296. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, September 13, 1968, 1:45 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Chlodnick File. Top Secret; Sensitive; For the Eyes of the President and Secretary Rusk Only.

Mr. President:

Just before 1:00 p.m. this afternoon, Ambassador Dobrynin called on me to deliver orally the attached note. He left behind, however, his handwritten translation from which we typed up his communication, literally./2/

/2/The typed communication is printed below; the handwritten translation from which it was made is attached but not printed.

When he had concluded, I raised the following points, after explaining that I had no other instruction except to receive his message and that what I was about to say was personal and informal.

1. Had he, in informing Moscow, made absolutely clear the distinction between my formal message to him and our informal discussion?/3/ He said: "Absolutely." But he evidently understood my major anxiety with this message, which was the phrase "questions named by the American side." He knew that the Middle East and Vietnam had been raised in our conversation not by me but by him. He added, therefore, that the "two subjects of interest to the American side" had been "often discussed between him and Secretary Rusk." I draw the conclusion, therefore, that in reporting he did not make it quite clear to Moscow that the notion of a Summit embracing the Middle East and Vietnam was, so far as our conversation was concerned, his idea and not mine, although I joined readily into the exchange of informal views.

/3/See Document 295.

2. I recalled that I had given him copies of the Dirksen and Hruska speeches and noted that there was, perhaps understandably, no reference to Czechoslovakia in this message. I asked, then, was he sure that the men in Moscow understood the relationship of Czechoslovakia to any possible meeting? He said: "Certainly, absolutely." I then asked what his personal view was about Czechoslovakia in the days ahead: would things get better, or worse? He said: "I believe, better."

3. He then asked me if I thought we would have an immediate response so that he should stay in town and not go to New York later this afternoon, remaining there Saturday./4/ I said that if I were he, I would proceed to New York. He said he would certainly be back in town on Sunday and could return to Washington if there was urgency.

/4/September 14.

4. In leaving, he asked if we could furnish him with a copy of the picture taken of him at the Cabinet table delivering the message on Czechoslovakia on August 20. I said that I would look into this somewhat ghoulish request.

Walt

Attachment/5/

Message From the Government of the Soviet Union to the Government of the United States

Moscow, September 13, 1968.

/5/No classification marking. The September 13 date is not included on the handwritten message.

(copy of Ambassador Dobrynin's handwritten paper)

1. As before the attitude in Moscow is positive to the idea of meeting with the President of the United States for an exchange of opinions on questions of mutual interest. The wish of President Johnson to have some degree of certitude in the positive outcome of his possible visit to the Soviet Union is understandable to us. It is also far from being indifferent to us what will be the result of such an exchange of opinions, though it is obvious that efforts from both sides will be needed to gain a success.

There is no objection in Moscow as to a discussion during such a meeting of questions named by the American side: curbing to strategic armaments race, question of Viet-Nam and the situation in the Middle East; this, of course, does not exclude the possibility of an exchange of opinions on other questions too.

2. So far as the question of strategic armaments is concerned, our point of view is that an exchange of opinions on this question during the meeting could result in an agreement that fulfilment of certain restraining measures in this field would answer to the interests of both our countries as well as to the task of strengthening international security. It would be possible to agree further on certain basic principles of limitation and then reduction in complex of both the offensive strategic nuclear weapons delivery systems and the systems of defense against ballistic missiles, having in mind that this would constitute a directive of the two Governments to their delegations to engage then in working out of an agreement on the concrete aspects of this problem.

3. We are ready to exchange opinions on Vietnam with the understanding also of the fact that the Soviet Union cannot be a substitution in this question for the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and for the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam. We think that such an exchange of opinions can be useful if to proceed from the fact that continuation of the war in Vietnam benefits nobody but those who would like to bring the United States and the Soviet Union into collision, and that the solution of the Vietnam problem can be found not on the battlefield.

We did already express to President Johnson our conviction that the current meetings in Paris between representatives of the DRV and the United States give an opportunity to find a way out from the present situation. We continue to believe--and it is not without grounds--that if the United States completely stop bombings and other military actions against the DRV it could create a turning point at the meetings in Paris and would open perspectives for serious negotiations on political questions of a settlement.

4. On the ways of settlement of the Middle Eastern conflict the Soviet Government has not long ago expressed to the Government of the United States a number of concrete considerations. For progress in this question it is necessary, of course, that both sides should proceed from undesirability of a new aggravation in this region. This, in its turn, provides for the necessity to liquidate the consequences of last year's aggression of Israel against the Arab states and first of all--for the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the territories occupied by them, together with the end of state of belligerency between Israel and the Arabs, recognition of the right of each State of this region to existence and respect of its sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence.

The striving for the political settlement of the problems of the Middle East is now, as it is known to us, a determining factor among the Arab leaders and we have made and are making all that depends on us to have this understanding strengthened in those countries of this region whose Governments listen to our opinion.

If the Government of the United States takes on its part the similar course in its relations with Israel this will greatly facilitate the stabilizing of the situation in the Middle East. Israel must withdraw its forces from the occupied Arab territories, then the threat to its existence will vanish just by itself. Then a perspective will be open of a real normalization of situation in all this region. If the forces of Israel were withdrawn from the occupied Arab territories then it would be possible to consider in the practical aspect also the question of curbing unnecessary and wasteful arms race in the Middle East; we do remember President Johnson's interest in this question. We are in principle in favour of this and we believe that corresponding steps in such direction would not contradict the interests of the countries of this region. If we had such understanding between our Governments it would be then possible to find a form of informing the public opinion (bringing it to the public).

5. Provided there is will of both sides, steps of no small importance can be made in the forthcoming months in the field of Soviet-American relations and thus not a bad foundation can be laid for further development of these relations in future.

Concerning the idea which is being planted by some people that the agreement of the Soviet leaders to meet with President Johnson was allegedly guided by motivations of conjuncture [in his conversation with me, Dobrynin went to some lengths to explain the meaning in English of this Russian phrase in its political context. It means a short-run, expedient, perhaps insincere political motivation. Technically, the word, derived from the German, means fluctuating.]/6/ the meaning of such allegations must be clear to the President. Of course they do not reflect our approach to the relations with the United States. Basic long-range interests of our countries and interests of peace in general are the determining factors in these relations. Our point of view lies in the very belief that current events, no matter how differently they can be perceived and interpreted, should not overshadow these long-ranged interests.

/6/Brackets in the source text.

297. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, September 13, 1968, 3 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Chlodnick File. Top Secret; Literally Eyes Only.

Mr. President:

Herewith very tentative first thoughts on the Soviet message of today.

1. The Soviet message is basically responsive in that it suggests what a communiqué might look like out of a meeting between the President and Kosygin.

--The formula on missile talks is probably as far as one could go unless one were immediately to exchange position papers and try to get a bit more substance into the communiqué.

--A good deal of work would have to be done on the Middle Eastern section because they have in it both the language of the November resolution and some of their old ritual about first withdrawal and then peace. But, presumably some hard work between Sec. Rusk and Dobrynin might get something mutually acceptable.

--On Vietnam, the language sounds okay but they are obviously suggesting a bombing cessation on the basis of their word. In his conversation with me, however, Dobrynin said "he had hoped that if we could not act immediately" upon the Soviet proposal "we would come back with a proposition which 'Kosygin and his colleagues' might press on Hanoi." Obviously the best setting for a meeting in Geneva would be a bombing halt achieved on the basis of the principles you have laid down.

--On Czechoslovakia, I do not see how the President could go forward unless the Soviets had publicly agreed to a date for the withdrawal of their troops from Czechoslovakia.

2. I, therefore, suggest--tentatively--that you talk over this message quietly with Sec. Rusk; you consider with him whether he should not call in Dobrynin on Sunday and say:

--that we found the Moscow message responsive and constructive;

--that it would be enormously helpful for such a meeting if there were a bombing cessation at the time it took place;

--that they should urge their Hanoi friends to try intensively in Paris to discover, with Harriman and Vance, a version of the Zorin formula or some other formula that would permit the President to call a bombing cessation in terms of the principles he has publicly laid down;

--that it is equally important for the total environment of the conference that the Czech crisis be greatly eased; and a stated

--schedule for the withdrawal of Soviet and other Warsaw Pact forces from Czechoslovakia, which Dobrynin promised the President on August 20, would be immensely helpful.

In short, if we had a bombing cessation formula and a Soviet troop withdrawal announcement, we would have the proper environment for the meeting.

Sec. Rusk could then state that until these questions were answered, the President could not make a firm and definite commitment. In the meanwhile, he, Sec. Rusk, was willing to work with Dobrynin on the appropriate formulae for a conference communiquéto see if there was, in fact, the basis for significant joint statements on the three issues. The formula on the missile talks looked promising; there were difficulties that would have to be ironed out with respect to the Middle East formula; the formula on Vietnam required that we find the "appropriate conditions" for a bombing cessation and that the Hanoi delegation in Paris go to work in the greatest seriousness and urgency on substantive issues immediately upon a bombing cessation, recognizing that the GVN must have a critical role in this settlement while, of course, the NLF could also participate.

3. If, in fact, we can find livable conditions for a Summit meeting in, say, Geneva, the President could meet thereafter with the NATO Chiefs of Government, both to report the results and to consolidate whatever measures might be agreed to strengthen NATO; and he could then proceed to the Far East to meet with the Chiefs of Government of the troop contributing nations.

4. As I say, these are first, tentative thoughts.

Walt

298. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, September 13, 1968, 6:40 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Chlodnick File. Top Secret; Literally Eyes Only.

Mr. President:

Sect. Rusk and I met at 5:30 this afternoon to discuss Dobrynin's message.

We talked on the basis of the attached memo to you from me (Tab A)./2/ Sect. Rusk believes that he should talk with you about this tomorrow (Saturday), preferably in the morning, or late in the afternoon, because he has a commitment to go to the baseball game tomorrow afternoon with the Diplomatic Corps--his only baseball game of the year.

/2/Document 297.

Sect. Rusk will speak for himself tomorrow, but he seemed intrigued by the Soviet message. The two key points were the proper ones; that is, a schedule of Soviet troop withdrawals from Czechoslovakia and a formula for a bombing cessation and getting on with the Paris talks. We both agreed that there was, in fact, more in the Soviet Middle East message than this paper suggested (the suggestion of the belligerents signing a "multilateral" document of peace, and the idea of a Four-Power guarantee of the borders).

We talked reflectively about a possible formula for a bombing cessation. The attached cable from Paris (Tab B)/3/ shows Manac'h on the same line that Dobrynin was with me and which Burchett foreshadowed the other day; namely, that we have a bombing cessation in return for a protracted lull. Sect. Rusk speculated that if the President had assurances--either in Paris or via the Russians--that there would be no shelling across the DMZ, no gross violations of the DMZ, no attacks on major populated centers in South Vietnam, and an agreement that the GVN would become party to the post-bombing cessation negotiations, the President could say: "Against the background of the previous statements that I have made and on the basis of information available to me at the present time, I have concluded that a bombing cessation at the present time has a chance of advancing the cause of peace."

/3/At Tab B is telegram 20830 from Paris, September 13. Etienne Manac'h was Director of Asian Affairs, French Foreign Ministry.

In any case, Sect. Rusk will be turning this matter over in his mind and will be at your disposal tomorrow--or, if it is more convenient, on Sunday.

Walt

Set up meeting with Sect. Rusk
No
Call me/4/

/4/None of the three options is checked.

299. Memorandum From the Government of the United States to the Government of the Soviet Union/1/

Washington, September 16, 1968.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Chlodnick File. No classification marking. Rostow handed the memorandum to Dobrynin during a meeting that began at 6 p.m. on September 16; see Document 300.

The President has considered very carefully the observations made by Ambassador Dobrynin on September 13./2/ He attaches serious importance to the understanding of Soviet leaders that a positive outcome of a highest level meeting between the two sides is essential to a success; and he agrees that this requires efforts from both sides.

/2/See Document 296.

The President wishes the Soviet leadership to have his further reflections about how such a success could be achieved.

With respect to offensive and defensive missiles, the President agrees that it ought to be possible to establish certain common basic principles affecting the limitation and subsequent reduction in such nuclear weapons systems. He further agrees that, following an accord on general principles at the highest level, representatives of the two sides would have to address themselves to the translation of general principles into the more concrete aspects of the problem.

It would, however, be desirable to go beyond a general statement that "restraining measures in this field would answer to the interests of both our countries as well as to the task of strengthening international security." With this in mind, the President would be glad to know whether the Soviet leaders could accept the following general objectives as guidance for our respective delegations or would wish to suggest any amendments for his consideration:

--To achieve and maintain a stable U.S.-Soviet strategic deterrence by agreed limitations on the deployment of offensive and defensive strategic missiles.

