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 | FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968 Volume XVII Eastern Europe Department of State |
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| Eastern Europe Region 1. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, January 16, 1964. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, E EUR E. Confidential. Drafted by Harriman and approved in M. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS In reply to my question as to what was going on in Eastern Europe, Velebit said that of course his contacts were only on the economic side, and then proceeded to discuss the political side as well. He started with Czechoslovakia, and said they were not doing well, their economy was stagnant, and there was a disposition to change their system. I asked, "Moving more to the Yugoslav example?" He replied, "I hope they do better than that." He said that the Czechoslovakians had shown more independence vis-á-vis the Soviets. They had openly opposed the Soviet position on the importance to be accorded East-West trade problems at the UN Conference on Trade and Development. Also, they had praised the ECE Secretariat's "Economic Survey of Europe" despite its unfavorable report on the Czech economy and the traditionally critical attitude of the Bloc toward such surveys. He said the Hungarians were much bolder than they had been, and even more so than the Poles. The Poles were being held back by Gomulka, who was "stupid and stubborn" and was putting the brakes on. When I asked him in what areas the Hungarians were bolder, he said both political and economic. The trend was towards close relations with Yugoslavia and acceptance of their ideas. He went into some detail in explaining Rumania's desire for independence of Soviet COMECON planning. The Rumanians were demanding independence in their economic development. He saw no progress in Bulgaria. He said the situation in East Germany was "hopeless". When I commented that the East German government was the most unpopular in the world, he said he wasn't sure that he could accept that and mentioned South Viet-Nam. I said to avoid argument I will change it to the most unpopular communist government. He replied, "undoubtedly." He said that 90-odd percent of the people were opposed to Ulbricht. He agreed that the undoubted objective of all Eastern European countries would be Tito's independent status. When I asked him what we could do to encourage this, he said we must be patient, it would be slow, but "don't put in any obstacles." He suggested we help to expand trade, of course on a "most-favored-nation" basis. He reiterated his conviction that improved trade improves the political climate. He said he regretted the comment that was made when the CIA report on the USSR was made public,/2/ drawing the conclusion that since the Soviet Union was in difficulties, we should put every obstacle in the way of her development. He said that sort of statement was counterproductive. I told him I hadn't seen the statement, but it evidently came from some news columns or commentaries. I agreed with his conclusion as far as the Soviet Union was concerned, but said that I felt that the regime of Peiping was so aggressive and in such difficulties it would be a mistake for us to change our attitude. As he was just leaving, he didn't comment on this. /2/Reference is to a January 1964 CIA report that placed Soviet growth rates over the previous 2 years at less than one-half those of the United States. For a summary of the report, see The New York Times, January 8, 1964.
2. Special Report by the Central Intelligence Agency/1/ Washington, March 27, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, East Europe. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. The chart and photographs included with the text are not printed. NATIONALISM IN EASTERN EUROPE A new and less rigid relationship is developing between Eastern Europe and Moscow. This has resulted partly from changes in Soviet policy but, more importantly, from a recognition by the lesser Communist regimes themselves that they now are in a position to insist on greater consideration for individual national interests. Although this discovery is having an ever-increasing influence on their attitudes, the Eastern European regimes realize also that there are continuing political, economic, and military advantages in remaining a part of some sort of bloc of Communist states. Moscow nevertheless can expect to encounter increasing difficulties in leading that bloc. Erosion of Soviet Control The recent trip to Peiping of a high-level Rumanian party delegation/2/ highlights the changes which have been developing in Moscow's relations with Eastern Europe. It seems clear that the Russians, lacking unanimous support even in Eastern Europe for their projected harder tactics in the Sino-Soviet dispute, had no acceptable alternative but to acquiesce in the Rumanian desire to play the role of mediator in talks with the Chinese Communists. Certainly Moscow's propaganda coverage after the Rumanian delegation returned empty-handed was warmer and more friendly than that given on its departure for Peiping. /2/March 3-10; the delegation was led by Prime Minister Maurer. In the post-Stalin era, policies pursued by the Soviet bloc had until last July increasingly reflected a consensus of the member states. Multilateral consultations on policy matters, with the views of all being heard, had with reasonable success replaced Stalinist bilateralism. At times, of course, such consultations became acrimonious as a single participant, strongly motivated by self-interest, held out for more consideration of his position. But in the long run the will of the Soviet Union usually prevailed. This technique of controlled multilateral policy-making suffered a severe blow last summer, however, when the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CEMA) finally yielded to Rumania's opposition and abandoned, at least for the time being, certain aspects of Soviet bloc planning and integration sponsored by the USSR. The subsequent trend toward even slacker control promises increasing difficulties for Moscow in its relations with the Eastern European countries, particularly because it no longer has as extensive a network of informers and advisers throughout their government and party structures. In Poland, for example, Soviet advisers and intelligence specialists since 1958 have been restricted to formal contacts with their counterparts under a written agreement and are no longer integrated into party and government offices. Similar arrangements are believed to govern Moscow's present relations with the other Eastern European States. Also contributing to the USSR's difficulties has been the disappearance, except in the broadest sense, of clearly defined limits set by Moscow of what constitutes acceptable behavior by a Soviet bloc member. A Polish Foreign Ministry official recently commented to a Western official that, even though neither the East German regime nor the USSR liked the idea of the Rumanian delegation going to Peiping, the Rumanians had the right to take an individual initiative in ideological as well as economic affairs. Ironically, Khrushchev's problems in Eastern Europe are the result of his own concept of "different roads to socialism," first made a point of doctrine in 1956./3/ During his trip last summer to Yugoslavia/4/ he gave added weight to the concept by accepting Yugoslavia as a Communist country practicing a correct form of socialism. This probably carried an implication for some of the Eastern Europeans that the limited autonomy they had heretofore exercised only in internal affairs had been extended to matters having bloc-wide significance. The effect is visible even in such conservative regimes as that in Czechoslovakia. Influential Czechoslovak party dissidents recently published an article strongly praising the basic features of Yugoslavia's unique brand of socialism and implying that these should be adopted in their country./5/ Even the Bulgarian regime is encouraging experimentation with and debate on more liberal methods of economic management, including decentralization and improved incentives. /3/Reference is to the communiqué issued on June 2, 1955, at the conclusion of Khrushchev's visit to Yugoslavia. For text of the relevant portions, see Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1955-1956, pp. 14266-14267. /4/August 20-September 3, 1963. /5/During the winter of 1963-1964, the Czech Government and Communist Party launched a series of attacks on cultural publications such as Kulturi Tvorba, Literarni Noviny, and Kultury Zivot, for articles they had carried that included suggestions that the Czechs examine other models of socialist development. The Eastern European leaderships, recognizing that Khrushchev needs their active support and backing in the dispute with Communist China, have been further emboldened in their efforts to establish a semi-independent relationship with Moscow. Since last fall several other Eastern European countries--in addition to Rumania--are believed to have vigorously opposed Russia's intention of bringing the Sino-Soviet dispute to a showdown. East Germany, on the other hand, is reported to be dissatisfied with Moscow's failure to take a firm line with Peiping. Effect of New Relationship with Moscow The assertion of autonomy in Eastern Europe has probably gone further than the Russians originally anticipated. In the summer of 1963, for example, following Rumania's insistence on going ahead with its plans for