have frequently antagonized the Soviets, however, the Yugoslavs have more often than not cooperated with them. d. The US and NATO would be considerably more concerned than they were in the Czechoslovak or Romanian cases and might react militarily. This could trigger a wider war. Conclusion: It appears highly doubtful that the Soviets will take the enormous risk of invading Yugoslavia for the questionable gains that would be achieved. 2. The NATO Stake: The strategic and security considerations raised by a Soviet invasion are serious and possibly vital to the defense of Europe for these reasons: a. The balance of military power in the Mediterranean and in the NATO southern and southeastern areas would be significantly altered. b. A direct threat to Italy and Greece would be posed. c. An important military challenge to NATO itself would have been offered. d. Austrian neutrality would be challenged, both by the possibility that Soviet troops would cross Austria en route to Yugoslavia and by the presence of Soviet forces in Yugoslavia. 3. The US Concern: Our stake in Yugoslavia since 1948 has been political, economic, and, to an uncertain degree, strategic. Cooperation with the Tito regime has been uneven, both in substance and objective. Although we have had cause to welcome Yugoslav political independence, and its development of considerable domestic liberalization, we have only rarely achieved any identity of views. There has been no effective military relationship for a decade. On most issues affecting world peace or European security the Yugoslav position has been considerably closer to the Soviet than to ours. Recent examples include Viet-Nam and the Middle East. We would nevertheless be deeply concerned over a Soviet invasion, both for the reasons cited in the preceding paragraphs, and because of the evidence it would provide of Soviet readiness to continue an aggressively adventurous course immediately adjacent to the NATO area. If this followed an invasion of Romania, it would be the third case of direct Soviet aggression in Eastern and Central Europe. The argument for considering active counter-measures stems basically, therefore, from the actual direct danger to US and Western European security interests offered by a Soviet invasion of Yugoslavia. 4. US Action Objectives: We would want ideally to prevent this invasion without becoming directly involved. In fact, to prevent without involvement is all but impossible, because any truly preventive steps would entail the serious risk of triggering a wider war, but on the other hand our actual security stake in Yugoslavia is too large and immediate for us to resist some type of involvement as proposed below. Our political debt to Yugoslavia for past "favors" is non-existent. In a post-invasion situation, any political or action objectives we might have would be directed almost exclusively to protecting the regional NATO position and forestalling further aggression rather than shielding the Tito regime. Our other interests can be practically served only by contributing to the prevention of an invasion. 5. Our Options: a. The Case of Assistance: Both politically and psychologically, supporting Yugoslavia is more attractive, convenient, and necessary than assisting Czechoslovakia or Romania. The Yugoslavs have considerable appeal in the West, they are closer and more identifiable geographically and, as they have done so skillfully in the past, they would actively resist invasion. These and actual military factors are a strong argument for proferring quick, effective assistance to Yugoslavia. They are not completely offset by the character of the Tito regime which, although more "liberal" than that of any other Communist country, is still basically undemocratic, or by the fact that the Communist Yugoslav Government has supported the Soviet position on virtually every major international issue since 1955. The balance tips toward some kind of assistance beyond the political steps we should take almost automatically. b. Political-Military Action: At a minimum, we should quickly take all of the steps described in the contingency papers for Romania and several others. These should include, both in the pre- and post-invasion periods, as appropriate: (1) Strong statements by the President and other NATO chiefs of state. (2) Regular, preferably inconvenient call-ins of Ambassador Dobrynin here and similar action by the NATO Governments. (3) Early, unmistakable reference to the risk and real possibility of nuclear war. (4) Convening of emergency NAC meeting followed as quickly as possible by force deployments calculated to demonstrate NATO determination to defend its regional interests. (5) Instructions on increasing military vigilance measures, return of redeployed US NATO air and army units, and redeployment of Spanish-based air squadrons. (6) Emergency meeting of Security Council and other appropriate UN action. (7) Announcement of the suspension of travel of US military dependents to Europe and return of those already there. c. Economic Assistance: The accompanying action memorandum "Assistance to Yugoslavia in the Eventuality of Soviet Military Pressures"/11/ sets forth the procedures to be followed to facilitate granting economic aid to Yugoslavia. The steps described in it should be taken upon determination that Soviet military intervention is likely. /11/Not printed. d. Military Aid: Aside from a military sales agreement, which amounts to an undertaking to sell Yugoslavia spare parts for equipment it obtained from us in the 1950's, we have no military responsibility for providing military aid to Yugoslavia. Legal obstructions which now exist can be overcome according to procedures set forth in the accompanying paper. We should be prepared to engage in military support operations for Yugoslavia in these circumstances: (1) Only if requested by the Yugoslavs. (2) No involvement of US or NATO personnel beyond participation in delivery operations. (3) Heavy equipment of a type requiring considerable lead time for delivery should not be provided. (4) If portable relatively easily deliverable equipment can be furnished at any stage of hostilities, we should take all necessary steps to grant it. (5) The Yugoslav military genius is in guerrilla-type operations. We should orient our assistance in that direction. 6. Contingencies and Responses: An invasion of Yugoslavia can occur in any one or combination of several ways: a. The movement of Soviet and other Warsaw Pact forces through Bulgaria and Romania. b. An invasion which would include the movement of Warsaw Pact forces through Romania either with Romanian agreement or after, or accompanying, an occupation of Romania itself. c. An invasion which would include the movement of Warsaw Pact forces through Austria. Our response to the invasion of Yugoslavia itself would not be materially different whichever routes of invasion were involved. The Soviets can in any case invade and occupy large areas of Yugoslavia quickly and probably effectively with elements from Hungary, Bulgaria, and (by air) the USSR as well as with occupation forces from Czechoslovakia and probably Romania. They would have considerable difficulty, however, in taking the country. The Yugoslav resistance potential is an enormous, proven quantity. It is highly probable that the Western response would, in the final analysis, be directed to bolstering and feeding it. Attachment 4 Paper Prepared in the Department of State/12/ Washington, undated. /12/Secret. Drafted by Crump (EUR/AIS) on September 30. AUSTRIAN CONTINGENCY A. Strategy and Issues Soviet action against Austria would indeed present a grave challenge to the United States and our national interests would be seriously involved. The threat to us would arise from a combination of strategic, psychological and political factors. Strategic Austria has no strategic resources or other important strategic considerations except for its geography. The gain of Austrian