Washington, October 2, 1967.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 17 USSR-US. Confidential. Drafted by Malone and approved in G on October 4.

SUBJECT
Chancery Site

PARTICIPANTS
Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, Soviet Embassy
Mr. Foy D.Kohler, Deputy Under Secretary

Mr. Kohler said that he thought we were all set on Mt. Alto as the location to be offered to the Soviet Embassy as part of the projected exchange of chancery sites. We would now need from the Soviet side a statement, either oral or written, that this was agreeable to them. He asked whether Ambassador Dobrynin was familiar with the September 28 Cleveland Park Citizens Association resolution on Tregaron. Ambassador Dobrynin said he was not fully informed, but he had seen an article in the Washington Star which had stated that Tregaron was again in the picture. The article had also mentioned that Mr. Rooney was opposed to it but that the Cleveland Park Citizens Association had voted in favor./2/

/2/The article, "Tregaron a Dark Horse for Russian Embassy," appeared in the October 1 issue, p. B-2; Congressman John J. Rooney (D-New York) opposed the site.

Mr. Kohler said that, for the Ambassador's private information, it was true that Mr. Rooney lives in the area and is opposed to having any embassies in that neighborhood. He then described the two main points of the recently passed Cleveland Park Citizens Association resolution: (1) that the U.S. Government could acquire the entire property, but (2) that the Government would be expected to make half of the property along the north side into a park. Mr. Kohler said in our view the Tregaron proposal complicates the whole chancery site picture, and we might be faced with long additional delays if we proceeded along those lines. He said we would like to have from the Ambassador a statement that the Soviet side was satisfied with Mt. Alto and indeed preferred it, since only half of the Tregaron property would be available under the Citizens Association resolution.

Ambassador Dobrynin said that, in view of what Mr. Kohler had said, he was prepared to give his immediate agreement to Mt. Alto. He said he was most anxious to have the matter of chancery sites settled. He asked what other steps would now be necessary. Mr. Kohler said he thought we could proceed quite rapidly now. We would make arrangements to have the General Services Administration transfer the Mt. Alto property to the Department for the purpose of making available a chancery site for the Soviet Embassy, in exchange for comparable property to be made available to us in Moscow. Following that we would be prepared to have an exchange of notes for a formal agreement.

Ambassador Dobrynin asked whether there was any precedent for this kind of exchange. Mr. Kohler said there was not, and therefore we could proceed in the way that seemed best. For example, we might agree to leases of 99 years or an indefinite period. The important thing was for both sides to be satisfied. Ambassador Dobrynin asked, in looking ahead to the building stage, whether the Soviets would deal with the State Department regarding the buildings' appearance, specifications, etc., or with some other government agency. Mr. Kohler said he thought they would deal with the city on that matter. He assumed the Soviets would perhaps wish to hire a contractor here, as well as bringing in their own people. Approval of the city authorities would be needed for various things, but he anticipated no problems.

In concluding their discussion of Mt. Alto Ambassador Dobrynin and Mr. Kohler reaffirmed that agreement had been reached in principle on the question of exchange sites.

The Ambassador said that, if queried by the press or others, the Embassy would state that it had opted for the Mt. Alto site.

250. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State/1/

Moscow, October 13, 1967, 1300Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 23-4 US. Secret; Limdis.

1443. 1. Deputy Minister Vinogradov called me to Foreign Office this morning with Kornienko present and made the following oral statement, copy of which he gave me for my convenience: "As is well known, for over four years American authorities have been preventing departure from the US of Soviet citizen Imamv Ivanov./2/ Soviet Government has repeatedly, including during discussions between USSR Foreign Minister and US Secretary of State Dean Rusk, raised with American side question of his departure from US. In February 1967, appropriate request was sent by Ivanov's parents, people of very advanced age, directly to US President. However, American officials, referring to US Government's inability interfere in any way in judicial process until hearing of Ivanov's case in appellate court, have thus far refrained from taking steps for positive solution this question. On October 6, 1967, decision by appellate court was made and it was negative for Ivanov. In view of this, I have been instructed once again to draw attention of US Government to fact that continuing detention in US of Soviet citizen Ivanov is additional element complicating Soviet-American relations, which anyway leave much to be desired. Soviet Government counts upon US Government taking steps in nearest future for positive solution of question regarding Ivanov's departure for his homeland the Soviet Union."

/2/See footnote 4, Document 207.

2. I said I understood there was a possibility of a further appeal and inquired whether it was intended such an appeal be made. Vinogradov said he understood that they had thirty days from October 6 in which to make an appeal and that this would be done if Ivanov was not earlier released. Kornienko pointed out that the State Department had taken the position that we could not intervene while an appeal in the courts was pending. I said I would promptly inform the Department of his statement.

