The Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons was opened for signature at Washington, London, and Moscow on July 1, 1968. At a White House ceremony on July 1, 56 nations signed the treaty. On July 9 President Johnson transmitted the treaty to the Senate, which gave its consent on March 13, 1969, by a vote of 83-15. The treaty, which required the ratification of the United States, the United Kingdom, Soviet Union, and 40 other states, finally entered into force with the deposit of U.S. ratification at Washington, London, and Moscow on March 5, 1970. For text of the treaty, see 21 UST 483 or the Department of State Bulletin, July 1, 1968, pages 9-11. For documentation on negotiation of the treaty, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, volume XI.

In his remarks at the signing ceremony on July 1, President Johnson announced that "agreement has been reached between the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States to enter in the nearest future into discussions on the limitation and reduction of both offensive strategic nuclear weapons delivery systems and systems of defense against ballistic missiles." For text of the President's statement, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1968-69, Book II, pages 763-765. Earlier, in a June 27 letter to President Johnson, Chairman Kosygin had indicated that the Soviet Government was prepared to publish the same statement in the Soviet press and over the radio on July 1. For text of Kosygin's letter, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, volume XI, Document 249. For text of the memorandum published by the Soviet Government on July 1, see Current Digest of the Soviet Press, July 24, 1968, pages 3-4.

278. Memorandum of Conversation Between Secretary of State Rusk and the Soviet Ambassador (Dobrynin)/1/

Washington, July 1, 1968.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Trip to Soviet Union. Secret; Nodis.

I met with Ambassador Dobrynin for thirty minutes following the NPT signing today.

I told him that a TASS representative, Mr. Kopytin, had called on Mr. Walt Rostow a few days ago, had referred to a certain amount of gossip around Washington that the President might have in mind a meeting with Chairman Kosygin, and had asked Mr. Rostow for any comment on the situation. I added that Mr. Rostow had replied that he himself had no information on this matter but that if there was interest in such a matter on the Soviet side that there were other channels which would be appropriate to be used to explore the possibility. Ambassador Dobrynin commented that Mr. Kopytin was not such a channel and was not involved in any way in such matters.

I then went on to say that the President has in fact been thinking about the desirability of another meeting with Mr. Kosygin and felt that there was much to be gained from it. Specifically, there would be a big meeting of the non-nuclear states in August to discuss the implications of the NPT. There would be great advantage if the President and Mr. Kosygin could demonstrate before that meeting that the two of us are seriously engaged in the matter of offensive and defensive strategic missiles. I said that the President would be glad to have a chance to initiate this important subject by a first talk with Mr. Kosygin, during which arrangements could be made for follow-up delegations on the two sides to work on the subject. Further, if it could be known publicly that this subject was to be a central topic for discussion, it could simplify speculation about other topics which might arise. Of course, if the two did meet for an informal working session other topics could naturally be brought into the conversation.

I said that the above pointed toward a meeting toward the latter part of July, if that would suit Mr. Kosygin's convenience. As for a place, the President would be open to suggestions which Mr. Kosygin might wish to make. It occurred to us that Geneva might be a possibility in view of the presence there of the ENDC. However, the President could, for example, make a non-stop flight to Leningrad if that would be a suitable place for a good working session. We understand that there might be some problems about what might be described as an official or state visit but that would be something on which Mr. Kosygin's judgment would be valuable. In any event, I said that the exact time and place were matters on which the President was willing to consider Mr. Kosygin's suggestions.

Ambassador Dobrynin did not raise any objections in principle and said that he would be in private personal contact with Mr. Kosygin. The Ambassador expects to be in Washington about a week before returning to Moscow for further participation in a high level review of U.S.-Soviet relations. He asked whether the President's schedule would permit him to have such a meeting in August or whether the two party conventions would exclude that. I said there might be some problem if the President were to undertake such a meeting in the middle of one of the two main party conventions. In any event I thought that an earlier date would be useful from the point of view of the conference of the non-nuclears scheduled for August. I could not derive any tentative Soviet reaction from anything Ambassador Dobrynin said. He obviously did not attempt to comment personally before checking with Chairman Kosygin.

Drawing a sharp distinction between the above part of my conversation and the matter of the Seaboard Airlines plane in the Kurile Islands, I told him I thought it would be most unfortunate if this matter turned out to be a major incident. I said that this was an instance of "unearned dividends" in our business, and that I much regretted that on Saturday of all days some American navigator and pilot apparently strayed off course. I told him that if this were the case, he could have my sincere expressions of regret right now. He said that he did not think this matter would prove to be too difficult but that he had had no instructions from Moscow. Whether his relatively relaxed and optimistic attitude will be reflected in Moscow, one cannot of course say.

The Ambassador then asked me about the prospects for the election. I told him that the present indications are that Vice President Humphrey and Mr. Nixon have a very strong lead in their respective parties but that I have been advising all of my friends in the diplomatic corps to add a final sentence in any report on our elections: "But don't forget that 1968 is a year of political surprises in the United States." He smiled and said that he has been doing just that to Moscow but that Moscow is very anxious to have something more solid.

He added, very much off the record, that Mr. Nixon has approached the Soviet Government on three occasions about a visit to Moscow following the Republican Convention. He said that they had simply not replied to the first two inquiries but now have a third inquiry in front of them which they are thinking about. I told him that I was not in a position at this moment to offer any advice on that subject but did point to the habit of many candidates to want to make a "grand tour" of foreign capitals and that this has presented problems for busy leaders of other Governments.

He then expressed interest in whether Senator McCarthy would go to Paris. I told him that we just didn't know, that Senator McCarthy has a passport and would probably be admitted to France. I also pointed out that such a visit would be very strange and not in accord with long-standing American constitutional and diplomatic practice. I said that Senator McCarthy might succeed only in misleading the representatives of Hanoi to which he assented.

Dean Rusk/2/

/2/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

279. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Washington, July 2, 1968, 10:30 a.m.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL US-USSR. Confidential. Drafted by Beigel and approved in S on July 7.

