307. Memorandum Prepared by Secretary of State Rusk/1/

New York, October 2, 1968.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Chlodnick File. Top Secret; Eyes Only.

Gromyko and I talked alone for an hour and a half. He handed me a Russian and unofficial English translation of the Soviet answer/2/ to Rostow's latest communication to Dobrynin.

/2/The Russian text is ibid. The unofficial translation is Document 308.

I read it over and asked him if he had any further observations to make. He said that he would prefer to comment after I had made any observations after reading the communication.

I said that the portion dealing with offensive and defensive strategic missiles seemed to be constructive and positive. We would wish to give it further study but I was under the impression we were making some progress.

On Viet-Nam, I said I was disappointed that there was no real response to the important communication which Rostow had given to Dobrynin.

On the Middle East, I asked if he had received the reply which Katzenbach had given to Dobrynin on Sunday./3/ He said that he had received it just as he had reached the airport but had not yet had a chance to read it or study it. I then said that it might be desirable for us to have a further discussion on the Middle East after he had had a chance to consider our reply.

/3/Katzenbach handed Dobrynin the 7-page paper, which was a reply to a paper that Dobrynin gave Rusk on September 4 (see footnote 6, Document 295) during a meeting on September 29.

His own comments were as follows: On strategic missiles he said that the Soviet Union was serious about this question. It involved not only economic and financial aspects of the arms race but also involved increasing dangers to both sides. After a number of exchanges on this matter I concluded that the Soviets were seriously interested and that they were trying to make some significant progress.

On Viet-Nam Gromyko said that the Paris talks were not getting anywhere on substance even though there was a broader understanding on both sides of the other side's viewpoint. He said that they much appreciated the fact that we had kept them informed in some detail about the Paris talks and that Hanoi had done the same. I pointed out that, in that case, the Soviets were probably the best informed people in the world as to the negotiating situation since they were getting detailed information from both sides. He said modesty prevented his making that point but that it was probably correct.

He said he had two questions to put to me about Viet-Nam. The first was whether the presence of the South Vietnamese at the conference table was the sole obstacle to stopping the bombing. I told him that this was a most important issue and, in some respects, might be the most difficult for Hanoi to accept. But I called his attention to the fact that in Rostow's communication to Dobrynin we had described three matters as simple facts of life. The President could not maintain a cessation of the bombing if there were abuses of the DMZ, if there were rockets and mortars slamming into population centers such as Saigon, Danang and Hue and if North Viet-Nam did not sit down promptly in negotiations at which the GVN would be present. I emphasized that it was not necessary to talk about "conditions", "reciprocity" or "quid pro quos." It was simply an elementary fact that no President of the United States could maintain a cessation of the bombing under certain circumstances and we had tried to be explicit to the Soviet Union about such circumstances.

His second question was whether we could eliminate Thieu and Ky as parties to the situation. He said we should not draw any conclusions from the question--he was merely asking a question. He said that the authorities in Hanoi took a very strong view toward these individuals and that the character of the regime in the South was a major obstacle. I replied very firmly that we could not go down this path. President Thieu and Prime Minister Huong together represented 45 percent of the votes cast in the last Presidential election in South Viet-Nam. They, too, had some strong views about the authorities in Hanoi but they were willing to negotiate with them and were willing to let them have the NLF on their side of the table. I made it very clear that there was no possibility that we would bring about a change in government in Saigon to accommodate Hanoi.

Gromyko then said that there were three parties involved in these communications: the North Vietnamese, the Soviet Union and the United States. He said that the United States ought to take into account the problem which Moscow faces in its own dealings with Hanoi and that we should put Moscow in a position to use its influence in Hanoi in a constructive direction. He illustrated his point by saying that if we told the Soviet Union that we would have to resume the bombing on this or that condition, the Soviets would have to say that to Hanoi. Hanoi, in turn, would then say to the Soviet Union "what have you done--have you sold out to the Americans?" I tried to get him to be more specific about just what he had in mind but all I could get was a statement that the atmosphere would be greatly changed if we stopped the bombing and vague allusions to what might happen if we did so.

In this connection, I told Gromyko that it was very important that the United States and the Soviet Union be precise with each other and that we not mislead each other. He seemed to agree. I reminded him that we had said that if the Soviet Union were to give us serious advice about stopping the bombing with full knowledge of the "three facts of life", we would take their advice very seriously indeed. We were interested in results; we were not standing on ceremony, we were not insisting upon particular procedures, we were not debating who might make the first move, we were not interested in face, we were only interested in peace. We were prepared to be flexible about procedural and other modalities if we could have reasonable confidence that results would follow. Just as Dobrynin has done in Washington, he tried to leave the impression that we ought to stop the bombing but he would not say that anything specific would result.

At one point I told Gromyko that we would be interested if the Soviets would tell us, with full understanding of our views, that the Soviets would make a maximum effort following a cessation of bombing. He said that he could state that they would do so but he refused to confirm that they would do so on the three points which we have described as "facts of life".

We had some rather pointless discussion on the Middle East which reflected my own discussion with Riad of Egypt the day before. For present purposes, this memorandum will not go into that because he and I agreed we should discuss the Middle East on a later occasion.

During a brief conversation about Czechoslovakia, referring to Rostow's remarks on the subject, Dobrynin stated quite categorically that under no circumstances would the Soviet Union discuss this subject with any other government--meaning particularly the United States. I told him about some of the problems which this had created for us but he was utterly unwilling to get into it in any way.

He said, at one point, that the Soviet leaders were ready for a meeting "at any time" and that that was a matter for us to consider. I did not respond on this point but made the general observation that I would report our conversation to the President and would be in touch with him further. Gromyko fully understands the President's personal relation to the Rostow-Dobrynin exchanges and that only three of us are informed about them.

In all of my exchanges with Gromyko since 1961 his personal attitude, manner and language were more friendly and agreeable than I have ever found him. He seemed to be going out of his way to establish a rapport. I mention this not because I think a new day had dawned but because it may be of some interest in thinking about the present situation. He told me that he would say some things in his speech tomorrow/4/ about Viet-Nam that would not surprise me. I replied that I did not believe he was surprised by my speech today/5/ in the General Assembly, to which he replied "not surprised but I could have hoped you would have said something different".

/4/For text, see Izvestia, October 4; excerpts are in The New York Times, October 4.

/5/For text, see the Department of State Bulletin, October 21, 1968, pp. 405-410; excerpts are in The New York Times, October 3.

My own impression is that I should go back at him again on Viet-Nam, as well as on the Middle East. There is something on his mind which he has not yet fully disclosed. I do not believe that we have a basis for acting now on the basis of the Rostow-Dobrynin communication. Before I see him again, I would wish to have the President's reactions to this first contact.

DR/6/

/6/Rusk wrote beneath his initials: "I could come to Washington at the end of the day on Thursday [October 3] if this seems desirable. Gromyko plans to return on Oct. 8."

308. Message From the Government of the Soviet Union to the Government of the United States/1/

Moscow, undated.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Chlodnick. No classification marking. The message is marked "Unofficial translation." It was handed to Rusk by Gromyko on October 2; see Document 307. The Russian text is attached but not printed.

