A-1036

Moscow, January 31, 1968.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 1 US-USSR. Confidential. Repeated to 23 Embassies and the Mission to NATO. Drafted by Political Officers David Klein, Paul Cook, Alexander Akalovsky, and Jon Lodeesen, and approved by Thompson.

SUBJECT
US Policy Assessment: USSR

REF
11 FAM 212.3-5;/2/ CA 5400 Nov 17, 1965;/3/ Moscow Tel. 2404 (Notal)/4/

/2/ The Foreign Affairs Manual's requirement for annual political reporting.

/3/Circular airgram 5400 contained the annual U.S. Policy Assessment, an evaluation of the effectiveness of U.S. policies in light of anticipated developments. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 2-3)

/4/Document 261.

I. Introduction and Summary

Three years after the ouster of Khrushchev, the Soviet regime remains a dictatorial oligarchy excessively concerned with problems of security both at home and abroad. It is in the paradoxical situation of issuing from on high directives demanding the exercise of initiative from below. Despite some success in strengthening the country's economic and military might, the regime more often than not seems to conduct itself as if its primary concern was to defend its right to rule.

The fact is, the present leaders can point with justifiable pride to some attainments of the last fifty years, not the least of which are the successful seizure and consolidation of power; an industrialization program which shifted the country from fifth to second place among the world powers; and finally, its role in the dramatic defeat of the German-led coalition of World War II. Even from the vantage point of only three years since their palace coup against Khrushchev, they can look with some satisfaction at their own performance record. They have produced some measurable economic progress and provided a semblance of political stability, if only for the reason that they have survived as a group despite changes in the pecking order and continuing differences. At the same time, however, reflecting upon their own virtuosity in seizing power and looking back at the conditions under which so many of the achievements of the last fifty years were attained--the terrible purges, and loss of twenty million lives and the vast devastation of the land during the War, and the inability of the system to curb either a paranoic Stalin or the erratic Khrushchev--the mantle of rule most certainly rests uneasily upon their shoulders.

The present leadership with some justification has been criticized for lack of verve. In part, their collective, colorless image stands out sharply because of the obvious contrast with the flamboyance of Khrushchev. In part, it is a direct reflection of the personalities of the leaders themselves. Their caution is understandable given the fact that for roughly three decades or more all of the present group have been members of a party with a long conspiratorial history. Their policies bear all the earmarks of a product of consensus which permits maximum maneuvering for all vested interests. Like the early Khrushchev, his successors are addressing the right issues. But unlike him, they seem to be more aware of the complexities and inter-relationships between the problems.

The void created by the absence of a visible and dynamic leader; the continued use of warmed-over revolutionary verbiage; and an over-dosage of introspection and xenophobia have all tended to obscure the fact that the present leadership has undertaken some policies of import and not entirely without success. They have, for example, been able to keep relations with the United States on an almost even keel, and have successfully exploited the irrational excesses of Peking to cut real or potential losses in the world communist movement. They also extricated themselves better than they had the right to expect from the imbroglio following the Arab rout in the June crisis and at the moment, at least, they seem to be advancing their cause in the Middle East. At home, although they clearly have not resolved the well-nigh intractable problem of resource allocation, they have started upon an economic reform. And although their approach to this problem has been hesitant and there has been some consequent loss of momentum, the program, in and of itself, is a step in the right direction.

In general, however, the record of the present leadership is not particularly auspicious either at home or abroad. Their ability to deal with the multitudinous problems is seriously affected by their astigmatic view of themselves and the world about them. They are inhibited by a persisting commitment to an increasingly outdated ideology. And even though this commitment has eroded over time, this regime still seems to feel constrained to explain developments and justify its decisions in stereotyped Marxist-Leninist terms. In doing so, they frequently create constraints where none exist and create problems that need not have arisen.

Though the present leaders stress the fact that they are children of the revolution, they make it emphatically clear they will not be fathers of another. Indeed, the coarse slogan applied to Khrushchev of seeking "goulash communism" has now been elevated to a party plank which asserts that the greatest contribution the CPSU can make to world communism is the building of an affluent communist society at home. To be sure, the regime remains concerned about developments beyond its borders. It can be expected to pursue active policies abroad, especially when its hegemonic rule in the communist movement seems threatened and its national interests involved. Since the Cuban missile fiasco, if not before, the regime appears to have become increasingly inward looking.

The number and magnitude of outstanding problems, and the way the present leadership comes to grips with them suggest that the present arrangement is an interim one. Conceivably, it can continue to muddle through. However, the system and the country need more effective leadership if the problems are to be dealt with.

[Here follows "Part II: Domestic Scene," consisting of sections on "Leadership," "The Government," "The Military," "The Economy," "Soviet Society," "Religion," and "Nationality."]

III. Foreign Policy

1. General Comment

Celebrating their Jubilee, the rulers in the Kremlin could take some pride in the fact that fifty years after the collapse of Tsarism, the Soviet Union was unquestionably the other world superstate. However, with the aggrandizement of power, and after some major setbacks, there has also descended upon the Kremlin an awareness of the costs and risks that go with it, and consequently a greater sense of responsibility.

The Cuban missile crisis served as a major watershed. In its aftermath, and particularly since the demise of Khrushchev, the Soviet leadership has not only given greater attention to the solution of major domestic, political and economic problems; it has on the international front, in the main, sought to consolidate existing positions rather than establish new beachheads. And even when it has become embroiled in new and critical situations, it has tended to exercise restraint and caution, avoiding overcommitment, and seeking to keep its options open.

