Washington, August 20, 1966.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 33-6 US-USSR. Secret.

Dear Cy:

The growing number of encounters between U.S. and Soviet ships and aircraft gives us increasing concern over the possibility of a serious incident which in the context of our current relationship with the Soviet Union could have serious political repercussions. As Soviet vessels become involved or involve themselves in our increasing operations off Viet-Nam, the risk of a serious incident inevitably increases. However, our concern is not confined just to the Vietnamese area.

For your own background I am enclosing a copy of a list of recent incidents which I had prepared on the basis of information available to us here./2/

/2/Not printed.

We have also studied the Rules of Engagement now in effect and they seem to us to be generally satisfactory. It seems that the Soviet rules are probably similar to our own, but the occasional dangerously close Soviet approaches to our aircraft and ships give us concern that Soviet personnel may exercise considerable latitude in the interpretation of their own instructions. It is also clear that situations arise in which "tests of will" take place between relatively junior officers on both sides, in the course of which the temptation to "shade" their instructions is undoubtedly very strong.

I have no solution to offer but suggest that when incidents do occur, you will want to satisfy yourself that the investigation on our part does not become just routine but that we thoroughly satisfy ourselves that our Commanders are rigidly adhering to their instructions in these matters of such great moment. I would also be glad to consider any suggestions that you may have for a broad approach to the Soviets on this question or any other suggestions that you may have./3/

/3/Vance responded in a November 30 letter to Kohler, Johnson's successor, stating that "yielding a clear right in any operational situation only invites future trouble" but that "pressing a situational advantage beyond reasonable or accepted rules of encounter risks serious damage to the delicate fabric of US-Soviet relations." Vance proposed "that the United States attempt to reach an understanding with the Soviets" on the issue. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 33-6 US-USSR)

Sincerely,

Alex

172. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Read) to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow)/1/

Washington, August 31, 1966.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President-Walt W. Rostow, Vol. 12. Secret; Exdis. Rostow forwarded Read's memorandum to the President under cover of a September 1 memorandum summarizing its contents. (Ibid.)

SUBJECT
U.S.-Soviet Civil Air Agreement

Following your luncheon discussion yesterday with Secretary Rusk and Secretary McNamara about possible early action to conclude the U.S.-Soviet Air Agreement, Secretary Rusk asked for an urgent review of this matter to see if there were any factors which should be brought to his attention and yours since July 15, 1966, when the Secretary recommended in a memorandum to the President/2/ that we be authorized to inform the Soviet Government that we were willing to sign the Agreement.

/2/Rusk stated that "we must find some way to give positive content to our repeated professions that we desire an improvement in bilateral relations" and that conclusion of the air agreement was the "only feasible proposal." (Ibid.) However, according to Rostow's September 1 memorandum (see footnote 1 above), after making the recommendation Rusk "then asked that it be held up because of troubles with the Soviet Union over the track meet, our cultural agreement, etc."

Ambassador Kohler's views were sought,/3/ and, as you know, he has stated that the chances of early Soviet agreement are "slightly under 50-50", but that we should proceed now to advise the Soviets of our willingness to sign as evidence of the sincerity of our stated desire to maintain normal relations with the USSR. (Moscow 1053)/4/

/3/Telegram 38129 to Moscow, August 30. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, AV 4 US-USSR)

/4/Dated August 31. (Ibid.)

The Bureau of European Affairs concurs with the Ambassador's views and notes that after five years delay in signing the Agreement, its use as a bargaining item has long since become counter-productive; that maximum usefulness from the Agreement is obtainable in the present context--as a sweetener in a prolonged stand-off situation. Soviet rejection or procrastination to an overture would not be disadvantageous, although this of course is not our objective.

In the present world situation and following the signing of the Canadian-USSR Agreement, there is a reasonable likelihood that other Governments will not misconstrue or overreact to an American initiative in this field. Assistant Secretary Gordon reports that there are no new factors in the Latin American sphere that need to be noted since the Secretary made his recommendation on July 15.

When last consulted earlier this summer, Pan American Airlines, the American carrier which would carry out the Agreement on our side, felt that flights to Moscow would probably not be profitable for some time to come, but on balance saw some advantage in serving Moscow. After the Agreement is signed, Pan Am would probably wish to have discussions with the Soviet carrier, Aeroflot, regarding intermediate stops, to improve profits of the operation. We are not aware of what the Soviet attitude would be to such a request except for a not-discouraging Soviet response to informal mention of this possibility by Juan Trippe in Moscow last June.

In one regard there is more justification for implementation of the Agreement now (for the 1967 tourist season) than when it was negotiated and initialled in 1961. Over 20,000 Americans now visit the USSR each year; many would be convenienced by implementation of such an agreement.

We have not made a formal effort to obtain the views of various agencies of the U.S. Government or various parts of the Department since 1963. At that time the JCS objected, but the Department of Defense overruled the Chiefs and interposed no objection to the Agreement. The FAA, CAB, and the Department of Commerce expressed no opposition. We know that the FAA would now like to make one relatively small technical change in the separate "Agreed Minute" but this can probably be done fairly simply and need not be a preliminary requirement for signing the Agreement.

On the basis of the foregoing the Secretary has suggested that we propose to the President that he authorize the Department of State to consult immediately with interested Congressional leaders, including Senators Fulbright, Hickenlooper, Magnuson, and Monroney. If Congressional attitudes seemed to warrant it, we would then request highest level authorization to permit us to instruct Ambassador Kohler to inform the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs of our interest in proceeding with the signing of the Agreement and suggesting that this be done by Secretary Rusk and Foreign Minister Gromyko in New York at the time of the convening of the General Assembly./5/

/5/In his September 1 memorandum Rostow gave Johnson three options in response: "Permit State to consult Congressional Leaders," "Disapprove," and "See me." The latter was checked. Written in an unidentified hand at the top of Rostow's memorandum is, "Why do Joint Chiefs of Staff object?" In a September 3 memorandum to Johnson, Rostow summarized the JCS objections as stated in 1963 and the Department of State's response and proposed a Tuesday lunch meeting with Rusk and McNamara to "walk around this once more before instructing Sect. Rusk to begin Congressional consultations." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President--Walt W. Rostow, Vol. 12) No record of the luncheon meeting on September 6 has been found, but on September 12 Rusk informed the President that the consultations with Congressional leaders had found general support for signing the agreement. (Memorandum to the President; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 74 D 164) The following day Kohler was instructed to inform Gromyko of this and to suggest that Gromyko and Rusk might sign the agreement when they were both in New York. (Telegram 46389 to Moscow; ibid., Central Files 1964-66, AV 4 US-USSR)

BHR

173. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State/1/

Moscow, September 13, 1966, 2155Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, UN 22-2 GA. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to USUN.

