Washington, July 11, 1967.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, USSR, Vol. XVI. Confidential.

SUBJECT
Soviet Cancellation of Performing Arts Tour in the United States

It looks as if the Soviets are persisting in their refusal to send their Festival of Arts/2/ to the United States. The Secretary raised the matter again with Dobrynin last Saturday and Foy Kohler has raised it with Tcherniakov--in both cases without a definite answer. However, the Soviet Embassy told Hurok/3/ yesterday that the tour is "indefinitely postponed." As for the reasons, I think it is pretty clear that the Soviets feel uncomfortable about Hollybush and any impression to the world that we and they are moving toward a better, or parallel relationship. The Mid-East is still smarting and their setbacks in New York don't help. The Festival of Arts group would be opening at the Lincoln Center in six days--which is a particularly poor place. Yuri Zhukov made some remarks to Hurok's man in Moscow about concern over anti-Soviet demonstrations in New York. Madame Furtseva, the Minister of Culture, was probably closer to the real reason when she said to Hurok that the Mid-East crisis was the problem.

/2/A troupe of 200 singers and dancers, also called the Festival of Stars.

/3/Impresario Sol Hurok.

The Soviets have said informally that we should not regard this as affecting other exchanges, although this could be a stall. We shall soon see, as a circus exchange (with the American circus going to the Soviet Union) is in the offing. In general, the Soviets have regarded their attractions coming to the United States as in their interest--as well as big money makers. Therefore they are paying something for cancelling the Festival of Arts (as is Sol Hurok, who claims he stands to lose one-third of a million dollars). With the Secretary having made two personal representations to Dobrynin and with other approaches to the Russians here and in Moscow, it is difficult to see there is much we can or should do about this--particularly as it has been our consistent position that it is up to the Soviets whether they want to bring attractions to this country. I doubt if a personal intervention by the President would be effective, and do not recommend it.

Press Treatment (Late Bulletin)

Hurok has just told UPI, AP and the New York Times. The Times called the Soviet Embassy and was told that "the reasons have been given to the Americans." The Times then called the State Department, which confirmed that the Soviets had given "the international situation" as their reason. I should think, on fairly deep background, we might indicate that with the Mid-East, the UN, etc., the Soviets seem to have been casting about for a gesture that is conspicuous, but not necessarily of deep policy significance.

ND

240. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Embassy in Norway/1/

Moscow, July 19, 1967, 1100Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 30 USSR. Confidential. Repeated to Paris and the Department of State.

259. Ref: Oslo 273./2/ For Kennan from Thompson.

/2/In telegram 273, repeated as telegram 309 from Oslo to the Department of State, July 20, George Kennan told Thompson that he found it difficult to understand the need for postponing publication of Svetlana Alliluyeva's Twenty Letters to a Friend, which Harper & Row planned to publish in early October, shortly before the Soviet Union's 50th anniversary celebration, since the book was not primarily political or even autobiographical and the U.S. Government had no part in the decision to publish it. (Ibid.)

1. Soviets repeatedly made clear they consider that publication date just before jubilee to which they attach enormous importance is proof that US Government is deliberately exploiting Svetlana in a cold war move. Publication will re-focus attention on her defection regardless of content. I am convinced that delay of four or five weeks would gain us great credit here and would affect some pending issues. Admit there may be little in this for Svetlana but if Soviets should learn that she had prevented postponement they would be even more bitter toward her. Unlikely but possible this could affect status of children.

2. When in Washington recently I recommended approach to lawyer but do not know outcome. Washington was concerned that government intervention would become known and arouse criticism.

3. Suggest reftel be repeated Washington.

Thompson

241. Editorial Note

On July 20, 1967, the intelligence community issued National Intelligence Estimate 11-4-67, "Main Trends in Soviet Military Policy." NIE 11-4-67 stated that the "Soviets almost certainly believe that their strategic position relative to that of the US has improved markedly" and that, while "Soviet foreign policy will continue to be based primarily upon political and economic factors," the "military capabilities that the Soviets are developing and the military relationships that are evolving will affect their attitudes and approaches to policy, they will probably seek to gain some political or propaganda advantages from their improving military position, and may take a harder line with the US in various crises than they have in the past." On August 9 the President's Special Assistant Walt Rostow forwarded NIE 11-4-67 to President Johnson. In his covering memorandum Rostow commented that the situation described in the NIE was "not alarming; but I suspect it will be exploited as a political issue in 1968. The Soviets are increasing the number of their hardened ICBM's while we are increasing the number of our warheads. Therefore, it will be argued, they are 'closing our nuclear superiority gap.' " Rostow continued, "no one thinks we are moving to a position where a Soviet first strike is likely to become rational in the foreseeable future. But the numbers will be moving unfavorably over the coming year." NIE 11-4-67 and Rostow's covering memorandum are scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, volume X.

242. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State/1/

Moscow, July 20, 1967, 1348Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, BG Moscow. Secret; Limdis.

271. For Kohler, Rimestad,/2/ and Leddy.

/2/Idar Rimestad, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration.

Subject: Chancery Site Negotiations.

Ref: Moscow 191./3/

/3/Dated July 14. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, BG Moscow)

1. As you will have seen from our tel 91 July 14, Foreign Ministry, in démarche to Guthrie on eve his departure, has in effect rejected our proposal that Soviet proffered site for new US Chancery and living quarters be extended to include site of our present chancery and suitable connecting avenue thereto.

2. We must consider which of various options open to us is most suitable course of action at this juncture when pressures are mounting on both sides for some resolution of chancery problem. We assume, in this respect, that Mt. Alto property cannot be reserved indefinitely for Soviet occupation. Similarly, we are advised that Soviets also hope for early decision regarding acceptability to us of site which is in area of Moscow already in process (CEMA development) of urban renovation and reconstruction.

3. I think that those of us with direct experience of our present chancery living quarters in Moscow need little documentation to comprehend how cramped and inadequately officed and housed we are. Pressures to accommodate, under suitable security safeguards, additional personnel and their dependents mount from year to year from all agencies of our government. We have already outgrown our present rabbit-warren, and it seems to me that we must, in our over-all national interest, give a sympathetic reading to proposals which will allow us to accommodate personnel and operations commensurate with our ever-increasing contact and involvement, at all levels, with the Soviet Union.