Though always rationalized in ideological terms, Soviet foreign policy objectives, including those within the Communist movement, are clearly geared to the interests of the Soviet state. This is not to say that ideology has no impact on foreign policy decisions. The fact is that even though the Soviet national goals are guiding, the regime, because of its makeup, tends to view world problems through ideologically colored lenses. This, in turn, raises not only the specter of misjudgment and miscalculation, but also the possibility of missed opportunities.

Despite the strain in US-USSR relations, the Soviet leaders recognize the necessity of maintaining some working relationships with the United States. Not only are they conscious of the political importance of such a stance, they also realize that it is essential for preventing a direct confrontation with the US, and dampening other conflicts that could lead to such a confrontation.

But the present leadership clearly has reservations about the priority Khrushchev assigned to Soviet relations with the US, and has tended to subordinate the development of bilateral relations with Washington to other issues of more immediate concern. The most important of these seem to be: a) to protect the Soviet positions in Eastern Europe and Asia, threatened by the growing nationalist trends among the Warsaw Pact members and by the emergence of a hostile China; b) to undermine the cohesion of NATO, isolate its most important member on the continent--the FRG--and reduce US influence in Europe; c) to broaden and strengthen Soviet influence along the underbelly of the Soviet Union--the Middle East and the Asian subcontinent; and d) to enhance the Soviet Union's position as a global power through selective political and economic penetration in other areas of the world.

[Here follow sections on "The Communist Movement," "East-West Relations," and "The Third World."]

5. US-Soviet Relations

For the past three years, US-Soviet relations have been mostly on dead center rather than frozen. Despite political inhibitions on both sides, essential activities have continued. Channels of communication have remained open. The two governments have been in contact to deal with major and minor crises. The "hot line" was used for the first time during the Middle Eastern crisis. Although Glassboro failed to produce perceptible movement on specific issues, it did bring the two heads of government together. Behind a smoke-screen of propaganda, the Soviets actively, and in some cases constructively, worked with the U.S. delegation at the UN. The Outer Space Treaty, the agreement on the rescue and assistance to astronauts, US-Soviet cultural and technical exchanges, US-Soviet fishery arrangements, and the draft non-proliferation treaty reflected a coincidence of US and Soviet interests in a number of areas.

The Soviets continue to regard the United States as the primary threat both in political and military terms. Soviet sensitivity to American political inroads was striking during the Jubilee, when Soviets threatened retribution for alleged American efforts to spoil the 50th anniversary. This was particularly emphatic in connection with Svetlana. While in part this sensitivity reflects an historical inferiority complex, it is also indicative of Soviet concern about the impact of increased contact with the outside world on the Soviet people. But despite the regime's warnings to its own people to be chary of foreigners, they for the most part, and particularly the intelligentsia, remain friendly to Americans as well as other outsiders and eager to be in contact with them and accepted as equals.

On the military side, the Soviet leadership does not consider an American attack on the USSR a likely possibility. Nevertheless, it continues to regard the United States, as it must, the USSR's major and most dangerous antagonist. War with the United States remains an essential part of Soviet contingency planning. This is necessitated not only because of competing interests, but also because the Soviet Union, no more than we, can be certain of the consequences of actions by third parties.

The Kremlin, at a minimum, is determined to maintain the existing strategic balance between the US and USSR or preferably improve it. While the Soviets are willing to cooperate in measures such as NPT, which limit the ability of others to disturb that balance, they are distrustful of arrangements which restrict their freedom to strengthen their military capabilities. Their failure thus far to respond to the US proposal for talks on offensive and defensive strategic weapons is a case in point. Clearly, it is difficult for this leadership to accept any arrangements which would tend to freeze the present Soviet inferiority, however meaningless the margin of US superiority may be from a practical standpoint. Some among the Soviet leadership are undoubtedly concerned about the tremendous cost and the practical futility of an unlimited arms competition with the United States. But they are almost certainly under heavy pressures from those, including the military establishment, who hope for an eventual breakthrough, to avoid inhibiting commitments. In addition, there are Soviets who probably view every element in the US military build-up, even those clearly designed to deal with other situations, as ultimately aimed against the Soviet Union, and argue for adequate countermeasures.

The Soviets undoubtedly realize that the United States desires as avidly as they the avoidance of direct confrontation. But Moscow appears unsure about American motives and purposes. Even allowing for the fact that their propaganda exaggerates considerably the reality, one point that is strikingly clear is that the present Soviet leaders do not trust the United States or its broader efforts to improve relations. The Soviets seem to believe that such efforts as bridge building are designed to undermine Soviet influence in what Moscow regards as its own domain, to divide Soviet society, to subvert the regime, and to weaken the Soviet Union's currency in the international arena. In short, Moscow is suspicious and defensive about the United States, and the process of rapprochement is certain to be long and tedious, even assuming Vietnam is resolved. But the Soviets recognize that they must live with us. While dramatic moves toward cooperation are probably impossible for some time, there is ample room for actions of a sufficiently low political profile which could be tailored to the needs of the present and help clear the way for future progress on major issues.

IV. Concluding Comments

The tensions generated by convergence of events, particularly Vietnam, have inhibited overt contact between the United States and the Soviet Union. But, propaganda campaigns notwithstanding, it is also true that levels of tension have been moderated by continuing discreet contacts between the two countries on urgent issues (e.g. ME, NPT, etc.), as well as by the preservation of a modicum of decorum in the every day business of international politics. The two super powers, each of which could annihilate the other, have come to understand that they need a talking and working relationship. For our part, we have also come to recognize the importance of establishing a political position enabling us to help stimulate liberalizing trends in the Soviet Union and thereby eventually create a situation in which real co-existence and peaceful competition are possible. In this purpose there is potentially wide support within the Soviet Union, support which could be broadened significantly if we succeeded in taking the high ground in the campaign for the preservation of peace.