1263. Ref: State's 41009, 44806; Moscow's 1182./2/

/2/Dated September 2, 10, and 9, respectively. (Ibid.) They all discussed preparations for a meeting between Rusk and Gromyko at the United Nations.

1. I saw Gromyko today and told him of Secretary's interest in resuming talks with him while both were in New York, and also indicated that Secretary would be pleased to arrange hospitality if Gromyko wished to visit any other part of U.S. I said that our missions in New York had already talked about the possibility of a meeting and, if Gromyko agreed to meeting, they could make necessary arrangements.

2. Gromyko said he had received word about this and that he of course agreed in principle. He had not given matter much thought but would think about it and let me know before I left Moscow on Thursday or send word back through the mission in New York. He asked if I could tell him what subjects Secretary would want to discuss. I noted that our missions had already talked about possible subjects, and that Secretary had in mind a tour d'horizon which obviously would include Viet Nam, various disarmament questions, bilateral matters, and of course anything Gromyko wished to raise.

3. Gromyko said that, on Viet Nam, he should mention again that Soviets were not going to negotiate with anyone on this matter; this did not mean they could not speak about their position, or hear other side, but they would not negotiate or do anything analogous to it (obviously implying that there should be no press stories alleging US-Soviet negotiations on Viet Nam). I replied that as much as we wished they would change their position, we nevertheless understood it at this point and had no desire to put him on the spot.

4. When Gromyko asked if we had in mind a purely exploratory exchange of views, I told him it seemed possible to me that we could move a little farther on some matters and singled out outer space (depending on progress in UN legal committee), non-proliferation, and comprehensive test ban. Mention of non-proliferation set in train an exchange of familiar arguments about whether US really desired non-proliferation, in course of which Gromyko said he had not detected any narrowing of wide gap between our two positions at Geneva talks. He did however express interest when I referred to President's statement on need for "compromise"/3/ and asked if there were any specificity in our position on this. I said there was none yet but that we were thinking about how we could close gap between us. Gromyko commented that since President had not specified what he had in mind, it was not clear how progress could be made.

/3/While discussing the non-proliferation treaty during his remarks at the National Reactor Testing Station in Arco, Idaho, on August 26, the President said "I believe that we can find acceptable compromise language on which reasonable men can agree." Johnson also expressed his desire to seek out all possible areas of agreement with the Soviet Union despite differences over Vietnam. For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1966, Book II, pp. 900-903. For documentation on the negotiation of the non-proliferation treaty, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, volume XI.

5. Gromyko complained at one point that although it was sometimes agreed in his discussions with Secretary that further talks should be held on one or another subject, none of these matters were ever permitted to come to fruition. Mentioning disarmament as one example, I said that while I did not want to provoke argument today on this point, it was nevertheless Soviet side which took position that Viet Nam was barrier to solution of bilateral and other questions between US and Soviets who spoke of "freeze" in our relations. I said it was regrettable that there were such differences between us as Viet Nam but US Govt had consistently maintained that special responsibility lay with our two powers and we should continue to try to make progress despite Viet Nam. I said in this connection that I was sure that he had read President's Idaho Falls speech,/4/ which was addressed to them; and that, as he knew, I had personally always felt that we should do what we could to move forward.

/4/See footnote 3 above.

6. Gromyko countered that contrary to what we say it was US in fact which had blocked final implementation, for example, of consular convention and air agreement. While he did not attach great importance to these issues, they had a certain importance and even on these minor matters we had stopped progress. I said I frankly recognized that these matters had not gone forward as had been expected but this was not cause but result of development in our relations.

7. Gromyko said they had impression that US had two policies, or at least two methods of conducting them, with respect to Soviet Union. On one hand, we tried to give impression that we were dealing with USSR and trying to reach agreement with them; and on other hand we conducted highly negative policies which only served to raise tensions. This, he said, created very difficult situation.

8. I told Gromyko I could not agree with this description. Soviets had their alliances and had made promises to some of its allies, and we also had obligations to many of our allies. Fact that we had to keep these obligations was fact of life but did not mean that we should not try to move ahead wherever we could.

9. During discussion disarmament, I said I thought some progress had been made at least in bringing language closer together, and that in fact I had always thought our purposes here were same. It had never been our purpose to give nuclear weapons to Germany or to any other state. We had not made same mistake, I said that Soviets had made in furnishing assistance to Communist China. If he wanted testimony to our position, he should study history of our refusal to help France which had cost us dearly in other ways. In any event, I said, there had been a change in situation following Chinese explosions which resulted in pressures in India and other countries for them to develop their own nuclear capability.

10. At end of conversation, Gromyko asked if Secretary had been specific about visit to "any other part of US" which had been mentioned. I said he had not, but assumed he had in mind whether Gromyko would wish to come down to Washington or travel anywhere else in US as he might wish. He took note of reference to Washington but went on to comment that he was not a great traveler.