President Johnson's observations on the subject of his meeting with Soviet leaders which were communicated by W. Rostow to the Soviet Ambassador on September 16/2/ have been attentively considered in Moscow. In this connection we, for our part, should also like to express some ideas.

/2/See Document 300.

I. It has been noted in Moscow that the President has reacted favorably to our suggestion that in the course of the meeting there should be established basic principles affecting the limitation and subsequent reduction in strategic armaments. We, for our part, agree that simultaneously the general objectives of our two countries in this field should be formulated in a more detailed form.

On the whole as a result of the exchange of views on the question of restraining the strategic arms race it could, in our opinion, be stated that the two sides had arrived at a conclusion on the expediency and feasibility of achieving a mutually acceptable understanding on this question, and that the implementation of measures to restrain the strategic arms race would answer to the interests of both our countries as well as to the interests of strengthening international security, and that this would also generate more favorable conditions for solving other major issues in the field of disarmament.

Specifically, it could be agreed that the two sides would be guided by the following general objectives:

--To achieve and maintain a stable U.S.-Soviet strategic deterrence by agreed limitations on the deployment of offensive and defensive strategic armaments.

--To enhance the credibility of our efforts to prevent the destabilizing actions of other nations by demonstrating Soviet and U.S. willingness to limit their strategic armaments.

--To provide mutual assurance to each of us that our security will be maintained, while at the same time avoiding the tensions, uncertainties, and costs of an unrestrained continuation of the strategic arms race.

--To improve U.S.-Soviet understanding by establishing a continuing process of discussion of issues arising from the strategic situation.

At the same time it could be agreed that the task of limiting and subsequently reducing strategic armaments should be resolved in compliance with the following basic principles:

(1) The limitation and reduction in strategic armaments should be carried out with due regard for the integral interconnection of the two principal components of such armaments, i.e. offensive and defensive weapons systems.

(2) The limitation and reduction in strategic armaments should be carried out as a complex including both offensive strategic nuclear weapons delivery systems and anti-ballistic missile systems.

(3) The limitation and reduction in strategic armaments should be so balanced that neither side could obtain any military advantages and that equal security should be assured for both sides.

There could also be registered an agreement of the two sides, along with implementation of measures to limit and reduce strategic armaments, to study the question of taking steps to rule out the accidental appearance of conflict--fraught situations involving the use of strategic armaments.

In conclusion it could be agreed that special delegations of the two governments, guided by the above-mentioned objectives and principles, would promptly address themselves to devizing an agreement on the concrete aspects of the problem of limiting and reducing strategic armaments.

[1.] Agreement, reached during the meeting, on the above-listed aspects of the problem of limiting and reducing strategic armaments could, in our view, then be set forth either in the final communiqué of the meeting or in the form of a joint statement of our two governments.

2. There is agreement in Moscow that the achievement of progress towards a peaceful settlement of the Vietnam problem would be highly desirable.

Our understanding of what is required to secure such progress has already been communicated to the President and we are forming the impression that our position in this regard has, in general, been correctly understood by the American side. However, an exchange of views during the meeting on this topic as well could, we feel, prove useful./3/

/3/In an October 2 memorandum to the President, Rostow highlighted the exchanges with the Soviets on Vietnam by providing excerpts from this message and Documents 299 and 307. He then passed on the following warning from Rusk: "Under no circumstances must Harriman know of these exchanges, he would resign." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Chlodnick File)

3. The deep concern about the explosive situation in the Middle East stated by the President and the desire he has expressed to assist in bringing about peace in that area as quickly as possible as well as his readiness to exchange views with the Soviet Union on this very important part of the world, have been taken note of in Moscow.

We believe it would be important and useful, without needlessly going into details which are subject to further consideration at other levels, to exchange views during the meeting and to register our agreement regarding the need to take all measures to bring about a peaceful settlement of the Middle East conflict and to prevent the resumption of hostilities in that area.

4. The conviction expressed by the President that a realistic and genuine understanding between our two countries is of vital importance to the assurance of a general peace and his desire that in the days and weeks ahead a good foundation could be laid for further development of Soviet-American relations in the future have been taken note of in Moscow with gratification. This corresponds also to our approach to relations with the U.S., including the question of a forthcoming summit meeting.

309. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, October 4, 1968, 12:45 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Chlodnick File. Secret; Literally Eyes Only.

Mr. President:

In re-reading the communication which Gromyko gave to Sec. Rusk on Wednesday night,/2/ it appears that they are suggesting a meeting which would be guaranteed before the event to be modestly fruitful with regard to strategic weapons talks. But they are saying that a Vietnamese formula probably cannot be established before the meeting and, therefore, the Vietnamese question should be discussed at the meeting. This is how I read the following passage:

/2/October 2; see Document 308.

"Our understanding of what is required to secure such progress has already been communicated to the President and we are forming the impression that our position in this regard has, in general, been correctly understood by the American side. However an exchange of views during the meeting on this topic as well could, we feel, prove useful."

With respect to Czechoslovakia, while they will not talk with us directly, obviously Dubcek is in Moscow and they are trying to get the best settlement they can wring from him and announce some kind of schedule of troop withdrawals. (I do not rule out that they will decide they cannot get an acceptable situation from Dubcek and go into a much harder phase in Czechoslovakia.)

But you may wish to think about a situation which could emerge in the next several days in which there was:

--A sharp turn for the better in Czechoslovakia;

--A clear possibility of a successful meeting on strategic missiles at the highest level;

--But the formula for a bombing cessation and serious talks had not yet been achieved but was on the agenda for, say, Geneva, as well as for discussion in Paris.

This is not a recommendation, but the posing of a possible contingency.

New but related subject: Gromyko said something interesting but mysterious in his General Assembly speech./3/ With respect to Vietnam, he said that after a bombing cessation, serious progress towards peace could be made in Paris--"or elsewhere."

/3/See footnote 4, Document 307.

I do not, of course, know what he has in mind. But it is possible that we will be presented with a formula in which:

--Hanoi suggests that the GVN talk with the NLF in Vietnam;

--When we say that the GVN must also talk about the DMZ, the 1954 Accords, the 1962 Accords, and other aspects of peacemaking, they will say: only after a political negotiation for a settlement can a legitimate government enter into negotiations on these issues.

In short, Hanoi may come back at us with a split negotiation, not unlike the "second device" that Bunker did not much like.

I have talked to Katzenbach and Bundy/4/ and started thought on how this might be dealt with. It would be tough because there is a certain legitimacy in getting at the political settlement in the South first; and we have always said that the political settlement in the South is a matter for the South Vietnamese, not for Hanoi or Washington.

/4/William Bundy, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs.

W. W. Rostow/5/

/5/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

310. Memorandum of Conversation Between Secretary of State Rusk and Foreign Minister Gromyko/1/

New York, October 6, 1968.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Chlodnick. Top Secret; Eyes Only.

After dinner I drew Mr. Gromyko aside into a small drawing room and had a talk with him alone.

