![]() |
![]() | ||||
Foreign Relations of the United States 1964-1968, Volume XIV, Soviet Union -Return to This Volume Home Page Released by the Office of the Historian A 'Controlled' Freeze, January 1966-May 1967
205. Telegram From
Secretary of State Rusk to the Ambassador to the Soviet Union
(Thompson)/1/ Washington, March 6, 1967. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File,
Intelligence File, Svetlana Alliluyeva. Secret; Flash. Nothing on this
telegram indicates how it was transmitted. For Ambassador from Secretary. 1. Svetlana Iosifovna Stalin, daughter of Josef
Stalin, walked into U.S. Embassy New Delhi 6 March with passport and
luggage and requested political asylum. Signed request for asylum in
U.S. 2. Ambassador Bowles authorized issuance U.S. visa
for sole purpose to permit Svetlana leave New Delhi and she departed
shortly after midnight 6 March via Quantas flight to Rome. Embassy officer
traveling on diplomatic passport accompanied her. She possesses open
ticket from Rome to U.S. but has no reservations beyond Rome. 3. Svetlana reported she arrived India 20 December
1966 accompanying ashes her deceased common law husband, Brajesh Singh,
expatriate Indian who lived Moscow and worked for foreign languages
publishing house. She said Brajesh Singh is uncle of Dinesh Singh with
whom she spent last week prior arriving at U.S. Embassy New Delhi. Dinesh
Singh is Secretary of State in Indian Foreign Office. 4. Svetlana claims she came to India on one month
visa but has made repeated attempts remain there, including appeals to
Dinesh Singh and Mrs. Gandhi, all to no avail. 6 March she asked Soviet
Ambassador Benediktov for permission remain but he flatly refused,
insisted she return Moscow via Aeroflot on 8 March and told her she would
not be allowed leave USSR again. She then came U.S. Embassy. 5. Ambassador Reinhardt has been advised that we
feel it would be undesirable for Svetlana to proceed to U.S., both
politically and from point of view her security. We consider it urgent
that every effort be made arrange other safer asylum in Switzerland, Spain
or Italy and have asked Ambassador Reinhardt to make every effort to have
her persuaded that such course in her best interest. When she agrees, we
will approach the govt concerned prior to her formal application for
permission to enter. Arrangements are being made with the Italians for her
to remain there safely for period sufficient to enable us to work out the
problem./2/ /2/Rusk
briefed the President on the situation with Svetlana Alliluyeva in a
telephone conversation that began at 4:03 p.m. on March 6. A recording of
the conversation is ibid., Recordings and Transcripts, Tape F67.08, Side
B, PNO 3. 6. Request your immediate comments and
suggestions. Our own feeling is that as soon as scenario is worked out we
should frankly inform Soviets, probably through Dobrynin here, emphasing
that this was a matter thrust upon us by circumstances and not of our own
seeking./3/ /3/Thompson replied in a March 7 telegram to Rusk,
stating that the "more we can disengage from this operation the better
from point of view of our relations with Soviets. They will in any event
blame U.S. for facilitating subject's departure from India and possibly
charge us with kidnapping." (Johnson Library, National Security File,
Intelligence File, Svetlana Alliluyeva) End of message. 206. Memorandum of
Conversation/1/ Washington, March 10, 1967. /1/Source: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 30 USSR. Secret; Nodis.
Drafted by Kohler. Walt Rostow forwarded a copy to the President under a
March 11 covering memorandum. (Johnson Library, National Security File,
Intelligence File, Svetlana Alliluyeva) SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS Ambassador Dobrynin called on request. I told him
that we wished to be completely frank and honest with him with respect to
our involvement in the case of Madame Svetlana Alliluyeva. In this connection I wanted him to know precisely
what had happened in New Delhi and to realize that our intervention was
purely humanitarian in accord with the long established American
tradition. Since it contained the most complete account of these events
and since it should be assumed that the document would likely become
available to the Soviets, in one way or another, in Delhi, I read to him
Ambassador Bowles' letter of March 10, 1967 to Mr. C.S. Jha, Foreign
Secretary of the Indian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He took copious notes
and has almost a complete version of that letter (copy attached)./2/ After he had fully noted
this account of events in Delhi, I told him that it was my understanding
that she had applied to the Swiss Government for a visa allowing her to
visit there for rest and recuperation and that the Swiss Government had
acceded to her request. I understood that she was already in Switzerland
and assumed that there would be news confirming this out of Switzerland
tomorrow. /2/Not
printed. I went on to say that the United States has no
desire whatsoever to exploit the case. As he would have been able to judge
for himself, we had shown restraint by refusing any comment whatsoever up
to the present time, and we would continue to show restraint. We would
comment publicly only if we were obliged to do so because of what others
might say, specifically either the Soviets themselves or the Indians. I
continued that the United States Government hopes that this case will not
do damage to Soviet-American bilateral relations at this delicate
juncture; that our actions have been and continue to be guided by that
consideration. This was the reason why I was being so full and explicit
and frank in letting him know precisely the extent of our involvement. I said that we had no desire to have Svetlana come
to the United States and that she seemed to have agreed that this would
not be in her own best interest or in the best interest of either the
United States or the Soviet Union or of the relations between the two. I said that Svetlana's future depended exclusively
on her. She had never been in our custody nor had her movements been
determined by us. I understood that at the present time she did not wish
to return to the USSR but that it was really her decision where she would
go after her visit to Switzerland. Ambassador Dobrynin expressed what seemed to be
real and heartfelt appreciation for this communication. He said that he
had noted the press stories and had heard many rumors and had feared that
troubles might ensue. He said he was accordingly very thankful to have
this full explanation. He added with apparent relief that it would now be
up to his colleague in Switzerland to pursue the case by trying to have a
talk with Svetlana. 207. Memorandum of
Conversation/1/ Washington, March 10, 1967. /1/Source: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, PS 7-1 US-USSR/Wortham, Ray
Buell. Confidential. Drafted by Kohler and approved in G on March
10. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS During his call on me today, I referred to the
efforts that everyone in the Executive Branch of the United States
Government from the President on down has been making in connection with
the ratification of the Consular Convention./2/ I said I was sure he had noted this and he
indicated assent. I pointed out that the debates were still continuing in
the Senate and that it was very important that nothing happen which would
turn the tide against ratification. /2/The
Senate Foreign Relations Committee reported the convention out favorably
by a 15-4 vote on February 28. The Senate voted 66 to 28 for ratification
on March 16, and the President ratified the convention on March
31. In this connection I said we were concerned about
the handling of the Wortham case which we understood was to be considered
tomorrow by the Court of Appeals./3/ Obviously, the most favorable thing that
could happen would be that the Court of Appeals should release Wortham. I
thought this would ensure passage of the Consular Treaty. However, as a
very minimum, it was important that no action be taken which would cause a
negative reaction. He asked whether postponement would be a good thing. I
replied that release of Wortham would be the best thing, but that I would
repeat as a minimum nothing adverse should be done tomorrow. /3/On
December 21, 1966, a Leningrad court had sentence Buel R. Wortham to 3
years in a labor camp on charges of theft of a statue and violation of
Soviet currency regulations. Ambassador Dobrynin said he understood my point
and that he would promptly telegraph Moscow on this matter./4/ /4/On
March 11 the Soviet Court of Appeals reversed Wortham's labor camp
sentence and fine him 5,000 rubles. In a March 11 memorandum Kohler called
it an "unprecedented reversal," which he also tied to his conversation
with Dobrynin on March 10 concerning executive clemency for Igor Ivanov, a
Soviet espionage agent on bail pending appeal of his 1964 conviction and
sentence of 20 years imprisonment. Kohler considered the reversal one of a
series of actions the Soviets counted on to give them "a certain amount of
credit" toward eventual clemency for Ivanov. (Department of State, Kohler
Files: Lot 71 D 460, Dobrynin-Kohler Memoranda of Conversation) 208. Letter From the
Ambassador to India (Bowles) to the President's Special Assistant
(Rostow)/1/ New Delhi, March 18, 1967. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File,
Intelligence File, Svetlana Alliluyeva. Secret; Eyes Only. Rostow
forwarded the letter to the President under cover of a March 24 memorandum
in which he stated: "Herewith Chet wraps up his end of the dealings with
the lady. He feels he acted properly; and, in retrospect, I agree."