territory by the Soviet Union, however, would provide it with a more defensible line against the West, would provide it with a natural corridor for access to Yugoslavia, and potentially Italy and Germany, and would deprive the West of a strategically located corridor for its access to Eastern Europe. Psychological Austria has demonstrated in recent weeks its concern regarding Soviet action against Czechoslovakia. That concern would undoubtedly intensify if moves appeared imminent against Romania and Yugoslavia. The Austrian press has discussed the desirability of an American guarantee of Austrian neutrality and Chancellor Klaus has informally inquired of Ambassador MacArthur what our reaction would be to Soviet aggression against his country./13/ We are committed by the State Treaty of 1955/14/ to recognize Austrian independence but we have no commitment to protect or guarantee that independence. There is no doubt, however, that the loss of Austria would be a severe psychological defeat for the West. /13/See Document 202. /14/For text of the treaty, signed May 15, 1955, in Vienna, see Department of State Bulletin, June 6, 1955, pp. 916-932. Political The challenge to this country in a Soviet move against Austria would be greatest in its political aspects. Austrian independence and neutrality has been clearly recognized by East and West and has become an important fact of political life in Central Europe over the past 13 years. An effort by the Soviet Union to violate that independence and neutrality would clearly be a change in the status quo which would threaten U.S. national interests. B. Scenarios There are several possible ways in which the Soviet Union might effect its move against Austria. There could be a request to the Austrian Government for free passage of Warsaw Pact forces across Austrian territory to reach Yugoslavia. There could be an unannounced violation of Austrian air space and territory by Soviet forces en route to Yugoslavia. Finally, there could be a statement by the Soviet Union that Austria was not living up to the terms of the State Treaty and, to protect Austrian independence, the Soviet Union was obliged to move into Austria to carry out the terms of the treaty. We see no likelihood of a coup d'etat in Austria in connection with a Soviet move. The Communist Party is no threat and the Austrian people have clearly demonstrated their disapproval and revulsion of the Soviet moves in Czechoslovakia. Austria has said it would resist any Soviet move by force; our assessment of the capability of the Austrian armed forces, however, leads us to believe that Austrian resistance would be ineffectual militarily, although it might create a psychological impact. Request for Passage The Austrians would undoubtedly respond that, as a neutral and sovereign nation, they could not permit the use of their territory for military operations against another nation. They would probably refer to the State Treaty and call upon the U.S., the UK and France to intercede with the fourth signatory to honor the obligation in that treaty to respect Austrian independence. Our response to such a request should be positive. We should issue, in the form of a Presidential or Secretarial statement, a call to the Soviet Union to honor its Treaty obligation. We should announce consultations with the British and French. We should announce our intention to convoke a meeting of the Security Council to discuss this matter on an urgent basis. Unannounced Violation The Austrians are fully aware of their inability to oppose the Warsaw Pact forces militarily. Their announced intention to do so is therefore probably aimed at exerting psychological pressure on the West to come to their defense and to help avert their defeat. Depending upon the time available to them, they would undoubtedly make public requests for assistance. These requests would be for ammunition, supplies, arms, air support, and commitment of Western forces, in an ascending order of involvement. Our response to these requests would have to be determined in the light of other developments and requirements for U.S. forces at the same time. Alleged Violation of the Treaty The above two scenarios discuss a move by the Soviets against Austria in conjunction with a move against Yugoslavia. It is possible, although less likely, that the Soviets might move against Austria alone, without at the same time undertaking a move into Yugoslavia. Such a move would probably be couched in the terms of a necessity by the Soviet Union to take action to correct a failure by the Austrians to live up to their commitments under the State Treaty, most likely a claim they had violated Article IV which prohibits union with Germany. Our response to this would be framed in terms of the Treaty. The Treaty provides a mechanism for consultation among the four chiefs of mission at Vienna on disputes arising from interpretations of the Treaty and we should use that mechanism to blunt the Soviet charges. Our reaction should be in concert with France and Great Britain and should also include a convening of the Security Council. Finally, however, it is recommended that we consider a preemptive move regarding Austria. Our public statements to date have not referred to Austria specifically and such a reference at an early moment would appear to be appropriate. We should undertake immediately to consult with France and Britain, reminding them they, too, have responsibilities under the State Treaty. We could suggest to them that the Secretary, Stewart and Debre call in the respective Soviet Ambassadors and state that recent developments have caused us to re-examine the State Treaty and our mutual obligations thereunder. In order that there be no misunderstanding, each Ambassador would be requested to report to Moscow the firm intention of his host government to uphold and honor the State Treaty and our firm expectation that the Soviet Union would do the same. The Ambassadors would be asked to convey to Moscow the three governments' views that any Soviet move against Austria would be a grave and serious threat to the peace of Europe and would be considered a clear indication that the Soviet Union was no longer interested in maintaining that peace.
24. Record of Meeting of the Senior Interdepartmental Group/1/ Washington, October 4, 1968. /1/Source: Department of State, SIG Records: Lot 74 D 344, SIG Decisions. Secret. Drafted by Ruser on October 12. CHAIRMAN'S SUMMARY DISCUSSION AND DECISIONS AT THE 44TH SIG MEETING ON OCTOBER 4, 1968 PRESENT SIG Staff Director DOD--Mr. Wyle JCS--General Bayne State-- [Here follow Items I and II.] III. Eastern Europe: Issues and Contingency Planning. The Chairman remarked that his purpose in asking for SIG consideration of the situation in Eastern Europe was to reach agreement on the broad principles embodied in the contingency papers which had been circulated in advance of the meeting./2/ He did not wish to discuss specific details at this time. If the general policy line could be agreed by the SIG, details of contingency plans could be worked out through interagency channels under the direction of the new IRG/EUR sub-committee to be chaired by Mr. Toon. /2/The papers are Attachments 1-4 of Document 23. United States Military Posture in Europe. The discussion opened with a series of comments on the military situation in Europe, with special reference to the less than desirable level of battle-readiness of certain United States units assigned to NATO. The existing shortfalls in men and materiel were readily explainable, it was pointed out, by the higher priority which had been assigned to support for the war in Viet-Nam and our strategic forces, as well as by the deleterious effect of recent severe budget restrictions. A question was raised concerning the preparedness of the Department of Defense to go to Congress for a supplemental appropriation if the situation in Eastern Europe suddenly took a serious turn for the worse. The