11. In reply to my query, he said Mrs. Gromyko would accompany him to New York but said official delegation had not yet been approved./5/

/5/On September 14 Kohler reported that he had lunched with Dobrynin that day for a "far-ranging discussion on Soviet-American relations" but noted that the substance of the conversation was largely repetitive of that with Gromyko. (Telegram 1280 from Moscow, September 14; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, POL US-USSR)

Kohler

174. Editorial Note

Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko and Secretary of State Rusk held discussions in New York on September 22 and 24, 1966, in connection with the convening of the 21st United Nations General Assembly. Memoranda of their conversations are in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Conference Files: Lot 67 D 586, CF 84. The memoranda of their conversations on the outer space and non-proliferation agreements are printed in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, volume XI, Documents 151-153. The memorandum of their conversation on Vietnam is ibid., volume IV, Document 247.

Rusk reported on his September 24 session with Gromyko in a telephone conversation with Walt Rostow the next morning. Rostow in turn reported to the President in a September 25 memorandum that Rusk believed the details of the civil air agreement could be worked out during October and that the outer space agreement would go through "since Gromyko in a speech made no reference to Soviet reservation about use of the Outer Space Agreements." In addition, "there was some closing of the gap in non-proliferation language" but "we are not home on this." As for Vietnam, "no substance; but the atmosphere was extraordinarily calm and quiet. Secretary Rusk says you will wish to study his memo of conversation to get the flavor which, in his experience, was unique for this kind of confrontation." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, USSR, Vol. XIII)

175. Memorandum From the Ambassador at Large (Thompson) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/

Washington, September 28, 1966.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, AV 4 US-USSR. Secret.

I think it is clear from your talks with Gromyko in New York/2/ that the Soviets will not let Viet-Nam prevent them from proceeding with the Civil Air Agreement, technical talks on peaceful uses of atomic energy, and probably also with an agreement on outer space along the lines of our proposals. I am less sanguine about non-proliferation, but I suspect that the Soviets have the same information as we do about tendencies in India. This must worry them because if India took the nuclear route, Pakistan would surely be pushed much deeper into the Chinese Communist embrace.

/2/See Document 174.

Ray Garthoff tells me that a German official recently privately expressed to him the opinion that the German Government could be brought to give up a hardware solution provided we could maintain the European clause in any agreement. This official's reasoning was that if European unity did come about, the Germans would not want to be committed to a position inferior to that of the French. I think that if we were able to accept treaty language that would bar a German hardware solution, we could probably sell the Soviets on a European clause.

Although there was nothing in the Gromyko talks that seemed very significant except the mild tone and their willingness to conclude some agreements with us, I am convinced from other information available to us that their main preoccupation is the internal situation in Communist China. It seems clear from the recent report from Belgrade that this is the chief question Brezhnev had on his mind in his recent visits to Eastern Europe. We have good reason to believe that the Eastern Europeans would like to see a Viet-Namese settlement and are doubtless pushing the Soviets to take some action in this direction.

Gromyko's emphasis in his U.N. speech on the importance of Europe doubtless reflects the real Soviet attitude but was probably made at this time to put the Viet-Namese problem in better perspective. It is difficult to assess what effect a settlement in Viet-Nam would have on Sino-Soviet relations. Whatever the terms, the Chinese would doubtless accuse the Soviets of a sellout. One of the most important Soviet pre-occupations must surely be what their position will be in North Viet-Nam after a settlement. If Peking continues on its present course, the Soviets may have less concern about their influence relative to that of China in Hanoi after a settlement. In any event, the Soviets cannot enjoy the growing burden of aid to Viet-Nam nor the continued risk that developments might lead to a confrontation with the United States or at least a very painful dilemma in the event of a conflict between the United States and Peking. Because the Soviets do not want to get too far in front of Hanoi and because Hanoi probably is awaiting the outcome of our elections before making any policy changes, I doubt if anything can be accomplished right now, but after the elections I am inclined to think that in the event of another bombing pause, the Soviets would bring considerable pressure on Hanoi.

176. Editorial Note

On October 7, 1966, President Johnson delivered an address before the National Conference of Editorial Writers in New York on steps to improve East-West relations. For text of the speech as delivered, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1966, Book II, pages 1125-1130. The Embassy in Moscow reported in telegram 1802, October 16, on the negative Soviet reaction to the President's speech, particularly as expressed by Leonid Brezhnev in an October 15 speech: "While Brezhnev avoided any such terms as 'hypocrisy' or 'insincerity,' and while he observed in passing USSR also wants mutually beneficial U.S.-Soviet relations, his line is hard and biting and accords with initial Sov press comment on President's speech, i.e., main prerequisites for development such relations are cessation U.S. 'aggression' in Vietnam and abandonment by U.S. of its alleged interventionism in general. According to him, President's 'attempt' suggest U.S. relations with USSR and other socialist states can develop unimpeded despite U.S. aggression Vietnam and interference in affairs other states is a 'strange and pernicious delusion.'"

The telegram concluded, however, that Brezhnev's failure to deal with the specific proposals in the President's speech probably reflected the "basic predicament" the Soviets were in as a result of their negative stance on the development of U.S.-Soviet relations and their interest in certain specific steps, such as the civil aviation agreement. Brezhnev's negative reaction should be interpreted as a "go slow" signal rather than as an outright rejection of those steps in which the Soviet Union had a strong interest. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 15-1 US/JOHNSON)

177. Memorandum for President Johnson/1/

Washington, undated.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 7 USSR. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Thompson and cleared by EUR, FE, ACDA, IO, E, and H. Forwarded to Rostow by Read under an October 7 covering note stating that the memorandum "represents the Department's views" and that "Rusk saw and concurred in an earlier draft essentially on the same lines." Rostow forwarded the memorandum to the President at 9:15 a.m. on October 10 together with an October 9 briefing memorandum on non-proliferation from Bator and an October 7 briefing memorandum on Vietnam from Harriman. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President--Walt W. Rostow, Vol. XIV)

SUBJECT
Meeting with Gromyko, 5 p.m. October 10, 1966

U.S. Objectives

The following are the principal objectives of your meeting with Gromyko:

1. To add one more step to the many we have taken to convince the Soviets and the rest of the world that we are leaving no stone unturned in our search for peace in Viet-Nam.

