Moscow, November 25, 1966, 1230Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 1 US-USSR. Confidential. Repeated to Paris, London, Bonn, Belgrade, Bucharest, Sofia, Warsaw, Budapest, Berlin, and Hong Kong.

2367. 1. As Soviet leaders who overthrew Khrushchev in 1964 begin their third year in power, it may be useful time to restate some of our conclusions and observations about character of this regime and its policies and how it fared during past year. These conclusions are set out in detail in Embassy's A-765/2/ and this telegram will deal primarily with foreign policy aspects of regime policies.

/2/Dated November 18, it transmitted the annual political and economic assessment. (Ibid.)

2. By and large Brezhnev and Kosygin must regard results of past year with satisfaction. They can count gains in foreign policy field which, especially from narrow perspective of the Kremlin, must seem quite impressive. In internal field, biggest grain harvest in Russian history gave the still flagging economy a solid boost and enabled regime to point exaggeratedly to virtues of its new agricultural policy. That they are still in serious trouble in getting their economy moving again is clear, but their lucky harvest could be counted on to blur effects of the deeper economic dislocations for a little while longer.

3. They will be most pleased by developments in foreign field where, with China virtually isolated in world Communist movement, they have helped achieve what Khrushchev conspicuously failed to do. This is especially satisfying to new leaders who had put their competition with China ahead of all other foreign policy problems, but they had other gains as well. They made further tangible progress in getting on better terms with their neighboring border countries to south, and they must believe they have weakened Western bloc with their improved relations with such countries as France, above all, but also with Italy and Canada. Indeed, despite a few setbacks as in Indonesia and Ghana, their relations with rest of world were improved generally and it was ironic but true that new Soviet leadership, while it continued to support insurrection against established order wherever this suited its interests, has been able to convince remarkably large body of world opinion that its basic purposes are peaceful.

4. To be sure, most of favorable foreign policy developments were not result of vigorous Soviet moves. On contrary, Soviet foreign policy since Khrushchev's demise has been marked by lack of major initiatives. Yet it is probably this very quiescence of Soviet foreign policy that has significantly contributed to many of these changes. Isolation of Chinese Communists is of course result primarily of their own actions, but posture of restraint Soviets have maintained until very recently in Sino-Soviet dispute has undoubtedly contributed to it. In Europe, de Gaulle would have been unable to carry out his grand design so expeditiously if an atmosphere of Khrushchevian frolics had continued to prevail. Same consideration applies of course to tendency among Western Europeans, and others as well, to downgrade Soviet threat.

5. Heavy ideological mantle cloaking Soviet foreign policy cannot conceal fact that its basic contours are drawn by USSR's own national interests. Although each Soviet move is always explained in ideological terms, its real aims are in most cases transparent. Indeed, in several cases over past year Soviets even disregarded need for ideological camouflage of their national interests. In their efforts to establish special relationship in Europe with France they almost completely ignored interest of French CP in last year's elections. In order to promote their national interests in Latin America Soviets drastically curtailed their support for militant revolutionary groups, promoted "united front" approach, and engaged in fairly active effort to establish relations with several reactionary" governments.

6. In U.S.-Soviet context, Soviet propaganda speaks of American imperialism but Soviet policy is based on tacit assumptions and in some cases even overt cooperation with U.S. Thus while it continued to insist that warmer relations were not possible as long as U.S. engaged in "aggression" against a brother socialist state, and while its vilification of the U.S. in its propaganda extended into all spheres of U.S. foreign and domestic policies, not sparing even the President, Moscow still found it possible to cooperate with U.S. in some areas where two national interests converged. This reflected in signing of air agreement,/3/ intensified search for mutually acceptable formula on non-proliferation, and negotiation of outer space treaty./4/ Latest offers by the President for closer U.S.-Soviet ties are also undoubtedly tempting to Soviets and, despite their public refusal to accept outstretched U.S. hand in present circumstances, possibility cannot be excluded that they will yet engage in some specific measures just as they have on air agreement.

/3/For text of the Civil Air Transport Agreement, signed at Washington, November 4, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1966, pp. 493-505.

/4/For text of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, finally signed on January 27, 1967, see ibid., 1967, pp. 1072-1075.

7. The freeze, in other words, has been a controlled one, with Soviets undoubtedly calculating that it will not jeopardize a relatively easy return to more normal relations once tactical exigencies for a freeze no longer exist. Basic to this view is Kremlin's knowledge at bottom that it could not live with an actively hostile United States. It also knows that its security problems cannot be definitively resolved without us. Eventually Moscow will need U.S. cooperation in handling awakening Chinese giant. In Europe it knows that however useful de Gaulle may be tactically, no final European settlement could be achieved without U.S. participation and sanction.

8. In Western Europe, Soviets are attempting, in essence, what U.S. is seeking to accomplish in EE, i.e., build bridges to individual countries and promote trend toward polycentrism. Despite certain success, Soviets are probably conscious of their inability to compete effectively in this game. They know they do not have much to offer to West Europeans-certainly not on major issue of German settlement-and are also concerned about unsettling effect their policy in Western Europe can have on their own alliance. This concern was evident last year in Soviet attempts to strengthen Warsaw Pact organization, presumably by instituting permanent coordinating body, and must have been compounded by failure of those attempts. Concept of unity in diversity being alien to Soviet system, Soviets must realize that effect of any overall decrease in cohesion is bound to have much more deleterious effect on Warsaw Pact than on NATO and it is probably because of this imbalance of risk that Soviets, despite a little bridge-building, are basically happy with status quo and still moving rather cautiously on European scene.

