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Foreign Relations of the United States 1964-1968, Volume XIV, Soviet Union -Return to This Volume Home Page Released by the Office of the Historian The Glassboro Summit, June 1967
229. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Glassboro, New Jersey, June 23, 1967, 11:30
a.m.-1:30 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File,
Country File, Addendum, USSR, Glassboro Memcons. Top Secret; Nodis.
Drafted by Krimer. The time of the meeting is from the President's Daily
Diary. (Ibid.) The memorandum cites the time of the meeting as 11:15 a.m.
to 1:30 p.m. Copies of the memoranda of the Johnson-Kosygin conversations
at Glassboro are also at the National Archives and Records Administration,
RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 7 US. PARTICIPANTS US USSR To Chairman Kosygin's apologies for having caused
the President some difficulty in selecting a place for the meeting, the
President replied that he was not concerned with minor items; he was happy
to welcome the Chairman to this country and particularly to this meeting,
and he was hopeful that they would get to know each other and understand
each other better. Chairman Kosygin said that there was a great deal
of clarification needed in order to understand each other's actions,
particularly during the recent period of time. The direction that US
policy was taking was not clear to him and to his colleagues in the
Government of the USSR. Therefore, he proposed to take advantage of this
meeting in order to better understand us and to be better understood by
us. He did not expect to reach all-encompassing global solutions here, but
if the President and he could at least reach agreement on some problems,
that would be of mutual advantage and would contribute to a better
understanding. The President replied that he quite agreed with
Mr. Kosygin's view of the purpose of the present meeting and remarked that
perhaps we were poor communicators. He knew that sometimes this was the
case between himself and our own people and that perhaps a better job of
communicating was required between him and the Chairman. He knew very well
that the major question with which he and the Chairman would have to deal
was whether or not they agreed on the kind of world that we would like to
live in, and also whether we could use the great strength and the vast
resources of the two countries to contribute to the goal of creating such
a world. The President believed that the American people want to live in
peace and harmony with the Russian people, in agreement and as friends
with them. He knew that he wanted to cooperate with the Chairman and the
leaders of his country and with the people of the Soviet Union to help
bring about peace in the world so as to prevent the holocaust that could
come about otherwise. Inquiring of the Chairman as to the size of his
family, and learning that there were just two children, i.e., Mr. Kosygin
and his sister, the President remarked that he was one of five children in
his family. It often happened that the oldest brother, himself, and the
oldest sister had to take special pains in order to avoid disputes and
differences between them so as to set a good example for the other
children in the family. Frequently, the oldest brother has to provide
guidance to the rest of the children. While he did not want to appear to
be paternalistic towards the Chairman's country, and its leaders, he
thought that if we could work more closely together, the two countries
could ultimately develop and multiply their resources so as to help their
peoples to a better life. The President thought that Ambassador Thompson
was an excellent communicator, particularly because of his great
friendship with the Russian people. He wanted the Chairman to know that
the Ambassador was fully authorized to speak for the President and on his
behalf. The President said that he also had a great deal of respect for
Ambassador Dobrynin whose representation of the USSR in this country was
of a very high quality indeed. For all the above reasons, the President
thought that if we could build upon the fact that while we have difficult
problems, we did have the same goals, this would be a useful and
constructive attitude to take for the leadership of both countries. In 3
or 4 instances, we had already made a good beginning. The President hoped
that his grandson would not have to experience a Pearl Harbor or a Siege
of Leningrad or any other kind of war-connected calamity. He was sure that
Chairman Kosygin felt the same way and thought it necessary to move
further in that direction. Chairman Kosygin said that whenever we discussed
any problem on a global scale, it seemed to him that there was complete
agreement between the President's view and his own. But he had to
emphasize here that this was true of this overall global aspect only. We
have the same goals, neither country wanted war, and everything else that
the President had said he could endorse. However, it seemed to him that
when we began to discuss specific problems and practical steps for their
solution, then a great many difficulties and differences arose. As
concerns Ambassador Thompson and Dobrynin, he quite agreed that they did
an outstanding job in representing their countries and he also wanted the
President to know that Ambassador Dobrynin kept in very close touch with
the situation in the United States and transmitted very careful reports to
his Government. He believed that Ambassador Dobrynin had a thorough
understanding of the situation in the United States and that his reports
were objective and correct. The Ambassador had not in any instance
attempted to inform his Government in any way calculated to disturb
relations between the two countries. Inasmuch as the President had inquired about the
Chairman's family, Mr. Kosygin wanted to enlarge on this question and said
that his mother had died when he was only 2 years old and that his father,
who had never remarried, had brought him up with the help of his
grandfather and other relatives. Mr. Kosygin came from Leningrad as did
his ancestors and they had all been workers, his father, grandfather, and
great-grandfather before him. He himself had also been a factory worker
and since the President had mentioned Leningrad, he wanted him to know
that he had spent the entire siege during World War II in Leningrad as a
representative of the Soviet Union's defense, later as the chairman of the
Leningrad Soviet. He had a very clear understanding therefore as to the
true meaning of war; he had experienced two world wars personally. He also
knew that the President had fought in World War II and had a good
understanding of what war was really like. Personally, he believed it was
not just the two of them but all the nations and all peoples who had a
good knowledge of the horrors of war and everything they implied. For this
reason, everyone would say that he and the President had to do all in
their power to maintain and strengthen peace in the world. He regarded
this not only as their greatest duty but also as a deep personal moral
obligation. Taking the Middle East situation for example, just as soon as
the fighting had begun, he and the President had communicated with each
other on the Hot Line and while, of course, they had not accomplished
everything to settle the issue, perhaps in some way this direct
communication had been useful. He wanted to tell the President very
frankly and clearly that he and his Government were dismayed by the fact
that the President had taken a certain position with which they had
agreed, but then a few hours later had changed it radically. This had
caused a great deal of worry and concern for him and his colleagues in the
Soviet Government and had indeed alarmed them. He was speaking very
frankly and sincerely; he did not know whether he would have another
chance to meet with the President and therefore wanted to take advantage
of this meeting for a frank and outspoken exchange. If the President
wanted him to be specific, he would be glad to explain what he meant
subsequently. But first, he wanted to say that just before leaving Moscow,
his Party and his Government had asked him to assure the President that
they all very much wanted this period of their lives to be devoted to
peaceful purposes and the future to better relations with the United
States. He, his Party and his Government, were totally
opposed to war. But if a war should be forced upon them, then the
Communist Party and the Government and people of the Soviet Union would
know how to fight and would know how to defend their people; this was not,
however, what they wanted. They wanted to do everything in their power to
develop peaceful and amicable relations with all the countries of the
world. History had entrusted him and the President with great
responsibility in this respect. Not everything in this world could be
measured in rubles or dollars; there were many other overriding humane
considerations which had to guide their work in the direction of
developing peace in the world and providing their peoples with a better
standard of living. To this they devoted all their activities and efforts
and he was sure that on this basis fruitful cooperation between the two
countries could be established. As he saw it, the path to this goal
consisted above all in trust for each other. If the situation could be
attained where Americans could trust the Soviet people and the Soviet
people could trust Americans, then he felt many questions facing us would
lend themselves to a comparatively easy solution. He would like to attain
such a situation, but to do so a great many steps in that direction were
required. The President said that he shared the Chairman's
views; he knew they had been stated sincerely and believed that the Soviet
people and the American people could easily agree on that kind of a
platform. He recognized the wisdom and desirability of the exchange of
views initiated by the Chairman on the Hot Line, he welcomed this
initiative, and wanted to state emphatically that he was unaware of any
change in the American position mentioned by the Chairman. We had brought
our influence to bear in the interests of preserving the peace; we had
asked for restraint and had urged Israel to agree not to abandon it. We
had not known of any plans for military actions until they had begun and