2. To exacerbate the Sino-Soviet quarrel. (The mere fact that you receive Gromyko will doubtless lead to Chinese charges against the Soviets of collusion with the U.S.)

3. To demonstrate to the Soviets that despite Viet-Nam, we are not only willing, but desirous of taking steps that will ease tension.

Talking Points

A. Viet-Nam. You may wish to tell Gromyko that you have been fully informed of his talks with Secretary Rusk and that you do not propose to repeat the statement of our position which is well known to him. There are, however, several points which you may wish to underscore:

1. First of all is your sincere desire for a peaceful settlement. You have taken every feasible step to move matters towards negotiation for a settlement or, pending that, for a reciprocal reduction in military activity. You have noted Mr. Gromyko's statement to the effect that every time we made a peaceful move we also took actions or made statements indicating a further American involvement. Such actions do not indicate bad faith on our part. They were previously planned and considered necessary only in view of the total lack of response from the other side.

2. We would be quite prepared to discuss what action each side might take to diminish the level of hostilities, but how can we do this when Hanoi will not talk to us in a conference, directly, or through third parties? Mr. Gromyko had suggested certain actions by us to establish a climate for a settlement but actions are needed on both sides to increase mutual confidence.

3. We will be grateful for anything the Soviets may be able to do to enable us to reach a peaceful settlement of this problem.

4. If Mr. Gromyko again urges unilateral U.S. actions, you may wish to note that the Soviets do not seem to have given us credit for having given up in advance one of our major negotiating assets; namely, we have made clear in advance our willingness to withdraw our troops and to give up the military bases which we have constructed in South Viet-Nam at enormous cost. In return for this, there has never been any concession from the other side.

B. Non-proliferation. Depending upon the status of Foster's continuing talks you may wish to emphasize our desire to overcome the remaining differences between us on the text of an agreement. It seems to us that as far as our objectives in non-proliferation are concerned we have a wide area of agreement. We do not intend to turn our weapons over to any other nation. Responsibility for firing U.S. weapons rests with the President under our law and policy, and there is no prospect that this will or can be changed. However, we do not wish to undertake treaty obligations which would commit us to act as if no alliance of a collective security nature exists with our allies. We cannot say to them that collective security within the alliance is none of their business. We have gone a long way in seeking to reach compromise language with the Soviet Union and we do not believe that any real Soviet concerns would be affected by the language which we have proposed. Time is running out on this subject. We should therefore seek to resolve the remaining differences.

C. Communist China. You might wish to see whether Gromyko will be disposed to discuss this subject by touching on the following points:

1. We are amazed and puzzled by what appears to be going on in Communist China. The turmoil there will surely increase the difficulty the Chinese are encountering in feeding their enormous population.

2. These events are cause for concern which the Soviet Government may share. In particular we hope that the chaotic conditions in China will not tempt the Chinese to divert attention by military adventures. For our part, we will take no action which could legitimately serve as a pretext for such a dangerous course.

D. Germany. It seems unlikely that Gromyko will raise this as a separate subject. He will, of course, express the traditional Soviet views on Germany in the context of his remarks on non-proliferation. He might argue for admission of the so-called German Democratic Republic into the United Nations, although this is doubtful.

E. Outer Space Treaty. On October 4 the Soviets accepted two of our important compromise proposals and, for other treaty clauses such as that relating to the granting of tracking facilities, put forward compromise language of their own. This Soviet movement has brought us closer to a treaty, though several problems remain to be worked out and our allies need time to react. Ambassador Goldberg is making an intensive effort to wrap up all of the major treaty points. If substantial agreement has been reached by October 10, you may want to express satisfaction; otherwise you might hope for a speedy conclusion.

F. Civil Air Agreement. We have prepared and the Soviets have agreed that Pan American send a small group to Moscow to review and update the agreement between the two airlines preparatory to the signing of the inter-governmental agreement here. We understand that General Loginov, the Soviet Minister of Aviation, will come here in early November for the signing. We are currently studying a few amendments proposed by the Soviets and are proposing a few minor, technical changes of our own.

G. Consular Agreement and Trade Expansion. You may also wish to express an intention of pressing for the ratification of the Consular Agreement and for Congressional action which would facilitate the expansion of trade.

H. Fisheries Problem. You may wish to express the hope that the U.S.-Soviet talks which will resume next month on the problem caused by the Soviet fishing fleet currently massed off our Northwest Coast will result in a reduction of the tensions this problem is creating for us.

178. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Washington, October 10, 1966, 5-6:41 p.m.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL US-USSR. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Thompson and approved by the White House on October 13. The full text of this memorandum, most of which deals with Vietnam, is printed in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. IV, Document 264. A memorandum of the part of the conversation dealing with non-proliferation is ibid., vol. XI, Document 157. The meeting took place in the Oval Office. The time and place of the meeting are from the President's Daily Diary. (Johnson Library) Dobrynin's recollections of the meeting are in his memoir, In Confidence, pp. 144-145; Johnson's are in The Vantage Point, pp. 248-249. Johnson discussed the meeting in a telephone conversation with Fulbright on October 11, calling it a "very delightful, scintillating, stimulating, exciting, enjoyable hour and 45 minutes." It was "very, very frank. Both of us spoke rather bluntly. He does by nature and I did by purpose." (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of a Telephone Conversation between Johnson and Fulbright, 5:20 p.m., Tape F66.28, Side A, PNO 2)

SUBJECT
Miscellaneous Matters

PARTICIPANTS

U.S.	U.S.S.R.
The President	Mr. Gromyko
The Secretary	Ambassador Dobrynin
Llewellyn E. Thompson	Mr. Sukodrev
Mr. Rostow

The President opened the conversation by saying that he had been informed of the Minister's talks with Secretary Rusk and the Minister's other activities and thought he must have been a very busy man.

Gromyko said it was true that he had much to do here. He had had an exchange of views with Secretary Rusk and had also had a meeting with Ambassador Goldberg to discuss questions which he had raised./2/ He assumed the President was informed of the content of these meetings and this would facilitate his task.