9. Regime itself remained nearly static during the year. Brezhnev emerged more clearly than before as first among equals, a primacy he conveyed most vividly when he usurped Kosygin's and Podgorny's offices to take his seat as de Gaulle's opposite number during General's visit here. As Brezhnev moved ahead, Shelepin, a prime contender for power, moved back, and it may have been that latter's loss was simply by-product of former's gain. These minor shadings did not change, however, an overall picture of surprising stability of leadership in a society in which struggle for power is endemic.

10. The personality of the regime also became more sharply drawn, especially at its do-nothing 23rd Party Congress in April. Proud of contrast it offers to free-wheeling of Khrushchev, present leadership is colorless, cautious, conservative and more realistic than its predecessor. It was clearer, too, that its instincts for caution led it in almost all cases to take the course of compromise, the approach of the lowest common denominator. From standpoint of U.S. security interest, these are qualities which make this regime more comfortable one to live with than was Khrushchev's-it is clearly a regime less likely to confront us with sudden crises in Cuba or Berlin and it acts circumspectly to avoid direct confrontation with us in Vietnam. From standpoint of interests of Soviet people, its virtues are less clear. The excessive caution with which it has moved to carry out the seemingly bold economic measures of a year and two years ago and to solve its other growing problems in internal field raises the question whether this is the regime that will carry through the jarring changes necessary to enable Soviet system to compete efficiently in a world of advanced economic and technological societies.

Guthrie

187. Editorial Note

On December 1, 1966, the intelligence community issued National Intelligence Estimate 11-12-66, "The Outlook for Sino-Soviet Relations." The estimate concluded that "Sino-Soviet relations will continue to deteriorate so long as the Mao Tse-tung-Lin Piao leadership group retains authority." In the longer term, "prospects for major changes leading either to a further deterioration or an easing of the dispute appear to rest mainly on what happens in China after Mao." Should there be a Sino-Soviet rapprochement in either the short or longer term, it was "likely to have definite limits. We expect little or no positive cooperation at the party level and a continuing general atmosphere of barely suppressed suspicion and mistrust. Moreover, the Sino-Soviet relationship would remain highly vulnerable to clashes of national interests over a broad range of issues." For text of the estimate, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, volume XXX, Document 223.

188. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State/1/

Moscow, December 6, 1966.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL US-USSR. Confidential. No time of transmission appears on the telegram; it was received in the Department of State at 5:41 a.m. December 6.

2515. Moscow 2483./2/

/2/Dated December 2, it summarized the Soviet domestic anti-Chinese Communist propaganda campaign. (Ibid., CSM 1 CHICOM-USSR)

1. Despite continuing appearance anti-US remarks in Soviet papers, one cannot escape over-all impression that anti-US propaganda of most vicious and spurious kind has dropped off perceptibly in main Soviet press since mid-Nov, in comparison with Sept and Oct. This has been directly related to a still sharper reduction in commentary, photo reporting, and even news coverage of Vietnam war, considering that latter recently has been generating good portion of anti-US material. Propaganda exploitation of uglier events in US life, notably racial strife, plus usual fare of biased reporting on US institutions and morals, have also tapered off slightly during same period. Tapering off of anti-US propaganda in Soviet domestic radio, TV, and provincial press has been slower. Apparently no real let-up yet discernible on Moscow international radio (we have FBIS through Nov 25).

2. Hard to imagine this propaganda ebb accidental. While it true period has seen numerous speeches by leadership requiring extensive press attention, plus somewhat less dramatic US actions than for example President's Asian trip,/3/ Vietnam war nevertheless certainly goes on and had been making top news here consistently for many months. Particularly striking is failure central Soviet press even to summarize points in Vietnam resolution of Hungarian Party Congress (Budapest 640)/4/ and relatively routine treatment latest US bombings Hanoi area. Sharp anti-Chinese build-up in same period (reftel) could conceivably provide explanation in sense of propaganda strategy.

/3/On October 17 President Johnson left Washington for a 17-day tour of the Far East and attended the Manila Conference on Vietnam.

/4/Dated December 3. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27 VIET S)

3. Last vehement anti-US campaign was mid-Nov discussion alleged US war crimes in Vietnam. This prompted by early Nov release "documents" of DRV war crimes investigation commission, which initially almost ignored by Soviet press. Coverage of US also hostile in early part of Nov, but no comparison with Oct, which saw vicious charge re US chemical warfare in Vietnam in connection with Nuremberg trial anniversary (uglier than on 1965 anniversary), attacks on Secretary McNamara, Peace Corps, President's speeches in Asia, exchange program (article on Prof Shulman), Westmoreland, and near end Oct, six days of highly offensive propaganda on Kennedy assassination and Warren Report, echo of which in provincial press continued through Nov. Sept level was almost as high as that of Oct, when one considers cumulative picture of attacks that month re US genocide, CIA and INR misdeeds, Puerto Rico exploitation, espionage in universities and exchanges, defector Harold Koch, convicted US soldier Dennis Mora, Eisenhower's Vietnam nuclear remark, and unfriendly references to VP Humphrey, Secretary Rusk and Amb Goldberg.

4. In our opinion, it too early to make meaningful evaluation of significance this relative let-up anti-US propaganda. However, as indicated reftel, we find it noteworthy and will be interesting see whether or not it indicates beginning of a definitive trend./5/

/5/Printed from an unsigned copy.

189. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Washington, December 21, 1966, 4 p.m.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL US-USSR. Secret. Drafted by Judd and approved in G on January 9. The memorandum is part 3 of 5. The meeting was held in Kohler's office. Kohler was appointed Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs on October 13 and entered on duty November 29.

SUBJECT
US-USSR Relations

PARTICIPANTS

Sir Patrick Dean, British Ambassador
David V. Bendall, Counselor, British Embassy

Amb. Kohler, Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
Thomas M. Judd, EUR/BMI

Ambassador Dean asked the Deputy Under Secretary what he thought were the prospects for US-USSR relations.

Ambassador Kohler replied the Soviets were conducting a holding operation at present. They were trying to keep everything from going down the drain pending a resolution of the Viet Nam conflict. As a result of Viet Nam they did not wish to offer or receive any new bilateral initiatives. They were prepared to make exceptions when any such initiative was considered by them to be overwhelmingly in their self-interest. The bilateral civil air agreement and the outer space agreement were examples. In the case of the latter, the Soviets knew they could not afford an arms race in space with the U.S. and the agreement had a convenient UN cover.

The Soviet attitude on nonproliferation, Ambassador Kohler continued, was changing. This was because it was becoming apparent, due to the attitude of the Swedes and the Indians, that unless something was done quickly, we would never get an agreement. There might be some progress in the nonproliferation field but beyond that nothing until after Viet Nam.

Ambassador Dean inquired as to the Soviet attitude on ABM's./2/ Ambassador Kohler said the Soviets had a strong defensive mentality. They would look at their effort in the ABM field from the point of view of how much they could afford. We did not think they were very far technically advanced in this area. The civilian leadership of the country probably regarded ABM's as still being in the experimental stage. There had been no decision to go all out. Of course the military, which wanted ABM's, was in a relatively strong position vis-á-vis the present collective civilian leadership.

/2/For documentation on Soviet and U.S. deployment of ABMs, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, volumes X and XI.

190. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State/1/

Moscow, January 11, 1967.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, PS 7-1 US-USSR. Confidential; Limdis. No time of transmission appears on the telegram; it was received at 6:44 a.m.

2989. 1. I am increasingly disturbed at number of cases brought to our attention of US citizens violating Soviet law, and believe we should be taking more drastic steps to stop it. As an Embassy we seem over recent weeks to have spent inordinate amount of our time picking up pieces after both tourists and exchangees who have either broken Soviet laws or allowed themselves to fall into KGB entrapment, and I am sure that cases coming to our attention are only small fraction of the total.

2. It is particularly discouraging to find that conviction of Wortham and Gilmour for black market ruble transactions/2/ has had so little effect on conduct of US visitors and residents here. Judging by number of cases that we have learned about just in past week, I suspect Kornienko was right when he told me last year at time of Dawson release/3/ that there were hundreds of violations of Soviet law by US citizens which were never drawn to our attention. These include smuggling (which Kornienko singled out as leading example), black market currency exchange, and resale of articles bought in foreign currency stores at favorable prices.

/2/Soviet customs officials arrested Buel R. Wortham and Craddock M. Gilmour, Jr., at the Soviet-Finnish border on October 1, 1966. A Leningrad court sentenced Wortham on December 21, 1966, to 3 years in a labor camp on charges of theft of a statue and violation of Soviet currency regulations. It fined Gilmour 1,000 rubles for a lesser role in the currency violation. (American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1966, p. 510n) Also see footnote 4, Document 207.

/3/Thomas Dawson, a Peace Corps volunteer in Iran, was apprehended by Soviet border guards on September 11, 1966, while gathering seashells near the Soviet-Iranian border. He was released on October 3. (American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1966, p. 486)

3. At least a few of these cases have been much more serious than relatively minor infractions committed by Wortham and Gilmour and it is ironic, in fact, that Wortham is one to get three year sentence when some of our other offenders put his dealings in shade. It seems quite likely to me that Soviets would have acted against some of recent offenders if they were not reluctant to add another case on top of Wortham-Gilmour or perhaps because they wish to avoid giving Amb Thompson that kind of problem to start his tenure with.

4. As far as tourists are concerned, we have already recommended (Moscow 2902)/4/ that stronger language be included in Dept's handouts on travel to USSR underlining penalties provided under Soviet law and citing recent convictions of US citizens. Dept may also wish to think of means to bring this warning more forcefully to attention of prospective travellers here. A public statement may have disadvantage of seeming to discourage tourism to USSR and also might be forgotten fairly quickly, but Dept should be able to persuade travel agencies specializing in Soviet travel to ensure that tourists coming here are given strict oral warning about black market operations in addition to travel handouts.

/4/Dated January 5. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, TRV Lanourette, William John)

5. Least excusable violations, and ones for which Dept and Embassy must accept part of blame, are those committed by Americans coming here either as exchangees or to meetings sponsored under exchange program. In past week we have had two flagrant transgressions by exchangees. That one should involve black market ruble transactions, importation of pornographic material, sexual promiscuity, distribution of proscribed material, and acceptance of letter from Soviet citizen for delivery through Embassy pouch, suggests at very least that Dept's procedures for clearing exchange candidates could stand a little improvement. All this suggests, too, that there is need for stricter briefing of exchange participants by both Dept and Embassy. We are reporting second case in septel.

6. We are in process now of discreetly speaking to each exchangee to make sure no one in doubt about his responsibilities here or that Embassy will recommend immediate recall of anyone guilty of gross violation of Soviet law. We also plan to tighten our own procedures for briefing all exchangees on arrival and for continuing contact with them during their stay, and will be making recommendations separately to Dept on steps it should consider taking there to same end. My purpose in this message is to call attention to general situation and impress upon Dept need that something be done about it.

