Washington, November 25, 1968.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Nixon & Transition. Secret. The memorandum is marked by hand at the top of page 1, "original given to Robert D. Murphy, 11/26/68." The text of the memorandum was excerpted from a memorandum dated November 25, 11 p.m., from Rostow to the President that contained "proposed talking points for Nixon." (Ibid.)

In general, I have concluded that in these nuclear matters I must take clear responsibility, but to do so in ways which keep flexibility for you after January 20. I understand that it is difficult for you to make responsible judgments at this time. You deserve time to assemble the advisers you want and to turn around and form your own assessments as to where you wish to go in the months and years ahead.

Briefly, the situation is this.

First, as you know, we have been working towards these discussions of strategic missiles since the London talks which Stassen began in 1958 on behalf of President Eisenhower. I myself went to work on this in January 1964 in my first communication with Khrushchev. At Glassboro I spent the better part of two days trying to get a date set to open these talks. We were just about to open them when the Soviets moved into Czechoslovakia in August.

Second, the Soviets indicated to us about two weeks ago, on November 14, that they felt it important to move promptly because they felt we were losing ground around the world on the Non-Proliferation Treaty. I share that judgment. I think the clock is ticking against you as well as against me on this non-proliferation issue. And I have concluded that we must move on the missile talks, if we can, to create an environment in the world which will make it easier for Japan, Germany, Israel, and India to put the NPT through their parliaments.

Third, twice in the last two weeks Dobrynin has told us that the Soviets are willing to negotiate with us in advance what we would agree to say as a result of the first exchange of positions on the missile matter. You should know that we have a position wholly agreed from Bill Foster to Bus Wheeler, from the Arms Control people to the JCS. You should also know that we would not move off that position before January 20. Therefore, any further negotiations of the missile matter would be in your hands. I am in a position, therefore, to go into this with a very limited objective. My objective would be:

--To put into negotiation our agreed position;

--To receive their initial position;

--To enunciate certain general propositions which are consistent with our position;

--To leave subsequent negotiations to the Nixon administration;

--In the meanwhile, to use the occasion to press Moscow to push forward Hanoi in the Paris talks, and to press Nasser on one critical point in the Middle East; namely, the need for the Egyptians to sign on to a document which would end belligerence and open the way to peace. This is the sticking point with the Israelis, and properly so.

Fourth, you should know that in discussions with Dobrynin, we have made it very clear that the missile talks could not take place if there were any trouble in Berlin and any further moves in Eastern Europe. So far as Czechoslovakia is concerned, they have withdrawn all their forces except 3 divisions and a headquarters; that is, they have 30 to 40,000 men instead of a quarter of a million. Moreover, these troops are no longer near the Bavarian border, they are near Prague. If we start these talks, I believe we will have a basis for Soviet good behavior in Europe which will stretch into the first months of your administration. Remembering the confusion you observed as Vice President in early 1953 when Stalin died, and I observed in early 1961 when we had the Bay of Pigs and a Berlin ultimatum, I would like you to have the chance of as quiet a period as possible as you get your administration on the road.

These are the four reasons which have determined my judgment that I should proceed. All that I ask of you is to reserve judgment until you see the results of these talks with the Russians. I think it would be wise if Bob Murphy came along as an observer. In this matter, you could play it as you think best for the future. If it goes well, you can back it up and stay with it. If it goes poorly, you would be able to retain your total freedom of action because, as I say, we would only be putting into play an existing agreed position wholly safe so far as U.S. interests are concerned.

This is what I have decided; but I want Bob Murphy to give you in depth all the considerations which have led me to this conclusion. You can then let me know exactly how you wish to position yourself in terms of your own interests and the future./2/

/2/In a November 29 memorandum to the President, Rostow reported that he had just talked with Murphy by phone and that Murphy said: "On going to the meeting, 'Frankly, he is blowing hot and cold.' He will want to turn it around in his mind. Murphy will let me know--probably by the end of the day." In a December 2 memorandum to the President, Rostow reported:"Bob Murphy called this morning and said Mr. Nixon had decided: it would be best if he did not attend a Summit conference now; Mr. Murphy would be his observer." (Both ibid.)

323. Notes on Foreign Policy Meeting/1/

Washington, November 26, 1968, 10:21-11:11 a.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings. No classification marking. Drafted by Tom Johnson. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room. The time of the meeting is from the President's Daily Diary. (Ibid.) A tape recording and 51-page transcript of the discussion is ibid., Recordings and Transcripts, Recordings of Meetings in the Cabinet Room.

THOSE PRESENT
The President
Secretary Rusk
Secretary Clifford
Walt Rostow
Senator Fulbright
Tom Johnson

Secretary Rusk: The logjam is broken. We expect Saigon to send a delegation to Paris.

In Paris, we worked out an arrangement with Hanoi where we agreed to disagree. It was a "Your side, our side" arrangement. On October 28 we had agreed language with Thieu to announce this, but when the horse came to the hurdle he would not jump.

There will be a good deal of confusion.

They are shooting at our reconnaissance planes and there have been violations of the DMZ.

Briefed on NATO.

Briefed on the Mideast.

This is a dangerous situation. The Arabs want total withdrawal from June 5 line before they talk. Jarring is working on this.

The Soviets have replaced all lost arms.

The Israeli Cabinet is split over terms of settlement. Eshkol is fighting for his political life.

Delay on the NPT.

Non-nuclear countries are building up resistance to the treaty because of our delay in approving it. Some of the non-nuclear countries want firm guarantees against aggression. We can't do that. That literally would make us policemen of the world.

Germany would not approve it without our doing so. We expect Italy to sign.

We are concerned about what is going on in Israel. We want some satisfaction for Israel on this. If they are 5-months pregnant, it may not be too late to stop it.

Japan will probably sign it.

Brazil, Argentina and Chile haven't signed it.

We have the same problem with India and Pakistan.

It could be dangerous in the months ahead.

At the moment when the Soviets moved into Czechoslovakia we were about to announce talks with them on the following:

1. Strategic Missiles
2. Mideast
3. Vietnam

Soviets have come to realize same thing as McNamara about the strategic arms race. We would hope to announce some principles with Soviets to get it moving toward a peaceful settlement. In Southeast Asia, we are in a position to demand a lot from the Soviets. We did what they asked us to do--stop the bombing of a fellow Socialist Republic.

We think it would be good for the President and Kosygin to meet.

We want to know about the NPT coming back.

1. Would a new committee hearing be needed?
2. What kind of vote would you expect?
3. How much of Czechoslovakia still hangs over it?
4. What about talks with Kosygin. Should we try to get forward movement started?

Secretary Clifford: We wish to maintain close working arrangements with South Vietnam. We must keep up reconnaissance to protect our men. We must know if they are moving substantial number of troops and supplies north of the DMZ. Some black Monday they might pour over the DMZ and kill many of our men.

We have stopped bombing for 26 days--now it is time for them to produce.