/2/Goldberg reported to Rusk on his October 3 meeting with Gromyko in telegram 1214 from USUN, October 3. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 7 USSR)

The President said he had been informed of these discussions and that Secretary Rusk would have a further discussion with him this evening./3/ While waiting for the photographers to come in, the President said that the Soviets had allowed their Ambassador to come back to Washington and in return the President had selected the best man we had to go to Moscow.

/3/The President met with Rusk from 4:35 p.m. prior to the Gromyko meeting but did not meet with Rusk later in the day. (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary)

Mr. Gromyko said Mr. Thompson would be very welcome in Moscow./4/ After the photographers had left, Mr. Gromyko remarked that the temperature of the room had risen as a result of their activities. The President replied that he hoped not as his job was to cool things down.

/4/The President appointed Thompson Ambassador to the Soviet Union on October 13. Thompson entered on duty January 23, 1967, and served until January 14, 1969.

Gromyko said that the leadership and the Government of the Soviet Union often discussed the question of where the policy of the United States is leading. He presumed that there was an awareness of the responsibility of the United States and of the Soviet Union in world affairs. However, certain facts related to United States policy baffled the Soviets. He could declare on behalf of the Soviet Union that it was in our mutual interest to work for better relations. If the United States Government and Mr. Johnson, as President, were willing to take steps to promote international dtente to improve relations, they would not find the Soviet Union lacking in response as this was in accord with the wishes of both the Soviet Government and its people.

The President said he agreed with the points Mr. Gromyko had made. We were just as baffled about the foreign policy of the Soviet Union. It was evident that we had not communicated with each other very well. He also agreed that agreement between our two great powers was of the highest importance and that we had a great responsibility to the world. He had on many occasions tried to take steps to ease tension. He had been greatly encouraged in the correspondence that had taken place during his early months in office. He had been deeply disappointed that the keeping of our commitment to South Viet-Nam seemed to frustrate these early beginnings. He had been distressed to read in the Soviet press remarks about himself personally and about the motivation of his Administration. He knew that the Soviet and American people wanted friendship and he was always ready to go more than half way to reach agreement. The greatest reward to him as President, and the greatest blessing for all people, would be if we could succeed in this endeavor.

[Here follows discussion of Vietnam; see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, volume IV, Document 264.]

179. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Washington, October 10, 1966.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL US-USSR. Secret; Nodis. Drafted and initialed by Thompson and approved in the White House on October 13.

SUBJECT
Soviet Greetings

PARTICIPANTS

U.S.	U.S.S.R.
The President	Mr. Gromyko
The Secretary	Ambassador Dobrynin
Llewellyn E. Thompson	Mr. Sukodrev
Mr. Walt Rostow

At the conclusion of the talk between the President and Mr. Gromyko, the latter said privately to the President that he had brought greetings from President Podgorny, as well as Mr. Brezhnev and Mr. Kosygin and their best wishes for the President personally, as well as for the United States.

The President replied that he was very appreciative of this message and hoped that Mr. Gromyko would take his greetings to the Soviet leaders. He said he would like to repeat the hope he had expressed when he first took office that it would be possible for Soviet leaders to visit this country or for him to visit the Soviet Union.

At this point the leadership of the Congress entered the room and were presented to Mr. Gromyko.

180. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Washington, October 14, 1966, noon.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL US-USSR. Secret; Limdis. Drafted and initialed by Stoessel and approved in the White House on November 10.

SUBJECT
US-Soviet Relations; Viet-Nam

PARTICIPANTS

U.S. Side:	U.K. Side:
The President	The Foreign Secretary, George Brown
Ambassador Bruce	Sir Patrick Dean, British Ambassador
Mr. Francis Bator
Mr. Walter J. Stoessel, Jr.

Following a private talk between the President and the Foreign Secretary, the President invited the group to walk with him around the White House grounds.

In the course of the conversation, the President spoke of the present state of US-Soviet relations, saying that he felt some progress was being made. He noted that we had a cultural agreement with the Soviet Union, that there was agreement that a civil air accord should be signed in the near future, negotiations on fisheries were proceeding, and the prospects were encouraging for a treaty on outer space. Both sides seemed to be working seriously on finding compromise language for a non-proliferation treaty. In general, the President said, he felt that our relations with the Soviet Union were better at present than they have ever been since he assumed the Presidency.

The President recalled his recent talk with Foreign Minister Gromyko./2/ This had been frank and useful. So far as Viet-Nam was concerned, the principal change he detected in the Soviet position was that Gromyko had indicated that the Soviets now have some influence in North Viet-Nam and that, if the bombing were to cease, there was reason to hope that this would be followed by positive action on the part of the North. Previously, Gromyko had only urged us to stop the bombing and then we would see what would happen.

/2/See Documents 178 and 179.

[Here follows five paragraphs on Vietnam.]

181. Memorandum From the Ambassador at Large (Thompson) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/

Washington, October 14, 1966.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, USSR, Gromyko Conversations, Vol. I. Secret. No drafting information appears on the memorandum, but it was initialed by Thompson.

SUBJECT
Conversations with Gromyko

I have the following observations on the discussions which you and the President had with Mr. Gromyko:/2/

/2/See Documents 178 and 179.

You will note that contrary to custom, Mr. Gromyko did not begin the conversation by expressing the greetings of the Soviet leadership, but waited until the conversation was over. My guess is that this was deliberate and that he wanted first to see how the conversation went. Apparently he considered it sufficiently satisfactory to transmit the greetings.

It seems to me the essence of the conversation with the President was that Gromyko admitted the Soviet Union had influence in Hanoi and that by implication they would exercise this influence if we stopped bombing. He also flatly stated that the reaction of Hanoi would be different, obviously referring to the reaction to the last pause. On the other hand, this was qualified, it seems to me, by the fact that Mr. Gromyko indicated that our last cessation of bombing was not successful because it was conditional. He pointed out that a number of countries knew that it was a pause and not a cessation and that we were waiting to see what the other side did. It therefore seems to me that a Soviet commitment to do something about a cessation is qualified by the indication that the pause should be unconditional and indefinite.