Certain bilateral enterprises have become institutionalized. While Soviet purposes do not necessarily coincide with ours, there is a good reason to assume that for the moment and with some adjustments, these enterprises continue to interest them as well as us. This includes the whole range of scientific and technical contacts as well as the cultural exchange agreement now due for re-negotiation. In a sense, the Soviets demonstrated the value they attach to exchanges when they were forced to take a hard look at the exhibits question and the consequences of reneging on those commitments. The prospects for future negotiations are uncertain. But on balance, there seems to be enough in these arrangements to serve the Soviets' purposes, not to mention the political implications of failing to reach a mutually satisfactory understanding on this issue. In this connection, continued flexibility on our side is in order. Although there is no question of the need for reciprocity, absolute symmetry of numbers is not essential.

Among the potentially more interesting projects are McGeorge Bundy's proposed international center, as well as a variety of joint research projects in the physical and biological sciences.

Commerce remains a largely unexploited area where considerable American influence could be brought to bear. Even with Vietnam, it seems to us we ought to make every effort to remove unnecessary barriers to expand trade. We recognize the political difficulties involved. However, in our view, the rationale for the President's speech of October 1966 remains valid. It is therefore in our interest to demonstrate the Administration's earnest by following through on the President's precepts, even though we recognize that there is no likelihood for legislation this year.

In this connection, the Soviets themselves have made some suggestions worth close examination, and, if possible, a positive response. There are Givishiani's suggestions for a bilateral review of patent and licensing practices; a nod, albeit tentative, from the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Trade toward joint production ventures; an exchange of seminars on business management as suggested by the Soviet Embassy in Washington; and the Soviets' proposal to review US and USSR restrictions on the use of port facilities.

We might ourselves take the initiative to try to clear away some of the underbrush in certain areas of bilateral interest. We should examine ways of improving the range and quality of commercial services Embassy Moscow can offer U.S. businessmen. An improved U.S. commercial image in Moscow would lend support to the President's East-West policies and export promotional activities could help our balance of payments program. The sharp percentile increase in direct U.S. exports to the U.S.S.R. last year suggests there are significant commercial opportunities here despite legal and political obstacles. We should also streamline our export licensing procedures so as to eliminate delay and uncertainty as impediments to U.S. exports. We might also re-examine within the U.S. Government the merits of the Treasury Department's blocking action against the accounts of the Moscow Narodny Bank in the Chase Manhattan Bank. Perhaps nothing can be done. But it can probably not be swept under the rug. The Soviets raised this issue with Senator Mondale again last month.

Efforts to establish acceptable arms control arrangements should remain under consideration. In this category, the most important item is our own proposal for the joint consideration of offensive and defensive strategic weapons control. The ball on this issue is now clearly in the Soviet court.

While we have no reason to be optimistic about major breakthroughs at this time, we do have elements of a useful program. In this connection, we ought to be particularly alert to possibilities of Soviet internal changes and the opportunities these might provide for us and our allies. However, we must avoid the temptation to force an unrealistic pace or to assume greater Soviet readiness to meet us than actually exists. What we do must not only be carefully designed; it must also be discreetly handled and properly timed lest our efforts be counterproductive.

LET

266. Letter From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Nitze) to the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach)/1/

Washington, February 1, 1968.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 32-1 US-USSR. Secret.

Dear Nick:

Cy Vance wrote to Foy Kohler on November 30, 1966, proposing that we attempt to reach an understanding with the Soviets on the subject of encounters between U.S. and Soviet ships./2/ Since that time, serious incidents at sea have continued, and the possibilities of collisions or other accidents have increased. The enclosed memoranda to Paul Warnke from Paul Ignatius report two recent incidents./3/

/2/See footnote 3, Document 171.

/3/The enclosures noted here and below are attached to a copy of Nitze's letter filed in National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-6 US-USSR.

While I understand that the Department of State prepared position papers on this general subject for Secretary Rusk and the President in connection with the Glassboro Conference, the matter has not, so far as I am aware, been raised with the Soviets./4/

/4/Written in hand in the margin to the left of this paragraph is the following: "NK: It was raised in an oblique way in the last Rusk-Gromyko letter." The reference is to Rusk's January 28 letter to Gromyko concerning the Pueblo incident, transmitted in telegram 106090 to Moscow, January 28. (Ibid., POL 33-6 KOR N-US) A discussion of "Harassment of Vessels at Sea" was included in the position paper on "Bilateral US-USSR Issues" in the President's briefing book for the Glassboro meetings. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, USSR, Hollybush I)

Let me urge that, in view of the continuing dangers which are inherent in this situation, you give serious consideration to a prompt approach to the Soviets on the general question of ships in proximity, perhaps along the lines suggested in the enclosure to Cy's letter of November 1966./5/ For your convenience, I enclose another copy of that letter and its enclosure.

/5/Katzenbach answered Nitze in a February 9 letter. He noted that in recent correspondence with the Soviets on the Pueblo case the United States had suggested private discussions on ways to avoid USSR-US incidents on the high seas; he therefore wanted to hold off on any new approach for a month or two to see if the Soviets responded. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 32-1 US-USSR)

Sincerely,

Paul

267. Briefing Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Leddy) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Rostow)/1/

Washington, February 21, 1968.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL US-USSR. Secret; Exdis. Drafted on February 21 by V. I. Toumanoff (SOV).

SUBJECT
Your Lunch with Dobrynin, February 22

Since his return to Washington on February 6, after a four-week visit to Moscow, Ambassador Dobrynin has resumed his contacts with US officials. He luncheoned with Secretary Rusk on February 15 and made an appointment with Ambassador Goldberg for this week. In his meeting with the Secretary, Dobrynin gave no indications of having special instructions as a result of his Moscow stay, and it is likely that he seeks a tour d'horizon with you to bring his exploration of current thinking in the Executive Branch up to date.