the construction of the Galati steel complex in the face of opposition from Moscow, CEMA, and the more industrialized northern satellites, Presidium member Podgorny visited Bucharest in an effort to persuade the Rumanian leadership to change its mind on this and other matters./6/ Then Khrushchev himself made a secret journey to Rumania to reason with Gheorghiu-Dej./7/ Moscow's opposition was based on the sound grounds that Galati was an economically questionable project. However, both Podgorny and Khrushchev failed to budge the Rumanian leader from his adamant opposition to plans which would in effect have kept Rumania predominantly an agricultural country. /6/According to Pravda, June 5, 1963, Podgorny visited Romania for a 2-week period in late May and early June. /7/Presumably during his August visit to Yugoslavia. An even more difficult problem for the Russians, growing out of the developing autonomous relations, has been public conflict between individual Eastern European countries over policy questions. This type of behavior, which has rarely been observed before, reflects the decline of Moscow's influence and is likely to become more frequent. Recently the East German party published a politburo report on problems it faced because of Czechoslovakia's de-Stalinization program./8/ This same report also attacked, although not by name, those brotherly countries--Poland, Rumania, and Hungary--that had signed economic agreements with Bonn. The East Germans were concerned because these three countries had recognized for trade purposes that West Berlin was a part of West Germany, a position contrary to that long propagandized by the Ulbricht regime and the USSR itself. By implication the East Germans criticized the USSR for permitting these developments and suggested that Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia should not sign such agreements. Bulgaria, nevertheless, did so three weeks later, and apparently with Russian approval. /8/The report of Horst Sindermann was published in Neues Deutschland, February 13, 1964. The Eastern European countries will almost certainly attempt to broaden their autonomy even more in view of the unsatisfied demands of self-interest in all of them. Also they have seen the success of other Communist regimes such as Yugoslavia, Albania, and Communist China in taking wholly independent courses of action. There are, to be sure, some built-in brakes on this pursuit of an independent course. No Eastern European Communist leader wants to risk his personal position through any weakening of the power structure in his own party, a distinct threat in Czechoslovakia and Poland and to a lesser degree so far in East Germany and Bulgaria. He may see Soviet support as the only thing standing between him and Albania. Furthermore, there are still advantages to be drawn from a generally common ideology and from participation in the Warsaw Pact and CEMA--despite disagreements with certain aspects of CEMA's programs. In the present fluid situation, Moscow is highly reluctant to try to insure conformity through coercive measures, such as political or economic sanctions, lest existing differences sharpen or more resistance be generated. Indeed, as a Yugoslav foreign affairs official recently remarked while commenting on the possibility of an international Communist meeting to condemn the Chinese, meetings such as those held in 1957 and 1960 could never again take place. The time is past, he said, when such meetings could be called at Moscow's behest. In his opinion, Rumania would decline to attend unless it has a clearly defined agenda in advance, and Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary would probably adopt a similar attitude. The development of a more persuasive approach on Moscow's part may therefore be adumbrated in its recently announced $300-million loan to Bulgaria for industrial development and its signing of bilateral agreements with Bulgaria, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia for long-term scientific, technical, and economic planning assistance and for greater economic coordination. Of all previous Russian loans to Bulgaria, totaling about $400 million, approximately half was earmarked for agricultural development. The new loan may thus be designed in part to forestall demands and recriminations by Sofia and another disagreement like that with Rumania. In another indication of Soviet fence-mending, a high official in Bucharest has just recently let it be known that the USSR will supply significant amounts of equipment, as originally promised in 1960, for the Galati complex as well as increased supplies of iron ore, a decision which, according to another source, may have been taken in early January. Effects on Internal Affairs The greater diversity and freedom of action that now characterize both the Soviet bloc's intramural ties and its relations with the West are not without effect on the individual parties, where current trends are in dispute. Factionalism in Czechoslovakia and Poland has become intense, is evident in Bulgaria, and has appeared even in East Germany. Czechoslovakia's Novotny has been forced by liberal elements in his party to remove close associates with Stalinist background, to ease restrictive domestic policies, and to give more latitude to the restive liberals and intellectuals. So far this has only sharpened the desires of the liberals for even more sweeping reforms and has weakened party authority and Novotny's power. Bulgarian Party First Secretary Zhivkov is under conflicting pressure from both hard-line and revisionist elements. In Bulgarian political terms Zhivkov is relatively moderate. He owes his present position largely to Moscow's support, which he must hold if he is to retain his leadership. The consideration may account in part for the USSR's recent new credit to Bulgaria. At the recent party plenum in East Germany,/9/ Walter Ulbricht alluded to developing internal strains. Among the contributing factors apparently are his regime's imitation of some of Moscow's innovations in economic policies; the rehabilitation of old party officials who were imprisoned in the wake of Czechoslovakia's purges in the early 1950's; the smoldering differences with other Eastern European countries--and perhaps Moscow--on the subject of Berlin and Germany; and the problem of trying to appear moderate to the outside world while pursuing harsh internal policies. /9/The meeting, held February 3-7, focused on economic and party discipline problems. It was reported on in airgram A-517 from Berlin, February 16. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 2 GER E) De-Stalinization elsewhere in Eastern Europe heightens the anachronism of the Stalinist Ulbricht. Even though in Moscow's view some liberalization of conditions in East Germany would probably be desirable, his strong hand is needed to inhibit the development of rivalries among potential successors. The Soviet leaders dare not risk such a situation in East Germany in view of their inability last winter to bring about a quick solution to the problems posed by the anti-Novotny elements in the Czech party. Polish party leader Gomulka at the moment seems to face the most serious challenge to his leadership and authority since his return to power in 1956. His politburo is aging; four members are seriously ill, and a fifth post has remained vacant since the ouster of Roman Zambrowski last July. Encouraged in part by the seeming decline in Moscow's influence over the local affairs of the Eastern European countries, a number of hard-line internal security specialists in Poland are pressing against this weakened top layer of their party. They reportedly have circulated a letter in the party criticizing some of Gomulka's policies, apparently hoping to challenge him at a party congress to be held in June. Unless meaningful Soviet backing is forthcoming Gomulka may thus be forced by the physical attrition now going on in the Polish politburo to co-opt some of his hard-line opponents into policy-making positions. Such a move could bring about a significant tightening of his present moderate policy. Prospects In order to maintain the present degree of diversity in Eastern Europe and the increasingly frequent expressions of national individuality, the regime leaders recognize they must have the good will of the Soviet Union. Their own self-interests dictate continued participation in Soviet bloc activities. Nevertheless, as national interests come to the fore in one satellite, similar interests are stimulated in others; and each move toward greater independence spreads like an infection throughout the bloc which Moscow may be able to limit but probably not fully control. As one Western official notes, de-Stalinization in Eastern Europe inevitably leads to "de-satellization." This fluid state in the Soviet bloc will continue. It may eventually lead, although not without strife, to some loose form of relationship in which each member would have reasonably broad freedom of action, a belief that it is an equal partner, and an assurance that its own interests will be respected. Such a grouping of independent Communist states held together by mutual self-interest could constitute a stronger, more viable system than an empire held in thrall by the Soviet Union. In this situation the countries of Eastern Europe will continue to evolve toward a status as genuinely autonomous political entities, subject to the pressures of national interests, rising popular expectations for a better life, and a resurgence of the historical frictions that have plagued the area for centuries.
