A-1757

Moscow, April 26, 1966.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL US-USSR. Confidential. Drafted by Akalovsky and cleared in draft by Guthrie and Kohler.

SUBJECT
US-Soviet Relations; MFA Policy Planning Staff

REF
Embtels 3182, 3188/2/

/2/In telegram 3182, April 18, Kohler reported that he had pressed Dobrynin for further details on the death of Newcomb Mott. (Ibid., PS 7-1 US-USSR/Mott, Newcomb) In telegram 3188, April 19, Kohler reported that Dobrynin was returning to Washington the following week since nothing had developed about his being reassigned. (Ibid., POL 17 USSR-US)

On April 18, Ambassador and Mrs. Kohler had Ambassador and Mrs. Dobrynin for lunch at Spaso House. In addition to the Mott case and Ambassador Dobrynin's personal plans, discussion of which was reported in the telegrams under reference, the conversation also covered the general state of US-Soviet relations, some of the pending bilateral matters, as well as the new functions of A.A. Soldatov, former Soviet Ambassador in London.

Ambassador Kohler referred to Gromyko's claim in his speech at the Party Congress that the output of anti-Soviet propaganda "per square meter" is greater in the US than anywhere else, and asked facetiously whether Dobrynin was the author of that passage. Dobrynin said he had a chance to comment on the draft of the speech and had looked at that particular statement but Gromyko had drafted it personally and would not change a word on the grounds that it represented a "scientific approach". In this connection, Dobrynin claimed that since last Fall, when the Secretary and Ambassador Kohler drew attention to the personal attacks on the President in the Soviet press (Embassy's A-425),/3/ no such attacks had been published which emanated from Soviet official sources.

/3/See footnote 1, Document 125.

Ambassador Kohler noted the increasingly negative reaction of American opinion to the constant and vicious Soviet attacks on the US, and stressed that this would make an eventual normalization of US-Soviet relations considerably more difficult than the Soviets seem to think, judging by what we hear from some of our Soviet colleagues. Dobrynin acknowledged that the situation this year is more difficult than last year. He said, however, that on the basis of his numerous conversations in Moscow he could assure Ambassador Kohler that Soviet policy toward the U.S. remains basically unchanged, although while the Vietnam situation lasted the Soviet posture could not be anything but what it was now. To support his point, he also cited the fact that the Party Congress had produced no surprises.

As he did on a previous similar occasion (Embassy's A-425), Dobrynin then criticized the U.S. unwillingness to ratify the consular convention or to sign the civil air agreement. The signing of the cultural exchange agreement was a good thing but despite the statements by the US that it wants better relations with the USSR, it has failed to act on other measures in which the USSR is interested. While the Soviet Government realizes that the President has to select his priorities, in view of this situation it has come to the conclusion that measures concerning US-Soviet relations have no priority at all. Thus, the consular convention was not pushed last year, and the situation this year seems to be even worse. While the convention is nothing very big, it has symbolic value. As to the civil air agreement, even the President said it could be signed as soon as the consular convention was ratified. The Soviet Government did not understand why the two were related then, and wonders what is to happen now. While a number of European countries, and even Japan, have entered or are willing to enter into an air agreement with the USSR, the US does not want to take even such a small step.

Ambassador Kohler explained that these were not purely matters of priority. Congressional figures-including those well disposed towards the USSR-have to take into account the fact that even if there were enough positive votes, any debate on such questions at this time would provoke a big argument further affecting US-Soviet relations. Dobrynin said he understood this but could not see how this applied to the civil air agreement.

In further conversation, Dobrynin confirmed the information the Embassy had reported earlier (Embtel 2939),/4/ that A.A. Soldatov, former Soviet Ambassador to the UK, is now involved in policy planning work. According to Dobrynin, Soldatov is to head a full-fledged Policy Planning Division in the Foreign Ministry, but the creation of that new office has thus far progressed only half-way in view of the difficulties connected with selecting and obtaining suitable high-caliber personnel. Viktor P. Karpov, presently Counselor at the Soviet Embassy in Washington, will probably be placed in charge of US affairs in the new division.

/4/Not found.

For the Ambassador:

DE Boster
Counselor for Political Affairs

159. National Intelligence Estimate/1/

NIE 11-7-66

Washington, April 28, 1966.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, National Intelligence Estimates. Secret. Submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence and concurred in by the United States Intelligence Board.

TRENDS IN SOVIET GENERAL POLICIES

The Problem

To estimate main trends in Soviet internal and foreign policy over the next year or two.

Conclusions

A. After the stormy years of Khrushchev, the Soviet Union seems to have settled down. The new leaders have framed a number of new policies, which are more realistic in terms of Soviet capabilities. In general these policies are more conservative. Internally, the leaders are trying to tighten up; they are trying to control the various spontaneous forces set loose under Khrushchev. Externally, they have given first attention to problems in the Communist world, particularly the challenge of China. They seem fairly well satisfied with the results thus far, and probably intend no great change in the near future.

B. However, there are trouble spots. There are tensions between the regime and the intelligentsia. Economic plans are still too ambitious and their failure would sharpen the question of how far and fast to go with reforms, particularly in introducing the "profit" system. Further strains on the allocation of economic resources are likely to be imposed by the demands of the military and space programs, and the ambitious agricultural plan. Though Brezhnev has emerged as the regime's leading figure, the ultimate locus of power and the manner of its exercise are far from settled.

C. As for foreign policy the regime has done well in isolating the Chinese and regaining positions in Asia lost by Khrushchev, but much will depend on what happens in Vietnam. The Soviets probably want the war to end soon, preferably by negotiations. But they do not yet have this much influence in Hanoi, and they will probably have to stick by their present policies-continued military aid and political support, but limited actual Soviet involvement. US-Soviet relations have been constricted by the Vietnamese war and no significant improvements are likely as long as the war continues.