I think it was striking that Mr. Gromyko avoided all polemics and was most careful not, in any way, to antagonize the President. He made the flat statement that the Soviet Union wished to improve relations which is a considerable change from their recent standard line which is that this could only happen after Viet-Nam was settled.

There are two points that Gromyko made in the conversation which I think we could successfully pursue for the purpose of clarification. At one point, after referring to the bombing pause, he said that this had been accompanied by conditions known to be unacceptable to the other side as the other side would have to capitulate. I am not clear just what he had in mind. The other remark was that we had not been sufficiently specific about our troop withdrawal. We might explore just what specific points he had in mind. Was it timing, for example, or perhaps the conditions we would require or what.

It is also striking that Gromyko only made one remark which could be implied as a threat and that was that if the United States widened the war, the Soviet Union would give further aid to the Viet-Namese and both the United States and the Soviet Union would find themselves drawn into these events.

It seems clear from all of the talks with Gromyko that the Soviet Union professes, and I believe genuinely, to wish to see a settlement of the Viet-Namese affair. Moreover, they are apparently prepared to reach at least some agreements with us and improve relations despite Viet-Nam. This is somewhat a change of position. The following occur to me as possible explanations:

In the first place, the deterioration of the Chinese Communist position in the Communist Bloc has meant that the Soviet Union is less concerned that actions to improve relations will expose them to effective Chinese attacks within the Bloc. In the second place, they must be genuinely worried about the chaotic situation inside Communist China and would like better relations with us not only in the event of unforeseen contingencies but also to deter us from any inclination we might have to get together with Communist China in opposition to the Soviet Union. An additional factor may be that from their point of view things are going well for them in Western Europe and they may think they can speed up the disintegration of NATO and promote troop withdrawals by being in a posture of better relations with the West. A further factor may be the upcoming fiftieth anniversary of the Revolution next year. The Soviets are preparing to put on quite a show and I believe would like a situation in which many Westerners will be present to hear their boasts of their progress.

Finally, the Soviets probably consider that a posture of improved relations will help bring pressure on us for agreements they would like to achieve, such as a non-proliferation treaty./3/

/3/In an October 17 meeting with Dobrynin, Thompson reviewed the President's conversation with Gromyko. Thompson said that he had been somewhat encouraged by the general tenor of the discussion even though a subsequent speech by Brezhnev seemed to throw "cold water" on it. Dobrynin concluded that this was not his impression of the speech and added that Gromyko left Washington with great hopes for a non-proliferation treaty. (Memorandum of conversation; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL US-USSR)

182. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Washington, October 14, 1966.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, INCO-FISH US. Confidential. Drafted by Wolf on October 17 and approved in S/AL on October 20.

SUBJECT
Fisheries and East-West Trade

PARTICIPANTS
Senator Warren Magnuson of Washington
Mr. Grinstein, Counsel
Ambassador L. E. Thompson, S/AL
Mr. Joseph J. Wolf, G/PM

Ambassador Thompson called on the Senator at the latter's suggestion. The Senator said that he wished to convey some impressions stemming from his recent trip to Moscow./2/ He thought that his contacts with the Soviet Fisheries people in Moscow demonstrated an awareness on their part of the importance of withdrawing their current fishing activities off the West Coast if other relations were to improve. All the Soviet people he had met seemed to be interested in improved East-West trade. The Senator had been frank to indicate that prospects for increased East-West trade would be harmed if the fishing problem remained unsolved.

/2/Senator Magnuson was in Moscow September 30-October 4. He met with the Minister of Fisheries, an official of the Ministry of Trade, and an official of the Academy of Sciences. Reports of his meetings were transmitted in airgrams A-573 and A-574, October 7; a summary report of his visit is in airgram A-575, October 11. (Airgrams A-573 and A-575; ibid., LEG 7 MAGNUSON; A-574; ibid., FT US USSR)

The Senator said that, as the father of the East-West Trade Bill, he had to say that the bill could not move forward through the Congress next year if the Soviet fishing activities off the West Coast continued unchecked.

Ambassador Thompson said that in the talks with the Soviets in New York last week, he had at least twice stressed to Dobrynin that it was important that these matters be taken care of. Dobrynin had indicated he understood.

Senator Magnuson emphasized that it was a human political problem, as the people of Washington could stand on the shore and see Soviet fishing fleets offshore. The Soviets were getting a minimal catch that was just a drop in the bucket to their global take, and they would be foolish to continue to irritate Americans in this way. There had been one or two shots fired already; unless it was stopped there could be serious violence between fishermen. Sport fishermen were also annoyed at the Soviet presence, and blamed any bad fishing on that. The Soviets also are taking hake, at the same time that the Congress has appropriated funds for a hake reduction plant in Washington. The Senator passed around a sample of the full page publicity this was receiving in Washington papers.

He said that he had not tried to connect this problem with the upcoming King Crab talks when he was in Moscow, a tactic which Ambassador Thompson approved. Ambassador Thompson suggested that the Soviets probably realize the little gain and great risk involved in this operation, but might be slow to agree not to fish offshore, since they might wish to use this as a bargaining point again and again. On the other hand, their conduct might change soon, a possibility Dobrynin had indicated.

Mr. Grinstein said he would be going to Moscow for the technical talks in November that were scheduled, but that the research by U.S. fishing interests was as yet inadequate to establish damage by the Soviet operations. He wondered if he should call the talks off, or postpone them. Ambassador Thompson said that the Russians would read too much into either a postponement or cancellation and suggested that the talks go forward as scheduled, even if our evidence was by no means conclusive.

The Senator said that he was glad that he was able to get Ambassador Thompson's views, since Mr. Mann's departure had left him without a focal point on the fishing question. Ambassador Thompson said that Mr. Rostow had been asked by the Secretary to supervise all fisheries matters.