Washington, March 31, 1964. /1/Source: Department of State, PPS Files: Lot 71 D 273, Eastern Europe. Secret. The source text, which is dated April 1, bears no drafting information. HIGHLIGHTS FROM THE SECRETARY'S POLICY PLANNING MEETING HELD MARCH 31, 1964 SUBJECT /2/Attached but not printed. The paper under consideration was described as an attempt to break through the conventional vocabulary and stimulate thought and discussion concerning basic assumptions of Western policy toward Eastern Europe. It was submitted to the March 11-13 meeting of the Atlantic Policy Advisory Group. The paper is framed by the intimate inter-relationship for Western policy of what happens in Eastern Europe, in the USSR, and in divided Germany. It identifies the forces at work in Eastern Europe which tend to promote polycentrism--but within prevailing limits of Soviet security and Communist control. It suggests that a central consideration in Western policy toward the area is to further favorable evolutionary development in the USSR. It indicates that the anticipated extension of current trends there may present perils and opportunities for Western policy--particularly in terms of German unification. It was reported that discussion of the paper at the APAG meeting revealed general gratification that "civilizing" influences are at work in Eastern Europe, and substantial agreement that these should be promoted for various reasons and by divers means including trade, cultural contacts and exchanges. There was a range of opinion on the extent to which Eastern Europe can be treated as a problem more or less separate from the USSR, on the importance for Western policy of current trends (and of Eastern Europe itself), and on the degree to which the West can influence events in Eastern Europe. APAG representatives from the UK, Norway and Canada treated the German problem gingerly and emphasized the efficacy of economic inducements to channel Eastern Europe's momentum in desired directions. At the other extreme, the representative of the Netherlands took a hard line, centering on the German problem and according no significance to East European developments as such. The middle ground was dominated by the French representative who underlined the priority of the German problem in relations with Eastern Europe, proposed exploitation of the political attraction of the Common Market, and urged planning for possible, if unlikely, large-scale violence in Eastern Europe. The German APAG representative hoped to make reunification attractive in Eastern Europe and the USSR by such means as a commitment not to change boundaries by force, a discriminatory denuclearized zone, bilateral agreements for Observation Posts and reparation payments. He indicated that relevant German policy attitudes vary from: (a) passive observation of the unfolding of history in the East, through (b) attempts to influence liberalizing forces in the area and (c) working by means of trade, contacts, etc. in the area, to (d) encouraging Eastern Europeans to negotiate while intensifying contacts with East Germany. He pointed to rising German sentiment for unification and forecast that issue would prove a critical test of the NATO Alliance. He thought in the event of another uprising in East Germany that the FRG would leave the Alliance if nothing were done to move the cause of Germany forward. It was suggested that the basic lesson of the recent APAG meeting and of the paper discussed may be that the future of Eastern Europe is inextricably bound up with questions of German unity and political freedom for East Germany. Perhaps we need to begin to think hard about Eastern Europe not only because current developments there are welcome signs of independence, but because these developments might lead to conditions under which the Soviet Union could accept a Germany united in freedom. We must recognize, however, that if the USSR gave up East Germany, it already or soon would have no ideological empire left in Eastern Europe. To do that the USSR would have to be much more Russian and less Communist. Nonetheless, the decisive question remains: will Moscow accept the ideological loss of East Germany and Eastern Europe? The ensuing discussion of the paper centered around the following major topics: 1. Relevance of the United Nations. It was suggested that the UN is relevant in the sense that Articles I and II of the UN Charter set forth standards of sovereign independence to which we adhere and can encourage others to adhere. We need not unilaterally shoulder the burden of urging the Soviet Union to divest itself of empire in Eastern Europe. 2. Role of Ideology. It was pointed out that the Soviets have made such a religion of communism that the ideology lives on in twisted form forty years after its legitimate death with Lenin. That religion is now out of date and must adapt or perish. If the USSR sticks to its unworkable tenets it will be inviting increasing trouble, making peaceful competition impossible ideologically as well as economically. In this sense the Chinese Communists are correct; i.e., genuine co-existence and orthodox Communist ideology are incompatible. It was noted that our principal concern is the external relations of countries not their internal policies. However, the latter may shape external relations in objectionable fashion. 3. Relative Importance of the USSR. There was discussion of the extent to which it is possible to view policy toward Eastern Europe in relative isolation from policy toward the USSR. The opinion was expressed that the main question must remain, what can we do in Eastern Europe to speed up evolution in the USSR? It was explained, with reference to ideology, that further evolution is essential to make it possible for the Soviet Union to accept a reunited Germany. On the other hand, it was noted that long-range policy toward Eastern Europe envisages full independence and sovereign relations for those countries with the free world and with the UN. A concern was expressed with inadequate focus on the goal of an independent Eastern Europe and at the possible implication that if the Soviets behaved the US would accommodate to Communist domination in Eastern Europe. It was pointed out that it is perhaps unnecessary to think about Eastern Europe in terms of our gain is the Soviet's loss and vice versa. We don't need the Eastern European countries on our side--we don't seek them as allies. Moreover, there is little practical likelihood of Eastern Europe being frozen into a polycentric status. There is too much political ferment for that, e.g., hard political choices for leaderships. It clearly is not enough simply to encourage developments in Eastern Europe without considering the effects on the USSR and on the German problem, in large part through the USSR. 4. The German Problem. It was noted that there appear to be two routes to German unification--confrontation and détente. The former has proven unsuccessful since 1945; the latter has yet to be tested. It would, however, present different security problems to the USSR. Soviet concern, it was argued by some, is far less with the security threat of a unified Germany than with the domino effect in Eastern Europe of the loss of East Germany. There was discussion of the impact on Soviet security of a unified Germany with meaningful security and disarmament arrangements. The opinion was expressed that if unification were evolutionary and without violence, Soviet concerns might be satisfied. Another view was that the security problem in Soviet eyes includes the threat of eventual German offensive capability, or at least of a German capability to spark a conflagration. 