I have attached State 117306 (Exdis) which summarizes Dobrynin's talk with the Secretary./2/ In addition, the following topics may arise.

/2/Dated February 17. Topics included Vietnam peace negotiations, North Vietnamese troops in Laos, Cambodian neutrality, the Jarring Mission to the Middle East, flights by U.S. and Soviet planes armed with hydrogen bombs, and the Pueblo incident. (Ibid.)

1. Strategic Weapons Talks. The latest exchange was between George Bunn and Vorontsov in which the latter repeated Dobrynin's earlier comment to Thompson that the USSR might give a favorable reply if the Korean problem is settled peacefully./3/

/3/Dobrynin's comments to Thompson noted here and in paragraph 6 were reported in telegram 2671 to the Department of State, February 2. (Ibid.)

2. Soviet Embassy Bombing. The Police Department has not turned up any suspects in the pre-dawn explosion today at the Soviet Embassy. No one was injured but the explosion broke many of the Embassy's windows and caused extensive damage in one of its front rooms. Meanwhile, full-time police protection has been extended to include the Soviet Information Department and Consular offices in Washington.

Secretary Rusk has expressed personal indignation and regret over the incident, both orally and in a hand-delivered letter to Ambassador Dobrynin,/4/ at the same time offering the Department's assistance. The Chief of Protocol has similarly expressed regrets.

/4/Transmitted to Moscow in telegram 118819, February 21. (Ibid., POL 23-8 US)

Soviet Minister Counselor Yuri N. Chernyakov called on Deputy Assistant Secretary Stoessel this afternoon to protest formally the bombing and call for a rapid investigation and for severe punishment of those responsible. Mr. Stoessel rejected a contention in the note that measures on the part of US authorities for protection of the Embassy were "completely inadequate." He voiced our profound regret over the incident, noting our acceptance of the principle that the host state should make reimbursement for damages to foreign chanceries. At the same time Mr. Stoessel strongly objected to a TASS English language report that the explosion occurred with the "connivance of US authorities."/5/

/5/On May 6 James Pratt of SOV turned over to Yuly Vorontsov of the Soviet Embassy a check for $12,105 to cover repairs for most of the bomb damage. Pratt indicated that the investigation of the bombing was continuing but that so far there were no results to report. (Memorandum of conversation; ibid., POL 17 USSR-US)

3. Possible Law of the Sea Conference. In response to the declared Soviet willingness to hold a bilateral meeting of experts to discuss issues that might arise in a possible Law of the Sea Conference, we had intended to inform them that we were ready to host the meeting in late February. However, before our response could be given the Pueblo incident intervened. We are now considering whether it would be advantageous to proceed with the talks at this time. Meanwhile, we have answered frequent Soviet inquiries by simply stating that the matter is still under consideration.

4. Chancery Sites. Having reached oral agreement in principle for the exchange of Mt. Alto and the Moscow site, we have submitted to the Soviets in Moscow a proposed lease agreement which they are now considering.

5. Moscow-New York Flights. The intermediate stop question remains the chief unresolved issue. We are awaiting a Soviet response to our suggestion that Warsaw and Prague either be added to the list of intermediate stops already discussed (Stockholm, Copenhagen, London and Montreal) or that they be designated as exclusively for Aeroflot while others would be exclusively for Pan American. (FYI--The Soviets have proposed East Berlin as an intermediate stop which is unacceptable to us.)/6/

/6/The intermediate stops issue was resolved in an April 30 amendment to the U.S.-USSR Civil Air Transport Agreement that permitted Pan American World Airways and Aeroflot each to make an intermediate stop between New York and Moscow at either Montreal, London, Copenhagen, or Stockholm. (Telegram 154257 to Moscow, April 27; ibid., AV 9 US-USSR)

6. Consular Convention. On February 2, Dobrynin mentioned to Thompson that the Pueblo affair and Vietnam had set back progress on bilateral questions. Thompson believes he may have had in mind the Soviet delay in ratification of the Consular Convention. The Convention was signed June 1, 1964, and approved by the Senate in February 1967.

7. US-USSR Exchanges Agreement. Although the last US-USSR Exchanges Agreement expired December 31, 1967, the Soviets have not yet agreed to a timetable for negotiation of a renewal agreement for 1968-69. We are approaching the time when further delay will affect exchanges program activities. This would include arrangements to place graduate students for the 1968-69 academic year, as well as the tour of a Bolshoi Ballet group tentatively booked by Hurok to open about April 20. Under similar circumstances in 1966, we told the Soviets that no tour could take place without a new agreement and we intend to act similarly this time.

268. Memorandum for the Record/1/

Washington, March 31, 1968, 6:05-6:30 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Rusk-Dobrynin.

Secret; Sensitive.

Meeting of the President with Ambassador Anatoliy T. Dobrynin/2/

/2/Dobrynin recounts this meeting from his perspective in In Confidence, pp. 170-172.

ALSO PRESENT

W. Averell Harriman and W.W. Rostow

(Note: Gov. Harriman and Mr. Rostow had gone over with Amb. Dobrynin the President's speech/3/ for about half an hour before joining the President in the Mansion.

/3/Reference is to the President's address to the nation delivered at 9 p.m. that evening. For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1968, Book I, pp. 469-476.

The partial bombing cessation was explained as well as other statements bearing on our negotiating position.)

The President met Ambassador Dobrynin at about 6:05 p.m.