3. I believe we could get considerable mileage from the release and deportation of Ivanov at this time and strongly recommend that we do so. The long freeze in the development of Soviet foreign policy due to the 50th anniversary celebrations will soon be ended and from all indications there is a close balance in the leadership as to the direction such policies should take. Our favorable action in this case could have an effect far beyond that which would normally result from a gesture of this kind./3/

/3/In telegram 57130 to Moscow, October 20, the Department of State replied, noting that it was considering the recommendation but wanted to avoid the erroneous impression that Ivanov's release was part of a trade, for example for the release of Stephen Zipper, a U.S. citizen arrested by the Soviets in late September 1967 and detained on drug-smuggling charges. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files, 1967-69, POL 23-4 US)

Thompson

251. Editorial Note

In a letter to President Johnson dated October 20, 1967, Chairman Kosygin called for "resolute steps" toward a political settlement in the Middle East. The President replied in an October 23 letter to Kosygin. On October 24 Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin presented an oral message, supplementing Kosygin's October 20 letter, that proposed a confidential exchange of views on the Middle East. The texts of these messages are scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, volume XIX. The President and Chairman Kosygin exchanged letters concerning the situation in the Middle East twice more before the adoption of UN Resolution 242, on November 19 and again on November 21. For text, see ibid.

252. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Washington, October 25, 1967.

/1/Source: Department of State, Kohler Files: Lot 71 D 460, Dobrynin/Kohler Memoranda of Conversation. Secret. Drafted by Toon on October 25 and approved in G on October 26.

SUBJECT
Ivanov Case

PARTICIPANTS

The Attorney General

Mr. Walter Yeagley, Assistant Attorney General

Mr. Foy D. Kohler, Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs

Mr. Malcolm Toon, Country Director, Soviet Union Affairs

Mr. Kohler called on the Attorney General today at 11:30 to discuss the Ivanov case.

As the Attorney General was aware the Soviets had made clear by their behavior over the past three years that they attached considerable importance to Ivanov. This had been reflected by several attempts to lay hands on possible hostages in the Soviet Union--e.g., Barghoorn in 1963/2/ and more recently Wortham and Gilmour,/3/ and by high level appeals for clemency both in Moscow and in Washington. (In response to the Attorney General's query as to why the Soviets attach so much importance to Ivanov, Mr. Kohler said that because attention had been given the case at the highest levels he could only assume that more was at stake than simply the morale of the Soviet espionage services; he suspected that there was a family connection between Ivanov and high officials in the Soviet Government.) Mr. Kohler said that the Secretary of State was aware of the difficulties that the Justice Department would face in considering any recommendation for Executive clemency in the Ivanov case, and it was for this reason that the Secretary had asked Mr. Kohler to raise the problem personally with the Attorney General. The Secretary had discussed the question with the President and Walt Rostow was aware that Mr. Kohler was raising the matter with the Attorney General today. Mr. Kohler then reviewed the case for clemency along the lines of the attached Talking Paper,/4/ a copy of which he left with the Attorney General. Mr. Kohler told the Attorney General that Ambassador Dobrynin had renewed the Soviet appeal for clemency with him at lunch yesterday and that Dobrynin had been told that while the question would be discussed with the Department of Justice Mr. Kohler was not in a position to make any commitment of any kind at this stage. Mr. Kohler then read to the Attorney General a full account of his conversation on this subject with Dobrynin.

/2/See Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. V, Documents 372, 374, and 376.

/3/See footnote 2, Document 190.

/4/Not printed.

The Attorney General said that he had not had an opportunity to examine the Ivanov file in detail but was of course aware of the case and of the Soviet interest in bringing about Ivanov's release. He would now examine the problem carefully, consult with his associates and be in touch with Ambassador Kohler at an early date. Meanwhile, he would like to explain in general terms the difficulties which he foresaw in supporting a recommendation for Executive clemency. In the first place, as a law enforcement officer he was conscious of the need to do nothing which would downgrade the vital nature of the responsibilities carried out by officials in his Department and the Federal Bureau of Investigation in protecting the security of the United States. Seizure and conviction of a foreign espionage agent is a rare occurrence, and release of a convicted spy without an adequate quid pro quo could be detrimental to the morale of law enforcement officers. Exchange of a Soviet espionage agent for one of our own was entirely defensible; but unilateral release of a convicted spy was quite another development which would be difficult for law enforcement officers to understand and support. Secondly, we had to look at the problem from the standpoint of deterrence. If the Soviets felt that their agents caught in the act of espionage would ultimately be released and would not have to serve the full penalty for their acts, seizure and conviction would not serve as substantial deterrence. The Attorney General, of course, recognized that Soviet espionage activities in the United States and elsewhere did not depend exclusively on efforts by their own nationals; they had a wide network of agents to draw upon. Thirdly, clemency for Ivanov could generate an impression with the American public that the principle of law enforcement was to be applied in a different way when diplomatic considerations were involved. Finally, and related to the third factor, was the problem of domestic political considerations. The Attorney General wondered how clemency for Ivanov could be explained to the public, to the press, and the Congress.

Mr. Kohler said that both the Secretary and others concerned with the problem in the Department were keenly aware of the difficulties cited by the Attorney General which must be faced in reaching a decision. Obviously we would have to give careful thought to a rationale for use in dealing particularly with the Congress, and on a background basis with the press, for clemency in the case of Ivanov. Perhaps the best approach to this problem would be to describe the act as a gesture of goodwill toward the Soviet Union with the aim of removing a serious irritant in our bilateral relations and with the hope that this would influence Soviet decision making in a direction favorable to us.