The Senator again stressed the important connection between clearing up the West Coast fisheries problem of close inshore Soviet commercial fishing, if the East-West Trade Bill was to move. He would be seeing the President on both these subjects Sunday night and would speak to him along these lines.

Ambassador Thompson again stressed the recognition we gave to the importance of the problem, and the fact that we would continue to press this on the Soviet representatives. He hoped Mr. Grinstein would pass on the results of his November talks.

183. Memorandum From the Ambassador at Large (Thompson) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/

Washington, October 25, 1966.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 77 D 163. Secret; Nodis. No drafting information appears on the memorandum, but it is initialed by Thompson.

At dinner last night, Dobrynin said he would like some personal advice. He said that President Johnson had referred, in passing, to the private correspondence between him and the Soviet leaders. After their meeting,/2/ Gromyko had asked Dobrynin whether he thought it would be a good idea to start up this channel again. Dobrynin had replied he did not know what to say, but would like to think about it and perhaps send Mr. Gromyko his views at a later date. He said he was still puzzled about what his advice should be and wondered if I could give him my own views.

/2/See Documents 178 and 179.

I replied that I thought this channel should not be used either for the normal conduct of regular business between the two governments nor to argue out standard positions of the two sides on disputed issues such as Viet-Nam. I thought it best that it be reserved for occasions when something constructive could be accomplished or when there was some explanation of policy or actions which were not readily apparent from formal communications.

Dobrynin expressed his appreciation and appeared to agree with the view I expressed.

184. Memorandum From the Ambassador at Large (Thompson) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/

Washington, November 4, 1966.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/AL Files: Lot 67 D 2. Secret.

I am concerned about the impression the Soviet leadership may get from our inaction on the non-proliferation treaty and what I would gather are contemplated actions in Viet-Nam./2/

/2/A reference to proposals to expand the air war against North Vietnam; see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. IV, especially Documents 295-299.

The Soviets have made a great point on non-proliferation as an indicator of our over-all intentions. While I do not suggest we should abandon our fundamental position, I do think our backing away from further discussion at this stage could cause serious Soviet misinterpretation of our intentions. I would, therefore, strongly urge that we have Foster proceed to discuss the present draft with Roschin, even though this language will probably not be acceptable to the Soviet Union. If we do have to delay further, then I would suggest that we frankly tell the Soviets that we would like to see the outcome of the present government crisis in Germany.

On Viet-Nam, although Gromyko did not produce anything we could accept, he did go further than the Soviets have ever gone before in indicating Soviet willingness to bring pressure on Hanoi if we would cease bombing. Moreover, all of the Eastern European Communist governments have been active in trying to bring about a cessation of bombing as a prelude to negotiations. If our answer to this is an escalation of the bombing, I am afraid the Soviets would conclude that anything other than a hard line on their part merely encourages us to think we can safely go for an all-out military victory. The tragedy of this, it seems to me, is that such increased bombing would have only a marginal effect on military operations in the south and judging from past experience, is unlikely to dispose the north to be any more inclined toward a settlement. It could, on the other hand, trigger greater Soviet or Chinese involvement and might cause Hanoi to cash the blank check it was given at the Bucharest Warsaw Pact meeting.

Finally, I should think what gain there has been from the Manila conference/3/ with world opinion would be largely dissipated if it were soon followed by an escalation of the bombing in North Viet-Nam.

/3/Regarding the Manila Summit Conference, see ibid., Document 281.

185. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State/1/

Moscow, undated.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL US-USSR. Confidential; Priority; Nodis. The telegram bears no time or date of transmission; it was received in the Department of State at 7:31 p.m. November 14.

2238. For President and Secretary from Kohler.

1. Following is full account Amb Kohler's conversation with Kosygin during his farewell call on latter this morning./2/ Account sent at Amb Kohler's direction but has not been seen by him and is therefore subject his correction. Ambassador was accompanied by Akalovsky.

/2/Kohler left the Soviet Union during the afternoon of November 14.

2. Amb opened conversation by expressing appreciation for opportunity call on Kosygin and take leave from him. Noting he had had long conversations with Podgorny and Polyansky/3/ and that he had discussed some questions also with Gromyko and Romanovsky,/4/ said did not wish take Kosygin's time with substantive discussion this occasion. Said, however, would be glad hear whatever Kosygin wished say or have conveyed to Washington.

/3/Summaries of Kohler's conversations with Podgorny and Polyansky were transmitted in telegrams 2189, November 10, and 2202, November 11, from Moscow. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, PER Kohler, Foy D.)

/4/No record of the conversations with Gromyko and Romanovsky has been found.

3. Kosygin observed period Amb's activities here had been complicated one, as US-Soviet relations had deteriorated and were even now rather acute. Asserted reason for such deterioration was not prejudice on part USSR towards American people or govt but rather Vietnam war. How US would finish that war difficult to say, and even US probably did not know how it would do it. However, war should be finished and Amb should convey to Washington that the sooner that done the better. Reiterating that difficult to say how war could be terminated, and noting he making no proposals, Kosygin suggested US making mistake and using wrong tactics. In fact, US had no tactics; its course of action seemed to be accidental and statements made by various US leaders were contradicting one another. Therefore, other side could have no confidence in US policy. Moreover, US statements contradicted by US deeds. Statement made today was contradicted by further escalation tomorrow. If President said something, McNamara said next day US would increase its troops in Vietnam up to one million, would destroy Vietnam, etc. While one could of course talk about destruction of Vietnam, to do so would not be simple matter, for both sides would suffer in process. If one hundred thousand Vietnamese were to be killed, US would have to sacrifice one hundred thousand of its own boys. And this, of course, was in context of regular operations rather than of "big things," of which he was not speaking. Thus, Kosygin continued, he regarded US Vietnam policy as extremely inconsistent and not offering other people possibility focus on problem. Said he could describe US policy in certain way but then hesitated and said he would rather not, as description he had in mind might be offensive to Ambassador. In any event, he said, US policy not a considered one and US did not seem know where it going. When US said it fighting for Saigon govt no one believed that as such govt did not really exist. Nor did anyone believe US statements that US fighting for Vietnamese people. To say that Vietnamese people should be protected and to destroy those people at the same time was paradox, indeed nonsense.