he was certain that the Chairman had not known and had not been consulted
on the act of closing the Straits before it had been taken. This
illustrated the great responsibilities of the two powers; the other
countries were a part of the family but it was up to the older brothers to
provide proper guidance./2/ As a result of the Chairman's
communications, we had gotten busy and it was perhaps a result of the
initiative displayed by the Chairman that we had managed to alleviate the
situation, even if only temporarily. The big question was really this: if
we could achieve some measure of success after the fighting had already
started, why could we not have done so before the start of hostilities? We
appreciated what the Chairman had done in this respect. /2/See
footnote 1, Document 219. Mr. Kosygin fully concurred with the President's
view. Once we had acted together, we had achieved some measure of success
in bringing about a cease-fire between Israel and the Arab countries; this
was good and he was very grateful. However, when he had seen before the
fighting had started that a military conflict was about to break out, he
and his Government had contacted the Arab countries with a view to
discourage them from starting a war and evidently they had been successful
in accomplishing this. It appeared to him that the United States had not
been successful in influencing Israel in the same direction. The President remarked that he did not think
either of the two big powers had been successful in this respect since it
was the Arabs who had taken the first act of closing the Straits. Mr. Kosygin was quite emphatic in feeling that the
Arabs had heeded his advice. The President repeated his statement concerning
the Straits and asserted that both great powers had succeeded in helping
to bring about the cease-fire and to allow tempers to cool. He was
concerned, however, over the fact that this had not been accomplished
before the outbreak of shooting. He did not believe that the Soviet Union
had wanted the UAR to close the Straits of Tiran or that it had wanted to
see the Arab countries undertake military movements on Israel's border and
publicly make many statements of their intention to liquidate Israel. He
had said to the Foreign Ministers that he would like to see this discussed
in the United Nations in the hope that neither side would undertake steps
which later both might regret. Perhaps the very fact that all of these
countries had at their disposal weapons, some provided by the Soviet Union
and some by the U.S., had permitted them to become that reckless. The
President hoped that his proposal for full disclosure of arms shipments to
the Mid-Eastern countries in addition to an agreement not to furnish arms
to them would in the future result in restraint being exercised by both
sides. He hoped that we could agree on such steps with Chairman Kosygin.
At this point, the President told Mr. Kosygin an anecdote about the
English writer Charles Lamb. Once, when he had laid aside a book he had
been reading, in obvious displeasure and had said to his sister that he
did not like the author, his sister asked him if he knew the author. To
this Lamb replied that he did not, that if he had known him he would have
liked him. The President expressed his view that he thought a similar
principle applied to Mr. Kosygin and himself, that in getting to know each
other better, they were also getting to like each other. Mr. Kosygin replied with respect to disclosure of
arms shipments and refusal to ship arms to the Middle East that quite
frankly he did not think this approach to be realistic at the current
stage. However, he wanted to return to the previous question concerning
the Hot Line communications. As he and his Government had understood the
first exchange, the positions of the two countries calling for a
cease-fire and a return to the original armistice lines had been as one.
But then, four hours later, as the military situation had changed, the
President had also changed his view. The President replied that we had not changed our
view; that we still adhere to the same principle of preserving the
territorial integrity of all countries. This was the policy of our
Government and we have stated it to Israel and to other countries just as
we are stating it right now with respect to Viet-Nam. We believe in the
territorial integrity of all countries and we want everybody to abide by
it. He was not aware of any change in the position of the United States
not only on this occasion but also on all past and present matters.
Certainly, there was no such change of view involved in the exchanges on
the Hot Line. He said that he knew that if we could accomplish what he
believed we had helped to accomplish before hostilities started, this
would have been useful, Nasser would not have closed the Gulf of Aqaba and
there would have been no destruction as a result of Israeli Air Force
action. If no nation had supplied arms to the Middle Eastern countries,
none of these war-like acts would have been taken. The President hoped
that if we could reach agreement between ourselves with respect to the
great problems facing us, we would be responding to what was expected of
us by our people. This is why we wanted to explore the questions of
restraint in developing anti-ballistic missiles systems and
inter-continental ballistic systems with the government of the Soviet
Union, so as to be able to devote the 40 or 50 billion dollars an ABM
system would cost to the peaceful development of our country. The
President was sure that neither people wanted to use these weapons against
the other and therefore believed that if we could manage to reach that
kind of agreement it would be very helpful to both countries. We did want
to live in peace-the question was how? He thought that an understanding
not to furnish arms to either side in the Middle East, an agreement
concerning the ABM systems, a solution of the problems in South Viet-Nam
and a cessation of hostilities with North Viet-Nam, that all of these
constitute a reply to the above question of how to live in peace. In 1948 both the Soviet Union and the United
States had agreed that Israel was entitled to a national life of its own
and this had a bearing on a solution to the Mid-East problem. The
President did not think either side had worked hard enough to reach
agreement on these questions. He wanted to suggest these measures to the
Chairman, measures for arms control, ABM control, Viet-Nam, Middle East,
and some steps for a solution to certain problems of mutual interest in
Europe. He would be glad to hear the Chairman's view concerning them. Our
peoples were asking us to find solutions and he thought that if Mr.
Kosygin and he could understand each other and like each other on the
principle illustrated by the Lamb anecdote, progress could be made.
Neither of our peoples wanted to cause harm to the other. Therefore,
perhaps extended discussions of all these problems could accomplish some
progress in the direction of finding solutions. Our people want us to have
confidence and trust in each other and perhaps the action decided upon
here in this little farm house could represent first steps in this
direction. The President would rather leave that kind of a monument of his
work than any other and he was sure that this was also true of the
Chairman. Mr. Kosygin assured the President that he took the
same view but as the President probably knew this was not such a simple
matter. He wanted to return to the first question concerning the situation
in the Middle East. What was it that could be undertaken now with respect
to the Middle East on which the two countries could agree? First of all,
he wanted to emphasize the Soviet Union had no commercial interest in the
Middle East, that it was not deriving any economic benefits from the
resources of the Middle East such as oil (the Soviet Union had ample oil
resources of its own); all that the Soviet Union was doing was investing
in development projects in Mid-Eastern countries, exemplified best of all
by the Aswan Dam. Presently an agreement was being worked out to build a
similar dam on the Euphrates River. None of these were military projects.
He did not know whether the President had ever visited the Middle East; if
he had, he surely would be appalled at the great poverty of its people-and
all this while there were enormous sources of energy available. The Soviet
Union could not be accused, as perhaps Great Britain could be, of
self-serving commercial interests in that area. The Soviet Union was only
investing there to raise the standard of living of other countries and
would wish to see the United States do the same; the USSR was not as rich
a country as the United States and yet it was doing all in its power to
help the impoverished people of the Middle East. Now, to turn to the
question of what could be done to solve the problems of the Middle East,
Mr. Kosygin drew a sketch of the Suez Canal indicating Israeli forces
occupying the eastern bank and Egyptian forces, regrouping after the
initial shock, on the western bank. He said that renewed hostilities along
the Suez, which was now the front line, would be inevitable unless the two
warring military forces could be separated. It was not reasonable to
expect the Arabs to withdraw any further; therefore, it was clear that
Israel would have to withdraw its forces back to the original armistice
line. If this were not done, hostilities were certain to break out again;
the Arabs were an explosive people and no other solution to this problem
was possible. The President asked Mr. Kosygin to consider the
record of the past three years of his Presidency. During that period of
time, we have not concluded any new military alliances with other
countries. We have concluded a cultural exchange agreement with the Soviet
Union, although its implementation had been hampered to some extent by the
rejection of Mary Martin's show "Hello Dolly" on the part of the USSR
following initial acceptance. We had concluded a civil air agreement, we
had concluded and ratified a consular agreement and we had concluded an
agreement on the peaceful exploration of outer space. The President hoped
that today we could agree that a non-proliferation agreement be actually
tabled before the other countries concerned become disgusted with the
endless delays which have occurred. Further, the President hoped that Mr.
