At 4:30 a.m. on June 5, 1967, Walt Rostow telephoned President Johnson to inform him that war had erupted in the Middle East. At 5:25 a.m. on June 5, Secretary of State Rusk sent a message to Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko informing him that the United States was "astonished and dismayed" by the reports of heavy fighting. Rusk stressed that it was "very important that the United Nations Security Council succeed in bringing this fighting to an end as quickly as possible." The memorandum of this telephone conversation is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, volume XIX. At 7:59 a.m. a message from Chairman Kosygin to President Johnson was received in Washington over the "hot line," the first substantive message sent on the "hot line" since its establishment on August 30, 1963. Kosygin concurred in the importance of securing an immediate cessation of hostilities and urged the United States to "exert appropriate influence on the Government of Israel." Between June 5 and the end of the Six Day War on June 10, a total of 20 "hot line" messages were exchanged between Johnson and Kosygin. For text of the messages, see ibid.

In addition to documentation on U.S.-Soviet communications during the Six Day War, Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, volume XIX, includes extensive documentation on U.S.-Soviet discussions concerning the situation in the Middle East from the end of the Six Day war to the adoption of United Nations Resolution 242 on November 22, 1967. For documentation on U.S.-Soviet communications concerning the Middle East from the adoption of Resolution 242 to the end of 1968, see ibid., volume XX.

218. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Washington, June 16, 1967.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 7 USSR. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Thompson.

SUBJECT
Kosygin's Visit to the U.S.

PARTICIPANTS
Soviet Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin
Llewellyn E. Thompson, American Ambassador

I saw the Ambassador at 9:30 last night at his residence and gave him the following oral message from the President.

I said the President had himself had no word whether Chairman Kosygin was coming to our country or not./2/ He wanted the Chairman to know that if so he would be welcome. The President would be glad for him to see our country and would offer him every hospitality. If Kosygin wished to see the President, he would be welcome to see him. He would invite him to visit him in the White House and would be glad to provide any type of hospitality or formality or informality that he would wish. If Mr. Kosygin wished to be away from the hurly-burly of a big city, the President would be glad to see him at Camp David where there would be facilities for any members of his party that he would wish to bring. This would give the opportunity for relaxed talks in a comfortable and isolated location.

/2/Kosygin arrived in New York the morning of June 17 for the Emergency Special Session of the UN General Assembly, which he addressed on June 19.

The Ambassador said he would promptly transmit the message. When I asked whether he thought Kosygin would in fact wish to see the President, he replied that he had not really discussed this matter and could not venture an opinion. I said that I imagined that if the two did meet the Chinese Communists and probably the Arabs would accuse us of collusion, but it personally seemed to me that it would be useful for the two to meet. Dobrynin said that he had recommended to the Chairman that he come to New York as he had never been in the United States. He observed that we had opposed the calling of a special assembly. I said we had ourselves voted against it but had not tried to block it. We did not think that this was the way to deal seriously with the problem.

Dobrynin inquired whether the Secretary would head our delegation. I replied I did not know and thought it likely he would at least be in New York at some time during the proceedings. I said that in any event I thought I was sure that he would be happy to see Mr. Gromyko.

I said I thought it was a shame that the Soviets had not cooperated with us in the Middle East, for if they had we could have prevented the conflict. I said that I would not like to be in the shoes of their military attaché in Cairo as they seemed to have made some serious misjudgments. Dobrynin emphasized that they had not trained the Egyptians although their technicians had helped in the delivery of specific equipment which was in fact of excellent quality. They had not, however, in any way trained the Egyptians in the handling of large bodies of troops. He also pointed out that most of the Egyptian planes had been destroyed on the ground. He asked why the Israeli had attacked and suggested that our people in Tel Aviv had surely been informed. I denied this vigorously and said the Israeli had promised us that they would not attack for a period of time in order to give us an opportunity to try to settle the problem and particularly the blocking of access to the Gulf of Aqaba. I said that this was the act which had caused matters to get out of control. The Israelis had made clear that this was casus belli.

I referred to my talk with Chernyakov and said we thought it most important that we not start the arms race in this area all over again. I said I was particularly thinking of the long range problem. Dobrynin said the Arabs had lost a lot of matériel and were pressing hard for its replacement.

Dobrynin said that the Soviets were ready to conclude the Non-proliferation Treaty and thought they were waiting now for our decision on the proposals made by Mr. Foster. I said I was not informed of the status of the problem but thought we were not far from an agreement.

Dobrynin said he had been present during the use of the "Hot Line" together with Gromyko and asked if I had been present at this end. I replied that I had. Dobrynin said they had wanted to send their message earlier, but he had reminded his people of the difference in time. I said that it had still been early in the morning here and hoped that they would keep this time differential in mind.

Dobrynin asked about what he called our big problem, that is, Vietnam. He referred to the DRV offer for talks in the event we stopped bombing. I said that they had asked us to stop bombing unconditionally and permanently and had still given no indication they would not continue the infiltration of troops into the South. I said we were most anxious to resolve the problem either through negotiations or through a tapering off of the use of violence. I thought we were prepared to move any time the other side indicated directly or indirectly that they were prepared to reciprocate.