Kosygin is having problems with cost of increased missile force.

They have start of an anti-ballistic missile system.

In DOD we are ready to discuss the elimination of a defensive missile system or a small defensive missile system to protect both of us from China.

We have every member of the JCS behind this plan now. We will lose two men on the JCS next spring--Wheeler and McConnell./2/

/2/General John P. McConnell, Chief of Staff, Air Force.

If we wait for Nixon they will put off those matters they can put off.

It could be a year before a Nixon team is ready to do this.

If we get the talks started he will only have to continue it. We need the impetus of a start.

If talks were held in Geneva it could be valuable.

The two men might also talk about Korea. They have been exceedingly provocative. As of now, we do have some superiority in nuclear field. They would like to stop now, I believe.

If a freeze were to take place, DOD would like for it to stop now. It would give us a slight advantage. If the Soviets have other adventures in mind this meeting could be a deterrent in this regard.

We have just been through a serious monetary crisis. What we are concerned with is the solidity of the dollar.

We have a momentum going now. It started with the decision to stop the bombing. Now we will have Paris talks.

If we could get talks with the Soviets, there is a momentum toward peace.

Walt Rostow: I told Murphy the President wanted to know if he would support a special session of the Senate. Murphy talked to Nixon. On Sunday, Nixon said he wanted to talk to the leadership.

Nixon said the President had to make a decision. He was not able to form an independent judgment. He (Nixon) said he was a strong supporter of the treaty, but some members would resent coming back for a special session. Nixon gave neither a "yea" nor a "nay".

The President: Senator Russell said he had to have more assurance than he has now before he would support it.

I do not like to see us wait. I do not know of anybody who would be hostile.

Senator Fulbright: There are five vacancies on my Committee. I would like to get it back to 15.

The key man is Dick Russell.

I didn't ask Russell. If Russell would support it and Stennis would support it you would have.

My first reaction is to do it by the first of December--not around Christmas. It would be no great problem if you call them back. We could have a briefing hearing--jointly with Armed Services and Foreign Relations.

Russell is the key man.

Senator Fulbright: On the Antarctic Treaty/3/ the JCS were for it officially, and not privately.

/3/The Antarctic Treaty was signed on December 1, 1959 (entered into force June 23, 1961), by the United States, Soviet Union, and 10 other countries in Washington to demilitarize the Antarctic continent. For text, see 12 UST 794.

You could pass it if Russell would pass it.

The Paris talks will keep Vietnam out of it. They won't want to rock the boat if they are going.

If you can get Russell's agreement and the JCS it is going through. I would also check on Hickenlooper./4/ He has been very lukewarm.

/4/Bourke Hickenlooper, Republican Senator from Iowa.

If Nixon and Dirksen won't oppose it, you are in good shape.

Would you feel out Aiken/5/ and Hickenlooper.

/5/George D. Aiken, Republican Senator from Vermont.

The President: What about talks with Soviets?

Senator Fulbright: It would be an excellent beginning for talks. It would be an excellent introduction for talks if this succeeded. I am very much in favor of talks and in favor of the NPT.

Secretary Rusk: If we brought this up and it failed it would be disastrous.

Senator Fulbright: I would question him. I would try talks with Soviets even if you do not have special session. I would do it at Geneva--not at Moscow.

I think the Soviets went into Czechoslovakia because they thought they were losing Czechoslovakia and Dubcek. It wasn't directed toward NATO.

If Russell got CIA, JCS, and Secretary of Defense--I think he has great respect for them--I think he would come along.

324. Notes on Foreign Policy Meeting/1/

Washington, November 26, 1968, 1:45-2:35 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings. No classification marking. Drafted by Tom Johnson. The meeting took place in the family dining room at the White House. The time of the meeting is from the President's Daily Diary. (Ibid.)

THOSE ATTENDING
The President
Secretary Rusk
Secretary Clifford
Robert Murphy (Nixon Staff)
General Wheeler
Walt Rostow
CIA Director Helms
George Christian
Tom Johnson

The President: I talked about the possibility of meeting with the Soviets with Senator Fulbright and Bob Murphy, liaison with Nixon.

Secretary Clifford: I said we had meeting after meeting after Glassboro on missile talks. I think it was the best prepared effort I had seen. At the eleventh hour, they (Soviets) went into Czechoslovakia.

The Soviets can't see how they can face the costs of the missile race.

They are ready for talks. We are ready. There is support for this at Defense. When Nixon comes in, it could be a year before you get back to the point where we are now.

We now have substantial nuclear superiority over the Soviets. If a freeze goes into effect, we would be ahead. They are gaining in ICBM and submarine field.

Robert Murphy: I don't know if we have superiority or not, based on intelligence briefings and reports I have had. We need to cut down on expenses. We have something going. The bombing was stopped. South Vietnam will come to Paris.

Secretary Rusk: An announcement will be made tonight.

Secretary Clifford: I think it would be in President-Elect Nixon's interest to get these talks started. During his term, I expect an agreement could be reached.

A number of forces are in position now to let talks begin. Then technicians can take over.

Items to be discussed:

Missiles
Vietnam
Korea
Mideast

Walt Rostow: The Soviets said they have done full staff work. They have a paper to hand us--a bargaining paper.

They are prepared to have agreed statement before we go.

We would go back and study papers each handed us.

Robert Murphy: That Communiqué would be a great achievement.

They use"equality of security."

Secretary Rusk: We have used this.

Walt Rostow: This is Dobrynin talking to Rusk and me.

The President has long history of correspondence on Vietnam. We could lay out this. They seem to want to work the Mideast out.

Secretary Rusk: We were far down this track before Czechoslovakia.

Neither one of us has decisive influence on countries of the Mideast. But we both do have legitimate claims on Soviet on Southeast Asia.

Robert Murphy: I have a reservation about summit meetings. The thought of another Glassboro would be unappealing.

The President: The question of preparation is not a relevant one. We have been prepared.

Secretary Rusk: We are under pressure from non-nuclear countries to get going on these talks.

The level of talks is related to Vietnam and the Mideast. Every week that goes by without progress increases the danger.

Robert Murphy: On the balance, this should appeal to Mr. Nixon.

The President: We don't want to commit Mr. Nixon, we do want him to know of it.

Buz, any comment?

General Wheeler: No, Sir.

The President: Dick?

CIA Director Helms: No, sir.

[Here follows discussion of Vietnam.]

325. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union/1/

Washington, November 26, 1968, 2204Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 18 US-USSR. Top Secret; Nodis; Cherokee. Drafted and approved by Rusk. The telegram is marked, "For Code Room: This is a Cherokee message." Cherokee was a codeword designation for a special telegraphic channel established for highly sensitive State Department messages. Rusk informed 22 Ambassadors of the new channel in circular telegram 267317, November 5. Rusk indicated that the channel would provide "an entirely private and secure means of communication" and would "make it un-necessary henceforth to use [text not declassified] channels in transmitting sensitive

messages." (Ibid.)

