Washington, August 16, 1968.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-6 US-USSR. Secret; Limdis. A typed note on the letter reads: "Signed Original sent 8/19/68."

Dear Paul:

You will recall that you earlier wrote me about the desirability of reaching an understanding with the Soviets on ways to avoid incidents at sea./2/ I would like to bring you up to date on our efforts.

/2/Document 266.

Following up on our initial approach, we proposed in an April 16 note to the Foreign Ministry/3/ that private discussion be held on this subject. On August 13, having had no response, we called in the Soviet Embassy political counselor and presented a memorandum expressing our concern and once again proposing talks./4/ We also used the occasion to pass on our account of the May 26 crash of a TU-16 which had been buzzing our ships in the Norwegian Sea.

/3/For text, see airgram A-233, April 9, 1966. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files, 1964-66, POL 33-6, US-USSR)

/4/Not found.

While we may yet get a favorable reply, my people believe the Soviets are simply not ready to talk on this one yet.

Sincerely,

Nick

285. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson/1/

Washington, August 19, 1968.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, USSR, Vol. XXI. Confidential. Rostow forwarded the memorandum to President Johnson under cover of an August 20 memorandum in which he concurred in Rusk's recommendation. Rostow's memorandum is marked with a "ps," indicating that the President saw it. A copy of the memorandum in State Department files indicates that it was drafted by T. R. Buchanan (SOV) and cleared by O/B, EUR/EX, SCA, and H. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, ORG 8 Moscow)

SUBJECT
Opening of Consulates in the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.

Recommendation:

That you authorize me to ascertain the views of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the question of opening an American Consulate General in Leningrad in exchange for a Soviet Consulate General in San Francisco./2/

/2/The recommendation was neither approved nor disapproved. In his covering memorandum, Rostow gave the President the option of checking either "Approve consultations," "No," or "Call me." The President checked "Call me." An undated handwritten notation on the copy in the State Department files reads: "No action taken to date. Mentioned in NSSM 9. EUR/SOV will raise again at appropriate time. (per Buchanan)" A copy of NSSM 9, "Review of the International Situation," January 23, 1969, is ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, National Security Study Memoranda, Box 365.

Discussion:

The Soviets proposed formally to us on August 13 that we begin negotiations as soon as possible with the aim of opening a Soviet Consulate General in San Francisco in exchange for an American Consulate General in Leningrad. This proposal followed informal approaches to Ambassador Thompson by various Soviet officials, including Ambassador Dobrynin.

I suggest that we respond favorably to the Soviet proposal. A Consulate General in Leningrad would provide us with a valuable listening post in one of the most important urban political and cultural centers in the Soviet Union. It would also enable us to maintain better contact with American students at Leningrad University, to be of greater service to United States citizens traveling in northern Russia, and to handle more effectively other consular matters such as shipping, estate cases, citizenship and visa issuance. Finally, it would be a positive and useful step forward in support of your policy of promoting closer ties and understanding between our two countries.

We estimate the cost of establishing a post in Leningrad at approximately $250,000 for the first year, with an annual cost thereafter of roughly $159,000.

We see no insurmountable problem with the Soviet wish to have a Consulate General in San Francisco. Mayor Joseph Alioto has already requested our assistance in encouraging the Soviets to choose his city. Thus, local cooperation appears assured./3/

/3/Gov. Reagan could present a problem. [Handwritten footnote by Rusk in the source text.]

During the ratification debate on the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Consular Convention on July 30, 1965, I promised to consult with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee before we considered opening negotiations with the Soviets on establishing any consular posts. (We will, of course, also consult the leadership and members of the California Congressional Delegation.) Before proceeding to ascertain the Committee's views on this matter, I would like to obtain your concurrence.

Dean Rusk

286. Telegram From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, August 19, 1968, 2304Z.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Trip to Soviet Union. Top Secret; Sensitive; Literally Eyes Only For the President; Flash.

CAP 82080. This afternoon Dobrynin handed to Sec. Rusk a hand-written note (which I shall preserve) as follows:

"There is positive attitude in Moscow to the wish of President Johnson to meet within the Soviet Union with the Soviet leaders for exchange of opinions on the questions of mutual interest.

There is no doubt that for the leaders of the two greatest states of the world there is what to exchange opinions about--in the field of relations directly between our two countries as well as in the field of pending big international problems. And there has piled up quite a few of such problems, as is known.

So far as the question of the time of the visit of President Johnson to the USSR is concerned, we suggest that this visit takes place in the first decade (ten days) of October.

As the Secretary of State will recall, in our talk on July 1,/2/ he said about a possibility of an unofficial visit of President Johnson to Leningrad to meet there with the Soviet leaders.

/2/See Document 278.

It is acceptable to us. There is no objections in Moscow--if the American side desires it--to an announcement in the nearest time about the coming visit of President Johnson to the Soviet Union.

We can suggest in this case the following text of an announcement for the press:

"Concerning the coming visit of the President of the USA L. Johnson to the Soviet Union.