4. Soviet need for new quarters in Washington seems equally demonstrable; they will say, it is even more evident.

5. It is against this larger background of world powers with rapidly expanding points of contact that we must regard our present negotiations. The Soviet side seems prepared to accept Mt. Alto. In turn, they have assured us over a period of months that the site presently offered, which is not rectangular in shape subsequent to modifications we suggested, is best they have available. We are disposed to accept this statement as probably accurate since our own knowledge of Moscow suggests that no site in city is ideal and that no properties prospected by other embassies in market for sites are as desirable as that offered us.

6. Shortcomings of site, i.e., present location in slum-like area, low elevation of property, nearness to football stadium, must be balanced against evident intent of Soviet authorities to reconstruct this area, which is situated very near to Foreign Ministry and which is already being rehabilitated with construction of CEMA complex of buildings in modern design.

7. I am fully aware of numerous considerations which militate against unconditional acceptance of site. These particularly include problem of low elevation of site. There is also need to obtain Congressional approval of over-all desirability of exchange of sites and construction of new US Embassy.

8. Certainly we shall always face in Moscow greater problems with regard to efficiency of construction, access to materials, and availability of skilled labor than USSR will face in Washington, even if there is mutual agreement that construction in each site proceed step-by-agreed-step. Proposed site in Moscow thus can never be fully equated to site offered in Washington, where quality of urban development and of civic and technological services greatly favors Soviet construction in Washington. Decision which must be taken is therefore essentially political in character. Looking to the longer term, and despite very fundamental differences along whole range of present policies and convictions, do we wish to take step accommodating our respective missions in more suitable quarters than either now has?

9. Subject to Washington review of certain special aspects of problem, my recommendation is that we accept in principle Soviet construction on Mt. Alto site in exchange for our construction on Soviet proffered site. Our acceptance "in principle" should be conveyed in terms of whatever conditions we regard as over-riding. These would include, of course, any reservations concerning height of buildings. I think we have in this connection useful argument at hand in our requirement to house growing US official population in Moscow on limited acreage offered by site which Soviet planners themselves hope will retain park-like character. For efficient use of site, tall buildings will obviously be required.

10. I recognize that US-Soviet relations are now undergoing perhaps more than usual strain. This need not, however, deter either country from embarking on useful and desirable projects of longer term significance. In any event, I would expect some years to elapse before either project could be finally realized even if agreement in principle is reached in near future.

Thompson

243. Memorandum From Nathaniel Davis of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) and the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bator)/1/

Washington, July 21, 1967.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, USSR, Vol. XVI. Confidential.

SUBJECT
Svetlana

As I am sure you know, the Svetlana book publication date is the subject of activity on several fronts. Yuri Zhukov has been complaining about it to visiting Americans in Moscow--particularly Harrison Salisbury and Arthur Schlesinger. Schlesinger wrote letters to Harper and Row and also Leonard Marks suggesting that publication be delayed. Schlesinger sent Dan Schorr a flimsy of his letter to Leonard Marks, and Dan broadcasted an account of it over CBS this morning. This understandably infuriated Leonard Marks, but he has by now calmed down enough so I think he will write Schlesinger a temperate reply.

Salisbury has gotten the New York Times worried (I understand they are afraid the Soviets will throw out their Moscow correspondents--which is a good possibility if they start serializing the book this October). Ambassador Thompson has also been discussing the matter with Kennan by telegram (Kennan is in Oslo)./2/ Ambassador Thompson would like to see us influence Svetlana toward a brief postponement. Almost everybody in Washington (including me) think we should keep hands off. An official intervention would undoubtedly leak and there is probably enough pressure being applied as it is. It is undeniably true that the original selection of October for publication was unfortunate from the point of view of our relations with the Soviets, but there is not much the U.S. Government can usefully do about it now.

/2/See Document 240.

The Department is planning to answer press queries by sticking to our established line that this is a private matter in which we are not involved./3/

/3/In telegram 11601 to Moscow, July 22, the Department told Thompson that it continued to believe that the U.S. Government should "not intervene in any way regarding book and its publication date." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 30 USSR)

ND

244. Memorandum of Conversation Between Secretary of State Rusk and the Soviet Ambassador (Dobrynin)/1/

Washington, July 26, 1967, 6:30 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Non-Vietnam, July-September 1967. Top Secret. Drafted by Rusk. Rusk forwarded the memorandum to the President under a July 28 covering memorandum, which is marked with an L, indicating that the President saw it.

In a long and relaxed talk with Ambassador Dobrynin in my office on the evening of July 26th, with no one else present, the following principal points emerged:

1. Ambassador Dobrynin confirmed that it had been the Algerians and the Syrians who had thrown the monkey wrench into possible Arab acceptance of the compromise resolution worked out between Gromyko and Goldberg in New York./2/

/2/For documentation on U.S.-Soviet talks in New York on the Middle East during July, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, volume XIX.

2. I pressed Dobrynin as to whether he was trying to give me some message in two earlier remarks he had made about the prospective or actual inactivity of the 3-4 North Vietnamese divisions in and around the DMZ. I asked him if he had anything as to Hanoi's military policy with respect to these divisions. He said that he had no such special information and that he had been making purely personal remarks on the basis of reports reaching his Embassy in Washington.

3. I asked him once again what the Soviet Union would do about Viet-Nam if the United States stopped the bombing. I reminded him that we had asked him that question quite some time ago and had never had any reply. He asked whether there was anything which the USSR could do which would make any difference to our bombing policy. I said I could not give him any generalized statement but it might be worth their trying to find out.

4. Dobrynin stated categorically that Hanoi had informed Moscow last December that they were preparing to have talks with us in Warsaw but had informed them later that the two bombing raids in the middle of December near Hanoi made such talks impossible. I then went over the four month's cessation of bombing in the ten nautical mile circle around Hanoi and said we did not understand why if they were prepared to talk in early December they were not able to talk during that four month period.