When I inquired why Semenov was not on the Soviet delegation, Dobrynin replied that he was ill.

As we were walking toward the door, I expressed regret at the delay in carrying out our Civil Air Agreement. Dobrynin said he could assure me that the delay was not due to political reasons but simply the Soviet desire not to start with an outmoded plane and the problem of equipping it to meet our standards.

219. Memorandum Prepared by Zbigniew Brzezinski of the Policy Planning Council/1/

Washington, June 16, 1967.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, USSR, Vol. XV. Secret. Forwarded to the President by Rostow under a June 17 covering memorandum in which Rostow stated: "With respect to Brzezinski's point, the third of the three points you gave me on the telephone yesterday seems just right; namely, that we welcome the Soviet Union as the other 'older child' in the family of nations and look to the Soviet Union as a partner in setting a framework which will avoid hostility between ourselves and by the other members of the family."

SUBECT
Kosygin's Mood and Perspective

In the event the President meets with Prime Minister Kosygin, some consideration should also be given to Kosygin's mood and perspective on US policy. It is quite likely that Kosygin will be influenced by:

a. A sense of humiliation and frustration, brought on by recent events in the Middle East as well as by Soviet inability to deter the United States from bombing North Vietnam.

b. A strong suspicion that the Soviet Union is facing "a general offensive by the forces of imperialism". The Communist mind likes to reason in patterns and to detect broad trends. Accordingly, the Soviets are inclined to see a connection between events in Brazil, Ghana, Indonesia, Congo, the Dominican Republic, and Greece. To them, the recent hostilities in the Middle East were part of this general effort to install pro-US regimes--thus to topple Nasser and the pro-Soviet Syrian Government, with Israel acting as a front for the US.

Given that, it is rather important that Kosygin emerge from any eventual meeting with the President disabused of the notion that the United States is out to humiliate the Soviet Union and is currently engaged in a broad political offensive directed against it. Some gesture may be in order. Kosygin should be made to feel that the President remains determined to pursue a policy of reconciliation, along the lines outlined in his speech of October 7th./2/

/2/See Document 176.

At the same time, it is also important that Kosygin does not leave with the erroneous impression-which apparently Khrushchev took home with him from the Vienna meeting with President Kennedy-that a policy of bluff and bluster will get the Soviet Union anywhere. He is not likely to do so if in the course of the conversations the essential US interests either in the Middle East or in Vietnam-interests which we cannot afford to compromise-are concretely and specifically spelled out to him. This would not only help to allay his ideologically-rooted suspicions; it would appeal both to his Russian common sense and to his communist sensitivity to realities of power.

ZB

220. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson/1/

Washington, June 17, 1967.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East Crisis, Vol. 6. Secret; Eyes Only. Rostow forwarded the memorandum to the President at 5:50 p.m. on June 17 under a covering memorandum which stated: "Herewith Sec. Rusk's statement of the consensus which emerged from the meeting this afternoon."

1. The following is Ambassador Thompson's memorandum of the message from Ambassador Dobrynin:

"Ambassador Dobrynin telephoned me from New York to say that Mr. Kosygin wished to thank him very much for the message from the President which I had transmitted to Dobrynin./2/ The Chairman appreciated the invitation to visit the United States. Unfortunately, he was very busy and would not have time now to visit the United States. The Chairman did not plan to visit Washington. If the President wishes or has some plans to be in New York, Mr. Kosygin will be ready to meet him in New York at any time or place convenient to the President.

/2/See Document 218.

"Dobrynin went on to add personally that this meant any place in or near New York but not any place far away from New York."

2. We are now revising the speech which you would make at the State Department at 9:30 on Monday morning to include the other subjects along the lines of your suggestions. We hope the next draft can be in your hands later this evening./3/

/3/For text of the President's June 19 address at the State Department's Foreign Policy Conference for Educators, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1967, Book I, pp. 630-635.

3. The most serious question for you to consider is what to do about a meeting with Kosygin. McNamara, Katzenbach, Vance, Bundy, Rostow, Thompson and McPherson and I discussed this question this afternoon. Our views may be summarized as follows:

(a) There is no need for you to rush up to New York to see Kosygin before his speech to the General Assembly. If the two of you meet before his speech, he might even be under pressure to be tougher in the General Assembly than he might otherwise-to avoid the impression among the Arabs or the Chinese that he was in some personal collusion with you. In any event, a tough speech by him after a meeting with you would make it appear that you had "failed" in your private talk with him.

(b) We do believe, pending some change in the situation, that there would be enormous political loss to you if Kosygin were to go home without a conversation between the two of you. We could not rely wholly upon his refusal to come to Washington since he has indicated that he would see you in New York. You should bear in mind that his theory is that he is visiting the United Nations and not the United States. It just happens that the United Nations is in the United States. You have said on other occasions that you would "go anywhere, see anybody" in the interest of peace. If it became generally known (as it would from the Russians) that you had refused to see Kosygin in New York, we believe that you would be under very severe domestic criticism-quite apart from international public opinion.

(c) There will be intense press interest in the question of whether the two of you will meet until the point is clarified. The Russians may do some leaking on their own. It is not clear, therefore, that the question can be held over until, say, next weekend.