The President began by stating that he was going as far as he could in all conscience go, given the tactical position in the field. He could not endanger lives of his men on the Vietnamese frontiers by having a total bombing cessation. It was up to the Soviet Union as Geneva co-chairman and as a major arms supplier to Hanoi to bring its influence to bear for a conference and the making of peace.

The President recalled that the Soviet Union had played an important role at Tashkent in settling the India-Pak war. He believed, after his talks with Premier Kosygin at Glassboro, that Kosygin wished to be helpful; although nothing had come of it. But the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. had shown in many matters that we could work together for constructive results; for example, in the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

This was a time for everyone to bring to bear the greatest forbearance, restraint, and understanding. In South Vietnam itself the contending parties must give up war and seek a one-man, one-vote solution.

The Ambassador should be aware, however, that the U.S. was not going to pull out of Vietnam. The proportion of American voters who actually wanted to pull out was about 5%; another 15% wanted the President to do less militarily; but there were 40% who wanted the U.S. to do more. That was the problem with which he had to deal.

The President had great concern about Southeast Asia as a whole, not only Vietnam. He feared a much wider war that would be contrary to both our interests and the Soviet's interests. He thought perhaps the Chinese were getting "cocky" and "chesty." Their aggressive ambitions should not be encouraged. It was up to the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. to end the war in Vietnam soon and prevent hostilities from spreading.

The President said he had gone 90% of the way; now it was up to the Co-Chairmen to make it possible to go the last 10% and start negotiations for peace./4/

/4/In a June 5 message to the President, Kosygin stated that he and his colleagues had grounds for believing that a full cessation of the bombing could lead to a breakthrough in the peace negotiations. The text is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, volume VI. For documentation on the role of the Soviet Union in subsequent Vietnam peace negotiations during 1968, see, in addition to the material in this volume, ibid., volumes VI and VII.

Ambassador Dobrynin asked the President to explain precisely why a 100% bombing pause was impossible. The President did so, adding that if Dobrynin thought of what it would be like if there were Russian soldiers in the same position as Americans and German forces were approaching, he would understand. Dobrynin said that the Soviet Union was lucky enough not to be there. The President countered: "But you are helping them."

Ambassador Dobrynin asked about the area in which we would bomb. It was explained: below the 20th parallel.

He asked if there was a time limit on the cessation. The President said no firm limit--perhaps a few weeks. Dobrynin said that was good. It is better not to have to hurry.

Dobrynin took full notes and a preliminary text of the speech, departing about 6:30 p.m.

W. W. Rostow/5/

/5/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

269. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, April 9, 1968.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, USSR, Vol. XIX. Confidential. Included in the President's Night Reading.

SUBJECT
Sale of Automotive Equipment to the USSR

Commerce, with the concurrence of State and Defense, is preparing to license $8.9 million of gear cutting, testing and measuring machines for the automotive plant Fiat is building in the USSR. The machinery is made by the Gleason Works of Rochester, New York.

The reasons for licensing this equipment are:

--CIA and Defense say it is not strategic and does not involve problems of new or advanced technology. They are sure it will in fact be used in the manufacture of Fiat cars.

--The sale will not disrupt defense priorities at the Gleason plant.

--Comparable equipment is readily available from Switzerland and West Germany. They will make the sale if we don't.

--Financing is all private. No U.S. Government credit or guaranty facilities are involved.

--We licensed similar machinery made by the same firm in 1966 for use in a Soviet-built automotive plant.

You should know, however, that protests will probably follow approval of the license. We expect adverse reaction from those members of Congress who have consistently opposed this trade. Commerce does not plan to issue a press release but it is preparing a statement of facts to answer inquiries. The Ashley Subcommittee on International Trade of the House Banking and Currency Committee will be informed.

This is a clear case of advantageous peaceful trade with the USSR. The Fiat plant will have a political impact in the USSR that is in our national interest. Furthermore, the sale is a net gain for our balance of payments./2/

/2/Below this paragraph the President wrote by hand: "Ask [Secretary of Commerce] CR Smith to personally check & call me."

Walt

270. Memorandum of Conversation Between McGeorge Bundy and the Soviet Ambassador (Dobrynin)/1/

Washington, April 26, 1968.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL US-USSR. Secret. Drafted by Bundy on April 30. Notations on Bundy's April 30 covering memorandum to Walsh indicate that Rusk saw Bundy's memorandum of conversation and that copies were sent to Katzenbach, Kohler, Harriman, EUR, and NEA. Walt Rostow forwarded a copy to the President under a May 4 covering memorandum, which is marked with an indication that the President saw it. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, USSR, Vol. XIX)

I had lunch with Ambassador Dobrynin on Friday, April 26. The meeting was at my initiative but at his Embassy. The vodka and lobster were excellent. This was the most informal and candid of all my talks with Dobrynin.

1. My business in proposing the meeting was to enlist the Ambassador in an effort to get Gvishiani to lead a Soviet delegation to the Sussex meeting on "common problems of advanced societies." I described the situation as it now stands--the British lead, the widespread response, and the remaining Soviet hesitation over the German problem. I told him that we were still anxious not to press for governmental decision, and he strongly agreed with this approach. Indeed he pressed for evidence that the Sussex meeting was nongovernmental, and I cited the fact that the formal invitation would come from Sussex University. I described Zuckerman's current proposal--that the Soviets could bring anyone they like as part of their own group (including, by implication, an East German) and I suggested that a non-German Eastern country could probably be included if that would help. I also said that while our first purpose had been and still was to open a new line of serious communication with the Soviet Union, the project was beginning to take on a life of its own because of the intense interest it aroused in many countries, so that I could not tell him that the idea would wait indefinitely for the Russians; the Sussex meeting, for example, was now sure to happen. Dobrynin told me that he remained personally favorable to the project and would raise the matter both with Gvishiani and through official channels.

