Moscow, January 10, 1966.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66,

POL 27 VIET S. Confidential; Limdis; Pinta. The telegram does not indicate a time of transmission; it was received at the Department of State at 8:28 a.m. Bundy forwarded the text to the President under cover of a January 10 memorandum that reads: "This is the message which Dean Rusk mentioned at our meeting at noontime. It is well worth reading."

2141. 1. In talks with colleagues here, I find considerable uncertainty and confusion as to where Soviets are heading as respects Vietnam.

2. My experience with the Soviets would suggest to me that where their aims and intentions are not reasonably clear to experienced observers, this means that they are themselves in a state of some uncertainty and confusion on the subject in question.

3. Until a couple of months ago every competent foreign observer in Moscow would have said with complete confidence that despite their noisy support of and military and economic aid to DRV, Soviet leadership clearly wanted negotiated solution in Vietnam and could be expected use influence to this end, short of undue pressure on Hanoi.

4. Soviet actions since about time major ChiCom attack last November have somewhat shaken this relatively optimistic view, notably escalation vicious anti-American campaign and evidence leadership trying organize world Communist meeting on agenda limited to "unity in support Vietnam against American imperialism." As minimum, this seemed to indicate Soviets not only sensitive Chicom attacks but had accepted and were ready to support obdurate stand North Vietnamese against negotiations. Since proposed conference apparently projected for time 23rd Party Conference, this effort implied Soviet expectation not serious steps toward peaceful settlement at least until sometime after March 1966.

5. Soviet behavior since suspension of bombing and launching of peace offensive/2/ has done nothing to alleviate this rather grim prospect. Their press commentary on our peace offensive has been cynical, taking cue from Hanoi in interpreting it as propagandistic preparation for further escalation of war, and only once mentioning fact of our suspension of bombing and that in course of reprinting a DRV statement. Podgorny took an unbending position with both me and French Ambassador in our discussions of Vietnam with him on December 29 and 30, and Kosygin's remarks on Vietnam to Japanese journalists published in Izvestiya on December 31 were calculatedly hard line. Even more significantly, composition of Shelepin's delegation to Vietnam/3/--timing of which indicates to me that it could have had no connection with our peace efforts-has clearly been intended to emphasize the possibility of increased military support for North Vietnamese with its inclusion of rocket expert Tolubko and Ustinov, whose career has centered on Soviet defense industry. Finally, the strong attack against us in Soviet draft co-chairmen message (Embtel 2111),/4/ published in today's Pravda, is yet another indication that Soviet preoccupation has been more in terms of how to exploit Vietnamese situation against us than to help find a peaceful settlement.

/2/For documentation on the 37-day bombing pause, December 24, 1965-January 31, 1966, and the peace offensive, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, volumes III and IV.

/3/A.N. Shelepin led a five-person Soviet mission to Hanoi January 7-12.

/4/Not found.

6. The picture is by no means as clear, however, and the outlook probably not as gloomy as the foregoing suggests. There is in all of this, in fact, a strong element of inertia, of continuity with the positions previously assumed by the Soviet leadership, suggesting that it may not yet have faced up to the decisions required by our peace offensive. In weighing these decisions, Moscow will be mindful of several factors which will give it pause:

A. Moscow undoubtedly recognizes that DRV has little hope of prevailing ultimately against U.S. power, especially if this power is more fully exerted. While Podgorny in his conversation with me followed established line, I was impressed by his description of widespread devastation caused by our bombing in DRV and his sense of acceptance that, even with aid of socialist camp, DRV could not defeat U.S. (with implicit recognition that Soviet and other outside aid would be limited and would not involve direct conflict between us). I was also struck by Podgorny's repeated expressions about improvement of U.S.-USSR relations in 1966, though this could simply be a reflection of his rather Khrushchevian personality.

B. Our peace offensive introduces highly complicating element in conduct of Moscow's own campaign for leadership both of world Communist movement and of third world. Our current efforts are bound to have an impact on a number of socialist governments-Yugoslavia and Poland may be good examples-which may already have misgivings about wisdom of Vietnam's unyielding line, and this impact will be still greater among third world states whose allegiance Moscow has insistently sought over recent months. Among other results, Soviet efforts to bring about an anti-American conference of Communist parties in support of Vietnam could run into even greater resistance than is now the case. Of more immediate importance to us, the longer our bombing suspension lasts, the greater I should imagine the pressures will be on the Soviet leadership from socialist and especially third world states to contribute to a settlement in Vietnam.