SUBJECT
Relations with the Soviet Union

PARTICIPANTS

United States
The Secretary
Assistant Secretary Leddy, EUR
Mr. E. J. Beigel, Acting Country Director for France

France
Ambassador Lucet
Mr. Jean-Pierre Cabouat, Counselor, French Embassy

The French Ambassador called at his request to discuss the current French trade measures (reported in State 195609),/2/ and to indicate that he would soon return to Paris to consult with his government and take his summer vacation. He was interested in having the Secretary's views on current relations with the Soviet Union.

/2/Dated July 2. (Ibid., FT 1/1/FR)

The Ambassador referred to the memorandum published by the Soviet Government on July 1,/3/ following the signing of the non-proliferation treaty, and asked what our reaction was to it. The Secretary said that in publishing their list of nine measures "on an end to the arms race and on disarmament in the near future" the Russians had merely cleaned out the refrigerator--full of proposals they had tabled at one time or another in the past. He said we also will have a list of proposals, but the concrete development at present will be the missile talks. The heart of this matter will be in bilateral talks, focusing on the U.S. and Soviet military establishments, in the first instance. He anticipated that there would also be discussion on this subject at Geneva, and NATO would be consulted as we move along.

/3/For text, see Current Digest of the Soviet Press, July 24, 1968, pp. 3-4.

The Secretary said that the missile question is both very complicated and very simple. The problem is one of avoiding tremendous new expenditures on both sides, which could only have, as an end result, the effect of maintaining the existing balance of nuclear deterrence. How to solve this simple problem, on the other hand, is a highly complicated technical question. We have wondered why the Soviets responded to our initiative; in the best case, they may have reached the same conclusion we did, that no significant advantage is possible for either side; in the worst case, they may feel that a gesture, without real substance, would help influence hesitant countries to sign the non-proliferation treaty. The Secretary said that we will proceed on the basis that the Soviets are prepared to deal with the problem seriously.

The Ambassador wondered whether this development indicated the possibility of a general improvement in relations with the Soviet Union. The Secretary replied that improvements had taken place on an eclectic basis, not across-the-board. While we have moved ahead with the non-proliferation treaty, two space treaties, a civil air agreement and a consular convention, our relations have not improved regarding Berlin and Viet-Nam, and our ideologies remain far apart. The Soviets appear to be suspicious of "bridge-building." We are trying to move ahead on a pragmatic basis, on matters that we believe will be of mutual advantage to both countries. We remain hopeful that in due course we will secure Congressional agreement in the area of trade expansion with Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, with authority to extend most-favored-nation treatment to those countries.

With regard to the Berlin situation, the Secretary said that he found a preoccupation in Germany, during his brief visit there, over what might come next rather than over the measures already taken. The Soviets tell us that the measures undertaken by the East Germans constitute only a change in form, not a challenge to Allied access, and that they do not wish to increase tensions over Berlin. The Secretary said that the measures are not consistent with Soviet understandings with the Allies, and that we must make clear to the Soviets that this is getting into dangerous country. Both we and the Soviets could do without another Berlin crisis. The impression we have is that the present measures were instituted in part because of concern over developments in Czechoslovakia. In this connection, the Secretary noted that in his public statement in Bonn on June 26/4/ he had suggested that the Soviets and Eastern Europeans are becoming a little frightened of peaceful coexistence, which in the long run could undermine the economic, social and political systems of the Communist states.

/4/For text, see Department of State Bulletin, July 15, 1968, pp. 74-75.

280. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Read) to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow)/1/

Washington, July 13, 1968.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, USSR, Vol. XXI. Confidential.

SUBJECT
US-USSR Exchanges Agreement for 1968-69

On February 27 I sent you the US draft for a new exchanges agreement with the Soviet Union for 1968-69. Negotiations began in Moscow June 3, and have now been completed. I enclose a copy of the agreed text./2/

/2/Not attached.

The new agreement retains the structure, general and procedural provisions of the last agreement, including protective language to insure reciprocity in performing arts and other programs. We were able to include a potentially valuable new provision for distribution of Amerika magazine to visitors at American exhibits. The Soviets also agreed to numerous editorial improvements in the text.

As the Under Secretary informed the President in his memorandum dated June 29,/3/ the Soviets insisted during the negotiations that they would continue the exchanges of performing arts groups and exhibits only at reduced levels. Since then we pressed for, and the Soviets agreed to, an increase to six in the number of cities at which exhibits may be shown. Since the last agreement provided for two exhibits in three cities each, the new provision gives our exhibit exposure equal to that obtained by both sent in 1966-67.

/3/Document 276.

In performing arts, the Soviets insisted to the end that they were able to send only three groups to the US in 1968-69 (against four actually sent and five provided for in 1966-67). The new agreement, thus, provides for the exchange of three performing arts groups in the next 18 months. In exchanges of individual performing artists, the new agreement contains tighter reciprocity provisions which may help to increase the number of American artists visiting the USSR.

Other programs are continued at levels either approximately equal to those provided for 1966-67 or ranging downward to the level actually implemented during that period. To a degree, we limited levels in technical exchanges in order to preserve the overall internal balance of the agreement.

In view of the President's interest, we thought you might want to see the agreed text which we plan to authorize Ambassador Thompson to sign./4/

/4/The agreement was signed at Moscow on July 15 by Thompson and Nikolai M. Lunkov, Director of the Cultural Relations Department, Soviet Foreign Ministry. For text, see Department of State Bulletin, August 5, 1968, pp. 154-159.

Benjamin H. Read/5/

/5/John P. Walsh signed for Read above Read's typed signature.

281. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of the Office of National Estimates (Huizenga) to Director of Central Intelligence Helms/1/

Washington, July 15, 1968.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, USSR, Vol. XXI. Secret; Eyes Only. Helms forwarded Huizenga's memorandum to the President under cover of a July 16 memorandum that stated: "Walt Rostow and I have been discussing the significance of recent Soviet foreign policy moves in an effort to ascertain what coherence there might be when the principal ones are taken together. To this end, the attached paper has been drafted. It is a careful, balanced analysis with which I agree." Rostow added his own covering memorandum to the President, dated July 16, in which he commented that the paper was "worth reading" and its author "a thoughtful and hardheaded fellow." In a July 16 memorandum to Rostow, Helms noted that he had also sent a copy of the paper to Rusk but otherwise it would be given no distribution. (All ibid.)

SUBJECT
Some Signs of Change in Soviet Policy

1. Signs have appeared recently that Soviet policy may be moving in new directions on some key issues. Having responded for the last several years to approaches on Vietnam only by a willingness to provide Hanoi's telephone number, the Soviets have now begun some diplomatic activity in the anterooms of the Paris talks. For the first time since the Arab-Israeli war a year ago, there are hints that Moscow's hard pro-Arab line may give way to a more flexible diplomacy and some parallel efforts with the US. And, of course, the American offer of a year and a half ago to discuss the control of strategic weapons has now been taken up. Assuming that these are valid and significant signs, some obvious questions arise: Why? Why now? What range of movement on these or other issues is likely?

2. The consideration that might figure in a shift of Soviet policy on such issues would no doubt be multiple and complex. But more than likely, given their intense preoccupation with tactics, the Soviets have in mind some inter-connection when they become active simultaneously in several apparently unrelated matters. There has not been, however, any general improvement in the climate of Soviet-American relations, Moscow's usual way of accenting the positive when it wants to get some diplomatic business done. The harsh attacks on the US which have marked the entire period of the Vietnam war continue. The suggestion is that Moscow is prepared for bargaining, but that the terms will be hard and that there will be no movement on matters important to the US unless it makes concessions sought by the USSR on others. Among the three subjects listed above, the Middle East and strategic arms control are those on which the US has been pressing Moscow to be more accommodating. Presumably the Soviets expect the US to move toward concessions on Vietnam.

Soviet Aims and Tactics on Vietnam

3. Support for Hanoi and its campaign against the South has had a high priority in Soviet policy since the fall of Khrushchev in 1964. While this course may have been entered upon then in the mistaken belief that Hanoi was nearing success, it has been persisted in at some cost and risk. Probably the main motive has been to sustain Moscow's claim to leadership of the Communist movement in the face of China's bitter attacks and deviant tendencies in others. At the same time, it was recognized that the widespread opposition to the US role in Vietnam provided opportunity for Soviet propaganda and diplomacy to work effectively against US influence in many other areas. Evidently, such possibilities as there might have been for constructive developments in Soviet-American relations did not weigh as heavily in Soviet calculations.

4. The Soviet leaders have probably always believed that the war could only end in a negotiated settlement, and they probably now hope that the Paris talks will develop in such a way as to bring that result at the earliest feasible date. Tactically, Hanoi's move to the negotiating table also frees Moscow to begin at last to talk with the US on Vietnam. That this is happening does not mean that Moscow is now prepared to play a mediating role, however, much less to bring any sort of pressure on Hanoi to settle for less than it wants. Soviet diplomatic activity so far is only parallel and supporting, and appears at every step to be coordinated with the Vietnamese. This will probably continue to be true, for two very substantial reasons. First, the Soviets clearly do not have significant influence on Hanoi's policy. Second, an attempt to put pressure on Hanoi to agree to some "compromise" solution short of its desires would play into China's hands and probably cost Moscow its entire investment and effort in North Vietnam.

5. Thus the outcome Moscow will be working for will be one satisfactory to the Hanoi leadership. If Hanoi wins control of the South, and perhaps eventually of Laos and Cambodia as well, the Soviets will expect their repute among Vietnamese and other Communists to grow, and they will expect to increase their influence in Southeast Asia generally, at the expense of both the US and China. They do not equate success for Hanoi with an enlarged Chinese threat to that area. On the other hand, if Hanoi feels obliged to accept an unfavorable outcome, the Soviets will accept this also, though in this case they would expect Chinese influence in Hanoi to grow at their expense. The ideal solution from Moscow's point of view would be one favorable to Hanoi, one that resulted from a negotiated settlement the Soviets could claim to have helped bring about, and perhaps also, if Hanoi were willing, a solution phased over some period of time, on the ground that this might limit complications and dangers in Soviet-American relations.

6. The indicated course for the Soviets, therefore, is to induce the US to move toward acceptance of terms agreeable to Hanoi. This has been their line all along, but the fact that negotiations are now in train authorizes them to take initiatives which Hanoi's previously rigid attitude precluded. If the Soviets still cannot bargain on their own account over a Vietnam settlement, Hanoi will have no objection and perhaps even counts on the Soviets exercising leverage on the US by opening up other areas of negotiation.

7. It is probably no accident, therefore, that the Soviets chose the present moment to signal an interest in moving with the US on the Middle East and in talking about control of strategic arms. In making this point it does not need to be implied that the Soviets will only make motions on these subjects and will not talk seriously. In fact, in respect of both there are good reasons for believing that the Soviets think the moment has come when there would be advantage to them in trying to deal with the US. The opportunity to bring these subjects together with Vietnam perhaps only gave an added incentive.

Soviet Policy in the Middle East

8. Since the Arab-Israeli war in 1967 the Soviets have aligned themselves rigorously with the Arab cause. They have resupplied the arms lost and in their diplomacy and propaganda have worked for a settlement which would at least deprive Israel of the fruits of its military victory. In some part, this effort was intended to recoup the loss of prestige suffered by the USSR when it encouraged the Arab belligerency prior to June 1967 and then stood idly by as its clients were humiliated. The Soviets probably now think that they have largely reestablished their position in the radical Arab states. But for many complicated reasons, some having to do with Soviet interests in Europe, both East and West, Moscow has no desire to align itself with Arab intransigence aimed at the destruction of the Israeli state. Its problem is to preserve its influence with the Arabs while avoiding a full commitment to Arab aims.