5. We both agreed that the Glassboro talks had been worthwhile. He said that Kosygin had taken away a positive impression of the President and I said that I could say the same about the President's impression of Kosygin.

6. We had a very brisk and frank discussion of the Svetlana affair. He said it was inconceivable to the leaders in Moscow that the United States could not have refused Svetlana entry into this country, and that they therefore looked upon her admission as a deliberate attempt to embarrass the Soviet Union. I went over the case in great detail, including the difficulties we had with both the Italian and Swiss Governments and our inability to find another country willing to take Svetlana to which she herself was willing to go. I reminded him that the problem arose because of three "stupidities":

a) The permission given to Svetlana to leave the USSR;
b) The Indian refusal to permit Svetlana to remain in India unless the Soviet Ambassador approved; and
c) The Soviet Ambassador's handling of the affair in New Delhi.

I told him that if they had other sensitive personalities of that sort to please keep them at home because we don't want them.

7. We reviewed briefly the ABM situation and I reiterated our keen desire to get some serious talks started. He offered nothing new.

8. I gave him a "helpful household hint" about contacts with the Congress and staff members of Congressional committees. I told him that, since Ambassadors are accredited to the President, it was important that any contact with the legislative branch be open and not appear to be covert or on the sly. I said that it did not leave a good impression if contacts occurred at remote out of the way places as though something was being hidden. I told him this was a friendly suggestion to him personally because the President has a great regard for him. He saw the point but said that suggestions about where to have lunch or to meet invariably came from our side and that his people could not very well say "I can't accept your suggestion about where to have lunch because the State Department prefers we lunch in the Statler dining room." My guess is that his Congressional contacts do, in fact, suggest unnoticed places for meals or for conversations.

9. During his absence from Washington on vacation during August he clearly preferred that any serious contacts between us be through Ambassador Thompson in Moscow rather than through Federenko in New York.

10. I asked him what the Communist Youth publication in Moscow meant when it charged Secretary McNamara and me with being at the head of a large task force of over 200 people with a mission of anti-Soviet propaganda and of undermining their Fiftieth Anniversary Year. He had not seen the article and so I gave him a copy. He made some vague references to a feeling in Moscow that we were attempting to discredit their Fiftieth Anniversary and referred to a large number of seminars being held in American universities this year with speakers hostile to the Soviet Union. I told him that it was inevitable that universities would pay special attention to the Soviet Union on its Fiftieth Anniversary. As far as our Government is concerned, I told him that I had never heard any reference being made to the Fiftieth Anniversary Year in policy discussions of particular subjects and that Soviet leaders should not suppose that their Fiftieth Anniversary is really taken note of in the formulation of U.S. policy. We have tried, in a low key handling of the Svetlana affair for example, to ease some of the sharper edges of our relationships during their Fiftieth Anniversary Year.

DR

245. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Washington, July 27, 1967.

/1/Source: Department of State, Kohler Files: Lot 71 D 460, Dobrynin/Kohler Memoranda of Conversation. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Kohler. The memorandum is part I of IV; parts II-IV, memoranda of conversation concerning the Middle East, a possible new Law of the Sea conference, and Soviet defector Vladimer Chalyy, are ibid.

SUBJECT
Bilateral Questions Pending Between USA and USSR

PARTICIPANTS
Amb. Anatoliy Dobrynin, USSR
Deputy Under Secretary Kohler

I had lunch with the Soviet Ambassador today at his invitation and talked with him from approximately 12:30 to 2:20.

I told the Ambassador that I had made my usual check list of pending and upcoming questions between us in the hope that when he got back to Moscow he could review the status of these matters and induce some movement on the Soviet side. We then reviewed the items shown on the attached list,/2/ and at his request, I left with him a copy. In the course of the discussion, he offered nothing really new on any of these subjects but did say that he would look into them after his return to Moscow.

/2/Not printed. The list included: strategic weapons talks; non-proliferation treaty; expert talks on peaceful nuclear explosions; technical talks on venting; space treaty ratification; satellite weather exchange improvement; embassy sites; civil airline services; desalting symposia and exchanges; atomic energy exchanges; and "other exchanges" (Amerika/Soviet Life/Sputnik, cancellation of the Hurok Festival, and a new agreement for 1968-1969).

In this connection, we did have a general review of the present Soviet posture vis-á-vis the US in the light of frequent Soviet remarks that certain things were impossible because of the international situation and, particularly, Viet-Nam. He claimed that there was no really fixed policy in Moscow, but that everything was discussed by the leadership on an ad hoc basis, and decisions were frequently affected by passing emotions of the moment or by the effectiveness of "eager-beavers" in various branches of the Soviet apparatus in influencing decisions one way or another. In this connection, he commented that not only he but also Foreign Minister Gromyko had been at a loss to understand why Moscow had cancelled the Hurok Festival on one day and three days later agree that the American Circus would be permitted to come ahead.

In general, he thought the Soviet posture was that relations with the US were to be handled in "low key" so long as Viet-Nam goes on. He saw no reason to think that there would not be a new agreement on exchanges for the next bi-annual period, though he thought there might be considerable discussion as to the specific content of a new agreement./3/

/3/On July 28 Dobrynin informed Kohler that he was leaving Washington for Moscow on July 29 and that he expected to return about September 1. (Telegram 13998 to Moscow, July 28; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 17 USSR-US)

246. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, September 18, 1967.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, USSR. Secret.

SUBJECT
Port Restrictions on Soviet Ships

When this question was put to you last May (Tab A),/2/ your reaction was to hold it "for the present."

/2/Document 214.

The original idea was:

--To increase the number of American ports open to Soviet and Eastern European ships from 12 to about 50;
--To provide for board and search on a spot-check basis (instead of the present full coverage);
--To reduce advance notification from 30 days to 7.

Nick Katzenbach, Foy Kohler and others at the State Department have looked at the problem again. They have come back recommending we take only the third step--reducing advance notification to 7 days. The original 30-day requirement was a rule the State Department set up for its own convenience in processing visas and export licenses for bunker fuel. (The Coast Guard has never required more than 7 days advance notice for its search and surveillance responsibility.)