I started by emphasizing the importance and seriousness of the Rostow-Dobrynin discussions and said that the President was personally and directly involved in all aspects of those conversations. Mr. Gromyko said they understood this and attached the highest importance to such discussions.

I then said that we had been giving further thought to what Mr. Gromyko had said to me in my call on him at his Mission about Moscow's problem in dealing with Hanoi./2/ I said that the Soviet Leadership might wish to concentrate on the point of the necessity of GVN presence in any negotiations leaving to us the problem of pursuing other points, such as the DMZ and attacks on population centers, for direct discussions between our delegation and the Hanoi delegation in Paris. I wanted to be very clear to Mr. Gromyko that I was not in any sense withdrawing the importance we attached to such military points as the DMZ and attacks on the cities; it was very important that there be no misunderstanding between the USSR and the USG on such matters. It is a "fact of life" that no President could maintain a cessation of bombing if there were abuse of the DMZ or if the cities were attacked. However, the question of having the GVN at the conference table required a political decision; if Hanoi agreed this would represent a "major development" in the situation.

/2/See Document 307.

Gromyko was noncommittal in his comment and repeated what he had said earlier about the USSR being able to be more effective in advising Hanoi if there were a cessation of bombing. I got the impression that he listened carefully to the point I made but I could not report that he agreed to act on it.

He then asked about the portion of their earlier message which discussed general principles on strategic missiles and I repeated my earlier statement that I thought that that part of their message was constructive, and that we would give them a reply after we have had a chance to examine it in detail. He inquired about what our present thought was about a possible meeting and I said I had nothing more to say on that subject but that the Rostow-Dobrynin channel should be kept open and available for any further discussion.

We then adjourned to another room to join our other colleagues for a discussion of the Middle East./3/

/3/A memorandum of their conversation on the Middle East is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, volume XX.

Dean Rusk/4/

/4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

311. Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Bohlen) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/

Washington, October 15, 1968.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Bohlen Files: Lot 74 D 379, Memoranda Drafted in G. Secret. A handwritten note by Bohlen at the top of the memorandum reads: "Shown to Sec--not relevant--no discussion of meeting."

Mr. Secretary:

Believe me I am not trying to find out what you have been discussing with Ambassador Dobrynin, but I do venture to express the very strong hope that it is not for the purpose of arranging a meeting between the President and Kosygin. Any such meeting at this time would have nothing in my opinion but bad effect for the U.S. and its general position in the world.

1. It would undo all of the effect of our reaction to the Czech invasion and would undercut any attempts that we may make to strengthen NATO. It would be regarded widely, in Europe particularly, as condoning the Soviet action in Czechoslovakia. This is particularly true since the story in Czechoslovakia is by no means over and there may be a considerable number of disagreeable and brutal action in the cards for the relatively near future.

2. It is difficult to see anything that could be constructively accomplished by a meeting at this juncture. It would certainly confirm the Soviets in the belief that they can virtually do almost anything in the world and still have "business as usual" with the U.S. I cannot see any particular agreements that could be facilitated by a Summit Meeting that could not be handled through normal diplomatic channels. This includes Vietnam and the fixing of a date for the Disarmament Meeting.

3. If a possible Summit Meeting has not been the subject of your discussion with Dobrynin, then I will take back and destroy this memorandum.

CEB.

312. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, October 25, 1968, 9 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Chlodnick File. Secret; Harvan Double Plus; Literally Eyes Only for President and Secretary of State.

Mr. President:

I received Amb. Dobrynin at my house at 5:00 p.m. today, October 25. After brief amenities, I told him that the President wished me to review with him, on the same basis that we had earlier met, his concerns about the present situation with respect to the Vietnam negotiations./2/ I explained that the document I was about to give him was a personal oral communication reflecting what was on the President's mind.

/2/The negotiations leading up to the bombing halt over North Vietnam on October 31are extensively documented in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, volume VII. Documentation on the Soviet role is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Chlodnick File.

He read the document carefully (Tab A)./3/

/3/Not printed.

With respect to para. 1,/4/ he said that only he, Dobrynin, knows fully about the Paris negotiations and communications between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Tcherniakov, his DMC, knows half the story. No one else in the Embassy has the knowledge to speak with any authority on what is happening about Vietnam. When I pointed out to him that we had stories alleged to be from diplomatic sources in London, he said he could not assume responsibility for the Embassy in London. I said that I had no doubt about the correctness of his own behavior in this matter but we were confronted with a fact; namely, that stories were appearing, allegedly from Soviet sources; and we were confronted with a second fact; namely, that almost every newspaper man who came into my office told me that his favorite Soviet contact was telling him hopeful things about the negotiations and how peace was about to break out due to the role of the Soviet Union. He said that he had issued instructions to everyone in his Embassy not to talk about Vietnam. We ended by my underlining what the memorandum said; namely, that this was a problem for the President for the reasons indicated.

/4/Paragraph 1 stated that "the situation is made very difficult by reports to the press apparently or allegedly from Soviet diplomatic sources, stating that we are very close to an agreement."

Dobrynin then turned to substance. He said that he found the memorandum very "disappointing." He thought we were going back to matters which had long since been settled. As he understood the situation in Paris, there were three questions.

--First, how we refer to the participation of those who would take part in the talks. On this matter we had raised a "new point" by wanting to get into the secret minute that participation "would not involve recognition." Everyone agreed that "recognition" was not involved.

--Second, there was the question that the bombing cessation would be "unconditional." He said this was not a matter, in his judgment, of great importance. It was not worth sacrificing the whole meeting on this matter. I interrupted to point out that my memorandum to him/5/ explained fully why we took the question of "unconditional" so seriously. Dobrynin said he now recognized that we attached great importance to the matter and would so report.

/5/Not further identified.

--Third, there was the question of the date of cessation of the bombardment. He attached great importance to the fact that the North Vietnamese had set a date; namely, November 2. He could not understand why a few days one way or the other were so important to us when there were such great issues at stake. We have been arguing, he said, for two weeks over the question of 2 days.

I said to him it was not quite so simple. From our point of view, we had in good faith put in a proposal in mid-October. We had chosen "the next day" because of what they had said about beginning serious talks the day after the bombing cessation. (Dobrynin said this was a new idea to him. He had not known that they had mentioned the next day.) I went on to say that having geared ourselves to a final decision on the basis of what had been exchanged, Hanoi negotiators had then unleashed a great many "rabbits": a four-power conference; a communiqué; a secret minute; several weeks "as a gap between the bombing cessation and the first meeting"; no conditions; etc. It was Hanoi's behavior with respect to these matters which had deeply concerned the President, because they might reflect a lack of understanding of the "facts of life" and a lack of understanding of the seriousness of the problems that we faced in moving forward, especially at so sensitive a political time.

After some elaboration by me of the kinds of pressures represented by recent items on the ticker in our political life, Dobrynin said: "I now understand better. I thought that this message would take us back very far to where we began some months ago; but I should like to clear up one serious point: in communicating this message to my government, should I say that the President will not proceed with the Paris negotiations until he gets a response from the Soviet government on the question raised?" I said that it was my impression that the President had merely asked me to convey to Ambassador Dobrynin and his government his present concerns. The question he was asking, however, was a serious diplomatic question and I would seek an answer.