C. Perhaps the most important factor of all will be Soviet concern about longer-term results of situation in which it must expect continuing buildup of U.S. military strength to point that cannot yet be foreseen. I think it unquestionably true that first aim of new Soviet leadership is to get their lagging economy moving again, and they cannot look with equanimity on prospect of substantial increase in defense portion of our budget which will require them either to fall further behind in terms of our relative military power positions or sacrifice some of their own economic plans in order to divert resources to defense purposes. Kosygin has several times voiced his concern on this score.

7. I suspect that above considerations add up to as mixed a picture in Soviet minds as it does in ours. I am inclined to believe that, for time being at least, Moscow will feel constrained to appear to match prospect of increased U.S. escalation. This indeed is meaning of Ustinov's and Tolubko's inclusion in Shelepin's delegation. In fact, however, it cannot be excluded that, behind smokescreen of this ostensibly offense-minded delegation, Shelepin will also be talking with North Vietnamese leaders about coping with our peace offensive in ways more satisfactory-at least from Moscow's viewpoint-than the present negative, unyielding line. Moscow's public line on our peace efforts has clearly lacked conviction, and they must know that it has not been convincing for others and does not square with image of peace-maker in Asia they are trying to create.

8. It is worth noting in this connection that in his expectedly tough speeches in Hanoi, Shelepin has refrained from joining Vietnamese in characterizing "peace offensive" as "lying campaign" and "fraud" (septel)/5/ and it is clear subject is one which will have to be dealt with in private talks. While Soviets will continue to be careful not to seem to be forcing Hanoi's hand, we consider likely they will argue circumstances require some more positive response from "socialist" side. Since we know Soviets are impressed by bomb damage and that bombing of "socialist" state is most galling aspect of whole situation to them, our best guess is that Shelepin may well advise Hanoi initiation talks would assure indefinite suspension bombing without prejudice to their military position in South Vietnam.

/5/Telegram 2136 from Moscow, January 8. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 32-1 INDIA-PAK)

9. In sum, we think "peace" campaign has introduced new element further complicating Soviet efforts organize Communist meeting around Vietnam and forcing them a step away from unquestioning acceptance Hanoi's objuracy. It could not have been better timed and I would hope pressure can be sustained.

10. Depart repeat as desired.

Kohler

147. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State/1/

New Delhi, January 13, 1966, 8:05 p.m.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 347, CF 86. Top Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Pinta. Drafted by Rusk. Rusk was in New Delhi January 12-13 to attend the funeral of Indian Prime Minister Shastri. He returned to Washington January 19.

Secto 10. Eyes Only for President and Acting Secretary from Secretary.

Vice President and I accompanied by Ambassador Bowles spent an hour and a half with Kosygin this afternoon. Translation cut conversation to 45 minutes talking time. Here are my most immediate impressions pending more detailed memorandum of conversation./2/

/2/Not found.

1 Kosygin's general attitude was direct, reasonably relaxed, and with a certain friendly informality in demeanor. Only occasionally did he slip into traditional Moscow verbiage such as "highway men" and "pirates" on which he was promptly picked up.

2. The most important aspect of conversation was what he did not say. There were no threats, nothing bordering on ultimatums, no declarations about increased Soviet assistance to Hanoi, or elements of that sort. That may come later but he did not produce them today.

3. He showed some reluctance to talk about Viet Nam and did not go into any details about specific points of settlement. He made it clear that he had no mandate from Hanoi, that he did not represent Hanoi, and that he was not a messenger for Hanoi or for us. He said we would have to find our own channels.

4. He made the usual point that this was an indigenous Vietnamese affair and that we should stay out of it. He was reminded that divided states such as Germany, Korea and Viet Nam present a special problem and that the attempt to use force in any of these divided states across demarcation lines was just as serious a threat to the peace as aggression across established national frontiers.