The change might result in a few more Soviet and Polish freighters calling at U.S. ports, and this might increase the chances of labor union opposition and political flak. However, easing the requirement would go a long way toward quieting the Russians and preventing retaliation (which the Russians have threatened) against our cruise-ship calls at Leningrad and Odessa. Kosygin raised the matter personally with Ambassador Thompson a few months ago.

Nick does not believe we need Congressional consultation--as it might actually stir up the issue over a minor administrative change. We would advise interested commercial shipping agents but not issue a press release. I recommend approval.

Walt

Approve/3/
Disapprove
Speak to me

/3/This option is checked. Handwritten notations at the top of the memorandum read: "Mr. N. Davis notified 9/18/67," "S/S notified," and "telegram cleared."

247. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State/1/

New York, September 28, 1967, 0600Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL US-USSR. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Rostow forwarded a copy to the President under a September 28 covering memorandum. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, UN Vol. 8)

Secto 16. Eyes Only for the President and Acting Secretary from the Secretary. In private conversation with Gromyko (two of us alone) tonight,/2/ the following matters were mentioned:

/2/September 27. Rusk was in New York for the 22nd UN General Assembly. In telegram Secto 5, September 26, he reported to the President on the opening dinner with Gromyko on September 25, during which the non-proliferation treaty, ABMs, and the Middle East were discussed. Secto 5 is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, volume XIX. Memoranda of Rusk's conversations with Gromyko on September 25, 27, and 28, concerning arms limitation, the non-proliferation treaty, the cultural exchanges agreement, outer space cooperation, and the Soviet proposal to the United Nations to define aggression, are in the Department of State, Kohler Files: Lot 71 D 460.

1. I asked Gromyko whether he had any further clarification on what he had said about our last meeting about ABM's. I told him that I was sure that the President would want me to report faithfully exactly how Gromyko saw it. Specifically, was there anything that Gromyko could say about the timing of negotiations? He replied that they have been giving the matter a great deal of thought, that they consider it is a question which needs further development, they accept our assurance of our readiness to talk about both offensive and defensive missiles, and came close to stating that they did expect to enter into serious talks with us on the subject. He said it was just not possible for him to indicate anything about timing. Putting Gromyko's remarks alongside of Dobrynin's remark on the same subject, I would gather that the Russians are formulating a position in the expectation of talks but are not yet ready to take the responsibility for setting a date and starting a process of discussion. I doubt we shall get much more from them, at least for the next several weeks.

2. I told Gromyko that I was prepared to discuss Vietnam in great detail and that he was familiar with our position. I told him that we continue to be in occasional contact with Hanoi through private channels and that we had exercised some restraint in our own operations in connection with such contacts. I did not go into detail and he did not ask me for any detail. He summarized their position in familiar terms, insisting upon a cessation of the bombing without any indication of what the results of such a cessation would be. He did not even state categorically that there would be talks. He brushed aside any thought of reciprocal military action on North Vietnam. He showed no interest in discussing the matter and it was not pursued in further detail. He did not respond as to what the Soviets would do if we stopped the bombing.

3. We then had some discussion about China. I asked him, with a light touch, if his people in Moscow thought that we were in some sort of conspiracy with Peking. He seemed somewhat amused by the question and asked me whether I thought if Moscow really believed that such was the case they would not have mentioned it to us directly. We had some discussion about elements of future common interests, based on national state interests despite ideology, as we looked to the prospect of a billion Chinese armed with nuclear weapons. He said there were such potential common interests but did not pursue the matter.

4. On the Middle East, he confirmed that the Soviet view was based on the tentative draft which we and they worked out at the end of the emergency General Assembly. He thinks there are points of interpretation on which the two of us do not see eye to eye. I told him that we had heard rumors that they were moving away from that position to the Tito proposals./3/ He said, of course, the Tito proposals were more acceptable to the Arabs and would be entirely acceptable to the Soviet Union but he understood that such proposals could not produce an answer. The principal points of interpretation to which he alluded were (1) the type of response expected from the Arabs if such a resolution were passed by the Security Council and (2) the Suez Canal. He agreed with me that the Soviets would not object to an opening of Suez to Israeli flagships but he saw no prospect that Egypt would agree. I doubt, therefore, that the Soviets will publicly support Israeli passage of Suez pending Arab agreement. Once again he left the impression that the Soviets are not so much concerned now with the Syrians and the Algerians and were prepared to work for a solution with which Nasser and the so-called moderate Arabs could live even if Syria and Algeria objected. He agreed that Algeria's distance from Israel made the Algerians rather brave. As a little bargaining pressure, he underlined twice the importance of the Middle East to US-Soviet relations, clearly inviting concessions on our side in the Arab-Soviet direction. We agreed that the state of belligerency must be removed but that the problem was to find a formula which would achieve the result without humiliating the Arabs. That will take some doing. It was left that we would be in further consultation with them about the Middle East to see if we could not clarify and tighten up the beginnings of the common approach we established in the emergency General Assembly. At no time was there any threat or bluster on his part.

/3/Information on the Tito proposals is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, volume XIX.

5. Gromyko spoke to me about reports they had heard about our building a nuclear mine field along the Turkish border. This was a subject which they raised more than a year ago with both us and Turkey and he said he had not had a very conclusive reply from either government. I told him that I did not know very much about it and that I would look into it to see if there was any more that ought to be said. He said that if these reports were true, this would have a very negative influence on our relations.

6. There was considerable discussion about Article 3 of the NPT, as well as procedures to be followed in bringing it to signature and the handling of the subject before the General Assembly. Details will be reported separately. It was agreed that Foster and Dobrynin would talk further about Article 3 after the meeting of the Ministers of EURATOM next Monday./4/

/4/October 1.

7. In the general discussion after dinner, most of the time was spent on a futile argument about procedure on the Soviet proposal for a definition of aggression.

8. In reply to my question, Gromyko indicated the Soviets would be prepared to proceed with negotiations for a new cultural agreement, possibly in December.

9. In a separate conversation with Thompson and Stoessel, Dobrynin suggested that Gromyko's indication on Monday that they might be ready to inaugurate civil air operations in October was probably a bit optimistic. He thought that Aeroflot like PanAm would not be keen to start operations in winter and that perhaps Gromyko had in mind an inaugural flight this fall with regular operations to start next spring. He said that they were having difficulty on the question of liability insurance.