D. In Europe, the Soviets will be more active, seeking to exploit de Gaulle's disruptive maneuvers within NATO. However, there is not too much they can do as long as their policy is fixed on the division of Germany. An active-policy is likely to be continued along the wide arc of countries south and east of the USSR. The Soviets have made progress in this area-Turkey, Iran, India, Pakistan, Japan-and will try to consolidate their gains at the expense of both China and the West.

Discussion

1. The 23rd Congress of the Soviet Party confirmed the main lines of foreign and domestic policy that have been gradually evolving since the fall of Khrushchev. Managed in the business-like fashion which is the image cultivated by the new leaders, the Congress produced no spectacular surprises and no broad new initiatives./2/

/2/The Congress met from March 29 to April 8. In Research Memorandum RSB 45, May 13, the Bureau of Intelligence and Research called the meeting "a well disciplined, almost routine affair, pervaded with the more orthodox themes that have come to be associated with the post-Khrushchev leadership. There were no major policy innovations." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/P Files: Lot 71 D 273, USSR)

[Here follow sections entitled "The Leadership," "Internal Policies," and "Foreign Affairs."]

The Outlook

40. While many specific policies remain unclear or even undecided, the conduct of the Soviet leaders does suggest the way in which, in a broad sense, they view the world and the USSR's future in it. Their approach is increasingly realistic. They do not act as though they believe that striking gains for Soviet policy or Communist aspirations are available in a host of countries. They do not seize upon every crisis, near or remote, as an opportunity to advance their cause suddenly and dramatically. This is, in our view, something more than just a matter of style. Rather it seems to reflect a growing appreciation of the complexity of the world, the unpredictability of events, and the limits on Soviet ability to direct, or profit from, political change in foreign countries. As a result, the USSR may be able to avoid many mistakes and to operate in a sophisticated and effective fashion in areas where genuine opportunities exist.

41. Fundamental Soviet objectives have not been altered. They are to preserve the security of the USSR, and to work toward the establishment of a Communist world under Soviet domination. Nevertheless, the approach of the new leaders extends and deepens the trend which dates from the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. It contrasts sharply with the period which preceded that crisis, when Soviet foreign policy seemed grounded on simpler conceptions and more extravagant expectations. Perhaps the chief significance of Khrushchev's ouster, therefore, is that a political change of the first magnitude inside the country has not reversed--indeed it has confirmed--the Soviet tendency to temper their revolutionary outlook on the world with concerns of national interest and great power status.

160. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Washington, May 19, 1966.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL US-USSR. Confidential. Drafted and initialed by Thompson and approved in S/AL on May 19. Thompson and Dobrynin also discussed American prisoners in Vietnam, de Gaulle's forthcoming visit to the Soviet Union, a new location for the Soviet Embassy, non-proliferation, a nuclear-free zone involving Israel and the Arab states, a visit of an oceanographic vessel to the Soviet Union, Rumania, and the visit of John D. Rockefeller, III, to the Soviet Union. Memoranda of these parts of the conversation are ibid., S/AL Files: Lot 67 D 2.

SUBJECT
Miscellaneous Intelligence

PARTICIPANTS
Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, USSR
Llewellyn E. Thompson, Ambassador-at-Large, Department of State

At lunch today, I asked Dobrynin of news of Mikoyan and Khrushchev. He said that Mikoyan had asked to be relieved from the Presidium because of health, as had Shvernik. He said, however, that Mikoyan was present on all ceremonial occasions. He said he had run into Mrs. Khrushchev briefly in the hospital and said that she was looking fine. He said that Mr. Khrushchev had had some kidney trouble but had recovered.

The Ambassador said he had had long talks with Brezhnev, Kosygin, and other leaders. He said he found the atmosphere much improved to what it had been under Mr. Khrushchev. He said he was able to express his views freely and frankly and was, in fact, encouraged to do so. He said his views were not always accepted, but there was no resentment at his expressing them. He said he had difficulty always in explaining statements such as that recently made by Mr. Acheson with respect to General de Gaulle/2/ as the Soviet leaders could not understand that statements of this sort could be made without representing firm United States policy.

/2/Presumably a reference to comments made by Acheson at a Senate subcommittee hearing in April. As reported in The New York Times, April 28, 1966, p. 15, Acheson stated that recent French policy had not drawn a picture of France as a dependable ally, and if Gaullist policy were to continue for a decade he speculated there would be a general disintegration in Western Europe, making the Soviet Union the magnet on the continent.

Dobrynin said he had attended the meetings of the Central Committee as a delegate. He said there were about ten Ambassadors who attended as delegates and a considerable number more who were there in the lower-ranking status of guests. He said that Fedorenko had attended as a guest and that it was not normal for a guest to be made a member of the Central Committee, but in this case, it had been decided that in view of the importance of the United Nations, Fedorenko should be made a member of the Auditing Commission.

I inquired whether his being a candidate member of the Central Committee meant that he got any more pay. He replied, "unfortunately not," but it did mean that he had more access to information about what was going on. He said because of the distance here from Moscow, he would probably not get all of the papers but these would be available to him whenever he was in Moscow.

He said that most of the members of the Presidium had not spoken at the Congress since Brezhnev was speaking, and also Kosygin, for the collective leadership. He said, however, that each of the members of the Presidium presided over the meetings in turn.

When I referred to the seating arrangement of the Presidium at the meetings, he pointed out that this varied somewhat and said that several times that Voroshilov had sat in the wrong place, on one occasion sitting next to Brezhnev, although he clearly did not belong there.

Dobrynin asked me if we had any ideas about what was going on in China. I said that we were mystified but were of the opinion that something important was taking place. I said that the attacks on the intellectuals seemed to be quite widespread and might even suggest that there were rival factions at work. He said that the attacks on the Soviet Union appeared to be getting increasingly vicious. He probed a bit with the obvious purpose of trying to find out whether Ambassador Gronouski's trip here meant that we were cooking something up with respect to Communist China. I said I was not aware of anything other than the usual repetitious go-rounds which we had with the Chinese in Warsaw.