The Attorney General asked whether the matter was urgent. Mr. Kohler pointed out that the question of appeal to the Supreme Court was now pending and it would be desirable to have a decision on the question of clemency before the appeal must be filed. Mr. Yeagley pointed out that he understood that Mr. Edward Bennett Williams, whose services the Soviets had recently engaged in the Ivanov case, had requested a stay until December 5 in which to file a petition for a writ of certiorari. It was agreed that we should aim for a decision on clemency before the expiry of the stay. The Attorney General commented that the fact that Williams had taken on the case could have ominous overtones; Williams was not the sort of lawyer to take on a loser.

It was agreed that the Attorney General would be in touch with Mr. Kohler or Mr. Yeagley with Mr. Toon when the Justice Department had had an opportunity to examine the problem in the light of this discussion. Meanwhile, Mr. Yeagley would be provided with a list of cases involving detention and/or conviction of American and Soviet nationals in recent years and the way in which these cases have been disposed of./5/

/5/During a meeting with Kohler on November 29, Dobrynin again raised the issue of releasing Ivanov and, "saying he was speaking personally, then stressed that this case was of importance in Soviet-American relations far beyond its intrinsic importance. Whatever the 'Special Services' might think about it, he was sure that the detention of Ivanov influenced negatively decisions in completely unrelated fields of real importance to the Soviet-American relationship." (Memorandum of conversation; Department of State, Kohler Files: Lot 71 D 460, Dobrynin/Kohler Memoranda of Conversation)

253. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State/1/

Moscow, November 12, 1967, 1000Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 15-1 USSR. Limited Official Use.

1755. Subj: Shifting Balance of Power in Soviet Leadership.

1. Perhaps the most significant development during the week-long 50th anniversary festivities was the conduct of the Soviet leadership itself and the implications of this conduct for developments within the hierarchical structure.

2. Obvious efforts were made during jubilee to perpetuate the public image of the Brezhnev-Kosygin-Podgornyy troika. However, after all was said and done it was Brezhnev who emerged more obviously than ever before as the primus inter pares in the present political constellation.

3. It was he who clearly dominated the festivities. He dedicated Lenin statue in Kremlin November 2; made the major addresses at sessions in Moscow November 3-4 and in Leningrad November 5; and acted as principal host and speaker at Kremlin reception following November 7 parade. Kosygin's role was limited to chairing part of November 4 Moscow joint session; addressing the Moscow organizations at awards meeting November 6; and delivering "short" toast at Kremlin reception. Podgorny's contributions about matched Kosygin's, with former chairing opening of joint session November 3 and presenting awards in both Leningrad and Moscow.

4. Deferential reference to troika members in speeches of lesser leaders were interesting. Brezhnev and several others referred by name to Kosygin and Podgorny in their "official roles," but that was all. In fairly sharp contrast all republic first secretaries at joint meeting in Moscow voiced explicit approval of Brezhnev's report although some endorsements evidently considered too personally laudatory and so were not carried subsequently in central press. Perhaps one of more interesting performances in this connection was Marshal Grechko's at the November 7 Kremlin reception where in homage to Brezhnev he noted the "daily leadership" of armed forces by CC CPSU and Politburo and toasted "CC CPSU, Politburo and General Secretary CC CPSU Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev."

5. Also were especially struck by minimal attention of speakers during talkathon to principle of "collective leadership." While Brezhnev pledged continuation and strengthening of principle once briefly and in passing, no other speaker touched this point which had been hallmark this leadership's pronouncements starting with Khrushchev's ouster.

6. How much Brezhnev's public preeminence reflects accretion personal power and how much attributable his institutional role on what was primarily a party holiday may be debatable. Nonetheless, his conspicuous over-shadowing of other members of leadership troika was so marked as to raise questions about future leadership balance.

7. In this context, the differences in tenor and content Kosygin's two speeches in Moldavia (Moscow 1334 and 1369)/2/ and Polyansky's article in "Kommunist" (Moscow 1578)/3/ take on more interesting overtones. This particularly so since Brezhnev in his marathon address seemed to endorse Polyansky's exposition and then go one step further to demonstrate close sympathy with military on assessment defense needs, securing in process Grechko's personal public tribute--an endorsement suggesting a close developing relationship between General Secretary and armed forces leadership.

/2/Dated October 4 and 7, respectively. (Ibid., POL 7 USSR)

/3/Dated October 26. (Ibid., E 5 USSR/Five Year)

8. It probably still premature to suggest that Brezhnev's leadership is unquestioned or that his views necessarily carry the day. By same token, however, it is difficult to ignore public personality play of last few days and implications it may have for changes in leadership.

9. Polyansky's star appears to be rising and his portrait was the only one, apart from the troika, in front ranks not in alphabetical order in the main parade of pictures carried through Red Square on the seventh.

10. Kosygin has at times appeared tired and his poor health and death of his wife have doubtless affected him. (For what it may be worth British Ambassador's barber said Kosygin spent large part of his summer holiday in heart clinic.) We have heard repeated reports that he has offered to resign.