7. While I am satisfied that behavior of Embassy staff is correct and that everyone is fully briefed on arrival, I am also planning to reiterate their responsibilities to them as well./5/

/5/The Department replied in telegram 120403, January 17, agreeing to the necessity of warning U.S. citizens of the dangers of violating Soviet law. (Ibid., POL 23-10 USSR)

Guthrie

191. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Washington, January 18, 1967.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 76 D 435. Confidential; Exdis. Drafted by Kohler and approved in S on February 23.

SUBJECT
Soviet-American Relations

PARTICIPANTS
The Secretary
Deputy Under Secretary Foy D. Kohler
Soviet Ambassador Anatoliy Dobrynin

During the Secretary's meeting with Ambassador Dobrynin tonight, the discussion turned to bilateral relations. After some general discussion in which Dobrynin took a rather pessimistic view, the Secretary informed him that the East-West trade legislation probably would not be coming up for consideration until May or June. However, the Secretary said he felt reasonably optimistic with regard to the Consular Convention which would be considered much sooner. After some discussion of FBI Director J.E. Hoover's statement,/2/ Ambassador Dobrynin suggested that the Administration had not really made it clear that the Consular Convention did not provide for the opening of consulates. That was an entirely separate question which had not even been officially discussed.

/2/See Document 194 and footnote 4 thereto.

During this phase of the conversation the Secretary referred to the new Soviet magazine, Sputnik, and the desirability of mutual exchanges. Ambassador Dobrynin spoke glowingly of the new Soviet magazine, but was otherwise noncommittal. There was also some inconclusive discussion on the project for the establishment of some form of East-West institute being undertaken by McGeorge Bundy. When Ambassador Dobrynin said the project seemed very vague to him, the Secretary pointed out that this was intentionally so; that Mr. Bundy's efforts were exploratory in nature; and that he did not have any specific project to propose, but was rather setting out to ascertain the possibilities of cooperation./3/

/3/Documentation on the establishment of an East-West institute is at the Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, East-West Institute. A memorandum of Bundy's February 25 conversation with Dobrynin on an East-West institute is at the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 1 US-USSR, attached to Kohler's March 25 letter to Bundy.

Reverting to the question of the proposed East-West trade legislation, Ambassador Dobrynin said that he had studied this carefully. As he understood it, this was a bill for the Eastern European countries and not for the Soviet Union. It seemed to him that the proposed bill almost said that the U.S. would not deal with the Soviet Union. The Secretary replied that the same provisions would apply to the Soviet Union as to the other Eastern European countries. A trade agreement would have to be concluded; in the case of the Soviet Union it was true that this would involve a lend-lease settlement. He asked Dobrynin's views on this, and the Ambassador indicated that they would expect any such settlement to be on the basis of the most favorable settlement we had made with other World War II allies, referring specifically to the United Kingdom./4/

/4/For more information on East-West trade legislation, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. IX, especially Documents 181 and 192. Congress passed no legislation on East-West trade in either 1967 or 1968 but did hold hearings on the issue during 1968.

192. Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Attorney General Clark/1/

Washington, January 20, 1967, 7 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of a Telephone Conversation between the President and Clark, Tape 67.03, Side A, PNO 3. No classification marking. This transcript was prepared by the Office of the Historian specifically for this volume.

President: Is there anything you can do with Hoover to try to get him to say that he's not against the Consular Treaty if he's given enough money to adequately cover any espionage activities?

Clark: I can try.

President: He wrote Rusk a letter/2/ but it doesn't do the job. It just says that-he was just saying that if they had new consular offices open why it would create a good many problems. It's very negative. And what we're trying to do now-we've got about five big decisions. One of them, just between us, is just as hot as a firecracker right now, on Vietnam. It could mean the difference. Another one is the Non-Proliferation Treaty. We're within an inch of getting it. Another one is the anti-missile missile. They're going to spend $30/40 billion and we're going to spend $30/40. We don't want to get in that arms race, so I sent Tommy Thompson back over there. I tried to talk them out of it. Now we've made a good deal of progress in the Civil Air Agreement. We don't trust them. We don't think you can trust them. We think you got to watch them every minute. We think you ought to watch them more than we are watching them. But the problem is not their knowing what we got. Hell, they've got blueprints of everything, as Judy Coplon shows./3/ The problem is we don't know what the hell they got, and the consulate thing gives us a chance to protect our people and get around and to have some little something besides right just in Moscow. And all of our people like Thompson and the experts say it's just so important. If they want to put x consulars here, well we don't mind how many million he gets, and he can just by God sleep with them. We expect them to be sleeping with people over there too, but we want to know more than we do know, and we think it's to our interest, not to theirs, that we think the advantages are so much stronger for us, at least Thompson does and Kohler does and Rusk does, so that is it. And if in talking to him [Hoover] we could say that let's be affirmative and say to Fulbright, "I am not running the State Department. I'm not passing on these treaties. I am not against a consular office provided-you know what I've said, it takes additional personnel." That's what I think he said to Rooney./4/ I think that's all he intended to say. I don't think he intended to start passing on diplomatic matters, but I don't know and I don't know whether I'm the one to get him to do it or whether you are. He wrote a letter that kind of halfway did it but it didn't do it enough to satisfy the Dirksens.