In the course of the conversation, he observed that he was not sure that the Communist Chinese really wanted to get into the United Nations and I replied that my own personal opinion was that they did not.

I mentioned that the Chinese were apparently sending vessels to repatriate some of their nationals from Indonesia. He merely observed that Chinese relations with Indonesia were very bad.

161. Letter From Secretary of State Rusk to Attorney General Katzenbach/1/

Washington, June 18, 1966.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 17 USSR-US. Secret. Drafted by Robert L. Barry (EUR/SOV).

Dear Nick:

I am sure you are aware that the Soviet Embassy has been looking for a large piece of property in Washington for several years to be used as the site of a new chancery. The Soviets contend that their present building is overcrowded, and they appear to have made a firm decision to move to other quarters rather than try to expand their facilities at their present site on 16th Street. Their inability to acquire suitable real estate has been an increasing irritant in our relations. Further, our Embassy in Moscow is badly overcrowded and far below standard, and the Soviets have refused to make property available to us for new buildings until their problem in Washington has been solved.

For these reasons I believe it is in our interest to assist the Soviets in finding a suitable chancery site. We have explored many possibilities but the only one that seems to offer promise is an arrangement, presently under consideration by the General Services Administration, under which we might offer to lease the Mt. Alto Veterans' Hospital site on Wisconsin Avenue near Massachusetts Avenue to the Soviets on a long-term basis. We would demand a site of comparable size in a comparable location in Moscow in return.

Before presenting this proposal to the Soviet Government I wish to be sure that Soviet occupancy of this property would not create an unacceptable internal security hazard. We have been consulting with the Department of Defense, the National Security Agency, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation to determine whether any major problems exist. The Department of Defense has informally agreed to our offering this property. The Federal Bureau of Investigation has not informed us of the existence of any potential security problems. The National Security Agency considers that some problems may exist and is studying the question further. They hope to come to a final decision quite soon.

I would appreciate your preliminary thoughts on the advisability, from the point of view of internal security, of offering this property to the Soviet Government for a chancery site in exchange for suitable facilities in Moscow. I believe that such a step would be in the national interest because it would remove an increasingly important irritant in our relations with the Soviet Union and it would facilitate a solution to our own critical housing problem in Moscow. Of course, a considerable period of time will elapse between the first discussions of our proposal and the beginning of any construction work on the property. An even longer time will pass before the site is occupied by the Soviets. During this period it would be possible to eliminate whatever risks to the internal security that may exist. Naturally, this Department is ready to cooperate with all interested agencies in this regard to the maximum feasible extent.

We will not discuss this possibility with the Soviets until you have studied the problem. However, we believe we should move quickly in order to maximize our chances of negotiating reciprocal arrangements in Moscow. Further, the General Services Administration cannot hold this surplus property for an indefinite period and a decision as to its disposal must be made soon. Therefore, I would very much appreciate an early reply./2/

/2/Apparently the Justice Department raised no objections to the Mt. Alto site because on July 8 Stoessel made the tentative offer to Dobrynin, but pointed out that this land would be available only in exchange for a comparable property in Moscow. Dobrynin showed definite interest in the location and said he would discuss it with the proper authorities during his return to Moscow. (Telegram 4942 to Moscow, July 11; ibid., POL 17-7 USSR-US) A summary of Stoessel's conversation with Dobrynin was included in the State Department's memorandum for the President for his evening reading. (Ibid., S/S Files: Lot 74 D 164)

Sincerely yours,

Dean

162. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bator) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, June 24, 1966, 6:30 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President-Walt R. Rostow, Vol. 7. No classification marking.

SUBJECT
Ships Under Soviet Charter in the Great Lakes

At Tab A, George Ball recommends two bridge-building actions: (1) permission for Western flag ships under Soviet charter to enter the Great Lakes; (2) Ex-Im guarantees of commercial credit for four East European countries./2/ As you know, Secretary Rusk wants to take a Congressional reading before going ahead with the Ex-Im guarantees. However, the shipping issue is ready for decision.

/2/Attached but not printed is a June 2 memorandum from Ball to the President. In National Security Action Memorandum No. 352, "Bridge Building," July 8, 1966, the President directed the U.S. Government, in consultation with its allies, to "actively develop areas of peaceful cooperation with the nations of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union." For text, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XVII, Document 15.

The Issue: The Soviets have asked us to permit non-Soviet Bloc ships under Soviet charter to enter Great Lake ports, on a scheduled basis. State recommends that we not agree to a scheduled service, but agree to consider individual applications.

The Soviet application has merit:

--Soviet ports are open to U.S. shipping on a non-discriminatory basis;

--We have been allowing Soviet charter ships into Atlantic ports all along; there is no real reason for treating Great Lake ports differently;

--The ships would be manned by non-Bloc crews, and subject to security inspection by the Coast Guard, etc., as in the case of Bloc flag vessels calling at other U.S. ports. Our strict-minded Interagency Port Security Committee is ready to go ahead;

--The Great Lakes can use the business.

Opposition: Senators Douglas and Hickenlooper are the most important opponents. Sen. Douglas remembers the blown-up locks of World War I. (If we go ahead, I will suggest to State that they explain to him that we are talking about Western flag ships with Western crews.) Hickenlooper is against because of Vietnam, as are Representatives Arends, Adair, Brad Morse, Selden and Laird (probably).

Gleason and the longshoremen will not like it either. (I understand Gleason controls some but not all of the longshoremen in the region.)

Support: According to State, Senators Mansfield, Dirksen, Kuchel, as well as such East-West traders as Senator Magnuson are favorable. In the House, supporters include the Speaker, Representatives Albert, Boggs, Ford, and William Springer (Interstate and Foreign Commerce). According to Carl Marcy, Fulbright "perceives no objections". (All together, State contacted 25 Members, and staff members of six more, and got support or an O.K. from 23 of the 31.)