An agreement has been reached that the President of the United States Lyndon B. Johnson will visit the Soviet Union in the first decade [week] of October 1968 for the exchange of opinions with the leading figures of the USSR on the questions of mutual interest."

If you wish to see Sec. Rusk this evening, he is available and standing by. I will only refer to this message but not discuss its contents if I can get you on the ground in Detroit./3/

/3/The President departed the LBJ Ranch at 4:08 p.m. on August 19, flew to Detroit to deliver a speech to the annual convention of the Veterans of Foreign Wars, and then to Washington, arriving at the White House at 11:08 p.m. (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary)

287. Message From Chairman Kosygin to President Johnson/1/

Washington, August 20, 1968.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Trip to Soviet Union. Secret; Nodis. The message is marked "Official Translation." A handwritten note at the top of page /1/reads: "Orig[inal] to WWR[ostow] 8/20."

Dear Mr. President,

My colleagues and I have acquainted ourselves with your letter of July 30 of this year/2/ on the question of Soviet-American negotiations concerning the integral limitation and then reduction of both the delivery systems of offensive strategic nuclear weapons and of the defense systems against ballistic missiles.

/2/See footnote 5, Document 282.

We note with satisfaction your agreement with the proposed period and place of these negotiations.

Concerning the level for conducting the negotiations on this question, we are inclined toward the appointment of special delegations for this purpose.

As far as the specific date for beginning the negotiations at Geneva, we thought it possible to propose September 30, that is, to begin the negotiations immediately after the end of the conference of non-nuclear states which, as is known, will take place in Geneva from August 29 to September 28 of this year. We also consider it possible to announce the proposed date for beginning the Soviet-American negotiations even prior to the opening of the conference of non-nuclear states, for example, on August 22. The text of the announcement could be the following:

"Concerning the Soviet-American Negotiations on the Question of Curbing the Strategic Armaments Race

Agreement has been reached between the governments of the USSR and the USA to begin negotiations on September 30 in Geneva on the integral limitation and reduction of both the delivery systems of offensive strategic nuclear weapons and the defense systems against ballistic missiles. The Parties have agreed to appoint special delegations for this purpose."

If you have any additional considerations, then we are prepared to study them, of course.

Sincerely,

A. Kosygin

288. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, August 20, 1968, 6:55 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Trip to Soviet Union. Top Secret; Literally Eyes Only.

Mr. President:

Attached are the notes for the background briefing, which I have prepared for Sec. Rusk and me for tomorrow.

I await your guidance.

W. W. Rostow/2/

/2/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

Attachment/3/

Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to Secretary of State Rusk

Washington, August 20, 1968.

/3/Top Secret; Literally Eyes Only For Secretary Rusk. The attachment was not forwarded to Rusk; see Document 289.

Herewith some notes for your and my backgrounders tomorrow.

1. The agreement announced this morning that the President will confer with leaders within the Soviet Union in early October is the outcome of a long process.

--it began in early 1964 when President Johnson first addressed himself to Moscow on a range of major substantive issues;

--it is a natural follow-on from the two intensive meetings at Glassboro in June of last year;

--it is also natural that the Chiefs of Government of the two countries should meet in the light of the intense negotiating efforts undertaken over the 14 months since the Glassboro meetings.

2. President Johnson's first major substantive message to the Soviet leaders was in mid-January 1964./4/ It proposed, among other things, that the two nations address themselves to the following objectives which would move the world towards peace:

/4/See Document 1.

--to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons;

--to end the production of fissionable material for weapons;

--to transfer large amounts of fissionable materials to peaceful purposes;

--to ban all nuclear weapons tests;

--to place limitations on nuclear weapons systems;

--to reduce the risk of war by accident or design;

--to move toward general disarmament.

In general, President Johnson urged that the two nations work on "specific problems"--such as these--rather than on "vague declarations of principle" that might be agreed. That has been the President's approach to U.S.-Soviet relations since then.

3. Progress was slow, but in the autumn of 1966, as a result of discussions between Foreign Minister Gromyko and Secretary Rusk, the outlines of a feasible Non-Proliferation Treaty began to fall into place and work intensified in that field. In November, 1966, the U.S.-Soviet Civil Air Agreement was signed. In late January, 1967, the U.S. initiated with the Soviet Union exchanges on the possibility of limiting both offensive and defensive strategic weapons; and, on the basis of a letter from Kosygin of late February, the President announced on March 2 the willingness of the Soviet Government to discuss this subject./5/ During the Middle East war of June, 1967, the Soviets initiated the use of the hot line; and a cease-fire was achieved in New York on the basis of intensive exchanges over that line (and otherwise) between the two governments.

/5/See Document 193.

4. Against this background it was natural that Chairman Kosygin and President Johnson should find an occasion to meet when Kosygin came to the United Nations meetings in New York on the Middle East late in June. At Glassboro the two leaders took the occasion for two days of exchanges covering a very wide range of topics, notably:

--the Middle East;

--Vietnam;

--the Non-Proliferation Treaty; and

--the possibility of a U.S.-Soviet agreement on the limitation and subsequent reduction of offensive and defensive nuclear arms.