4. Kosygin then said he wished point out US actions Vietnam helping Chinese fan hatred in Asia which in its extent and racial aspects similar to that promoted in Germany under Nazis. US rendering tremendous assistance to Chinese in this respect, and difficult to see how anyone could do more to help Chinese fan hatred of white man. US creating situation which intolerable and which could provoke great forces into taking dangerous steps. Thus far Chinese leaders making great deal of noise but taking no action. However, both Ambassador and he knew how policy was made and what this noise signified. This noise could turn into action, for situation where mob frenzy and ferocious hatred whipped up could easily get out of control. Neither US nor USSR needed such situation. Thus while US and USSR had contradictions in that area they had common things as well. What they needed was a settlement in Vietnam, Kosygin said he could develop his thought further, but this very complex problem and only thing he would say now was that US should think about it.

5. Kosygin then said another major problem in world was European question. Related to European security was non-proliferation, on which agreement should be concluded as soon as possible. USSR had given us its views on subject in New York on Saturday. When Ambassador spoke to President, he should tell him not to treat non-proliferation as routine matter, for if that problem were to go through bureaucracy much precious time would be lost and history would not forgive that. Ambassador should tell President to act as swiftly as possible on Soviet proposal, which should not raise any problems of principle. Kosygin said he believed agreement on non-proliferation should not be treated as technical matter but as major historic act. We should handle agreement on non-proliferation in such way as to give it greatest importance and official weight, so that it would resound throughout world. (Apparent implication these remarks is Soviets may wish have non-proliferation agreement signed with great fanfare, possibly at highest level.) Kosygin then said that in his opinion non-proliferation "act" must be applicable to both signatories and nonsignatories of agreement, and some formula should be found to cover this point. In his view, major deficiency of Limited Test Ban was that it did not apply to nonsignatories. At this point Kosygin paused and said he speaking frankly in hope that, contrary frequent US practice, his statements would not appear in press tomorrow. If they were to appear he would not say anything further to Amb. Ambassador assured Kosygin his remarks would be held in strictest confidence. Kosygin continued it completely improper situation where those who had signed agreement did not test whereas nonsignatories engaged in testing. Therefore, such non-proliferation formula should be found as would cover not only signatories but others as well. Neither US nor Soviet formula did so at the moment, but any further formula should.

6. Amb Kohler observed we had given Soviets our formula last week, noting he had also given text to Gromyko on Saturday. Kosygin said he had heard about it but had not read it. Ambassador recalled he had participated in Camp David discussions with President and Secretary on non-proliferation question, during which President expressed strong desire for mutually acceptable formula. President was very gratified at progress made in Rusk-Gromyko discussions and wanted formula to be found which would reflect those discussions. We hoped formula we had given Soviets last week could be basis for agreement. Ambassador said non-proliferation was question on which he personally, as well as entire US Govt, convinced US and USSR had common interest, and we should make every effort find expression that interest.

7. As to Vietnam, Ambassador said did not wish argue with Chairman but did want make few comments. US and USSR were in obvious disagreement as to basic facts this situation. However, it clear that answer to this problem is peaceful settlement.

He could not exaggerate sincerity with which President approached search for peaceful solution. US objective limited, and we not seeking destruction North Vietnam or South Vietnam. We did not believe Vietnamese would wish Chinese enter into this situation. Kosygin interjected that actions were sometimes taken without other party being asked; e.g., US bombed North Vietnam while he was there and it neither asked North Vietnam nor informed USSR about its actions. Ambassador reminded Kosygin about what had preceded our decision to begin bombings. He continued by expressing hope Soviets would at some point help find peaceful solution. We realized Soviet difficulties in this respect but perhaps Chinese isolation had changed situation. Ambassador then recalled that during Harriman visit last year, Kosygin had said Vietnamese comrades did not exclude peaceful settlement, that this important, and that settlement would naturally be on basis 17th parallel. Ambassador inquired whether Kosygin still held such view.

8. Kosygin responded Vietnamese comrades did not exclude peaceful settlement, and he could confirm that such settlement would be on basis Geneva Agreements. Vietnamese comrades had been saying this at all meetings which had been held thus far. US must give a great deal of thought to problem. As to Vietnamese, they had set forth their views.

9. Kosygin continued Soviets wanted relaxation tensions in both East and West, and peace throughout world. USSR would develop its policies and activities in that direction. Ambassador should convey this to President and also tell him USSR did not seek arms race or tensions. While Soviet decisions would be firm, USSR would not depart from this course. He should also tell President that USSR firmly adhered to policy of peaceful coexistence and would not deviate from that policy. Both party and govt very firm on this point.

10. Ambassador concluded conversation by expressing satisfaction Kosygin's remarks. He observed that during his tenure of over four years there had been ups and downs in US-Soviet relations but that he was very happy that even now, when we had Vietnam problem between us, reasonable level of relations being maintained. Kosygin interjected he also appreciated this. Ambassador said he also gratified that, whatever US-Soviet tensions, he personally had been treated with friendliness and courtesy by everyone in USSR. Now that he going back to Washington, where his responsibilities would be much broader, he would make particular effort to assist in finding solution to Vietnam problem and help further improve US-Soviet relations. Said he glad Thompson would replace him as that would ensure continuity.

11. Finally, Ambassador alluded to Mrs. Kosygin's illness and conveyed Mrs. Kohler's and his own best wishes for her speedy recovery. Kosygin acknowledged his wife not well, noting she had wanted see Mrs. Kohler before latter's departure but unable do so on account her illness./5/

/5/In a December 6 letter to Kosygin, the President indicated that Kohler had reported to him on this conversation and that he had studied Kosygin's remarks carefully and appreciated the frankness of his observations. Following brief comments on non-proliferation, the President responded at length to Kosygin's remarks on Vietnam. For text of that portion of the letter, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. IV, Document 330.

Guthrie

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