(d) I would recommend that, in any event, Ambassador Thompson proceed to New York on Sunday and have a long talk with Dobrynin. Then, I would go on to New York on Tuesday and have a talk with Gromyko.

(e) The group named above would recommend that you decide now that you will see Kosygin before his departure even if it means your going to the New York area. If you do that, you can also see Krag, Wilson and one or two other Heads of Government who might be in New York at the same time. There would be considerable advantage in letting it be known early that you expect to see Kosygin in order to avoid a churning press. If you agree with us that it is important to see him before he leaves the United States, it would be better to make the arrangement early rather than appear to be submitting to UN, US or Congressional pressures.

(f) You need not go into New York City to see Kosygin; arrangements could be made to meet him at an estate on Long Island or in Westchester County. None of us thinks that your going to New York to see Kosygin would require you to appear in the General Assembly. You always have the option of appearing in the General Assembly if the course of Assembly discussion leads you to believe you would like to do so.

(g) If you do not wish to make a final decision before you hear Kosygin's opening speech on Monday morning, Llewellyn Thompson could go back to Dobrynin with a message substantially as follows:

"The President regrets that Mr. Kosygin feels unable to visit Washington. The President will study his own schedule about other possibilities and will be pleased to know what Mr. Kosygin's own schedule is if that is now known."

221. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Johnson/1/

Washington, June 21, 1967.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Trip to Soviet Union. No classification marking.

You have asked whether I believe a meeting between you and Kosygin would be desirable. I favor such a meeting for the following reasons:

a. Assuming that Kosygin meets you at least half way in making the arrangements, I cannot conceive of circumstances in which the personal, political, or diplomatic cost to you or to our nation would be significant.

b. The American public expects that you will meet with Kosygin, and unless the failure to meet is clearly his, the domestic and international price to you of a failure to meet could be substantial.

c. At a minimum you would take from the meeting an appraisal of Kosygin which should enable you to better predict his behavior and he, in turn, would better understand your character and the resolve with which you approach our commitments in Vietnam.

d. There is a possibility, although I think the chances are less than even, that a meeting with Kosygin would lead to progress toward: secret talks on Vietnam; limitations on the continuing expansion of the Soviet and U.S. strategic nuclear forces; control of arms deliveries to the Middle East.

In summary, assuming the meeting is arranged on the proper basis, I believe the potential costs to be small and the potential gains to be great.

Robert S. McNamara

222. Memorandum From the President's Special Consultant (Bundy) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, June 21, 1967, 5:15 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Trip to Soviet Union. No classification marking. On June 7 Johnson named McGeorge Bundy as a Special Consultant to the President and Executive Secretary of the Special Committee of the National Security Council, which Johnson established on June 7 to coordinate U.S. policy in the Middle East.

Mr. President:

Walt passed me your request for a memo on a meeting with Kosygin.

Cons: 1. He has not gone at this in a gracious way, to put it mildly, but he is within his rights in visiting the UN, and the custom of working by indirection goes back in the Russian character at least 200 years.

2. Very little of substance can come from the meeting, and it may even lead to a hard-nose standoff, but the estimates of both hard- and soft-boiled demonologists run against such a result, and everyone knows that you are not the man to lose in a face-to-face encounter with anyone.

3. After a week of pulling and hauling, some may call it a tactical surrender if you go near New York, but there are solutions to that in the neighborhood. Of those I have heard, the Governor's mansion at Princeton seems best.

Pros: 1. If you meet him you avoid all the negative consequences of not meeting him. That avoidance in itself is a very large gain. If you do not meet Kosygin, who has come as far as New York, the continuing noises (press and politicos) will be awful. I have had a great deal of free advice on this point from people I have not bothered you with.

2. You get a measure of the man. Kosygin is only one member of a committee, but he is one of the most important and certainly the best informed on foreign affairs. You will get a picture of him which can only be helpful to you.

3. Kosygin will get a measure of you. This is the most important point of all. You really do speak, on topics like Vietnam, wider contact, and the Middle East itself, in tones which are significantly different from those of your Secretary of State. In my judgment there is more prospect of Soviet help on Vietnam than they have ever given (though much less than Averell Harriman thinks). I think you can increase the prospect of such help and in particular I think that Johnson to Kosygin is a vastly better channel than Johnson to Wilson to Kosygin.

Specifically, you could substantially improve Thompson's value to you and to the United States by emphasizing directly to Kosygin your confidence in him.

In summary, I see no unmanageable risks in the meeting, modest but practical advantages in holding it, and very great penalties (both here and in friendly opinion abroad) if it does not occur.

In this as in other things, people everywhere apply a double standard to us and to the Soviets.

McG. B.

223. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, June 21, 1967, 6:15 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Trip to Soviet Union. Secret.

Mr. President:

1. The case for seeing Kosygin:

--At home it will cover your flank to the left and among the columnists. If you don't do it, they will blame every difficulty that follows on the lack of a meeting. The Republicans will run on: I will go to Moscow.