--To enhance the credibility of our efforts to prevent the destabilizing actions of other nations by demonstrating U.S. and Soviet willingness to limit their strategic missile forces.

--To provide assurance to each of us that our security will be maintained, while at the same time avoiding the tensions, uncertainties, and costs of an unrestrained continuation of the strategic arms race.

--To improve U.S.-Soviet understanding by establishing a continuing process of discussion of issues arising from the strategic situation.

The President believes that it would be highly desirable for both sides to do their utmost to find a way to move the Vietnam problem toward a peaceful settlement. No other accomplishment, which might result from a high level meeting, could match a good result on this problem. A significant forward step not only could make a major contribution to peace in Southeast Asia but it could provide the opportunity for general progress in reducing tensions and solving other issues in the interest of a general peace throughout the world.

The President is under no illusions that peace in Southeast Asia will be possible unless both sides desire it. For his part, he earnestly desires peace in Southeast Asia if it can be achieved in a way which is consistent with the vital interests of the United States and its allies in that part of the world. He hopes very much that the leaders in Hanoi desire a peace which affords the Democratic Republic of Vietnam its own security and an opportunity to determine its own future. In the broadest sense, it seems to us that such a peace could be achieved on the basis of the Geneva Accords of 1954 and 1962. Without entering into ideological or polemical discussion, the President thinks that any stable peace in Southeast Asia must give full weight to the wishes of the people concerned, a principle which is most often referred to as self-determination.

The talks in Paris have not, unfortunately, produced as yet any significant steps toward a permanent peace nor even any tangible steps toward a reduction of hostilities. We are aware, of course, of the insistence by Hanoi on a total cessation of the bombardment of North Vietnam.

The President wishes the leaders of the Soviet Union to know that he is prepared to stop the bombing of North Vietnam. He has taken such action in the past and can do it again. But the leaders of the Soviet Union will surely understand that the President must be interested in the consequences of such an important step on his part. It is not necessary to get into highly theoretical or semantic discussions about such words as "conditions," "reciprocity," or "mutual restraint." The President attaches no importance to modalities, channels of communication, or the more technical maneuvers associated with traditional diplomacy. He is interested in the substance and the results.

The President has noted with interest and respect the judgment of the Soviet leaders that they continue to believe that they have grounds for the view that a complete cessation of the bombardment of North Vietnam would create a turning point at the meetings in Paris and open possibilities for serious negotiations on political aspects of a settlement.

The leaders of the Soviet Union should know that the President is prepared to try to solve the matter on a de facto basis. Setting all political arguments aside, the simple fact is that the President could not maintain a cessation of the bombing of North Vietnam unless it were very promptly evident to him, to the American people, and to our allies, that such an action was, indeed, a step toward peace. A cessation of bombing which would be followed by abuses of the DMZ, Viet Cong and North Vietnamese attacks on cities or such populated areas as provincial capitals, or a refusal of the authorities in Hanoi to enter promptly into serious political discussions which included the elected government of the Republic of Vietnam, could simply not be sustained.

If, after appropriate exploration and consideration by the leaders of the Soviet Union, they are prepared to advise the President to proceed on the basis of what is now being said, the President would take their advice with the utmost seriousness.

The President believes that the leaders of the Soviet Union will understand the elementary requirements which any man in the President's position would face. The President respects the deep interest of the Soviet Union in its fellow socialist country, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. He believes that the Soviet leaders, in turn, understand the interests and responsibilities of the United States toward the Republic of Vietnam.

The President would like to emphasize his readiness to stop the bombardment of North Vietnam just as soon as it can be done with integrity, as a move toward peace and not as a unilateral concession of military advantage to those who wish to continue the battle.

With respect to the Middle East, the President is deeply concerned about the explosive situation there and would like to assist in bringing about a permanent peace in that area as quickly as possible. He was very glad to have in front of him the views which Ambassador Dobrynin gave to Secretary Rusk,/3/ which reflected, as the Ambassador indicated, the attitude of certain key Arab countries. We understand that the substance of these views has been made available to Ambassador Jarring. We ourselves expect to be in touch with Ambassador Jarring and to make a major effort on our side to move the matter forward. It is not the President's desire, at this stage, to get into the details of the views expressed by the Soviet Union. Obviously there are some difficulties for us in those views; for example, if the state of war in the area is to be eliminated at an early stage, the justification for a continued refusal or free passage through the Suez Canal would presumably disappear. The President was interested and is giving further thought to the suggestion of a possible four-power guarantee of a settlement which could be reached among the parties. Foreign Minister Gromyko and Secretary Rusk will have an opportunity, during the opening stages of the United Nations General Assembly, to discuss these matters further in the light of Ambassador Jarring's efforts. We are inclined to believe, for a number of reasons, that it would be better for both sides to give strong support to Ambassador Jarring than for us to try to agree details on a bilateral basis. We wish to emphasize, however, that we are ready at all times to exchange views with the Soviet Union on this very important part of the world.

/3/See footnote 6, Document 295.

The President has, as the Soviet leaders know, made a serious effort during his Administration to find points of agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union. He has done so, despite certain criticisms both at home and in some other countries, because he is deeply convinced that a realistic and genuine understanding between our two countries is of vital importance to the possibilities of a general peace. An enduring peace is the President's first objective. He would like nothing better than to find in the days and weeks ahead a good foundation which can be laid for further development of Soviet-American relations in the future.

The President has deeply regretted the complications created by current events which are differently interpreted by our two governments. He takes some encouragement from the message/4/ delivered by Ambassador Dobrynin on August 20 that recent actions by the Soviet Union are of a temporary nature and will be changed at the earliest possible moment.

/4/See Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XVII, Document 80.

Finally, the President wishes to underline his view as to the seriousness of these private exchanges and to express the hope that they can reach conclusions which will insure the success of a high-level meeting and, more importantly, contribute both to good relations between our two countries and to the peace of the world.

300. Information Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, September 16, 1968, 8:10 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Chlodnick File. Literally Eyes Only for the President and Secretary Rusk.

Mr. President:

Amb. Dobrynin came in at 6:00 p.m. and left at 7:30 p.m.

I handed Amb. Dobrynin the memorandum/2/ and said it had the same status as the "oral communication" he delivered and left with me.

/2/Document 299.