278030. Literally Eyes Only for the Ambassador from the Secretary.

There follows a memorandum of conversation at luncheon November 25th between myself and Dobrynin prior to the latter's return to Moscow for consultation. The memorandum is generally self-explanatory and you will note that I invited Dobrynin to discuss the matter further with you in Moscow when he has reactions from his own people. It is most important that you handle any cable traffic on the subject as Cherokee messages.

I will be sending you some prior background material through the same channel, including an agreed statement of general principles on strategic missiles worked out between us and Moscow through a very private channel./2/ The President has not made a final decision about proposing a specific time and place for a meeting with Kosygin but it is very much on his mind. He sees some considerable advantage if such a meeting could produce forward movement on strategic missiles and some improvement both in the Middle East and Southeast Asia. We do not underestimate the difficulties or complications. Much, of course, will depend upon the attitude of Mr. Nixon as strategic missile talks cannot get very far beyond the exploratory stage before January 20th. I would be glad to have any reactions you yourself have along the way but, again, I emphasize the importance of the Cherokee channel.

/2/See Document 308.

Memorandum of conversation/3/ begins:

/3/Another copy of the memorandum of conversation indicates that it was drafted by Rusk and Bohlen, who also attended the meeting. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 18 US-USSR)

"The Secretary said that the President was giving renewed thought to the possibility of a meeting between himself and Mr. Kosygin. He thought that it might be a good idea if such a meeting could produce positive results and not merely mean that each side would reiterate their positions on a number of questions. He said the meeting could produce some progress on important questions and help reduce tensions that would be worthwhile. He was not referring merely to what was said in the communiqué of what would be the practical effect of a private meeting between the two men.

Ambassador Dobrynin said that he thought almost all of these matters had been agreed prior to the postponement of the idea of a meeting.

The Secretary agreed and added that however at the present time it would be necessary to talk this subject over with Mr. Nixon.

Middle East

The Secretary mentioned the possibility of some progress on the Middle East. Dobrynin replied that it would be difficult to obtain any assurance beforehand although almost any subject could be discussed. The Secretary mentioned the Middle East as a possibility. He said for example if there could be a Soviet-American agreement that both would use their best influence to bring about a situation where peaceful arrangements might be possible between Israel and the Arabs this would be important. The Secretary went on to say that he had raised on his own initiative with Riad in New York a number of points of possible settlement. He had been disappointed in Riad's reaction, who had taken refuge behind Jordan and Syria. He said that the U.S. had put these propositions forward without clearing them with Israel and he wished to assure Dobrynin that the U.S. was very serious in the Middle East matter. In fact, the Israelis had been somewhat upset. He asked Dobrynin to try and ascertain whether in the Soviet judgment it would be possible to make any progress in the Middle East at a summit meeting. Dobrynin replied that there could be no guarantee of result, but that the subjects could be discussed.

Ambassador Dobrynin then inquired exactly what the Secretary would like to receive from the Soviet Union which had not already been mentioned in the exchange of letters between Kosygin and the President. The Secretary replied that it was not a question of what went into the communiqué but rather a private agreement which might be reached between the two men when they met. In the Middle East it would be useful if we could agree that we would both use our influence, the Soviet Union with the Arabs and the U.S. with the Israelis. He mentioned the seven points that he had put to Riad and inquired whether or not the Soviet Union really thought that these seven points had merit and could constitute a possible basis.

Ambassador Dobrynin inquired whether or not the President was thinking of a meeting in general or whether he really wanted to have answers to specific points before he could consent to a meeting. The Secretary replied that at the moment it was not specific as to points but more thinking aloud. The Secretary again referred to the seven points that he had put to Riad and stated that it might be useful to have the Soviet opinion as to whether these might form a basis to a settlement between Israel and the Arabs. Dobrynin remarked that there might be more points added or some changes might be made, but that anything could be discussed.

The Secretary said the President would like to know whether or not it was considered on the Soviet side that a meeting would be worthwhile in the present circumstances. Dobrynin said that he was sure that his government would agree that the Middle East should be on the agenda. He did not think that he could get any opinion as to results in advance of the event. He repeated his question as to whether or not the President was merely thinking of the idea of a meeting or wanted assurances on a number of points before it was decided. The Secretary repeated that the President was thinking in broad terms and not about details. The Secretary said for reasons with which the Ambassador was familiar the meeting had to be postponed, but the President was thinking about the possibility and whether or not it would be worthwhile or would merely result in a reiteration of previous positions. The Secretary mentioned for example that we might both agree to use influence to reduce incidents. Ambassador Dobrynin returned to his previous question as to whether the President was asking for assurance before agreeing to a meeting or was merely thinking out loud. The Secretary said that if it was understood for example that both wanted peace in the Middle East and used influence to that end this would produce a result which would be very useful. He mentioned the difference between speeches in the UN and that of conversations which would occur at a meeting. Dobrynin remarked that he could agree right here and now that the Soviet Union wished peace in the Middle East and he did not believe that Kosygin would have any problem in talking about using their influence to that end, but repeated that it was difficult to make pre-conditions in advance. He said he knew that on his return to Moscow he would have an interview with Kosygin, who would ask concretely and specifically 'What do the Americans want from us?' The Secretary said he was not asking for any conditions.

Strategic Missiles

Ambassador Dobrynin remarked that he thought in regard to the ABM matter that this whole thing had been agreed in principle and there would be no need to redefine the question. The Secretary said that he agreed as far as the ABM was concerned, but he thought that what was involved was a judgment by both of them as to whether or not at this particular time a meeting would be useful. If both were prepared to use their full weight with the respective friends in the Middle East this in itself would be useful. He repeated that he had gone ahead without Israel in his discussion with Riad and that had been quite upsetting, and he wondered whether the Soviet Union would be prepared to do the same thing in regard to the Egyptians. Dobrynin repeated the quest as to what the American Government wanted from the Soviet Government.

Southeast Asia

The Secretary said in stopping the bombing in Vietnam we had really agreed to the primary Soviet desire in regard to the Southeast Asia matter and he pointed out the 230 violations in the DMZ since the cessation of bombing. He said there was evidence of enemy personnel, not Viet Cong but North Vietnamese, while we had absolutely no personnel in the DMZ. He said it would be useful to consider whether or not it might be useful to consider some of the understandings reached with Hanoi being put into a formal or more contractual form. It was possible that the British and the Soviets as co-chairmen of the Geneva Conference might wish to consider the desirability of putting the ICC into the DMZ, or another possibility would be for Hanoi to agree to get its people out of the DMZ. He thought this might be a suitable subject for discussion between the President and Mr. Kosygin. A second point which might be suitable was the 1962 agreements on Laos. In 1962 after the negotiations an agreement had been worked out and we felt that the considerations which were offered then were still relevant in the situation at the present time. Ambassador Dobrynin remarked that the history of Vietnam was a very complicated and long one; that it was doubtful if we could take two subjects such as the DMZ and Laos in isolation from others. The Secretary said that when we had doubts as to the clarity of Hanoi's understanding we had discussed it with the Ambassador who had brought back the reply that the Soviet Government said the doubts were unfounded.