The President sought at that time a firm date and place for the opening of strategic arms talks; but the Soviet Government was not yet prepared for a decision.

5. Since Glassboro, U.S.-Soviet cooperation has helped yield some striking results-great and small:

--The Non-Proliferation Treaty has moved forward and been signed by 77 nations;

--At the July 1, 1968, signing of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the two nations agreed to hold talks on strategic arms limitation in the near future. We expect a time and place to be set before too long.

--Between September, 1967, and April, 1968, a treaty on the return of astronauts was negotiated and signed;/6/

/6/For text of the Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts, and the Return of Objects Launched Into Outer Space, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1967, pp. 1076-1078. The United States signed the agreement on April 22, 1967; it entered into force on December 3, 1968.

--In August, 1968, with U.S.-Soviet cooperation, a UN conference was inaugurated on the future of the sea beds;/7/

/7/See Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XI, Documents 270 and 279.

--In November, 1967, the U.S. and the Soviet Union joined in support of a Security Council resolution on the Middle East which is the basis of Ambassador Jarring's mission;

--In July, 1968, the first flights took place under the U.S.-Soviet bilateral Air Agreement;

--In June, 1968, the Consular Convention was ratified and went into effect in July;

--In July, 1968, bilateral U.S.-Soviet discussions were inaugurated on the Law of the Sea;

--In addition, progress was made in such other bilateral matters as the Cultural Exchange Agreement, Renewal of Atomic Energy Exchange Agreement, and the negotiation to improve Embassy sites.

In short, the year since Glassboro has been, certainly, the most intensive and successful post-war year in U.S.-Soviet relations despite failure to achieve full and effective agreement on two great unresolved issues:

--the Middle East; and

--Southeast Asia.

President Johnson has steadily emphasized both the reality of the progress achieved and the reality of the dangerous unresolved issues that remain between the two nations.

6. On March 31, when President Johnson withdrew from the presidential nomination, he had very much in mind a desire to devote himself as fully as possible to movement towards peace. He, therefore, was pleased when, after preliminary exploration by both sides, it was agreed that a meeting this autumn of the Chiefs of Government of the Soviet Union and the United States made sense. Before Glassboro, at Glassboro, and since Glassboro he has worked to make the strategic missile talks a reality. The question of time and place was dealt with in a number of exchanges at the highest level, notably since the NPT moved towards reality in June. If any one factor crystallized the decision in both governments to move to a summit meeting it was probably the agreement to proceed to strategic missile talks. We felt it might be helpful if the Chiefs of Government could meet in roughly the same period as these talks were inaugurated, because of the importance, the sensitivity, and the complexity of negotiations on this matter--which President Johnson has often emphasized. We have no announcement to make at the present time; but, as indicated earlier, we expect to be in a position to make an announcement soon on the time, place, and level of the strategic missile talks.

7. Although the opening of the strategic missile talks was probably the catalyst that led to this decision by the two Governments, the meeting of President Johnson with Chairman Kosygin will undoubtedly be the occasion to consult on:

--a variety of bilateral matters;

--next steps in the implementation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty;

--the possibilities of bringing our positions closer on the Middle East and on Vietnam.

W. W. Rostow/8/

/8/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

289. Editorial Note

On the night of August 20-21, 1968, Soviet and other Warsaw Pact troops invaded Czechoslovakia. Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin informed President Johnson of the invasion at a White House meeting that began at 8:15 p.m. on August 20. A summary of the meeting and the text of the Soviet message read by Dobrynin at the meeting are printed in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, Volume XVII, Document 80. At 10:15 p.m. on August 20 the President convened an emergency meeting of the National Security Council, at which a decision was made to inform Dobrynin that the U.S. Government would not announce the President's impending visit to Moscow. For notes of the meeting, see ibid., Document 81.

President Johnson condemned the invasion of Czechoslovakia in a statement broadcast by radio and television on August 21. For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1968-69, Book II, page 905. That same day the Embassy in Moscow informed the Department of State in telegram 9465 that all elements of the mission had been asked "to keep official and social contacts with Soviet authorities to minimum," an action approved by the Department in telegram 224834, August 21. Plans for technical talks with the Soviets on the peaceful uses of nuclear explosives, scheduled to begin in early October, were suspended. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-1 COM BLOC CZECH)

290. Telegram From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson in Texas/1/

Washington, August 24, 1968, 1849Z.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Rusk-Dobrynin. Secret; Nodis; Literally Eyes Only for the President. The telegram is marked with a "ps," indicating that the President saw it. The President was at the LBJ Ranch. He flew from Washington to Texas on August 23 and remained in Texas until September 3. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary)

CAP 82121. Herewith a conversation yesterday of Ambassador Dobrynin with Secretary Rusk and Ambassador Thompson.

"The Secretary said he had asked the Ambassador to come in for a very informal chat about current problems. He began by referring to his talk with the Ambassador early in the week on developments in Czechoslovakia./2/ The Secretary said that he came from Georgia and was sometimes referred to as soft spoken in manner. He wondered whether the Ambassador had in any way been misled by the manner in which he had discussed the Czechoslovakia problem, and whether the Ambassador had fully understood the significance of what the Secretary had told him about reaction in this country and the possible effect of Czechoslovakia developments on Soviet-American relations.