reply was that justification for a supplemental could be produced on very short notice. However, in the event of the development of a real crisis--such as Warsaw Pact movement against Berlin--the Department of Defense could raise expenditures for troop support even above the current budget level by using unobligated funds, and seek a supplemental appropriation later. Such short-term excess expenditure could be authorized by the Secretary of Defense even in the absence of a Presidential declaration of a national emergency. Czech Situation. One member expressed the opinion that a tighter Soviet squeeze on Czechoslovakia appeared to be in the offing. The Chairman remarked that, after the initial Soviet decision to invade had been taken, it had become less a question of whether there would be a further squeeze than when and how the squeeze would come. Sterner Soviet measures to enforce their will in Czechoslovakia seemed to him to be a foregone conclusion. Other members commented that it must be deeply aggravating to the Soviets that they have not been able to produce even one Czech leader who is willing to state that he requested that Soviet troops enter the country. There was some evidence, it was felt, that the Soviets were attempting to drive a wedge between the Czech and Slovak elements of the population, and simultaneously striving to build up the image of the Slovak politician Husak as a national leader. However, it was pointed out that there were serious limitations on how far the Soviets could carry such a policy. They would be unlikely to favor a federal solution in Czechoslovakia, with greater autonomy for the Slovaks, because such a development in Czechoslovakia would have great impact on a number of national groups in the USSR itself who desired a greater degree of self-determination. Mr. Katzenbach then invited Mr. Leddy to comment on the Eastern European situation and the various issues and contingency papers which had been distributed for SIG consideration. Mr. Leddy noted that the EUR papers on Czechoslovakia and the organization of a new IRG/EUR subcommittee were primarily informational, while those on Romania, Yugoslavia and Austria were action-oriented and would require further study and refinement. He did not propose to summarize all the papers but would comment on selected problems. Deterrent Actions. Mr. Leddy observed that most planning heretofore had been slanted towards defining United States responses to selected contingency situations in Eastern Europe. He now hoped to give increasing emphasis to possible deterrent actions that could be taken right now to help prevent further Soviet aggression in Eastern Europe. Our options in this area might be limited, but there were certain things we could do to signal our concern to the Soviets. He felt, for example, that a firm United States posture in 1951 had been influential in deterring Soviet action against Yugoslavia. The Secretary's recent speech to the United Nations General Assembly/3/ was a useful step, and other ways could be found to focus public attention on the aggressive Soviet posture in the Balkans and to discredit the Soviet attempt in Pravda to formulate a philosophy to justify armed intervention in the affairs of her socialist neighbors./4/ /3/For text of Rusk's October 2 speech, see Department of State Bulletin, October 21, 1968, pp. 405-410. /4/See footnote 4, Document 23. In the Yugoslav case, it would be desirable to encourage further high-level visits such as that of Gligorov to the United States. (Harmel and Stewart's visits to Bucharest, Mr. Leddy said, were also useful in signalling our general concern about possible Soviet moves against Romania.)/5/ Such visits had the salutary effect of underlining the continuity of Western ties with the Yugoslav regime. Similarly, we (as well as the British and French who were partners in the effort) ought to make public reference to the 17-year-long tradition of United States assistance to Yugoslavia, without in any way committing ourselves to specific actions in the event of a Soviet attack. This would have to be done carefully and in an appropriate context to avoid giving the Soviets a green light on Romania. /5/British Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart visited Bucharest September 8-9; Belgian Foreign Minister Pierre Harmel visited Bucharest September 13. Another suggestion offered was a quiet campaign to convince Western European Communist Parties to come out more explicitly against Soviet intervention in Eastern Europe, and to induce some reputable European newspaper or periodical--preferably socialist or even communist in sympathy--to devote more critical attention to the Pravda justification for Soviet intervention. The point should be driven home that such a philosophy is unrelated to Marxist-Leninist theory, and in fact could most accurately be characterized as Hitlerian. Some members pointed out that we must plan for a progression of deterrent actions designed to suit differing scenarios. Following a Soviet invasion of Romania, for example, we should have in mind a series of much stiffer actions to warn the Soviets of our increased concern over the sovereignty of Yugoslavia. These might include overt military moves such as rapid reinforcement of NATO air squadrons in Italy, and naval maneuvers by the United States Sixth Fleet in the Adriatic. Mr. Leddy commented that at that point we should also be fully prepared to move quickly in the United Nations. He felt that the General Assembly should be seized of the problem as soon as possible, because in the case of Yugoslavia we could probably obtain widespread support for deterrent action. The Chairman commented that he felt the best way to deter further Soviet military action in Eastern Europe was to keep raising the cost to the Soviets of their invasion of Czechoslovakia. There was a growing tendency to begin to accept the Czech episode as closed, which only played into Soviet hands. The degree to which we are able to keep the occupation of Czechoslovakia a painful and embarrassing subject for the Soviets inevitably would influence their decision whether to embark on similar adventures in Romania or Yugoslavia. The Balkan Pact. There was general agreement that the relationship of the Balkan Pact to NATO needed further study. At the time of the signing of the Bled Agreement between Yugoslavia, Greece, and Turkey in 1954/6/ there had been some direct bilateral military coordination between the Yugoslavs and the Greeks. In the event of a serious military threat, the Greeks had been granted the right to move into the southern tip of Yugoslavia to defend the approaches to Greece, and there had been exchanges of information on the military staff level. The degree to which this cooperation had persisted in more recent years was unknown. /6/For text of the Bled Treaty, signed on August 9, 1954, see American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955: Basic Documents, pp. 1235-1239. The treaty established the Balkan Pact. Apparently NATO had never taken official cognizance of the Balkan Pact, despite its possible effect on its obligations to Greece and Turkey under Article V of the NATO agreement. Mr. Leddy said that legal experts were currently studying the possible interrelationship of the two international treaties but more work needed to be done. Yugoslav Capacity to Resist. An associated question was raised about the present Yugoslav capacity to resist armed intervention by the Soviet Union. It was agreed that the intelligence community should develop a current estimate, possibly in the form of a SNIE. Austria. Mr. Leddy commented that the contingency of Soviet military pressure on Austria was less likely but more complicated than the cases of either Romania or Yugoslavia. If the Austrian State Treaty were violated by the Soviets--for example, by seizure of their previous zone of occupation--United States action would have to be concerted in advance