11. Despite Brezhnev's preeminence, he has not succeeded in establishing his image as the leader and Kosygin appears to be much more respected by the public. I suspect also that even in party circles, Kosygin by sheer ability has influence comparable to that of Brezhnev, at least in his own field.

12. Podgorny appears to be ambitious but limited in ability. Should Kosygin resign, he or Polyanskiy would appear to be the most likely successors. On the other hand, if there should be a Kremlin coup, Shelepin would be the most likely to lead it and Brezhnev and Podgorny the most likely to be dropped.

13. I must point out that these views are highly speculative as we have little to go on. I am encouraged to submit them by the fact that I have recently had occasion to ascertain that they coincide not only with those of a number of my colleagues but also of the few Russians who have been willing to talk about such matters. It is a game that anyone can play.

Thompson

254. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union/1/

Washington, November 25, 1967, 1616Z.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, USSR, Vol. XVI. Secret; Nodis. Drafted and approved by Rusk. Rostow forwarded the telegram to the President under cover of a November 28 memorandum in which he stated that it "opens up the possibility of a most interesting and spacious dialogue with the Soviet Union if they are interested." (Ibid.)

74809. Eyes Only for Ambassador From Secretary. Now that the Fiftieth Anniversary is behind us and we had a unanimous vote on the Middle East resolution in the Security Council, I will pass along my own thoughts regarding your 1389 of October 9./2/

/2/Telegram 1389 from Moscow reported that during a talk with Thompson on October 9 Gromyko referred to a discussion with Rusk in late September during which the Secretary raised the possibility of an understanding that there would be no border changes in Asia without the agreement of the U.S. and Soviet Governments and that the problem of divided countries should be solved gradually by the wishes of their peoples. Gromyko asked that Rusk be more specific about what he had in mind. (Ibid.)

Mr. Gromyko and I, in our talks in New York, were getting close to the edge of talking about China and the general situation in Asia. I told him that I thought that there were important elements in the Asian situation in which the interests of the Soviet Union and the United States might coincide. I said, as an example, that the United States could proceed on the basis that--

(a) The present frontiers in Asia should be looked upon as permanent.

(b) If there are border disputes we would be prepared to lend assistance in a peaceful resolution of such disputes. (I had in mind such a border as the McMahon line between India and China.)

(c) If there are problems of demarcation, we would be ready to be of assistance in demarcation. (I had in mind the borders of Cambodia.)

(d) In the event of divided states such as Korea and Viet-Nam the issue should be resolved by peaceful means and not by force.

I told Gromyko that these four points were a basis for a genuine common interest between the United States and the Soviet Union. I don't recall that I told him, but I had in mind that point (d) might work to the advantage of the United States in its short-run in such situations as Viet-Nam but that the Soviet Union might be much interested in point (a)--given the longer range prospects of their problems with a billion Chinese.

I specifically did not propose any "form of understanding" and do not do so now. It might be no more than a basis for some further conversation between us. Nor was I attempting to find a formula which might be simply a temporary convenience with regard to Viet-Nam from our point of view. I was letting my mind range far ahead to the long term complex of Asian problems over the next ten or twenty years.

I would suggest that, in mentioning the matter again to Gromyko, you tell him that I was thinking in the broadest and longest range terms about the situation in Asia and how the state interests of the Soviet Union and the United States would fit into that situation. You might add that I have been trying to analyze the uncertainties of the next decades in Asia and have been trying to identify those points of common interest between the Soviet Union and the United States which might be genuine common interests. Obviously, the identification of such common interests on such important matters could be important for the two countries on whom fall so much responsibility for the maintenance of peace.

As a postscript, I departed from my traditional practice and attended the Fiftieth Anniversary Reception at the Soviet Embassy in Washington. I did so for a very simple reason: We have had fifty years of coexistence as between the Soviet Union and the United States (in the sense that we have not had a major war with each other), and I would be glad to have another fifty years about which one could say the same thing./3/

/3/Thompson responded in telegram 1946, November 27, that he was inclined not to seek an appointment with Gromyko specifically on this subject but to discuss it the next time he had occasion to see him. (Ibid.)

Rusk

255. Memorandum From Zbigniew Brzezinski of the Policy Planning Council to the President's Special Consultant (Roche)/1/

Washington, November 27, 1967.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings File. Secret. The President read Brzezinski's memorandum to the attendees at the National Security Council meeting on November 29. (Memorandum for the Record, November 19; ibid.)

SUBJECT
China, the Soviet Union and Vietnam

In response to the President's request of this morning, the following are my thoughts on the subject:

I. Chances of Chinese Involvement

1. Although the Chinese do not wish to become involved, the likelihood of Chinese involvement will grow as the light at the end of tunnel begins to be brighter.

2. The Chinese wish the war to go on as long as possible: it ties down both the United States and the Soviet Union, while also increasing US-Soviet animosity. Moreover, stability in Southeast Asia, achieved essentially through a successful US policy, is the last thing they want.

3. In the event of a settlement or simply the gradual fading of hostilities, some internal conflict in the Hanoi leadership is to be expected. The more militant faction may see no choice but to invite Chinese assistance. To assume that no North Vietnamese would ever call for Chinese aid is to underestimate the degree of ideological fervor and anti-US hostility that today exists in Hanoi.