5. Kosygin also remarked that we thought that we were being "noble" in withholding bombing which we had no right to do anyhow and that our act appeared to be an ultimatum. I gave him a very frank statement on the background of the present pause, pointing out that the governments of the Soviet Union, Poland, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Rumania and others have been telling us for months that there was no possibility of taking steps towards peace while the bombs were falling in the North. I recounted that we had asked for months for some hint or indication or suggestion of what would happen if we stopped the bombing but had received no answer at all except that Gromyko had said "Stop and see", and that Hungary had said, with Soviet knowledge, that they were convinced that "something good" would happen. I told him that we had decided to find out. I told him that we had thus far had no reply through any channel to our peace efforts and that we had observed that North Viet Nam was continuing to infiltrate and could count considerable numbers of trucks moving south.

6. He offered nothing on Shelepin's visit and gave no specific answer to questions about procedure, namely, how they thought future contacts with Hanoi could best be handled. I would gather from his treatment of these subjects that (a) the collective leadership in Moscow has had no chance to consider the results of Shelepin's visit, (b) he already knew Shelepin got nowhere in Hanoi, or (c) that he had not been informed about the closing day or so of Shelepin's visit.

7. In sum, I would think that our talk today represented little or no change in the problem as we know it except that it was of some importance that he did not approach the issue in belligerent tones as between the Soviet Union and the US but rather as an issue between Hanoi and the US.

8. I have not taken time to detail the statements made by Vice President and myself but I would compliment the Vice President in his presentation of your own position. We left with Kosygin full copy of your State of the Union message./3/

/3/For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1966, Book I, pp. 3-12.

9. It was interesting that Kosygin was especially anxious that our talk not be represented to the press as a negotiation on Viet Nam. He was most insistent that it be described simply as a courtesy visit during which the two sides exchanged views on matters of common concern. Obviously he did not wish to expose himself to Peiping and Hanoi on this point and I would suggest that we not ourselves disclose the substance of the talk nor let it be built up as an interview of major importance. My guess is that we shall hear more from Moscow when their various travelers get home and can compare notes with Shelepin.

Rusk

148. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, January 15, 1966, 4:50 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President-McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 18. Secret.

SUBJECT
Two telegrams from Ambassador Goldberg

1. I attach two telegrams from Arthur Goldberg to you which he has written at my suggestion/2/ after telling me on the phone this morning of his conversation with Dobrynin.

/2/The President circled "my suggestion" and wrote "good" above it.

2. One of his cables/3/ mentions the problem of getting a quick answer to the pen-pal message which Dobrynin delivered last week./4/ We are working on this and expect to have a State Department draft at the first of the week. These things always take time because the State Department has considerable internal resistance to this channel, but I agree with Dobrynin that it is important to make a prompt answer, and we will do so. A couple of weeks for an important topic of this sort is not too much./5/

/3/Telegram 3131 from New York, January 15; not printed.

/4/The message from Kosygin to Johnson, delivered by Dobrynin to Ball on January 11, dealt with the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons and MLF. For text, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XI, Document 108. In forwarding it to the President, Bator noted that it was first pen pal message from Kosygin since February 1965 (Document 90). (Memorandum to the President, January 12; Johnson Library, National Security File, Head of State Correspondence, Pen Pal Correspondence, Kosygin)

/5/Johnson's answer, which Thompson delivered to Dobrynin on January 24, is printed in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XI, Document 116.

3. Goldberg's other telegram/6/ reflects a regular refrain of Dobrynin's. I am inclined to agree that an occasional private message from a White House staff officer is useful. I think, for example, that before we end the pause it may be helpful for me to have a second lunch/7/ with Dobrynin to point out how much more we have done than he asked for. But I think it will be better not to go quite as far as people sometimes did in 1961-63.

/6/See attachment.

/7/Johnson circled "a second lunch" and wrote "I agree" below it. Bundy discussed the bombing pause with Dobrynin on January 18. A memorandum of the conversation is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Bundy Files, Memos of Conversation, Bundy, 1964-66.

McG. B.

Attachment/8/

Message From the Ambassador to the Mission to the United Nations (Goldberg) to President Johnson

New York, January 15, 1966, 3:30 p.m.

/8/Secret; Nodis. The text is from telegram 151855Z from USUN to the White House, January 15, 1:55 p.m., which was retyped in the White House specially for the President. The time on the source text is presumable the time it was retyped in the White House. A copy of the telegram is ibid., Agency File, United Nations, Vol. 3.

In a telegram to the Secretary of State I have reported on a conversation with Ambassador Dobrynin at a private dinner at his house in Washington last night pursuant to his invitation which I accepted after consultation with Secretary Ball. I have asked that this telegram be passed to the White House for your information (attached)./9/

/9/See footnote 3 above.