with the United Kingdom, France, and Austria. A great deal more preliminary work remained to be done in this area. Furthermore, we were assuming that Austria would reject a Soviet demand for the right of transit of Soviet troops. But what would we do if the Austrians, under great pressure, agreed to such transit? Would we consider this grounds to justify our re-occupation of Austrian territory under the State Treaty? Berlin. It was observed that the paper dealing with Berlin/7/ was rather bland in its estimate of the current threat, especially in regard to possible reactions to the forthcoming CDU convention to be held in West Berlin. No such convention had been held there since 1952, and the resumption of this degree of FRG political activity in Berlin might be considered highly provocative. In addition, when discussing Allied responses to curtailment or interruption of access to Berlin, it was probably wrong to assume that the FRG would agree to any restrictions on Inter-Zonal Trade (IZT). Past experience had shown that the West Germans were unwilling to take any action to abridge existing agreements on IZT. /7/This paper was Attachment 5 to Document 23, not printed. Mr. Leddy suggested that a useful move in contingency planning for Berlin would be to get authorization for a tripartite declaration on the relationship between the FRG and West Berlin. It was suggested that another possibility would be a quiet diplomatic note on the subject from the United States, United Kingdom, and France delivered simultaneously to the Soviets, but it was pointed out that if the advice was to be effective, it would have to be publicized. Whatever the course of Berlin contingency planning, General Wheeler remarked that he hoped no one would recommend stationing more United States troops in the city. In the first place, there were too few available elsewhere in Europe. Mr. Leddy agreed that the military effectiveness of a build-up in the Berlin garrison would be most doubtful, and it would not provide any real increase in deterrence against Soviet and East German military action. The only true guarantee for the existence of West Berlin remained the United States warning to the Soviets that overstepping a given line would mean war. Discussion of Berlin concluded with a series of comments regarding the growing reluctance of the World Bank to schedule its 1970 meeting in West Berlin. The French reportedly had passed the word that a meeting in Berlin would be unacceptable, and authorities at the World Bank had begun to talk of serious difficulties with the Yugoslavs, Arabs, and others if such a meeting were scheduled. Mr. McNamara had informally expressed his preference for Copenhagen to avoid these problems. Some international bankers had begun to speak deprecatingly of the economic future of Berlin as a result of its constant population drain, especially in the younger segments of society, and its failure to achieve economic viability. Mr. Leddy expressed the opinion that the United States must work to stem this tide, and continue to support the convening of the World Bank meeting in Berlin. It was true that Berlin was plagued by economic problems, mostly understandable as a result of the peculiar situation of the city, but these in no way diminished our national interest in Berlin nor should they weaken our support for the World Bank meeting there in 1970. At this point the Chairman and other members were required to leave in order to attend a White House ceremony. Since there remained ample ground for further discussion of Eastern European problems, the Chairman suggested that the SIG Staff Director would be in touch with SIG members on the advisability of scheduling another meeting on the same subject. IV. Action Summary. A. The proposal by General Wood with regard to the Special State-Defense Study Group report on overseas base requirements (see Section II) was approved. B. The formation of a sub-committee of the IRG/EUR under the chairmanship of Mr. Toon to coordinate interagency contingency planning on Eastern Europe was approved. C. It was agreed that further interagency study would be undertaken under the direction of the IRG/EUR sub-committee, emphasizing the range of preventive measures which might be taken to deter further Soviet aggression in Eastern Europe, as well as specific contingency responses to Warsaw Pact action against Romania, Yugoslavia, Austria, and Berlin along the lines set forth in the SIG discussion (see Section III). D. It was agreed there would be further study under the same auspices of the interrelationship, if any, between the Balkan Pact and the NATO treaty. E. It was agreed that the intelligence community would develop an estimate of Yugoslav capacity to resist Soviet armed intervention, possibly in the form of a SNIE./8/ /8/No SNIE was produced. Claus W. Ruser
25. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, October 12, 1968, 1 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL EUR. Secret. Drafted by Tanguy and approved in S on October 21. Debre was in the United States to attend the U.N. General Assembly session. The source text is labeled "Part V of V." SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS U.S. France The Secretary emphasized the importance of being clear in advance as to what our commitments are vis-á-vis situations possibly involving war. Debre reiterated the importance of the distinction he had drawn in his talks in New York between a Soviet move against Romania and any such move against West Berlin, Yugoslavia or Austria. The Secretary agreed that there would be significant differences between these two types of action. He added that the United States was watching Soviet troop movements carefully. We do not see any imminent Soviet threat today against Romania, Yugoslavia or Austria. The Secretary added that Soviet intervention in Romania might well be designed to prepare a move against Yugoslavia. Debre observed with feeling that any new Soviet moves would close the door to a resumption of Western conversations with the Soviet Union. Debre thought that the Soviets were aware of this and would give it considerable weight in planning their future actions. The Secretary hoped that Debre was right but he was personally less confident that this factor would deter them. When the Russians judge that their fundamental interests are involved, the Secretary said, it is difficult to know in advance how far they will allow themselves to go. M. Debre declared that the French Government operated on the postulate that Russia did not want to become a country which was forced to choose "guns over butter." Such a development within Russia would mean a return to the worse days of the Stalin period. It would also mean that the Soviets accepted the possibility of a new war. When and if this day comes, Debre continued, "everything would change" including their leadership and our estimate of their policies and intentions. The Secretary observed that hopefully the Russians may now be learning that some things cannot be accomplished by means of armies of occupation. If so, this would be a helpful development. The Secretary asked Mr. Leddy to look into the feasibility of expanding our information programs to Yugoslavia and other Eastern European countries to accentuate the message regarding the immense problems which the Soviet Union has created for itself by its use of armies of occupation. Debre commented that the leaders of Communist parties in the other Eastern European countries seem to have gotten the point of direct interest to them from the Czech experience. In the event of Soviet intervention and occupation the local Communist party must change one leader out of every two.