5. Potential Crises. It was suggested that trends in Eastern Europe to date comprise a cumulation of small increments, but historical trends may now outrun manageable rates and magnitudes. Thus, the US need prepare for crises in the area lest we freeze as we did at Budapest or act in haste contrary to our real interest. The unpopularity in Eastern Europe of the USSR and of the Communist regimes was cited as a potential source of mass violence and possible subsequent escalation. It was noted that the unpopularity of at least the USSR seems a permanent condition if for no other reason that the USSR has no economic possibility of satisfying the aspirations of the peoples of Eastern Europe. It was pointed out the Soviets could create a real crisis of a different order for the Alliance by withdrawing troops from Eastern Europe and East Germany and challenging us to reciprocate. Follow-up Action Suggested by the Discussion a. Preparation of a paper further pointing up the policy implications of developments in Eastern Europe (in connection with consideration of the Soviet succession process)./3/ /3/Apparent reference to "The Situation in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Occupation Zone of Germany," April 3. (Department of State, PPS Files: Lot 71 D 273, Eastern Europe) b. A review of the extent to which smaller Communist countries are actively engaged in conspiratorial aspects of world communism (as a possibly important aid in treating different Communist countries differently). c. Study of problems and opportunities should the USSR challenge the US with meaningful and/or dramatic disengagement and disarmament moves (e.g., troop withdrawals from Hungary and reductions in East Germany). d. Renewed attention to planning in connection with crises likely to stem from developments in Eastern Europe (e.g., East German or Czechoslovakian blow-up, Rumanian defection, double-header succession crisis in Moscow and East Berlin).
4. National Security Action Memorandum No. 304/1/ Washington, June 3, 1964. /1/Source: Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM 304. Secret. Copies were sent to the Secretaries of Defense and Commerce, to the Director of Central Intelligence, and to the Administrator of the Agency for International Development. MEMORANDUM FOR SUBJECT In his speech at Lexington, Virginia, on May 23, 1964,/2/ the President said: /2/For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1963-1964, Book I, pp. 708-710. "We will continue to build bridges across the Gulf which has divided us from Eastern Europe. They will be bridges of increased trade, of ideas, of visitors and of humanitarian aid." The President would like Department of State to complete by August 1, 1964, recommendations which translate this statement of policy into specific action programs for each of the Eastern European countries (with particular reference to substance and timing) and, at the same time, to examine the possibilities of multilateralizing these relations in Eastern and Western Europe. McG. Bundy
5. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, June 9, 1964, 3:15 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 EUR E. Confidential. Drafted by Creel and approved in S on June 17. The meeting was held in the Secretary's office. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS Germans US Following a brief opening exchange about the situation in Southeast Asia, the Secretary asked Herr Strauss for his views as to what was going on in Eastern Europe. He cited the example of Rumania where, among other developments, the government had recently referred to Mr. Khrushchev as a "thief"./2/ /2/Apparent reference to an exchange of attacks in broadcasts made by the state radios of Romania and the Soviet Union during late May and early June 1964. Strauss said he was very interested in this situation. He had recently talked to a journalist from Die Welt who had returned from a trip to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. The journalist had told of the existence of an open anti-Khrushchev movement in Soviet Georgia. Young people seemed to be particularly involved in this movement and the police were apparently helpless to do anything about it. Strauss felt that his information on this situation was insufficient and he wanted to look into it further when he returned to Germany. He said that the big question was how far the leaders of the Eastern European countries could go against Moscow without eliminating themselves, either by provoking Moscow to some action against them or as a result of internal disturbance. He felt that national Communism was not possible without the protective umbrella of Moscow. Should this umbrella be removed, it would be only a few months before the Communist regimes in Eastern Europe would be upset. The problem for these regimes, therefore, was to try to balance between gaining more independence and not losing the protection of Moscow against internal upheavals. Another factor in the picture, Strauss continued, was the resentment felt by the peoples in Eastern Europe against Soviet economic exploitation. The Secretary commented that he had had in the past extensive contacts with scientists from Eastern Europe and he had been made aware of their strong resentment against the second-class status in scientific matters which had been accorded them by Moscow. In addition to the dangers in Southeast Asia, the events in Eastern Europe were in his opinion among the most interesting developments in the world picture today. Ulbricht appeared to be getting worried over a sense of increasing isolation from the rest of Eastern Europe. Today the winds of liberalism were even blowing out of Prague of all places. The Secretary inquired of Strauss where he thought this trend would lead us. Strauss replied that "this depends on us". There were two extremes; on the one hand, the mood of détente might lead people to ask why, if we are moving to normal relations with the Communist countries in Eastern Europe, should we not also have normal relations with Ulbricht; on the other hand, a policy could be pursued tenaciously to make Ulbricht an intolerable burden to Moscow. Strauss said he felt it should be recognized how difficult it would be for the Soviets to replace the Communist regime in East Germany. He had always said that the German problem could not be separated from its context, and he felt the objective should be to bring about a situation where Moscow would be prepared to normalize the situation on the basis of increasing self-determination in the areas under its control. Strauss continued that there were three points in the area of East-West relations that he wished to stress: 1) We must help remove the fear among the peoples of Eastern Europe of a military threat from a united Germany. 2) We should make clear that there was no long-range solution possible in Europe on a lasting and stable basis which did not take legitimate German interests into account. (He interjected here that he would dismiss out of hand the recent Seebohm speech, which he described as "crazy".)/3/ /3/In a May 19 speech, East German Minister Hans Cristoph Seebohm called for the return of the Sudetenland to Germany. 