--There is a 20% chance that it will have a net favorable effect in U.S.-Soviet policy;

--Given the present state of affairs, I think the chance is well under 10% that it could make things worse between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. (The trouble with Vienna was not the meeting itself, but that Khrushchev had decided to see if he could break President Kennedy on Berlin. I do not see the Soviets in an ultimatum mood on either Viet Nam or the Middle East at the moment. There is always, of course, the chance. But if the chance exists it is because the Soviet Government, which is a collective organization, has so decided. And we might as well get it straight and soon, as obscurely and later.)

2. On a cold, hard, objective basis I am confident that your net impact on Kosygin (and through him on his colleagues) will be positive. I have had the privilege of seeing you deal with a wide range of governmental leaders. Your batting average justifies this confidence. Kosygin should feel both the steel and compassion; the determination and flexibility; and, above all, your willingness to treat the Soviet Union as one of the two older responsible children in the human family if they will so behave.

For these reasons, on balance, I am for the meeting, if it can be arranged in ways which leave you feeling comfortable and not cornered. That is why I support strongly Maguire Air Force Base, although it's going to be a little tough for them to swallow.

3. What might come out of the meeting? Aside from your impact on Kosygin, nothing hard that they have not already decided. But it could accelerate the pace.

4. With respect to the Middle East, they may have decided to move in time from a straight confrontation on the question of Israeli withdrawal to playing a role in a settlement. If so, that would emerge in the days ahead via Gromyko. You may be able to smoke out a little in advance.

5. With respect to ABM-ICBM, Kosygin is in a position where he must give you a simple Yes-No answer on whether his government is willing to engage in serious talks. Again, that has probably been decided. It could be communicated diplomatically. You might, through this meeting, get authoritative word earlier than otherwise.

6. On the substantive side, the serious case for talking with Kosygin is Viet Nam. Frankly, I am a little impressed by the fact that the North Vietnamese have initiated contacts with us at several points. I am impressed by the fact that Kosygin dropped "permanent" from his bombing formula. It may be that our polls, which show popular support for a harder policy, have led them to believe that they will not be saved by the election of 1968; they may believe that we are about to make important decisions to increase our forces and perhaps apply more pressure against the North; that the bombing we have been doing is too unpleasant to be accepted over a period of years ahead; that there is danger, if we proceed on our present track, of either a clear-cut Hanoi defeat or a U.S./Soviet confrontation which they do not want; and that Hanoi is coming to believe that time is no longer its friend.

7. If there is anything at all in this line of thought then, of course, a meeting with Kosygin could be most important. And certainly the most important thing on which you must make up your mind is what you say to Kosygin--after hearing him out--on Viet Nam.

8. My own thoughts are not final, but here they are. You might say that he knows our commitment and our views; and that the formula of the Foreign Minister in Hanoi is not satisfactory to us. We cannot accept a stoppage of bombing simply for the possibility of talk. What are his views? If it emerges that he does not repeat the permanent formula and goes on to say he is sure talks could take place if we stop bombing unconditionally, you could then explain that so long as the DMZ is being violated you cannot make a commitment to stop bombing. You might ask him if they would respect the DMZ if we stopped bombing the North. He is most unlikely to be able to give you a definite answer on this; but he might agree to find out.

You could then indicate that there is a certain urgency in this matter. Your forces are under great pressure. They are taking heavy casualties every week. Secretary McNamara is going out to review the situation and to make recommendations. You might then add this: every mature American remembers that we lost more casualties during the Panmunjom negotiating period than we did during the Korean War. The critical question that must be answered by Hanoi is whether they are or are not willing to make peace on the basis of the 1954 and 1962 agreements and leave the South Vietnamese to settle their own political affairs on the basis of politics and not violence. We are looking for peace in Southeast Asia at the earliest possible time; but not on the basis of turning South Viet Nam over to North Viet Nam.

Walt

224. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State/1/

New York, June 22, 1967, 1600Z.

Secto 14. Secretary's dinner for Gromyko, June 21, 1967. Following is based on uncleared memcon, subject to revision on review, FYI, Noforn.

Present on the Soviet side were Gromyko, Dobrynin, Federenko, Sukhodrev. US side was Secretary, Ambassador Goldberg, Ambassador Thompson and Stoessel.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, ORG 7 S. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Passed to the White House.

Dinner began 8:15 p.m., ended 11:30 p.m. Atmosphere business-like. Following is summary of discussion which took place before all those present./2/ In addition, Secretary had several private exchanges with Gromyko.

/2/Seven memoranda of conversation were prepared for this meeting, which was held in Rusk's apartment at the Waldorf Towers: Part 1 is on the Non-Proliferation Treaty; part 2 is on the exchange of Embassy sites; part 3 is on Soviet ratification of the Consular Convention; part 4 is on the ratification of the Outer Space Treaty; part 5 is on the Civil Air Agreement; part 6 is on Vietnam; and part 7 is on Laos. All are in the Department of State, Kohler Files: Lot 71 D 460, Rusk/Gromyko Memoranda of Conversation.

1. Non-Proliferation Treaty--Secretary said we had instructed our representative in Geneva to agree to tabling NPT with blank Article III/3/ on understanding this article could be discussed further by US and Soviets subsequent to tabling. This could give other countries, particularly non-aligned, a chance to discuss other provisions of treaty. Gromyko said he felt it would be preferable to agree between us on Article III before tabling treaty; in the long run, this procedure would save time.