9. If the present stalemate continues, the Israelis will simply stand fast on their territorial gains and the Arabs will feel that they have no recourse but to look to another round of war. They will demand more and more arms and probably direct Soviet support as well in an eventual showdown, perspectives which cannot be congenial to Moscow. The Soviets probably now think that they have an interest in joining with the US to bring the Middle East hotbed under some degree of control. What they would want from the US is pressure on Israel to moderate its claims for a settlement. In return, they might hold out the possibility of an agreement the US has long sought--one limiting arms sales in the region. The Soviets would be particularly pleased if under such an agreement the US could be persuaded to withhold further supply of high performance aircraft to Israel. In any case, they would expect that the prospect of parallel action to contain the dangers in this area would elicit considerable US interest. And, they might think, this could have some bearing on what the US would be willing to do about a settlement in Vietnam.

The Soviet Approach to Control of Strategic Arms

10. The long delay in acceptance of the American offer to discuss the control of strategic weapons was probably owing to several reasons. Responses to the repeated American initiatives in the arms control field have always been marked by extreme caution and suspicion, and on so central an issue as the control of strategic weapons the resistance of conservative forces, both within and outside of the military establishment, was probably formidable. Moreover, until very recently the Soviets have been in the position of catching up, at least in numbers of land-based ICBM's. The present moment, when the Soviets have probably come to have real confidence in their possession of an assured destruction capability, and before the US advances to new developments which could unhinge this equilibrium once more, probably seems the most opportune to entertain measures to arrest competition in this field. The Soviets are probably not fully confident of their ability to keep pace should the race continue, and, of course, they must be deeply conscious of the economic burdens of continuing.

11. Moscow's willingness to begin talks does not signify a firm intention to strive for an agreement. In the initial phase, the Soviets will probably confine themselves to probing the US position. If and when they get down to serious dealing, the process, given the critical nature of the issues, will be hard and prolonged. But, because of their intensely political approach to arms control issues, the Soviets will see certain advantages in this very process. For one thing, they are aware that prolonged negotiation about arms control measures is itself a form of arms control, since some inhibition would be imposed on new US programs. For another, they would hope that one result of the negotiations, even if no agreement issues from them, will be that the US concedes in principle that the USSR is and should be recognized as an equal power, with a full right to strategic parity, however that may be defined in detail. This alone the Soviets would see as a considerable political achievement, with favorable implications for the position of the Soviet regime at home, for its claims to leadership in the Communist world, and for its standing and influence as a world power.

12. And, of course, to engage the US in negotiations for a goal--significant arms control agreements--to which American opinion and policy are deeply committed, would, the Soviets could calculate, have an influence on how the US appraised what was at stake in one or another form of Vietnam settlement. It is not that there could be any direct trade-offs; this would be too crude. But the belief that Soviet-American relations were at last on a constructive course could have a far-reaching effect, especially on general American opinion, in making concessions in Vietnam seem more acceptable. It is a classic Soviet mode in negotiating close issues to hold out the promise of broader benefits to follow.

In Sum

13. This reading of the signs which point to some new directions in Soviet policy on certain major issues clearly does not forecast any very deep change. There are good tactical reasons why the Soviets should now move toward some degree of tacit collaboration with the US in the Middle East, and should take up the US offer to discuss the control of strategic weapons. The possibility of influencing the US course in the negotiations on Vietnam by these moves is an added tactical consideration of great weight. In other areas, however, Soviet purposes will require that tension and hostility be sustained. This is particularly true in Eastern Europe where the Soviet hegemony is under challenge and where "the threat of aggressive US imperialism" is more than ever needed. Even in the USSR itself, the leadership apparently feels, certain unwholesome tendencies and a kind of ideological unsteadiness preclude any broad relaxation of tensions with the US. Thus the signs of change considered here presage, in the intentions of the Soviet leaders, no very far-reaching effects for Soviet-American relations. But then the Soviet leaders have not been uniformly successful in forecasting and controlling the consequences of every new turn in the play.

JH

282. Record of Meeting/1/

Washington, July 29, 1968, 7-8 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recordings of Meetings in the Cabinet Room, Tape C043B-1D. No classification marking. The transcript of the tape was prepared in the Office of the Historian. A transcript of the meeting prepared by the President's secretary, with some revisions made based on the tape, is printed in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XVII, Document 75.

Cabinet Room Meeting of Monday, July 29, 1968, 7:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m. With the President, Secretary Rusk and Secretary Clifford and Tom Johnson

Clifford: You've got to look at it, too, of the possibility of there being some serious dangers inherent in it./2/ One quick reaction I would have would be that if by chance Czechoslovakia is still a pending problem, I don't believe I'd go near Kosygin during the time that Czechoslovakia is still hot. You could get caught up in that and I'm just afraid it would be difficult for you to extricate yourself. You could have a talk with Kosygin and the day you talked with him Soviet troops could move on Czechoslovakia or the day after you left, troops could move in Czechoslovakia. It would be, they'd be tied together in some way, whether that would suit Kosygin's attitude or not, I don't know. I think that we have to be careful about the reasons why the President was seeing Kosygin at this time. Is it because the President has a new plan that he is taking to Kosygin vis-á-vis Vietnam? Is there something new he wants to take to him? Is it because the President's concerned about the Middle East--some development there? Is he concerned about NATO? You know, there's so much cooking right now. As far as starting off with Kosygin on a discussion of strategic limitation and ultimate reduction, I don't know. Right at this time, Mr. President, I wonder whether that's advisable. These are going to be long, difficult, exceedingly complex negotiations. Whether the President and Kosygin can do anything much at the very beginning of it, I don't know. I think that the general approach would be, well--I just wonder what they can do about it. And I think we have to be careful--the time that the President selects to see Kosygin. I would hope that there'd be time when we didn't have a situation quite as inflammable as it is. I'm thinking of the Czechoslovakian problem. I think that's a terribly difficult problem. I know we can't get in it. I feel some concern that we can. Czechoslovakia is supposedly a free country and they can be under the heel just like Hungary was. I don't know for instance whether somebody might decide to bring this up in the Security Council in the UN-Czechoslovakia. Maybe some member of the Security Council could decide to bring it up. That would tend to exacerbate it. So, a second point I'm making is to sound a note of basic caution about going to see Kosygin right at this time. I think it must be watched with great care. The third point I have--after Dean left Saturday afternoon, I just noted down thoughts that I had, just in my own handwriting--I've not given them even to the girl. The third point I'd like to make has to do with the Convention.