3) It was necessary to convince Moscow that the danger from abandoning their satellites in Eastern Europe was less than from withholding a peaceful settlement in Central and Eastern Europe. The Secretary said he thought it was possible that in the period immediately ahead we might find Khrushchev more adamant than ever about the German question. Khrushchev fully recognized that if Soviet troops were pulled out of East Germany he could end up by losing all of Eastern Europe. Strauss said this was why he was convinced the German problem could not be separated from its European context. In a sense the 22 Soviet divisions in East Germany were a garrison for the entire Soviet "belt" in Eastern Europe. He agreed with the Secretary that there was not much hope for a short-range solution. One factor was the importance of ideology--if one Communist regime should fall back into the ranks of capitalism, this would represent a great setback to the world Communist movement. The Secretary referred in this connection to the current controversy between Moscow and Peiping and said that from the standpoint of orthodox Communist principles Peiping was right; any really genuine peaceful co-existence which could be achieved would basically transform the character of world Communism. Strauss cited the case of Austria, and said that what had happened there was not applicable to the German situation. In Austria the Russians had never established a Communist regime. This meant that they could retreat from Austria without losing any face. This was impossible in Germany where there was a Communist regime. Should the Soviets stop upholding this regime and permit free elections, 90 percent of the people would vote against it. This would represent a great defeat for world Communism. The Secretary referred to our recent talks with the Rumanian trade delegation./4/ While there had been no anti-Soviet talk from either side, he felt that the net effect had been to encourage Rumanian national feeling. He agreed with Strauss that the problems of Germany and of Eastern Europe were part of the same complex; the 22 Soviet divisions in East Germany helped the Soviets maintain control over the situation throughout Eastern Europe. He also agreed with Strauss that there was a limit beyond which the Communist governments in Eastern Europe would find it difficult to go. All this did not make the solution of the German problem any easier. /4/See Documents 142 and 143. Strauss said he agreed we could not expect too much. The Poles, Czechs and others would have to be careful to "stop short of the threshold". The Secretary referred to the recent increase in tourism from West Germany to Eastern Europe as a new and important factor in helping to mitigate fear of Germany in Eastern Europe. Strauss agreed. He said that the fear of Germany in these countries was one of Moscow's strongest instruments. It was most important to take away the "nightmare" of the German military threat from the peoples of Eastern Europe, although some of the governments in that area might need a supposed German threat to remain in power. The Secretary commented that he had repeatedly cautioned about any complacency developing over any atmosphere of détente. It was important to bear in mind that the range of US-Soviet agreements thus far was very small and that all the big questions, such as the German problem, still remained unresolved. We were concerned that any feeling of détente might cause the peoples in Western Europe to relax prematurely. Strauss agreed there were dangers in any détente atmosphere. For one thing, he felt very strongly that we must destroy the idea that a détente means a series of concessions to the Soviets. Another danger was that in looking for material comforts and advantages out of a détente we could all fall asleep at the expense of our military posture. The Secretary said that at one point we had been concerned about a double standard which seemed to exist, particularly in the matter of East-West trade. For example, when we sold wheat to Russia there was an outcry from Europe, although European trade with the Communist world was much greater than our own. Strauss said he agreed and felt that "there had been a lot of hypocrisy in Europe on the matter". Speaking personally, he would like to have as little trade as possible with the Soviets and Eastern Europe. The Secretary said he wondered, however, whether we should not consider how important a stake the Eastern Europeans might acquire in East-West trade. Strauss agreed this was a factor and said maybe we should use trade as a political weapon without saying so. The Secretary said this would be fine if we could all move in step together, but we had not succeeded in doing so over the past 17 years. He cited current disagreements over long-term credits to the Soviet Union as an example. The Secretary commented that NATO's basic problem was to try to maintain solidarity in a time of peace and prosperity. There was of course no problem in this regard in times of real trouble. Strauss said he agreed. We seemed to be further from a real military crisis in Europe than at any time since 1945. He added that despite tendencies in other parts of Western Europe, there was no pressure in Germany to reduce the 18-month period of conscription. The Secretary said that another big problem facing NATO was whether the member countries could have common policies, if not common actions, in other parts of the world where a Communist threat existed. In the US we felt that these problems could not be separated, since they formed part and parcel of the world-wide Communist threat. If there were real trouble in Southeast Asia, this also raised a threat to Europe. Strauss said he wondered what Moscow would do if the US and China got into real trouble with each other in Southeast Asia. He himself felt that Moscow would welcome this. The Secretary said one thing which was sure: there would not be another Korea in Southeast Asia. The military situation now was much different and our own military posture much better than at that time. The Secretary continued that the big question was how to get Peiping and Hanoi to realize where they were going before they went too far. They seemed to have a rather primitive view of the situation. Strauss inquired with a smile whether the Secretary was elaborating a contingency plan for action. The Secretary replied that one plan we were not studying was how to get out of Southeast Asia. We would not get out. The consequences would be a chain reaction throughout Asia and the Middle East which would extend even into Western Europe. He felt that while Europe might be somewhat disinterested now in Southeast Asia, they would lose this disinterest rapidly if the US were to leave Southeast Asia. Strauss said it was a pity that the movement toward European unity had not made further progress. The Secretary agreed that it was a tragedy that when there was such disarray in the Communist Bloc, the West also seemed incapable of united action. Strauss said he knew that the Germans should be prepared to accept greater commitments in the world at large, but there was a difficulty arising from German memories of the disasters suffered in their past history as a world power. These memories had tended to make the German people more narrow-minded and provincial. He felt he must add that the Allied program after the last war for "re-educating" the German people had been partly responsible for this attitude in Germany.