(Ibid.) Dear Walt: I am enclosing some documents in regard to the
Svetlana episode which I think will interest you; you may want to show
them to the President. I have sent a similar set to the Secretary. These enclosures are (1) a play by play
description of the series of events that took place here in Delhi; (2) a
copy of Svetlana's handwritten statement in which she described her family
relationships and why she has determined not to return to the Soviet
Union; and (3) a copy of a personal note of appreciation which she sent me
from Switzerland./2/ /2/The
first enclosure is printed below; the other two were not
attached. As you will sense from her Statement she is an
extraordinary person. Our operation here was a ticklish one and everyone
concerned performed with competence. If we had refused to help her she
would have gone to the press and the roof would have blown off at home. If
we had gone directly to the Indians for "guidance" she would have
pressured us formally for asylum and there would have been a major
conflict among the Indians, Soviets and ourselves. She is going to write a book (indeed it is already
largely written) which will sell hundreds of thousands of copies./3/ As I suggested in a message
to the Secretary this book with some timely guidance from some American
whom she trusts could be written in a way that would help, not hurt,
US-Soviet relations. If, after dealing with the Stalin years, her emphasis
were on the new more liberal Soviet generation and hopes that it can
develop a cooperative relationship with America the favorable impact could
be very great. /3/Reference is to Twenty
Letters to a Friend, published by Harper & Row in October
1967. With warm regards, Attachment Memorandum for the
Record/4/ New Delhi, March 15, 1967. /4/Secret; Noforn. Prepared by Bowles. Another copy
is in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central
Files 1967-69, POL 30 USSR SUBJECT 1. At 7:30 pm on March 6, 1967, a neatly dressed
woman carrying a small suitcase appeared at the main door of the Chancery.
Speaking good but accented English she told the Marine Guard Cpl. Daniel
Wall that she was a Russian citizen and she wished to talk to an Embassy
officer. 2. According to standard procedure Cpl. Wall
called the Consular Officer George Huey, Security Officer John St. Denis,
and appropriate [less than 1 line of source text
not declassified] officers and asked the woman to wait in the Marine
Guard Office near the entrance until the officers arrived. 3. The Consular Officer, Mr. Huey, arrived at the
Chancery at 7:35 pm shortly followed by the Security Officer, John St.
Denis and the [less than 1 line of source text not
declassified] officers. 4. According to the woman's passport she was
Svetlana Iosifovna Alliloueva, born in Moscow, February 22, 1926 and
entered India December 20, 1966. She was taken to the DCM's empty office
where she was interviewed by Mr. Huey and by [less
than 1 line of source text not declassified]. 5. The following are the pertinent points of the
interview: (In addition, the text of a statement which she wrote out in
longhand later in the evening is attached.) A. Svetlana stated that she was the daughter of
Joseph Stalin by his second wife, Nadezhda Alliloueva, and that she was
the "common law wife" of Brajesh Singh, an uncle of Dinesh Singh, who had
been an employee of the Foreign Languages Publishing House in Moscow. B. Svetlana stated she had arrived in India on
December 20, 1966, accompanying the ashes of Brajesh Singh, who had died
in Moscow in late October 1966. She and Brajesh had wanted to marry, but
had been denied permission. This denial was conveyed to her by Kosygin
personally. It was also Kosygin who personally approved her visit to
India, evidently after strong representations from Dinesh Singh and T.N.
Kaul. C. The ceremony for immersion of Brajesh's ashes
in the Ganges took place on December 25, 1966, near Brajesh's village in
Uttar Pradesh. Dinesh Singh had wanted to use this occasion to demonstrate
Indo-Soviet amity, and had invited the top Soviet Embassy officials,
(neglecting to inform and invite many of Brajesh's old friends). The
Soviet Embassy, however, was under orders to keep everything quiet, so
none of them attended. D. She had long been disillusioned with Communism.
It was not just the disappointments related to governmental interference
in her personal life in the past few years (i.e. refusal to allow her to
marry Brajesh), nor was it a result of the 20th Party Congress. Her
disillusionment she said had begun long before, but recent events had
provided her with both the additional incentive to make this critical
decision and the opportunity to carry it out, which would probably never
be repeated. E. Her initial permission had been for a two week
stay in India and she had simply defied the Soviet Government by remaining
in the village for two months, ignoring requests, then orders, from the
Soviet Embassy that she return immediately. F. Svetlana stated that she had fallen in love
with India and her first desire was to remain here. She considered her
late husband's family in U.P. her own; they felt the same way about her
and wanted her to stay with them. She had discussed the matter with T.N.