On balance, I would vote for the State proposal that we tell Moscow we cannot give them a blanket yes, but will consider individual applications. This would be a forward step, yet would give some protection against the Cold Warriors.

FMB

Approve State Recommendation/3/
Disapprove
Speak to me

/3/This option was checked. Rostow wrote "OK" to the right of Bator's initials.

163. Letter From the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations (Fulbright) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, June 30, 1966.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, Legislative Background File, Consular Treaty. No classification marking.

Dear Mr. President:

On June 17 I wrote Mike Mansfield expressing the hope that there might be a fresh look at the Consular Convention in view of your recent comments about the importance of building bridges to the East and other signs that we would like to move toward a relaxation of tensions in our relations with the Soviet Union./2/ I said in my letter that I knew a Senate vote would be close and that this might be a hard decision in an election year, but that if J. Edgar Hoover could be persuaded to qualify his comments about the espionage risks he feels Soviet Consulates represent,/3/ if the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency were willing to do some quiet work in the Senate, and if Senator Dirksen could be convinced that the Convention was in the national interest, it would be possible for the Senate to muster the necessary two-thirds vote.

/2/Fulbright's June 17 letter to Mansfield was forwarded to the President by Bator under cover of a June 21 memorandum in which Bator stated: "This is an odd about-face by the Senator. Until now, he has taken a consistently gloomy view of getting the convention through. His letter comes close to a damn-the-torpedoes line--and puts him on record as a bridge-builder (and the President on the spot.) The truth is that it would be bad foreign policy, as well as bad domestic politics, to take a chance, go for broke--and lose."

/3/Reference is to Hoover's testimony on March 4, 1965, before a subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, in which he stated that the establishment of new Soviet consulates would make the work of the FBI more difficult since it would increase Soviet opportunities to carry on intelligence and espionage operations.

Mike replied in a letter of June 23/4/ that although he believed personally that the Convention was in the national interest and should be ratified, his judgment was that the Convention would lead to acrimonious debate in the Senate and would fail to obtain a two-thirds vote.

/4/Not found.

I know that you are firmly dedicated to the proposition that it is in the interest of the United States to improve relations with the Soviet Union in fields where there is a possibility to do so. It seems to me that the Consular Convention is clearly in our interest. Not only is it primarily our travelers in the Soviet Union who will be the beneficiaries but I would think that we would derive comparably greater intelligence benefits from opening consulates in the Soviet Union than the Soviets would by opening consulates here. Most importantly, of course, the Convention would also serve the higher purpose of improving the atmosphere of United States-Soviet relations at a time when such improvement is badly needed.

Hence, I am writing to offer you my full support in securing ratification of the Convention. I feel that I have a responsibility to do whatever I can to obtain a two-thirds majority for the Convention.

As you know, opposition to the treaty was mobilized by various conservative groups relying for their principal authority on statements by J. Edgar Hoover. I cannot help but think that if Mr. Hoover were to consider the national interest of the United States, he would conclude that the advantages to the United States far outweigh the fact that the Federal Bureau of Investigation will be faced with the responsibility of controlling the activities of a few more intelligence agents.

I want you to know that I stand ready to do anything that I can do to help you on this matter./5/

/5/A note attached to Fulbright's letter, prepared by secretary Vicki McCammon, indicates that, upon reading the letter on July 7, the President instructed her to tell Walt Rostow to tell Ball to go see Fulbright and inform him that the President, like Fulbright, wished they could get a two-thirds vote. Ball was also to tell Fulbright that "Hoover is not the cause of this-nor is he [Johnson] influenced by anyone in Washington," just as he assumes "Fulbright is not influenced by anyone in Washington." A second note attached to Fulbright's letter indicates that the President's wishes were relayed to Rostow on July 7.

Sincerely yours,

JW Fulbright

164. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State/1/

Moscow, July 12, 1966.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, CUL 16 USSR. Secret. No time of transmission appears on the telegram; it was received in the Department of State at 1:35 p.m. on July 12.

166. Deptel 5363./2/

/2/On July 11 Kohler reported that the Soviet track and field team had canceled its tour of the United States because of American atrocities in Vietnam. The Ambassador informed Washington that he intended to protest this violation of the exchange agreement and tell Gromyko that "this manifest violation of formal agreement could not but have serious consequences for US-Soviet relations." (Telegram 161 from Moscow; ibid.) In telegram 5363, also dated July 11, and drafted by Thompson and approved by Rusk, the Department of State advised Kohler to take a lower-key approach to Gromyko since this reaction to the bombing in North Vietnam was not serious. (Ibid.)

1. My conversation with Gromyko is reported at length separately./3/ Conversation followed the general line of reftel as necessarily modified by course of conversation. I desire, however, to make a few comments. I quite agree that Soviet action in cancelling track and field meet is an indication that they do not intend to take serious action in response to our bombing of POL North Viet-Nam./4/ However, this decision was taken on its own merits and because of limitations in possibility of response as well as their obvious decision not to carry things so far as to commit them to direct physical conflict with us. I do not, however, regard this as a reason for not taking every action we can think of to inhibit them from destroying exchange programs.

/3/Telegram 171, July 12. (Ibid.)

/4/Regarding the U.S. decision in late June 1966 to bomb POL (petroleum, oil, and lubricants) storage installations in North Vietnam, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. IV, Document 164.

2. Likewise I see no relationship whatsoever between their action in connection with the exchange program and their decision to proceed with negotiation for a treaty on celestial bodies./5/ It has long been clear to me that they will avoid any new agreements whatsoever directly with us or in which we are the two principal participants, so long as Viet-Nam continues, other than those involving compelling Soviet interests (Embtel 2920, April 5, 1965)./6/ If they do in fact proceed to the negotiation of the treaty on celestial bodies and reasons will be unrelated either to Viet-Nam or to the exchanges agreement. Soviet leadership has a practically insoluble problem of resource distribution. It is clear that they are finding the burden of trying to rival us in military and space programs almost crushing. If they should not negotiate such a treaty, they are much more foolish than I believe them to be for they clearly cannot afford to engage in an arms race in space.