The Secretary said that for a long time it had been a first requirement of the Soviet Union that the U.S. should stop the bombing. This was now done and 'we want to know what it means to you.' Dobrynin reverted to his original thesis that it was possible to discuss anything; that there could be no assurances or pre-conditions before a meeting. The Secretary replied that he was not trying to lay down conditions but was groping for a judgment on both sides as to whether or not the meeting would be worthwhile in that it would move things along positively and reduce tensions. Dobrynin said that he thought on two subjects, the ABM and the Middle East, there would not be so many problems, but that on the last two mentioned, the DMZ and Laos, this would be difficult. He pointed out as he had said earlier that the Vietnam situation was complicated and had a long history, and you couldn't treat two questions in isolation.

The Secretary said we had stopped the bombing and this greatly simplified the situation. Dobrynin remarked that the Soviet Union had been helpful in arranging the talks in Paris. The Secretary said when he had asked Dobrynin some time in the past whether or not after the bombing was stopped they would be in favor of full implementation of the 1962 Geneva Convention he, Dobrynin, had said yes. Dobrynin said this was quite true, that he felt to be quite frank for example in regard to assurances regarding the DMZ question required by the American side it would be necessary for the Soviet Union to take it up with Hanoi which then might consider that Kosygin was trying to use the subject to get into a meeting with the President. Then they would immediately interpret American desire for assurance as a condition. The Secretary said that the fact of 230 violations of the DMZ was not a very good development. The Secretary said he thought the discussion between heads of state would be intimate and discreet and indeed very secret, and there might be discussions as to what the two countries, the U.S. and the Soviet Union, would do about the situation even in the absence of Hanoi and Saigon, for example. He mentioned that President Kennedy had met with Khrushchev in Vienna and they had reached a certain type of understanding in regard to Laos which had provided help to us in the Geneva Agreement in 1962. Dobrynin said he understood the importance of this but felt there could not be assurances or pre-conditions. At this point the Ambassador inquired about what time we had in mind for a summit meeting in our eyes if and when one was decided on. The Secretary said possibly some time around the middle of December. The Ambassador then said what about an ABM meeting if there is no summit. The Secretary said he could not comment on this because the present discussion had to do with a meeting.

Ambassador Dobrynin said that some time ago he had had a discussion with Walt Rostow of the White House which had indicated to him that the idea of a summit meeting had been dropped and that he, Rostow, inquired about the possibility of ABM discussions presented as a separate matter. Rostow at that time referred to Berlin, about which nothing had happened. It would appear now that the possibility of a summit was being revived. The Secretary agreed and said the President was returning, and he emphasized the word returning, to the idea of the possibility of a summit conference.

The Ambassador then asked the Secretary what sort of an idea we had for the solution of the Vietnamese question and whether or not we were thinking in terms of a coalition government. The Secretary replied that we were not thinking in terms of a coalition government and then mentioned that one possibility towards a solution would be the withdrawal of all foreign forces, including North Vietnam. This, however, would require the reconciliation of the population of South Vietnam. The Ambassador inquired whether this envisaged setting up of an international commission. The Secretary replied that it was too far in the future to consider now. He said in reply to the Ambassador's question about a cease-fire that one of the difficulties was the actual position of military forces inside the country. He pointed out that some of the provincial capitals had to be supplied by air and that this problem of access had to be resolved before there could be any cease-fire.

The Secretary suggested to Ambassador Dobrynin that, upon his return to Moscow, he ascertain what Soviet leaders feel they can say about the questions raised by the Secretary and that he be in touch with Ambassador Thompson who will be in a position to handle the matter most discreetly.

The meeting ended with the Secretary wishing Dobrynin a pleasant voyage and a possible holiday in the Soviet Union."

Rusk

326. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State/1/

Moscow, November 29, 1968, 1038Z.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President--Walt W. Rostow, Vol. 109. Top Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Cherokee.

6635. Eyes Only Secretary.

1. Gromyko called me to the Foreign Office at 11:30 this morning and made following oral statement:

"Secretary of State Rusk in a conversation with USSR Ambassador in Washington Dobrynin on November 25 of this year/2/ touched on a number of questions which, in the opinion of President Johnson, could be discussed in the event of his meeting with Soviet leaders.

/2/See Document 325.

In conformity with the desire expressed by Rusk to learn the opinion of the Soviet side with respect to these questions, we would like to report the following for transmission to President Johnson:

1. We proceed from the fact that, concerning the limitation of the strategic arms race, there was agreement, in the course of the preceding exchange of opinions between us, on a sufficient number of concrete propositions regarding common goals and basic principles for limiting and subsequently reducing strategic weapons, the approval of which could be completed by a discussion of this question at a possible meeting. As far as we understand, our detailed considerations on this subject, handed to the Secretary of State on October 2 of this year,/3/ were positively received on the American side. For our part we are ready as before to review the stated considerations as a basis for the achievement of an initial, principled agreement on this subject.

/3/Document 308.

2. The opinion expressed by Secretary of State Rusk, to the effect that through the joint efforts of the USA and the USSR toward peace in the Near East, there can be achieved positive results in a peaceful settlement of the Near Eastern conflict, fully corresponds to our point of view on this subject.

From our side we are doing and intend in future to do everything dependent on us in order to promote in practice a peaceful political settlement of the Near Eastern problem and to strengthen understanding of the necessity for such a settlement in those countries of the region whose governments give consideration to our opinion.

We have also repeatedly and frankly expressed to US representatives, including to President Johnson personally, our opinion that if the US Government will maintain an analogous line with Israel, the cause of liquidating the consequences of last year's Israeli aggression against the Arab states and thus the establishment of peace in the Near East has every chance of success.

Therefore, we are by no means inclined to consider that events in this region 'are not amenable to control.'

3. We also have no doubt of the usefulness of an exchange of opinions on questions concerning Southeast Asia. From our point of view, the main problem of this region today remains the stopping of the bloodshed in Vietnam and the achievement there of a political settlement on the basis of respect for the legal rights and aspirations of the Vietnamese people.

As a result of the agreement reached at the Paris negotiations on the cessation by the US of bombing and other military acts against the DRV and on the beginning of political negotiations with the participation of representatives of the DRV, NLF, USA and the Saigon administration looking toward a peaceful settlement of the Vietnam problem, more favorable conditions have in our view been created for movement forward in this direction. Moreover, as is well known, it is in no way the fault of the DRV or its friends that there is a delay in beginning the political talks with the participation of the four sides.

In the event the American side has any other additional considerations which it would like to express in connection with the consideration of the question of the possible arranging of a meeting between President Johnson and the Soviet leaders, we are ready of course to hear them and to take such considerations into account before final decision on this question."