/3/For additional discussion during 1967 of Article III, known as the safeguards article, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XI, Documents 172, 188-189, 198-199, 205-206, 208, 211-212, 214-216, and 218-223.

On subject controls, Gromyko said we should use international organizations, not special groups or blocs which would involve discrimination. Thompson thought this procedure would mean loss of signatures of important countries but Gromyko felt we should not be too pessimistic on this score. Secretary noted EURATOM countries couldn't agree to Gromyko's suggestion because de Gaulle has veto. He thought Soviets might use their influence with French to overcome this problem but Gromyko said Soviets had already explained this to French, who did not agree.

Gromyko did not exclude possibility of tabling draft NPT with blank Article III. Even this might be a step forward. However, he felt other clauses of draft would be looked at as well. Re amendments he wondered if we were not worried about possibility that other countries would not be obliged to adopt amendments agreed between nuclear powers. Secretary responded negatively, noting that under our constitution we cannot accept situations where other countries could make treaty binding on US without our agreement. Secretary said that, of two alternate texts for amendments clause, we would prefer shorter version providing for agreement between nuclear signatories. This might cause problems with some non-nuclear powers but we have talked to NATO allies about both alternatives and there appears to be no problem on shorter version.

Secretary raised question of duration NPT. Some countries feel they should not bind themselves forever; however, we feel withdrawal clause should take care of problem. Gromyko asked what length of time might be acceptable if limit had to be placed on duration of NPT. Secy said some countries have mentioned 25 years. Gromyko did not specifically object, saying only, "In any case, treaty must be for long period of time."

Gromyko cautioned that even if Sovs agreed to table with blank Art III some further time might be needed on their side for consultation with allies. Secy said we had taken care of this with NATO allies at Luxembourg and were prepared to go ahead at any time.

2. Exchange of Embassy Sites--There was brief discussion this subject with Secy emphasizing the ball now is in Sov court. Gromyko was uninformed on details, although Dobrynin said problem seemed to be that we had upped our demands as to site in Moscow. Thompson explained our need for Congressional approval of transaction before final agreement for exchange of sites can be reached and emphasized necessity for obtaining a satisfactory site in Moscow.

3. Consular Treaty--Secy asked when Sovs would ratify. Gromyko responded that Sovs would ratify; their procedures were not yet fully completed but he foresaw no particular problem.

4. Outer Space Treaty--Queried on exchange of ratifications for OST, Gromyko said there should be no difficulty and only question was to establish mutually convenient time.

5. Civil Air Agreement--Sovs said only problem holding them up was their desire use new jet transport plane on Moscow-NY service. Gromyko said IL-62 is already in use on Moscow-Khabarovsk run transporting cargo, but was still considered experimental since it had not passed all of its tests.

6. Viet-Nam--After dinner, Secy turned to Viet-Nam asking if Sovs saw any procedures which could be used open up question for discussion. We are prepared for bilateral talks, a new Geneva conf, UN talks direct contacts with Hanoi-anything which could help bring conflict to an end.

Gromyko, speaking for the first time during evening in Russian through interpreter, said one of methods Secy suggested could bring prospects for positive development, i.e., contacts between two sides. However, for this, an atmosphere must be created which would be conducive to talks and this must involve unconditional cessation of bombing of DRV. Gromyko recalled that in past contacts between two sides had seemed to be developing but had broken off as result US escalation of bombing attacks. He thought there were possibilities for us to find solution to present highly complex situation if as first step we agreed to unconditional cessation of bombing.

Secy said Hanoi's position seems to be that pause in bombing is insufficient; that there must be permanent and unconditional cessation of bombing while they refuse to stop hostile activities on their side. Gromyko replied Sovs could not conduct negotiations for Hanoi. Only way to find out what would happen is to stop bombing unconditionally. Sovs did not know whether DRV would insist on formal statements in connection with cessation. Only way to find out is to take step of stopping bombing. Secy called attention to presence of two or three DRV divisions near DMZ and to continuation of Viet Cong attacks in SVN during period in December when contacts were being sought through Poles. We had agreed to keep our bombing attacks ten miles away from center Hanoi and did this for several months but there was no reciprocity from DRV or Viet Cong.

Secy noted our last efforts to make contact through DRV reps in Moscow. He did not know if it was worthwhile to make another effort, but we were prepared to undertake it.

Gromyko said we were turning things topsy-turvey in wanting talks to precede end to bombing. Only way in which to create situation where talks could mature is to stop bombing unconditionally.

Gromyko then developed thesis that fighting in SVN was result national liberation struggle not directed from Hanoi. We were wrong to attempt shift blame for fighting to Hanoi. We should stop bombing DRV and should put questions of political prestige into the background. Sovs are convinced DRV will defend its rights to existence indefinitely and if we count on successful military outcome we are making mistake. This could cause not only great sacrifices for us but also involve great dangers of widening conflict. Gromyko said US seems to underestimate importance of what Sovs say on this subject. Gromyko doubted if other possibilities for solution mentioned earlier by Secretary, such as Geneva conf or UN, were realistic because necessary agreement by interested parties could not be obtained.