/5/In a May 7 statement President Johnson had expressed the need for a treaty governing the exploration of celestial bodies. Four days later Goldberg gave Federenko an outline of points for inclusion in such a treaty. On June 17 the Soviet Deputy Representative to the United Nations, Platon Morozov, transmitted to U Thant the Soviet draft of a celestial bodies treaty. (Ibid., vol. XI, Document 127) For documentation on negotiation of the treaty, which was signed on January 27, 1967, see ibid., volume XI.

/6/Document 105.

3. While I might have a shade of difference with respect to the reasoning of paragraph 2 in reftel, (since much of agreement could similarly be deprived of any but declaratory meaning) I consider it tactically sound and was careful in my discussion with Gromyko simply to read him the language in question which would indicate the extent of Sov Government responsibility and let him draw his own conclusions. Obviously he made no real distinction himself, while in his initial statement, he attributed the cancellation action to the feelings of the athletes. He did not pursue this line but rather indicated the action represented a deliberate decision of the Soviet Government.

4. I had a little more trouble, but tried even harder, to maintain the distinction with local American correspondents who pressed hard. I read to them the statement by the Dept's spokesman (Deptel 5028),/7/ stressing with respect to the exchange agreement the language that Soviet action in our view only "violated spirit of agreement". In response to further questioning, I made the distinction between contract and sub-contract, saying we were not charging violation of the overlying contract though the action was a clear breach of the sub-contract between the AAU and the Sov Sports Association.

/7/Dated July 11. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, CUL 16 USSR)

Kohler

165. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State/1/

Moscow, July 12, 1966.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66 POL US-USSR. Secret; Exdis. No time of transmission appears on the telegram, but it was received in the Department of State at 8:19 p.m. on July 12.

177. Ref State 4411./2/

/2/Dated July 6. (Department of State, S/S-I Limdis/Exdis Microfilm)

1. I have been increasingly concerned at stream of vituperation directed against us in Soviet press and TV, as well as at naivete and surprise this regard of many recent visitors to this country--including some who should know better. I am also disturbed at current tendency which I sense in US--especially in academic and journalistic circles--to think of Soviets as "good guys" struggling with Chinese "bad guys" to introduce moderation and peacefulness into international Communist movement. This outlook--which ignores repeated Soviet endorsements of "wars of national liberation"--inescapably leads many in US to excuse Soviet actions re Vietnam on grounds that Kremlin leaders "cannot help themselves" because of their dispute with Chinese. While there is, of course, kernel of truth in this line of reasoning, it is harmful to us in terms of our relations with USSR because it encourages Soviets to exploit double standard and roundly condemn US in most objectionable manner both publicly and privately and, at same time, feel confident that their efforts will be "understood" because situation in SEA is "extremely complicated one."

2. I am, therefore, viscerally sympathetic with Ambassador Bowles' suggestion that we should adopt a tougher line toward Soviet efforts re Vietnam. I believe this should be done by taking extreme care that no official statements or speeches by US officials contain explicit or implicit apology for Soviet line of action in Vietnam. Nor should we allow others to believe that we satisfied re Soviet "moderation" there. Thus I have been glad to see publicity given to Ambassador Goldberg's "put up or shut up" statement and to George Ball's television interview Monday/3/ in same vein. However, I do not believe that extensive and concerted propaganda campaign in all appropriate capitals and throughout world press, as suggested reftel, would be productive or, given present climate, necessarily convincing. It might even be interpreted as having ominous overtones or as evidence growing desperation in US re Vietnam.

/3/July 11.

3. Despite Soviet hostility and the torrent of abuse hurled at US, it should be kept in mind that one of realities of Vietnam situation is fact that Soviets thus far have been relatively cautious in avoiding any actions which could lead to collision with US. It is obviously in our interest not to back Sovs into corner--e.g. boasting re relative ineffectiveness of their SAM's--and thereby pressuring them to step up efforts against us in Vietnam. Should also be kept in mind that Sovs, to best of our knowledge, have never ascribed their actions Vietnam to fact that they cannot allow Chinese to be more revolutionary than they are. Their rationale is that they cannot leave fellow socialist country in the lurch. With or without Sino-Soviet dispute, Sovs would have felt obliged to provide DRV, in present situation, with some form of military aid, even under Khrushchev. Indeed, it can be argued--and Soviets themselves argue it all the time and in our view quite convincingly--that Sino-Soviet dispute has lessened effectiveness Soviet aid to Vietnamese over what it would have been had Moscow been able to patch up quarrel with Peking.

4. Finally, I cannot endorse our hinting that Sovs may really want war between US and China. Despite Chinese avowals that they would not call for Soviet support if hostilities with US ensue, Sovs acutely aware that Sino-Soviet defense treaty still valid (Sovs reiterated its validity this year on Feb 15 anniversary of its signing--Embtel 2507)./4/ They further aware that serious threat of Sino-US war would pose immense policy problems which at very least would necessarily affect their internal economic and military planning. It is almost truism to state that Soviet leadership not anxious to cope with such problems at present time, if ever.

/4/Dated February 14. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, EDU 6 USSR)

Kohler

166. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson/1/

Washington, July 14, 1966.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, State Department, Vol. IX. No classification marking. Attached to another copy of the memorandum, which shows it was drafted by Thompson, is a note that states the President agreed to the level of representation discussed at the Polish reception but did not wish to withdraw the invitation to the Soviet Science Attaché. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 17 EUR E-US)

I believe that, in view of the action of the Soviets and of the East European Chiefs of Mission in declining your invitation to accompany you on the Sequoia last night, it is advisable that we take some action at least to send them a signal that this action has been noted and resented. While I would not advocate any action which would seriously affect our basic relations with these countries, I do believe it important to make them aware of the importance we attach to the office of the President of the United States. We are proceeding to cut back our attendance at the Polish National Day reception to the level of office director.