/2/In a July 25 letter to the President, Kosygin proposed that the strategic missile talks commence within one to one-and-a-half months and that Geneva be the site. For text, see ibid., vol. XI, Document 261.

[Here follow 3 pages concerning the President's possible attendance at the Democratic National Convention in August.]

[Clifford:] There's another little element there. We don't know when the North Vietnamese are gong to launch their next series of attacks. If they chose to and the President saw Kosygin in early August or some time through that period there or some time in August, that might be the time that they'd choose to launch attacks. I don't know. I think, if I were they, I'd maybe be on the lookout for some situation of that kind. They would get some notice in advance. There always has to be some word in advance to the American public and to the press generally that such a meeting is to be held. There'd have to be some advanced announcement. There again is an opportunity for embarrassment to the President. This is very prominent in my mind, as I look ahead at this time, Mr. President, with the condition existing in Czechoslovakia, with existing in Vietnam--we're waiting for the other shoe to drop over there--I can see more danger in a visit with Kosygin at this time than I can see benefit. Now I think there will come a time when the President can see Kosygin. Right now it just seems to me that it's tempting fate too severely.

President: What time do you see it come?

Clifford: Well, I think there'll be a resolution of the problem in Czechoslovakia. These things don't go on indefinitely. The President is still President. Let's see, August, September, October, November, December, you're still President for six months, until the 20th of January. That's almost six months off. I don't know, it could be a week.

President: You think it would probably be all right to have meetings in November and December?

Clifford: It wouldn't bother me a bit. It wouldn't bother me a bit. You're going right on being President and you're not bothering with politics. The fact that there's some new man or something, that wouldn't bother me a particle. I think in maybe a week, could be a week, Czechoslovakia would be resolved one way or another. Could be two weeks, or take three weeks, but I think it's going to be resolved, that this thing has gotten so acute now, so inflammatory, that I think they're going to lance this abscess one way or the other and I think it will be out of the way. Now, I think that we will all learn during the month of August whether there's going to be another series of attacks from the enemy in Vietnam. Maybe it will come and maybe it won't, and I think we get that out of the way so that that doesn't get too involved in it. It wouldn't disturb me at all if the talks on strategic weapons control were to start at some other level. It's going to go on for some time. I don't know that it has too much significance in having it started by Kosygin and the President and I'm not even sure that it's particularly valuable to just confine it to that at the starting. I think that the President when he goes to see, or arranges to see Kosygin, under proper circumstances in which Kosygin's comfortable I would hope the two of you would be able to sit down and cover the entire mosaic of our problems. An announcement could be made ahead of time to that effect and something after it could come out. Right now I believe that if I were Kosygin with this real nose bleed on my hands with Czechoslovakia I think almost the last person I would want to see right now would be President Johnson.

President: Yes, I think there is something to that. I'm not necessarily trying to help him though.

Rusk: Well, Mr. President, I'd like to comment very briefly.

President: Let me comment on Clark's thing. I think there is no reason why we have to act until the Czechoslovakia situation is cleared. As I indicated, that's number one. If it's two weeks, that's another matter. I would expect maybe it wouldn't be that long. I don't know. I can't tell. But I don't think it's essential. We don't say that I don't think that the President and Kosygin sit down together. We have though for four years urged this step upon them and we finally got them to agree now that there will be a meeting within a month or a month and a half. I would like to forthrightly respond to that and accept it and give him my views of what ought to happen. And I think there may be some merit in the four days of the Convention there, waiting until it's over with, I don't care. And it may be that he won't want to start at this level. I'd rather think he wouldn't, although I would like to because I think that that would be the way. But if not, if you want to modify that part of it if that is a--you might say, or at the Foreign Minister level. One or the other of us ought to start it off. And so I'm willing to rewrite the letter and use his phrase--not ours.

Rusk: Month, month and a half.

President: Yes, and I'm willing to also add that if this doesn't suit you, why we'd be glad for the Foreign Ministers to start it off. We do think it's of sufficient importance. The very first proposal we made to the Soviet Union we insisted on time and date and place and subject. There is so much that is pending that needs the attention of both countries. What I'm terribly afraid of is--I'm afraid by our sitting with our hands in our pockets, just merrily, merrily going along, just reacting to all of their initiatives and their propaganda and their party line, that we just finally catch ourselves signing off which we have been doing most of the time and I think we're likely to be doing it again. I think we'll be having a Council meeting here in a week or so and everybody will pretty well agree in general, well, we ought to cut out something else we're doing in deference to these folks. That is what I am fearful of.

Rusk: Well, I agree with Clark. I think you do, too, about the possible connection between this Czechoslovakian business. I think, myself, that the chances are—

President: We wouldn't have waited today if it hadn't agreed on that.

Rusk: That's right. That's right. I think we're likely to see some sort of answer on the Czech business before then.

President: I think so.

Rusk: We did put in this draft: "If the general situation permits." That's a phrase that covers the Czech business in our minds. If things really start in Czechoslovakia we'd just ourselves pull back even if Kosygin accepted this.

President: That is what that was intended to do. But I don't think that we even need to dispatch the letter until we see a little clearer than I do now. I said that last weekend and I didn't ask for this meeting today.