/2/Rusk had brief meetings with Dobrynin on Monday morning, August 19, and at 11:35 p.m. on August 20. (Ibid., Rusk Appointment Book) A report on the latter meeting is printed in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XVII, Document 82.

The Ambassador said he had fully understood the Secretary's remarks. He said that the decision which his government had made was obviously not an easy one. The reaction in the United States and for that matter in certain Communist Parties had been clearly predictable. He had personally thought that a solution to the Czech problem had been found, but something must have happened to change the situation. In speculating on what this might be the Secretary referred to Herr Ulbricht's visit to Czechoslovakia. Dobrynin said that Soviet policy was not determined by Herr Ulbricht or anyone else. East Germany was of course an important member of the Warsaw Pact, but the Soviets knew how to say no to Herr Ulbricht. Later in the conversation Ambassador Thompson speculated on the role of the Czechoslovakia press in effecting the Soviet reaction, and Ambassador Dobrynin acknowledged that this was certainly a factor. Ambassador Dobrynin said that his counselor had returned from Moscow last weekend, and had told him that most of the Soviet leaders were on vacation. Dobrynin had been on the verge of asking permission to accompany his wife and daughter when they return to the Soviet Union next Tuesday. He indicated he had received word of the change in Soviet policy only a short time before he had informed the President about it.

When the Secretary indicated that he had been surprised by the Soviet action, Dobrynin attempted to justify it largely on the basis of internal developments in Czechoslovakia. The Secretary said that we had seen no indications that Czechoslovakia intended to leave the Warsaw Pact or conduct itself in any way other than as a member of the socialist camp. Dobrynin said that in his view it had become clear that Dubcek/3/ was a weak leader who was allowing things to drift, and that in these circumstances the right was steadily gaining influence, and the Soviets thought that Dubcek was losing control of the situation. These developments were leading in the direction of a situation in which Czechoslovakia would no longer be a member of the Warsaw Pact. Dobrynin emphasized that the Czech economic reforms had nothing to do with the case as the Soviets considered that this was a matter for them alone to decide.

/3/Alexander Dubcek, First Secretary of the Czechoslovak Communist Party.

When the Secretary again referred to the possible effects of recent developments on Soviet-American relations, Dobrynin said that he could tell the Secretary that he had received instructions to say, in case the subject were raised, that the Soviet Union desired to continue to make progress upon the bilateral questions with which they had been dealing before the recent Czech events. He referred specifically to the peaceful uses of atomic energy and the strategic missile problem. He understood that it would probably be impossible for the United States to proceed immediately in these matters while the international situation was still so unclear. Without wishing to press the Secretary he wondered whether as a matter of policy, unrelated to timing, the United States would also wish to proceed to deal with these problems.

The Secretary said that his reply would have to consist of two statements. The first was that from the beginning of his administration the President was profoundly and passionately interested in advancing the cause of peace and in promoting better relations and better understanding between our two countries. We of course had differences, and some of these would remain but in this atomic age the President considered it essential to do everything he could to diminish dangers of conflict. The Secretary mentioned that the President had today met with the Congressional leadership. Many of these men had been scattered about the country, and their reactions reflected the serious impression which the Czech developments had had on the American people. It appeared that the President would be subject to strong criticism for his efforts in building better relations with the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, he could assure the Ambassador of the President's deep commitment to the cause of peace.

The second part of his answer was that at the present stage he simply could not say what the policy of the United States would be upon the problems under discussion with the Soviet Union.

The Secretary expressed the hope that President Svoboda's/4/ visit to Moscow would be successful. Dobrynin said that Svoboda would stay on until the next day when he would return to Czechoslovakia. The Secretary raised the question of the safety of the Czech leaders, and Dobrynin said that while of course he had no specific information, he was convinced that no harm would come to Dubcek or the other Czech personalities. In this connection the Secretary referred to the Czech radio broadcast commenting on the composition of the Czech delegation that had gone to Moscow.

/4/Ludvik Svoboda, President of Czechoslovakia.

The Secretary mentioned that the President had gone to the ranch. We had received in the last few hours a number of alarming rumors about a possible Soviet invasion of Romania. The Secretary emphasized that these rumors had not come to us from the Romanians. The Ambassador would surely be aware of what the effect such action would have upon the United States opinion coming on top of the recent Soviet action in Czechoslovakia. The Secretary expected the President to telephone him as soon as he arrived at the ranch and received these reports, and the Secretary did not know what he should reply. He asked whether Dobrynin had any information on this subject. Dobrynin said he had neither seen nor heard any indication whatever of any contemplated Soviet action against Romania, and did not believe that there was anything to these rumors. On the contrary, he referred to the warm greetings which the Soviet leadership had sent to the Romanian leaders on the occasion of their national holiday./5/

/5/On August 30 Rusk again raised with Dobrynin the issue of a possible Soviet invasion of Romania. A memorandum of their conversation is printed in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XVII, Document 165.