I could not detect any particular change in mood although I found nothing encouraging in his attitude about Vietnam. The evening as a whole was reasonably relaxed with no polemics.

Rusk

248. National Intelligence Estimate/1/

NIE 11-7-67

Washington, September 28, 1967.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/P Files: Lot 72 D 139, USSR. Secret; Controlled Dissem. Submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence and concurred in by the U.S. Intelligence Board.

SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY

The Problem

To examine recent trends in Soviet foreign policy and their bearing on the situation within the Soviet leadership, and to estimate the course of the USSR's policies over the next year or two.

Summary

A. The Soviets have registered no really significant foreign policy success in recent years. It is true that there has been an increase of their influence in certain areas, especially in states on the USSR's southern periphery and in the Middle East, and that they have been able to make some progress in the pursuit of their aims in Western Europe. But Sino-Soviet relations have continued to deteriorate, the trend toward declining Soviet authority in the Communist world has not abated, and Soviet policy in the Third World has met with few particular triumphs and has encountered a number of setbacks.

B. The present collective leadership has survived for three years and no early return to one-man rule seems in prospect. We do believe, however, that there are persistent disagreements within high councils. Some of these involve domestic issues, such as the problem of resource allocation and of relations between the political and military leaderships, which have an important bearing on the USSR's international position. Others sometimes arise directly from questions of foreign policy, such as Soviet conduct during the 1967 crisis in the Middle East.

C. The Soviet leaders have not outgrown a dogmatic attitude that the world should conform to the Soviet image of it, but their foreign policies often reflect an understanding that there are definite limits to their ability to shape and exploit the course of international events. We believe that this ambivalence will persist for some time and will be evident in the way in which the Soviet leaders grapple, or fail to grapple, with the issues of Soviet foreign policy. Toward the US, for example, it will probably be evident in the USSR's anxiety to avoid crises which could lead to a confrontation, but, at the same time, its disinclination to seek a significant improvement of relations, its reluctance to accept extensive arms control and disarmament measures, and its probable refusal to try to bring any real pressure on Hanoi to modify its terms for a settlement in Vietnam. Elsewhere, it is likely to be evident in a prudent approach to China, ambiguous policies in the Arab States, and an active though wary campaign to expand Soviet influence in the Third World.

Discussion

1. The present period of Soviet history has assumed much of the character of a stable but uninspiring interregnum. No single figure has been able to dominate the political scene as Khrushchev once did, and the country has had to function without the kind of forceful direction of policy that such a figure can provide. The present leaders, repudiating Khrushchev's excesses of style and extremes of policy, have chosen to reign as a committee and to govern through compromise and consensus. They seem to recognize the complexity of the problems facing them and generally to appreciate the limitations placed by time and circumstance on their ability to seek new ways or to find new purposes. It is true, in any case--in contrast to the notable series of changes which occurred in the aftermath of the death of Stalin--that the main lines of Soviet doctrine and policy have remained substantially unaltered in the roughly three years since the fall of Khrushchev. And nowhere is this more apparent than in the USSR's approach to the great issues and events of world politics.

I. The Post-Khrushchev Record

2. To most of the Soviet leaders, the view from Moscow could not have seemed very good in the early fall of 1964. Khrushchev was still seeking in the main to recover from past failures--China from 1960 onwards, Berlin in 1961, Cuba in 1962--and he exhibited few signs of having in mind any very promising proposals for the future. Many of his approaches to problems must have seemed to his colleagues to be not only unorthodox but unrewarding. His determined efforts to rush toward the formal excommunication of China were actually losing ground for the USSR within the international movement. His flirtation with West Germany in the summer of 1964 was worrying his friends at home and alarming his allies in East Germany. And his apparently growing willingness to abandon Vietnam to the Chinese and the Americans smacked of a retreat which would not only violate the concept of doctrinal brotherhood but also damage the USSR's standing as a great power.

3. Khrushchev's successors set about immediately after his removal to restore convention, consistency, and momentum to Soviet foreign policy. Their first concern was to curtail the spread of disarray within the Communist world and to restore the good name of the USSR as the leading Communist power. To these ends, they called off the clamorous campaign against Peking and strongly proclaimed renewed interest in Vietnam. They surely understood that these actions might lead to some deterioration of relations with the US, but did not seem to believe that they would greatly increase the risks of confrontation. On the contrary, while probably impatient with Khrushchev's intermittent appeals for détente with the US, the new Soviet leaders also clearly disliked his impulsive and occasionally risky behavior and hoped that a more prudent course would enable them to avoid international crises directly involving both the US and the USSR. They believed that Khrushchev had been insufficiently "revolutionary" in his handling of Communist affairs but at times overly provocative in his dealings with the West, and they hoped somehow to redress the balance.

4. The early hopes of the new leadership for improved Soviet fortunes abroad have scarcely been fulfilled, and the record of Soviet foreign policy since 1964 must now be viewed in Moscow with, at best, mixed feelings. In the area of first concern, relations within the Communist world, there has been considerable improvement in the USSR's relative status vis-á-vis China. This has come about partly because of Moscow's insistence on unified Communist support of Hanoi, a policy which has contributed to the willingness of several Asian parties to move away from Peking. But the improvement in the Soviet position has been the consequence mainly of China's own conduct rather than because of any appreciable increase in the USSR's international standing. Sino-Soviet relations have, in fact, continued to deteriorate and the problem remains a serious one for the Soviet leaders. Moreover, the commitment to support North Vietnam involved a miscalculation, i.e., the Soviet leaders' expectation of an early Communist victory in the South and their failure to foresee direct and massive US involvement in the war. And though, as seen from Moscow, the war in Vietnam has had its advantages, particularly in terms of what the Soviets perceive to be the increasing isolation of the US, it has had its adverse effects as well. Chances of future difficulties and dangers, especially vis-á-vis the US, almost certainly appear to the Soviets to be growing./2/

/2/For a fuller discussion of Soviet policies concerning Vietnam, see SNIE 11-11-67, "Soviet Attitudes and Intentions Toward the Vietnam War," dated 4 May 1967, Secret. [Footnote in the source text; see Document 213.]