2. After our discussion on the suggested center for the study of common problems of advanced societies, the Ambassador surprised me by opening the subject of the Middle East with some energy. He said that he thought nothing could be done as long as the U.S. would not use its influence on Israel, and when I asked whether the Soviet Union was prepared to use its influence on the U.A.R., he not only did not say no, but seemed strongly interested in the possibility--not today, but later, we agreed--that the U.S. and the Soviet Union might have very private talks to examine the terms that each might be willing to support with its friends in the area. We reviewed some of the familiar pieces of the puzzle and while Dobrynin did not depart from the basic Soviet line, he was less resistant than I expected to my assertion that anyone who wanted the Israelis to withdraw from the Canal would have to say something about Israeli shipping through the Canal. (I do not myself regard the Canal as the central element in the problem, but I made that obvious point in reply to his standard ploy on withdrawal.) The deposit which the exchange left in mind was that Dobrynin would be personally favorable to a policy of détente by little steps in this area, but that he was probably acting as a disavowable skirmisher. He also remarked that his government did not understand why we pressed the question of arms, when in its view the problem of arms was primarily a consequence and not a cause of the troubles there. I explained that the problem mattered greatly to us because it was an area where Soviet action was forcing U. S. action. He said that he himself recognized our problem but that it was hard to explain in Moscow. He also asserted with great firmness that his government had no intention of "fishing in troubled waters" in the Middle East. I expressed some skepticism, and he refined his point; he agreed that his government had interests and purposes of its own in the area, but he said it was not seeking military bases or a military position--he said that they could easily have much more of that sort of thing if they wanted. I told him I was not a believer in the theory that the Soviet Union was trying to outflank NATO by military means in the Middle East. I thought it had more sense. I said that I thought the real question was whether Nasser could or would accept any constructive moves. On that point Dobrynin mentioned refugees, and then by common consent we turned to another subject. But the exchange suggests to me that there may be more Soviet readiness for serious talk than I have thought.

3. My exchange with Dobrynin on the subject of a site for Vietnam talks was brief. I opened it myself by saying that I was sure he was a man who could understand that Warsaw really was unacceptable from our standpoint. He answered that he did now understand this because he had been given a full explanation by Walt Rostow. He did not contest the matter at all. I found this mildly interesting because in the past Dobrynin has nearly always taken just a few minutes to give me the standard brand of argument when his government was pressing a particular propaganda position with energy. He then went on to say that he thought the people in Hanoi had expected Warsaw to be acceptable to us and that he himself would have shared this judgment before our position became clear. I said that I could understand this error but that I myself believed that the President's position was both persuasive and very firm indeed.

I did try to hint to Dobrynin that the unacceptability of Warsaw did not rule out a Communist capital. I did this by saying that in my own judgment Moscow would be a much better place than Warsaw. Dobrynin, as I expected, said that Moscow would be unacceptable for the Soviet Union because it would put them a shade too close to the action. I said I could understand that.

Dobrynin and I exchanged reminiscences about the selection of Glassboro. I raised the subject in order to demonstrate that agreement can be reached from quite different starting points in these matters. Dobrynin agreed, and told me what a hard time he had had in persuading Kosygin that the Americans were acting in good faith in proposing a military air base at one stage. He said that the Chairman had insisted that no one could be serious in proposing anything so obviously inappropriate. Dobrynin told me that this first reaction was based on the attitude the Soviets take toward their own air bases, to which no one is invited in any circumstances. Dobrynin said he had explained that the crazy Americans thought their air bases were dandy places for receptions and entertainment of all sorts, and eventually the Chairman calmed down and settled for a polite Soviet explanation to us that an air base would not be understood by third parties.

4. In speaking of Glassboro, Dobrynin made an interesting comment on the exchange between Bob McNamara and Kosygin on the ABM./2/ He said that both he and his Chairman had been gravely disappointed by McNamara's presentation. Given the degree of Dobrynin's candor on other subjects, I was much struck by the energy and firmness with which he associated himself with his principal on this point. He said that in their view McNamara had said nothing more than had already been said publicly by the Americans many times and had given them nothing concrete in terms of facts and figures which would show seriousness. I expressed my surprise, without arguing the point, and said that we on our side had been much disappointed by the Chairman's polemical and even propagandistic response. I asked Dobrynin whether he thought this subject remained one on which there could be really serious private exchanges, and he said that he did indeed think so. He said one of the things which had bothered them about the McNamara démarche at Glassboro was that it had taken place in rather a large group at luncheon. Dobrynin told me that the President had checked with him briefly before giving McNamara the go-ahead signal, and my impression was that he blamed himself for not having tried to steer the President off this tack at the time.

/2/See Document 231.

I myself continue to believe that Bob McNamara made a much more serious effort than Kosygin and Dobrynin apparently give him credit for, but from the point of view of the future I think the interesting point is that Dobrynin himself clearly thinks something better can be done on both sides. My own impression is that the best way to explore this subject further would be for the President or the Secretary to designate either McNamara himself or some other trusted and highly knowledgeable individual to explore it directly with Dobrynin. Talks with Dobrynin can be wholly secure, and all the evidence suggests that what is discussed with him gets reported effectively to the highest levels.

5. In informal conversation before lunch, Ambassador Dobrynin displayed a high degree of understanding of election-year politics in the United States. He seemed to have a clear and sympathetic appreciation of the positions of the leading candidates, and as always I think we are fortunate that a man of his caliber is reporting on American affairs to Moscow.