4. Either responding to such a call, or even on their own initiative, the Chinese may feel that the gradual introduction of limited forces either into Laos or the DMZ would be sufficient to bolster sagging North Vietnamese morale and to perpetuate the conflict, without risking excessive US response. To the Chinese, both the Korean War and the very measured character of US escalation against North Vietnam provide psychological assurance that the likely US response to initially limited Chinese involvement would be measured and tempered.

II. The Soviet Attitude towards the Vietnamese War

1. At first, the Soviet leaders were concerned that the war may complicate the US-Soviet relationship or prompt unacceptable risks. This fear is probably much less today than a year or so ago.

2. As the war went on, the Soviet leaders began to see some major benefits themselves from the US involvement. In their thinking:

a. The war weakened US posture in Europe and created new openings for Soviet diplomacy;

b. it reduced the effectiveness of US bridge-building to East Europe;

c. it intensified domestic strains in the United States while consuming major US resources;

d. it diverted Chinese hostility from the Soviet Union and reduced the likelihood of a US-Chinese rapprochement.

3. Without a doubt the war also has created liabilities for the Soviet Union. The Soviets have been embarrassed by their inability to deter the US from bombing a Communist state. The war did reduce the possibility of increased US-Soviet trade, which at least some Soviet leaders desired. Nonetheless, the assumed political benefits of the war certainly must outweigh in the minds of most Soviet leaders the loss of somewhat marginal and essentially only potential economic benefits.

4. It would appear that today the Soviet leaders are primarily concerned with containing the risks of the war; not with the war itself. Furthermore, if one bears in mind the over-all Soviet view of their relationship with the United States--including the allegedly more "aggressive" US policy--it is difficult to see why the Soviet leaders should not view the war as, on balance, convenient, though posing certain obvious risks. A prolonged and painful continuation is preferable either to a US victory or even to a compromise settlement, which would simply free the United States to pursue more effectively its policies in Asia or Europe. Prolonging the war but minimizing its risks--that in essence appears to be the Soviet posture in regard to the Vietnamese conflict./2/

/2/On December 12 Brezezinski completed a 71-page paper entitled "The Soviet Union and the United States" that analyzed the state of Soviet policy toward the United States and, on that basis, developed some propositions concerning the probable trends in the U.S.-Soviet relationship and some implications for U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union. A notation on the paper indicates that Rusk saw it. Henry Owen, Chairman of the Policy Planning Council, forwarded it to Rusk under a December 15 covering memorandum that recommended Rusk meet with the Policy Planning Council and other senior Department officers to discuss the paper. Rusk approved the proposal but no record of a meeting has been found. The paper is in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 1 US-USSR. Owen's memorandum is ibid., S/P Files: Lot 72 D 139.

256. Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency/1/

Washington, December 8, 1967.

/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO/IMS Files: Job 78-06423A, Box 3, Folder 6, US Govt-State Dept. Confidential. Attached to a routing slip that indicates it was seen by Helms and Deputy Director for Plans Thomas H. Karamessines. A note on the slip states: "The content of the attached was read by Amb. Goldberg this morning (14 Dec.). He handed back the copy without comment."

SUBJECT
Reporting from U.S. Embassy Moscow

1. The Embassy's reporting is entirely satisfactory in quantity, quality and timeliness. We rarely differ with the Embassy in the interpretation of either internal or external developments. The Embassy's Soviet contacts--naturally, always small in number and a dubious lot on political questions--have, over the years, been a valuable source of information on the cultural and intellectual milieu. The Embassy is also well tied into the Moscow diplomatic and foreign correspondent informational network.

2. It is disappointing, but not at all surprising given the state of US-Soviet relations, that Ambassador Thompson has been unable to reestablish the direct, personal links with the Soviet hierarchy he had in his previous tour in Khrushchev's hey-day. He is, of course, an old Soviet hand and has few peers in his experience of Soviet diplomacy. He has always been, however, more the practical diplomat than the thoughtful student of Soviet affairs. His personal communications to Washington are often cryptic and prosaic. In addition, he has a reputation for being circumspect and unusually close-mouthed in matters he considers diplomatically sensitive and it is thought in the State Department that in such instances he often resorts to private, exclusive communications.

257. Paper Prepared in the Department of State/1/

Washington, December 11, 1967.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 74 D 164. Secret. Forwarded to the White House for the President's Evening Reading.

STATE DEPARTMENT ACTIVITIES REPORT

[Here follow reports on the US-Japan Automobile Talks, the Travel Control Bill, and Otto Otepka.]

4. Kohler-Dobrynin Meeting--Foy Kohler had a farewell luncheon/2/ today with Ambassador Dobrynin. Foy noted that the Russians owe us answers on a number of questions, particularly that of strategic arms limitations./3/

/2/On December 31 Kohler stepped down as Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs.