6. Memorandum From the Acting Deputy Director for Intelligence (Smith) to Director of Central Intelligence McCone/1/ Washington, June 25, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, East Europe, Vol. 7. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. A handwritten note on the source text by McCone reads: "Personal for McGeorge Bundy, JAM." In a June 26 memorandum to Bundy, attached to the source text, McCone explained that the memorandum printed here consisted of "some ideas that we have developed as to how these bridges might be constructed." He noted that no attempt had been made "to deal with the questions of legal restrictions or the practicality of suggestions on the basis of political or public opinion considerations." SUBJECT 1. This memorandum is responsive to your request that we identify some of the moves which could be taken with respect to implementing the President's policy of "building bridges across the gulf which has divided us from Eastern Europe." It is not intended as an exhaustive study of the many possibilities available. 2. Obviously some steps which might advance our interests with the current regimes in Eastern Europe might have adverse effects on the general population in the area. They might also have similar effects on our interests in other areas, for example in West Germany or in the USSR. In general we have not attempted to sort out and weigh the balance of interests involved in each case. 3. The memorandum also does not attempt to evaluate the chances of obtaining positive action by the US Congress in cases where legislative action might be necessary. 4. We have coordinated this paper with DD/P. General Considerations 5. Clearly, implementation of the policy must avoid dramatic and flamboyant actions which are likely to generate suspicion or which would be difficult for an Eastern European nation to accept. A series of small steps that convey our intentions and that do not create embarrassing political overtones would best serve Western interests. Even these must be subtly initiated. 6. There are open to Washington certain domestic actions which, although they would arouse a critical response in certain circles in the US, would contribute to a general improvement in the atmosphere with Eastern Europe./2/ Among these are: /2/Appended as Annex I is a summary of former Ambassador Kennan's views on US policy toward Yugoslavia, written in December 1962. His views are pertinent to the "bridge building" policy. [Footnote in the source text. For text of Kennan's memorandum, dated November 28, 1962, see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. XVI, Document 140.] A. Abandonment of the annual Captive Nations Week resolution by the US Congress. It is outdated, obviously resented, and ignores the diversity in Eastern Europe. B. Withdrawal of direct and indirect support of East European refugee groups and governments-in-exile. These organizations enjoy no political influence in their native countries and could never serve as an acceptable nucleus for a non-Communist government. US support of these groups, moreover, carries the implication that they are an alternative government to that in power with which we would be attempting to establish a bridge. C. Expansion of the modest efforts now underway to educate the US public so that it will understand the evolving situation in Eastern Europe. This could lead to a lessening of local discrimination in the US against the sale of goods imported from Eastern Europe. It could lead to a favorable attitude in Congress toward the President's policy. D. Essential to any program of "building bridges" is the easing or repeal of restrictive legislation on dealings with Communist countries, so that the executive agencies of the US Government can deal with these states with greater flexibility. Under present law the extending of aid even for humanitarian purposes, such as after the Skoplje earthquake, is time-consuming and extremely difficult to arrange. 7. There are other general official actions the US can take which would not require any change in existing policies. A. The Department of State could clarify immigration policy regarding people born in Eastern Europe who now are resident in the free world and who have subsequently made trips behind the Iron Curtain. Many such people erroneously fear they would lose the right to visit or emigrate to the US if they make a return trip to their homeland. Western European citizens also suffer under the same illusion. B. The Department of State could publicly clarify in Eastern Europe US policies on issuing visas to rank and file members of the Communist party or other extant parties in Eastern Europe. Many party members do not realize they are eligible for US visas under existing regulations. C. Provisions could be made for more expeditious handling of requests by US citizens of Eastern European origin who desire and need official help in making substantial gifts (such as the X-ray machine recently given to Wroclaw Hospital in Poland) to their homeland. The present process of arranging for delivery of such gifts is very laborious because the machinery of the Department of State and other government agencies is not prepared administratively to deal with such requests. 8. Since 1949-1950, US restrictions on trade with Eastern Europe and Communist emphasis on production for internal or intra-bloc use have kept commerce between the two areas far below its potential. 9. In recent years, however, all the Eastern European countries have shown growing interest in increasing their imports from the US, primarily of advanced technical equipment, but also of agricultural and other products. Some of these goods are denied the Eastern European countries by means of US export licensing restrictions. Moreover, the ability of these countries to pay for imports from the US is limited since they are denied access to commercial credit and are not accorded Most Favored Nation (MFN) treatment. Partly for these reasons, and partly because of domestic economic priorities, the East European countries have not made a major effort to develop production of goods marketable in the US. The exceptions are Yugoslavia and to a lesser extent Poland, which have been treated much more liberally than the other countries of the area in regard to US export licensing. They receive normal commercial credits, PL-480 credits, and MFN treatment. More liberal export policies and access to commercial credits also are being given to Rumania, which, however, does not have a very large short-term potential for exporting to the US. 10. Czechoslovakia probably has the most urgent need for increased trade with the West, including the US. Hungarian interest in Western machinery and equipment has increased. Bulgaria, the least developed of the Eastern European countries except for Albania, has a vital and continuing need for foreign equipment, technical assistance, and credits. The USSR has provided this support and recently granted Bulgaria a credit of $333 million. Bulgarian interest in increased trade with the US, therefore, probably would be mainly long-term and devoid of great urgency. 11. One way to increase US trade with East European countries without new legislation would be to liberalize US licensing requirements and make available normal commercial credits. Licensing policy toward Eastern Europe, however, involves questions of what constitutes "strategic goods" and of policy toward the Soviet Union, which may have access to products and technology sold to Eastern Europe. Substantial expansion of trade with these countries in the long term would require extension of MFN treatment to East European countries. 12. Further dissemination of information, trade fairs and exhibitions, resident offices and other means of trade promotion on a reciprocal basis would also serve the general objective of expanding US contacts with Eastern Europe. 13. US support for the accession of East European countries to the various Western-oriented international economic organizations, such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), might help to provide additional forums for East European contacts with Western countries, although the present nature of Soviet-type economic systems precludes any meaningful adherence to the policies of these organizations. 14. Outside the trade field, encouragement of tourism and exchanges of delegations and of university students and professors could be pressed further. 15. There is another general consideration bearing on the "bridge" policy as a whole. This is to avoid unnecessary competition with our Western European allies in certain Eastern European countries. By virtue of history and economic factors, several NATO states are better qualified to undertake some aspects of the "bridge building" and could be encouraged to expand their current role. Whatever steps the US may take to improve relations with Eastern Europe will necessarily influence the policies of our NATO allies. 16. Appended are annexes detailing possible approaches for each country in the area./3/ /3/None printed. R. J. Smith
7. National Intelligence Estimate/1/ NIE 12-64 Washington, July 22, 1964. /1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-R01012A, ODDI Registry. Secret; Controlled Dissemination. According to a note on the cover sheet, the CIA, the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense, and the NSA participated in the preparation of the estimate. This estimate was submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence, and concurred in by the U.S. Intelligence Board with the Directors of INR, DIA, and NSA concurring and the representative of the AEC and the Assistant Director of the FBI abstaining on the grounds that the subject was outside their jurisdiction. CHANGING PATTERNS IN EASTERN EUROPE The Problem To assess the situation and outlook in the Eastern European countries and their external relations over the next few years. Conclusions A. Eastern Europe has entered upon its third post-Stalin phase. The years 1953-1957 were marked by popular upheavals and the danger of disintegration, and the next several years by consolidation and relative quiet. The present is marked once more by a preoccupation with change and we look for a period of political liveliness and fluidity. (Paras. 1-11, 22) B. In the minds of most Eastern Europeans, however, the basic fact of Communist rule is not now in dispute. It is rather the question of the national future, within the framework of a Communist system, which is being subjected to examination and experiment. The internal issues are those of liberalization and economic reform. These in turn are closely related to the problems of autonomy within the Communist camp and relations with the West. Increasingly, the leaders of Eastern Europe are feeling free to approach these questions less in the light of Soviet wishes or the supposed common interests of the Bloc, more in the light of national aspirations and local political conditions. (Paras. 8, 12, 24) C. One result of this trend, which is likely to continue for the next several years, is a growing diversification in Eastern Europe. Outsiders, including the USSR, will find it increasingly hard to apply a general analysis and a general policy to the area. We expect in most of these countries some movement toward political liberalization and a search for better balance and more efficient methods in managing the economy. Economic progress, while likely to show some improvement over the generally dismal record of the last two years, will not be such as to diminish dissatisfaction and impatience in the near future. Political evolution is not likely to proceed at a speed which threatens the Communist regimes. (Paras. 22, 24-25, 29-30, 33) D. In external relations, we expect a similar uneven evolution away from the tutelage of Moscow and toward closer contacts with Western Europe and the US. We believe that the Soviets would consider direct military intervention in Eastern Europe only in emergency circumstances, when they believed vital Soviet interest to be threatened. In political terms, the irreducible Soviet demand probably is that these regimes should remain professedly Communist and continue at least formal membership in the Warsaw Pact. So long as these limits are not transgressed we believe that the USSR is prepared to tolerate considerable divergence in internal policies and even to acquiesce reluctantly in further manifestations of independence in foreign policy. Most countries will almost certainly seek to develop their economic and cultural relations with the West at a rapid rate, though the economies of Eastern Europe will remain closely tied to that of the USSR. (Paras. 24, 31-32, 34, 36) E. Though we believe that these trends will unfold gradually and without major upheavals, we are conscious of the possibility of sharp instability and even violent shifts. The chances of change of this sort depend to some extent upon each country's success in managing domestic problems and party factionalism. Developments in the Soviet Union will probably be equally important. If the USSR continues to falter in its competition with the West, to lose prestige in the contest within the Communist movement, or to give an impression of uncertainty in its policy, Eastern European nationalism may be moved to bolder ventures. These possibilities will also be heightened during the succession period in Soviet politics, which is likely to breed factionalism, nervousness, and exaggerated hopes and fears in Eastern Europe. (Paras. 26-27) [Here follows the Discussion section of the estimate.]