McGeorge Bundy

271. Editorial Note

In a letter to Chairman Kosygin dated May 2, 1968, President Johnson proposed that the Soviet and U.S. Governments announce during the debate then underway in the United Nations General Assembly over the Non-Proliferation Treaty "that they have agreed to begin bilateral negotiations on an agreement to limit strategic offensive and defensive missiles." For text, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, volume XI, Document 237. Kosygin replied in a June 21 letter to Johnson that the Soviets "attach great importance" to "questions concerning restraint in the strategic arms race" and they hoped "before long it will be possible more concretely to exchange views." The President responded the next day, proposing to Kosygin that they jointly announce on July 1-the day the Non-Proliferation Treaty would be opened for signature-an "agreement to hold talks on the strategic missile problem." Kosygin accepted the proposal in a June 27 letter to Johnson. For text of their exchanges are June 21, 22, and 27, see ibid., Documents 247-249.

272. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, May 29, 1968.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, EDX 4 US-USSR. Confidential. Drafted by Boris H. Klosson and Arthur I. Wortzel (both EUR/SES) and cleared by Toon, CU/EUR, and USIA. Rostow forwarded the memorandum to the President under a May 31 covering memorandum. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, USSR, Vol. XIX)

SUBJECT
Negotiations with the Soviet Union on Renewal of Exchanges Agreement

The Soviets have now agreed to open negotiations in Moscow on June 3 for the US-USSR Exchanges Agreement for 1968-69./2/

/2/Records of the meetings are in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, EDX US-USSR. Emory Swank, Deputy Chief of Mission in Moscow, reported to the Department on the progress of negotiations in telegrams 4164, June 8; 4237, June 13; and 4312, June 19. (Ibid., EDX 4 US-USSR)

The negotiations are likely to suffer from the effects of two major Soviet preoccupations. Dissent among their own intellectuals and the recent unsettling developments in Eastern Europe have led to sharpened Soviet efforts to guard against "hostile foreign influences."

The negotiations will also be further complicated because the expected Soviet negotiators are all newcomers to the exchanges program with the United States as a result of reorganization in Moscow.

The Soviet draft of the proposed agreement would reduce some types of exchanges compared to the levels in the last agreement. In two areas of paramount interest to us-exhibits and performing arts-the draft avoids specific commitments. (However, contracts for one exchange of performing groups have been signed in anticipation of an agreement, and we have had some indication that the Soviets intend to move forward with exchanges of other groups.)

In the negotiations, our objective will be to preserve the 10-year-old framework for reciprocal exchanges and to ensure continuation of some activity in all previous categories of exchanges, including performing arts attractions and exhibits. We will insist on the principle of a balanced program which reflects the interests of both sides. We will require preservation of protective language which assures us reciprocity in these exchanges. Our ultimate pressure on the Soviets would be to refuse to conclude an agreement which does not meet these requirements.

Although we will seek to maintain the same level of exchanges activities as that envisaged in the previous agreement, we recognize in the present political climate the need to be flexible. Our draft proposes some innovations and expansions, but we expect the Soviets to reject any new activities that might be represented as an advance in exchanges or an improvement in relations with the United States.

I will report to you further before the negotiations are concluded.

Nicholas deB. Katzenbach

273. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, June 7, 1968, 4:15 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Trip to Soviet Union. Secret; Sensitive. In a June 4 note to the President, Rostow asked: "Do you wish me to have an unofficial, exploratory word with Dobrynin on a Soviet trip, which you mentioned the other day?" The President wrote on Rostow's note in response: "ask Rusk to give judgment & explore."

Mr. President:

I talked privately with Sec. Rusk about a trip to the Soviet Union. His view is as follows:

1. He doubts whether a trip in the present stage of the Vietnam negotiation would be acceptable or fruitful.

2. If we achieve a negotiating breakthrough-even before Vietnam is wound up-he thinks a trip might be acceptable to the Soviet Union and quite useful.

3. Therefore, he is inclined to await the outcome of our exchanges with Moscow and events in Paris over the next several weeks before proceeding with exploratory discussions with Dobrynin.

I agree.

W.W. Rostow/2/

/2/ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

274. Editorial Note

At a White House ceremony on June 13, 1968, the United States and the Soviet Union exchanged instruments of ratification of the Consular Convention signed at Moscow on June 1, 1964. For text of the convention, see Department of State Bulletin, June 22, 1964, pages 979-984. President Johnson ratified the convention on March 31, 1967, after the Senate gave its consent on March 16. The Soviet Government ratified the convention on April 26, 1968, and it entered into force on July 13, 1968.

275. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State/1/

Moscow, June 27, 1968, 0925Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, EDX 4 US-USSR. Confidential; Immediate.

4406. Ref: State 190346./2/

2 In telegram 190346, June 25, the Department instructed Thompson to call on Gromyko "in effort to induce some degree of flexibility in Soviet position" on the cultural exchanges agreement. (Ibid.) Katzenbach informed the President in a June 24 memorandum that an impasse had been reached on the major issues involved, since "the Soviets insist on significant cut-backs in the areas of greatest importance to us-exhibits, performing arts and students exchanges-as the price for continuing the exchanges program." (Ibid.)

Subj: Cultural Exchange Negotiations.

1. In after-dinner conversation last night, Kornienko inquired about status of exchange negotiations. I said Washington was very dissatisfied with Soviet draft and I expected instructions to take the matter up with Gromyko. Kornienko said Gromyko occupied with Supreme Soviet which would take up foreign affairs today and that he would probably not be available until next week. He strongly advised against pursuing this question with Gromyko indicating that firm decision had been taken at highest level. Zinchuk in separate conversation with Klosson took same line. When I referred to imbalance in Soviet draft, Kornienko said that if we wanted to cut out some of the exchanges agreed to, the Soviets would be quite willing but in that event they would have some ideas of their own about what might be dropped. He emphasized that Soviet draft on balance provided for exchanges somewhat above actual level of past year. He specifically mentioned memorandum on atomic energy cooperation.