/2/Hoover's letter, dated September 16, 1966, and Rusk's September 14 letter to which it responded were both released by the State Department on January 20. For text, see The New York Times, January 21, or American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1966, pp. 485-486. Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings on the Consular Convention began January 23.

/3/On March 7, 1950, Judith Coplon and Valentin Gubitchev, a Soviet consular official, were found guilty of conspiracy and attempted espionage against the United States.

/4/See footnote 3, Document 163.

Clark: I saw it on the ticker. It looked pretty good to me, but I'll--

President: Well I talked to Fulbright this evening and I talked to Dirksen last night. It doesn't quite do the job. What we need for him to say is-if I could get him over here and get Fulbright over here and just sit down with them and say, "Here's what the advantage is to us," and let both of them listen to it, maybe Dirksen. "Now what do you need to do to see that our security is protected?" And he could say, "well I need so and so and so." "OK, we'll give you that."

Clark: Let me discuss it with him and see what--

President: Don't say I initiated it and don't say I started it but-think about it./5/

/5/Clark met with Hoover on January 21 to discuss the Consular Convention. Johnson summarized Hoover's position, as expressed in the meeting, in a telephone conversation with Senator Mike Mansfield on January 25, during which the President and Mansfield discussed strategy for securing approval of the convention by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of a Telephone Conversation between the President and Mansfield, 10:55 a.m., January 25, Tape F67.03, Side B, PNO 5)

[Here follows discussion of other subjects.]

193. Editorial Note

On January 23, 1967, Llewellyn Thompson presented his credentials as Ambassador to the Soviet Union. He served until January 14, 1969. His predecessor, Foy Kohler, had departed post November 14, 1966, to become Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs. In a January 21 letter to Chairman Kosygin, President Johnson emphasized that he had asked Thompson to return as his Ambassador to the Soviet Union "because of the great importance I attach to the improvement of relations between our two countries." The President then proposed that the United States and the Soviet Union conduct discussions toward reaching an understanding which would "curb the strategic arms race." Kosygin replied on February 27 that the Soviet Government was "prepared to continue the exchange of views" on strategic nuclear weapons, and Johnson announced the Soviet willingness discuss the issue at a March 2 press conference. For text of Johnson's and Kosygin's letters, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, volume XI, Documents 178 and 185. For text of Johnson's press conference, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1967, Book I, pages 259-262. Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, volume XI includes extensive documentation on the issue of strategic arms limitations talks with the Soviet Union, which is indexed on pages 781-782 (under "Freezes on strategic offensive and defensive missile systems"). President Johnson recounted U.S. efforts to begin the talks in The Vantage Point, pages 479-491. Ambassador Dobrynin discussed the issue from his perspective in In Confidence, pages 148-154, 165-167, 177-178, and 184-187.

194. Letter From the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (Hoover) to Senator Karl Mundt/1/

Washington, January 23, 1967.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, Legislative Background, Consular Treaty. No classification marking.

Dear Karl,

I have received your letter of January 21, 1967,/2/ in which you advised that you are concerned and confused over the various interpretations being given to my letter of September 16, 1966, to Secretary of State Rusk, "with regard to the position of the FBI on the probable consequences likely to result from ratification of the Consular Treaty now before the United States Senate."/3/

/2/Not printed. (Ibid.)

/3/See footnote 2, Document 192.

It should be clearly understood that the FBI is the investigative arm of the Department of Justice and, as such, it is our responsibility to gather and report facts. The FBI is not a policy-making agency and we do not express opinions. Since 1924, when I became its Director, the FBI has refrained from injecting itself into the area of legislation. The Consular Convention between the Soviet Union and the United States, which is now before the United States Senate, is no exception to this long-standing rule.

Because the Consular Convention does involve considerations which have a direct bearing upon the responsibilities of the FBI, I appreciate your interest in requesting the following facts from me. Again I emphasize that the FBI is not recommending a course of action or expressing an opinion.

You specifically inquired whether I had changed my views or whether any evidence has developed to make me change my mind about my testimony of March 4, 1965./4/ The answer is an unequivocal no.

/4/Mundt was one of several members of the Senator Foreign Relations Committee who, influenced in part by Hoover's testimony, had dissented from the committee's recommendation in 1965 that the Senate ratify the Consular Convention. Regarding Hoover's testimony, see footnote 3, Document 163.

During my testimony before a subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee on March 4, 1965, I called attention to the fact that the establishment of Soviet consulates in this country, "of course, will make our work more difficult." At no point in my March, 1965, testimony-nor following the release of that testimony by the House Appropriations Committee in May, 1965-did I state or imply that the Consular Convention would impose any additional burdens of responsibility upon the FBI that we are incapable of handling. Nor did I express any opinion concerning the matter of ratification. The simple fact is that the work of the FBI in combating Soviet-directed espionage activities in this country has increased through the years commensurate with the increase in Soviet representation here. I can also state without equivocation that communist-bloc diplomatic establishments in this country serve as focal points for intelligence operations.

You inquired whether, since March 4, 1965, there has been a cessation of attempts by communist diplomatic personnel in this country to engage in acts of subversion or attempted espionage. The answer again is an unequivocal no.

You asked whether these efforts by communist diplomatic personnel still continue. They most certainly do. Representatives of the KGB (Soviet Committee of State Security) and the GRU (Soviet Military Intelligence Service), comprising a large segment of the Soviet diplomatic corps in the United States, are conducting an intensive campaign aimed at the most sensitive data regarding our scientific and technical developments, our military and defense programs and the future plans of our Government.