He read the communication carefully. He said in general that the communication was "positive and clear." He had the following observations to make.

1. Missile talks. He understood our objective in proposing an amplification of the principles. He wanted to know, simply, whether the response of the Soviet government should come back through his channel to me or through normal diplomatic exchanges. I said that until we were clearer as to whether the conditions for a Summit were mutually understood and agreed, he might let their response come back to me. I then went through the points that it was agreed that I should make on a "personal basis" as reflecting the attitude of the President, as he had indicated it to Sec. Rusk and myself.

2. With respect to Vietnam, he made the following points:

--As for "two days and nights" he said that Kosygin in London had felt pressed against the wall with too short a time for consultation with his colleagues. Two days and two nights sounded short for action after the President announced a pause. I pointed out to him that the fact we were talking now gave the Soviet government a chance to consult within itself and with its allies. I was simply indicating the kind of pressures which would bear on the President. He accepted this without further comment. I rate his comment on London as a mere debating point.

--On the military points concerning the DMZ and the cities, he said our point of view was clear. He did not know how his government would react. But there was no difficulty in understanding what we were saying.

--He spent a great deal of time, however, on the question of the role of the GVN. He said that his government was absolutely confident that "serious negotiations" on all the issues which Harriman and Vance had raised in Paris would follow a bombing halt. He was confident also, however, that Moscow could not give any assurance to us on the role of the GVN in a negotiation between us and Hanoi. That was Hanoi's business and ours. He felt it important that, if the Soviet Union gave a positive reply to the message I had handed to him, that we not take such a positive reply as committing the Soviet Union to assuring the role which we had envisaged for the GVN in the negotiation. He felt that this was likely to be a part of the "serious negotiations" between ourselves and Hanoi after a bombing cessation. Since Harriman had raised this point in Paris, he would expect Hanoi to be prepared to respond, after a bombing cessation. But he felt it important that he, personally, not deceive the President or that the Soviet Union not deceive the President by indirection. I responded that I was simply reporting what I understood to be the President's attitude. The Soviet Union had raised with us its judgment, at the highest level, that "serious negotiations" would follow a complete bombing cessation. We felt it important that they not be deceived as to what we felt was involved in "serious negotiations." We had spent more than 4 months on the question of a bombing cessation. If bombing ceased and then had to be resumed, it would be a most serious matter. Therefore, while the U.S. was putting no conditions to Moscow, it was important that the Soviet leaders understood the President's mind in this matter. Dobrynin responded, closing out the discussion, by saying he thought that we had understood one another on a personal basis, but we should understand that there are limitations to which the Soviet Union could commit itself to the U.S. One of those limitations was the exact role of the GVN in a Vietnamese settlement and the exact negotiating form of that settlement. I told him that his point of view, on a personal basis, was understood and I would report it.

3. On the Middle East, he said that for about 6 months there were no communications between the U.S. and the Soviet Union on a Middle Eastern settlement. There was a certain amount of communication on the details of resolutions at the General Assembly, but nothing constructive and positive. Now the Soviet Union, on a government-to-government basis had laid before the U.S. a proposal./3/ If the U.S. did not wish to respond, that would be understood. It was his view that it would help Jarring and the countries involved if the U.S. were to give to the Soviet Union its own ideas about how a Middle East settlement might be brought about. He could understand very well if the President did not wish to get into the details of a Middle Eastern proposal; but he underlined (3 or 4 times) that his Middle Eastern communication was a government-to-government communication. In his view, it would help Jarring if the U.S. were to come back with its own precise views on how a Middle Eastern settlement could be achieved. It might clear the way for the talks between Sec. Rusk and Foreign Minister Gromyko if this were done promptly. The two Foreign Ministers might then make more progress when they meet in New York and save much-needed time. I confined myself to saying I would report these views to the President and to Sec. Rusk.

/3/See footnote 6, Document 295.

4. I then went through my points on Czechoslovakia. He asked if we were asking for a commitment from the Soviet Union to the U.S. about an announcement of Soviet troop withdrawals before a Summit: if we were setting this as a U.S. condition? I said flatly, no. We were not talking about conditions. We were searching to make good on an agreed proposition; namely, that it was the interest of both sides to have a positive outcome of a Summit meeting. I was simply stating a fact; namely, that a major contribution to the success of such a Summit meeting would be that, pursuant to Amb. Dobrynin's presentation to the President on August 20,/4/ the Soviet Union would decide that it was in a position to "withdraw without delay" Warsaw Pact forces from Czechoslovakia.

/4/See footnote 4, Document 299.

5. In conclusion, I underlined the passage in our message in which the President's views on the importance of Soviet-American relations was expressed. What I had conveyed to him informally, in supplementing the formal message, was simply the underlying judgments as to what might make a meeting at the highest level a success. There was no question of conditions. There was no question of an ultimatum. We were acting on the assumption that each side was trying to establish whether, within the limit of its interests and responsibilities, we could produce a successful Summit meeting.

6. Amb. Dobrynin ended by repeating what he had said at the beginning: That our message was clear and positive. He would get in touch with me when he had a reply.

7. W.W.R. comment: There was nothing in the detailed conversation on a personal basis that was difficult except Dobrynin's anxiety that we not hook Moscow implicitly to a commitment that Hanoi negotiate directly with the Thieu government. I had the feeling--no more--that they expected Hanoi to more or less behave with respect to the DMZ and the cities; but I would not hang my hat on that. With respect to the Middle East, he was obviously a little disappointed. I got the impression that Moscow expects us to come back with a concrete proposal, even if it is written in Jerusalem. And I, personally, do not think that would be a wholly bad idea.

Walt

P.S. I began my "informal conversation" on Vietnam by recalling the 37-day pause and the advice from the Soviet Embassy in Washington: he immediately said, "That was only an Ambassador, this is the leadership of the Soviet Union"!!

301. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Washington, September 17, 1968.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, FT 1 US-USSR. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Colbert.

SUBJECT
Discussion of U.S. Attitude Toward Trade with the USSR

PARTICIPANTS

Mr. Robert Scheuer, Intertex International, Inc.

Mr. Morton Yuter, Intertex International, Inc.

Mr. Malcolm Toon, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary, EUR

Mr. James Colbert, Economic Adviser, EUR/SOV

Mr. Scheuer outlined to Mr. Toon the status of Intertex's recent business dealings with the USSR. He said he understood that, as a result of the Czechoslovak situation, our attitude had changed, and that we were opposed to significant new business. He wondered whether their competitors in Western Europe and Japan would be likely to follow the same policy. He also wanted to know if he would be allowed to ship some medical equipment to the USSR which he described as a routine recurring business.