I then called the President and put the issue to him. The President said, no. I do not wish to be that hard. I do not wish to commit myself to holding up the Paris negotiations. I would wish to know the reaction of the Soviet government to this situation.

After this clarification, Dobrynin returned to the three points at stake in the Paris talks. He said: You and I can talk with brutal frankness and if I understand what you are telling me, it is that on one point you are prepared to compromise. That is, you are prepared to see the participants listed. But on two points you intend to hold firm; that is, on "without conditions" and time. At about this point I received a telephone call from Ben Read who told me that we would be prepared to tell the North Vietnamese in the context of the secret minute that we did not plan to use in formal statements the phrase "conditions." I informed Ambassador Dobrynin of this fact and said that now we were prepared to compromise on one and a half of the three points. It was time for them to clear this underbrush away.

At this point Dobrynin volunteered the following. He had been privileged to get the reports from both our side and from the Hanoi delegation. He could attest from his personal knowledge that we had "many, many times" made clear the "facts of life." I asked: "Are you, Ambassador Dobrynin, prepared to tell me that they understand the 'facts of life'?" He said, "I can only say that from their reports to me as well as your reports to our people in Paris, you have expressed yourselves very clearly."

At almost exactly 6:00 p.m., as Ambassador Dobrynin was about to leave, he received at my home a telephone call from Tcherniakov, his DCM. Tcherniakov reported that a message to the President from Kosygin had just arrived, on Vietnam. We consulted together as to where the message should be delivered. We decided to minimize the chances of a leak about our contact and Tcherniakov would deliver the message to my house. Dobrynin then dispatched his car to pick up

Tcherniakov, and we settled down to await him. (Up to this point, contrary to his custom, Dobrynin did not have a Scotch. He accepted, while awaiting Tcherniakov.)

During the interval, Dobrynin raised with me the question of missile talks. Where do we stand? I said that while the matter was still on the President's mind, he was much concentrated on the question of Vietnam. I then asked: "Was it true that the Warsaw Pact forces are moving out of Czechoslovakia?" He hastened to tell me that Bulgarian, Hungarian, and Polish as well as some Soviet forces were moving out of Czechoslovakia. He added, gratuituously, that there never had been any German forces in Czechoslovakia--which, I take it, will be the Soviet mythology in the face of protests of the other occupying powers of Germany.

He indicated his view that it would be a good thing if we could get on with the missile talks.

I took the occasion of the break to say that, on a strictly personal basis, if I had any advice to give the leaders of Hanoi, it would be to go very rapidly for a definitive settlement in Southeast Asia once the new phase of talks opened, assuming we could surmount present problems. I recalled that it only took a month's hard work in Geneva in 1954. He asked me why I thought there was urgency. I said there were two reasons:

--First, there would be a wave of expectation and goodwill in the U.S. in the wake of a bombing cessation, quiet at the DMZ, quiet in the cities, and GVN participation in Paris. But he had to remember that this was a country which had a scar on its heart over Panmunjom. If the talks dragged on, there would be grave disappointment.

--Second, as he could see from the polls, this country was undergoing a swing towards conservatism. This has happened before in our history, but it was clear that something like 60% of the people were for Nixon or Wallace. I could not predict what would happen if there was protracted frustration in the movement towards peace. It was my personal judgment, however, that there would be strong pressures to apply more military power in Vietnam rather than less.

I concluded by saying that in my quite objective judgment, it would be wise for the leaders of Hanoi to seize this moment and work with President Johnson towards the position he first outlined in his Johns Hopkins speech;/6/ namely, a position in which an independent North Vietnam associated itself not with China but with the other countries of Southeast Asia in constructive efforts at development. Only in this way was North Vietnam likely to maintain its independence. (Dobrynin showed surprising interest and concentration as I made this point.)

/6/For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965, Book I, pp. 394-399.

Tcherniakov then came in with the attached letter to the President from Kosygin (Tab B)./7/

/7/Not attached.

Dobrynin then gave me the following informal translation.

"Mr. President:

"Information we are receiving from official representatives of the United States as well as from the representatives of the DRV, shows that there is now beginning a very important movement in the U.S.-Vietnamese negotiations in Paris.

"Judging from this information, the position of the two sides on the cessation of bombardment, etc., is much closer. And the possibility of reaching an agreement on this question is quite real.

"By such an agreement we could lay the basis for a beginning of a breakthrough towards a political settlement of the Vietnam problem.

"If this possibility which now exists is missed--the development of events could go in a different direction.

"We are convinced that it is necessary that both sides show understanding and responsibility at this moment.

"In this connection, we should like to tell you quite frankly, Mr. President, that we are not completely convinced that the American side's actions in Paris have proceeded from this particular understanding of the situation.

"We are concerned that the achievement of an agreement in Paris on the cessation of the bombing of the DRV and the beginning of subsequent political talks with participation of the DRV, NLF, U.S. and the Saigon administration could be torpedoed because of details of third importance which, in reality, do not have any significance.

"We would like to hope that the government of the United States would understand its responsibility in connection with the present negotiations in Paris and would not let these negotiations to break but would use them to open the way to a peaceful settlement of the Vietnam problem, based on the respect of the legitimate rights and hopes of the Vietnamese people which correspond with the interest of the people of the United States and the peoples of the whole world."

On a wholly personal basis, I made the following observations to Dobrynin on this letter.

First, I would, of course, promptly communicate it to the President and to Secretary Rusk. Second, I found it good that on both sides there was an impulse to communicate when a matter of concern arose affecting the peace. Third, as my communication to him revealed, the President felt concerns of first importance in the light of the positions taken by North Vietnam, which Chairman Kosygin had described as third importance. The question of conditions and of timing were, from our point of view, major matters.

He said that the communication, which I had given him, and our discussion had made this clear and he would so inform his government.

As we went out to our respective cars, I looked at my watch and said: "Anatoliy, it is now midnight in Paris. You'd better get to work to clear up these issues of third importance." He said he would get busy but he didn't know what he could accomplish before the morning meeting in Paris.

Upon returning to my office, I then reported to the President that we had received the message from Kosygin and briefly summarized its substance.

The President instructed me that, after checking with Sec. Rusk, I should make the following points to Dobrynin.

"I have informed the President of Chairman Kosygin's message and he wished me to convey to you immediately the following points:

1. The President is gratified that both the Chairman and he were thinking of same problem at the same time.

2. The President has tried and is trying to find answers to these problems but has been unable to persuade the other side to meet us on acceptable terms. Perhaps Chairman Kosygin can help. Perhaps he can try to help move us closer.

3. The President wishes you to know that the points I made to you this afternoon are, in effect, his response to Chairman Kosygin. They represent the anxieties on the President's mind.

4. The President agrees with Chairman Kosygin that this is a critical phase. He would welcome any assistance the Chairman can give us in getting these issues solved. The President believes that, with the passage of a few more days, this possibility for progress might move away from us."