Kaul, who was strongly opposed to her remaining. In fact Kaul exchanged
several letters with her while she was in U.P., urging her to return to
Moscow. She also spoke with Dinesh Singh, who said that she could remain
in India only if the Soviet Government gave her permission; "this was not
the time when India could afford a disturbance in its relations with the
Soviet Union." She requested Dinesh Singh to take the matter up with Prime
Minister Indira Gandhi. He later told her that he had done so, and that
she had agreed with him that it was impossible. With this hope gone she
felt that her only hope of remaining in India rested with the Soviets. G. Consequently on March 6 she had lunch with
Soviet Ambassador and Mrs. Benediktov and again requested that she be
permitted to remain in India. But once again her request was bluntly
refused. The tenor of the meeting left no doubt in her mind that she would
never again be permitted out of the Soviet Union. H. At one point either Dinesh Singh or T.N. Kaul
(it is not clear which) suggested to her that, if she were determined not
to return to the USSR, she might consider an approach to a "third
country," as India could not accept her. I. Svetlana said that when Ambassador Benediktov
made it clear that she would have to be on the flight to Moscow leaving
Delhi early Wednesday morning/5/ and in view of the refusal of Dinesh Singh
and T.N. Kaul to help her she resolved to appeal to the United States for
help. On the evening of March 6 she packed one suitcase (leaving two
others behind) in her room on the Soviet Embassy compound, called a taxi
to the gate of the compound, and asked the driver to take her to the
American Embassy. He did so without hesitation. /5/March
8. J. In response to persistent questioning Svetlana
insisted that she definitely could not go back to the USSR, as she was
determined to live her life as a free person. In the USSR she was not only
subject to the restrictions that apply to all citizens, but to additional
ones that applied to her because of her unfortunate position as some sort
of "national relic." If she returned to the USSR Svetlana was not sure
that her defiance of orders during her stay in India would be punished,
but she was certain she would never have another opportunity to travel
abroad. K. Since she could not remain in India, she was
appealing to the United States, which was a country she greatly admired.
She wrote and signed a formal request for asylum in the United States in
which she stated she is CPSU member but no longer favors the Communist
system. No promises of any kind were made to her. L. Svetlana was also told that we could not at
this point definitely promise asylum to her, and asked her what other
courses were open to her. She replied that if the United States could not
or would not help her she did not believe that any other country
represented in India would be willing to do so. Since she was determined
not to return, her only alternative was immediately to tell her story
fully and frankly to the press in the hope that she could rally public
support in India and the United States. M. Svetlana was reminded that at this time the
Soviet Embassy, being occupied with a full formal reception in honor of
Marshal Zakharov, was still probably unaware of her departure, and if she
chose to return she could still do so without them being aware that she
had ever left. She clearly and forcefully stated once again that she could
not and would not go back. 6. During the evening [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]
Roger Kirk, the Embassy Soviet Affairs Specialist, and Richard F. Celeste,
the Ambassador's Personal Assistant, were also called in. The interview
was interrupted at approximately 9:00 pm to permit the preparation of a
Flash cable/6/ to
Washington. /6/Not
found. 7. The initial part of this cable summarized the
facts outlined above and indicated that in our estimate we could count on
no more than four hours before the Soviet Embassy discovered that Svetlana
was missing. The message also pointed out that once her defection was
discovered and the GOI informed we would almost certainly be prohibited
from assisting her. The message concluded that "unless advised to contrary
we will try to get Svetlana on Quantas Flight 751 to Rome leaving Delhi at
1945Zulu" (1:15 am March 7 local time) and stated that she will be
accompanied by Embassy officer [less than 1 line
of source text not declassified]. 8. This cable to Washington was transmitted at
9:40 pm (March 6, 1610Z) and its receipt was acknowledged by Washington
eleven minutes later. 9. At this point it was explained to Svetlana that
we could not guarantee her asylum in the United States, but we were
willing to assist her in leaving India for Rome immediately if she should
choose to do so. She was cautioned that this would mean burning her
bridges behind her with no clear idea of what lay ahead. She asked whether
we would abandon her in Rome if it should be decided not to let her go to
the United States. She was told that if we could not grant her asylum we
would certainly continue to assist her until she did find a haven.
Svetlana then stated that she chose to proceed to Rome. 10. At this point, since a number of arrangements
had to be made, Svetlana was asked whether she would be willing to write
out a brief life history. She agreed to do so and spent the rest of the
evening until her departure for the airport writing. The text of this
longhand statement has been transmitted separately. 11. From Svetlana's statement to Embassy officers
it was clear that (a) she was not prepared to return to the USSR; (b) she
wanted to stay in India but that this had been ruled out by the GOI unless
the Soviet Government would approve and she was told that such approval
would not be forthcoming; (c) she wanted the assistance of the United
States Government, at a minimum, to leave India and find a safe place to
live and, at a maximum, to grant asylum in the US; and (d) if she could
not get US assistance her only recourse would be to contact the press and
appeal publicly for the help and support of the people of India and of the
United States. 12. While awaiting response to the Embassy's cable
to Washington I carefully reviewed the options with [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]
Roger Kirk and Richard Celeste. Four courses of action were discussed. A. To deny Svetlana our assistance and encourage
her to return to the Soviet Embassy compound; B. To keep Svetlana in the Chancery or Roosevelt
House until her future could be resolved with the GOI and the Soviet
Government; C. To grant her a visa to the United States
(Svetlana's Soviet documentation was in order and unrestricted) which
would enable her to leave India and proceed to another point while the
matter was considered further; D. To spirit Svetlana out of India covertly in the
hope that the US role in her departure could be kept secret. 13. I immediately ruled out alternatives A and D.
In regard to the first option to reject Svetlana's appeal for assistance
would be completely contrary to our national tradition. When it became
known that the United States Government had refused an appeal for
assistance from the daughter of Joseph Stalin, the public outcry in the
United States and elsewhere would have been overwhelming. Moreover, since
she had stated her intention to make a public appeal if we refused to help
her a profoundly embarrassing situation would also be created with the
Governments of India and the USSR. 14. Since it was impossible to confirm Svetlana's
identity during the brief time at our disposal, since the possibility of a
Soviet provocation could not be ruled out and, most important, since any
US role would almost certainly eventually come to light I considered that
the fourth option, i.e. to spirit Svetlana out of India covertly, involved
unacceptable and unnecessary risks. 15. Thus the choice was between keeping her in the
Chancery and informing the Indian Government that she sought asylum in the
United States, and assisting her to leave India as quickly as possible.
Careful consideration was given to both alternatives. 16. If Svetlana had been kept at the Embassy and
the GOI informed, an issue between our Governments and that of the Soviet
Union would have been immediately joined. The Government of India, under
heavy pressure from the Soviet Union, would have demanded Svetlana's
"release" to Indian custody. We would have had to refuse since it was
clear that the GOI could not be relied upon to permit her to stay on in
India peacefully. The fact that Stalin's daughter had sought and received
refuge in the United States Embassy would become known within a short time
and the Chancery and Roosevelt House would be besieged by the world press.