Washington, July 27, 1964. /1/Source: Department of State, PPS Files: Lot 71 D 273, Eastern Europe. Secret. The source text, which is dated July 30, bears no drafting information. HIGHLIGHTS FROM THE SECRETARY'S POLICY PLANNING MEETING OF JULY 27, 1964 SUBJECT Under discussion were two papers: one an S/P paper on policy toward Eastern Europe,/2/ the other a draft reply to NSAM 304/3/ outlining action programs in Eastern Europe./4/ /2/Apparently "Bridge Building in Eastern Europe," undated. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Eastern Europe) /3/Document 4. /4/A draft of Document 12. The NSAM draft reply was characterized as a wide-ranging response which should distinguish more clearly between the measures that could be taken now and those that might become feasible as developments in East Europe progressed. Two specific criticisms were made: (1) it fails to distinguish between East Germany and the other East European states; (2) the proposal to encourage West Germany to modify the Hallstein Doctrine/5/ is unrealistic and impractical. /5/Reference is to the December 9, 1955, statement by the Federal Republic of Germany that it would break diplomatic relations with any nation that recognized the regime in East Germany and that it would refuse to enter into diplomatic relations with any East European state except the Soviet Union. The policy paper received general acclaim for its worth in boldly proposing a line of policy. It was criticized on the following counts: 1. The paper is overstated in its optimism concerning both the analysis of the evolution of the East European nations and the action programs proposed. The ideological aspect is understated: these are strong Communist regimes. The possibility of a "Marshall Plan" approach is overstated. The paper needs to emphasize that its proposals are long-run in nature and cumulative in effect. 2. There is an overemphasis of the beneficial effects upon the Soviet succession of the evolution in the East European nations. "Reconciliation" with the West may have a reverse effect, causing the Soviet succession to eventuate in a regime determined to hold Eastern Europe in its grip. We must be cautious, since our East European policy will affect the Soviet succession. 3. In any case, "reconciliation" is a dangerous word politically, implying that we are reconciled to the suppression of the East European peoples by their Communist governments. A new word or phrase should be found. Moreover, the paper's proposals seem to lend support to these governments at the expense of the people, who, in some cases, are suppressed in a most Stalinist way. 4. The paper should delve deeper into the relationship of the "reconciliation" process to German reunification and Central European security arrangements. The long-run erosion of East European ideological unity may well contribute to the progress on a German settlement. 5. The paper should not permanently preclude the possibility of "reconciliation" with the GDR as well. Instead of "isolating" East Germany, why not consider the same "reconciliation" policy toward it as toward the other East European states? This could help to promote German reunification. (This suggestion was rebutted on two grounds: (1) the internal effect in the FRG of such a policy would render it self-defeating. Alienated West Germans might turn to a strong nationalist government which would by its character retard the desired evolution and "reconciliation" in Eastern Europe. (2) A "reconciled" Titoist-minded East Germany would cause the Soviets to hold on to it that much harder.) In discussion it was emphasized that we must not allow our Eastern European policy to be vetoed by Bonn. There is a certain amount of hypocrisy in the German objections to enlarged US contacts with the East. A short paper was requested outlining the differences between our present Eastern European policy and what that policy would be were we to go as far as the Germans in our contacts with the East. It was also suggested that an article on the Eastern European situation written by John Strachey for Encounter be distributed./6/ /6/Reference is to a series of lectures by John Strachey published as an Encounter pamphlet, The Challenge of Democracy (London, 1964). The problem of what kind of public statement on our Eastern European policy could be issued was discussed at length. In brief, the problem is how to talk about our objectives without getting in their way. Two points of view developed: one holding that for the present we should keep as quiet as possible, the other holding (with the S/P paper) that the President should issue a public statement enlarging upon his "bridgebuilding" speech. The following reasons were advanced against a public statement: a) In an election year it would be dangerous and divisive, as East European policy might become a campaign issue. New policy should not be introduced in a political campaign because it would not benefit from rational debate. b) There would be an element of presumptuousness in our publicly proclaiming our policy. This would irritate our European allies who are far ahead of us in pushing contacts with the Eastern European nations. Due to Congressional inhibitions we are far behind Western Europe in trade development with these countries. It would be better to bring Congress along before speaking out. The counter-arguments to "keeping quiet" follow: a) The President has already spoken out in his "bridgebuilding" speech; hence, this issue is bound to make its way into the campaign in any case. b) The latter is desirable, as the issue of East European policy is a good one with which to confront the unthinking opposition. c) Khrushchev already has a jaundiced view of our intentions in Eastern Europe. Hence, enunciating them--as the Attorney General did upon his return from Poland--will not do any harm. d) The articulation of our policy toward Eastern Europe has been helpful in the last six months; we need continued articulation. e) It was suggested that we use the drafting of a Presidential message on Eastern Europe as an exercise in prior consultation with the UK, France, and West Germany. This would go far to ensure a coordinated allied policy in the future. Concerning trade relations with Eastern Europe, it was cautioned that we must look into the deeper implications of MFN treatment. The problem is what do we do when we achieve this? Tariffs are of no significance to Communist nations with state trading systems. We must realize that these nations will have state trading for the foreseeable future. This means that their presence in the GATT might disrupt that already fragile body; we must consider this when we respond to their overtures for closer relations with the GATT. In the case of the USSR, we should not extend MFN until they settle some outstanding claims, including lend-lease. Divergent opinions were expressed concerning whether the "reconciliation" of Eastern Europe should have a primarily European or an Atlantic orientation. It was held that the US has the most prestige of any Western nation in Eastern Europe and that we should maximize the presence of Americans there. It would be a mistake to overemphasize Eastern European association with Western Europe. The structure of the latter is weak already, and the association of Eastern European states would only dilute it further. Eastern Europe should develop closer links with the Atlantic Community as a whole. Cooperation on specific subjects within the framework of the OECD might be useful. But the view was expressed that apart from the possibilities of arranging European-wide cooperation in some technical fields such as highway safety standards, the Council of Europe could do little in associating Eastern Europe with the West. On the other hand, it was held that rather than trumpeting a new US policy toward Eastern Europe it would be wiser to conform our policy with that of