Mr. Toon confirmed that the invasion of Czechoslovakia had indeed caused us to revise our thinking about trade with the USSR. He said we no longer took the line of favoring peaceful trade, but were asking U.S. business to hold off from new ventures. He also noted that we were urging other friendly governments to follow our line. With regard to the sale of medical equipment, Mr. Toon indicated that he did not think this would present a problem under the new policy. With regard to Mr. Scheuer's question as to whether the Soviets had discussed trade with us since the events last month, Mr. Toon said that they had not.

Mr. Scheuer was interested in our views as to possible legislative action on trade. We said that it was difficult to predict at this point what Congress might do in this regard in reaction to Czechoslovakia. Any East-West trade bill was, of course, out of the question. Mr. Yuter asked whether we intended to give MFN to Romania. Mr. Colbert said that we would like to have authority across the board to extend MFN.

In conclusion, Mr. Scheuer said they would follow our guidance on future trade transactions with the USSR. He indicated some concern, however, lest business be lost to their competition.

302. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Leddy) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/

Washington, September 17, 1968.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Bohlen Files: Lot 74 D 379, Dobrynin/Bohlen Memoranda of Conversation. Confidential. Drafted by T.R. Buchanan (SOV) and cleared by USIA.

SUBJECT
Soviet Jamming of VOA Broadcasts

Problem:

The Soviet Union instituted systematic jamming of Voice of America broadcasts in the Russian, Ukrainian, Georgian and Armenian languages as of 2:00 a.m. on August 21, concurrent with the invasion of Czechoslovakia. VOA has subsequently cut back its special round-the-clock news coverage of Czech developments but there has been no reduction in Soviet jamming thus far. We are anxious to avoid a return to the costly radio jamming battle of the pre-June 1963 period.

Discussion:

Russian language broadcasts of the BBC, Radio Liberation, Deutsche Welle and even an Ecuadorian religious station are also being jammed. The fact that the Soviets are using only sky wave jammers, rather than the massive coordinated sky wave and ground wave effort of the pre-1963 era, and are not jamming all broadcasts, e.g., Baltic language broadcasts, gives some ground for hoping that the effort is limited in scope and related directly to Czech developments.

VOA has nevertheless been forced to add three new frequencies to its Russian-language and two new frequencies to its Ukrainian, Georgian and Armenian-language broadcasts. If Soviet jamming continues, VOA will need to consider inter alia reactivating its long wave transmitter in Munich, which operates on a wave length used by Radio Moscow--thus risking an escalation of the jamming effort.

USIA is anxious to protest Soviet interference with its broadcasts to the International Telecommunications Union, of which the USSR is also a member. Under the provisions of the Montreux International Telecommunications Convention, however, member states are required to notify one another of any infringements of the Convention. We would propose, therefore, to protest directly to the Soviets first in order to give them an opportunity to stop their jamming, before we protest formally to the ITU.

Recommendation:

That you approve the attached Aide-Mémoire and authorize Ambassador Bohlen to transmit it to Ambassador Dobrynin at the earliest opportunity./2/

/2/Secretary Rusk approved the recommendation on September 18. Bohlen met with Dobrynin on September 19 to give him the aide-mémoire. Dobrynin read it and responded that "he was certain that there was no convention to which his government was a party that would prohibit the right of a state to protect its people or its own territory from broadcasts of a hostile nature to the state." A memorandum of conversation and the aide-mémoire are ibid.

303. Intelligence Memorandum/1/

0623/68

Washington, September 19, 1968.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vol. XXI. Confidential; No Foreign Dissem. Prepared by CIA's Office of Current Intelligence and coordinated with the Office of National Estimates. In the National Security Council, copies went to Rostow, Bromley Smith, and Nathaniel Davis.

THE USSR'S INTERNATIONAL POSITION AFTER CZECHOSLOVAKIA/2/

/2/On November 7 the intelligence community published NIE 12-68, "Eastern Europe and the USSR in the Aftermath of the Invasion of Czechoslovakia," printed in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XVII, Document 26.

Summary

Moscow intervened in Czechoslovakia because it feared for its hold over Eastern Europe. Calculations of profit and loss with respect to Soviet international policy in general were secondary. The decision to invade meant that the Soviet determination to preserve the status quo in Eastern Europe overrode any urge that Moscow might have had to seek advantage in limited accommodations with the non-Communist world. In this sense, the Soviet leadership behaved characteristically. Intervention was, at the same time, the most difficult decision ever made by the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime and may turn out to be its most fateful one.

Although the Soviets would like to regard the Czechoslovak affair as essentially internal business and to have the rest of the world so regard it, the issue inevitably raises additional issues for them: relations between East and West and between Communist parties, the trend of Soviet defense spending, the development of the Soviet economy and internal discipline. Only time can tell whether the Soviets were right in concluding that intervention was the lesser of two evils. It will depend, among other things, on whether and for how long the pressures for reform in Czechoslovakia and elsewhere in the Soviet bloc can be contained; whether the collective leadership can master its own internal conflicts, and how the policies of others, especially the US, are influenced by what has happened in Czechoslovakia.

Increased distrust of the USSR in the US and Soviet defensiveness and insecurity revealed by the invasion do not bode well for US-Soviet relations in the near future. The possibility should not be excluded, however, that Moscow will see some need after Czechoslovakia for taking steps to keep US-Soviet relations from settling into a total freeze. There is, at any rate, no present indication that Moscow's interest in missile talks with the US is less than before.

[Here follows the body of the memorandum.]

304. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Washington, September 20, 1968, 12:30 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Rusk-Dobrynin. Top Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Leddy. Rostow forwarded the memorandum to the President under a September 26 covering memorandum that is marked with a "ps," indicating that the President saw it.

PARTICIPANTS
The Secretary
Ambassador Dobrynin
Assistant Secretary Leddy

This meeting took place at the request of Ambassador Dobrynin who asked to see the Secretary on the question of US/Soviet discussions on peaceful explosive nuclear devices (PNEDS). (There is a separate memorandum of conversation on this subject and on the question raised by the Secretary of the Soviet propaganda campaign against Germany and Berlin.)/2/ What follows is a note, in one copy, of off-the-record remarks made by the Secretary, and Dobrynin's responses.