Rusk: I asked for it. [Unintelligible.] What such a meeting would be about. I think that we can make it pretty clear that it is about offensive and defensive missiles. That is a question which everybody knows the President's worked on very hard and worked on personally. He tried very hard at Glassboro to get these talks started. He's also worked hard on the non-proliferation treaty which has in it an obligation on the part of the nuclear powers to get going and negotiate in good faith about elimination of the arms race. So from that point of view it seems to me that it would militate in favor of the President's launching these discussions. There's another factor and that is that, Clark, you may not like this one particularly. I think if the President initiated the discussions, this would be a sign to what General Eisenhower called the military industrial complex that, Goddamn it, getting an agreement to limit offensive and defensive missiles is the national policy of the United States. We want people to think about how you do it and not think about how you'll avoid doing it. Looking ahead you look at these tens of billions that are going down this rat hole if we don't find an answer to it, you see. So there's an internal commitment involving the President's study. Now there is danger when the court of last resort gets into session, and Kosygin could turn up there with demands on Berlin or something. After all Khrushchev did drop the Berlin crisis in President Kennedy's lap when they met in Vienna. This did not happen in Glassboro partly because Kosygin was over here at the United Nations on the Middle East frying some fish of his own at that time. And therefore, this was not racked up. There's a little danger. I think it is not as great now as it might have been earlier that that would happen. So this is why--subject to Czechoslovakia--I myself come down on the balanced judgment that there would be real merit in the two meetings if it could be done under the appropriate circumstances.

Clifford: I find no disagreements with that, Dean. I think that President Kennedy's meeting in Vienna with Khrushchev was a calamity.

Rusk: It was.

Clifford: Boy, it was a real zero from President Kennedy's standpoint. Now I think conditions have changed. I think that the Soviets have shown an inclination to find some basis of cooperation with us. That very interesting sentence in the last letter of Kosygin that we will both find as we get into this that a savings can be effected, a very substantial [Unintelligible.]

Rusk: I would be for the President's having a chance to talk with him quite informally--without pretending that is the main subject--about Vietnam and about the Middle East.

Clifford: I would have no difficulty with that.

President: You know originally I thought we ought to say that, and I took it out.

Rusk: Yes.

President: This is not the only subject. This refers to--

Rusk: It will also give us a chance to discuss quietly and informally some of the problems or tensions to which you referred.

President: That just polished up the very [inaudible] three matters they wanted to talk about but also left us a getting out place even on Czechoslovakia or any other developments after it was set. And I don't think I would want to specify that I would not want to attend a meeting. Now, I don't see that this would do the damage to the Democratic Party that Clark does. I have a different viewpoint. I think it's the best thing that we could do for the Democratic Party, whoever is nominated at that time. I don't think we necessarily need to go at that specific moment, but I think most of them will be pretty glad that we're having a meeting. I would just leave it more in his hands on the month to month and a half basis.

Rusk: All right.

President: But I think we could do that after you see what--.

Clifford: I would agree, too, that it would be of great benefit to the Democratic Party if it didn't take place on those very days that they were having their Convention.

President: Well their Convention is going to have all the television every hour. This meeting is not going to be taking much of it. And I would doubt that he would set the meeting. I would just leave it and say anytime within the month or month and half he mentioned, it would be agreeable with us. I'd be pretty agreeable to hear suggestions.

Rusk: All right.

Clifford: Does he have in mind that the President would like to start it off personally with Kosygin, because he said nothing about that in his last reply. And the President I think said nothing about that in this one. Does he?

President: Yes.

Rusk: Yes.

Clifford, Oh, he does. Well I see. I didn't notice it.

President: He understood at Glassboro that we were pressing on this very hard. A little history would help us. Khrushchev wrote me in December '63 a rather broad long letter and we responded January the 16th, '64/3/ in which we discussed the perils of armament in the world and the two powers poised at each other and how much it would cost us and how much good could be done if we could only approach this problem of disarmament and particularly if we could have some agreement that would bring about the non-proliferation treaty. This was number one on the list and we listed a series of reductions in our armed strength and in our future investments in armaments. And we stuck it right up to him and said that we very much want to do this and then we followed that with a series of specific moves where we reduced our atomic reactors and asked him to do likewise and he held off to the last moment until ours was announced. I was actually at the microphone speaking when he notified us that he would issue an announcement at the same time./4/ We suggested 2 o'clock on Tuesday. I started speaking at 1:45 and we hadn't heard from him and about 1:55 why they brought us a note that he was going to announce it at 2:00, right at the last minute. He went out and our people, we pursued this up until we went in there with our bombing in '65 and things kind of tapered off. At Glassboro it heated up again, very strong. And we took the initiative and just almost wrestled him to have the meeting and said anytime, anywhere we'll send our man to Moscow or we'll meet in Geneva or we'll come back to Glassboro. We'll do anything, but this we must do. We thought we got a tentative, implied acceptance then and we thought it would be rather soon. He got back and subsequently came along and implied it again. What did he say in that language when we got back? We announced it the day Bobby Kennedy made a speech and we didn't call him up and find out he was going to speak the same day or not so they charged us with bad motives. You remember that don't you?

/3/See Document 1.

/4/Presumably a reference to the President's announcement on April 20, 1964, of a reduction in the production of enriched uranium. For more information, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XI, Document 25.

Rusk: Yes. [Unintelligible.]

President: There was some indication that they would meet with us again but they never would set a date. So we have kept shoving 'em all during that period. Now we've come along and he has said yes a month or month to six weeks. Now if we don't want to talk or if we are hesitant to talk or if we want to just let it go through the regular channels of Bill Foster at Geneva, that's one thing. That's now my view. It hasn't been for four years and I think this is most important thing we could ever do.

Rusk: Mr. President, I tried to get Kosygin to accept McNamara in Moscow the following Wednesday after Glassboro. Could be there next [unintelligible]--can't come then. Well then name a date. Pressed them very hard on this.