Kosygin could assure him that Ambassador Thompson would get to talk to his
representatives concerning control of the ABM race. He hoped we could
announce that such talks would take place. Three months ago the Chairman
had informed him that he was prepared to undertake such discussions, yet
nothing further had happened. Thus we could point to four finished and
completed measures undertaken by the two countries during the past three
years, none of which were war-like or had any military connotations. We
should agree now to table a non-proliferation agreement and we should be
able to tell our people today that we would undertake discussions
concerning the ABM systems; even if we disagreed on many aspects of this
problem, the discussions in themselves would prove to be a step in the
right direction. Regarding arrangements to control the Middle East
situation, the President would like to have Mr. Kosygin's views regarding
the five points he had proposed, national life, territorial integrity,
etc. Perhaps agreement could be reached on some of these and perhaps Mr.
Kosygin might have some proposals which the President could agree to. The
President emphasized that he did not doubt that Mr. Kosygin wanted the
same thing as he, and he knew what he wanted. The President did not like
to see one-half of our budget devoted to military expenditures. Soon after
he had become President, he had addressed a letter to the then-Chairman
Khrushchev in which he had proposed that the military budgets of both
countries be reduced. This was before the Viet-Nam conflict, before the
aggression of North Viet-Nam against South Viet-Nam. This, however, was
another subject to be explored; right now the President felt we had the
opportunity to take effective steps in the interests of world peace as
outlined above. Mr. Kosygin repeated that on the whole, on a
global scale, he agreed with the President but that he was disturbed when
it came to discussion of specific points and proposed measures. Mr.
Kosygin repeated his view of the Suez Canal situation. He continued that
mankind would not forgive him nor the President for wasting one-half of
the resources of the two countries on military expenditures. Weapons were
built, became obsolete and were discarded. Yet, in his view, it was the
United States that was being carried away by the military situation, as if
driven to it by some force. The military budget was being increased
constantly and this forced the Soviet Union to keep up and increase its
own military budget. Once we had told you two years ago that we proposed
reduction of military expenditures by mutual example. The Soviet Union had
followed through; yet because of the Viet-Nam situation, or Korea, or some
other reason, the United States had increased its budget and forced a
reversal of Soviet policy. This has become a race. The United States
increased its military budget and then the Soviet Union had to follow suit
although it was the United States which was always ahead, with the Soviet
Union merely following its lead. As concerns the President's view on the
ABM system, it was not anti-ballistic missiles that were the root and the
cause of trouble and tension in the world. To a much greater extent this
was due to the development beyond reason of offensive weapons systems. The President told Mr. Kosygin that he was under
pressure on the part of many people in this country to adopt the decision
of spending some $40 billion for the development of an anti-ballistic
missile system. He had not taken a decision as yet and did not want to
take it without at least first having had a chance to explore all
possibilities of avoiding such a race with the Soviet Union. He had
brought Secretary McNamara to this meeting and Secretary McNamara was
anxious to sit down with Soviet military representatives to discuss and
explore possibilities of preventing an ABM race between the two countries.
Secretary McNamara could say everything here in five minutes that the
President had expounded in his letter. He knew better than anyone else how
quickly weapons became obsolete and turned to junk and therefore was more
aware than others of the need to hold down the arms race. Thus, if the
experts could examine the problems and present drafts to deal with them
this could be announced today as one of the results of the present
meeting. The President would also hope today to be able to state that the
two countries were prepared to table a non-proliferation treaty. As for
Secretary McNamara, he was willing to meet with Soviet representatives at
any time in Geneva or elsewhere in order to reduce the $73 billion
military budget we were now faced with. Perhaps Mr. Kosygin could suggest
how such discussions could be started. If these points could be announced
today, i.e., non-proliferation, arms disclosure, ABM discussions, the
world would salute the two leaders for what they had accomplished. People
in our country and indeed throughout the world were already recognizing
the initiative which had brought about this meeting. As for Viet-Nam (the President drew a sketch of
North and South Viet-Nam separated by the DMZ), he wanted Mr. Kosygin to
understand the following: North Vietnamese soldiers were being sent
through the DMZ to attack South Viet-Nam. Some of our military people
advocated our replying in kind. We did not however want to conquer North
Viet-Nam, we merely wanted to prevent the North Vietnamese from completing
their aggression against South Viet-Nam. It was for this reason that we
sent planes to North Viet-Nam to bomb instead of men to fight. If we could
get the North Vietnamese to stay north of the DMZ, our people would remain
south of it, and the bombing cease. In that case, the co-chairmen of the
Geneva Accords would have a chance to supervise free elections in South
Viet-Nam and the people of South Viet-Nam would be given a chance to
express their view as to what government they wanted to have. All we were
being told, however, was for you to stop the bombing. Our reply to this is
if we did stop what could we expect in return? We know that ultimately we
can do no better than to let self-determination in South Viet-Nam prevail
and we think you know this also. Perhaps today there was not enough time
to discuss all of these problems, perhaps the Chairman could suggest some
additional steps to be discussed at a later date, but the President did
want him to be quite sure that the United States had no desire to conquer
North Viet-Nam. If the three billion people of this world could be
informed today that Chairman Kosygin and President Johnson had made some
progress in the direction of resolving some of the problems between them,
this would represent a great step forward and would be universally
acclaimed. Chairman Kosygin, returning to the question of the
Middle-East asked the President if he was informed of the conversation
which took place last night between Secretary Rusk and Dr. Fawzi, Deputy
Prime Minister of the UAR./3/ /3/The
memorandum of their conversation is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, volume
XIX. The President replied that Secretary Rusk had only
briefly informed him of the conversation since they had not as yet had a
chance to talk to each other. Mr. Kosygin continued to the effect that Dr.
Fawzi had first called on him and then on Secretary Rusk. Mr. Kosygin had
asked Dr. Fawzi to explain the position of the UAR concerning the Gulf of
Aqaba. In Mr. Kosygin's opinion the situation along the Suez Canal was
most acute, the Canal was blocked and paralyzed and would remain this way
as long as Israeli forces remain on the East Bank. He was sure that the
President would agree that the Arabs could not withdraw any further.
Therefore the Jews had to leave. There was no other way than for them to
withdraw. In his view then, if the Middle East problem was to be solved by
the United States and the Soviet Union, the very first decision had to be
the withdrawal of troops to the original armistice line. He did not want
to repeat the conversation between Secretary Rusk and Dr. Fawzi except to
say that Dr. Fawzi had informed Secretary Rusk that if the International
Court of Justice would reach a decision that the Gulf of Aqaba was to
remain open, the UAR would abide by that decision. This was said to
Secretary Rusk and to Mr. Kosygin by Dr. Fawzi on direct instructions from
Nasser. The President must realize the difficult situation in which Nasser
found himself today. There are many positions that he could not publicly
advocate but which he was willing to agree to in private and in
confidence. Mr. Kosygin asked the President to treat this communication in
a most confidential manner because he felt that it provided hope for a
solution of the Middle East problem. If the problem were not solved,
another war would be sure to break out sooner or later, completely
destroying the Suez Canal in addition to other quite unforeseeable
consequences. Whatever the Soviet Union or the United States had to do
about this, whether we furnish them weapons or not, they would be sure to
resume the fight sooner or later. If they had weapons, they would use
them. If they did not have them, they would fight with their bare hands or
buy weapons and surely someone would be found to sell them these weapons.