/2/The memorandum of conversation is printed in full in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XV, Document 290. The portion dealing with PNEDS is ibid., vol. XI, Document 285.

The Secretary said that when he came into office he had been convinced that the Soviets were sincere when they said that they wanted to pursue a policy of "peaceful co-existence". He had continued to hold this view during the past few years. There had apparently been a real desire on the part of the Soviet Union to see a broadening of contacts between East and West, a lessening of tensions, a degree of liberalization, a disposition to come to grips with some of the real problems in the world. However, the Soviet action in Czechoslovakia had raised questions in his mind. He didn't understand why the Soviets had felt it necessary to do what they did in Czechoslovakia. Were there new elements or forces at work in the Soviet system? Was there a different orientation of Soviet foreign policy in the making? What might this mean in terms of a policy of peaceful co-existence?

It was at this point, reported in the other memorandum, that Dobrynin asserted, not on a purely personal basis but with official force, that the Soviet Union continued to pursue the policy of peaceful co-existence. He added that he had gained the impression that a number of American officials somehow thought that the Soviets were now deliberately attempting to intensify contacts with the United States and other western countries because of Czechoslovakia (i.e., presumably to help the Soviets in shoving Czechoslovakia under the rug). He denied that this was the case and said that these efforts at contact were simply the continued pursuit of peaceful co-existence, as before.

The Secretary then referred to the fact that the invitation for a meeting between the President and Soviet leaders in the Soviet Union and the Czech invasion had occurred about the same time; that he had concluded that the Soviet decisions on both matters must have been made by the same people at about the same time, presumably over the weekend; and that the coincidence of the actions was like throwing a dead fish in the face of the President of the United States.

Dobrynin said that he could not give an official explanation of this coincidence, but being familiar with the Soviet bureaucracy, he had personally concluded that the decision to invite President Johnson to the Soviet Union (communicated to Secretary Rusk abroad the Honey Fitz on the evening of August 19)/3/ had been made in Moscow about a week before. He said that a decision of this kind, although having been made, nevertheless had to go through a bureaucratic process of several days. On the other hand, it was clear that the decision to invade Czechoslovakia had been made considerably later, perhaps on the weekend of the 17th-18th or even Monday, the 19th. He pointed to the fact that several of the Soviet leaders had been on vacation and were called back to Moscow over this weekend.

/3/See Document 286.

305. Telegram From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson in Texas/1/

Washington, September 22, 1968, 1623Z.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Chlodnick File. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only; Literally Eyes Only for the President. The telegram is marked with a "ps," indicating that the President saw it. The President flew to his Texas ranch on September 19 and returned to Washington on September 24. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary)

CAP 82463. I now rate the possibilities of a positive response from Moscow and enough from Hanoi to proceed as one in three or one in four--no higher, but no lower.

On that still highly contingent basis, I thought you might wish to look at a draft statement announcing your decisions and your movements, to see how certain key sensitive matters might be dealt with:

--The GVN, whose stability and sense of confidence must be preserved;

--The Czech question;

--The NATO issue;

--The nature and limits of our understanding on the bombing cessation, so that your hands would not be tied should you have to resume.

At some point the Norwegians would have to step before the world and say Hanoi promised them no violation of the DMZ and prompt, serious, sincere negotiations.

Also, once the bombing stops, we have to push Moscow very hard to press for peace and to take a firm, unambiguous position to clear up Laos.

I have given thought to Bangkok; first or last?

The advantage of seeing the troop contributors immediately is obvious; but we will not know then:

--The immediate post-bombing state of the Paris talks;

--What the Russians are--and are not--prepared to do post-bombing, towards peace in Southeast Asia.

Therefore, I now lean to: Geneva; Brussels; Bangkok.

The advantage of Geneva first is to hold the Soviet feet to the fire on delivering in Paris, on Laos, etc. they have always said they could do more if we stopped bombing. We've got to nail it down in the first flush of the event.

I calculate something like this:

--By the end of this week we shall know whether Moscow and Hanoi will give us enough to proceed.

--Once you make a decision, it will take a few days to work out the scenario here, a few further days to get Bunker, Thieu, and Abrams abroad; get dates set for the Russians; inform Hanoi, if we so decide, so they can get out military and diplomatic instructions;

--I would guess you would want about three days in Geneva, two in Brussels, perhaps a stop in Paris: two days in Bangkok. With flying time, etc. perhaps eleven days. If talks opened in Geneva, for example, on October 7, you could be home for the weekend of October 19-20, I should guess.

Draft contingent text follows, which I have not showed to Sec. Rusk because of its highly tentative status.

DRAFT CONTINGENCY PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT

In recent weeks there have been intense private contacts, direct and indirect, with the authorities in Hanoi, including private meetings in Paris. There have also been a series of exchanges with the leaders of the Soviet Union. As a result of these exchanges, I have reached two conclusions.

First, I now judge that we have reason to believe the cessation of the bombardment of North Vietnam by U.S. forces could take place under conditions which involve no increase in the risk of casualties to the forces of the United States or to our allies.

I also have reason to believe that such a cessation of bombardment could lead to serious discussions which would move the war in Vietnam towards a settlement.

It is extremely important that the President not mislead our own people, our allies, or the world at large about these conclusions. We have made real progress, but I cannot guarantee at this stage the precise military or diplomatic behavior of the authorities in Hanoi after a bombing cessation. We shall have to assess that behavior with respect to military operations and diplomatic performance very carefully in the days ahead. But the other side knows well that our eyes will be focused on three specific matters:

--First, on whether the demilitarized zone is respected by their side as well as by our side;

--Second, whether there are attacks on the cities of South Vietnam. These could have the gravest consequences for the environment of diplomatic talks;

--Third, whether, in the light of the diplomatic positions we have already conveyed to the other side at great length, there are very prompt, serious negotiations looking towards the earliest possible peace in Vietnam and Southeast Asia. There can be no political settlement in South Vietnam without the full participation of the Government of Vietnam. We appear to agree with the authorities in Hanoi that the political settlement in South Vietnam must be reached by the people of South Vietnam--and that means the elected constitutional Government of South Vietnam must play a leading role. There can be no definitive settlement of the Demilitarized Zone and other matters relating to the Geneva Accords of 1954 and 1962 without the full participation of the Government of Vietnam.

The bombardment of North Vietnam will cease on -----. We expect the new phase of serious, substantive discussion to open in Paris the next day, -----.