26. National Intelligence Estimate/1/ NIE 12-68 Washington, November 7, 1968. /1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-R01012A, ODDI Registry. Secret. According to a note on the cover sheet, the CIA, the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense, and the NSA participated in the preparation of the estimate. It was submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence, and concurred in by the Members of the U.S. Intelligence Board. The representatives of the AEC and the Assistant Director of the FBI abstained on the grounds that the subject was outside their jurisdiction. EASTERN EUROPE AND THE USSR IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE INVASION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA Conclusions A. The Soviets intervened in Czechoslovakia because of their genuine fear that the existence of a reliable Communist authority in Prague was threatened by the reform movement in the Czechoslovak Party. The Soviet leaders believed that if this development was not checked their hegemony would ultimately be jeopardized in Eastern Europe as a whole. The process of forcing the Czechs back into the approved mold is proceeding slowly, and the Soviets may be obliged in the end to move directly against the Prague leadership. B. Both Romania and Yugoslavia will remain apprehensive about Soviet intentions for some time, especially in view of Soviet assertions of a right to intervene in Socialist countries. The Soviets probably do not now contemplate any direct military action against Romania, although other means of pressure can be expected. A Soviet military move against Yugoslavia seems even less likely. Although by its action against Czechoslovakia the USSR has probably for the time being discouraged assertions of national independence among its East European allies, the growth of anti-Soviet nationalism in the area seems likely to continue and to produce new manifestations of resistance to Soviet authority. C. The present Soviet leadership will probably continue to strike a course somewhere between attempting to restore complete subservience in Eastern Europe and accommodating the trend toward independence and the expression of national peculiarities. The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance will remain generally ineffective, both as an instrument of Soviet hegemony and as a means of fostering East European economic development. Within the Warsaw Pact, the Soviets will probably feel obliged to place greater reliance on their own forces and less on those of the East Europeans. D. Although the Soviet leaders were probably in basic agreement that measures had to be taken to arrest the reform movement in Czechoslovakia, over time this crisis will probably sharpen a number of chronically troublesome issues within the Soviet leadership. Yet the Soviet leaders are likely to realize that this is not a propitious time for open displays of disunity. Among other things, they are probably concerned over the effects of their actions of Czechoslovakia on the Soviet population itself. E. The Soviet move in Czechoslovakia did not signify a general hardening of Moscow's policies toward the West. The Soviet leadership considers the Czechoslovak problem as one internal to its own sphere. But Moscow's attitude toward West Germany will remain quite harsh and the Soviets may authorize the East Germans to undertake new harassments aimed at the West German position in Berlin. Discussion I. Introduction 1. The dust and debris raised by the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia have yet to settle, and the uncertainties left in its wake involve more than the kind of regime which will govern in Prague. Also affected are Moscow's attitudes toward West Germany and the Berlin question, its policies toward the other Communist mavericks, Yugoslavia and Romania, and its posture toward Eastern Europe as a whole. Involved in addition are the broader questions of the USSR's policies toward Western Europe and the US and its position in the international Communist movement. Finally, the Czech events could affect the relative positions of the various Soviet leaders and the stability of the leadership as a whole, which may have been shaken by differences over Soviet policies during the crisis. 2. The Soviet leadership's decision to invade and occupy Czechoslovakia was apparently arrived at with some reluctance. It came only after various other forms of pressure on the Czechoslovak regime had failed and, presumably, after the leadership had decided that the risks of nonintervention simply outweighed all the probable costs of an invasion. The Soviet leaders, or a majority of them, came to believe that the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia was no longer reliable and was in effect abandoning control over the country to the "counter-revolutionaries;" that Czechoslovakia was edging toward at least a de facto withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact and a policy of neutrality; and that the West, and especially West Germany, was almost certain to gain greater influence in Prague. Moscow apparently calculated that the political and strategic consequences of these developments would shake its position in the other countries of Eastern Europe. And the Soviet leaders feared that this, together with the example of a liberalized socialism in Czechoslovakia, would ultimately have deeply unsettling effects on the Soviet population itself. 3. The intervention did arrest the political developments in Czechoslovakia which the Soviets viewed as dangerous, but the process of forcing the Czechs back into the approved mold is taking some time. Moscow would like to avoid further violence and to oblige the Czech leaders themselves to take the responsibility for undoing the reforms so intensely supported by the population. Probably Moscow would also like to discredit the present leaders and to displace them with others willing to collaborate in the old way. To this end the Soviets are trying to build up a pro-Soviet faction within the Party and to place men loyal to themselves in the security organs and communications media. Their hope is that ultimately the present leaders, under the demoralizing conditions of occupation, can be divided among themselves and discredited with the population. 4. It is difficult to see how the present indirect manifestations of resistance can be sustained indefinitely or how these alone could force the Soviets to abandon the aims for which they intervened. If necessary, the Soviets will probably take direct measures to install a reliable leadership and will use force to suppress any demonstrations by the population. If they are obliged to go to these lengths, however, the political costs of the intervention will be compounded and the problems of maintaining Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe will in the longer term be still further complicated. II. The Implications in Eastern Europe Near-Term Repercussions 5. Among the other states of Eastern Europe, Romania and Yugoslavia were most immediately affected by the shock waves flowing from the Soviet action. Fear of a similar Soviet move against themselves was for a time quite high in both Belgrade and Bucharest. The reactions in each capital, however, seem to have been different. Following a brief period of public outrage, the Romanians have, on the whole, been more restrained. Clearly, as initial fears recede, the Ceausescu regime is determined not to surrender its sovereignty, but it is equally anxious to tailor its actions so as not to provoke Moscow into moves against it. Tito, on the other hand, was appalled by the invasion and--more certain of his independence--was perfectly willing to say so to the Soviets and to the world at large. The Yugoslavs saw in the invasion an assault on their own principles and policies, both domestic and foreign, and foresee a long period of strain in their relations with the USSR. 6. Soviet pressures on Romania and hostility toward Yugoslavia seem likely for some time to come. Anti-Yugoslav propaganda, some of it directed against Tito personally, will probably remain fairly intense, in part because of Moscow's anxiety to remind the other East Europeans of its attitude toward all forms of "revisionism." Pressures on Romania, perhaps including hints of military moves and additional demands regarding Warsaw Pact maneuvers on Romanian soil, will probably continue at least so long as Bucharest insists on behaving in an independent, and at times, unfriendly fashion. The Soviets probably do not now contemplate any direct military action against Romania, however, partly because of their calculations of the political costs and partly because they do not consider Romania to be as important strategically as Czechoslovakia. A military move against Yugoslavia seems even less likely. Nevertheless, apprehension about Soviet intentions will persist in both countries for some time, especially in view of the Soviet assertion of a right of intervention in socialist countries. 