Thus the matter would have become an issue between the three governments
in a most contentious fashion and in a situation which would leave us
little room for maneuver. A first class international Donneybrook would
have been inevitable with the outcome unpredictable. 17. The appeal of assisting Svetlana to leave
without officially deciding the matter of asylum in the United States was
manifold. In the first place it could be done openly and legally since her
Soviet and Indian documentation was in order. This would protect the
United States against charges of another CIA plot and against the
accusation of kidnapping her against her will. Secondly it would provide a
breathing spell in which her future status could be considered without the
direct glare of publicity and without the involvement of the new
Government of India which would be almost certainly bound to bow to Soviet
pressure if she were still in India. 18. At approximately 11:30 pm I decided that we
should provide Svetlana with a visa and I confirmed the tentative
arrangement to place Svetlana on the Qantas flight for Rome, accompanied
by an American officer, unless we received contrary instructions from
Washington in response to our earlier cable in the meantime. 19. With my concurrence Mr. Huey, the Consular
Officer, endorsed a B-2 Visitor Visa in her passport, valid for one entry
if used within three months (i.e. before June 6, 1967). The visa did not
contain any mention of an INS waiver. Mr. Huey issued the visa on the
understanding that in fact Svetlana would not proceed beyond Rome unless
an appropriate determination were made in Washington that this was
desirable. Only with such a valid visa would the commercial airlines
accept Svetlana as a passenger to the West on the basis of her own
documentation. 20. At 12:15 Svetlana was driven to the airport by
Mr. Huey, accompanied by Marine Sgt. Michael Watson in civilian clothes
and [less than 1 line of source text not
declassified] Roger Kirk. There they met [less
than 1 line of source text not declassified] who had proceeded to the
airport to purchase the airline tickets. At Palam Airport Svetlana checked
through both Government of India immigration procedures and Government of
India customs procedures in the normal manner, using her own
documentation. Thereafter she waited in the public international departure
lounge at the airport for approximately one and a half hours (the plane
departure, which had been scheduled for 0115, was delayed for an hour and
a half due to a leak in its hydraulic system). The absence of any effort
at secrecy or coercion can be and has been attested to by numerous Indian
immigration, customs and airport officials as well as the airline officers
and employees with whom Svetlana was in contact. 21. As no contrary instructions were received from
Washington, at approximately 0245 Svetlana departed New Delhi on the
Quantas flight [less than 1 line of source text
not declassified]. 209. Memorandum of
Conversation/1/ Washington, March 23, 1967. /1/Source: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-4 US-USSR. Limited
Official Use. Drafted by Stoessel and approved in M on March 29. The
memorandum is Part I of III. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS Mr. Rostow said he had asked the Ambassador to
come in in order to stress to him the seriousness with which we regard the
latest incident involving violation by a Soviet trawler of waters off
Alaska, which we have restricted for fishing rights. Mr. Rostow noted that
the trawler which has just been apprehended by the Coast Guard within the
9-mile contiguous zone/2/
had been observed previously in December fishing within the 3-mile
territorial water limit in the Shumagin Islands area. This had been
protested at the time to the Soviet Embassy but now the same trawler was
involved in another incident. Further, Mr. Rostow noted several reports
from Alaska that Soviet fishing vessels are concealing their hull
identification numbers and that Soviet trawlers recently have damaged
thousands of dollars worth of crabpots. /2/On
March 22 the trawler was observed by a U.S. Coast Guard aircraft fishing
within the contiguous fishery zone at a point 5.5 miles from land near
Seal Cape off Alaska. A Coast Guard cutter pursued the trawler into
international waters and took it in tow. (State Department Activities
Report, March 22; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59,
S/S-I Files: Lot 74 D 164) Mr. Rostow said that the population in Alaska is
aroused about the incidents involving Soviet trawlers and the Department
is under a great deal of pressure from Alaskan officials as well as
Congressional representatives to take a very strong stand on the
incidents. Mr. Rostow mentioned that Senator Bartlett, who previously had
approved the Administration's restraint in handling the case of the Soviet
trawler apprehended early in March,/3/ has now said that he favors the strictest
application of the applicable penalties and the maximum fine against the
trawler. /3/See
Document 204. Mr. Rostow said that the Department is now
considering its position in the matter and the nature of the advice it
should give to the Justice Department. In this regard, it is most
important that we have a clear understanding of the Soviet attitude toward
these incidents and Soviet policy regarding them. It is one thing if the
incidents which have taken place are isolated events resulting from an
excess of zeal on the part of the captains of the fishing vessels. On the
other hand, if it is a deliberate policy on the part of the Soviet fishing
fleet to violate our regulations, this would obviously be much more
serious. Mr. Rostow asked the Ambassador if the Soviet fishing fleets were
under strict instructions to comply with US regulations. The Ambassador said that he certainly assumed that
the trawlers had instructions to observe the US regulations; however, he
would verify this with Moscow and would inform Mr. Rostow as soon as
possible./4/ /4/On
March 25 Alexander Zinchuk, Minister-Counselor at the Soviet Embassy,
advised Rostow that masters of all Soviet fishing trawlers had been
informed of new restrictions on foreign fishing in U.S. coastal waters and
that Soviet masters who violated foreign fisheries laws were punished by
Soviet law. A memorandum of their conversation is in the National Archives
and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69 POL 33-4
US-USSR. Mr. Rostow concluded by stressing again the
seriousness with which we view these incidents. He said that the Soviet
Union had been given ample advance warning of our intention to establish
the restricted zones and that an extended grace period had been given
before we undertook to enforce the regulation. It would indeed be
regrettable if these incidents were allowed to become another irritant in
US-Soviet relations and he hoped the matter could be resolved
satisfactorily. 210. Memorandum of
Conversation/1/ Washington, March 23, 1967, 6 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 30 USSR. Secret;
Nodis. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS Ambassador Dobrynin called on me this evening, at
his request, and made to me the following oral statement on the case of
Svetlana Alliluyeva, replying to my statement to him/2/ on the same matter: /2/See
Document 206. "The assurances of the American side in connection
with the case of S. Alliluyeva, relayed by Kohler, have produced a rather
strange impression. The U.S. Government is trying to impress us with the
idea that it was not implicated in the departure of Alliluyeva from India
and that allegedly it in general is not interested in the whole affair,
having a clear understanding of the undesirable consequences it could have
for Soviet-American relations. Moreover, the fact that Alliluyeva has not
come to the U.S.A. is portrayed almost as a friendly gesture by the U.S.
Government toward the U.S.S.R. "Meanwhile, it is completely clear, even from the
information passed by Kohler, that it was American officials, including
the American Ambassador to India, who organized the travel of Alliluyeva
from New Delhi to Western Europe by the use of underhanded (nizkoprobnii)
methods which could only be dictated by feelings of ill-will toward the
State of which she is a citizen. "Strictly speaking, we are not at all concerned
here with the fact that Alliluyeva left India for some place or other. No
one intended to prevent her from doing this. In what country or countries
she is and how long she stays there is her personal affair. The attitude
of the Soviet authorities toward this is clear from the very fact that she
was given a visa for departure from the Soviet Union. Moreover, it has
long been well-known that she is a person who is not completely sound
(zdorovii) with pathological traits (elementi) which have been reflected
in her general behaviour. Soviet authorities did not see any reason on the
basis of this not to permit her to go abroad, but I am instructed to
inform you of this aspect of the affair. "But what cannot but surprise us are the
above-mentioned activities of U.S. representatives, and, consequently, of
the U.S. Government. These activities are saturated with a spirit of open
unfriendliness toward our country and are in direct conflict with
statements about striving for an improvement in U.S.-U.S.S.R. relations.