2. I must confess I am disappointed at being overruled on this matter. Most we can hope for in my view would be very slight improvement in present draft. It seems clear that decision to hold exchanges at present level has been taken by Politburo. Gromyko will be unable to change this in any material way without referring back to highest level. I doubt that he will do this, but if he does we risk jeopardizing entire agreement. Both Kornienko and Zinchuk indicated that there was strong high level opposition to any agreement. I doubt that it is in our interest to be suppliant on this issue and we should certainly not threaten to break off negotiations unless we are in fact prepared to carry out our threat.

3. Although I have strong misgivings about this approach, I shall tomorrow morning ask for appointment with Gromyko unless Department, in light this message, wishes modify my instructions. Request comments urgently./3/

/3/In telegram 191845 to Moscow, June 27, the Department informed Thompson that it was reviewing the situation in light of his message and that he should withhold seeking an appointment with Gromyko. (Ibid.)

4. I think we should also urgently decide how we are going to play this matter with the press. My own view is that we should play it on low key stating we would have liked to have had wider exchanges but have agreed on continuing on roughly level carried out last year. If Department agrees with this line, the sooner we conclude the agreement the better in order to avoid appearance of having received major rebuff.

Thompson

276. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, June 29, 1968.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, USSR, Vol. XX. Confidential. Rostow forwarded the memorandum to the President under a June 30 covering memorandum. (Ibid.) Another copy of the memorandum indicates that it was drafted by Arthur Wortzel (EUR/SES) and concurred in by SCI, CU, USIA, and Toon. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, EDX 4 US-USSR)

SUBJECT
US-Soviet Exchanges Negotiations

Our negotiations in Moscow for renewal of the US-USSR Exchanges Agreement for 1968-69 have reached an impasse on two major provisions-exhibits and performing arts groups. Most other portions of the text are agreed or are unlikely to pose serious difficulties.

In the two programs at issue, the Soviets have insisted that they are unable to continue at the levels provided in the last agreement. Specifically, they have offered to exchange three performing arts groups against five provided for in the 1966-67 agreement (of which the Soviets sent only four, although we sent five), and one exhibit against two in the last agreement (of which they sent only one, while we sent two).

Soviet reluctance concerning exchanges with the US in cultural and informational fields is not new, but is now probably increased by difficulties in the Soviet Union with the intellectual community, as well as by Moscow's problems with Czechoslovakia and intrabloc solidarity as a whole.

Although the Soviets have negotiated in a constructive fashion on a number of other portions of the agreement, including a potentially useful arrangement for improved distribution of Amerika magazine, they have stood absolutely firm on the two disputed programs.

Overall, the prospects for the program under a new agreement, apart from the two in dispute, are as follows: General procedural provisions are entirely consistent with our position, including protective language to assure full reciprocity in performing arts and other programs. Program levels range from those specified in the last agreement downward to those actually implemented in 1966-67. Academy of Science and American Council of Learned Societies annexes are at pre-existing levels. An annex on cooperation in atomic energy has been agreed, ending a Soviet-enforced lapse since 1965.

Ambassador Thompson, who returned to Moscow June 25, has now expressed the view that we cannot expect significant improvement in the Soviet position. He has serious doubts as to the utility or desirability of any high-level appeal, and believes that we would be well advised to move ahead to conclude an agreement soon if it is decided that the terms are acceptable.

Unless we are merely to continue talking with little apparent prospect of significant improvement in the program for the new agreement, we face a decision among the following options:

1. To suspend or terminate the negotiations unless the Soviets accept some compromise in exhibits and performing arts.

2. To accept the Soviet position and conclude an agreement on that basis.

3. To accept the Soviet position on performing arts and exhibits, but to invoke countervailing reductions from Soviet-proposed levels in exchanges of primary interest to them, e.g. technical and agricultural, in order to restore a balance among the ingredients in the total program.

Clearly the reduced performing arts and exhibits programs will decrease the impact of the exchanges program. Nevertheless, I believe that it is in our best interests to continue-even at reduced levels-rather than to break off the negotiations. I very much doubt that we can force the Soviets to back down from their present position. To terminate the talks now would fly in the face of everything you have tried to do with the Russians since Glassboro.

If you decide that we should conclude an agreement at the reduced levels, I believe that our position would be improved by imposing some countervailing cuts, as suggested in option 3. We would then be able to explain the agreement as maintaining its normal balance, although at a lower level than we would have liked.

After you have given us your decision on how to proceed we will instruct Ambassador Thompson to make a last effort to obtain some modification of the Soviet position. We will ask him to try for Soviet agreement to receive our exhibit in up to three more cities, making a total of six (as the proposed agreement now reads we can show our exhibit in three cities). If we can get the Soviets to agree to this change it would achieve much of the value of two separate exhibits. Even if Thompson failed, we could proceed under either option two or three.

I have talked to Dean Rusk and Len Marks who agree that we should follow option three.

Options:

1. Terminate negotiations unless the Soviets accept some compromise.

2. Accept the Soviet position and conclude an agreement.

3. Accept the Soviet position on performing arts and exhibits, but reduce the levels of certain of the exchanges of interest to the Soviets./2/

/2/This option was checked. A note on Rostow's covering memorandum, made by his secretary, Lois Nivens, states that on June 30 Rostow notified Walsh of the approval of option 3. The agreement was signed at Moscow on July 15 by Thompson and Nikolai M. Lunkov, Director of the Cultural Relations Department, Soviet Foreign Ministry. For text, see Department of State Bulletin, August 5, 1968, pp. 154-159.

Nicholas deB. Katzenbach

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