If nothing else they would fight with hunting rifles. Mr. Kosygin was sure
that the more than 120 nations represented in the United Nations desired a
peaceful settlement and he was sure that an overwhelming majority of these
nations would vote to support the withdrawal of troops proposal. He was
concerned, however, since he saw the United States do everything possible
not to permit a vote leading to troop withdrawal. Was this a humane or
realistic position for the United States to adopt? In summing up, Mr.
Kosygin wanted to propose that (1) Secretary Rusk inform the President
about his conversation with Dr. Fawzi, (2) that all troops be returned to
original armistice lines, and (3) that after this had been accomplished,
all other problems could be discussed. This might take a few months, but
it would/4/ be done.
Otherwise, whether we wanted this or not, another war was sure to break
out. Mr. Kosygin recited his proposal once again, this time placing
greater emphasis on further attempts to be made to discuss all other
outstanding problems in the Middle East area after the withdrawal of
troops. He asked the President to understand Nasser. Everything was in a
state of uproar in the Middle East. If the President had been there, he
would know that Arabs were an explosive group of people. At present, it
was necessary to support Nasser because otherwise the situation would be
worse. Soviet President Podgorny was in the UAR at present and in greatest
confidence Mr. Kosygin informed the President that just two days ago he
had asked President Podgorny to talk to Nasser and to ask Nasser to have
his position explained directly to the United States. The Rusk-Fawzi
discussion was a result of this action. The Soviet Union had no desire to
injure Israel. It is for this reason that he was careful in his speech
before the UN to make this point clear. But was it likely, indeed was it
realistic to assume that since the Arabs had not talked to Israel before
the start of hostilities that they would do so now, before the troops were
withdrawn? It was extremely difficult, if not impossible, now for the Arab
leaders to undertake anything in this direction. Mr. Kosygin emphasized
that he was telling this to President Johnson in great confidence, that
this was certainly not intended for any press statements. /4/Written in hand above "would" is "could?"; in the
State Department copy at the National Archives, "would" is crossed out and
"could" written in hand above it. The President said he hoped that we could prevail
on both sides there to first agree that they would talk to each other. Mr.
Kosygin surely knew that when he asked for troop withdrawal, questions of
security in the area were automatically being raised. The Israelis felt
that they had been asked to do this very same thing in the past without
gaining any security. Therefore, along with the troop withdrawal someone
had to provide that security for them. The President would be glad to
explore this question either in the UN or directly with the countries
concerned, i.e., specifically how to preserve the territorial integrity of
all states involved and how to provide for their security at one and the
same time. The President hoped that we could avoid another war involving
the use of arms, for we have seen in the last few days what vast
destruction and human misery such wars lead to. If we refrain from
furnishing arms to Middle Eastern countries, at most they could fight with
their hands, which certainly would not be as bad as an armed conflict. Mr. Kosygin replied that the Middle Eastern
countries would find someone to sell them weapons no matter what the great
powers would do. Meeting adjourned for lunch. 230. Record of the President's Debriefing/1/ Glassboro, New Jersey, June 23, 1967, 11:30
a.m.-1:30 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File,
Rostow Files, Hollybush. No classification marking or drafting information
appears on the record. Rostow wrote in hand at the top of page 1: "File:
only copy." Debriefing by the
President on his talks with Chairman Kosygin, morning of June 23, 1967, at
Hollybush, Glassboro State College, Glassboro, New Jersey. The talks were not denunciatory or argumentative.
Kosygin was reserved, contained, but jolly. Kosygin pointed out that he had an 18-year old
grandson and granddaughter and was the senior grandfather present. They
both had a duty to protect them by maintaining peace between their
countries of 200 million. The President said they had a responsibility not
only to the 200 million but to the whole world of 3 billion. He hoped
their grandsons would grow up to know each other. They had lived through
the horrors of two wars and they did not wish their grandchildren to share
that kind of experience. Kosygin said that during the Second World War he
had responsibility in Leningrad. He would never forget American help at
that time. He said he wanted peace, but you don't. The President said, I
believe you are sincere but I am also. At which Kosygin appeared a bit
chagrined at his first ploy. The President explained that in the 3 years he had
been in office, we had made no new treaties. He had wished to make
progress in relations with the Soviet Union. He began with a letter to
Khrushchev urging that they both cut back their nuclear production, and
they did. He urged they both cut back their levels of defense expenditure,
and they did. Things then changed. There were hard words about Viet
Nam. In these 3 years, despite their stopping Mary
Martin's going to Moscow, they had concluded the cultural agreement and
civil [air] agreement, Consular Agreement. Working hard on
non-proliferation, ready next week to start discussions on ABM's and
ICBM's. He was awaiting answer which had been delayed 3 months. (President
made this point three times and never got a reply.) The President said that on the Middle East he had
presented his 5 points but got no comment from Kosygin. Kosygin said that
the President before the war had talked about territorial integrity,
asserted this on hot line, but wound up protecting aggression. Kosygin
said that he had been Stalin's deputy for 12 years. He had served in
Leningrad. He would never forget the time when arm in arm we resisted
Fascism. He wished we could agree on some of these moves now. Kosygin then
said we must bring back the troops to the original armistice lines, and
put the question of Aqaba into International Court of Justice. Then we
could discuss other problems. Then came the nearest thing to a threat. He
said, unless you do this there will be a war, a very great war. I'm
against it. They will fight with arms if they have them; if not, with
fists. All troops must be withdrawn at once. They will fight with their
bare hands, if necessary. (The President said it was not clear in this
passage whether the Soviets would supply the arms for this blow up or
engage themselves.) The President then leaned forward and said very slowly
and quietly, let us understand one another. I hope there will be no war.
If there is a war, I hope it will not be a big war. If they fight, I hope
they fight with fists and not with guns. I hope you and we will keep out
of this matter because, if we do get into it, it will be a "most serious"
matter. The President's judgment was that this was not an ultimatum and he
backed away from the implication that the Soviet Union might itself become
involved. On the NPT, the President asked Kosygin to set a
date and let us table the agreement. On ABM's and ICBM's, he said let us go to work.
Sec. McNamara can go to Moscow. We can meet in Washington or some neutral
point. On Viet Nam, the President drew a map and urged
the separation of North Viet Nam from South Viet Nam. Kosygin attacked
corruption of the regime in Saigon. The President did not engage in the
quality of our allies. President said some think we should invade North
Viet Nam-not Sec McNamara, but some do urge that. We think bombing of
North Viet Nam is better than invading it. If you could get them to stop
invading the South, you could say to us don't invade North Viet Nam. But
they must get their people out of South Viet Nam. The UK, ICC or anyone
could have free elections. They could have any kind of government they
want. Kosygin said Sec. McNamara couldn't wait three
days in February before he started bombing the North. The President said,
well you didn't have any influence in Hanoi. The Chinese had taken over.
You couldn't deliver them. Kosygin said that Fawzi had given Sec. Rusk
important proposals. Kosygin complained about Amb. Goldberg's position at
the UN. The President pressed him on sending arms to the
Middle East. Said he hoped we both could avoid doing that. By working the
hot line, they had achieved a cease-fire. The U.S. knew nothing of the
attack. Had no knowledge of the Israeli attack. They thought they had
commitments from both parties. He said he assumed the Soviet Union did not
know of the closure of the Gulf of Aqaba before it took place. The President repeated he hoped both of us would
stay outside the area with our armed forces. If we engaged, it would be
quite serious. At one point Kosygin complained about our bombing
Hanoi when he was there. The President explained that our bombing had
nothing to do with his presence. Sec. Rusk was bombed when at Saigon. This
was a problem of travelers going into war areas. In fact, we made clear in
our Tonkin resolution we would not take such attacks. When they killed 60
of our men asleep at Pleiku, we had to take action. Totally unrelated to
Kosygin's visit. President pressed on Middle East, Viet Nam,
non-proliferation, ABM's. He got no positive reaction in the first talks.