/3/Kohler and Dobrynin reviewed the following items on Kohler's list of pending business: space cooperation, cooperation on desalting, technical talks on Plowshare and interpretation of the Limited Test Ban Treaty, the strategic weapons talks, incidents along the Korean DMZ, Moscow-New York flights, chancery sites, the exchanges agreement, and problems involving Sputnik magazine and the Americk-Soviet Life magazine exchange. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL US-USSR)

Dobrynin agreed that despite Viet-Nam there are three areas in which we have to cooperate: (1) maintaining exchanges between the two peoples; (2) rationalizing the strategic weapons race and moving toward a reduction in conventional armaments; and (3) cooperating on the use of outer space.

Dobrynin said Moscow's policy on Viet-Nam was completely "hands off", but added that Moscow suspects we really do not want peace. Foy did his best to disabuse Dobrynin and stressed that it was Dobrynin's responsibility to correct such misapprehensions in Moscow.

Benjamin H. Read/4/
Executive Secretary

/4/Signed for Read in an unidentified hand.

258. Paper Prepared in the Department of State/1/

Washington, December 18, 1967.

/1/Source: Department of State, G/PM Files: Lot 69 D 258, Box 270, US-Soviet Military Relationship. Top Secret. Transmitted to Secretary Rusk by State Department Counselor Robert R. Bowie and Deputy Assistant Secretary for Politico-Military Affairs Philip J. Farley under cover of a December 18 memorandum that listed the purposes of the study as: "a. Assess the significance of projected changes in US and Soviet forces over the next five years or so. b. Analyze how various key countries are likely to perceive the changing military situation. c. Propose what the US should say or do to deal with the consequences to our foreign policy of these changes." The memorandum also noted that Rusk authorized the study on September 20 and Kohler received a copy of the

paper and agreed with its major findings and conclusions.

CHANGING US-SOVIET STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIPS

1. A General Observation

An assessment of relative military capabilities is exceedingly complex, uncertain, and controversial. It is complex because so many variables enter into the assessment of military capabilities and because military technology is advancing so rapidly and on so many fronts. Even for the present, many of these variables are subject to wide ranges of estimates (e.g., How hard are missile silos? How accurate are missiles? What is the actual operational reliability of weapons systems?). Intelligence estimates have not proven fully reliable in the past. In the future, the variations of these estimates may be even greater because it is inherently more difficult to obtain reliable information on qualitative changes of the type expected.

The present study confirms the fact that there are great and honest differences of opinion among knowledgeable experts, particularly as to the future relationship of strategic forces. "The truth" is elusive partly because our information cannot be complete, and partly because the relevant indicators of military capability depend on what you are trying to measure. Unquestionably the same uncertainties exist for the Soviet Union. Thus, categorical statements (including our own) about strategic relations, particularly projections more than five years into the future, should be treated with considerable skepticism.

2. Findings on the Strategic Balance (Details at Tab A)/2/

/2/The tabs were not attached.

a. During the past three years, the Soviets have substantially increased their ability to damage the US in a nuclear exchange. Our ability to limit damage to the US has been correspondingly reduced. Their rapid buildup of hardened, dispersed ICBMs has given them a deterrent in which they should have high confidence. In a second strike, we estimate they could inflict two to four times more damage on the US today than they could in early 1965 (80-100 million fatalities as compared to 25-35 million). The Soviet leaders certainly are aware that their situation has improved, even though their detailed calculations may differ from ours.

b. Perceptions of the strategic balance are probably more significant in international relations than the actual balance. Our own perceptions of the balance may not have changed as markedly as the above facts suggest. This is best assessed by our own leadership. However, it should be noted that, in the early 1960's, we already had credited the Soviets with the ability to do substantial damage to the US, and we foresaw the emergence of mutual deterrence by mid-decade. On the other hand, the Soviets undoubtedly had a feeling of strategic inferiority in the early 1960's which must have declined today.

c. Over the next decade, we expect the Soviets to continue expansion of their strategic forces and even to surpass us in some categories of strategic strength. They will equal the US in the number of ICBM launchers deployed during the coming year and will probably continue to expand their force beyond 1000 missiles. Several Soviet ICBMs with advanced performance characteristics now are in development. The USSR also will pass us in total intercontinental megatonnage in 1968 or 1969. They could equal or surpass us in numbers of Polaris-type submarines in the mid-1970's. They already have an ABM system in the Moscow area, and it seems likely they will deploy ABMs more widely in the 1970's.

d. These trends do not now jeopardize the US deterrent, nor do they seem likely to do so in the next five years or so. We believe that the Secretary of Defense makes a persuasive case that our deterrent will remain more than adequate even against quite unlikely increases in the threat. However, we should point out that some qualified military experts question this conclusion. At present, our principal means of assuring deterrence into the 1970's is the MIRV/3/ program. MIRVs will increase our total number of warheads from about [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] today to [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] in 1976, with the increase beginning in 1970. However, between now and 1970 the Soviets could come close to parity in total intercontinental warheads.