After briefing Sec. Rusk and reporting the President's four-point message, he suggested that I add the following additional point.

5. Therefore, the President believes that both sides should push these issues of third importance quickly aside and get on with the real business, which is making peace.

I then telephoned Ambassador Dobrynin and twice repeated these five points for urgent transmission to Moscow.

W. W. Rostow/8/

/8/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

313. Editorial Note

In a memorandum to the President composed at midnight on October 27, 1968, Walt Rostow recounted his meeting earlier that evening with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin. "I then explained bluntly the President's dilemma in having to take such a major step [as halting the bombing of North Vietnam] at such a critical political period in the U.S. with nothing more from Hanoi or Moscow than assent by silence. I indicated the importance that the President attached to some positive indication from the Soviet Union that there was reason to believe that it was Hanoi's intent to honor the understanding on the DMZ and the cities." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Chlodnick File) Rostow handed Dobrynin an oral communication that specified the three assumptions on which the President was proceeding in the negotiations--that the South Vietnamese would be received at the conference that followed the bombing halt and that, while discussions continued, North Vietnam would "respect" the demilitarized zone and South Vietnam's cities. The communication stated further that the President was "proceeding on these assumptions in the belief that Mr. Kosygin understands them and 'has reason to believe' that if the bombing stopped productive discussion could promptly follow." The President was "very anxious to have any comments or reaction Mr. Kosygin may have to these three points" and would "carefully weigh Mr. Kosygin's observations before making a decision." (Ibid.)

On October 28 the Soviet Government passed the following note to the U.S. Government:

"The progress made at the meetings in Paris between representatives of the DRV and the United States on the halt of the bombings of the DRV, on the opening of political negotiations and on the participants of these negotiations, is being noted with satisfaction in Moscow.

"The representatives of the United States in Paris have had more than once an opportunity [to get convinced in] to become sure of the seriousness of intentions of the Vietnamese side in the search for mutually acceptable solutions. The Vietnamese leaders have repeatedly told us as well about the seriousness of their intentions. The most recent facts, in our view, convincingly prove, that the Vietnamese side is doing everything possible to put an end to the war in Vietnam and reach a peaceful settlement on the basis of respect for the legitimate rights of the Vietnamese people.

"In this connection, it seems to us that doubts with regard to the position of the Vietnamese side are without foundation (groundless)." (Ibid. Brackets in the quoted paragraph.)

314. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State/1/

Moscow, November 11, 1968, 2020Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL US-USSR. Secret; Immediate; Exdis.

6409. Subject: McNamara-Kosygin Conversation.

1. Kornienko, Chief USA Section MFA, called me early November 11 to say that Kosygin, informed of McNamara's brief visit to Moscow en route Afghanistan and recalling their meeting at Glassboro, would be pleased to receive him at Kremlin office same afternoon. Kornienko indicated he aware McNamara on strictly private visit as tourist./2/

/2/McNamara was President of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development; he stepped down as Secretary of Defense on February 28, 1968.

2. Although this unsolicited invitation came as a surprise, it was evident that it could not be rejected without serious diplomatic repercussions. Meeting took place in Kosygin's office and lasted for one hour and forty-five minutes. Besides principals, an interpreter, a Soviet note-taker, Kornienko and I attended.

3. After pleasantries, Kosygin, who appeared relaxed and considerably more at ease than McNamara had remembered him at Glassboro, introduced subject of Vietnam. McNamara, disclaiming competence on this question since his departure from government, countered by introducing as topic his continuing interest in moving toward meaningful negotiations on limitation and reduction of strategic and other arms. At least half of subsequent conversation revolved about this topic.

4. Kosygin immediately inquired as to position of President-elect Nixon on missile talks. He then went on to say that USSR adheres to its former (read pre-Czechoslovakia) position that military budgets have reached impossible levels and that increasing them further could have unpredictable consequences. He said that USSR will cooperate in seeking further disarmament measures, will try to secure general adherence to NPT, and will follow course of "general lessening of tension."

5. McNamara replied that American people share these objectives. There followed a discursive analysis of whether mutual trust--a phrase introduced by Kosygin--need precede negotiations on limiting and reducing strategic delivery systems. McNamara pointed out that suspicions arising from differences in philosophy, political systems, power relationships, and history cannot be eliminated at once but that these need not hinder initiation of talks. He said he would have preferred talks to start two years ago. However complicated, difficult, and extensive they might prove to be, they were worth the effort.

6. Kosygin interjected that "both sides have enough." He described alternatives to disarmament as "insanity and war" and asserted that serious negotiations are essential. He then asked McNamara why US so suspicious of Soviet motives. US now spending 75 to 80 billion dollars per year on armaments and defense. This he described a "colossal" figure. McNamara said his military advisers had asked for more, to which Kosygin replied, with a smile, "military will usually ask for everything."

7. On US suspicions of Soviet motives, McNamara pointed out that philosophic and pragmatic differences between US and USSR are so great decades will be required to eliminate them. He said he saw no need to suspend arms talks in interim since mutual advantages, first in lessening dangers of nuclear conflagration and of mutual destruction, second in budgetary savings, underline need to proceed with talks as soon as possible.

8. After alleging that US Government had set first link in chain of mutual suspicions by intervening against newly emerged Soviet Russia 48 years ago, Kosygin struck a more serious note. He admitted existence of deep philosophic and pragmatic differences between our nations and said that "these exist and will continue to exist: they are irreconcilable." Despite these fundamental differences, he continued, USSR proceeds from policy of peaceful coexistence, "as old as Lenin." Our nations should proceed on this principle, irrespective of differing philosophies. Disarmament is an "imperative necessity," not because USSR is weak or that "we need it more than you." Soviet "humanistic society" favors disarmament as matter of principle. USSR adheres to position favoring a "gradual" solution of disarmament problems. McNamara responded by rejecting thesis that Soviet society more humanistic than American and by emphasizing risks in further accumulation means of mutual destruction and political and economic advantages of arms reductions.

9. During remainder of conversation Kosygin (a) inquired into financial policies and resources of IBRD without indicating more than polite interest; and (b) asked McNamara whether he believed US truck manufacturers would have some interest in USSR as market for production technology (Kosygin said USSR requires a sharp increase in truck production and highly evaluates US experience in this field). Full memcon on these topics and on conversation on disarmament summarized above will be pouched./3/

/3/A memorandum of conversation, drafted by Swank, is in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL US-USSR.

10. Comment: McNamara's impression is that Kosygin displayed infinitely more interest in disarmament generally and in talks on limitation and reduction of strategic delivery systems in particular than at Glassboro eighteen months ago. Despite Kosygin's disclaimer, McNamara believes that cost of escalating strategic arms and consequent impact on other essential problems is vital ingredient of Kosygin's very apparent interest in getting talks under way.