Indeed, there are in Soviet-American relations many problems with which
one might be occupied with much greater benefit for both sides than
fussing over dubious business of such a kind. "This is what we wished to say about this matter
with complete frankness, having in mind that what we have said would be
brought to the attention of President Johnson. "It is of course for the American side to draw the
appropriate conclusions from all of this. We do not intend to suggest
(podskazivat) to [the American side]/3/ any sort of decisions on this score." /3/Brackets in the source text. At my request and only for my convenience in
making an accurate report of the conversation, he left with me the
attached copy of his talking notes in Russian./4/ /4/Not
printed. I told the Ambassador I took note of his
statement. I regretted that the Soviet authorities had seen fit to take
the unhelpful attitudes indicated therein. As the Ambassador knew, we had
been frank and straightforward and had tried to handle this matter in a
way designed to avoid creating obstacles to our relationship; we would
continue to do so. Ambassador Dobrynin nodded in what seemed to be an
expression of personal agreement but made no comment. The Ambassador did,
however, refer to the TASS report of McCloskey's press briefing which he
said indicated the Department had approved in advance the issuance of a
visa to Alliluyeva. I told him this was not true, and I thought it was
unlikely that McCloskey could have said so. I had seen the statement he
was to make to the press and it contained no such assertion./5/ /5/Note:
In fact, McCloskey following his reading of the authorized statement on
March 22, 1967 did state in reply to a question that Washington had
authorized the issuance of the visa by New Delhi. This, of course, was not
true. [Footnote in the source text.] 211. Telegram From the
Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State/1/ Moscow, April 24, 1967, 1330Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 17 USSR-US. Secret;
Limdis. 4566. 1. At lunch today I asked Dobrynin what had
brought him back to Moscow. He replied that government wanted to talk
about Soviet-American relations but went on to say that question foremost
on everyone's mind was Vietnam. He said many members of government were
convinced that we were not ready for negotiations but were bent on
achieving a military victory and that our peace moves were merely a screen
to cover each escalation. He went over past history and cited as the most
recent example our having proposed a withdrawal ten miles on each side of
the DMZ and then almost immediately had bombed targets around Haiphong.
This particularly concerned Soviets as their ships were frequently in the
port. 2. Dobrynin said that government was still
considering the ABM question but said that this like all other questions
of relations with the US was affected by the Vietnam problem. 3. He said Soviets would ratify Consular
Convention in due course but they would probably ratify Treaty on Outer
Space first. Thompson 212. Letter From the Under
Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Rostow) to the Ambassador to the
Soviet Union (Thompson)/1/ Washington, May 1, 1967. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File,
Country File, USSR, Vol. XV. Secret; Official-Informal. Read forwarded a
copy of the letter to Walt Rostow under cover of a May 5 memorandum.
(Ibid.) Dear Tommy, I have been trying to arrange a reconsideration of
the approach to the Soviets about Vietnam we have discussed at intervals
ever since I came to the Department last fall. First my recent trip to
Europe, then Punta del Este, and now Adenauer's funeral have caused
delays. Meanwhile, the process of hostilities in Vietnam
asserts a dynamic force which continues to cause both of us great concern.
We-we, the civilians, that is-have failed to produce a political solution
for the war. It is almost reflexive action to allow more leeway to the
soldiers, and especially to the Air Force. In turn, the pressure on China
and the Soviet Union mounts. Your interesting telegram No. 4491,/2/ and then 4566,/3/ as well as the corresponding
message in the other series,/4/ leads me to write this letter, both to
carry on our own conversation, and to try to clear my mind. /2/In
telegram 4491, April 19, Thompson questioned whether the "continuing
campaign of Vietnam peace moves" served to further the possibility of
peace negotiations. So far as the Soviet Union was concerned, Thompson
stated, initiatives with a remote chance of success, especially those
involving the Soviets, "may be positively harmful as adding to Soviet
suspicions of our sincerity." For text, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. V, Document
137. /3/Dated
April 24. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central
Files 1967-69, POL 17 USSR-US) /4/Not
further identified. I believe, as you do, that we are on a tricky and
dangerous course, and that relative success in South Vietnam is increasing
the risk of a confrontation with the U.S.S.R. The Soviets are putting more and more material
into North Vietnam. So far-in use at least-it is material mainly to defend
North Vietnam. They are sending us warnings--i.e., Zhukov's talks
here,/5/ and Brehznev's
latest speech calling on us to get out of Europe. And they are letting it
be known that they think the following somewhat inconsistent thoughts: (1)
that we are not interested in negotiation, but in military victory, which
they say is impossible; and (2) that the recent move towards détente was
at our initiative; that we need a posture of détente with them for
domestic purposes; and that so far we have given them nothing in return
(never mind that we can't see what they have "given" us in this
minuet). /5/Walt
Rostow's memorandum of his conversation with Yuri Zhukov on April 18 is at
the Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Special
Files, Public Service, Kennedy-Johnson, Subject Files, Z misc. Whatever these signals mean--whether they are
preparations for serious talks between us, or serious warnings, or nothing
in particular but noise--there is no doubt that at some point, over some
issue, there is a risk of forcing them to a confrontation, and that the
risk would be less if bombing could be confined to the infiltration
routes. Dobrynin told me once there were some steps the Soviets could not
tolerate. I suppose the loss of North Vietnam to the Communist camp would
be one. As you know, I have felt for some time that unless
the war were settled, it would enter a more dangerous phase,--a phase of
danger for the Soviet Union as well as for other people--and that sooner
or later we should have to follow the procedure which, with some
variations, led to the end of all the post-war crises, that is, a secret,
low-keyed warning to the U.S.S.R., followed by joint or parallel
U.S.-Soviet action to put out the fire. I have recently checked with Dean Acheson about
the stages of settlement in Korea. The first step, according to Dean's recollection,
was a talk between George Kennan and Malik in the middle of June, 1951.
George was about to go back to Moscow as Ambassador. He asked to see Malik
in New York to go over the list of new men in the Soviet Foreign Office.
In the course of that talk, he was instructed to talk along these lines:
"His boss (i.e., Dean Acheson) was beginning to wonder if Malik's boss
knew where this thing was going. He couldn't figure out Soviet intentions.