You requested that you be supplied with a list of attempts by communist diplomatic personnel to engage in acts of subversion or attempted espionage as they are available for public information, segregated by calendar years over the past six to ten years. In accordance with your request, there is attached a list of Soviet officials stationed in this country who have been arrested or expelled from the United States since January 1, 1957./5/

/5/Not printed.

With every good wish,

Sincerely,/6/

/6/Printed from an unsigned copy.

195. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union/1/

Washington, January 25, 1967, 7:23 p.m.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, CUL 8 USSR. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Wortzel and approved by Leddy.

125373. Subj: Exchanges. Ref: State 124520.

1. In meeting with Dobrynin January 25 Leddy expressed Dept's concern over implications of Soviet action on Industrial Design exhibit./2/ Leddy reviewed negotiating history, stressing Soviet commitment to receive exhibit in early 1967, and US actions in conformance with Soviet stipulations.

/2/The Embassy reported in telegram 3164, January 24, that Spirin informed an Embassy officer that the Soviet Union, "due to number of circumstances," would not receive the Industrial Design exhibit during the time proposed by the Department, nor would it be accepted earlier than December 1967. Ambassador Thompson commented: "This is clearly top-level decision and I do not believe anything we could do would allow us to proceed with exhibit in near future." (Ibid.) Telegram 124520 to Moscow, January 24, noted that the Department thought the issue important enough to discuss with Dobrynin. (Ibid.)

2. Emphasizing degree of official interest and concern with exchanges program, exemplified at time of signing agreement last March, Leddy pointed out that inevitable publicity of Soviet action likely to have wider effect than upon Exchanges Agreement itself. Quoted Romanovsky statements made during negotiations committing Soviet Government to receive exhibit in early 1967. Then pointed out that failure Soviets live up to exchange commitments could lead many to question validity Soviet commitments in other engagements such as proposed Consular Convention. This could seriously affect our strong efforts to have Convention approved by Senate.

3. In reply to Leddy's expression of hope for Soviet reconsideration, Dobrynin expressed his understanding of situation and implications of action, and promised to seek quick reply from Moscow.

4. Leddy replied in negative to Dobrynin query as to whether commitment to December opening would be acceptable.

Rusk

196. Editorial Note

The Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, known as the Outer Space Treaty, was signed by Washington, London, and Moscow on January 27, 1967. The treaty was subsequently signed by representatives of 57 other nations. For text of the treaty, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1967, pages 1072-1075. For documentation on negotiation of the treaty, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, volume XI, page 776 (under "Celestial bodies treaty" in the index). The treaty entered into force October 10, 1967.

Chairman Kosygin and Ambassador Thompson attended the signing ceremony in Moscow. Thompson reported in telegram 2113, January 27, that following the ceremony Kosygin "brought up Vietnam saying latest news not good. He said we constantly escalating and there was now talk of our bombing airfields. When I said I knew President was earnestly trying to end conflict he said that then we should act differently." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, SP 4)

197. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Washington, January 27, 1967, 4:45 p.m.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL US-USSR. Confidential.

PARTICIPANTS
Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, USSR
W.W. Rostow

PLACE
Lunch at the Embassy Residence

Today I had one of my periodic lunches with Ambassador Dobrynin.

1. I first put strongly to him the case for their going forward with the Kiev exhibition at a time when the Consular Convention was delicately balanced and we were trying to push forward with other enterprises involving U.S.-Soviet Union relations. He said that he agreed with me that Moscow should not risk tipping the balance in the wrong direction on this minor issue; and he had so recommended to Moscow./2/

/2/In telegram 129728 to Moscow, February 2, the Department reported that Rusk had telephoned Dobrynin to reinforce the démarche made by Rostow on January 27. (Department of State, S/S-I Limdis/Exdis Microfilm Files, Reel 145) In telegram 132463 to Moscow, February 6, the Department reported that Dobrynin called Rusk on February 4 "to advise him that because of President's expressed concern Soviet authorities had reacted favorably to our request that Industrial Design Exhibit go forward first half of 1967." The telegram noted that the President discussed the problem with Dobrynin on January 27 following the signing of the Outer Space Treaty. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, CUL 8 USSR)

2. He then asked me what my assessment was of the prospects for the Consular Convention. I said it was a close thing, as he knew; but the Administration was working hard at it.

3. He asked why the Administration was obviously working so hard on the Consular Convention this year when it did not work so hard last year. I said that I could not give a responsible government answer to that question; but it was my personal view that the shift in the seriousness of the Soviet Union on the non-proliferation agreement had made a deep impression; and there was a growing sense in the government-with the non-proliferation agreement and other matters, including the problem posed by the ABM-that this was a good time to do the maximum we could on both sides to create a good atmosphere in U.S.-Soviet relations. He said that this was a clear and understandable answer to a question which had puzzled him. I said, again, this was a personal judgment.

4. We then moved to the ABM issue. I explained in some detail why it might be possible for the Soviet Union to move slowly and in small increments on the ABM's, but that in a democratic society with two Senators from each state, it would be extremely difficult to have an ABM system limited to one city or one region. If we installed such a general system, I was sure the Soviet marshals would be pressing the government in Moscow for many more offensive missiles to which, inevitably, there would be still another U.S. response. Therefore, this was a moment for us to try hard to stabilize the strategic nuclear arms race. He said that he understood this argument, but would not commit himself further.