In response Goldberg's question as to how we could find out manner in which Hanoi would interpret pause in bombing on our part, Gromyko said it would not be difficult for us to find out. He could not speak for DRV or transmit proposals to them. He thought we were exaggerating the problem. We should first have unconditional cessation of bombing and then we could have discussions. Secy asked what would happen if we stopped-would divisions on other side attack? Gromyko replied that if bombing ceased, conditions would be created for establishing contacts and with contacts this type of problem could be discussed.

Secy again returned to problem of reciprocity. Ten thousand Americans have been killed in Viet-Nam and our people would not understand if attacks continued in South while we discontinued in North. Gromyko asked why he proceeded on supposition that attacks in South would continue. We should find out ourselves.

7. Laos--Secy wondered if there was any possibility solving situation in Laos. He felt it was capable of being solved in short time. Gromyko rejoined that our growing interference is basic problem. Sovs were worried about our behavior in Laos which weakens arguments for observing Laos agreements. Sovs are not present in Laos, but US is. Secy asked if Sovs would be prepared to call for full agreement of all parties re observance of Lao agreement. Gromyko said Sovs were ready if we were, but US was in Laos and they were not. Secy pointed to 6,000 NVN troops left in northern Laos after agreements but Gromyko said this was one-sided information and fact remained US was interfering in Laos. US was not in a good position to talk on non-interference in that country, whereas there is not one Sov soldier there.

Secy urged that Sovs use their influence as co-chairman to bring about observance of agreement but Gromyko repeated our presence weakens their position as co-chairman. When Secy pressed Gromyko to join with other co-chairman to get all contending parties out of Laos, Gromyko said it would be better for ICC to undertake such responsibility.

Secy said our understanding of Harriman-Pushkin agreement was that three powers of ICC could not use veto to restrict ICC activities. Gromyko said Sovs had different interpretation. Gromyko said there should be discussion between three political parties in Laos. He thought we were complicating coordination among the three parties and he asserted our influence was greater with Souvanna Phouma than that of Sovs.

After inconclusive discussion of background of assassination of former FonMin Pholsema, in which Gromyko sharply disagreed with views of US side, Gromyko said in response to Secy's plea that we all act to support original agreement in Laos that Sovs would like to see agreement and are prepared to consider "realistic proposals" without prejudice. Gromyko did not exclude Sovs would revert to Laos problem again.

Rusk

225. Memorandum From the President's Special Consultant (Bundy) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, June 22, 1967.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, USSR, Hollybush II. Secret. Sent through Rostow.

The Middle East with Kosygin:

You know all the issues. I think what we need is to probe him on one basic point:

Do they want to cool it off, or heat it up again? They really do have the choice, in two main ways:

(1) How many planes and tanks they give UAR and Syria. (You can safely refer to "reports" of "hundreds" of tanks and planes, without making the reports your own-if he denies the reports you can press the value of your call for registration of arms shipments at the UN. This should be mentioned with emphasis somehow, or they'll think you didn't mean it in your speech.)/2/

/2/See footnote 3, Document 220.

(2) Whether they join us in serious negotiations for a realistic peace, which our 5 principles do aim for, or instead stick to unworkable propaganda positions. Specifically, you could note with satisfaction his acceptance of Israel as a state, and press him to get his friends to do the same. The question after that is maritime rights, and after that, recognized and secure boundaries. He'll talk withdrawal; we want withdrawal to peace, not to June 4.

We will match our policy to theirs. We have absolutely no desire for another arms race, nor do we seek any "confrontation" with them. We don't think the Middle East is a promising place for either of us to play such games in-the players there are too unpredictable. Moreover, we recognize that they can't make a 180 degree turn over-night, nor seem to abandon friends like Nasser-dangerous, unreliable and ineffective though Nasser has proved. But every move toward peaceful and constructive positions will get full understanding and response from us.

On the past, you may want to assure him categorically that we did not know of Israeli decision of June 4 that they would have to react to the threat they faced. He does not need to be told that we weren't in the fighting itself--he knows.

On one separate point: Having been in Saigon at the time, I remember how much Kosygin resented our choice of that moment, when he was in Hanoi, for our first bombing attack. I think you ought to tell him--in a wholly private word--that you had no intention of involving him in any way-you had long since determined that you would have to react at once to the next direct attack on US installations there-and your hand was forced by the people who hit Pleiku. (I believe this quite personal concern of his is entirely separate from the general question of bombing.)

Finally, while I think you will want to be courteous and even gentle in tone, I think it will be important to be clear and firm in substance-your public language has been extremely moderate and generous, and we don't want him to miss your strength. The best way to show it will be if he tries any rough stuff--which I don't predict--but one way or another this old pro needs to take home a picture of your strength as well as your responsiveness.

McG. B.

226. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State/1/

New York, June 22, 1967, 1934Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL US-USSR. Secret; Nodis. Passed to the White House.