But he found Kosygin friendly, jolly and warm. He enjoyed him. There was some exchange on the two Ambassadors.
President said he thought very well of Amb. Dobrynin and Tommy Thompson
had his full confidence. He had returned to Moscow as duty to all humanity
as well as to his country. Kosygin said Dobrynin reports very objectively. He
says nothing that will increase the heat between the two countries. 231. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Glassboro, New Jersey, June 23, 1967, 1:30-3:10
p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File,
Country File, Addendum, USSR, Glassboro Memcons. Top Secret; Nodis.
Drafted by Krimer. The time of the luncheon is from the President's Daily
Diary. (Ibid.) The memorandum cites the time of the luncheon as 1:30 to 3
p.m. Another record of the discussion during the luncheon, made by the
President's secretary, Marie Fehmer, is included in the President's Daily
Diary. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS US USSR During the lunch, the President and Chairman
Kosygin exchanged a number of views in repetition of some of those
discussed during the morning meeting. At one point, Mr. Kosygin stated
that all governmental and international bodies had a tendency of becoming
bureaucracy managed and controlled. He saw a great danger in this trend
which had brought about the demise of the League of Nations and said that
in his view a meeting of heads of states or governments at the United
Nations every year or two years would be helpful in preventing this trend
from getting the upper hand. He felt that the UN would then truly provide
a forum for an exchange of views between governments as against the
present situation of a bureaucracy and red tape hindering the useful work
of the organization. At the President's request, Secretary McNamara
discussed with Chairman Kosygin some aspects of arms control. He stated
his position regarding the desirability of avoiding an ABM race between
the two countries by pointing out that the two countries had engaged in an
arms race in nuclear weapons which had already gone beyond all reason. Mr.
Kosygin agreed with this view. The Secretary enlarged upon the process of
the US reacting to developments in the USSR and vice versa, and said that
he considered this to be an insane road to follow. At some point, we
should begin to dampen the expansion of nuclear arms-both offensive and
defensive. He emphasized that he did not mean this statement to imply that
the US or the Soviet Union should disarm. He considered complete
disarmament to be beyond achievement at the present stage of world
affairs. He did think, however, that both countries should put a limit on
their development of offensive and defensive weapons. Mr. Kosygin said that he did not quite agree with
this view of preventing a race in ABM systems development. He said:
supposing we were to agree that no ABM systems were to be developed at
all, but that it would be perfectly all right to continue to develop
offensive weapons; what could mankind possibly hope to gain from this type
of approach? He knew that Secretary McNamara was not a military man, even
though he was engaged in dealing with military matters, but he saw no
logic in his arguments. Further, Mr. Kosygin said that he had read a
speech delivered by Secretary McNamara in which the Secretary had stated
that it was much cheaper to develop offensive weapons than defensive ones.
Mr. Kosygin considered this type of approach to be actually immoral. He
regarded this as a commercial approach to a moral problem which was by its
very nature invalid. He would agree with the Secretary if the Secretary
would agree to consider the entire complex of the arms race in offensive
and defensive weapons. Secretary McNamara stated that he knew he had not
made his thoughts clear to many people in this country and from Chairman
Kosygin's remarks he concluded that his views were not clear to the
Chairman as well. He did not suggest control or limitations on defensive
weapons only, but on both. He supposed that the subject required more time
than was available today and suggested that it could be further explored
through Ambassadors Thompson and Dobrynin, but he did want to stress 2 or
3 points: (1) he did not suggest that the discussion be limited to
defensive weapons; (2) he did not believe that we should limit defensive
weapons and continue expanding offensive ones; (3) the whole matter was
not a question of offensive weapons being cheaper than defensive ones; he
was not taking a commercial view of the problem as the Chairman had
suggested. He did not think that in the present situation the security of
our respective peoples would permit us to disarm in the near future. But
he did consider the continued growth of offensive weapons to represent a
great danger to each of our countries and a great penalty to our
respective societies. Secretary McNamara developed the thought that the
development of offensive weapons led to increased development of defensive
measures against them, which in turn promoted further development of
offensive weapons, etc., beyond all reason. Such a situation was not in
the interest of the security of either country and he felt very strongly
and hoped that this process could be stopped by discussing the entire
range of problems either in Moscow or in Washington or in both places. Mr. Kosygin said that he had read the Secretary's
speech which had led him to the conclusion that a commercial approach had
been taken. He did not think he was wrong in this and indeed the Secretary
confirmed that he had made such a speech, although he was convinced the
Chairman had misunderstood his meaning. Mr. Kosygin was glad to see that
he was right. He did not want to say anything that was wrong for the
simple reason that he was the Prime Minister of the Soviet Union. He
continued that he then interpreted the Secretary's statement in the manner
in which he had described it earlier, namely, that the Secretary advocated
a limitation on the development of defensive weapons while continuing the
development of offensive weapons. He failed to see how the question could
be posed in such a bare-faced manner. After he had read the Secretary's
statement, he very much wanted to have a chance to meet him and tell him
just that, so that his words might perhaps force the Secretary to realize
the fallacy of his concept. He considered it to be his duty to say this to
the Secretary and he was very happy to have the opportunity of doing just
this. On the other hand, he did see a positive aspect in what the
Secretary had just said in the sense that the Secretary appeared to be
urgently concerned for the fate of mankind, and this he considered to be a
hopeful development. Secretary McNamara replied to the Chairman that
while he knew it to be true that offensive weapons were cheaper than
defensive ones, as is true of many facts, this particular one was quite
irrelevant. Some people in our country thought that the Secretary was in
favor of disarming at the expense of the security of our nation. This view
was quite as wrong as the one expressed by the Chairman. He did think,
however, that each country could take some steps toward limitation of arms
without endangering its respective security. Ambassador Thompson remarked that he thought a
part of the misunderstanding arose because of the great pressure in this
country to further develop armaments as a result of increasing ABM
development in the Soviet Union. At this point, the President and Chairman Kosygin
exchanged toasts, texts of which are attached hereto./2/ /2/Not
attached; for text of the President's toast, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States:
Lyndon B. Johnson, 1967, Book I, pp. 643-644. 232. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Glassboro, New Jersey, June 23, 1967, 3:44-4:35
p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File,
Country File, Addendum, USSR, Glassboro Memcons. Top Secret; Nodis.
Drafted by Krimer. The time of the meeting is from the President's Daily
Diary. (Ibid.) The memorandum cites the time of the meeting as 3:15 to
4:30 p.m. According to the Daily Diary, at 3:10 the U.S. delegation
retired to a small sitting room and the Soviet delegation retired to the
conference room, and Johnson and Kosygin did not go back into the study to
resume their private meeting until 3:44. PARTICIPANTS US USSR Mr. Kosygin informed the President in strictest
confidence as follows: In anticipation of a meeting with President Johnson
he had two days ago contacted Hanoi in the person of Pham Van Dong as to
what he could do during his meeting with the President to help bring this
war to an end. Just now, while he was having lunch with the President, a
reply from Hanoi had been received. In substance, it amounted to the
following: Stop the bombing and they would immediately go to the
conference table. Mr. Kosygin did not know what the President's views of
this proposal would be, but he wanted to express his own opinion very
strongly, to the effect that he thought the President should follow-up
this proposal. It provided for the first time the opportunity of talking
directly with Hanoi at no risk for the United States. He asked the
President to recall the experience of President de Gaulle of France who
had fought in Algiers for seven years and still wound up at the conference
table. He was sure of the North Vietnamese will to continue to fight for
many years if necessary. And what would the President accomplish? He would
carry on a war for ten years or more, killing off the best of the young
people of his nation. Mr. Kosygin knew that American soldiers fought well,
that they knew how to fight, and that they fought willingly since they
believed that they were fighting for their country. The young people of
the Soviet Union in similar circumstances would also fight just as well.