Let everyone be clear: The objective of what we are doing-the test-is prompt and serious movement towards peace. The bloodshed in Southeast Asia must end.

The second decision at which I have arrived is that it is my duty now to meet with the Soviet leadership to open discussions on offensive and defensive strategic weapons and to discuss other matters which might advance peace in the world.

I first raised the question of limiting the arms race in strategic weapons with the Soviet Union in mid-January 1964. There is no single more important question before the Soviet Union and the United States. There is no single matter on which progress would contribute more to a sense of confidence and the possibility of peace throughout the world. In addition, success would free vast resources for productive purposes.

I went into this question with Premier Kosygin at very great length at Glassboro in June 1967. He agreed then, in principle, that such talks would take place; but there was a long delay in fixing the time and place for the opening of these talks. We have now agreed that the talks shall open on ----- in Geneva. I shall lead the American delegation, using the occasion, as I indicated, for conversations on other critical matters bearing on peace throughout the world. These other matters will include peace in Southeast Asia-where the Soviet Union bears important responsibilities as co-chairman of the Geneva Conferences of 1954 and 1962--and the Middle East, where it is my hope that in the weeks ahead all governments will contribute to the limit of their capacity and imagination in backing the mission of Ambassador Jarring and achieving a breakthrough towards peace in the Middle East.

In making this decision, two factors have weighed heavily on my mind.

The first was the future of the people of Czechoslovakia. As I have said before, the entrance of Warsaw Pact forces into Czechoslovakia was a tragic event and a setback to men's hopes everywhere for peace, moderation, and the gradual easing of tensions in Central Europe. It was a dangerous event because it brought into Central Europe substantial additional Soviet forces threatening to upset the military equilibrium. Events of recent days have somewhat eased, but not ended the tensions and danger in Central Europe.

I have had, therefore, to ask myself this question: would talks with the Soviet Union on strategic missiles and other matters hurt or help the people of Czechoslovakia--and, in a larger sense, would they help or hurt the men and women throughout all of Europe?

I have concluded that the issue of curbing the strategic arms race and carrying forward the struggle to lift from mankind the threat of nuclear war is such an overriding issue that we should now go forward. The future of the men and women and children of Czechoslovakia is as much bound up in this matter as the future of the human beings in every corner of the world.

The second consideration which has weighed upon me, bore on my responsibilities and those of my successor. I have asked myself this question: would it be right to open these talks when it is likely that the negotiations will stretch out into the time when another man bears the responsibilities of the Presidency?

I have concluded that it is right to carry forward to the stage of initial negotiation this enterprise which I launched almost five years ago. I am comforted in doing so because the position our negotiators will take to the discussions is one agreed in detail by the military and civil authorities throughout the United States Government. We are going in on solid ground. My successor will be in a position--should the negotiations proceed into his time, as I expect--to lay his hand on critical matters that may have to be faced before a final agreement is reached.

We have, of course, kept our fighting allies informed of the course of the negotiations in Paris. They have been informed also of the circumstances which have led me to conclude that it is now worth taking the risks of a total cessation of bombardment of North Vietnam. Nevertheless, we are seven governments which have been in the trenches together. We shall be fighting side by side still in the weeks ahead, while working shoulder to shoulder equally for a stable, honorable peace in Southeast Asia. And beyond that we shall be together--with many others--in helping build the security and prosperity of the whole region in the postwar years.

Therefore, after consultation with the governments concerned, I have thought it wise to meet with the leaders of South Vietnam, Korea, Thailand, Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand. We shall be gathering in Bangkok on ----- to share our thoughts on the war, on negotiations, and on the future stability and prosperity of Southeast Asia.

The evolution of events in Central Europe, the Middle East, and Asia are, of course, of great concern to our NATO allies. They also have a vital interest in the problem of seeking to limit strategic weapons between the United States and the Soviet Union.

We have been in the closest consultation through NATO since the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia, examining together the implications for the defense of the West of that action. In the light of those consultations and in the light of developments I am describing to you tonight, I have suggested to the NATO leaders that we might all meet in Brussels on -----.

We have clearly come to a critical moment in the history of this very small planet. As your President, I have made the pursuit of a stable peace--with honor and dignity for all--my first concern since my first day in office. As I set out now to these three meetings, on my final pilgrimage for peace, I ask for your support and your prayers.

306. Talking Paper Prepared in the Department of State/1/

Washington, undated.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Conference Files: Lot 69 D 182, CF 316. Confidential. Prepared for Rusk's briefing book for his meetings with Gromyko during the 23d Session of the UN General Assembly. Rusk went to New York for UNGA September 29 and returned to Washington October 8. (Johnson Library, Rusk Appointment Books)

TWENTY-THIRD GENERAL ASSEMBLY
New York--September-October 1968

USSR

US-Soviet Bilateral Relations

A separate talking paper has been prepared covering multinational issues which you may wish to raise with Gromyko, such as Berlin, the Middle East and Viet-Nam./2/

/2/Not printed. (Ibid.)

More routine bilateral issues are discussed below for the event that Gromyko may wish to raise any of them--perhaps to test our present attitude and to demonstrate Soviet interest in proceeding with business as usual. The moment does not appear appropriate for you to raise any of these issues yourself. Should Gromyko choose to discuss any of the following issues, you may wish to respond along the lines indicated below.

1. Opening of Consulates

The Soviets followed up several informal approaches to Ambassador Thompson last spring regarding the establishment of consulates by proposing formally on August 13 that we establish a Consulate General in Leningrad in exchange for a Soviet Consulate General in San Francisco.

Recommended U.S. Position

You may wish to remind Gromyko of your obligation to consult with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee before talks on consulates are begun with the Soviets and observe that the present does not appear to be a favorable time for such consultations. However, we continue to have the matter under study.

2. Chancery Sites

The two unresolved issues concern the amount of land to be exchanged and the terms for renting Spasso House. Recent negative comments by Congressman Wayne Hays about the whole project, following the invasion of Czechoslovakia, is a new element.

Recommended U.S. Position

If Gromyko raises the issue, you may wish to stress that the final decision on the amount of land to be exchanged must stand up to Congressional scrutiny, in order to permit early signature of an agreement. In this connection, we hope that the chancery site in Moscow will include the triangular piece of land in dispute. We are prepared to continue to pay our present rental for Spasso House until the present lease expires in 1985, and then renegotiate at the going diplomatic rate at five-year intervals.