5. Elsewhere in the Communist world, the trend toward declining Soviet authority, already well underway in Khrushchev's time, has not been arrested. There have been conspicuous absences from Soviet-sponsored international Communist conferences, and enthusiasm in other parties for Moscow's handling of its Middle Eastern policies has been noticeably subdued. Rumania's demonstrations of independence have continued, major examples being its diplomatic recognition of West Germany and its deviant policy toward Israel. And the USSR's problems with Castro's Cuba--particularly concerning the proper "revolutionary" policy to follow in Latin America--persist and have become more open.

6. Soviet policy in the Third World can claim few particular triumphs in the post-Khrushchev period. The campaign to normalize relations and lay the basis for expanded influence in neighboring states has made some progress, especially in Iran and Turkey; efforts to bolster the USSR's international prestige were well served by Moscow's success in arranging a cease-fire between India and Pakistan in 1965. But the Soviets have also suffered a number of serious setbacks in the Third World, as in Ghana and Indonesia. Moreover, while it had once appeared that the present Soviet leaders were approaching their Third World problems with greater caution and selectivity than Khrushchev, their judgment was called into question by the role they played in the Middle East crisis of 1967. Moscow apparently could not resist the opportunity to manipulate Arab-Israeli tensions, but the war which followed, and the defeat of the Arab forces in that war, were developments which the USSR did not desire, initially did not foresee, and, later, could not forestall.

7. It is in Western Europe that current policies have appeared most promising. The Soviet leaders have come to appreciate the grave risks involved in Soviet threats and demonstrations of power--as in Berlin--and to comprehend that such tactics only serve to consolidate the Western alliance and the American presence in Europe. Their aims have remained the same--to isolate West Germany, disrupt NATO, and sever the close ties between Europe and the US--but they have in recent years generally refrained from bellicose behavior. They have sought instead to exercise influence through more active participation in conventional European politics and diplomacy, through the cultivation of de Gaulle and France, and, in general, through emphasis on the desirability of an all-European détente and security system. And largely because these tactics have coincided with a changing climate of European opinion, there has been, in fact, a rising interest in Western Europe in some form of settlement with the USSR.

8. Soviet emphasis on détente in Europe has not been accompanied by any comparable emphasis on a resolution of differences with the US. On the contrary, Soviet leaders have publicly asserted that no such resolution is even conceivable so long as the US is involved in the war in Vietnam. But they have also indicated (and, during the Middle East crisis, demonstrated) a strong desire to keep the lines open to Washington. And though they have at times insisted that US-Soviet relations must remain frozen for the duration they have been willing to conclude specific agreements (e.g., on the peaceful uses of outer space) and to negotiate about others (e.g., nuclear nonproliferation) when they saw larger advantage to Soviet policy. Thus, if Khrushchev demonstrated his ambivalence toward the US by sometimes speaking as a friend while more often behaving like an enemy, the present leaders have perhaps demonstrated a similar state of mind by tending in some ways to do the opposite. In any case, it is clear that the leadership has been unable to resolve the contradictory demands of a policy which seeks, on the one hand, gains against the US in Europe and Southeast Asia and elsewhere and, on the other, a tacit understanding with the US to avoid measures and countermeasures which would seriously risk major international crisis.

II. Foreign Policy and the Leadership

9. It has never been possible to assess the precise impact of Soviet foreign policy on the course of internal Soviet politics, or vice versa; the intertwining of domestic and international policy questions with purely internal political concerns is too intricate. Individual leaders seize on particular policy issues as a pretext to embarrass or defeat political rivals, and questions of policy often become only incidental to the struggle for power. It is also obvious that some of the top Soviet leaders become identified with a point of view and a set of policies and that their political fortunes can rise or fall partly on the basis of the success or failure of these policies. Certainly among the circumstances responsible for Khrushchev's downfall were the failure in 1962 of his boldest foreign initiative, the Cuban missile venture, and the apparent failure in 1963 of his greatest domestic program, the campaign to raise agricultural production.

10. The collective leadership has survived longer than many observers anticipated. It has done so in part, perhaps, because it works; the leadership has for the most part been stable and its policies, though mostly undramatic, have generally achieved some measure of success. It has also done so because none of the leaders has as yet displayed the power, fortitude, or even the desire to upset existing arrangements. It has almost certainly not done so, however, because of any dearth of controversy within high councils. On the contrary, there appear to be at least four or five major areas of debate and discontent within the leadership, some of which involve, either directly or indirectly, major questions of foreign policy.

11. Economic questions, many of which have an important bearing on the USSR's posture abroad, have been the subject of disputes within the Soviet elite for some time. Indeed, such questions as how much emphasis to attach the one or another economic program, and how best to proceed with the allocation of investment priorities, were central to much of the debate and rancor which surrounded Khrushchev. In order to advance his favorite domestic programs, especially in agriculture, Khrushchev was willing at one point to risk considerable controversy by seeking to cut back investment in defense and, as a corollary of this, to ease relations with the US. Khrushchev's successors are much less willing to provoke controversy, more prone to bureaucratic compromise, and less inclined to search for quick and dramatic solutions to complex problems. Nevertheless, they too are plagued by disagreements over how best to divide the nation's material resources. Thus, they have not as yet been able to agree on the final version of the Five-Year Plan for 1966-1970, and they have continued to dodge a number of painful decisions simply by assigning high priorities to a broad variety of competing goals, including defense, heavy industry, agriculture, and the consumer./3/

/3/For a more extensive treatment of economic issues and of Soviet economic policies generally see NIE 11-5-67, "Soviet Economic Problems and Prospects," dated 25 May 1967, Secret. [Footnote in the source text. NIE 11-5-67 is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, National Intelligence Estimates, 11-67.]