7. Ceausescu's strong domestic position--which rests substantially on his image as a nationalist--will probably not suffer as a result of his efforts to cultivate the appearance of more harmonious relations with the USSR. These will probably be widely regarded as a simple exercise in prudence. For his part, Tito will probably push all the harder for his program of liberal reform at home and will try to strengthen his ties with both the West and the Third World. In Yugoslavia, the net effect of the Soviet action against Czechoslovakia will thus be to reverse Belgrade's movement toward closer relations with the USSR and to strengthen its determination to pursue an independent and nonaligned socialist course. 8. Elsewhere in Eastern Europe, the Czech invasion may in the short term strengthen the positions of the existing regimes and leaders, but it has also created new problems for them. Gomulka has emerged from the crisis as still the principal Soviet ally in Eastern Europe; this will not help him with his people, nor intimidate for any length of time his enemies within the Party. Kadar's popular reputation may suffer somewhat because Hungarian troops were used in the invasion, and his Party position may suffer somewhat because he supported Dubcek. Generally, however, the Hungarians are likely to appreciate more than ever that, under Kadar, they have enjoyed relative prosperity and freedom. Ulbricht, in East Germany, has seen his harsh attitude toward the Czech experiment adopted by the Soviets (and he himself thus vindicated), but he has also had to face increased expressions of public dissatisfaction. Zhivkov in Bulgaria has behaved entirely as the Soviets wished him to, and their support of him, as a result, is probably assured for some time. The apprehensive Albanians have begun to show a friendlier face toward both Romania and their traditional enemy, Yugoslavia, while stepping up their attacks on Bulgaria. 9. In general, the lesson of Czechoslovakia, like the lesson of Hungary before it, is not likely to be lost on either the ruling parties or the people at large. The USSR has now moved forcefully to set limits on the permissible. No party will be allowed to share power with other organized groups, to institute programs of reform which significantly decentralize political power or economic control or remove restraints on public media. Further, all parties will be under stronger pressure to follow foreign policies (as, for example, toward West Germany) which adhere to guidelines laid down by Moscow. For the next few years, Moscow has probably assured a larger measure of compliance from its East European allies, though most of them will continue to seek ways to pursue their own interests as best they can. In any event, resentment of Soviet authority will no doubt continue to smolder, and the political and economic forces working for greater national independence, though subdued or underground, will continue to pose a threat to tranquility and to the Soviet position in the area. 10. The Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia probably served, in fact, to dramatize for all the East European peoples the power and the appeal of the Czech movement and the poverty of Soviet efforts to contain it. Thus while certainly made aware of the risks of going beyond the bounds now firmly set by Moscow, East Europeans have also been reminded once again of their unhappy relationship with a doctrinaire, reactionary, and oppressive neighbor. Many East Europeans were clearly chagrined by the invasion of Czechoslovakia and by the use of East European forces in that invasion. All in all, if the Soviet move has served to erect new barriers against the advance of national independence in Eastern Europe, it has also surely failed to halt the growth of a strong anti-Soviet nationalism behind those barriers. Longer Term Outlook for Soviet Authority in Eastern Europe 11. The Soviets have sought since roughly 1953 and the death of Stalin to transform their system of control and influence in Eastern Europe into a largely voluntary association of allied states owing political and ideological allegiance to Moscow. The use of terror was for the most part discontinued, heavy state-to-state economic and political pressures were played down, and cordial relations between "fraternal" Communist Parties were emphasized. In addition, multilateral organizations, principally the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CEMA) and the Warsaw Pact, were used in an effort to coordinate economic and military affairs and to provide the Soviets with mechanisms for exercising their Bloc-wide dominance. At least some Soviet leaders apparently believed that a true "socialist commonwealth" could be established on these new foundations and that it was only natural--and in accord with Marxism-Leninism--for the various states of the commonwealth to identify their national aspirations with those of the USSR. Other Soviet leaders were perhaps more cynical but seemed to be convinced that they could establish a harmonious and viable empire on the basis of strong inter-Party ties. 12. But the predominant trend in Eastern Europe has been toward greater independence from the Soviet Union. Since 1953, the people of two countries have sought to rebel against the Soviet-imposed system: East Germany in 1953 and Hungary in 1956. Poland, swept by nationalist fires, had its moment of defiance in 1956. Albania succeeded in breaking away a few years later. Romania has gradually been acquiring a large measure of freedom from Soviet dominance since the early 1960's. And Czechoslovakia, through a process now called "peaceful counterrevolution" by the Soviets, was well on its way in 1968. Over the past 15 years, then, only one of the USSR's allies in Eastern Europe has remained largely untouched by the currents of nationalism, and even that country, Bulgaria, was the scene of an attempted military coup in 1965 which had anti-Soviet undertones./2/ /2/On April 22, 1965, the Bulgarian press reported that a plot against the Bulgarian Government had been uncovered and that its leaders included the commander of the Sofia military garrison, a member of the diplomatic service, and a senior Communist Party member. The Bulgarians officially described the plot as "pro-Chinese." Western analysts, however, noting that the three were former partisans, and had formerly been purged as Titoists, believed they were nationalist Communists. Nine plotters were tried in secret and sentenced to jail terms. 13. This long history of discord and dissension, and in particular, the recent crisis in Czechoslovakia, pose some fundamental questions for the Soviet leaders. Can they continue to approach Eastern Europe in the way laid down after 1953 and, at the same time, maintain their position there, let alone encourage the formation of an enterprising and viable empire? Can CEMA ever manage to coordinate, unite, and develop under Soviet leadership the economies of the entire region? Similarly, can the Warsaw Pact perform adequately in the various capacities it has been assigned--can the various national armies be relied upon, could they fulfill a wartime role against NATO, can the Pact structure be used to help control the member states, could Pact forces be used once more against another socialist state? Are there changes which could be made in either CEMA or the Pact which would significantly enhance their capabilities? 