5. I then pointed out to him that it would be harder to get nations to sign a non-proliferation agreement if they saw the United States and the Soviet Union entering another major round in the arms race. He questioned me as to whether I was proposing a specific link between the non-proliferation agreement and the ABM agreement. I said that I was not, but merely underlining the difficulties we might both face if we were urging others to enter a world of non-proliferation while each of us was spending many billions of dollars in bilateral strategic arms race. He said that he understood and agreed with this view.

6. He asked, in this context, if the Germans were going to propose changes in the language of the non-proliferation treaty. I said that I did not know. We had no final response from Bonn. He expressed the hope that they would find it possible to accept the present draft. Once changes, even minor changes, were suggested, there would be difficulties in re-clearing the treaty with all parties.

WR

198. Editorial Note

On February 6, 1967, Chairman Kosygin arrived in London for a week's visit, during which he and British Prime Minister Harold Wilson sought unsuccessfully to initiate peace negotiations between the United States and the Democratic Republic of North Vietnam. Documentation on Sunflower, as the initiative was code-named, is printed in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, volume V. Memoirs by participants in the initiative include Lyndon Johnson's The Vantage Point, pages 253-255; Harold Wilson's The Labour Government, 1964-1970, page 442; and Chester Cooper's The Lost Crusade, pages 350-368.

199. Memorandum for the Record/1/

Washington, February 9, 1967.

/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency: Job 80-B01285A, DCI (Helms) Files, DCI (Helms) Memo for the Record, Folder 9. Secret.

SUBJECT
Senate Contacts on United States-Soviet Consular Treaty

1. After speaking with the President on the telephone, I called Senator Russell at 11:40 A.M., on 7 February, and spoke with him along the lines that the President had suggested./2/ After informing him that I was seeing Senator Dirksen that afternoon, I volunteered that since meeting with Senator Russell on 28 January, I had ascertained that the United States Intelligence Board, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Secretary of Defense were all in favor of seeing the Consular Treaty ratified. Senator Russell expressed appreciation for this information. He did not ask to talk with me further on this matter.

/2/Attached is a transcript of Helms' February 7 conversation with the President.

2. At 4:00 P.M., on 7 February, I met with Senator Dirksen, at his request, in his back office in the Capitol. We spent twenty minutes together. I covered in detail with him the points which the President had suggested, including the support of USIB, the JCS, the Secretary of Defense, and the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. [12 lines of source text not declassified]/3/ /4/

/3/[text not declassified] which is attached, [text not declassified]. A copy is also in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President--Walt W. Rostow, Vol. 19, #1a.

/4/[text not declassified] which is attached, [text not declassified].

3. Attached are the papers relating to the meeting with Senator Dirksen./5/

/5/Also attached are a transcript of Helms' February 7 telephone conversation with Katzenbach and a membership list for the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board.

RH
Director

200. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State/1/

Moscow, February 13, 1967, 0930Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL USSR. Secret; Limdis.

3465. 1. Following are some first impressions after a month back in Moscow. They will of course be subject to change after further contact and observation.

2. The leadership appears weak. While Brezhnev is clearly number one, the Politburo is in fact operating collectively. One well-informed observer told me that formerly it was only necessary to convince Khrushchev in order to carry out a given proposal. Now it was necessary to convince nearly every member of the Politburo since almost any one of them could successfully block it. It appears true, however, that the direction and management of agriculture and the economy has improved and that the regime's pride in its "business-like" approach is largely justified although hampered by collectivity which makes for indecision and lack of bold initiatives.

3. The volume of daily anti-US items in the press is greater than I had realized, not only in connection with Vietnam but in the general distortion of American life and policies.

4. The standard of living has improved over the past four and a half years but only slowly.

5. People express themselves more freely in private conversation and the intellectuals are straining at the limits set for their activities. These limits have widened since my last tour here.

6. Ideology appears to play an even more important role in policy making as well as propaganda-possibly the result of the ChiCom hammering at revisionism. The fiftieth anniversary celebration will doubtless bring increased emphasis on ideology.

7. There is a somewhat greater emphasis on internal problems in relation to foreign affairs.

8. Khrushchev was a prolific source of information on Soviet policies and the thinking that lay behind them. Now there is remarkably little contact between the diplomatic corps and the political leadership and such as there is, is not generally rewarding.

Thompson

201. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State/1/

Moscow, February 18, 1967, 1730Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files, 1967-69, POL US-USSR. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.

3559. 1. My call on Kosygin ten a.m. this morning lasted two hours and ten minutes. In addition to Vietnam, which took bulk of time, other subjects discussed were ABMs, Soviet agriculture and industry, and some bilateral matters, all of which being reported in septels./2/ Kosygin was accompanied by Kornienko, Troyanovsky, and interpreter. I had Akalovsky with me.

/2/All dated February 18. Telegram 3562, which reported on Vietnam, is printed in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. V, Document 85. The text of telegram 3560, which reported on ABMs, is ibid., vol. XI, Document 182. Telegram 3565, which reported on Soviet agriculture and industry, is at the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL US-USSR. For reports on bilateral issues, see Documents 202 and 203. Telegram 3561 summarized the discussion of a leased line to improve communication facilities between the Moscow Embassy and Washington. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, USSR, Moscow Embassy Communications Problems) Copies of Thompson's telegrams were forwarded to President Johnson on November 18. (Memorandum from Rostow to the President, February 18; ibid., Vol. XIV)

2. Atmosphere during meeting was very businesslike, with Kosygin stressing Soviet desire for relaxation of tensions in general and improved US-Soviet relations in particular. One thing that struck me especially is Kosygin's obvious preoccupation with China.