He hoped they knew. Did they really want a blow-up?" A few days later (on June 23) Malik made a speech
which contained a hint. We followed it up in Moscow. This led to
Kaesong. I'm checking the files. But I remember Dean
telling the story the same way some years ago. My thought, as you know, is to convey both a
warning and an offer to the U.S.S.R.: a warning that the present course
could get out of hand, with results no one wants; an offer, in the spirit
of our "special relationship" to join with them in procedures that could
bring this affair to an end. The essence of that approach (at least the second
part: there was no visible warning) was put to Dobrynin by the Secretary
in January,/6/ and
recently followed up by Harriman and me. There are different ways to
formulate the idea. It rests in the end on the assumption that we have a
common interest in ending the war on the basis of the status quo ante,
since further hostilities carry risks we both wish to avoid. How to get
there? They will know best about how to bring influence on Hanoi. The
essential is to face the issue in this form. /6/Regarding Rusk's conversation with Dobrynin on
January 5, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968,
vol. V, Document 7, footnote 2. The resulting Sunflower negotiations
during January and February, in which Kosygin played a major role, are
documented ibid. You say a proposal that the Soviet cut off aid to
NVN could be interpreted as a move on our part to turn Hanoi over to the
Chinese. Agreed. But it should be possible to meet that concern, both
through our warning as to the alternatives, and through the suggestion
that we jointly guarantee the outcome of the settlement, directly or
indirectly. In that connection, I am intrigued by recent Soviet moves with
regard to Laos. The 1962 agreement/7/ rests on the notion of joint guarantee,
after all. /7/Dated
July 23; for text, see American Foreign Policy:
Current Documents, 1962, pp. 1075-1083. I'm sure that some people in the Soviet Union
would like to see us continue to flounder in Vietnam, and to have the
President punished politically in 1968. Such a result would paralyze
American foreign policy for the forseeable future, and open the door to a
renewal (or should I say intensification?) of Soviet adventurism in the
many soft under-bellies of the world. Even though there are risks, as you say, that
efforts to involve the Soviets may be misunderstood or rebuffed, I remain
convinced that the time has come to try. The alternatives are all worse.
And we've been rebuffed by experts, after all. I should think that we have nothing to lose by
moving forward, and a lot to gain, even if we do no more than deter and
diminish Soviet military assistance to North Vietnam. It should not be
hard to work out a formula both for the warning, and for the offer--a
statement calculated to allow them political credit as peace makers if
they want it, to meet their political interest in North Vietnam, and to
point the way to stability. This is the only path I can see now for reaching
the posture you mention in paragraph 7 of your 4491./8/ /8/In
paragraph 7 Thompson proposed making a dramatic announcement, such as of a
substantial increase of U.S. forces in South Vietnam combined with a
leveling off of the bombing of the North, that would hurt the Viet Cong at
the same time that it reduced the risk of increased Soviet aid to the
North. Such a course might reduce criticism at home and thus North
Vietnam's hope of an early U.S. withdrawal. It might help counter Zhukov's campaign
here-intended to make our flesh crawl-if you dropped the remark that some
of your colleagues thought the situation in Vietnam was approaching that
in Korea at the time of the Kennan-Malik talk. Yours, as always, Eugene V. Rostow/9/ /9/Printed from a copy that indicates Rostow signed
the original. 213. Special National
Intelligence Estimate/1/ SNIE 11-11-67 Washington, May 4, 1967. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File,
National Intelligence Estimates, 11-67. Secret; No Foreign Dissem;
Controlled Dissem. Submitted by the Deputy Director of Central
Intelligence and concurred in by the United States Intelligence Board. An
explanatory note indicates that the SNIE was prepared at the request of
the Department of State. In telegram CAP 67378 to President Johnson at his
Texas ranch, May 5, Walt Rostow transmitted the full text of SNIE
11-11-67, noting that the President had already received the summary of
"this thoughtful report" that morning. The telegram is marked with an "L,"
indicating that the President saw it. (Ibid., Country File, Vietnam, Vol.
LXX) SOVIET ATTITUDES AND INTENTIONS The Problem To examine the USSR's policies toward the Vietnam
war and its views of relevant US policies, and to estimate Soviet
intentions in relation to that conflict. Conclusions A. While the Soviet leaders see the war as
advantageous to them in many ways, they also see disadvantages which make
their options unpromising and hazardous. They probably believe that there
is no prospect of movement toward a political solution for several months
at best and appear to have concluded that for the time being they have no
alternative but to help Hanoi to carry on the war, hoping that changes of
attitude in either Hanoi or Washington, or both, will make a political
solution possible later. B. The Soviet leaders fear that the US, in its
impatience to get the war over, will escalate the conflict in a way which
will increase the risks and costs for the USSR; in an effort to forestall
this they are currently stressing their intention to move to more vigorous
support of North Vietnam. We believe that during the coming months they
will continue to supply equipment designed to strengthen air and coastal
defenses in North Vietnam and to increase the firepower of both the
regular North Vietnamese forces and the Communist forces fighting in the
South. C. Whether or not there are formal arrangements
covering the transit of Soviet supplies across China, we believe that
Peking will not pose serious obstacles to such transit. But the relations
between Moscow and Peking are still fundamentally hostile, and their
attitudes toward major issues of war and peace in Vietnam will continue to
differ profoundly. D. The North Vietnamese at some point will
probably press the Soviets for more sophisticated equipment than those
types now arriving on the scene or in the pipeline. These might include
cruise missiles and tactical rockets which could be used to support North
Vietnamese operations in the DMZ area and against US warships. The USSR
might believe it had to respond to such pressure, although it would be
concerned that the use of such weapons would provoke a still more
dangerous US response. E. If the intensity of the conflict were to be
increased by the US, we believe that at some point the USSR would create
an atmosphere of heightened tension with the US. The Soviets might take
certain actions designed to bolster North Vietnam and to warn the US, such
as the provision of limited numbers of volunteers or crews for defense
equipment or possibly aircraft. They might also break off negotiations
with the US on various subjects and suspend certain agreements now in
effect. The mining or the blockade of the North Vietnamese coast would be
most likely to provoke these responses, since this would constitute a
direct challenge to the Soviets, and there would be little they could do
on the scene. We do not think the Soviets are prepared to resort to strong
and direct threats of general war as a means to protect North Vietnam or
to preserve Soviet face. F. There would also be a good chance that at some
juncture the Soviets would exert strong efforts toward a political
solution, but they would probably not make Hanoi's acceptance of talks an
explicit condition of continued material support. [Here follow 5 pages of Discussion and a 4-page
Annex.] 214. Memorandum From the
President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bator)
to President Johnson/1/ Washington, May 12, 1967, 1:30 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File,
Country File, USSR, Vol. XV. Secret. Bator forwarded the memorandum to the
President under a May 12 covering memorandum which stated: "The Russians
last gave us a prod on this two or three days ago. Nevertheless, we would
hold up on consultation until it is clear that the game of naval 'chicken'
in the Japan Sea [in early May the USS Walker
was scraped by two Soviet destroyers] does not show a pattern."