The Secretary concluded the conversation by stating that he did not contemplate informing the press of Ambassador Dobrynin's visit."

291. Telegram From the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Smith) to President Johnson in Texas/1/

Washington, August 28, 1968, 1702Z.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President--Walt W. Rostow, Vol. 92. Top Secret; Eyes Only.

CAP 82219. For the President's Eyes Only. Following is Ambassador Thompson's report of his conversation yesterday with Ambassador Dobrynin./2/

/2/A memorandum of their conversation on Czechoslovakia is printed in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XVII, Document 89.

In the course of my talk with Dobrynin, he raised the question of the possible visit of the President to Leningrad and the missile talks. He said it appeared clear that his government had decided to separate the two matters. He personally had the impression that the President was interested in visiting the Soviet Union and that this had been a maximum desire whereas a meeting of the chiefs of government in Geneva in connection with the missile talks would have been the President's minimum desire.

I said I was not here at the time and did not know the President's mind on these matters.

Dobrynin said he thought the Soviet Government had agreed to Geneva as a locale for the talks as a response to our wishes. He thought that if we preferred to have them in Moscow, there would be no problem on their part.

I said I had no idea what our views on the matter were. I said that obviously both these matters would be contingent on what now happened in Czechoslovakia.

I said I was personally optimistic that missile talks could succeed as I was convinced that it was in the interest of both our countries.

He said that when he was last in Moscow he had seen draft instructions which were of such nature that he would have been quite satisfied to have headed the talks on the Soviet side on the basis of these instructions. He said they were long and complex but quite serious. He also said that the Soviets envisaged that the talks would be held in secret.

I replied that I assumed that this would also be our view although we would undoubtedly have to let our allies know the general trend of the talks which increased the possibility of leaks.

He said he quite understood the present situation and observed that we had a month before the missile talks were scheduled to begin.

I asked who he thought would head up the missile talks on the Soviet side if they were on the level of special delegations. He said he did not know but when I suggested it might be someone like Kuznetsov, he said he thought this was a real possibility.

He said that he understood that Gromyko intended to come to New York about the first of October for the General Assembly. He asked me to let him know anything I could before my departure on our attitude with respect to the missile talks.

In the course of the conversation, I made quite clear that a number of problems in our bilateral relations would depend upon how matters actually developed in Czechoslovakia and that in any event some immediate issues would be adversely affected. He indicated that he fully understood this.

Dobrynin noted that the West Germans, the Chinese Communists and the Secretary had raised the question of Romania and he wondered why. He smiled when he mentioned the Chinese. I replied that from our point of view it was quite simple. The day the Secretary spoke to him, we had received a series of alarming reports from non-Romanian sources and it was quite natural for the Secretary to ask about them.

292. Instructions for the Ambassador to the Soviet Union (Thompson)/1/

Washington, September 5, 1968.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Chlodnick File. Secret; Eyes Only. A list of documents in the Chlodnick File, prepared in the White House, identifies this paper as "Instructions for Amb. Thompson, September 5, 1968, in talking with Amb. Dobrynin." Thompson met with the President and Rostow from 1-1:47 p.m. on September 5. The President's Daily Diary records the following about the meeting: "Amb returns to Moscow next Monday or Tuesday . . . hopes to get guidance on how to respond when--as he expects--Soviet leaders ask him whether we are prepared to go forward on pending initiatives." (Ibid.) For a memorandum of Thompson's conversation with Dobrynin on September 6, see Document 293.

The President wishes to hold open the possibility of strategic weapons talks. His present idea is that he would open these talks at the highest level, not via the Secretary of Defense or the Director, ACDA. Thompson should try to get any indication if there is any "give on this subject" or any truly serious "interest." The President does not wish to do anything unless there is "some chance--a modicum of hope--of agreement."

Thompson should begin, however, by executing the instruction the President gave him with respect to his meeting on Friday/2/ with Dobrynin at lunch; that is, Dobrynin should be made clearly to understand that the President resents the Soviet circulation of the idea that he is personally anxious for some contact at the highest level with the Soviet Union. This has been damaging. The President is not interested in personal contacts or cosmetics. He is only interested in a meeting where there is a serious possibility that major, substantive results could be achieved.

/2/September 6.

Thompson should also convey to Dobrynin the depth of the political reaction in the U.S. as reflected by the returning members of Congress. Dirksen's and Hruska's remarks should be noted./3/ Hruska is probably going to be Dirksen's successor.

/3/For text of their remarks, see the Congressional Record--Senate, September 5, 1968, pp. S 10315-S 10318.

W. W. Rostow/4/

/4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

293. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Washington, September 6, 1968.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Chlodnick File. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Thompson.

PARTICIPANTS
Soviet Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin
Ambassador Llewellyn E. Thompson

The Ambassador asked if I could give him any information on a number of matters that were up for decision. He mentioned the Non-proliferation Treaty, the exchange of ratifications of the Agreement on the Return of Astronauts, and the talks on strategic missiles.