14. The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance is a going concern only on paper and in a number of particular areas--e.g., in transportation and electric power--where cooperation between the member states is obviously desirable, noncontroversial, and relatively easy of accomplishment. In other areas, and in terms of coordinating and dividing specific national tasks, the organization has consistently run into apparently insurmountable economic and political obstacles. Romania, for example, has since 1963 persistently refused to surrender any of its national economic prerogatives to an international body dominated by the USSR. The Soviets are unable, or are themselves unwilling for various national reasons, to push very hard for the concept of a truly united Bloc economy. It seems highly unlikely that this picture will change very much within the foreseeable future. As an instrument of Soviet hegemony, or even as a means of fostering Eastern European economic development, the future of CEMA does not appear to be at all promising. 15. Instead the Soviets will continue to rely on bilateral relations with the individual Eastern European countries as the main channel for strengthening trade ties with the USSR and for enforcing economic orthodoxy. Eastern European hopes of relaxing political controls over economic life have clearly been set back by the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia. Economic reforms of the restricted type practiced by East Germany and Poland will remain in effect. The bolder programs of Czechoslovakia and Hungary, such as partial decontrol of prices and foreign trade, are likely to flounder in the absence of political liberalization and closer ties with the West. And Czechoslovakia has been forced to drop the radical plan of setting up workers' councils like those in Yugoslavia. Trade with the West should continue to rise, as fast as the economic facts of life permit, but without the growing Western influence that seemed to be in prospect before the invasion of Czechoslovakia. 16. The Czechoslovak crisis has put in question the USSR's reliance on various East European Armed Forces to function in important roles during wartime./3/ Moscow must consider that the Czech Army can no longer function as a reliable instrument of Soviet policy, and must also be concerned about manifestations of nationalism in the armed forces of other allied states. As a simple matter of prudence, the Soviets probably feel obliged to place greater reliance on their own forces and less on those of the East Europeans. Moscow may now seriously consider not only the strengthening of its forces in Eastern Europe, but may also seek ways to achieve a more closely integrated Warsaw Pact command structure. Steps such as these would be useful not only against NATO but also as a means to develop a stronger instrument of control within Eastern Europe. /3/For further discussion see SNIE 11-17-68, "Capabilities of the Warsaw Pact against NATO," dated 8 October 1968, Secret, and the forthcoming NIE 11-14-68, "Soviet and East European General Purpose Forces," Top Secret, All Source. [Footnote in the source text. SNIE 11-17-68 and NIE 11-14-68 are in the Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-R01012A, ODDI Registry.] 17. The Soviets have for some time sought to enlist the voluntary compliance of the Eastern European regimes but they have also been ready to apply pressure whenever it seemed necessary. Though this approach has been found severely wanting, they probably are not at this point prepared to make many changes in their general policies in Eastern Europe. The Soviet attitude will probably be more unyielding for a time toward deviations, and on key issues Moscow will almost certainly remain harsh and demanding. But it does not now seem that the Soviets are prepared to attempt a general rollback in Eastern Europe toward complete subservience and orthodoxy. Nor, however, does it seem at all likely that the present leadership will entertain any notions of a basic accommodation to the trend toward independence and the expression of national peculiarities. 18. Over the longer term, of course, when new leaders appear in Moscow, the Soviets might come to adapt themselves to the process that is underway in Eastern Europe. They could, for example, become less and less concerned about the orthodoxy of other Communist parties and less and less enchanted with the dreary prospects (and rising costs) of trying to maintain their imperial position. Such a stance would certainly have its advantages: it would help to improve relations between Moscow and the presently disgruntled leaders of Western European Communist parties; it would permit a return to détente policies vis-á-vis Western Europe as a whole, West Germany excepted; and it would help to advance the USSR's prestige within the international Communist movement and within the Third World. 19. The ideas and character of the next generation of Soviet leaders are not, however, predictable, and we certainly do not look forward to any change in fundamental Soviet attitudes toward Eastern Europe within the foreseeable future. Probably for a long time, hegemony exercised on the present pattern will be seen as vital to Soviet national interests. Certainly the present Soviet leaders have shown no disposition to allow it to crumble. Khrushchev wished to reform the empire, not dissolve it, and his successors are wary even of reform. Given the continuing growth of Eastern European nationalism, and given the continuing determination of the Soviets to combat it, tensions between ruler and ruled are likely to be endemic and further crises appear almost inevitable. III. The Implications for the USSR Domestic 20. Throughout the recent period of crisis in Eastern Europe, the Soviet leadership acted in public as a unified collective. But Brezhnev, as the most powerful figure on the Politburo and as the leader who was earlier most closely identified with both Novotny and Czechoslovakia, was generally thought to be the major architect of the USSR's policies and the man most responsible for its setbacks. It seems likely that the leadership as a whole was essentially united on the principal proposition: the course followed by the new leadership of Czechoslovakia threatened the vital interests of the USSR. It seems plausible, however, that there were different currents of opinion within the leadership over the degree of danger Czechoslovakia represented at any given moment and over what should be done by the USSR to contain that danger. 21. In addition, the Czech problem will probably in time have the effect of sharpening a number of chronically troublesome issues within the leadership. As a consequence of the invasion, for example, the Soviet military may demand a greater share of the nation's economic resources, to the distress perhaps of some of the leaders especially concerned with the growth of the civilian economy. Policy choices bearing on the international Communist movement and on relations with the West may become more contentious. Discontented and ambitious leaders can be expected to try to weaken the position of rivals who might appear newly vulnerable in the wake of the crisis. 22. The collective has endured for almost four years, and its ability so far to govern with few signs of inner turmoil has surpassed most expectations. The Czech problem probably presented it with its most difficult hours and may have placed some of the top leaders in a weaker position. Although Brezhnev may, for a variety of reasons, become the obvious and most convincing scapegoat for an unsatisfactory episode in the conduct of Soviet affairs abroad, there is no evidence at this time that any other leader has the strength to displace him. It also seems unlikely that a move against Brezhnev, or any of the other top leaders, would come too close on the heels of the events themselves. This is not a good time for open displays of disunity. 