12. Relations between the Soviet military establishment and the political leadership appear to have been relatively harmonious in recent years, largely because the politicians have been responsive to the opinions and budgetary claims of the military. But the scope of military authority in managing the armed forces and the role of professional military opinion in framing policy are questions which remain sources of potential discord. There have been occasional signs that the resource allocation issue remains a focal point of tension. The current question of the nature and extent of future Soviet antiballistic missile (ABM) deployment, and whether to discuss this and other arms control issues with the US, seems to have led to apprehension within the military and perhaps some dissension within the leadership as well./4/

/4/For a fuller account of political-military relations in the USSR, see NIE 11-4-67, "Main Trends in Soviet Military Policy," dated 20 July 1967, pp. 13-14, Secret. [Footnote in the source text.]

13. Concerning specific questions of foreign policy, disagreement within the leadership probably tends in the main to focus on particular issues and events as they arise. The leadership's handling of the Middle East crisis, for example, was severely criticized during the June meeting of the party Central Committee. We do not know whether the critic, Nikolai Yegorychev, who subsequently was dismissed from his important party position, had charged the senior leadership with failing adequately to support the Arabs, or conversely, had complained that the USSR had been overextended and overcommitted to the Arab side. Rumors in Moscow at the time suggested the former, perhaps because Yegorychev has long been identified with a group in the party which seems in general to have favored a harder line both at home and abroad.

14. We believe that in Soviet politics there are, in fact, those who normally respond to issues as traditionalists, i.e., with ideological rigor and bureaucratic conservatism, and others who are willing to stretch doctrine and entertain certain unorthodox departures in policy. But we do not think that all Soviet leaders can be placed in one or the other category or that such a division reflects so simple a matter as a split between militants and moderates.

15. Discontent with Soviet actions during the Arab-Israeli war may indeed have been strongest among the traditionalists, some of whom apparently fear that a US-imperialist tide is sweeping over the earth and that--as in the Middle East--Soviet policies and Soviet power have been inadequate to check or reverse its spread. But the principal architects of Soviet policies--the dominant senior group in the Politburo, i.e., Brezhnev, Kosygin, Podgorny, and Suslov--could by no means be lumped together simply as antitraditionalists. Though these four men apparently were united in their determination to avoid Soviet embroilment in the Arab-Israeli war, disagreements among them on other issues are probably not uncommon. None of these men, however, appears to be an extremist and they all seem to be near the middle of the Soviet political spectrum.

16. Probably in part because of this, the present Soviet leadership has so far managed to avoid the kind of intense debate over policy issues and maneuvering for political advantage which leads to irreconcilable factionalism and wholesale political purge. But the recent reduction of status of Politburo member Aleksandr Shelepin and some of his closest followers testified to the continued existence of political tension at top levels. And if the economy should once again falter, or if the present leadership should encounter serious reverses abroad, the chances would increase of intensified quarrels which could bring changes at the top.

III. Current Issues of Policy

17. Like Khrushchev and Stalin before them, the present leaders would like to see Soviet power and ideology become dominant on a world scale. This, at any rate, is a goal which the Soviets continue implicitly to maintain and an achievement which they no doubt continue to promise themselves. As a real prospect, however, the notion of a worldwide Soviet triumph has long since lost much of its substance and virtually all its immediacy. Too many things have happened in recent years--too much trouble with the economy, too many rows with the Chinese and within the international movement, and too few gains against the West--to permit any responsible Soviet leader to view the future with the kind of simplistic optimism once expressed by Khrushchev.

18. But if the Soviets now understand that there are definite limits to their ability to shape and exploit the course of events abroad, they have not as yet shown signs of accepting this appreciation gracefully. They sometimes seem most reluctant to match their ambitions to their means; old habits and old doctrines apparently die hard in the USSR, as elsewhere. Consequently, Soviet foreign policies now seem to reflect both a new sophistication (a more realistic and flexible awareness of national interests) and an old simplicity (the dogmatic insistence that the world conform to the Soviet image of it). We expect, in general, that this ambivalence will persist for some time and will continue to be evident in the way in which the Soviet leaders grapple--or fail to grapple--with the international issues certain to confront them.

19. Military Policy. The Soviet leaders have always conceived of military power as an essential element of their foreign policy and, since World War II, have viewed the balance of forces with the US as a factor of major influence on the course of world politics. But the present leaders, while no less concerned with the USSR's military posture than their predecessors, apparently now recognize that the impressive buildup of Soviet strategic strength will not necessarily bring gains in foreign policy. They may already have decided that, however essential to national security, the achievement of a rough strategic parity with the US is unlikely in itself to bring them appreciably closer to the fulfillment of their international objectives, and that, especially for their purposes in the Third World, greater attention will have to be paid to the development of ground and naval forces./5/ Soviet military leaders have been displaying growing interest in broadening the range of Soviet military capabilities, and the leadership as a whole evidently has become increasingly concerned with the problems and how best to meet contingencies short of general war./6/

/5/Brig. Gen. P. D. Wynne, Jr., for the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, believes this paragraph seriously underestimates the positive relationship between growing Soviet strategic capabilities and the foreign policy of the USSR, and implies a lack of Soviet appreciation for the significance in international affairs of a markedly improved Soviet strategic posture. He would, therefore, delete the second and third sentences and substitute the following:

"The present leaders, no less sensitive than their predecessors to the relationship between the USSR's military posture and their freedom of action in dealing with the West, apparently recognize that a continuing buildup of Soviet strategic strength will support foreign policy objectives. They may already have decided that achievement of a credible counterforce, damage-limiting capability against the US would be worth the effort in view of the strong backup this would provide for more aggressive pursuit of objectives in other areas of the world utilizing specialized ground, naval, and tactical air force elements." [Footnote in the source text.]

/6/See NIE 11-4-67, "Main Trends in Soviet Military Policy," dated 20 July, pp. 3, 20-21, Secret. [Footnote in the source text; see Document 241.]

20. Arms Control. The USSR does not view arms control as a problem of great urgency. It does see, however, some political profit in disarmament negotiations and in US-Soviet agreement on certain limited forms of control, such as a nuclear nonproliferation treaty. Concerning measures which might prove to be politically disadvantageous, the Soviets are likely simply to stall or reject. Thus, for example, proposals to restrain the world arms trade are not likely to appeal to the Soviets since such trade and aid is clearly regarded in Moscow as the USSR's primary political tool in the Third World. And concerning measures of greater scope, such as the control of strategic weapons, the Soviets are likely to proceed with great caution, suspicion, and reluctance. It is possible that they might decide to negotiate about such matters (including the AMB question), but for the present we think the chances are slight that they would be willing to agree to any comprehensive program of strategic arms control.