On the Non-proliferation Treaty, I said that I thought the President and the Secretary considered this a multilateral agreement which should not be related to other issues. On the other hand, he must be aware of the sentiment that was building up in the Congress as the result of developments in Czechoslovakia and that we would have to investigate further to see what the line would be in the Senate. The Ambassador indicated that he quite understood that it might be wise not to bring this matter to a head in the immediate future.

With respect to the Agreement on the Return of Astronauts, I said that it was my understanding that we had not yet ratified this agreement. He said this was contrary to his information although he could well be wrong and asked if someone in the Department would let him know the status of the matter.

On the strategic missile talks, I said that I could not give him any definite information as the matter was still under active consideration. I referred to recent speeches in Congress which reflected the very strong sentiment that was extremely critical of the Soviet action in Czechoslovakia. I mentioned specifically statements by Senators Hruska and Dirksen as well as others. The Ambassador indicated that he was familiar with these statements and mentioned in fact that there were a number of others.

I said that in this connection I wished to tell him that the President had been very much concerned at statements in the American press to the effect that the President was very eager for a meeting with the Soviet leaders. I said I thought the President had the impression that at least some of these pieces had been inspired by Soviet sources.

Dobrynin reacted immediately and vigorously. He said he could assure me that his Embassy was in no way responsible. In order to draw him out further, I mentioned a piece by Joseph Kraft who was known to have good contacts with his Embassy. He said that his Counselor had talked to Kraft who had reported to him that Kraft had queried him about a possible Presidential visit and that his Counselor had confined himself saying that was up to the American side. Dobrynin said he could assure me that he had no instructions to raise this matter other than reply to questions, and the Soviet position was in fact that this was up to the American side. Dobrynin said that we obviously had ways of running down these matters and that he was confident that his Embassy was not involved since he had given strict instructions on this matter. He said he had himself noted these press references and realized that they were most unhelpful. He said he could not help but suspect that someone was interested in preventing any top level meeting, and he wondered if the West Germans or others were not responsible.

Continuing on the strategic missile talks, I said that I could not improve upon the presentation made to him by the Secretary who had explained the President's long-standing and deep interest in promoting the cause of peace and better understanding between our two countries. On the other hand he could understand that in the light of the Czech developments and the reaction in this country, the President was in a very difficult position. I thought that if the President could be reasonably certain that real progress could be made, he would be prepared to disregard criticism of him for a meeting but it was of course difficult to know in advance what the prospects of success were.

With regard to the missile talks, Dobrynin replied that he had seen on his last visit to Moscow the draft instructions to the Soviet delegation. They were very detailed and raised a number of complex issues. On the other hand, they were devoid of polemics and represented a serious effort to find a basis for agreement. He suggested that the talks need not necessarily be opened on a top level and thought that in any event the issues were of such a nature that they could not entirely be resolved in one brief discussion.

I concluded by repeating that no decision had been made. He emphasized that he had not been instructed to press us on the matter and I got the impression that the Soviets would understand if a date later than September 30 was suggested.

294. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, September 9, 1968, 11:15 a.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Chlodnick File. Confidential; Sensitive; Literally Eyes Only. The memorandum is marked with a "PS," indicating that the President saw it.

Mr. President:

You should know that, pursuant to your instructions, Dobrynin is dropping by my home at 8:30 p.m. this evening.

I attach notes on your guidance to me over the phone. I would, of course, make these points in appropriately diplomatic--but quite clear--form--but blunter than if I were at State.

The technical problem is this:

--On strategic missiles, neither we nor Moscow can assess whether the first talks could be productive until each side had quietly examined the other's opening position. Otherwise the meeting could only be productive in the sense that initial views were exchanged and both sides agreed to meet again.

--On other matters, the great thing would be for the meeting to announce forward movement on Vietnam and the Middle East. That depends, of course, on what emerges in Paris and in New York (General Assembly) in the weeks ahead.

I shall communicate the message precisely as given to me; but the optimum outcome would be for Dobrynin to come back and say we're prepared to work towards a meeting with positive results and see, in, say, three weeks time, whether a basis existed for a positive, constructive result.

Walt

Attachment/2/

Washington, September 7, 1968.

/2/Secret.

1. The President does not wish to launch the missile talks at a meeting lower than the Kosygin-Johnson level.

2. The President is prepared to contemplate a meeting in the original time frame--that is, October 1--10--if there could be good results.

3. Frankly, a meeting which was not successful would simply give a political handle to Nixon that President Johnson "was selling the country out."

4. Only if Dobrynin believes the chances for a productive meeting "are good" is the President prepared to contemplate such a session.

5. Dobrynin should be aware of the depth of the Congressional reaction about Czechoslovakia. (See Hruska and Dirksen speeches.)

6. If the Soviet Union does not want to deal with President Johnson on these matters constructively, they can wait for Nixon. (See latest polls.)/3/

/3/In a September 6 memorandum to the President on the "Advance Gallup" for September 8, Fred Panzer stated that "the GOP continues to lead the Democrats as the party better able to handle the Nation's top problems." The memorandum is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Chlodnick File.

295. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, September 10, 1968.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Chlodnick File. Top Secret; Sensitive; For the Eyes of the President and Secretary of State Only. Forwarded by Rostow to the President under a covering memorandum, dated September 10, 2:30 p.m., in which he stated that he went over the memorandum in detail with Rusk at lunch on September 10. He also indicated that there were only two copies, the President's and his, and there would be no copy in the State Department. A handwritten note on page 1of the memorandum states that Rusk did not keep a copy.

Mr. President:

Pursuant to my memorandum to you of yesterday (attached),/2/ Ambassador Dobrynin came to my home at 8:30 yesterday evening. We had a very long private conversation.

/2/Document 294.

1. After amenities, I explained that I wished to talk to him about the context of the message given him by Ambassador Thompson a few days ago/3/--the context being, perhaps, more appropriate for a White House aide to explain than an Ambassador. I then presented the six points/4/ in a lucid and appropriate form. Before the evening was over, he took down the six points. I phrased the sixth about as follows: "If the Soviet Union does not wish or does not find it possible to deal with President Johnson on these matters constructively, this would be understood; but they should study carefully the political temper of the United States and especially recent polls." I gave him a copy of the latest Gallup poll, as well as a copy of the Dirksen and Hruska speeches./5/

/3/See Document 293.

/4/See the attachment to Document 294.

/5/See footnote 3, Document 292, and footnote 3, Document 294.

There is no doubt that he has those points with absolute clarity, returning to them several times before he left.

2. Dobrynin then turned to the problem of the missile talks. He said, as he had said several times to Thompson, that he had seen the position papers of the Soviet Union. They were detailed and highly technical. Moreover, he said that as a diplomat he must report to me in candor that they represented not a final position but a bargaining position. He assumed that our papers would be similar in character. To complete the negotiation on the missile question would, in his judgment, take considerable time. Therefore, if concrete results were to emerge from a first meeting between Kosygin and the President, he thought we should consider two possible steps:

--an early exchange of papers at the Ambassadorial level: via Thompson in Moscow and Dobrynin in Washington. This could be done quietly and would give each side a chance to see what elements in them could be the subject for an interim agreement in principle at the Summit meeting;

--an effort be made, before a Summit meeting, to agree on these matters of broad principle which would guide the negotiations in the wake of a Summit meeting.

3. Dobrynin then turned to the Middle East and raised this question: In the wake of their paper to us on the Middle East,/6/ is there any way that a Summit meeting might push us towards peace in the Middle East? I then pointed out to him that the paper they had given us was interesting in structure, but it did not come to grips with the Israeli judgment that only direct negotiations could lead to a settlement which would be politically and psychologically stable. I told him we were taking the Soviet paper seriously, but there were problems with it, including the relationship of any views that might be developed between the United States and the Soviet Union on the one hand, and the Jarring mission on the other.

/6/Dobrynin gave the paper to Rusk during their meeting on September 4. The text is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, volume XX.

4. Dobrynin then made a long reply with the following points:

--After the Arab-Israeli war, the Soviet Union could have exploited the situation to set up bases and greatly to strengthen its military and political position in the Middle East. They had decided not to do so. This paper reflected an authentic desire for a stable settlement.

--We should be conscious of one particular point in the Soviet proposal; namely, the idea of a Four-Power guarantee of Middle Eastern borders. The idea had come to him through Dr. Nahum Goldman, an old Zionist. He, Dobrynin, and the Soviet Government had concluded that a Four-Power guarantee of the Middle Eastern frontiers was the most solid basis the Israelis could acquire for the continuity of their national existence-more solid than a peace treaty with the Arab states. He suggested that, perhaps, an agreement on this particular point might be a constructive item for a Summit meeting.

--As for the rest of the substance of the paper, he thought that Jarring might submit some such paper against the background of prior U.S.-Soviet agreement. Jarring had been running around the Middle East, but not making much progress. If he could put in a proposal backed by the U.S. and the Soviet Union, then his mission might move forward more rapidly.

He returned several times in the course of the conversation to a Four-Power guarantee as the critical element for Israel in the Soviet paper.

5. Dobrynin then turned to Vietnam and talked at very great length, making, in the end, the following points:

--He continued to regret that we had not responded more positively to Kosygin's statement that "he and his colleagues had reason to believe, etc."/7/ To the best of Dobrynin's knowledge, this was a unique message to the United States. He had hoped that if we could not act immediately upon it we would come back with a proposition which "Kosygin and his colleagues" might press on Hanoi.

/7/Reference is to Kosygin's June 6 letter to Johnson scheduled for publication ibid., volume VI.

--He then raised the subject of the third offensive. With striking candor he said: "Now that the Democratic Convention is over, the offensive may subside." If there was a lull in the level of violence in South Vietnam, would we be willing to stop the bombing? He then introduced the familiar argument that we were "a great country dealing with a small country" and we could afford to be generous. I said the question was not one of generosity, but of the lives of American soldiers and our allies. There is also the critical matter that if they were not prepared for reciprocity at this stage, I did not see how a stable peace could be negotiated for Southeast Asia. The negotiation of a peace would have to confront certain hard facts about the presence of North Vietnamese forces in Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam. If we evaded the question of reciprocity on the bombing, we might then be confronted with a similar stubbornness and unwillingness to face reality with respect to the GVN in Saigon; then, the question of North Vietnamese troop withdrawals from the South; etc. We did not see why, if they were serious, they would not settle down and make peace on the basis of hard realities.