/3/Multiple, independently-targeted re-entry vehicles. [Footnote in the source text.]

e. The Soviets also have been gradually increasing the reach of their conventional military forces. In recent years they have developed forces which, while probably originally intended for the general war mission, now provide them with capabilities for distant, limited operations. Specific evidence of growing Soviet military reach includes: greater worldwide naval activity, particularly in the Mediterranean; the expansion and modernization of airlift and sealift capabilities; and a modest expansion of naval infantry (marines). The Yemen provides evidence of Soviet willingness already to exercise their growing reach. We foresee a doubling of port-to-port sealift capabilities over the next decade and a substantial increase in their airlift. However, the Soviets will remain far behind the US in their over-all capability to move large forces rapidly to distant points and will have less capacity for opposed operations beyond the range of their tactical aircraft.

f. The Soviets have maintained superiority in Central Europe and have modernized their forces, including the provision of a formidable tactical nuclear capability. However, since the early 1960's, our own assessments have recognized that the margin of their conventional superiority is much less than we previously assumed, particularly in a surprise attack. Furthermore, the consensus in NATO is that a Soviet attack on Western Europe is highly unlikely.

3. Political Implications (Details at Tabs B and C)

a. The current rapid growth in Soviet strategic nuclear forces is unlikely to increase their willingness to take actions which they believe would have a high risk of leading to nuclear war with the US either directly or by escalation. For in contemplating the possible consequences of any such course, their own casualties would still be likely to weigh more heavily upon Soviet calculations than their growing ability to hurt us. Such restraint, however, does not rule out Soviet initiatives that could adversely affect the US or its allies' interests. Where a direct conflict of interests develops, Soviet leaders may prove tougher in maintaining their positions in a situation of mutual deterrence.

b. We should be concerned that, as the Soviets view their higher strategic force levels as reinforcing deterrence, they may be more inclined to think they can intervene in third areas with reduced risk of American opposition. Potential Soviet options for such moves are created by the greater reach of their conventional forces. As a result, they may be more tempted to respond to requests for military support from governments or factions they support politically. Thus, we could be faced with situations in which the Soviets intervene before we do, leaving us with the choice of initiating confrontation or accepting a fait accompli.

c. While the basic condition of deterrence is not likely to be upset in the next five years, any close reckoning of the state of the strategic balance will be increasingly complex and difficult. In particular, net evaluations are becoming more and more sensitive to assumptions about weapons characteristics, such as accuracy, which are extremely difficult to verify. Traditional "box score" comparisons of US-Soviet strength relations are becoming increasingly subject to varied interpretations and possible manipulation for polemical purposes both by domestic critics of our defense programs and by the Soviets.

d. Domestic American controversy over defense policy is likely to increase, inevitably attracting foreign attention. So far, foreign reaction to changing Soviet capabilities has been limited, but American discussion will expose foreign opinion to criticism of American policy on two lines--one that US programs are pushing the Soviets into a new round in the arms race and the other that American vulnerability is increasing and that American ability to meet its Alliance commitments is declining. Either line of criticism could, if it makes an impact abroad, complicate our foreign relations.

e. Uncertainties will tend to generate mutually reinforcing pressures on both sides to use "worst case" assumptions. For the Soviets, this will mean having to adopt military budgets which entail a cost in over-all economic growth rates. Moscow may seek ways of regulating the pace of the arms race, perhaps using arms talks and even limited arms control agreements for this purpose. There appears, however, to be very little likelihood that the two sides will be able to attune their views on all the complex issues sufficiently to conclude a comprehensive agreement to end the race in strategic weaponry.

4. Conclusions

a. Mutual deterrence is here and likely to persist for at least the next decade. In these circumstances the US will have increasing difficulty in defining vital interests for which the use of nuclear weapons would be warranted. Moreover, even to maintain deterrence we will have to continue spending large sums because of the uncertainties inherent in the strategic equation and the steady development of new weapons systems.

b. Effect on the Soviet Union--The Soviets probably believe that their growing strategic capabilities will deter the US, enhance their prestige, and improve their ability to influence events in other countries. The Soviets may be more prone to take advantage of opportunities to intervene in local conflicts or may be more readily drawn into such conflicts and, once involved, may be less willing to withdraw. Thus, we may face situations where the Soviets are there first or where it will be desirable for the US to intervene rapidly to assure they are not. At present, this seems most likely to occur in the Middle East or Africa.

c. Effect on NATO Allies--Soviet military capabilities in Europe will remain at least as great as heretofore. From a military viewpoint, Soviet leaders will certainly feel as able as they have been in the past to engage in a policy of threats or renewal of pressures on Berlin. Their increased over-all power may cause our European allies to be more deferential to Soviet political pressures and lead to questioning of the reliability of American commitments. The confidence of the European members of NATO in US nuclear intervention in the event of an attack on Europe already has declined and probably will be further eroded. While the Europeans already understand in general terms that mutual deterrence exists, they have been slow to acknowledge the full meaning for them. Where they have recognized the implications, with the exception of France, they have chosen to play them down. To be sure, a significant deterrent to an attack on Europe will remain so long as the US retains a nuclear arsenal. However, continued concern about the US nuclear guarantee and demands for reassurance are likely to be prominent in our future relations with the NATO countries. If our allies feel these concerns are not being met, it could lead either to neutralism or to greater pressures for independent nuclear capabilities.

d. Non-Proliferation--Questions about the validity of the US deterrent in protecting other countries could feed pressures for additional independent nuclear capabilities--and not only in Europe. We are likely to encounter increasing pressures for more specific assurances as to our nuclear commitments at a time when the strategic situation and the mood of the American public make it less likely that we will be able to accede to these pressures.