In addition, the Soviet Science Attaché has been invited, along with some other diplomats (but no other East Europeans), to attend the launching at Cape Kennedy on Monday. If you have no objection, I propose to withdraw the invitation as an indication of our displeasure at the refusal of your invitation for last night.

Dean Rusk

167. Memorandum From the Ambassador at Large (Thompson) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, July 15, 1966.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, USSR, Vol. 12. Secret. The memorandum is attached to a July 16 covering memorandum from Rostow to the President stating that Thompson's memorandum was an "analysis of the Soviet attitude toward Vietnam against the background of the general position of frustration confronting Moscow." Rostow's memorandum is marked with an "L," indicating that the President saw it.

The Soviet leadership is suffering from a deep sense of frustration faced, as they are, with a number of intractable problems. One of the most serious is their economic situation. Their agricultural problem is particularly difficult and they plan to invest some fifteen billion dollars a year over the next five years in this sector, the greater part of which will be a direct charge on the State budget. Their contract with the Canadians for nine million tons of grain over the next three years shows that they realize that even these enormous investments will not bring about a quick solution of their agricultural problem. At the same time, they have realized that their present system of industrial management is unsatisfactory and they are groping around for solutions and have cautiously embarked on a series of reforms. It is clear that their resources are inadequate to meet the goals they have set for themselves as long as they maintain their present level of military and space expenditures. Yet they do not feel able to cut back on their military expenditures because of their deep suspicion of us and the difficulty of a weak and divided leadership to carry out a cutback even if they should decide that this was advisable. Yet despite their heavy expenditures on arms they have at best a stalemate with us and are still in a position of relative inferiority. Their economic problems are compounded by their insistence upon the primacy of the Communist Party which constantly interferes in production decisions. Their need for decentralization and greater delegation of authority is evident but they have been unable to bring themselves to take serious steps in this direction for fear of undermining their own power base.

The role of the Party also exacerbates other internal problems, particularly the attitude of Soviet youth who no longer accept the outmoded dogma. The people as a whole demand a higher standard of living, and while they have yielded to this pressure by a decision to increase radically their automobile production, they are unable to satisfy the basic needs of the population. This could be accomplished only by a severe cutback in military expenditures.

After all of their sacrifices to establish Communism in their own country and spread it abroad, they find themselves locked in a bitter struggle for leadership of the Communist world with Communist China and engaged in a two-front cold war. They are having difficulty keeping their East European allies in line and their hopes for the growth of the Communist movement in Western Europe and in the third world have largely been thwarted. Since the ideology does not permit them to blame the system, whenever there is a failure heads must roll and it is therefore understandable that the leadership is worried.

Apart from these and other specific problems, there is the role which ideology plays in all Soviet Communist actions. This ideology is outdated almost to the point of absurdity and yet it is the basis on which they hold power. This causes two sets of problems. The first is that it causes them in many cases to make a false analysis of a given situation and the second is that it often bars them from working out a rational solution to a given problem or at least places limits upon their freedom of action.

For example, to them Cuba was a case of American "monopoly capital" keeping in power a corrupt dictator in order that they could exploit the Cuban people. They can always find some facts to support their analysis of such situations. The Dominican affair fitted in with their picture of the powerful United States using force to oppose the aspirations of the masses. It is perhaps easier to understand the distorted picture which the Soviet leaders have of the world when we recognize our own tendency to oversimplify and to gloss over some of the weaknesses of our own case. The attempts on their part to bring some rationality into the ideology has been vigorously challenged by the Chinese Communists.

Against this background, the Viet-Namese affair is particularly galling to the Soviet leadership. They stand to lose by it in almost any outcome and they want neither the United States nor China to come out on top. With their ideological background, their view is the reverse of ours. They are concerned that if we win we will be encouraged to use force to suppress what they consider popular movements wherever they develop. This would undermine their conviction that Communism is an inevitable phase of history. Khrushchev once remarked that if Communism did not demonstrate its superiority and sweep the world, his life would have had no meaning. Although a real believer, Khrushchev was far more pragmatic than the present leaders who are much more orthodox in their outlook. The Viet-Namese affair has also added to the difficulties for the leadership to resolve some of the problems mentioned above. It has made more difficult any cutback in military expenditure or agreement on disarmament, has caused a deterioration in relations with the United States and has affected trade relations and the possibility of obtaining foreign credits. Moreover, with the bitter struggle going on in the Communist world, it is particularly hard for them to be exposed as a paper tiger and unable to do more for a socialist country which they consider to be under attack by an aggressor.

I believe the Soviets recognize that we behaved reasonably well in carrying out the Laos agreement and I do not believe that they are responsible for what happened there, although they could have done more to support the settlement. In Viet-Nam, however, they point to the mere numbers of the Viet Cong and the staunchness of their struggle as evidence that we are, in effect, helping to crush a popular movement. Although this would in any event give them a serious problem they make a great distinction between what we do in North Viet-Nam and what we do in the South. I believe that we can take almost any action in the South without serious risk of Soviet involvement. I doubt that they will take any radical action as a result of our bombing of the POL and interpret their cancellation of the visit of their track team as evidence that their reaction will be limited probably to some increase in the supply of military equipment. I believe, however, that any dramatic step-up in our action against North Viet-Nam could bring us into an area of real danger. This would be particularly true of action to blockade or mine North Viet-Namese harbors because of the parallel with Cuba and the direct confrontation which this would involve. The Soviets have a strong inferiority complex which causes them to overreact whenever they think their prestige is involved.