2. I said that you were sending me the exchange of correspondence on missile talks but I had not yet received it. I asked if it was Soviet idea that at possible meeting an agreement on principles to guide missile talks would be reached and embodied in some sort of declaration or communiqué and that this would then be followed by detailed negotiations. He said that was his understanding.

3. I referred to your seven points on the Middle East and asked if he thought these could furnish the basis of an agreement. He said he did not wish to discuss details but could say that the seven points contained some constructive suggestions. He also wished to refer to the conversation he had had on this subject with you in New York. He said the trouble was that there appeared to be no change on the part of Israel. He said the US should use its influence to change the Israeli position.

4. Dobrynin has not been able to reach Moscow because of bad weather here. I therefore told Gromyko for his background that I understood we were thinking of December 16 and 17 in Geneva. He said he was not in a position to comment./4/

/4/In telegram 279345 to Moscow, November 28, Rusk stated: "Regarding time and place of meeting referred to in my last Cherokee our thinking is approximately December 16-17 in Geneva. You are free to suggest this to Dobrynin at first opportunity." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President--Walt W. Rostow, Vol. 109)

5. Indicating I was speaking without instructions I said that a two-day meeting would leave little time for any consultation by the principles with their governments and that it seemed to me that the more advance preparation the better. He nodded but did not comment.

6. You will note statement referred to Soviet leaders in the plural. I will try to find out from Dobrynin whom they have in mind.

Thompson

327. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State/1/

Moscow, November 29, 1968, 1420Z.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 109. Top Secret; Priority; Nodis; Cherokee.

6643. Following message to be decrypted by senior communications watch officer only. Literally Eyes Only for Secretary from Ambassador:

Ref: State 278030./2/

/2/Document 325.

1. While appreciate President's desire to advance cause of peace before leaving office, I confess I am skeptical that much can be achieved at proposed meeting except announcement of agreement on principles to guide missile talks which I gather is already well prepared.

2. Progress is possible on Middle East if we are prepared to make deal which we would both agree to try to impose (short of use of force) on the two sides. But I wonder how much leverage we will have on Israel with only little over a month remaining from time of talks until new administration takes over.

3. Highly publicized top level meeting may make Soviet pressure on North Vietnam more difficult as Chinese Communists will make much noise about collusion and sell-out. In any event I doubt Soviets will go beyond urging a settlement on NVN in general terms. I do not believe they will support any particular political terms but will probably be prepared to press NVN on reduction of violence. Greatest value of meeting might be in using Soviets to impress North Vietnamese that we are not about to capitulate and that real compromise will be necessary if agreement is to be reached.

4. Soviets will be glad to draw attention away from Czechoslovakia and exploit suspicions of our allies. On the other hand an even moderately successful meeting will diminish likelihood of further Soviet adventures or pressure on such issues as Berlin.

5. I should think President would wish to raise Pueblo case as Soviets could probably be pushed into giving us at least a little more help on that issue and mere fact of meeting might exercise some influence on North Koreans.

6. Even if Brezhnev should attend meeting, Soviet principals will almost certainly be bound by rigid instructions and there will be little time in two-day meeting for them to consult Moscow.

Present regime is not noted for ability to reach quick decisions. Therefore, the more clearly President can indicate to Soviets in advance what he expects of them, the more likely agreement can be reached.

Thompson

328. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union/1/

Washington, December 4, 1968, 1444Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL US-USSR. Secret; Nodis; Cherokee.

281528. Eyes Only for Ambassador from the Secretary.

Please see Dobrynin informally as soon as you can and try to get some feel from him as to Soviet thinking about a possible meeting now that he has been in town for a few days and may be able or willing to say somewhat more than did Gromyko. One question on our minds is whether Gromyko's talk with you is supposed to be their answer to my conversation with Dobrynin./2/ Gromyko's comments must have been on the basis of an abbreviated cable reporting by Dobrynin rather than on the basis of any significant discussion among Soviet leaders. I must say that Gromyko's remarks about the Middle East and Southeast Asia were rather bleak and, as you pointed out, not very encouraging about the possibility of any major advances in either area./3/

/2/In telegram 6728 from Moscow, December 5, Thompson wrote that he did consider Gromyko's oral statement on November 29 (see Document 326) in answer to Rusk's talk with Dobrynin on November 25 (see Document 321). (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President--Walt W. Rostow, Vol. 109)

/3/Thompson commented further in telegram 6728: "I should think it wise to keep public focus of any meeting squarely on missile talks where it now is regardless of attention devoted to other problems. Believe our friends will accept this whereas if it were thought that main purpose was US-Soviet bilateral on other issues this could cause complications with our allies, particularly as I assume we could not give them much advance information."

FYI--You should know that, if such a meeting is held, Nixon would almost certainly not accompany the President but would designate Bob Murphy to represent him in the President's party. End FYI.

Rusk

329. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union/1/

Washington, December 10, 1968, 0040Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL US-USSR. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Cherokee.

284495. Eyes Only for the Ambassador from the Secretary.

We would hope that at your luncheon with Dobrynin you could get, even if only informally and unofficially, some insights into what Soviet leaders really have in mind about a possible meeting. The fact that they have not responded to your specific suggestion of the 16th and 17th in Geneva indicates that they may have some questions in a period of transition between two administrations in the United States. I wish to emphasize that there is no interest here in a meeting merely for its own sake or for cosmetic purposes at the end of an administration, although we have good information that their Embassy frequently passed to the press here that the President wanted a summit meeting. On the subject of missiles, we have done an enormous amount of work and have State, Defense, JCS and ACDA all together on what we think is a reasonable and constructive position. A new administration could lose a great deal of time, momentum and even unity in starting all over again. Meanwhile, the missile race may not wait for another protracted period because actions will be taken on both sides which would make eventual agreement both more difficult and achievable only at higher levels of expenditure and danger. Further, the Middle East and Southeast Asia situations are urgent. We have had little encouragement from what has been said by the Russians so far that they anticipate any serious advances on these two areas. On the other hand, we have now stopped the bombing of their fellow socialist country, North Viet-Nam, and believe we are entitled to see them "put their stack in" to help bring peace to Southeast Asia. On the Middle East, I personally went over with the Egyptian Foreign Minister the various points arising under the November resolution of the Security Council and did so in a spirit which was forthcoming from Egypt's point of view and in a way that was not at all pleasing to Israel. The Egyptian response was negative and disappointing and reflected no signs of any constructive Soviet influence in Cairo.

It would be very helpful if you could make a judgment in your talk with Dobrynin as to whether they prefer to wait for a new administration or whether they are reluctant about being pressed hard on such problems as Southeast Asia and the Middle East. They may be interested in a meeting but may prefer a somewhat later date because of the recent involvement of their leadership with Czechoslovakian Central Committee and Party Plenum. We ourselves may have a problem with those particular dates because of allied consultations but we could manage it. They may be expecting something more from us but I am not sure what it would be. The President believes that they have lost some of their interest in a meeting because of impressions from Nixon associates. In any event, the present situation is that we have suggested a specific time and place and they have not responded. Do your best scouting job with Dobrynin. Regards.