21. Vietnam. A prime concern of the Soviet leaders about their involvement in the war in Vietnam is simply that they might become embroiled in situations which they could not control. Neither the US nor North Vietnam, the principal actors in the conflict, is very susceptible to Soviet influence; either of them could behave independently in a way which could test the USSR's resolve, strain its resources, and risk its direct involvement. But, if uncomfortable about the degree of their commitment to an ally which has a strong and difficult will of its own and which pursues a cause (control of the South) which is not of vital concern to the USSR, the Soviets nonetheless see no acceptable alternatives to their present policies. Almost certainly, they hope Hanoi or Washington, or both, will some day make a political solution to the war possible. In the meantime, they will seek to persuade the US not to escalate the conflict any further and to agree to terms for a settlement which would be acceptable to North Vietnam. But they will probably not try to bring any real pressure on Hanoi to modify its terms for such a settlement; they are not anxious to present themselves in the role of an "appeaser"--in this way jeopardizing whatever influence they have been able to build up--and they are certainly aware that such pressure would probably be ineffective in present circumstances.

22. China. The USSR's delight at the way China was able to dissipate its resources in the Communist world by behaving bizarrely at home seems to have been succeeded by concern over China's rabid hostility, bewilderment over the course of events inside China, and apprehension over what might happen next. Over the last few years, the Soviets have strengthened their armed forces along the Sino-Soviet frontier and in Mongolia and--though probably anticipating only border skirmishing--are probably preparing for more serious contingencies. But we do not know whether the Soviets have plans for direct intervention in China in the event of anarchy or civil war. We believe that the present Soviet leaders, who have been relatively restrained in their approach to the Chinese problem to date and who have been fairly prudent in their handling of world affairs generally, would seek to avoid direct involvement.

23. Europe. The Soviet leaders appear to be convinced that their generally conciliatory approach to Western Europe is a promising one and seem to recognize that they would have much to lose and little to gain by reverting to a harsher policy. They will probably continue for some time their present line of trying to persuade the West Europeans that the US is beginning to disengage from Europe and that détente with a benevolent Soviet Union is an ever growing possibility. While a formal multilateral conference on European security is not likely in the near future, an increase of bilateral contacts and negotiations between West European countries and the USSR seems probable. The Soviets will almost certainly continue publicly to treat West Germany as a pariah, but will privately seek to explore the possibility of movement in Bonn toward acceptance of the status quo in Germany.

24. The USSR's efforts to convince the Eastern European States to follow a uniform Soviet-devised foreign policy have encountered resistance in recent years, and the Soviets have had to tailor some of their own policies to meet the needs of relations between Warsaw Pact States. Soviet tactics in negotiations with the West on such issues as nonproliferation occasionally show evidence of delays imposed by consultations and frictions within the Pact. At the same time, the Soviets have scored some successes, most notably in slowing down the movement in Eastern Europe toward broader and freer contacts with West Germany and other West European States. In addition, as a result of the crisis in the Middle East, they have been able to establish unusually close rapport with Yugoslavia concerning policies toward the Arab World. But gains such as these may prove to be transitory; there appears to be little that Moscow can do to prevent the East Europeans from behaving in increasingly independent ways when their national interests so dictate. Rumania--which has already formally recognized West Germany and which publicly refused to align itself with the USSR vis-á-vis the Arab-Israeli war--is by now the classic case in point.

25. The Middle East. In the wake of the Arab-Israeli conflict, Moscow appears to be taking stock of its policies in this area. The decisions taken at once to start some replacement of military equipment were probably provisional, intended primarily as a political holding action and not as an encouragement to continued Arab militancy. But the Soviets must recognize that, if they wish to enlarge their influence in the area, an aim they are very unlikely to abandon, they have no alternative to continuing to work with the radical Arabs. Probably as they move to repair this relationship, they will try hard to gain more direct influence over client governments and military establishments. But it is still unlikely that they will wish to do this by entering into actual military alliances or acquiring military bases in Arab countries. The ambiguities in Soviet-Arab relations will remain. Moscow will continue to exploit anti-Western attitudes in Arab countries, but it will not run the military risks or accept the political costs of identifying itself with Arab aspirations to destroy Israel. It follows also, however, that--barring a major change in Arab attitudes--the Soviets will not give very much help to diplomatic efforts to move toward a basic settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict./7/

/7/A long-range view of Soviet policies and aims is contained in NIE 11-6-67, "Soviet Strategy and Intentions in the Mediterranean Basin," dated 1 June 1967, Secret. Although completed before the June 1967 hostilities, the main judgments in this paper remain valid. See also SNIE 11-13-67, "Probable Soviet Objectives in Rearming the Arabs," dated 20 July 1967, Secret. [Footnote in the source text. NIE 11-6-67 and SNIE 11-13-67 are in the Johnson Library, National Security File, National Intelligence Estimates, 11-67.]

26. The Third World. Partly as a result of their recent experiences in the Middle East, the Soviet leaders may have undertaken a new and more searching look at their policies in the Third World. Indeed, there may be considerable discontent with the commitment of Soviet resources and prestige to clients whose interest may be essentially different from those of the USSR and whose conduct can be both unpredictable and uncontrollable. Some may argue that more caution should be exercised in involving Soviet policy with the great variety of so-called "national liberation" forces in the Third World. The question has probably arisen as to what degree of risk--military and political--to assume in honoring Soviet commitments, or what Soviet clients may think are commitments. But, even if such questions are under review, it seems very unlikely to us that the Soviet leaders would as a consequence make any very dramatic changes in policy. Any abrupt cutback in the USSR's material support of and political relationships with the Third World would jeopardize the heavy investment already made. Moreover, the Soviet leaders are almost certainly convinced that, as a great power, the USSR has a legitimate interest in practically all areas of the world and a political need to assert that interest.

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