President: Now, it's been a year, during that time he's put off and put off during that year. During that time I've had to go up with my budget and I've had to put the ABM in the budget to stick it, hold firm and not weaken, with everybody wanting to shimmy a little bit. And then when he got up, a lot want to run away from it after it gets up there, as you observed with Symington, and so forth, the fight that went on in the Senate. And now he's still holding back one Goddamn year and not doing anything and finally when the Senate vote gets out of the way and it looks like we are going ahead, and we hold out the hand of peace here but the hand of strength here so we're going to go on, we don't want to do this, we'd like to save this 50 billion that the two of us are spending, but he's just got no sense at all. We'll go on. We are not going to let you destroy us. We're not going to let you be defended and us not defended. Then he comes up and says I'll see you in a month or month and a half. That's where we are. Then we say well we can't do it because we've got a Convention. That doesn't appeal to me. I'd go right back to him and say that you suggest a month to a month and a half and Geneva is agreeable and a month to a month and a half is agreeable and we would suggest it on this level and if you're not satisfied, if you don't want to do it on that level, well then I'll arrange for the Foreign Ministers.

Rusk: All right.

President: And then I'd let him say it. And if he picks August 25th I wouldn't be worried. I don't think he will, but I'm sure that we can so arrange the agenda that we could get our man nominated and the American people would have all the Democratic Convention they want. I think they will have. I think it will be the thing that is uppermost. We talk a lot with these folks. You have met with Gromyko a good many times. I have met with Gromyko and with Kosygin and it hasn't turned the world upside down. We know, just like Averell and Vance meeting with them over there. What I'm really worried about is that they're more in command of our forces than I am. That's what really troubles me. These damned cables coming in like that. Because I read this record and I see these pictures and I see Javits get up and I see Morgan get up and I see all of them come up and I see the New York Times editorial and it just fits in to this whole damn faction. If I hadn't been watching it for four or five years I wouldn't be worried about it, but it's just not accidental. And I don't want to get hung on the rack. I just don't want to get caught on it.

Rusk: All right.

President: I want to make it so firm and loud that I don't want my people to serve that up to me and then have Goldberg come along here and saying, well as you know I thought this way.

Rusk: They can well concentrate on trying to get another private meeting and get an answer from Hanoi.

President: I think we'd better show them that just a few speeches and pressure are not going to do it. They are beginning to think we're jelly and we'll do it and I don't understand why he'd send this wire after we told him how we felt about it.

Rusk: The trouble is that negotiators habitually--

President: It's not negotiation, hell, this is--

Rusk: Get actions to take the next step. That's one of the problems about American negotiators, they're always in a little bit more of a hurry than the other side. I think they also--maybe Averell is making some judgments about politics here at home.

President: A good deal and it looks like a good deal of it in Vietnam--the battle strategy too.

Rusk: Mr. President, on the longer-range negotiations for this thing I'd just like to put it in the back of your mind. I think Clark and I would agree that the two key people from our respective Departments might be Brown. He's very knowledgeable in this field.

Clifford: Harold.

Rusk: Harold Brown and Butch Fisher, who works in the ACDA. I think we also feel there ought to be a principal negotiator on top of them. Maybe in the State Department. A man from the Defense Department would be the principal negotiator on disarmament. I think it would be a mistake, and the Pentagon would feel this even more strongly than I, for ACDA to be the number one fellow on this particular subject. Now one possibility would be to bring Tommy Thompson out of Moscow for these talks in Geneva, let him be there for three or four weeks for the first round. Then we're bound to close off the talks for awhile and study each other's position in more detail. Tommy is not doing a great deal in Moscow these days and he would be in a position to follow up. So he would be one possibility. Another possibility would be, that is after the Foreign Ministers' review [unintelligible] get through with it, another possibility would be Chip Bohlen. I think in terms of negotiation of this kind of thing, Tommy Thompson would be, in some respects, a more competent negotiator because he's very familiar with all these matters having worked with the Pentagon for years in that Deputy job over in my shop. But I just wanted to mention that to you, because other names may occur to you to head up the delegation but we would suggest a head of the delegation plus Brown and Fisher and their respective staffs.

Clifford: We have to bring the Joint Chiefs along on this one, as you would know. They'd be very important and our record must be absolutely clear. They feel the responsibility, of course, as we all do, protecting the security of this country. They, I was telling Dean Saturday afternoon, they paw the air when Bill Foster's name is mentioned. They think Bill is very soft and very fuzzy-headed. Dean said, very correctly, well, anybody who'd be head of ACDA would be viewed in that light by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

President: Just one second. [The President left the room.]

Rusk: My guess is that the Russians will buy a Foreign Ministers' like a flash and so the problem disappears. The Convention will prevent it.

Clifford: You mean the ACDA and the Joint Chiefs of Staff problem?

Rusk: No, I say if we go back to the Russians and say that I could see Kosygin myself, if not the Foreign Minister, I think the Russians will buy a Foreign Ministers' like a shot.

Clifford: [whispering]: I don't think Kosygin will see the President now with all the difficulties, because--

Rusk: I don't see much of a meeting between the two after November with the President-elect in the wings. I think it ought to be before November.

Clifford: I think so too, I think it ought to be before. The problem the Russians have too, vis-á-vis Peking, Kosygin and the President meeting and all, they're awfully sensitive about this too. Of course, they'll get a hell of a lot of blast right now. Apparently, the President wants to start, however. Does he? Does he want to start?

Rusk: Yeah.

Clifford: Then, what is this alternative? What would the Foreign Ministers meet about. Just meet together to plan an agenda for the two?

Rusk: Well, to deal with that, we would try to agree on some general principles. [The President re-entered the room.] And then we would make a proposal that we're working on now. We'll have it up to the President shortly after August 7th we hope.