Rusk

330. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, December 11, 1968, 1:35 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Strategic Missile Talks. Top Secret; Literally Eyes Only.

Mr. President:

I gather from Sec. Rusk that both you and he are now cool to the possibility of a Summit on missiles; and I would guess that Moscow is also cool./2/

/2/In a memorandum to the President written at 9:55 a.m. on December 11, Rostow reported that, according to a telegram from Thompson, Dobrynin "said that if the President decided not to go ahead with the meeting, that would be understood in Moscow and there would be no hard feelings." The President wrote in hand on Rostow's memorandum, "I'm ready. Are they?" (Ibid.)

The reasons are ample:

--time is short;
--we could not go far beyond the exchange of positions and papers;
--we would have to brief in Rogers and Laird;/3/
--we would have NATO consultation problems.

/3/Secretary of State-designate William Rogers and Secretary of Defense-designate Melvin Laird.

Every normal argument is for leaving it to Nixon. And that may be the correct course.

But it may also be a decision we shall regret more than any other in the years ahead.

Nuclear agreements are always marginal and tough. If we do not hold the meeting, the new administration may let the NPT and missiles slip in priority. Time will pass. Men and situations will change. And mankind may move down the wrong fork in the road for what will, with hindsight, look like relatively trivial reasons.

Therefore, I suggest that the President and Secretary of State make one more assessment of NPT and missile talk prospects in the Nixon administration, before abandoning the concept finally./4/

/4/At the bottom of the memorandum, Johnson wrote in hand, "I agree," and drew lines connecting his remark to the third paragraph (circling the wording"we shall regret more") and to the final paragraph (circling"Therefore, I suggest" and "one more assessment").

Walt

331. Editorial Note

On December 12, 1968, President Johnson and President-elect Nixon met alone in the Oval Office from 5:35 to 7:25 p.m., their first meeting since November 11 (see footnote 3, Document 315) and the only occasion during November and December when they met alone. (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary) No record of the discussion has been found. At 3:15 p.m. on December 12, Walt Rostow forwarded a briefing memorandum to the President under a covering note that stated:

"Herewith notes covering all the items you asked me to prepare, plus Pueblo, in this order: Vietnam; Paris; Arab-Israeli dispute; NPT; Pueblo. I have not put anything down on the Summit because I do not know where you came out last night with Sec. Rusk and what precisely you wish to say to Mr. Nixon today. I don't know whether Nixon will be bringing with him any of his staff; but you may wish to talk alone with him about the Summit." (Ibid., National Security File, Rostow Files, Nixon and Transition)

The President's Daily Diary lists neither a meeting nor a telephone conversation between the President and Secretary of State Rusk the previous evening.

President-elect Nixon departed the White House at 7:42 p.m. on December 12. President Johnson telephoned him in New York City at 9:36 that evening. The conversation was not recorded and no other record of the conversation has been found. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary)

332. Telegram From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson in Texas/1/

Washington, December 14, 1968, 1611Z.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Strategic Missile Talks. Secret; Literally Eyes Only. The President flew to his Texas ranch December 13 and returned to Washington December 15.

CAP 82396. Herewith a letter from John McCloy to the President and a memorandum to the President urging strongly that we not enter into missile talks with the Russians at this time.

John McCloy called me about this and said that no one except his secretary, the President, and me would see the memorandum.

The memorandum arose, he said, from a conversation with Clark Clifford in which Clark indicated such talks as a possibility./2/ I shall, of course, make no distribution of this unless you so direct.

/2/In a December 2 memorandum to the President, Clifford made a strong case for moving forward with the missile talks beginning at the head of government level to be followed by working level talks. For text, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XI, Document 295.

December 12, 1968

Dear. Mr. President:

I have felt impelled to prepare the enclosed memorandum which I would very much like to have you read before you or anyone else undertakes to open up talks at this particular point in history with the Soviet Union on the missiles issue.

I have not sought to refine the language of this memorandum as I would if I had not felt that it was important to bring it to your attention as promptly as possible.

Respectfully yours, John McCloy

Enclosure

Memorandum to--the President

From what I can gather from the accounts of the press interviews and rumors that I hear, the government still has under serious consideration the initiation during the last days of this administration of talks with the Soviet Union dealing with the matter of reduction or control of nuclear missile weapons.

As you know, I am Chairman of the General Advisory Committee created by an act of Congress and in accordance with the provisions of the act that committee's responsibility is to advise the President, the Secretary of State and the Director of the Agency on all matters pertaining to arms control and disarmament. I have held this position since the original committee was appointed. I was also asked by President Kennedy to set up the Agency for Arms Control and Disarmament and took over its direction until it was prepared to function under the act and under a new director. It is not, however, as Chairman of that committee that I feel I should express my views regarding the contemplated meeting with the Soviets, but as an individual and former government official who has had long association with matters affecting the security of the country. That association has included problems of armament, both conventional and nuclear, as well as policies in respect of arms control and disarmament. It has also involved extensive negotiations with representatives of the Soviet Union.

I have a very strong feeling that it is inadvisable to open these talks now at any level and certainly not at the top level. I hold these views for the following reasons:

(1) The main priority at the present moment is the repair and reinvigoration of the Alliance not the inception of a dialogue with the Soviet Union. Any efforts at this time to alter this priority will have, in my judgment, most serious effects on the Alliance. It is a gesture toward the Alliance which is needed at this time not a gesture toward Moscow.

(2) Sufficient weight, in my judgment, has not yet been given to the effects of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, the announcement of the so-called Brezhnev doctrine/3/ and the threats against West Germany. Nor has sufficient weight been given to the altered security position of Europe and the United States which new developments have brought about.

/3/Originally propounded by Soviet Communist Party spokesman Sergei Kovalev in an article entitled "Sovereignty and International Responsibility of Socialist Countries" in Pravda, September 16, 1968. A translation is printed in Current Digest of the Soviet Press, October 16, 1968, and in Robin Alison Remington, ed., Winter in Prague: Documents on Czechoslovak Communism in Crisis (Cambridge, Mass: The MIT Press, 1969), pp. 412-416.

(3) No matter how tentative or general the form of the initial approach to the Soviet Union may take by instituting it we shall be implicitly accepting a principle of no superiority, or expressed in a different form, of parity. No amount of semantics with the use of different words can alter that fact. The minute we touch our foot down in the meeting room this principle is implicit. This involves a major step in the development of both our strategy and our public opinion. The present administration and its predecessors have constantly insisted that we have always been in a position of massive superiority in the nuclear field and that we intend to maintain this position. I have seen the papers which outlined the position of the United States on this matter of missiles which were prepared prior to the Czech invasion. There was no question in my mind nor in the mind of agency representatives that it did embody this principle, although it was implicit rather than expressed. I am not suggesting that we should continue to insist upon superiority, although I have questioned the assumption that parity is necessarily a more stable form of defense than that of superiority. My position is that the assumption of parity in whatever form of words it is stated should be understood by the new administration and clarified with the Congress, the country and the allies to a much greater degree than it has been before the United States enters upon meetings which commit us to it.