--This led to a very long series of statements on the mind of the men in Hanoi--and in Peking--as seen from Moscow. He began with the Chinese Communists. He said that in their dealings with Moscow, the Chinese Communists often took positions that made absolutely no sense to the Russian mind. For example, in a meeting with Soviet and other Communists, the Chinese Communists said bluntly they did not mind a nuclear war. This would wipe out most of the Soviet population and a high proportion of the Chinese population, but would leave them with two or three hundred million Chinese. (He reported that an Eastern European Communist leader spoke up and asked: "What about us?") He said that while the men in Hanoi were not casual about nuclear war, they were filled with ideas which were foreign to Moscow and--no doubt--to us. They took enormous pride in their capacity to survive and persist in conducting the war against the world's greatest power. They evoked memories of how they have survived for centuries against the Chinese; struggled successfully against the French; kept in the battle against the big American forces. They are very stubborn about their objectives: he cited their satisfaction and pride in forcing us to stop a part of the bombing. (At this point he came perilously close to suggesting that we should have used more power against them, but veered away quickly.)

--On the other hand, he said that Hanoi had shared with Moscow some of the negotiating positions they would take after a bombing cessation. He could not reveal these to me. But he personally concluded that they would negotiate seriously.

--In underlining the curious pride and mentality of the men in Hanoi he gave a long circumstantial account of how the Soviet Union was prepared to make available to them pilots for air defense. He said that the Soviet Union had a number of experienced pilots who were in retirement at an early age. Their pensions were greater than the salary of an Ambassador. Some Soviet military men were extremely anxious to get them into Hanoi so that they could acquire experience in combat with the Americans. The Americans were learning exactly what the capacity of their aircraft and their pilots was. The Soviet Union could only train their men under non-combat conditions. Therefore, the pressure to get Hanoi to accept Soviet pilots was considerable. But they flatly refused. He cited this, again, as an example of the extreme pride of a very small power in dealing with a major power.

6. I told him that I had no position to report to him on a cessation of bombing other than that with which he was wholly familiar. We hoped that things would move forward in Paris. If they wish to negotiate with President Johnson, they had better get moving. I doubted that they would do any better in negotiations with President Johnson's successor, whoever he might be. Moreover, they had better reckon that the South Vietnamese are as stubborn as the North Vietnamese. They will soon have a million men under arms of increasing competence and confidence.

7. Dobrynin then suddenly asked: If there were a free election in the South, how do you think it would come out? I said that it was my private judgment that the hard core Communists could not attract as much as 10% of the South Vietnamese vote. On a Popular Front basis they might do better; but, for what it was worth, I did not believe that a Popular Front in South Vietnam would do as well as the French and Italian Communist parties in their elections. He asked: How would President Thieu fare in an election? I took him through the election statistics (which I shall send him), pointing out that between them, Thieu and Huong had gotten 45% of the vote. If you added in former General Don in the Senate, you were up to something like 56% of the vote. Except for Dzu, who was in effect a Popular Front candidate, the balance went to anti-Communist Nationalists. I concluded that the problem of the South Vietnamese in an election, in my judgment, was not with a vast pro-VC majority, but how to avoid running 10 Nationalist candidates, as they did last time. I concluded by saying that I could be wrong; and if the men in Hanoi believed in the popularity of their cause, let them adopt the test of a one-man, one-vote election. We were ready. He asked: Is Thieu ready? I said that it was my impression that he was ready. I cited the statement in the Honolulu Communiqué which he had volunteered despite the fact that he was under considerable political pressure at home at a time when a major attack on Saigon was expected.

8. We then concluded as follows:

--He would report the six points as the communication from me to him. He then went over these once more, finally, to make sure he had them clear.

--He would, on a quite different basis, put forward the idea as a matter discussed informally and without responsibility, of working towards a Summit in which intensive prior consultation had established some limited basis for a successful forward movement in missiles, the Middle East and, possibly, Vietnam.

--He said that, obviously, only intensive preparatory work could establish whether we could develop the basis for a successful Summit in the days ahead. The question for Moscow and for us was: Were we prepared to enter into such contingent preparatory work? He would put that proposition to Moscow on a personal basis. We should think about it.

9. In closing, I underlined once again the importance of how things evolved in Czechoslovakia and called his attention, once again, to the Dirksen-Hruska speeches.

10. As we walked to his car, he recalled that we had first discussed U.S.-Soviet relations in December 1960 in Moscow. Despite many difficult and dangerous crises and setbacks since then, progress had been made. It was his personal belief that we should not be excessively discouraged by the crisis in Czechoslovakia, but try to move forward when we could, for "there was no other way."

Walt

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