In his view, it was now time to end the war and to sit down at the
conference table and then the President could see what would develop. This
could be the very greatest problem which the two of them could resolve
here together today: to end this obnoxious war and to let the rest of the
world breathe easier because the danger of it spilling over into a bigger
war had been removed. He repeated once again that this message was
intended for the President only; that this was not to be made public in
any way. The President replied that first of all he agreed
to the limitation on disseminating the information provided. Secondly,
however, he asked what would happen if we went to the conference table
this very minute; would this mean that fighting would continue as it had
during the Korean armistice negotiations? Chairman Kosygin replied that he would not
guarantee that the war would end, neither could he guarantee however that
it would escalate. With great emphasis he made the point that while the
President thought he was fighting the Chinese in North Korea, Mr. Kosygin
had to tell him that he was actually helping the Chinese in achieving
their very worst designs. The President said that China represented the very
greatest danger to both countries at present, and that he certainly did
not want to do anything that would promote Chinese policy. Mr. Kosygin asked the President to bear in mind
that this meeting between them was of an emergency nature, that time was
short and that if time were available they would be able to explore the
most delicate problems at greater length. While he considered North
Viet-Nam's proposal to be the President's own business, he emphatically
believed that now the President had ample reason to sit down and negotiate
with North Viet-Nam. He had not wanted to take any responsibility upon
himself in speaking on behalf of North Viet-Nam and it is for this reason
that he had asked for a statement of their position and had received this
reply just an hour ago. If the President could see his way clear to follow
the proposal, this would be an immense step forward in the right
direction. Sooner or later American forces would have to be withdrawn from
Viet-Nam and it was better sooner than later. Could the President imagine
what great sighs of relief would be heard throughout the world if such a
truly historic decision were taken by him now. At several different times
in the past, the President had sought an intermediary between the US and
North Viet-Nam and had even considered using the offices of some second
rate countries, which carried no weight in the world, but here and now
there was an opportunity to engage in direct negotiations with Hanoi and
he earnestly urged the President to weigh this possibility. Mr. Kosygin
would still be in New York on Saturday and Sunday and would be glad to
transmit any reply the President had to make. To the President's question of when the Chairman
expected to leave the United States, Mr. Kosygin replied that he was
leaving on Monday and added, again in confidence, that he would visit Cuba
on the way home. The President asked for additional clarification
on the following points: He was informed to the effect that North Viet-Nam
had five divisions deployed immediately north of the DMZ. It was the best
advice of our military people that if the bombing stopped, these five
divisions would be brought to bear upon our Marines immediately south of
the DMZ, resulting in a great many casualties among our boys. Mr. Kosygin
surely realized that should this happen following the President's decision
to stop the bombing, he would be crucified in this country for having
taken the decision. Chairman Kosygin thought that from a practical
point of view the question could be put as follows: If the bombing stopped
today, representatives of the United States and North Viet-Nam would meet
tomorrow, wherever the President wished--Hanoi or New York or Moscow or
Paris or Geneva or any other place. From that point on, it would be up to
the negotiators to work out what was to follow. In establishing such
direct contact with Hanoi, the President could present all questions
between the United States and North Viet-Nam and the other side could do
the same. Certainly, this could save hundreds of thousands of lives which
would otherwise perish in vain. The President could set the condition that
if the bombing were stopped, representatives of the two countries should
meet at any place designated in, say, two days. Without such direct
contact, no solution was possible. The President did not know what they
wanted and indeed North Viet-Nam did not know what the President wanted.
Mr. Kosygin urged the President to try this step, which in addition
carried no risk to the position of the United States. He urged the
President to weigh this proposal, he did not then ask for a reply today,
he asked the President to think it over. The President asked the Chairman whether he would
and could provide assistance at the conference table, if such a meeting
took place, in obtaining self-determination for the people of South
Viet-Nam? Mr. Kosygin replied that he could not decide this
question independently without advice from North Viet-Nam. But, if by
tomorrow night the President could inform him of his views and conditions
on this question, he would immediately transmit them to Hanoi for a
reply. The President again asked the Chairman whether,
assuming that we got to the conference table, the Soviet Union would and
could help us obtain an agreement providing self-determination for the
people of South Viet-Nam which would ultimately enable us to withdraw our
forces. The President had formerly informed Mr. Gromyko that if such an
agreement could be obtained, we would be prepared to withdraw our troops
regardless of former investment in the area. He would interpret free
elections in South Viet-Nam under the supervision of the co-chairmen as
fulfilling the conditions of such an agreement. Mr. Kosygin replied with a suggestion that the
question the President had asked him be formulated on paper without
reference to Mr. Kosygin or the USSR, that it be addressed to North
Viet-Nam, and be given to Mr. Kosygin for immediate transmission to Hanoi.
Such a statement should preferably be brief and clear and he, Mr. Kosygin,
would consider this to be an important step forward. The President asked Mr. Kosygin when and where he
could meet with him if he would give favorable consideration to addressing
such a question to North Viet-Nam? He suggested another meeting with the
Chairman on Sunday afternoon at the same place, in other words, at the
Glassboro State College. The President also wanted to explore a number of
other questions with Mr. Kosygin. He honestly believed that the Chairman
had misunderstood Secretary McNamara and very much wanted to correct this
misunderstanding because it was Secretary McNamara who exercised a
restraining influence on the ABM systems development. The President also
wanted Chairman Kosygin to understand very clearly that when we proposed
discussions on ABM systems, we of course had in mind not only defensive
but also offensive weapons. Mr. Kosygin replied that he was still shocked by
Secretary McNamara's speech in which he had referred to offensive weapons
being cheaper than defensive ones. The President urged Mr. Kosygin to
further explore Secretary McNamara's views. He felt he had profited by
talking to the Chairman face to face and thought that either the Chairman
or his representatives could carry on a dialogue with Secretary McNamara
and they would profit by it also. The President again urged that the
non-proliferation treaty be tabled if necessary even without Article III,
leaving that question to be agreed upon later. To this Mr. Kosygin replied that he could not see
why this insignificant problem of who was to exercise control should play
such an important part. Inasmuch as an international agency existed of
which both countries were members, the IAEA, why then did we insist on
inspection by EURATOM rather than by that agency? Why could not the
President and he agree to resolve this question in order to have a
workable draft to present to the other countries? The President suggested this be worked out between
Secretary Rusk and Mr. Gromyko this weekend. As for Secretary McNamara, he
was willing to meet with the Chairman's representatives in Moscow, Paris
or Geneva at any time. Mr. Kosygin replied that he would consult with
Moscow and give the President his answer on this subject. He stressed
again that all problems between the two nations could be solved if it were
not for the grave problem in Viet-Nam and the new problems which have
arisen in the Middle East. He felt very strongly that Viet-Nam had
destroyed much that had developed between the United States and the USSR
and had given China a chance to raise its head with consequent great
danger for the peace of the entire world. Viet-Nam also led the United
States into something unknown and had finally resulted in a military
budget today which was greater than that of 1943. He asked if this could
be considered to be a sober and reasonable policy. If it came to a
question of prestige, he wanted to remind the President of the example of
de Gaulle who had fought in Algiers for 7 years and then had withdrawn; in
consequence, his prestige had not decreased at all, on the contrary it had
risen throughout the world. In one of the telegrams transmitted over the
Hot Line, Mr. Kosygin had written the President that there were forces in
the world which were interested in causing a clash between the United
States and the USSR. He assured the President that such forces did indeed
exist. The President and Chairman Kosygin considered a
joint statement to the press which the President read to Mr. Kosygin and
asked him if he had any changes or additions to suggest. Mr. Kosygin
concurred in the statement completely, considered it to be an accurate and
correct reflection of the talks held at this meeting. It was agreed that
the President would read the statement to the press and that Mr. Kosygin
would add his concurrence in the statement immediately following the
President's address. The meeting was adjourned until Sunday, June 25,
1967, at 1:30 p.m., to be held at the same location. A copy of the press statement is attached./2/ /2/Not
attached; for text of the President's statement and Kosygin's response,
see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United
States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1967, Book I, pp. 644-645. 233. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to
President Johnson/1/ Washington, June 24, 1967. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File,
Country File, Addendum, USSR, Glassboro Memcons. Top Secret. The President
read the text of the messages in the memorandum and the attachment to
Kosygin at their 3:20 p.m. meeting on June 25. See Document
235. The enclosed is our suggestion of a paragraph
which you could give as an oral message tomorrow. For the convenience of
the Chairman, you could actually give him a copy. But since his message to
you was oral, it might be better that the enclosed be oral, at least in
form. In addition to the enclosed, we believe you should
say the following to the Chairman: "Mr. Chairman, you and I have a very special
responsibility on matters involving peace. It is of the greatest
importance that you and I not misunderstand each other and that no
problems of good faith arise between us. Therefore, I want you personally
to know that we are prepared to stop the bombing as a step toward peace.