(Ibid.) SUBJECT The Russians are once again putting pressure on us
(Kosygin-Thompson) to reduce our present tough restrictions on access by
Soviet ships to U.S. ports. On the face of it, they have a beef. They
treat U.S. ships on a par with others. We keep them out of all but 12 of
our ports, and put them through a lot of red tap, frisking, etc. before we
let them in anywhere--restrictions which we do not apply to non-communist
nations. The result is that they almost never use our ports. Our ships
don't much use theirs either, but that is by choice. On the basis of an interagency staff level
recommendation, Nick Katzenbach suggests that we explore with key labor
people (Meany, Gleason, et al)--and then on the Hill--the possibility of
some careful easing of the restrictions. A brief summary of the kind of
easing we have in mind is at Tab A./2/ It would be designed to forestall a row
with Moscow, without any risk to the security of our ports. (The present
arrangements were designed to keep the Russians from sneaking nuclear
weapons into U.S. big-city harbors. This made some sense in the mid-50s
before the Russians developed intercontinental missiles with hydrogen
warheads. It makes little sense now. In any case, we would maintain enough
control to hedge our bets.) /2/Not
printed. In any case, we must proceed carefully. This is
the sort of thing that could cause a rapid rise of George Meany's
temperature. And he would have plenty of allies among the more edgy of our
security people, who tend to think there is a communist under every
bed. The recommendation to consult comes from
Katzenbach and has the support of the appropriate people in the other
agencies, including Defense and the Chiefs. If you approve, we would go
ahead only/3/ after it is
clear that the current game of naval chicken in the Sea of Japan does not
develop into a pattern. And after taking soundings, we would lay out for
you the choices for final decision. /3/"Only"
is underlined in pen. FMB OK for Katzenbach, Wirtz/George Weaver, et al, to
take soundings with Meany/Gleason and then on the Hill/4/ /4/None
of the options is checked, but to the right of Bator's signature, Rostow
wrote "OK." The President wrote, "I would hold this for the
present." 215. Telegram From the
Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union/1/ Washington, May 19, 1967, 8:58 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL US-USSR. Top Secret;
Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Rusk. 198583. Literally Eyes Only for the Ambassador
from the Secretary. There follows the text of a message which the
President wishes to send to Kosygin, possibly on Monday./2/ We feel that it might be
useful to have some such message taken into account in present
deliberations going on in Moscow. You should, however, hold this message
for a further execute authorization. /2/The
message was forwarded to Kosygin on Monday, May 22. This gives you a chance to make any comments which
you might have on the text or the timing. You should know that at least
one more strike on the Hanoi power plant is authorized and its timing will
depend upon weather. "Dear Mr. Chairman: I wish to address you at this
time because we appear to be faced by a series of situations which are
dangerous in themselves but which, taken together, could seriously impair
the interests of our two countries and the attempts which have been made
on both sides to improve our relations. I would wish you to consider if-whatever our
differences-our common interests do not now require concerted or parallel
action to bring these situations under control. First, Viet Nam. There
the increasingly large scale of North Vietnamese forces moving through the
DMZ, the increased use of Laotian territory for the movement of men and
arms to the south, and the growing use of Cambodian territory by the
forces of North Viet Nam create dangers of widening the already dangerous
hostilities in Southeast Asia. Secretary Rusk has recently written Mr.
Gromyko about Laos/3/ and
our desire to see the Accords of 1962 fully carried out as we had a right
to expect they would be. As you know, we have repeatedly affirmed that we
consider the Accords of 1954 as an adequate basis for peace insofar as
North and South Viet Nam are concerned. Further, we have urged that
international action be taken to assist Prince Sihanouk in maintaining the
neutrality and territorial integrity of Cambodia. You are already familiar
with a considerable number of proposals which we and others have made
which could lead to a military de-escalation of the conflict. You are also
aware of a number of steps which we have taken de facto in this direction
without any response from Hanoi. We have been disappointed in this lack of
response and will try to probe such a possibility further. Therefore, I
urge you once again, as I did in my letter of December 6, 1966,/4/ to lend your help in
bringing this conflict to a close by exercising fully your prerogatives as
Co-Chairman of the Geneva Conferences which yielded those Accords. /3/Rusk's
message was transmitted in telegram 191165 to Moscow, May 10; for text,
see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XXVIII,
Document 285. /4/For
text, see ibid., vol. IV, Document 330. Second, the Middle
East. The increasing harassment of Israel by elements based in Syria,
with attendant reactions within Israel and within the Arab world, has
brought the area close to major violence. Your and our ties to nations of
the area could bring us into difficulties which I am confident neither of
us seeks. It would appear a time for each of us to use our influence to
the full in the cause of moderation, including our influence over action
by the United Nations./5/ /5/Documentation on U.S.-Soviet relations concerning
the Arab-Israeli conflict during late May is scheduled for publication
ibid., volume XIX. Included are Thompson's report of his meeting with
Gromyko on May 23, transmitted in telegram 5078, May 23; Thompson's
assessment of the crisis as seen from Moscow, transmitted in telegram 5125
from Moscow, May 25; an exchange of messages between Kosygin and Johnson
on May 27; and Rusk's May 28 message to Gromyko. Third, Cuba. In
Venezuela and elsewhere the government of Cuba is engaging in quite open
and active support of violent movements, including the illegal transit of
international frontiers with men and arms. I found in my recent meeting with Presidents of
the Western Hemisphere at Punta del Este/6/ a great deal of excitement and determined
concern on the part of my fellow Presidents about these actions by Cuba. I
would hope there is some way in which your influence in Havana could be
used to halt these dangerous activities. /6/For
documentation on the Punta del Este meeting on April 12-14, see ibid.,
volume XXXI. Beyond these points of danger and conflict, there
are two areas of opportunity where I deeply believe it is our common
interest and common duty to humanity to achieve constructive results: the
achievement of understandings which would limit our respective deployments
of ABM's and ICBM's and the negotiation of a non-proliferation
treaty./7/ These two
enterprises are not explicitly linked; but I am sure you are conscious
that our task of persuading the non-nuclear powers to accept a
non-proliferation treaty would be greatly eased if you and we could
demonstrate concurrently our will and ability to begin to bring the
nuclear arms race under better control. I hope, therefore, your government
will find it possible to respond positively to our proposals to enter into
serious discussions on the ABM and ICBM problem. /7/Documentation on negotiation of the
non-proliferation treaty and initiation of strategic arms talks is ibid.,
volume XI. I am aware that neither of our nations fully
controls the forces at work in Southeast Asia, the Middle East, or the
Caribbean. Indeed, we cannot determine by ourselves whether a
non-proliferation treaty will prove acceptable to the governments,
parliaments, and peoples of the principal non-nuclear nations.