Western Europe first. The Europeans are not at present unhappy to see the US a minority of one on COCOM. Before talking of pushing on, we should first catch up with our European allies. Both Western Europe and the US have tools with which to help loosen the Eastern European "bloc." Western Europe has geography, history, and such things as common waterways to weigh in the balance. The US has other assets such as the six million Americans of Polish extraction. The following additional problems were mentioned: The process of "reconciliation" with Eastern Europe raises three questions concerning its future orientation: (a) the connection between Eastern and Western Europe; (b) the connection between Eastern Europe and the US, and (c) between Eastern Europe and worldwide institutions. In addition, this process raises the question of how the US can consult with its Western European allies on policy toward Eastern Europe. Systematic consultation is needed at operational levels. This could be done in the Quadripartite Group or in the NAC. It was suggested that in our public statements we should stress our desire to improve relations with all Communist states, including Soviet Russia, and not just with "special cases" in Eastern Europe. Otherwise, if the Soviets receive the impression that we are fomenting difficulties for them in Eastern Europe, this would be contrary to our long-run policy of achieving understanding with the Soviet Union. Action: A short paper outlining the differences between (a) our present East European policy and (b) what that policy would look like were it as liberal as that of the FRG. Distribution to Bureau representatives attending the Secretary's Policy Planning Meetings of the pamphlet by John Strachey on Eastern Europe.
9. Letter From Secretary of State Rusk to Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/ Washington, December 24, 1964. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, PER 12. Secret. Drafted by Vedeler, Henry, and McAfee and cleared by Llewellyn Thompson, Denney, and Davis. Dear Bob: I am disturbed by the effect on our relations with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Poland of the recent incidents involving clashes between United States Military Attachés and local officials in those two countries. I have in mind particularly the Khabarovsk affair and the shooting incident in Poland./2/ These are the latest manifestations of a problem which has caused serious difficulties in our relations with the Communist countries for some years. Although the fault lies in most instances with the authorities of the other governments concerned, our people sometimes contribute to incidents through over-zealousness, violation of local laws or failure to appreciate the responsibilities underlying the enjoyment of diplomatic privileges and immunities. /2/Documentation on the incident in Khabarovsk, September 28, is in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, volume XIV. The reference to a shooting incident has not been identified. I think the time has come to review our policies, regulations and instructions governing the intelligence-gathering activities of our military personnel in the Communist countries of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union in an effort to reduce the chance of future incidents which might cause further complications in the pursuit of our over-all foreign policy objectives. We are also concerned that the present trend, if not checked, may result in the curtailment or even termination of the activities of our Attachés in the Communist countries. There have occurred in the past few years several developments that have a significant bearing on this problem. In the first place opportunities for political gains among these countries have increased, while the improvement in our relative power position and a reduction in U.S.-U.S.S.R. tensions have reduced the likelihood of military engagement. Second, other methods of intelligence collection have become available, thereby raising the question whether the risks Attachés should take need be so great as formerly. A further relevant consideration is that last year for the first time we imposed restrictions in the form of closed zones on the movement of Attachés of the Eastern European countries in the United States./3/ This step, taken without regard for reciprocity, has, as expected, produced a reaction from the Eastern European Governments prejudicial to our relations with them and to the environment in which our Attachés operate. /3/For texts of the November 12, 1963, statement outlining travel restrictions of East European diplomats, the U.S. notes to individual countries, and a list of U.S. counties closed to travel, see Department of State Bulletin, December 2, 1963, pp. 860-863. The Department and our diplomatic missions abroad, particularly those in Communist countries, appreciate the contribution of our Military Attachés to national security. Their responsibilities receive and will continue to receive the full support of the Department of State and our Ambassadors as one of several important and interrelated functions of our diplomatic posts. In the light of recent developments, however, we should make sure, in the effort to protect the diplomatic immunity of the Military Attachés themselves as well as all other members of our missions in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, that the operations of our Attachés conform as far as possible to diplomatic standards. I have two suggestions. (a) Renewed attention to the points in President Kennedy's letter of May 29, 1961/4/ regarding the Ambassador's authority to coordinate and oversee activities of all personnel of United States Government agencies assigned to his mission, and in National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 2 (Revised January 18, 1961)/5/ concerning the coordination of collection activities and the Ambassador's responsibility in this regard. /4/For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1961, pp. 1345-1347. /5/The revision was approved at the 474th meeting of the National Security Council, January 18. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records) The text of the original paper, dated September 15, 1958, is ibid., Gray Papers, NSCID series. (b) The development of guidelines to govern the activities of all United States personnel engaged in the overt collection of military intelligence in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. The guidelines, which would be formulated by appropriate officers of our Departments, should have as their basic theme the obligation of all of the officers on an Ambassador's staff to contribute to the creation and maintenance of a climate which will give this Government the best possible opportunity to implement United States foreign policy in the country concerned. This would, for example, call for Embassy officers to seek required intelligence to the maximum extent possible through overt collection activities, and to avoid pointless conflict with a security system which is an ever-present fact in Communist countries, though at times and after appropriate clearance exceptions could be made. May I have your approval of or comments on these suggestions as well as any other views you have on this general subject? If you agree to a more detailed exchange between our Departments on this matter, may I suggest that you have the appropriate officers of your Department make contact with Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Richard H. Davis and Deputy Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research George C. Denney, Jr. I shall look forward to hearing from you in this matter./6/ /6/No reply was found. With warm regards, /7/Printed from a copy that indicates Rusk signed the original. [Continue with the next documents] Volume XVII Index | Foreign Relations Online | Historian's Office | |