We are not prepared to stop the bombing merely to remove one-half of the
war while the other half of the war proceeds without limit. I am accepting
very large risks in giving you the message for transmittal to Hanoi which
I have just given you. I want you to know that if talks do not lead to
peace or if protracted talks are used to achieve one-sided military
advantage against us, we shall have to resume full freedom of action. I
say this to you and not to Hanoi because I think it is of great importance
that you and I fully understand each other. I do not ask you to agree; I
am merely asking you to understand what is in my mind." Dean Rusk/2/ /2/Printed from a copy that bears this typed
signature. Attachment/3/ Oral Message From President Johnson to Chairman
Kosygin Washington, undated. /3/Top
Secret. The United States anticipates that it could stop
the bombing of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam. The United States
further anticipates that, following the cessation of bombing, there could
be immediate discussions between representatives of the United States and
of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam. These discussions could be held in
Geneva, Moscow, Vientiane, or any other suitable location. The United
States further anticipates that its own and allied forces in the northern
provinces of South Viet-Nam would not advance to the north and that
elements of the armed forces of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam in the
northern part of South Viet-Nam and in the southern portions of North
Viet-Nam would not advance to the south. The United States anticipates
that, if discussions are held between its representatives and those of the
Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, all questions which either side might
wish to raise could be raised. The United States would hope, on the basis
of the anticipations expressed above, that the results of such talks could
be the stabilization of peace in Southeast Asia. The United States would
be glad to know of the reactions of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam to
the thoughts expressed above. 234. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Glassboro, New Jersey, June 25, 1967, 1:50-3:05
p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File,
Country File, Addendum, USSR, Glassboro Memcons. Top Secret; Nodis.
Drafted by Krimer. The meeting took place during a luncheon, the time of
which is from the President's Daily Diary. (Ibid.) The memorandum cites
the time as 1:30 to 2:45 p.m. A list of those present is at the end of the
memorandum. PARTICIPANTS US USSR Following an exchange of pleasantries between the
President and Chairman Kosygin, a brief description of each other's
workday and the President's thanks to the Chairman on behalf of himself
and Mrs. Johnson for the presents given him at the previous meeting, the
President inquired how Mr. Kosygin had enjoyed his visit to Niagara
Falls./2/ Mr. Kosygin said
that he had enjoyed it very much indeed, particularly his inspection of
the power station, which was of great interest to him from an engineering
point of view. He said that the Soviet Union today had the largest power
station in the world and that next year an even larger hydro-electric
power station would be started up. Thus when he said he liked the power
station at Niagara he was speaking as an expert. President Johnson briefly
mentioned the six small water projects on his native river in Texas and to
Mr. Kosygin's question as to whether irrigation was used in that part of
the country he replied that it was and also, in connection with the meal
served at the luncheon, mentioned that he raised sheep. /2/Chairman Kosygin, his daughter, and about 50 other
Soviets visited Niagara Falls on June 24, traveling there in a
Presidential aircraft. Chief of Protocol James W. Symington, who
accompanied Kosygin, reported on the visit in a June 27 memorandum to
President Johnson. (Ibid., Memos to the President--Walt Rostow, Vol.
32) President Johnson told the Chairman that he had
made an excellent impression on the American people, that everyone here
was hopeful that peaceful relations with the Soviet Union could be
maintained and extended and that the leaders of the two countries would
find ways and means to bring this about. He said that the press reaction
to Chairman Kosygin's visit here was very favorable and that, in spite of
some such feelings in the past as had been stimulated by the Dies
Committee, on the whole, the great wish of the people of this country was
that Americans and Russians would find a way to like each other rather
than hate each other and to this end the Chairman's visit had contributed
significantly. Chairman Kosygin replied that while it was true
that the people here seemed to be very friendly and pleasant, he was
somewhat perplexed by some excerpts from the President's address in Los
Angeles which had been shown to him to the effect that while a socialist
and a capitalist system existed in this world, tensions would remain./3/ /3/For
text of the President's remarks at the President's Club dinner on the
evening of June 23, see Public Papers of the
Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1967, Book I, pp.
645-650. The President replied that he must have been
misquoted or else quoted completely out of context, since in his speech he
had spoken of a new spirit of friendship between the two countries and of
his earnest hope that mutually acceptable solutions to outstanding
problems would be found. He had said in that speech that one meeting does
not in itself resolve all problems, that their solution required extended
talks and negotiations and that that was what he was now trying to
accomplish. Mr. Kosygin volunteered the information that he
was leaving at noon on Monday, June 26, 1967, and in reply to the
President's question said that he did not presently intend to stop
anywhere else other than Cuba, where he hoped to spend no more than two
days. He was anxious to return to Moscow since he had to present a
three-year budget plan; this was not an easy job because of the
conflicting demands for resources made by various agencies and
organizations of the Soviet Union for construction and development
purposes. He said that he was under great pressure to devote more of the
resources of his country to these peaceful pursuits, that many people came
to him with requests for more money and that he was hard put to explain
why not all these requests could be granted. He had the feeling that even
after his explanations these people went away believing that they had not
been properly understood. In this connection the President expressed the
hope that the two countries would be able to reduce their military budgets
in order to devote more of their resources to peaceful pursuits. He
pointed out that during the three years he had been President his
Administration had tripled expenditures for education from $4 billion
annually to $12 billion, that it had also tripled expenditures for health
in the same amount, that is, from $4 billion to $12 billion annually and
that this total increase in expenditures from $8 billion for health and
education when he first became President to $24 billion now indicated the
direction in which he wanted this country to develop. It is for this
reason that he was most anxious to have a chance to explore all
possibilities for cutting down the military budget if the Soviet Union
could be persuaded to do the same. We were ready to discuss all aspects of
this question, we had asked for such talks three months ago through
Ambassador Thompson and yet nothing further had been heard since the
Soviet Government had indicated that it was willing to discuss these
matters. When and where could Secretary McNamara meet with representatives
of the Soviet Union to begin meaningful discussions? Mr. Kosygin said that he and his Government were
indeed interested in finding some means of reducing military expenditures,
but that this very much depended upon relations with the United States.