(4) It was a serious mistake, in my judgment, when in connection with the origination of the non-proliferation agreement, we first cleared a draft with the Soviet Union before we approached some of our most important allies and certainly the one which was most deeply concerned. The avidity to reach an agreement, almost any agreement, with the Soviet Union made us lose sight of the significant priorities. I fear we may be on the verge of making the same mistake again. The best way to avoid a fragmentation of Europe, the further erosion of the Alliance and a constructive modus vivendi with the Soviet Union is the maintenance of a thoroughly convincing and cohesive Allied security policy.

I am aware that there have been general expressions on the part of the Allies including the NATO ministers as well as resolutions in the United Nations regarding the advisability of our opening negotiations with the Soviet Union leading to the reduction of nuclear armaments, but I believe these expressions only reflect the general pressure for such reductions without taking into necessary account the implications of the Czech affair, the alteration in the power balance (which certainly has taken place) or the character of reduction or control of armaments which the general security situation now justifies. It is much more than a matter of comparison of the number of warheads of the United States and the Soviet Union or the general comparison of the Soviet-United States position. It is now a matter of the whole allied deterrent. The studies made before the Czech invasion are, in my judgment, not up to date and no temporarily comforting assurances on the part of Moscow in regard to Berlin, Rumania, Yugoslavia, etc., alter the fundamental fact of the deployment of Soviet troops further west and in greater quantity than was the case even during the war. The Czech invasion demonstrated a mobility speed and capacity to reinforce on the part of the Soviets which we, with all our vaunted airlift possibilities, cannot now remotely duplicate.

The Czech invasion, together with the greatly increased nuclear and conventional potential of the Soviets and the emergence of the Soviets and Soviet influence into the Mediterranean, constitute a new situation of which we should take advantage in dealing with our allies. The next meeting, in my judgment, should be in this country with the allies and there the matter of determining together what is the overall need in the light of the new developments should be dealt with before any further overtures are made to the Soviets. If this procedure and priority is not followed, I very much fear we shall only be encouraging our European Allies to rely more heavily on the so-called détente and the United States ultimate strategic deterrent without doing their share to maintain the immediate and probably more convincing deterrent of well trained and well supported forces in the field. A joint and serious review of the whole security position will tend to recreate the cooperative spirit of the Alliance which is so greatly needed at this time.

The Soviets are bound to exploit with their allies and their potential satellites any hasty meeting with us as an acquiescence in the consequences of the Czech invasion. In spite of all The New York Times' editorializing, there is no need for haste. If the program has merit for us and the Soviets, its advantages will not disappear overnight. The value of the program to the Soviet Union is very great and will extend into at least 1969. It will be just as important to them in 1969 as in 1968 to reduce our nuclear potential and it will be just as important to them to have us enter into a non-proliferation treaty which consolidates their near monopoly of nuclear weapons and forever excludes Germany, one of our allies, from having them. It is no argument to contend that the Joint Chiefs of Staff may withdraw their support to a reduction in the course of another administration due to a possible change in Joint Chiefs of Staff personnel. Such an argument merely confirms the fact that there exists a tendency to preclude the new administration from entire freedom of action in a matter that will deeply concern the country and for with the new administration is bound to have to assume the ultimate responsibility.

I know that there has been sustained and thoughtful work done on this problem in the preparation for the meeting with the Soviet Union. Though most of it was done before the Czech affair occurred, I am sure considerable thought has been given it since then but these studies will be available for the new administration to review and to some degree for the allies to review before a meeting with the Soviets takes place. The problem is, as I happen to know, most complex and practically impossible for the new administration to grasp with all its implications between now and the time which I guess is contemplated for the initiation of the talks. I really do not understand how any group of people, including those just designated by Mr. Nixon to become his Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense, can be expected to have a knowledgeable attitude on this vital issue and yet I feel certain that the issue is so great and so significant, one can be quite certain the new administration is going to have to give thorough, sincere and prompt thought to it. This opportunity should, in my judgment, be afforded them free of any pressure which an immediate meeting with the Soviet representatives would entail.

333. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain European Posts/1/

Washington, December 18, 1968, 0050Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, EDX US-USSR. Confidential; Immediate. Drafted by Edward W. Burgess and Leo J. Reddy (EUR); cleared by CU, USIA, and five offices in EUR; and approved by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs George S. Springsteen. Sent to the Mission to NATO for Harlan Cleveland and to Moscow, Warsaw, Budapest, Prague, Bucharest, and Sofia and repeated to all NATO capitals.

288756. Subject: High-Visibility Exchanges with USSR and Eastern Europe.

1. We have decided to resume gradually high-visibility exchanges with Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact participants in action against Czechoslovakia. Decision is based on long-term advantage to US of high-visibility exchanges with Soviet Union and other EE countries and results of our consultations with NATO Allies. Just as suspension of these exchanges in August served our purposes, their resumption is also in our interest as one facet of our overall policy toward USSR and Eastern Europe.

2. Insofar as Soviet Union is concerned, this decision involves resumption of negotiations for the appearance of US performing arts groups in the Soviet Union and negotiations for "Education--USA" exhibit. FYI. We are accordingly seeking two appropriate American performing arts groups which could be sent to USSR in 1969, one as early as possible to balance USSR State Symphony's US tour scheduled begin mid-February. Acceptance USSR State Symphony remains contingent on signature of contract for one US performing arts group and satisfactory progress in negotiations for exhibit and second performing arts group. Embassy Moscow will be instructed to make this clear to Soviets at such time as we are able to provide negotiating instructions. End FYI.

3. Policy decision also provides for reversion to pre-August 20 policies on exchanges with Poland, Hungary and Bulgaria.

4. We do not plan to volunteer any public statement of policy but will respond to inquiries as change becomes known by statement that our attitude toward Soviet and EE action against Czechoslovakia has been made clear both unilaterally and in concert with our NATO Allies. Attitude is in no way altered by the resumption of exchanges.

5. For USNATO: You may draw upon foregoing in NAC December 18 during discussion of political subjects (Agenda Item I). In informing NAC of decision on resumption of exchanges, you should mention that decision partly due to fact that other Allies appear to be going ahead already with major exchange activities, as well as general agreement at December 10 POLAD's (USNATO 6216)/2/ that it would be appropriate to begin to modify restraints imposed on contracts with Warsaw Pact Five after invasion of Czechoslovakia. Another reason for our decision is desire to preserve exchanges program that includes activities of prime interest to us, especially since impact of performing arts groups and exhibits is invariably greater within closed Soviet society than in West.