Nevertheless, our influence in these matters remains formidable if it is
used in the same direction. At this critical moment I believe we must try
consciously to overcome the forces drawing us further away from each other
and bring to bear our capacity to shape events along paths of moderation
and peace. I have outlined my own thoughts on certain of
these matters and would be glad to have your own thoughts and any
suggestions which you might wish to make. Sincerely yours, Lyndon B. Johnson" 216. Memorandum of
Conversation/1/ Washington, May 31, 1967. /1/Source: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 30 USSR. Secret;
Nodis. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS The Soviet Chargé d'Affaires called on me at 5:30
this afternoon at his request. Referring to penciled notes from time to
time, he made roughly the following statement with respect to the case of
Mrs. Svetlana Alliluyeva. He said that in the view of the Soviet Government,
the actions of the United States Government in this case were hostile
toward them and contrary to the statement which I had made on March 10 to
Ambassador Dobrynin./2/ In
this connection, he referred to my statements at that time that we had
trusted this case would not become an obstacle in relations between us,
and had emphasized the President's sincerity in seeking to follow the line
of normalizing relations. He also repeated that I had then wanted Moscow
to believe that the United States Government in no way had a direct
interest in this matter and was not interested in bringing her to the
United States. Continuing, he said the Soviet Government had taken note of
these statements but that almost at once, we had started to act in a
contrary manner. /2/See
Document 206. He said that Mrs. Alliluyeva was not a normal
person but that there were distinct signs of mental disturbances in spite
of which she was actually being exploited for concrete and definite
political purposes. The Soviet side could not ignore the fact that this
exploitation was deliberately timed to coincide with the date of great
importance in the history of the Soviet Union. The question, therefore,
arose as to whether the United States Government realized that there are
many other problems in which both sides could be more profitably engaged
than in intriguing in a matter of this kind. The Soviet side, he continued, would point out
that there were in the Soviet Union a number of people who have been
anxious to write about events relating to the death of the late President
Kennedy, and yet they had been restrained and were not allowed to
elaborate on certain theories and arguments. The Soviets had not been
guided by opportunistic motives but by realization that such things do no
good. Incidentally, he said, the Soviet side was guided
by the same motivations in connection with the observations of the
Secretary of State about Soviet statements relating to American
personalities including the President of the United States. To speak frankly, he said, whatever might be said
about freedom of expression and the like in connection with Svetlana
Alliluyeva, the Soviet side understood that everything which would be
stated or written by her or ascribed to her would be coached and endorsed
by the American side. Besides this, the Soviets knew very well the mental
and intellectual capacities of Mrs. Alliluyeva herself. In saying all this straightforwardly, the Soviet
side was not pretending to give advice or to make recommendations as to
particular steps. This was the business of the American side. But
naturally, it was quite another matter as to what reaction and what
response would follow the actions of the American side in the Alliluyeva
case, what emotions it could stir up in the Soviet Union, and what its
influence would be on relations between our two countries which even
without all this are already strained enough. After hearing him out, I told Mr. Tcherniakov that
I would like to make some immediate remarks in reply, reserving the right
to make further reply after fully studying his statement and consulting my
superiors. I said first of all I wanted to reject any charge or
implication of United States Government involvement or exploitation of
Mrs. Alliluyeva. I could assure him, and I wanted him to assure the Soviet
Government that no American official, indeed no official or any Agency of
the American Government had been in touch with Mrs. Alliluyeva since she
arrived in Switzerland. There was no question whatsoever of any intrigue
or any coaching, or any approval of anything she had said, or might say.
Mr. Leddy had informed him, Mr. Tcherniakov, of the revalidation of a
visitor's visa to Mrs. Alliluyeva and of the fact that she was coming to
this country. This was an action which we had taken in conformity with
American laws and traditions. During the time when she had been in Switzerland,
she had had an opportunity to decide what she wanted to do and where she
wanted to go, whether it was to any country in the world, or whether it
was to return to the Soviet Union. She had decided that she wished to come
to the United States and in accordance with our laws and traditions she
had been given a visa to do so. In the circumstances, however, there had
been no question of defection or asylum, and she was here on a visitor's
visa. She was completely free any day to go elsewhere or to return to the
Soviet Union. She was in no sense in the custody or under the influence of
the American Government or any agent or Agency of the American
Government. As to what she might say or write this was not
only not under the control of the American Government, but could not be
controlled by the American Government. Freedom of expression is embodied
in our Constitution and even the President of the United States could not
change this. Incidentally, I added so far as the reported
publication of her book was concerned, this would be the case even if she
were not in the United States but still in the Soviet Union. If she had
found a way to get her manuscript out as had Sinyavsky and Daniel, there
was no way to prevent its publication in the United States even had we
wished to do so. Reviewing my own notes regarding this statement, I
said that I failed to understand the reference to the death of President
Kennedy and could not accept any parallel whatsoever between this and the
question of Mrs. Alliluyeva. I could not conceive that anyone in the
Soviet Union was in a position to contribute any information about the
death of President Kennedy and that it would be very interesting if anyone
were. So far as I knew the manuscript which Mrs. Alliluyeva would be
having published not only in the United States but elsewhere concerned her
own life and was written even before she left the Soviet Union having been
brought out according to her own statement by "Indian friends". We could
not and would not object to any Soviet citizen publishing his own memoirs
whether it was in the Soviet Union or outside the Soviet Union. In this connection, I said that I wanted to
confirm every word that I had previously said to Ambassador Dobrynin on
this subject. Furthermore, the spirit in which this was said remained
unchanged. So far as we were concerned, we had not even known that Mrs.
Alliluyeva was outside the Soviet Union until the minute she walked in the
American Embassy in New Delhi. We had in no way had anything to do with
her appearance there and except for the immediate assistance in her
departure from India had had no contact with her whatsoever. The United
States Government had no interest in exploiting her or influencing her.
She was strictly a private person and operating in a private capacity. We
continued to hope that this case would not be made into an obstacle in the
relationship between the two countries. At the end, Mr. Tcherniakov asked a couple of
questions, in reply to which I pointed out that the United States
Government owned only one publishing house, while the Soviet Government
owned all in the USSR. He then concluded by saying he was not in a
position to add anything to the statement he had been instructed to make
to me. [Continue with the next documents]
Volume XIV
Index | Foreign
Relations Volumes Online Released Prior to January 20, 2001
|
![]() | |
![]() | |
![]() |
This site is managed by the Bureau of Public Affairs, U.S. Department of State. External links to other Internet sites should not be construed as an endorsement of the views contained therein. |