How could the US reduce its military expenditures while it was spending
upwards of $20 billion on the Viet-Nam war alone? It seemed to him that
while this war continued a discussion of budget reduction could not be
more than academic. With reference to Viet-Nam, the President pointed
out that military expenditure reduction could be achieved if the Soviet
Union reduced or eliminated its supply of military equipment to North
Viet-Nam while we found a way to de-escalate the struggle in South
Viet-Nam. He said that at the very least an increase in the
military budgets could be prevented if agreement was reached with the
Soviet Union on the ABM problem. He had held back on authorizing full
development of ABM systems in order to provide the opportunity for full
exploration of this question with the Soviet Union. President Johnson
repeated: when and where could Secretary McNamara meet with Soviet
representatives? Mr. Kosygin said that our proposals appeared to
extend to a discussion of defensive systems only and that he could not
agree with such an approach. President Johnson retorted that, as he had
stressed during their previous talk, we definitely meant exploring all
possibilities of reducing expenditures for offensive as well as defensive
systems. Mr. Kosygin said that if the President really
wanted to discuss disarmament measures he was prepared to come here from
Moscow with a delegation of his experts for that purpose. But he still
failed to see true possibilities while the Viet-Nam war continues and
while the Middle East situation remains unsettled. He turned to a
repetition of his position regarding the Middle East. He pointed out that
on the one hand there were 100 million Arabs who were really people of the
19th century as far as their spiritual development was concerned, and on
the other hand here were 3 million Jews who were 20th century people, had
attacked the Arabs and seized large tracts of Arab territory. There could
be no peaceful settlement in the Middle East unless these forces were
withdrawn. The President replied that one could not regard
this question as merely a matter of numbers of people involved, it was
also a question of what was right. The President had been careful to note
in Mr. Kosygin's speech before the UNGA that he had acknowledged Israel's
right to a national life./4/
He asked the Chairman whether he had read the President's speech on
the Middle East situation which had been delivered before the Chairman's
address./5/ Following Mr.
Kosygin's reply to the effect that he had watched the President's speech
on television and had had it translated for him, the President asked Mr.
Kosygin point by point whether he did not agree with the proposals the
President had made in that speech. One such proposal pertains to the
recognition of Israel's right to a national existence. A second proposal
pertains to the right of free passage through international waterways such
as the Strait of Tiran and the Suez Canal; since the Soviet Union was also
a maritime power, surely the Chairman too was for such right of free
passage. He certainly thought the Chairman would agree that something had
to be done for the refugees of this and the previous wars. /4/For
text of the June 19 speech, see The New York
Times, pp. 16-17. /5/For
text of the President's address at the State Department's Foreign Policy
Conference for Educators on June 19, see Public
Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson,
1967, Book I, pp. 630-635. Mr. Kosygin said that in his view, following troop
withdrawal to the original armistice line, all other questions could be
solved. He pointed out that surely if the United States had been invaded
the President would not agree to any discussion of settlement as long as
parts of the United States were under foreign control. For his part he
could definitely state that the Soviet Union under such hypothetical
circumstances certainly could not agree to hold discussions while parts of
its territory were occupied by an aggressor. He related this position to
the previous discussion of reduction of the military budget and said that,
after all, it was not the Soviet Union which had gone to war but rather
the United States in Viet-Nam. The President pointed out that we had not gone to
war over Cuba although the Soviet Union had placed offensive missiles on
that island. To this the Chairman replied that the Soviet Union had not
gone to war either, that it had withdrawn its missiles from Cuba. In fact
he said that we had been instrumental in pressuring Khrushchev to withdraw
the missiles and surely the President knew that there were no missiles on
Cuba today. Mr. Kosygin said that Nasser presently was in a
very difficult position, that what was needed was an effort to find a way
out for Nasser, that the question of closing the Straits could be solved
if troops were withdrawn to start with. A way to accomplish this would be
to state that following troop withdrawal all other questions would be
considered. President Johnson did not think that it was
possible now to just remove the troops without at the same time removing
the dangers which had caused the conflict in the first place. We had to
find a way to get the two sides to talk to and listen to each other. We
did not say that all of our friends were perfect and he was sure the
Chairman would not make such statements about his friends either. The
President knew that it had not been the Soviet Union's advice that caused
Nasser to close the Gulf of Aqaba, and that evidently the Soviet Union's
advice to Nasser had not been heeded. This same situation pertained to
some of our friends too. This was a case where neither our friends nor the
Chairman's friends took our respective advice. He was sure that the
Chairman did not think the US had encouraged Israel to send its Air Force
into action. He considered the Chairman to be far too intelligent to think
that. President Johnson repeated that it was not enough
to say: "remove the troops," that along with troop removal the dangers
facing Israel would have to be removed as well. The President pointed out
that short of some such arrangement the Israelis would certainly not
follow our advice. They had not followed our advice with respect to
refraining from sending their Air Force into action just as Nasser had not
followed the Soviet Union's advice which the President was confident must
have been to refrain from closing the Gulf of Aqaba. Alarming reports of
new arms shipments being carried by hundreds of planes and ships to the
Arab countries since the ceasefire, and continuing danger of renewed
hostilities had already resulted in our being asked to supply new weapons.
So far we had refused in the hope of getting the Soviet Union's agreement
to full disclosure of arms shipments, in spite of various pressures upon
us. Therefore, the solution of the Middle East difficulties had to be
found in something that would be acceptable to both sides. How else could
we make our friends listen? Mr. Kosygin stated emphatically that he was
certain war would break out again unless the Israeli troops were withdrawn
quickly. Therefore, he suggested that the UN Security Council pass a
resolution forcing Israel to withdraw and include a provision for
negotiations to begin following withdrawal. He was convinced that this was
the only way to prevent a new war in that area. He pointed to the
experience in Algiers where the Arabs had fought for seven years until
France finally decided to withdraw. He was sure the President knew that
the Straits would have been opened had hostilities not been initiated by
Israel. To this the President replied that both countries
should have taken immediate steps to open the Straits after Nasser had
closed them. Mr. Kosygin said there was little point now in a
historical review of that situation. The problem was here and now and the
only solution was troop withdrawal. President Johnson repeated again that such a
resolution would not be heeded by Israel. Before the outbreak of
hostilities he had talked for one hour with Israel's Foreign Minister Eban
and thought after that talk that Israel would await the Security Council's
action before doing anything drastic. However, after all Nasser had seized
the Straits, he had closed the Gulf, he had threatened to liquidate Israel
and had concluded a military agreement for that purpose with Syria. This
must have scared the Israelis to death, prompting them to send their armed
forces into action. Neither one of us had been able to prevail upon our
friends, and the President knew today that the resolution proposed by the
Chairman would not be followed. Apparently Foreign Minister Eban had met
with disagreement within his own government, which was split almost evenly
on the issue of what effective steps to take. For this reason what was
needed now was not a determination of what was right depending upon the
numbers of people involved on each side but rather by what could be done
to remove the fears along with removing the troops. He was certain that
the five points he had proposed would accomplish exactly that. At this point the President and Chairman Kosygin
left the luncheon table for their private meeting. Also present at the luncheon were: US PARTICIPANTS USSR PARTICIPANTS [Continue with the
next documents]
Volume XIV
Index | Foreign
Relations Volumes Online Released Prior to January 20, 2001
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