/2/Dated December 10. (Ibid., POL EUR E-EUR W)

You should then make following additional points:

a. We are seriously concerned that Allies, in renewing exchange activities, may give collective impression of desiring precipitate return to pre-August 20 normalcy.

b. Too rapid a renewal of exchanges could nullify much of psychological impact of November Ministerial Meeting decisions and affect public resolve within Allied countries to meet contributions to improve NATO defense posture.

c. We therefore strongly urge that Allies (1) resume exchanges with Warsaw Pact Five as gradually as possible; (2) try to keep closely in step on this issue through close consultations; and (3) keep public statements of this resumption as low key as possible.

Rusk

334. Message From the Soviet Government to President-elect Nixon/1/

Moscow, December 18, 1968.

/1/Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Henry A. Kissinger Office Files, Administrative and Staff Files, Transition, Nov. 1968-Jan. 1969, Robert Ellsworth, Box 1. No classification marking. A typed note at the top of page 1 states: "Hand delivered 4:00 p.m. Palm Court Plaza Hotel New York City 12/18/68." Presumably the message was handed to Robert Ellsworth by Yuri Tcherniakov. A handwritten version of the same message (the printed version is typed) is attached to a note that reads: "Ellsworth from Tcherniakoff (USSR)." (Ibid., Country Files-Europe-U.S.S.R., Box 66, Soviet Contacts (Sedov), 1968-69) Yuri Tcherniakov was Minister Counselor at the Soviet Embassy in Washington. Robert Ellsworth was a Nixon aide who, according to Dobrynin in In Confidence, pp. 186-187, informed Dobrynin at a private dinner on November 24 that President-elect Nixon had authorized him to maintain informal contacts with Dobrynin on problems of mutual interest to Nixon and the Soviet leaders. Dobrynin states further that at a second meeting, "some days later," Ellsworth explained that Nixon "seriously objected" to President Johnson's plans for a summit meeting; and "a week later,"Dobrynin passed to Ellsworth a Soviet reply stating that Nixon might not have been aware that it was President Johnson who wanted a meeting and that "'it is up to the American side to form its attitude to such a summit. As to us, we do not adjust our views to momentary advantages.'" (Ibid., p. 187) Although Dobrynin's excerpt from the Soviet message differs in wording from the message, he is presumably referring to the same one.

I have informed Moscow of our conversation on the 8th of December when you stated President Nixon's considerations concerning a possible meeting of President Johnson with the Soviet leaders.

In this connection I am instructed to convey you for President Nixon the following.

Since, as it is apparent now, Mr. Nixon is obviously not aware of all the circumstances of this matter, we would like to state for his information that the question of President Johnson's wish to meet with the Soviet leaders was raised on the initiative of the American side at the beginning of July this year. Then in the middle of September and again at the end of November the American side--on its own initiative as well--returned to this question.

Supposing that Mr. Nixon was informed of the course of affairs in the exchange of opinions between Moscow and Washington on this matter, we on our part were planning nevertheless to find out his attitude towards the possibility of President Johnson's meeting with the Soviet leaders before any final decision was reached on this matter.

Now the situation in this respect has been clarified. It is of course difficult for us to judge the character of American side's intentions concerning a summit meeting and hence--how successful it could be under present circumstances. Mr. Nixon is of course in a better position to judge this.

So far as our own attitude to such meetings is concerned we can say absolute firmly that this attitude is being determined not by any motivations of the moment. We approached and still approach the question of such meetings with all seriousness, having in mind that for the leaders of such two states as the United States and the Soviet Union there is always something to exchange the opinions of in the interests of our two countries as well as in the interests of universal peace and security.

As to the problem of curbing the race in the strategic armaments we can state also with all certainty that our approach to the discussion of this problem--be it at summit, be it at any other level--is most serious. We had proceeded precisely from this when an agreement was reached between the Governments of the Soviet Union and the United States, which was proclaimed on the 1st of July this year, to enter in the near future into negotiations concerning complex limitation and reduction of offensive strategic nuclear weapons delivery systems as well as systems of defense against ballistic missiles.

The problem of limitation and subsequent reduction of strategic weapons is undoubtedly one of the biggest questions in the relations between our countries. The results of discussion of this problem will, of course, depend on positions of both sides. If the Government of the United States really wishes, as we do, to facilitate the cessation of armaments race then there is no doubt that these results can be positive.

Verbal:

If there is any reply to this, Tcherniakoff is ready to receive it and convey it to Moscow.

335. Memorandum From Henry Kissinger to President-elect Nixon/1/

Washington, December 18, 1968.

/1/Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Henry A. Kissinger Office Files, Country Files-Europe-U.S.S.R., Box 66, Soviet Contacts (Sedov), 1968-69. Secret; Nodis.

SUBJECT
My Conversation with Sedov of the Soviet Embassy

As I indicated to you earlier, I met with Boris Sedov of the Soviet Embassy this evening. I made the following points to him:

--The President-elect meant it when he said that this was to be an era of negotiation not confrontation.

--The Soviets will find that the President-elect is open minded, precise, and interested in lasting settlements based on the real interests of both countries. Settlements cannot be based on trying to take away the options of the other side. Lasting settlements must reflect real interests.

--A crucial test of Soviet intentions to improve relations with the US will be whether the USSR accepts a summit meeting between now and January 20. If such a meeting is held, the Nixon Administration will be forced to find some way to make it clear that we will not be boxed in, and that we will move at our own pace at a time we decide to be appropriate. In other words, we believe that the only purpose of a summit meeting now can be propaganda to embarrass the new Administration. We would react accordingly./2/

/2/Commenting in his memoirs on Johnson's proposal that both men attend a summit in late 1968, Nixon stated that he "saw no solid basis for concluding that the Soviet leaders were prepared to negotiate seriously on any critical issue. Nor did I want to be boxed in by any decisions that were made before I took office." (The Memoirs of Richard Nixon, p. 345)

--On the assumption that the USSR will do nothing to disturb the atmosphere either by summit conferences or by fomenting crises, the new Administration is very interested in serious talks. The tendency in the past few years has been to worry about the "atmosphere" of relations between the two great powers. The new Administration is convinced that there are real and substantial differences between the US and the Soviet Union and that it is these differences which must be negotiated.

--On the strategic missile talks, Mr. Nixon is intent upon an assessment of our strategic position before moving into the negotiation stage. Our analysis of the issue, however, will be influenced by Soviet willingness to negotiate seriously on other questions--particularly Vietnam and the Middle East.

--Assuming Soviet willingness to negotiate on such issues, arms talks could be held simultaneously. Such judgments will also influence the ratification of the Non Proliferation Treaty, which Mr. Nixon has called a matter of timing.

--It would be useful to Mr. Nixon if the Soviet Union were prepared to indicate to us a willingness to negotiate on these outstanding issues, and to provide us with some indication of the positions they would take thereon.

End of Document

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