5850. Pass White House for Walt Rostow from Thompson./2/

/2/Rostow forwarded the text of the telegram to the President under a covering memorandum dated 8:30 p.m., June 22. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, USSR, Hollybush II) Thompson attended a White House meeting with the President on June 23 from 8:45 to 9:42 a.m. Also attending were Rusk, McNamara, Katzenbach, Rostow, Bundy, and Christian. No record of the discussion has been found. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary)

1. Following are some personal suggestions for line President might use in opening discussion with Kosygin.

2. Regret first meeting takes place against current background and that Chairman will not have opportunity see more of our country. Hopes someday conditions will permit him to see Soviet Union. Hopes Chairman has good impression from what he has seen of US but New York international city and not typical.

3. President very conscious of heavy responsibility resting on our two countries in an atomic age because of their size and influence.

4. Unfortunately more than one government trying to cause trouble between us in short-sighted view of their narrow selfish interests. Important that we be frank with each other and have the kind of relations which will enable us to frustrate efforts of troublemakers. We believe in real co-existence and not mere absence of war between us. We must find way to prevent quarrels between other countries from involving us.

5. No desire and time available too short to engage in ideological discussion but one point worth mentioning. Soviets have advantage in fact they free to use leftists including Communist Parties in Western world to carry on ideological struggle. This possibility denied to US but this does not concern us. Since we do not consider that whole world has to have same system. What does concern us is that Soviets seem to see pattern of anti-Soviet behavior in our policies everywhere in the world. For example they seem to consider our policies toward Vietnam and Syria and UAR in same category. Essential difference is that Syrian and UAR Governments came into power largely by actions their own people. What we oppose in Vietnam and in some countries in Latin America is outside intervention to determine character of regimes in those countries.

6. Nasser seems to think we were trying to bring him down and there are some indications Soviet Government thinks downfall of Syrian Govt was objective of our policy. This quite untrue. We gave far more economic and military aid to Arabs than to Israel including very substantial economic aid to UAR. What many of these countries fail to understand is that while we do not wish to dictate their policies on basis our aid, our aid programs are in final analysis dependent upon what the Congress will provide and it is naturally affected when governments we are aiding engage in vicious attacks upon us. Some of the Arab countries that have broken relations with us have indicated they expect us to continue our economic aid. Soviets must have experienced some of same attitudes.

7. The most important thing in my view for President to get across is our desire to resolve current problems and work for better relations. We would be glad to see Soviet Union prosper. Essential that we not devote our energies to working against interests of the other or to let other small countries try to solve their problems by engaging the two of us in a head-on collision.

8. In Middle East we should work to remove the causes of tension in that area-in disarmament at least a freeze and later reduction-in the atomic field move quickly to try to prevent proliferation which now particularly important in Middle East. Most critical current problem remains problem Vietnam which we sincerely wish to settle.

Goldberg

227. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State/1/

New York, June 22, 1967.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, USSR, Hollybush II. Top Secret; Immediate; Nodis. There is no time of transmission on the telegram; it was received at 7:20 p.m. Rostow forwarded the telegram to the President at 7:30 a.m. on June 23 under a covering memorandum that stated: "You will wish to read this textual report of Sec. Rusk's critical conversation with Kosygin-to get the flavor. The question, as phrased here, is even better: "What shall we strive for?" (Ibid.)

Secto 16. Memorandum of Conversation.

Participants: Kosygin, Gromyko, Dobrynin, the Secretary and Amb. Thompson. Soviet Mission, 12 noon, June 22.

1. After some polite remarks the Secretary said the President had telephoned him and asked him to express his regret that he was not able to arrange to extend his personal hospitality to the Chairman at the White House or Camp David. The President understood, however, the Chairman's concern with the General Assembly and how occupied he was. He hoped that on some other occasion he would be able to personally entertain him.

2. The President wanted, if the Chairman thought a meeting to be desirable, to suggest that they meet tomorrow without any formal agenda. Either side could bring up any questions they thought would contribute to a useful meeting. The President had in mind discussing nonproliferation, the missile problem--both offensive and defensive, the Middle East where we had some common points of interest but also some differences and perhaps Southeast Asia. If the Chairman thought a meeting would be useful the President suggested MacGuire Airforce Base in New Jersey. This was a federal government facility about one hour and 10 minutes drive from New York. The President would be glad to make a helicopter available and suggested the meeting might begin at eleven. They could have lunch and the President would have to depart about 2:30 or 3:00 in the afternoon.

3. Kosygin said that he had no objection to discussing the problems the Secretary had mentioned. The discussion should not be limited by a fixed agenda. He anticipated a general exchange of views in which each could explain their general position. What he was after was the answer to a question. What should we strive for.

4. The Secretary said no one can answer this question better than the President.

5. Kosygin said this question was decisive for the Soviets. If this could be decided then all other matters would fall into place. He wished to raise the question as to why the meeting should take place on a military base. Both he and the President were civilians engaged in a peaceful endeavor.

6. The Secretary said he wished to be quite frank. The location proposed would be quiet and secure. It was difficult for the President to arrange on short notice the communications he needed. He had an appointment to speak in California and could take off from the base directly after the meeting. He said the base was not bristling with guns. Kosygin said the important thing was to consider public opinion. People would wonder what we were trying to demonstrate. Perhaps a place could be found off the base. He was not objecting to the area. He stressed that in his view it was not in the President's interest to meet on a military base. Both countries had declared for a peaceful approach, they needed only one room for about four hours and even a hotel room would suffice. People would wonder whether we had wanted to show him our guns or rockets.