23. The Soviet leaders will wish to preserve the appearance of unity within the collective in part because of their probable concern over the effects of their actions in Czechoslovakia on popular attitudes at home. Though many Soviet citizens seem at least initially to have accepted the rationale for the invasion, or to have been apathetic about the whole affair, some of the intelligentsia entertained strong doubts about the official reasons given. (Abrupt changes and contradictions in the Party line--e.g., toward the character of Alexander Dubcek--would be enough in their own right to foster skepticism, or at least bewilderment.) Some Soviet intellectuals--who looked on democratic developments in Czechoslovakia as a happy augury for their own circumstances--have apparently been greatly agitated by the invasion and, in some instances, anxious privately to disown it. Finally, within Soviet minority groups, most notably in the Ukraine, there apparently had been growing interest in what was going on in Czechoslovakia, especially concerning the implications for the USSR of Prague's newly tolerant attitude toward its own national minorities. 24. While the problem of intellectual and minority group dissent in the USSR has existed for some time, the growth of democratic and nationalist sentiments in Eastern Europe seems to have stimulated similar attitudes in the USSR. In fact, despite increasingly repressive official policies, signs of disaffection within the Soviet Union have recently become more frequent. Both intellectuals and members of minority groups appear to have become more sullen and less disposed to cooperate with the regime, and radical ideas seem to have maintained currency despite heavy-handed efforts to subdue them. Clearly the Soviet leaders have acted as if they consider this kind of disaffection to be a deeply rooted and long-term problem, though they will probably be able to hold it to manageable proportions for some time. Foreign Policies 25. The Soviets apparently do not now contemplate any radical shifts in foreign policies beyond those required by the Czechoslovak occupation itself. The move in Czechoslovakia did not signify the USSR's intention to undertake a general hardening of its policies toward the West. As Gromyko made explicit in his recent speech to the United Nations General Assembly, the Soviet leadership considers the Czecho-slovak problem as one internal to its own sphere, and therefore as a matter not subject to discussion with outside powers. The Soviet effort to solve this problem was conceived and executed in this context, and the Soviets have sought--except partially in the special case of West Germany--to avoid entangling their policies elsewhere in the world with their actions against Prague. That is to say, Moscow has made no deliberate moves to change course toward the Third World, Western Europe, or the US. 26. Specifically concerning the US, a number of proposed programs already appear to be casualties of the Soviet move and prospects for a number of others have been placed in doubt. Small accommodations, such as the institution of New York-Moscow air services, do not appear jeopardized, but proposals for arms control and disarmament, already inherently difficult of accomplishment, face formidable new obstacles. The economic and military interests which seemed to be moving the Soviet leaders closer to the idea of some arms control arrangement have not in and of themselves been lessened by recent developments in Eastern Europe, though the consensus within the collective on this subject may well be affected by the atmosphere of renewed tension generated by the Czech events. Much will now depend also, of course, on the impact of recent events on the attitudes and policies of the US. 27. Concerning Germany, the current heavy propaganda and diplomatic campaign against Bonn seems primarily to represent an effort to levy blame for the Czechoslovak crisis on the most convenient and useful outside scapegoat. This effort happens to coincide quite well with the traditional Soviet attitude toward Bonn, and also serves as a rationale for the permanent stationing of Soviet troops in Czechoslovakia. It seems likely that the USSR's attitude toward West Germany will remain quite harsh, in part because Moscow fears West Germany's relations with Eastern Europe as a potential alternative to Soviet influence. The Soviets clearly want no further forward movement of Bonn's Ostpolitik. 28. One way of seeking to blunt these West German policies and of bringing direct pressure to bear on Bonn would be to renew the campaign against the West German presence and activities in West Berlin. The Soviets realize, however, that in the wake of the events in Czechoslovakia, sudden moves by them in Berlin could quickly generate a major crisis. They probably will not, therefore, attack the Allied presence in Berlin directly but, instead, may authorize the East Germans to undertake new harassments aimed at the West German position. On the whole, we think the chances are good that there will be a renewal of tensions around Berlin in coming months. 29. In Western Europe, the Soviets are seeking to repair the damage done their relations with the various governments and the local Communist Parties by the invasion of Czechoslovakia. There are no signs that Moscow is prepared to depart from its preinvasion efforts to cultivate good will, especially in France. Its task is much more difficult now, however, and the heavy-handed propaganda tactics used against Bonn have greatly reduced Western Europe's receptiveness to détente overtures. But the Soviets are anxious, apparently, to convince the West Europeans that their move against Prague was essentially defensive and is not to be seen as a threat against the integrity of any Western country. Kosygin's sudden visit to Finland was probably undertaken to calm Finnish apprehensions about Soviet policy. To a certain extent, of course, the state of relations between East and West is a matter of atmospherics. If the situation in Czechoslovakia appears to return to "normal," concern in Western Europe will gradually abate, and the Soviets will probably then revert to the themes of European security and détente which have been featured in their policy for the last several years. 30. Moscow's relationship with many Communist Parties has been heavily damaged by the action against Czechoslovakia. The international Communist conference, which has long been sought by the Soviets and has now had to be postponed, will have little chance of restoring Communist unity. Both the French and Italian Parties counseled against the intervention but were disregarded by Moscow. Official Soviet doctrine now emphasizes that the USSR has a duty when necessary to interfere in the affairs of any fraternal Communist state, and with military force if circumstances require. The French and Italian Parties have rejected this proposition, in part from the conviction that it is ideologically untenable, in part from the knowledge that it is indefensible to their local electorates. Despite grumbling by their Stalinist minorities and pressure from Moscow, the major West European Parties have maintained their initial disapproval of Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia. They will not be pressured into reversing this decision, although they will continue to pay lip service to "proletarian internationalism" and friendship with the USSR. The Soviets have little prospect of restoring the position of commanding influence over the international Communist movement they once held. 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