Given our own obvious vulnerability to nuclear attack, it will be more difficult for the US to extend nuclear assurances, and it may also become increasingly difficult for us to satisfy other countries that their security requirements can be met through nuclear guarantees. (The light ABM defense should help, at least for some years, to reinforce our assurances to Asian countries that feel threatened by Communist China.) Under these conditions, there may be greater pressures for independent nuclear capabilities. Our efforts to resist such pressures are likely to increase strains in our relationships with friendly countries.

e. Limiting Strategic Forces--In current circumstances the reasonable approach would be for both sides to seek to limit their expenditures on strategic forces. However, the prospects for limiting strategic forces by agreement with the Soviets are not promising. The difficulties have been noted above, particularly the difficulty of controlling technology. However, the effort to achieve such an understanding should not be abandoned. If, as seems likely, a situation of mutual deterrence is destined to persist for some years, both sides may become convinced that they should try to maintain deterrence at lower levels of effort. Two possible approaches with respect to the Soviets have been advocated in recent years: (a) one stresses our ability to maintain superiority and the futility of their competing with us; (b) an alternative approach accepts approximate parity as inevitable and seeks specific means of implementing it through discussion, and, hopefully, agreement. Past US public statements of defense policy have stressed elements of both approaches. In our view, it is preferable to avoid the rhetoric of both "superiority" and of "parity." Rather, our statements should stress the adequacy or sufficiency of our deterrent and make the point that we are doing just as much as is necessary to assure our deterrent. We are not attempting to accelerate the arms race by doing more nor jeopardizing security by doing less.

f. Offense-Defense Balance--A major asymmetry exists between the US and Soviet strategies and strategic postures. This is the difference in relative emphasis which we and they place on strategic defense. In recent years, US policy statements have given increasing weight to "assured destruction" and lesser weight to "damage limitation." This trend has certain foreign policy implications.

First, the Soviets see us as "offense-oriented." Almost certainly they will perceive the sharp increases in US offensive warheads which will result from our MIRV program as a serious threat to them. This Soviet view contributes both to the maintenance of political tensions and constitutes an obstacle to disarmament agreements. It is possible that we could meet this situation, without necessarily increasing our total strategic effort, by a greater relative emphasis on defense in US strategic doctrine. Such emphasis might contribute to arms control in two ways: (a) greater US defensive effort would complicate Soviet strategic planning and make their strategic effort more costly, thereby imposing further economic pressure for limiting arms; (b) if Soviet leaders want to reach agreement, a more balanced, mixed system might make agreement more feasible because of somewhat greater similarity in defense posture.

Second, the erosion of our ability to limit damage to the US is creating doubts about the firmness of US nuclear commitments. Even if defenses are far from perfect, doing something about defense could create a psychological climate which could be somewhat reassuring (without necessarily being falsely reassuring) both for our public and our allies.

Finally, quite aside from its merits, we should also recognize that the prospect of defense against missiles continues to have domestic political appeal. If the Soviets continue to deploy an ABM and we deploy only for protection against China, this will remain a political issue in this country.

On the other hand, a greater emphasis on defense also presents us with many problems. As has often been pointed out, no combination of defense and counterforce can begin to provide complete protection against the Soviets. A larger ABM program could further stimulate arms competition, and would be even more likely to do so if undertaken in conjunction with further improvements to our offensive forces. Furthermore, deployment of ABMs and greater emphasis on civil defense will create opposition from many allies who are concerned that this will intensify the arms race.

Clearly, we should make a more intensive effort to analyze the pros and cons of the damage-limiting issue as it affects our foreign relations. In the meantime, we should not take positions which will make it more difficult for us to expand our defensive programs should we wish to do so in the future.

5. Recommendations:

a. That the Secretary of State, through the Under Secretary, request the SIG to arrange for appropriate political-military contingency planning in light of the above analysis. Such planning should focus in particular on the Middle East and Africa and should consider where and how the Soviets would be most likely to intervene in local conflicts if they should be requested to do so by a local government or revolutionary movement.

b. That the Secretary of State suggest to the Secretary of Defense the need for State and Defense jointly to develop a rationale for our strategic forces, to be used in the forthcoming DOD posture statement, which takes into account the impact of that statement on the Soviets and our allies. Particular attention should be paid to the way in which our assured destruction and damage-limiting objectives and capabilities are described./4/

/4/Rusk transmitted copies of the paper to McNamara and Helms on December 18. His covering memorandum to McNamara is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, volume X. Helms responded in a January 11, 1968, letter that "its major findings generally accord with our view of Soviet strategic developments." He attached comments that noted "such differences as we have." (Department of State, G/PM Files: Lot 69 D 258, Box 270, US-Soviet Military Relationship) Defense Department comments, prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, International Security Affairs, and Systems Analysis, were transmitted to Rusk by Nitze on May 24. In a June 3 memorandum to Farley, Leon Sloss of G/PM indicated that the JCS generally agreed with the study but that the comments by ISA and Systems Analysis were generally critical, particularly of the emphasis given to defense. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/P Files: Lot 72 D 139)

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