The foregoing is an attempt to explain Soviet actions but, of course, not to justify or condone them. Whatever the outcome of Viet-Nam, I am afraid it will take considerable time for us to get back on the path we were following in our relations with the Soviet Union when this affair began. In any event, we must always be aware that while an important evolution was taking place in the Soviet Union, which over time might have led to real coexistence, the Soviet leaders, as contrasted with the people, are dedicated to a dogma that is implacably hostile to us.

Llewellyn E. Thompson

168. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bator) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, July 19, 1966.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, USSR, Vol. XII. No classification marking.

SUBJECT
The Soviet-US Exchange Program

At lunch today Secretary Rusk may discuss the possible cancellation of our hand tools exhibit in the USSR./2/ The Russians have been dragging their feet on visas for exhibit personnel, and giving us the run-around on arrangements. They may wish to punish us on Vietnam and to protect themselves from the danger of "collaboration" with the U.S. Cancellation of the hand tools exhibit would be a clear violation of the exchange agreement.

/2/In a July 19 memorandum Rusk proposed to the President either the suspension of all new exchange activities or an ad hoc cancellation of certain exchanges if the Soviet Union canceled the hand tools exhibit. Rusk expressed support for the first option, which would "make clear to the Soviets that we will not implement an agreement which they abuse to suit their political purposes." (Ibid.)

Kohler proposes he tell Gromyko we have concluded from the Russians' actions on the track meet and exhibit that they are not prepared to carry out exchanges which "attract public attention." Therefore,

--we view performing arts and sports exchanges as suspended;

--we shall negotiate attendance at scientific congresses on a case-by-case basis; and

if there are more Soviet violations, we reserve the right to reexamine our obligation further.

(Kohler cautions against declaring the whole agreement invalid because it would 1) probably cause the Soviets to cut off Amerika magazine (which is covered by the agreement) and 2) risk Soviet resumption of VOA jamming.)

The people at State think Kohler's proposal does not punish the Soviets enough. They believe

--a suspension of performing arts exchanges would actually buttress the Russians' public stand of "non-collaboration" with us.

--it would leave technical exchanges intact, and these are the ones the Soviets have most interest in.

--we would have trouble enforcing a case-by-case negotiation of attendance at scientific congresses because of pressures from the American scientific community.

Instead, State proposes a suspension of all new activities--more sweeping, and also more risky than Kohler's proposal.

If Secretary Rusk should raise this question at lunch, you may want to ask:

a) At what level we are pressing the Soviets on hand tools (visas, etc.) before we tell them we are retaliating. (I am not sure Kohler or Thompson has yet intervened strongly.)

b) How serious are our losses if we make a soft reply-by accepting Kohler's formula?

c) What is the Secretary's evaluation of the effect on your peace posture at home and in Europe if we suspend all new activities under the exchange program?

d) Are we sure the Soviets have no come-back which would obscure their clear violation of the agreement?

e) Can we hold the level of retaliation at "new activities," or do we risk counter-retaliation against the sections of the agreement we want to preserve-such as Amerika magazine?

f) How much would the partial suspension of the Soviet-US agreement affect bridge-building elsewhere in Eastern Europe?/3/

/3/A handwritten note on Rusk's July 19 memorandum indicates that at the luncheon meeting on July 19 the President approved suspension of all new exchange activities. (Ibid.) In a July 20 memorandum Rostow, noting that Press Secretary Bill Moyers, NSC Staff Member Nathaniel Davis, and Bator leaned toward ad hoc cancellation, asked the President to look at the two options again and confirm his decision for Rusk. (Ibid.) The subsequent Soviet agreement to accept the U.S. exhibit made the issue moot.

Francis M. Bator/4/

/4/Printed from a copy that indicates Bator signed the original.

169. Special National Intelligence Estimate/1/

SNIE 11-16-66

Washington, July 28, 1966.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, National Intelligence Estimates. Secret. Submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence and concurred in by the U.S. Intelligence Board.

CURRENT SOVIET ATTITUDES TOWARD THE US

The Problem

To assess the short-term outlook for Soviet-US relations, with particular reference to Vietnam.

Conclusion

On balance, we continue to hold the view that the men who took over from Khrushchev almost two years ago have been conspicuous in their cautious approach to both foreign and domestic problems. They will go as far as they consider prudent in their support of Hanoi. We do not foresee either a shift to a more radical and venturesome line of action or initiatives toward a peaceful settlement.

1. Over the past several weeks, the Soviet government has further sharpened its attacks on US policies in Vietnam and has taken a number of additional steps to chill its relations with the US. These latest moves are clearly intended to underline Soviet condemnation of US bombing of POL facilities in North Vietnam early this month. The Soviets cancelled their participation in a sports meet in this country, at the last minute. They have refused permission for an American news network to film shows in the USSR, have staged anti-US protest rallies in the USSR and have in general been responsible for some deterioration in US-Soviet cultural relations. [1 line of source text not declassified] in public statements, the USSR has vigorously renewed its endorsement of Hanoi's terms for a settlement.

2. At the same time Moscow has avoided some provocative moves which it might have made. For example, since the spring of 1965, the Soviets have not permitted mass demonstrations against the US Embassy in Moscow, in contrast to recent mass protests in East Europe. After considerable hesitation, the Soviets agreed to permit a US industrial exhibit to open next month in the USSR as scheduled, thus keeping to the letter if not the spirit of the new cultural exchange agreement. Berlin, that sensitive touchstone of US-Soviet relations, has remained quiet. Indeed, there are indications on Moscow's part of a desire to minimize the chances for friction there, e.g., it has acted to expedite the movement of Allied traffic into West Berlin. Despite the lack of progress, the USSR continues to participate in the Geneva disarmament talks and Soviet officials in Geneva have in recent weeks showed serious interest in negotiating a treaty governing space exploration.