11. For man whose face easily reflects tension and fatigue, Kosygin looked relatively relaxed and composed, he nevertheless frequently seemed at once assertive and defensive about Soviet accomplishments, noting that "even Tashkent wants a subway now," recalling Soviet aid to Afghanistan ("marvelous engineering of mountain roads, natural gas lines, irrigation projects, etc."), and asserting that despite expected rise in auto production USSR will avoid congestion of New York, Paris Rome and London. Despite these boastful interludes, he was amiable throughout conversation.

12. Without reading more into conversation than it merits, we nevertheless think it noteworthy that Kosygin took initiative for this meeting. He obviously had missile talks and Soviet truck production on his mind, but he was probably also prepared to hold forth on Vietnam had McNamara led conversation in that direction. It seems to me that primary significance of meeting may lie in fact Kosygin was making gesture of friendship to first distinguished American of his acquaintance who has come through Moscow since August invasion of Czechoslovakia. That subject, incidentally, did not arise during conversation./4/

/4/On November 14 Rostow forwarded to the President a November 12 Intelligence Note from Thomas Hughes of INR to Acting Secretary of State Katzenbach that analyzed Kosygin's talk with McNamara. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President--Walt Rostow, Vol. 105)

Swank

315. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Washington, November 12, 1968.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President--Walt Rostow, Vol. 105. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Thompson and approved in S/S on November 13. Rostow forwarded the memorandum to the President under a November 14 covering note. (Ibid.) The memorandum is part 1 of 3. Part 2 is Document 316. In part 3 Dobrynin indicated that he anticipated returning shortly to Moscow for consultations but did not expect to remain long as Ambassador after the new administration took over. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President--Walt Rostow, Vol. 105)

SUBJECT
Luncheon Meeting between Ambassadors Thompson and Dobrynin

PARTICIPANTS
Llewellyn E. Thompson, American Ambassador, Moscow
Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, Soviet Ambassador, US

At luncheon today Ambassador Dobrynin asked me what I thought could or should happen in Soviet-American relations during the period from the present time until the inauguration of the new administration./2/ He asked whether we would simply have to mark time or whether there were some problems on which progress could be made.

/2/Richard Nixon defeated Hubert Humphrey in the presidential election on November 5.

I referred to the public statements by the President and the President-Elect following their meeting yesterday/3/ but said I had no information other than that which had appeared in the press. I felt sure that if possible we should try to make progress on such international problems as the Middle East and, of course, Viet-Nam. In connection with the latter problem I mentioned the reports of violations of the DMZ and said I trusted his government realized how serious these developments were.

/3/For text of their public statements, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1968, Book II, pp. 1119-1120. A record of their meeting, during which they discussed the transition and reviewed major foreign policy issues, is at the Johnson Library, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings. Also attending were Rusk, Clifford, Wheeler, Helms, Rostow, and Tom Johnson. According to the record of the meeting, the possibility of a U.S.-U.S.S.R. summit meeting was not discussed.

Ambassador Dobrynin said that he was quite sure that the North Vietnamese did not intend to break down the agreement.

The Ambassador raised the question of the NPT and referred to the statement by Senator Mansfield that he might bring this up with the new Congress as soon as it was convened. I said I did not know what the thinking about timing was but I felt sure that we would, in due course, proceed with the ratification of the agreement.

The Ambassador also raised the question of missile talks. I referred to reports of Mr. McNamara's discussions in Moscow. I said that again I was not aware what decisions, if any, might have been taken here. I agreed when the Ambassador remarked that the ball was in our court, and said I assumed that Mr. Nixon had discussed this with President Johnson, but did not know what had transpired.

316. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Washington, November 12, 1968.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President--Walt Rostow, Vol. 105. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Thompson and approved in S/S on November 13. Rostow forwarded the memorandum to the President under a November 14 covering note. (Ibid.)

SUBJECT
Luncheon Meeting between Ambassadors Thompson and Dobrynin

PARTICIPANTS
Llewellyn E. Thompson, American Ambassador, Moscow
Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, Soviet Ambassador, US

Ambassador Dobrynin asked for my personal advice on what he or his Embassy should do with respect to the President-Elect. He understood that Mr. Nixon would probably remain in New York until the inauguration and that it was unlikely that he would have an occasion to see him. He wondered whether he should try to get in touch with any of the people around Mr. Nixon. He thought the matter was somewhat delicate as he did not wish in any way to appear to be pushing or to forget the fact that President Johnson would be in office until January 20.

I suggested that he would probably be well advised to take no initiative in the matter, but to be available if any of Mr. Nixon's advisers should approach him./2/

/2/See footnote 1, Document 334.

I asked what his views were on a possible summit meeting between Mr. Nixon and the Soviet leaders.

The Ambassador replied that his personal view was that he was very much in favor of a summit meeting and thought that the sooner it took place, the better, although Moscow would realize that this was a matter involving US domestic considerations. He thought the Soviet leaders would be quite prepared to meet Mr. Nixon either before or after the inauguration./3/

/3/In telegram 6642 from Moscow, November 29, Thompson reported this conversation to Rusk and indicated that in a November 19 letter he had passed on the information to Robert D. Murphy, whom Nixon had named as his liaison to Secretary Rusk. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President--Walt Rostow, Vol. 109)

317. Information Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, November 14, 1968, 3:30 p.m.

/1/Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Chlodnick File. Top Secret; Sensitive; Literally Eyes Only.

Mr. President:

Dobrynin's agenda for lunch/2/ was quite clear:

--Vietnam;
--missile talks.

/2/Reference is to Rostow's lunch meeting with Dobrynin on November 14.

1. With respect to Vietnam, he was primarily interested in knowing how we were getting on with Saigon. I explained some of Saigon's difficulties, emphasizing the role of Hanoi, VC, and Paris propaganda. I hit hard on the DMZ and firing upon our reconnaissance planes./3/ I told him I was temperately optimistic about the GVN getting to Paris, but could give him no time.

/3/See special memo on reconnaissance. [Handwritten footnote in the source text. The memorandum is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, volume VII.]

He said he hoped it could be soon. We were losing momentum. He expressed the hope that when they got to Paris they would be able to organize private talks in various pairings.

With respect to Saigon and the NLF, he said that they would not come hat in hand to Thieu begging forgiveness but would negotiate hard on the basis of the population and territory they held, plus their program for the future of the country.

I said the critical matter, in my view, for Saigon and the NLF was to get off together up a back street in Paris and talk about the substance of the matter rather than jockeying publicly for face and position. He agreed.

His final remark of the lunch was as follows: "Off the record, I wish to tell you that we have had as much trouble with Hanoi as you are having with Saigon. The only difference is that your troubles take place in public."

2. Missile talks. I told him that there might be advantages in opening the missile talks soon; but two things would be required if the President could have a strong case:

--an atmosphere that made such talks politically possible;
--clarity about the result.

He picked this up with the confidence of a man who had full instructions.

Dobrynin said that his government felt that it was important

not to lose momentum in the missile talks, and it was equally important that we create a good atmosphere for the passage of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. He felt that it would be a great contribution to the future of U.S.-Soviet relations if President Johnson could get these talks started very soon, because it would lay a basis for moving rapidly with the next Administration.