Thompson

202. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State/1/

Moscow, February 18, 1967, 1930Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, OS 12 USSR. Secret; Priority; Limdis.

3563. 1. During my call on Kosygin today, he raised question of discrimination against Soviet vessels in U.S. ports. Noting he had discussed this with Kohler, he complained that while U.S. vessels treated by Soviets on equal basis with ships any other nation, only Soviet vessels discriminated against by U.S. He wanted me to report to U.S. Govt Soviets regarded their request for equality as legitimate and would wish U.S. reply on this matter. He said he wanted bring up this subject in this fashion rather than formally.

2. I told him that U.S. Govt already working on this problem. However, he probably knew that difficulties were due to position taken by American trade unions rather than govt. While noting this not directly related to subject he had brought up, I mentioned that our goodwill could be seen from fact only last month we had assisted more than 40 Soviet vessels in evacuating members of crew who had fallen ill, providing for repairs, etc.

3. Kosygin said Soviets very grateful for U.S. assistance and noted Soviet ships also have strict instructions assist U.S. vessels as well as vessels of any other nation, in case of distress. As to my remark re trade unions, he commented Soviets also had trade unions and that latter complained about U.S. discrimination and demanded equality. Kornienko added that problem with U.S. was not only of trade unions' position but also of discriminatory rules such as prior notice, etc.

4. Kosygin concluded discussion on this subject by stating that if we wanted improve U.S.-Soviet relations, something Soviets desired sincerely rather than as matter of expediency, there should be no discrimination by either side. USSR could reciprocate in full but that would serve no useful purpose. All USSR wants is equal treatment and U.S. should therefore consider Soviet request.

Thompson

203. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State/1/

Moscow, February 18, 1967, 2130Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL US-USSR. Secret; Priority; Nodis.

3564. Subject: February 18 Call on Kosygin-U.S.-Soviet Relations.

1. After raising question of equal treatment for Soviet vessels in U.S. ports (septel),/2/ Kosygin said that as to general question of U.S.-Soviet relations both sides must seriously seek relaxation of tensions. USSR does not want arms competition, it wants relaxation of tensions. Noting he wanted me to report his remarks to President, he also said all Soviets did in France and UK was not for purpose of putting those countries up against U.S. In fact, in discussing question of treaty with UK,/3/ he had expressed full understanding for UK commitments visá-vis U.S. Soviets believe relations could be improved without affecting alliance commitments, and were proceeding on same basis within their own alliance.

/2/Document 202.

/3/Kosygin proposed an Anglo-Soviet friendship treaty during his early February visit to London.

2. I responded by noting that President had asked me to return to Moscow because he hoped to have problems between U.S. and USSR resolved. I did not wish to be immodest and I did not know how much I could contribute to this objective, but I had come here in hope that I could make some contribution. Since Ambassadors now tied to telegraph lines, perhaps their role not as important as it used to be, but I would seek promote President's objective to best of my abilities.

3. Kosygin concluded our meeting by saying this was exactly how Soviets had understood my appointment. Soviets had regarded it as a serious step by President reflecting his desire for improved U.S.-Soviet relations. As to my remark on the role of ambassador in modern world he had to disagree because in addition to his chair and his telegram wire, Ambassador had a head; if head was good people at the other end of wire listened to it.

Thompson

204. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Washington, March 3, 1967.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-4 US-USSR. Secret. Drafted by Rostow on March 4 and approved in M. The meeting was held after dinner at Rostow's residence.

SUBJECT
Arrest of Soviet Trawler off Alaska

PARTICIPANTS
Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, Ambassador, USSR
W. Averell Harriman, Ambassador at Large
Eugene V. Rostow, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The conversation after dinner opened with a discussion of the problems presented by the arrest of a Soviet trawler within the three-mile limit off Alaska./2/

/2/On March 2 a U.S. Coast Guard cutter arrested and seized a Soviet fishing vessel after it had been fishing within the 3-mile limit off the Shumagin Islands, Alaska. On being hailed the vessel made for high seas, throwing overboard its catch as it went. (Memorandum from Meeker to Rusk, March 3; ibid.)

Ambassador Dobrynin recalled that on several occasions he had been asked by Ambassador Thompson to withdraw the entire Soviet fishing fleet from waters off our West Coast for considerable periods of time. Ambassador Thompson had appealed to his understanding of American politics to propose friendly and cooperative actions on the part of the Soviet Union. These withdrawals of the Soviet fleet were in no way required by international law, but were done simply to be of assistance to the United States Government. On one of these occasions, he said, he was startled after a perfectly calm meeting with the then Governor of Alaska to read a newspaper story to the effect that the Governor of Alaska had pounded the table, and in effect given the Soviet Union an ultimatum which they had then accepted. He had shrugged this off as part of the game of American politics.

But, he said, he could see that after this trawler episode, he might well be met the next time he was asked to take some such step by a telegram ordering him to tell the American Government "to go to hell".

He thought this arrest was a first offense, and hinted it might be treated as such. I remarked that according to our information, the trawler was well within the three-mile limit, and had been fishing.

In the Ambassador's presence, I called Attorney General Clark to obtain the latest information on the case. I explained the situation to the Attorney General, who reported on the steps taken and under way. He commented on the political implications of the episode in Alaska and on the West Coast. I called his attention not only to the bearing of the episode on our Soviet relations, but that we had been opposing high fines for American fishing boats off Peru and Ecuador.

I said we should be in touch with him in the morning. And I told the Ambassador simply that we were following the case closely, and would of course provide them with every facility they wished to dispose of the matter quickly.

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