3. These contradictory manifestations indicate the growing complexities of the USSR's position in regard to Vietnam, its relations with the US, and its position in the Communist world. The USSR has made important gains in its contest with Peking by supporting Hanoi and calling upon all Communist countries to participate in joint action to aid the DRV. In order to maintain this improved position they must continue to support Hanoi, and, at the same time, disprove the endless Chinese charges of US-Soviet "collusion." For these reasons, they remain unwilling at present to take any initiatives to bring about a negotiated settlement. But the Soviets have shown themselves keenly aware of the dangers of escalation and reluctant to become deeply involved in the war. These attitudes have placed important limits on Soviet reactions to events in Vietnam.

4. As a result of this dilemma, the Soviets, in order to register their disapproval of US policy, have turned to such well advertised areas of US-Soviet relations as cultural exchanges. The Soviet leaders recognize that the publicized sector of relations is an area especially vulnerable to Chinese attack. By the same token, the Soviets also recognize that they can attract the most dramatic publicity when bilateral exchanges and contacts are abruptly cut off. Moreover, US-Soviet exchanges in general may be under something of a cloud in the Soviet leadership because of the concern it has manifested recently over its control of the Soviet intellectuals. Thus, for internal Soviet reasons, as well as because of the Vietnamese war, certain areas of US-Soviet cooperation are likely to suffer. In sum, a generally hostile climate between the US and the USSR is likely to continue for some time.

5. Indeed, it may get worse. Thus far, Soviet policymakers have confined their actions to those areas of US-Soviet relations which are secondary and presumably expendable. But further developments could impel the USSR to adopt more radical measures. The crucial question, of course, is whether the worsening in relations will be reflected in some new and dangerous Soviet action in Vietnam or elsewhere. Moscow's inability to influence thus far the course of events in Vietnam, pressures from North Vietnam for more effective assistance, and the contest with China for influence in Hanoi and elsewhere, are all factors which could cause the USSR to consider actions which it has thus far avoided.

6. We continue to believe, however, that despite uncertainty and apprehension concerning US policies, Soviet leaders see no realistic alternative to continuing their present course of action. The Soviets probably still have no clear idea of how the Vietnamese war will develop. They appear to be intent on limiting their own risks and we think that they will try to maintain this policy. But while we can be fairly confident of the policy the Soviet Union prefers and will try to pursue, there are still forces at play which could draw Soviet policy onto a course of greater risk.

7. As US military pressure on Hanoi increases, Soviet actions might be intensified with more overt participation of personnel or improvement of defense weapons systems. Because of the USSR's present involvement in the DRV's air defense, this is a special area of responsibility for Moscow. Up to now, the Russians have not emphasized their role in Hanoi's air defense. However, if this system continues to prove relatively ineffective, the Russians might be called upon to supply the DRV regime with more assistance, such as MIG-21s, improved radar, or more technical and advisory Soviet personnel.

8. Moscow has recently revived its earlier pledges to send "volunteers" to support Hanoi if requested. Such statements, made jointly with Warsaw Pact allies, seem primarily intended to undercut Peking's charges of US-Soviet "collaboration" and to highlight China's isolation, though the Russians may also hope that the move will have a deterrent effect on US actions in Vietnam. Privately, some Soviet officials have gone out of their way in conversations with the US to disclaim any intention of actually sending volunteers. However, it is just this sort of tactic which illustrates Moscow's continuing dilemma in Vietnam. If Hanoi did eventually call for such support, although Ho Chi Minh has recently said such a move was unnecessary, the USSR would probably send additional technical personnel and declare their presence openly. Even then, the Soviet leaders would try to avoid the appearance of direct US-Soviet combat.

170. Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hughes) to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow)/1/

Washington, August 6, 1966.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, USSR, Vol. XII. Secret; Noforn. Rostow forwarded the memorandum and the attached Intelligence Note to the President under cover of an August 6 note stating: "As requested, herewith the State Department response to your two questions of this morning conveyed to me by Bill Moyers." (Ibid.)

RE
Your request this morning to George Ball for INR comments

Attached is a paper in which we look at Soviet policy over the last week or so in some detail./2/

/2/Attached but not printed is INR's Intelligence Note 494, August 6, "Temperature Check on the State of US-Soviet Relations."

In a nutshell, the Kosygin speech, Supreme Soviet declaration and protest note on Haiphong use some tough talk./3/ But we can see no qualitative change in the Soviet policy lines already evident for some time: aid, probably increasing in quantity, to North Vietnam; diplomatic and propaganda pressure to get us to desist or at least to deter us from escalating; no initiative toward a peaceful settlement unless and until Hanoi gives the green light; nevertheless keep in touch with us on issues such as outer space and nonproliferation and on selected bilateral problems such as fisheries.

/3/Reference is to Kosygin's August 3 speech to the Supreme Soviet, the Supreme Soviet's August 3 Declaration on Vietnam, and the August 5 Soviet note charging American interference with Soviet shipping near Haiphong. For text of Kosygin's speech and the Declaration on Vietnam, see Current Digest of the Soviet Press, August 24, 1966, pp. 11-18. The Soviet note was handed to Kohler by Kuznetsov on August 5, but Kohler refused to accept it in view of its "abusive language." (Telegram 609 from Moscow, August 5; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 15-1 USSR)

The Soviets seem to be confident that they can continue along these tracks with some profit, though we think some of their recent tough talk reflects worry over our further plans in Vietnam. Curiously enough, they also seem worried about US-Chinese Communist collusion, though their recent emphasis on this is in large part intended to rebut Chinese charges against them.

The troublesome thing about how Brezhnev and Kosygin have handled themselves is that they do not seem to have thought much beyond current profit to the time when their willingness to hitch their cart to Hanoi's horse may lead them into a direct confrontation with us that can no longer be glossed over, like their present involvement in some of Hanoi's air defense. Perhaps the time has come to get that message across more clearly.

Tom Hughes

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