He then turned very professionally to:

--What are the conditions?
--What do you want by way of an outcome?

With respect to conditions, I pointed out that the effort had been frustrated by their move into Czechoslovakia. The critical thing for us to know is that there was a clear dated plan for the movement of Soviet troops out of Czechoslovakia.

He asked: Does that mean all troops? If it does, you should know that some troops will remain.

I said that I could not talk for the President in this matter, but my impression was that the troop withdrawal issue had to be clear and Czechoslovakia, in general, quiet. He said he would try to get for me information on the timing of the troop withdrawal schedule, although he added that he thought our intelligence people were probably well informed.

I then said that it was a fact of life that trouble in Berlin would not create a proper atmosphere for moving forward. He said that the Soviet Union did not wish trouble in Berlin. It was Moscow's impression, however, that Bonn was playing a game of mounting more and more meetings in Berlin as a provocation. Bonn rather hoped that there would be trouble, and this would serve as an excuse for postponing the NPT and obstructing U.S.-Soviet relations. He first said that Bonn was creating "new precedents" in the meetings it mounted in Berlin. When I challenged him on this, he shifted to: They are pushing too many meetings in Berlin in too short a period of time. I said I would check this, but that was not my impression. He ended by saying he would report our feeling about Berlin as an environmental condition.

He then turned to the proposed result of the meeting. He said he had assumed from our previous conversations that a meeting would:

--exchange technical papers and explain them;
--leave detailed negotiation for a later time; and
--issue an agreed set of guiding principles.

He then put this question: Are the principles which I transmitted to you from the Chairman (attached at Tab A) satisfactory?/4/ Are there any clarifications that you wish in those principles? Is there anything you would like to add? He said that his government would, in his view, be glad to exchange views at the Ambassadorial level, via Tommy Thompson in Moscow, or elsewhere, so that President Johnson could have in hand the concrete result he wanted before proceeding to a final decision on a Summit Meeting on missiles. He was sure that his government would negotiate in good faith to try to achieve this result.

/4/Document 308.

I said that I could not tell him whether the President would regard as a sufficient end result a meeting of the kind he described ending up with the publication of the principles as he had transmitted them to us. I told him I would be in touch with the President and let him know.

As we left, he pressed this point hard and asked when I could be back to him with an answer to this question. I said that I could give him no time. It was possible that the President would wish to consult Secretary Rusk, who is out of the country./5/

/5/Rusk was attending the NATO Ministerial Meeting in Brussels.

He ended the discussion by saying he was sure his government was prepared to move fast on missile talks. He would inform them of the two conditions I had raised concerning the environment for such talks. He urged us to let him know if the "concrete result" we wish to have in hand was satisfactory and, if not satisfactory, how we would wish it changed.

3. We then exchanged views on the Middle East. He thought we should both work to try to get Jarring to lay on the table a proposal which had the backing of the U.S. and the Soviet Union. He said that he had transmitted his conversation with E.V. Rostow to Moscow and hoped for an early response. I asked him whether he thought Cairo was ready for peace. He said: Yes, if it did not involve a public acknowledgment of defeat. I asked if that included letting the Israeli ships go through the canal. He said that he thought that Cairo was unhinging the link between Israeli shipping and the refugee problem; but it would probably try to keep the Israeli ships as a "late item" in the settlement.

4. General Observations. We exchanged reflections on the last eight years. He said he thought this had been a period of "missed opportunities" in which the fault lay on both sides. Nevertheless, we had made some progress. It would be a great thing if we were to set the missile talks in motion soon and lay a framework for continuity into the next Administration while accelerating the passage of the NPT.

Walt

318. Information Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, November 14, 1968, 5:30 p.m.

/1/Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Chlodnick File. Top Secret; Sensitive; Literally Eyes Only. The memorandum is marked with a "ps," indicating that the President saw it.

Mr. President:

Herewith an initial comment on Dobrynin's position at the lunch he initiated.

1. Moscow is clearly ready to go--and eager--if you can work it out.

2. Their reasons are quite similar to our own: to create a good backdrop for the NPT in January; to keep the momentum of the work on missiles going into the next Administration; and, therefore, to avoid a long delay in both the NPT and the missile affairs./2/

/2/For CIA's analysis of Soviet reasons for favoring an early start to missile talks, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XI, Document 296.

3. Reading over the proposed joint communiqué statement on the missile talks,/3/ I have two reflections:

/3/Presumably a reference to the principles proposed by the Soviet Government in Document 308.

--first, they need some staffing out by Sect. Rusk and a few others;

--basically, they represent the kind of public commitment that might emerge; although the heart of the matter will lie not in the public statement of principles, but rather in the simple fact that initial positions have been exchanged between the two governments and that further rational negotiation can proceed early in the next Administration.

4. The heart of the matter, then, is not so much in the refinement of the principles, but in persuading Nixon that this is the right course for him, for the President, and for the nation.

5. With respect to a rationale for Nixon, these are key points:

--we have been working on this since January 1964, and working intensively since the Glassboro sessions;

--we start with a position which is fully acceptable to the JCS and all civilian authorities in the government;

--any modifications and negotiations from that position will lie in the hands of the next Administration;

--a coming to grips with this matter at an early date would make it easier to get the NPT through the Senate in January;

--equally important, if Nixon encourages the President to go forward with this, it will virtually guarantee Soviet restraint on Berlin and Eastern Europe in the first phase of his Administration because once the talks are started, the Soviet Union will have a major interest in not creating circumstances which would require that they be broken off. We have been clear with them about both Berlin and Czechoslovakia.

6. I have no doubt that there will be those who argue to Nixon that he should wait and take this matter in hand himself. I understand very well the leverage we had on him on the Vietnam matter; but I am not clear what leverage the President will have on this issue except:

--his power of initiative even without Nixon's assent;

--an appeal to statesmanship and self-interest.

Walt

319. Weekly Summary/1/

0047/68

Washington, November 15, 1968.

/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency: Job 79-T00936A. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. The Weekly Summary was issued every Friday morning by CIA's Office of Current Intelligence. Printed here are pages 11-12.

MOSCOW SEEKS A RETURN TO NORMAL RELATIONS WITH THE WEST

Moscow is making a determined effort to restore a business-as-usual atmosphere to its relations with the West. The Soviet aim is to implant the notion that Soviet domination of Eastern Europe--on which Moscow has been insisting vehemently--is one thing, while "détente" is another. To this end, the Soviets have toned down their propaganda attacks on the West, have made a number of conciliatory gestures on particular issues, and have tried to revive interest in questions of mutual East-West concern.

The USSR has publicly and privately made clear that it is willing to begin exploratory talks with the US on limitation of strategic weapons. At a Soviet anniversary reception in London last week, for example, a Russian diplomat urged that the US get on with arms discussions. In the main address at the celebration of the Bolshevik Revolution in Moscow on 7 November, First Deputy Premier Mazurov reiterated Russia's readiness to do so, as did the Soviet ambassador at the UN in a major speech on disarmament this week. Premier Kosygin was apparently eager to convey the same message to former Defense Secretary McNamara in Moscow this week./2/

/2/See Document 314.