7. The Secretary said that this was President Johnson's third choice. His first being the White House and the second Camp David. If Camp David were chosen the Secretary could escort him there by helicopter. There had been no design to get Kosygin on the military base but the President's thought was a federal facility which we could control and arrange the necessary security and privacy.

8. Kosygin said he understood but the people would not. Perhaps the meeting could be put off until Saturday in order to make better arrangements. He said perhaps Americans did not understand how Europeans looked on such questions and he repeated a meeting on a military base would not be in the interest of the President. He would be prepared to meet at 9 or 10 on Saturday. The meeting should serve the cause of peace and the solving of important world problems. He did not want this to be considered a meeting which would increase tension. He believed the President wanted it to be of a friendly character. He was not standing on formal consideration and did not want to make it more difficult for us. He appreciated the invitation to visit the White House but pointed out he was not on an official visit to the United States.

9. The Secretary asked if he could reconsider the suggestion of Camp David.

10. Kosygin said he simply could not go there. This was not his caprice. He had to consider the reaction of public opinion. Perhaps we did not feel the same delicacy.

11. The Secretary said within the American scene a meeting on a base would not appear to us as it apparently would to them. A military base in our system did not have that character and a meeting on it would be more normal to us. A base was not just soldiers but a community which had schools, hospitals, residences, etc.

12. Kosygin suggested they might go to a farmer's house. If they were in the Soviet Union this could be easily arranged for a meeting of a few hours.

13. The Secretary said he would report back to the President. It would be difficult to propose a fourth site. The Chairman has his problems but the President has problems of his own.

14. Kosygin said the public need not know of other sites and the one selected could be presented as the President's proposal.

15. The Secretary said he understood that the Chairman was stating a preference but did the Chairman wish him to say to the President that he could not meet at the base.

16. Kosygin said he did not want the matter put in such black and white terms but he wanted to ask the President that he take his views into consideration. Kosygin said that if it would help matters he could meet at any time on Saturday.

Rusk

228. Editorial Note

At 10:40 a.m. on June 23, 1967, President Johnson arrived by helicopter at the campus of Glassboro State College in Glassboro, New Jersey, for his first and only summit meeting with a Soviet leader. Chairman Kosygin arrived by automobile at 11:22 a.m. At 11:30 the two men began the first of three private meetings, two on June 23 and one on June 25, all of which were held in the study at Hollybush, the large stone home of the college president, Dr. Thomas E. Robinson. In addition, Chairman Kosygin and President Johnson together with their delegations met both days for luncheon in the dining room at Hollybush. (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary)

According to the President's memoir, The Vantage Point, page 482, Glassboro, which had been proposed as a site the day before by New Jersey Governor Richard J. Hughes, offered several advantages: it was a small college town near the midpoint between New York and Washington and only 18 miles from the Philadelphia International Airport and 10 miles from the New Jersey Turnpike. The decision to hold the summit at Glassboro was announced at 6:35 p.m. on June 22.

Following their meetings on June 23, the two leaders made brief remarks to the press, indicating that they would resume their discussions at 1:30 p.m. on June 25. For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1967, Book I, pages 644-645. President Johnson then flew to Los Angeles to deliver a speech that evening at the President's Club dinner, following which he flew to his ranch in Texas. The morning of June 25 he flew from Texas to Philadelphia, arriving by helicopter at Glassboro at 12:41 p.m. The Soviet delegation arrived at 1:31 p.m. The U.S. and Soviet delegations met for luncheon at 1:50, followed by a private meeting between President Johnson and Chairman Kosygin. (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary) Upon concluding their meeting, the two men again made brief remarks which are printed in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1967, Book I, pages 650-651. The President made additional remarks upon his arrival at the White House that evening, which are ibid., pages 651-652.

Documentation on the Glassboro meetings, including the briefing book prepared by the Department of State, is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, USSR, President's Meeting with Chairman Kosygin (Hollybush I and II). Additional documentation is ibid., Rostow Files, Hollybush and Trip to Soviet Union; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Conference Files: Lot 68 D 453, CF 200; and ibid., Central Files, POL 7 US. While Johnson and Kosygin were meeting on June 23, Secretary of State Rusk met at Glassboro with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko. A memorandum of their conversation on non-proliferation and other nuclear issues is printed in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, volume XI, Document 198. A memorandum of the conversation on the Middle East is scheduled for publication in volume XIX. A memorandum of their conversation on West Germany is in Department of State, S/S-I Files: Lot 79 D 246. For President Johnson's recollections of the Glassboro summit, see The Vantage Point, pages 481-485. Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin recalls the summit in In Confidence, pages 162-167. Walt Rostow recounts the meeting from his perspective in John W. McDonald, ed., U.S.-Soviet Summitry: Roosevelt through Carter (Washington, D.C.: Foreign Service Institute, U.S. Department of State, 1987), pages 56-62. An oral history interview with William D. Krimer is at the Johnson Library. Krimer was the U.S. interpreter at all the meetings but the final one and drafted the memoranda of conversation for the meetings at which he was interpreter.

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