Clifford: Just to finish this other point, if the President were to designate Bill Foster to be the chief negotiator, then I think that he would be waited upon by Wheeler and the rest of the Joint Chiefs and I think they'd say we can't go along, and there's no use taking on that kind of fight at the beginning I think. I believe they'd feel better about Butch Fisher than they feel about Bill Foster. I think they feel that Butch is a little harder nosed than Bill is. At the same time if you were to suggest that Butch Fisher was to be the chief negotiator I think that they'd be over here within the hour saying let us tell you why this must not be. Wheeler felt so strongly about it he called and made an appointment with me. He came and talked to me about it. Told about all the experiences they've had with ACDA and it's one of those situations in which men get locked into a state of mind after a certain number of years. Now, whether there's justification for it or not, I think it's beside the question. If it's a state of mind, it's one that we don't have to take on./5/

/5/In a July 30 letter responding to Kosygin's July 25 letter, the President agreed to Kosygin's proposals that the talks begin within a month to a month and a half and that Geneva be the site, and he indicated he would be ready to initiate discussions at the level of chiefs of government, foreign ministers, or heads of special delegations. Johnson asked Kosygin for his suggestions as to exact dates and level of representation. For text, see ibid., Document 263.

[Here follow 6 pages of discussion on Congressional relations and defense-related issues.]

283. Memorandum of Conversation Between Secretary of State Rusk and the Soviet Ambassador (Dobrynin)/1/

Washington, August 15, 1968.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Rusk-Dobrynin. Top Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Rusk on August 16. Rostow pouched the memorandum to the President at the LBJ Ranch under an August 16 covering memorandum. The President flew to the ranch on August 2 and remained there until the afternoon of August 19.

In a relaxed and extensive informal talk with Ambassador Dobrynin on the evening of Thursday, August 15th the following points emerged:

1. I pointed out that the alternatives which we had suggested as to the level at which offensive-defensive missile talks might begin were for the purpose of making a prompt reply by the Soviet Union somewhat easier if our original suggestion had caused complications. The alternatives were given in a rough order of priority as far as our own choices were concerned. The Ambassador said that he might have a reply on the 16th or 17th because the Soviet leadership has its meeting usually on Thursdays--similar to our Tuesday luncheons at the White House. I told him that I thought there would be advantage in our being able to announce the time and place of such talks before the convening of the Non-Nuclear Weapons Conference later this month in Geneva.

2. On the substance of the offensive-defensive missile talks, Dobrynin reflected great earnestness in the importance of the talks and the seriousness with which he considered the subject. I told him that I thought that these talks might well be the most important talks between our two countries since World War II--and he agreed. He asked about our Poseidon and Minute Man Tests and I told him that it was not possible for us to proceed on the basis that we already had an agreement prior to reaching one. I said that these tests have been laid on for a long, long time and that the timing was not connected in any way with the timing of discussions. He seemed quite relaxed on this point.

3. On a very much off-the-record basis, he told me that he did not think Le Duc Tho/2/ was bringing any change of position back to Paris with him. I clearly had the impression that he had had a telegram from Moscow following the Le Duc Tho visit to Moscow. I have passed this information on to Harriman and Vance.

/2/North Vietnam's chief negotiator at the Paris peace talks.

4. On Czechoslovakia, he said that "the" issue was the exclusive position of the Communist Party and the discussion in Czechoslovakia about sharing political responsibility with "twenty or more" parties. He said this was a matter of such fundamental importance that it was not only Czechoslovakia's business--it was also the business of the Soviet Union. He further stated that if the Communist Party remains in full control, the Soviets would have no problem about considerable changes in the internal structure of the country, especially in matters of economic reform.

5. He was upset by two recent instances of bad manners--partly because Moscow seemed to wonder whether he, the Ambassador, had handled his own part of them properly. The first was Senator Mansfield. Senator Mansfield called him on a Monday afternoon saying that he was leaving for Moscow the next morning, would be in Moscow for twenty-four hours and wanted to see Brezhnev and Kosygin. The Ambassador explained to Mansfield that such appointments are not easy to arrange on such short notice but that he, the Ambassador, would do what he could. During his day in Moscow, Senator Mansfield was informed by the Soviets that Mr. Kosygin would see him the following morning. Much to their surprise, Senator Mansfield simply took off for Prague.

The second case involved Mr. Nixon. After Mr. Nixon's public announcement that he was not going to the Soviet Union, an aide of Mr. Nixon telephoned Dobrynin and asked him whether there was any reply with regard to Mr. Nixon's visit to Moscow. Dobrynin said "What do you mean reply? My Government and I assume from your public statement that you are not going to Moscow and, therefore, there is nothing to answer." Thereupon Nixon's aide said that Mr. Nixon did wish to go to Moscow.

I told the Ambassador to get a private word to Mr. Gromyko that I personally regretted bad manners but these are people whom we cannot control.

6. I reminded the Ambassador that he had telephoned me last week expressing concern about the EURATOM countries entering a "reservation" at the time of signing the NPT. I told him that my information was that these countries did not intend to enter a reservation but were stating that the timing of the ratification of the NPT on their part would be related to an agreement between EURATOM and IAEA on safeguards.

7. Mr. Gromyko will be coming to the United Nations General Assembly.

8. I referred to a remark by Mr. Kuznetsov to one of our Embassy officers in Moscow indicating the Soviet desire to discuss the opening of Consulates in Leningrad and San Francisco. I told him that, in connection with the ratification of the Consular Agreement, I had made a commitment to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to discuss with the Committee the actual opening of Consulates and I would do this in September when the Senate returns. He seemed to understand and was relaxed about it.

9. I asked him what they really had in mind about their proposals for a new International Communications Satellite System. I expressed the hope that we could find a basis for a genuinely international system but that we were opposed to the notion of a one nation-one vote formula because it separated too much actual responsibility and usage from the element of control. After discussing the problems created in the General Assembly by the multiplication of small states, he expressed the hope that we could work out some formula in which a general communications satellite system could come into being.

10. There was a little discussion of domestic politics in the United States but nothing of moment came up. I declined to answer his question as to whether or not there was a "New Nixon."

DR

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