3. Proposal for Discussion of Naval Incidents

Following the crash of a Soviet TU-16 aircraft in the Norwegian Sea while conducting hazardous buzzing operations around the USS Essex, we reaffirmed on August 13 our proposal of April 11, 1968, that U.S. and Soviet representatives meet to discuss ways of avoiding incidents at sea./3/

/3/See Document 284.

Recommended U.S. Position

If Gromyko indicates willingness to discuss this proposal, we suggest that you confirm our continued desire for such a meeting and propose that the details be worked out between the Soviet Embassy and the Department.

4. Offer of Navigational Equipment

Following the incident of the Seaboard airliner, which violated Soviet-controlled airspace and was forced to land, we delivered a note/4/ to the Soviet Foreign Ministry on August 15 offering to lease navigational equipment to the USSR at a nominal cost for installation along the North Pacific route. We also renewed our request for additional information on Soviet navigational aids in the area. The Soviets have not responded to our approach, although a Soviet official in Moscow inquired on August 20 what we meant by "nominal cost," indicating some Soviet interest. In order to demonstrate Soviet interest in returning to business as usual, Gromyko could indicate a favorable response to our proposal.

/4/Not found.

Recommended U.S. Position

If raised by Gromyko, you may wish to tell him that our offer still stands and that we would be prepared to move ahead on this proposal, since it is in our mutual interest to do so.

5. Law of the Sea Talks

U.S. and Soviet experts held exploratory talks in Washington July 13-23 concerning a possible Law of the Sea Conference. A second round of talks was scheduled to begin in Moscow on September 30; however, on September 16, we informed the Soviet Embassy that we did not consider it appropriate to resume discussions on the planned date.

Recommended U.S. Position

If Gromyko should inquire as to possible rescheduling, you may tell him that we have the matter under consideration and hope discussions might resume at an appropriate time.

6. Port Security

Last spring, the Soviets revived a proposal for talks on entry of Soviet ships into U.S. ports and American ships into Soviet ports. We informed the Soviet Embassy on June 26, that since the proposal was raised within the context of entry for fishing vessels, it would be appropriate to defer the question until the next round of fisheries negotiations. It is possible that Gromyko may refer to the longstanding Soviet proposal for talks on port entry and urge that discussions take place independently of the fisheries talks.

Recommended U.S. Position

If Gromyko raises the question, you may point out that the next round of fisheries talks will probably be held in December. We believe these talks would be the most suitable forum for consideration of the matter, since representatives of domestic fishing interests, who are vitally concerned in this question, will be on our delegation. You may also wish to comment that it is a poor time to consider concessions on this question, in the light of Czechoslovakia.

7. Fisheries Matters

Both the Atlantic and the Pacific Fisheries Agreements with the USSR will come up for renegotiation at the end of the year. We desire to proceed with the renegotiation and have tentatively planned for the talks to take place in Washington, beginning on December 4 for the Atlantic Agreement and January 8 for the Pacific Agreement. In order to prepare for these talks, we have gone ahead with a joint US-Soviet inspection exchange, permitted the Soviet research vessel "Blesk" to visit Woods Hole, Massachusetts, for a program of joint research, and continued plans for expert talks in the USSR in October.

Recommended U.S. Position

If Gromyko should mention the fisheries agreements, you might say that we believe they are in our mutual interest and desire their continuation. Cooperation in the fisheries field has benefitted both sides and we hope it can be maintained.

8. Jamming of VOA

Mr. Bohlen protested to Ambassador Dobrynin on September 19 over the jamming since August 21 of VOA broadcasts to the USSR in the Russian, Ukrainian, Georgian and Armenian languages. Dobrynin argued in familiar rebuttal that the USSR has a sovereign right to protect itself against hostile propaganda. He claimed that jamming does not violate the International Telecommunication Convention--which we dispute.

Recommended U.S. Position

If Gromyko should reiterate these views, you may wish to point out that by reinstituting jamming, associated with the "cold war," the Soviets only feed the suspicions and tensions generated by their invasion of Czechoslovakia. You may wish to express your regret over this action which runs counter to our deeply-felt belief that freedom of information helps build mutual understanding between peoples and a peaceful world.

9. Ivanov Case

Convicted spy, Igor Ivanov, former Amtorg chauffeur, has been free on $100,000 bail since late 1963, pending appeals. The Supreme Court has set arguments in the case for October and will probably hand down its decision before December. The legal issue involved is whether wire tap evidence can be examined in camera or must be disclosed to the defense. If the Court insists on disclosure, Justice will be forced to dismiss the indictment and Ivanov will go free. The Soviets have made assiduous high-level efforts to bring about Ivanov's release.

Recommended U.S. Position

Should Gromyko raise the case again, you may point out that it is presently before the Supreme Court and that arguments in the case will be heard this fall. If Gromyko should ask what action has been taken on the clemency petition submitted by Ivanov's parents, you may respond that consideration of this petition has been suspended for the time being. You may also wish to point out that the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia has made it more difficult for us to examine ways in which the case could be resolved favorably for the Soviet side.

10. Social Security Payments

In June, we lifted the prohibition on the payment of Social Security annuities to persons in the USSR (Treasury Circular 655) and took steps to arrange for payments. A Social Security representative was in the USSR to discuss the establishment of verification procedures, when the Soviets marched into Czechoslovakia, and he returned without meeting with the Soviets. It was decided that talks should be deferred, and that we would take another look at the matter next spring. The Soviet Embassy has indicated that it is receiving queries from potential recipients, who contemplate returning to the USSR.

Recommended U.S. Position

In the event that Gromyko raised the question, you may wish to say that we do not feel the moment is opportune to hold such talks now.

11. Exchanges

We have cancelled high visibility programs scheduled for this fall, but we are continuing low visibility exchanges involving scientists, researchers, graduate students and professors under agreed quotas. The Soviets have complained that our "unjustifiable" cancellation of the Minnesota Symphonic Band involved a considerable loss to Goskontsert, the Soviet sponsor.

Recommended U.S. Position

In the event that Gromyko should ask about our intentions with regard to the balance of the recently concluded Exchanges Agreement, you may wish to tell him that it is not our present intention to suspend the Agreement. However, the United States Government and people did not consider the Minnesota tour appropriate in the light of the Soviet action against Czechoslovakia. For its part, the Soviet Union in the recent past has cancelled or postponed various scheduled cultural exchange groups for less valid reasons.

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