The Russians also have moved recently to conclude some minor agreements with the US on which both sides had been marking time, including a long-planned exchange of new embassy sites. The purpose of these actions clearly was to hasten the end of the period of coolness in Soviet-American relations which set in with the invasion of Czechoslovakia. In addition, the Soviets and their East German allies refrained from retaliatory moves during a fortnight of West German meetings in Berlin, although Moscow may yet give East Germany the green light to impose new restrictions on West German access to Berlin. It seems clear, however, that the Soviets wish to avoid the kind of harassment that could lead to a Soviet-Allied confrontation.

The Soviets recently took pains to receive amiably the UK's new ambassador in Moscow. President Podgorny contended that Anglo-Soviet relations had suffered "unnecessarily" as a result of the Czechoslovak affair.

Moscow's diplomatic efforts have resulted in the rescheduling for this winter of a session of the Franco-Soviet "Grande Commission" on cooperative projects, which was due to meet in September but had been postponed by Paris. The Soviets have studiously avoided including France in their press attacks on the "imperialist" West since the Czechoslovak invasion in order to maintain at least the appearance of a special "détente" with Paris. Recently, some of the venom has been dropped from Soviet propaganda directed at West Germany, a favorite target. Indeed, Moscow has made the gesture of offering to reopen negotiations with Bonn on a civil air agreement. Moreover, the USSR has generally muted its anti-Western propaganda, and for several weeks has ceased to accuse the US of having incited Czechoslovak "reactionaries."

Other efforts to improve the Soviet image can be found in the succession of high-level foreign visitors welcomed in the USSR. Since the invasion, ranking officials from all of the non-Communist countries on Russia's borders except Turkey and Norway have received the red carpet treatment.

320. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, November 20, 1968, 12:30 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Strategic Missile Talks. Top Secret; Sensitive; Literally Eyes Only.

Mr. President:

You asked me to develop a plan to get the missile talks started at the highest level.

1. Problems

--Czechoslovakia.

The military situation is that the Soviets appear to be down to three divisions plus some headquarters troops. That is probably rock bottom. They have pulled their forces away from the German frontier and are not, therefore, in a tactically threatening position with respect to NATO. My judgment about Soviet troops is that we have that issue in about as good shape as we can get it. It should not be a barrier to strategic missile talks.

With respect to Czech politics, the situation is less clear. Obviously, Czech liberals and Soviet-backed conservatives are still struggling with the conservatives, making progress, but not winning. The students and the unions seem to have made effective common cause. I would say that unless we get demonstrations and strikes with bloody repression, we could probably live with the Czech domestic political situation.

--In making the case to our people for going ahead with strategic missile talks, however, we would have to acknowledge that the whole intervention was tragic. We could not gloss it over. We could say something that is true: It is in the interest of the Czechs as well as all humanity that we proceed with the strategic missile talks.

--Berlin.

Recent alarums proved false. My guess is that Berlin would be quiet if we went ahead.

--The text of the Joint Communiqué on Missiles.

I re-read what the Soviets added. One of their paragraphs talks about "equal security should be assured for both sides." If this is interpreted to mean that each side should be left with an assured second strike capability, we could buy it. We would have to make sure, however, that the Soviets did not read this as meaning that we were going for equal numbers in all categories. This we could not buy.

--More generally, I think we would have to come back to the Soviets with our own redraft of the present combination of their points and our points before we could be confident that the result would be acceptable. Bob Murphy could work with Secretary Rusk on this once the President and Mr. Nixon had agreed in principle that we should go forward.

--The major problem is Nixon and his willingness either to support an early meeting on missiles at the highest level, or not to oppose it. I repeat the paragraph from my previous memo:/2/

/2/Document 318.

"With respect to a rationale for Nixon, these are key points:

--we have been working on this since January 1964, and working intensively since the Glassboro sessions;

--we start with a position which is fully acceptable to the JCS and all civilian authorities in the government;

--any modifications and negotiations from that position will lie in the hands of the next Administration;

--a coming to grips with this matter at an early date would make it easier to get the NPT through the Senate in January;

--equally important, if Nixon encourages the President to go forward with this, it will virtually guarantee Soviet restraint on Berlin and Eastern Europe in the first phase of his Administration because once the talks are started, the Soviet Union will have a major interest in not creating circumstances which would require that they be broken off. We have been clear with them about both Berlin and Czechoslovakia."

2. In retrospect, I think that last point could be made very strongly to him. In general, my somewhat amateur political advice would be this:

--Tell Nixon you have decided to go ahead if you can get agreement along the lines of the principles already built into the U.S. national position;

--Give him the option of coming along, like Attlee with Churchill to Potsdam;

--Give him the option also of having Murphy come along;

--Before seeing Nixon, however, make sure we have an agreed redraft of the principles we would put to Moscow cleared by the JCS. That is the first preliminary technical job. I would suggest that Sect. Rusk be asked by you to take it in hand promptly.

3. Your case for doing it before January is exceedingly strong because:

--You have put almost five years' work into it, including intensive work in the last year and a half;

--The opening of these talks could ease the NPT problem enormously.

Walt

321. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Washington, November 25, 1968, 1 p.m.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 17 USSR-US. Secret. Drafted by Bohlen and approved in S/S on November 25.

SUBJECT
Luncheon Discussion

PARTICIPANTS
The Secretary
Deputy Under Secretary Charles E. Bohlen
Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, USSR

At the beginning of the luncheon today/2/ Ambassador Dobrynin raised the following points with the Secretary: (1) the status of the repatriation treaty for astronauts; (2) the discussion with the Soviets of territorial waters; (3) the American reaction to the latest Soviet offer in regard to the Embassy plots; (4) the question of the peaceful uses of atomic energy; and finally, (5) the status of the Ivanov case. The Secretary asked Mr. Bohlen to check on these points but said in regard to the Ivanov case that this would have to wait the disposition of the case before the Supreme Court.

/2/The major portion of the conversation at this meeting was reported in Document 325.

Mr. Bohlen checked on the above matters and found out: (1) The dates of either the 3rd, 5th or 10th of December had been suggested to the White House for signature of the repatriation treaty for astronauts, but no reply had been received from the White House./3/ (2) Territorial waters--we are prepared to go ahead and Meeker was supposed to discuss with Vorontsov. (3) Embassy plots--we have decided to accept the Soviet proposition and the Embassy has been suitably informed. There is here a problem of hearings under District law before the Washington plot can be transferred to the Soviets. (4) Peaceful uses--it was ascertained that this had been placed on ice for the time being.

/3/The Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts, and the Return of Objects Launched Into Outer Space entered into force on December 3 with the deposit in Washington, London, and Moscow of instruments of ratification by the three depository governments. A separate rather than a joint deposit procedure was followed. The State Department favored the former "in keeping with our post-Czech invasion attitude toward the Soviets," according to a November 22 memorandum from Rostow to the President. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, USSR, Vol. XXII)

Note: Mr. Bohlen informed Ambassador Dobrynin of the foregoing by telephone.

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