In addition to matters reported, Dobrynin privately said to me he regretted very much there was no informal line of communication between the White House and himself on important matters affecting Soviet-American relations. He said that during President Kennedy's administration such informal channel existed in the presence of the then Attorney General. He quickly added that because of Senator Kennedy's present position this obviously is no longer feasible but emphasized that another channel would in his opinion be helpful. He went on to say this did not in any way denigrate from his very cordial and close relations with the Secretary of State and Ambassador Thompson. Rather his point was that Soviet leaders felt reassured if another channel to the President was open to them.

Lest there be any misunderstanding concerning my reporting this to you, I hasten at this point to say I do not regard myself to be the appropriate channel for this purpose.

If you think well of the idea at all, and you are in a better position to assess the desirability of such a channel than I am, I should think it ought to be someone on your staff in whose discretion you have complete confidence and who is in daily touch with you. Bill Moyers, Jack Valenti, or any other of your trusted aides could be such a channel.

I merely report this to you for your information.

149. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Washington, January 17, 1966.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 17-8 USSR-US. Confidential. Drafted and initialed by Toon on January 17.

SUBJECT
Report of Luncheon Conversation Between Carl Rowan and Two Soviet Diplomats

PARTICIPANTS
Mr. Carl Rowan, Publishers Newspapers Syndicate
Mr. Malcolm Toon, Director, SOV

Rowan called on me to report a luncheon conversation on Saturday, with Chernyakov and Kalugin of the Soviet Embassy. The Soviet Embassy officials had told Rowan that the Soviet Government was perfectly prepared to carry on normal bilateral relations with the U.S., but had so far failed to receive the necessary degree of cooperation from U.S. authorities. They cited as illustrations of this state of affairs the Soviet willingness to put into effect the Civil Air Agreement and the Consular Convention and said baldly that the negative attitude of the U.S. Government had prevented any progress along this line. Rowan asked me what I thought of this rationale presented by the Soviet officials.

I told Rowan that with regard to the Civil Air Agreement and Consular Convention I was obliged to admit that there was an element of truth in the Soviet argument. I then briefly reviewed for Rowan the history of both agreements and told him that it was unlikely that any final action on them would be taken in the near future. I pointed out, however, that the Soviets' own record was not quite so clean and bright as the Soviet Embassy interlocutors had led him to believe. The Soviets were primarily responsible for the slowdown of exchanges. They had refused to permit American performing arts groups to tour the Soviet Union in accordance with commitments under the exchange agreement, they had so far been almost totally unresponsive to our request for negotiations on a new exchanges agreement, and they had given indications that the outlook for exchanges was rather bleak in view of the current situation in Vietnam. I pointed out to Rowan that the Soviet argument that exchanges could not go on in a normal way because of our "changed policy in Vietnam" was without any substance; as the Soviets well knew our policy had been constant throughout three administrations. Obviously the tempo and nature of our support under this policy to the South Vietnamese had undergone change but this change was in response to actions taken by the other side in the Vietnam conflict. In a word it was Soviet policy not U.S. policy that had changed.

Rowan also reported a complaint by his Soviet hosts concerning the "visa war" which was now being waged by the State Department on foreign correspondents. I told Mr. Rowan that this was not the first time I had heard this complaint. I felt it important that Rowan understand that any difficulties that had arisen with regard to correspondents should be laid squarely at the Soviet door. I then reviewed for Rowan the history of expulsions of American correspondents from Moscow and told him that the arbitrary Soviet attitude toward the American press had naturally resulted in a certain lack of enthusiasm on our part for rapid processing of visas for Soviet correspondents here. The Soviets clearly understand, however, that if they would issue a visa to Watson of ABC any logjam that they might think exists would be quickly broken. I said it might be useful for Rowan to reinforce this line with the Soviets at his next meeting.

Rowan said that he hoped to be able to visit the Soviet Union sometime next spring (a tentative departure date is March 20) and he had discussed with Chernyakov and Kalugin the possibilities of arranging interviews with top Soviet leaders during his visit. They gave him some encouragement and said they would check his request with appropriate authorities and be in touch with him at a later date as to interview possibilities. They expressed the hope that if he should go to Moscow he would not behave as Jimmy Reston had; they said that Kosygin was shocked by Reston's comments in his column following the interview, particularly his description of Kosygin as tough, doctrinaire, and essentially anti-American./2/

/2/For text of the transcript of the Kosygin/Reston interview and Reston's comments thereon, see The New York Times, December 8, 1965.

150. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State/1/

Moscow, January 26, 1966.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, USSR, Vol. XI. Confidential; Limdis. No time of transmission appears on the telegram but it was received in the Department of State at 1:01 p.m. on January 26.

2329. Pass USIA. Deptel 1817, Emb A-1132, 1158, 1183, 1186./2/

/2/Dated January 24, 18, 21, 25, and 25 respectively, they all discussed various aspects of the disparity in the distribution of Amerika in the Soviet Union and Soviet Life in the United States. (Telegrams 1817 and 1186 and airgram A-1132; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, PPB 10 US; the other two airgrams are ibid., CUL 9-6 USSR)

1. Soviets over past year have grown increasingly frustrated over contrast between avid demand for Amerika in USSR (Swedish correspondent just telephoned to say queue today at Gorky street bookstore for Amerika's was longest line-150 meters-he had ever seen in queue-laden Moscow) and lack of success Soviet Life in US. Recent manifestations this frustration (see referenced airgrams) have led us to conclusion Soviets likely to press in negotiations for reduction or curtailment present 60,000 agreed circulation.

2. As Amerika is highly effective medium, widely known in USSR, first and only American magazine available to Soviet readers, provides striking and attractive visual depiction American life and, hopefully, represents first wedge in our efforts to open Soviet society to American periodicals, Emb assumes we will wish to defend US interest involved to maximum our ability in negotiations. Should we voluntarily curtail circulation Soviets will have achieved their aim without confronting our strong opposition at conference table and would certainly be greatly encouraged to consider effort eliminate magazine altogether. If this is their objective, we could probably expect to receive additional and increasing returns on 40,000 copies in manner similar to experience leading to previous cessation of publication of Amerika. Additional returns could then be cited at negotiations to justify Soviet position interest in Amerika falling off.

3. I strongly recommend we continue to exercise right to circulate 60,000 copies. To meet obvious difficulty we would now have defending indefinite continuation present method of mailing returned copies, we could mail them registered mail (Wiener letter to Davies Jan 20)./3/ Personnel for addressing registry forms would become problem but we can handle it temporarily. We sent 100 copies of returns by registered mail Jan 8 and have already received 42 receipts.

/3/Not found.

4. No copies Amerika returns now on hand. (A-1186.)

Kohler

151. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson/1/

Washington, February 13, 1966.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, CUL 16 USSR. Confidential. Drafted by Boris H. Klosson and Arthur I. Wortzel (EUR/SES) and cleared with Leddy, Thompson, CU, and IO.

SUBJECT
Possible United States Tour of Soviet Bolshoi Ballet

The Soviets last year proposed that the Bolshoi Ballet tour the United States this spring as the first attraction under a new exchanges agreement for 1966-67. Sol Hurok, who has acted as impresario for many Soviet groups, has been handling arrangements for the Bolshoi tour.

Based upon this planning, the Soviets last year offered the Bolshoi to the United Nations for a benefit performance in New York on behalf of the United Nations International School. At the United Nations Secretariat's request, Ambassador Goldberg last August agreed to share sponsorship of the benefit with the Secretary General and Soviet Ambassador Federenko. It was assumed that the Bolshoi Ballet would come to the United States in the normal course of the exchanges program. Last month, under encouragement from Mr. Hurok, the United Nations Secretariat issued invitations for a benefit performance at the Metropolitan Opera House on April 19, which would be the opening night of the proposed United States tour. These invitations carried the written sponsorship of U Thant, Ambassador Goldberg and Ambassador Federenko.

By way of background, under our Exchanges Agreement with the USSR for 1964-65, each side agreed to receive five performing arts groups. We have received all five Soviet groups, but the Soviets have failed to receive our fifth group. As a result, we informed the USSR in December that, unless a new agreement is concluded or assured and unless the Soviets deal with their remaining obligation to receive an attraction under the last agreement, no Soviet performing arts groups would be permitted to come to the United States. This includes the Bolshoi Ballet.

We agree with Ambassador Kohler that failure to hold the line would encourage the Soviets to think that they could carry on an exchanges program suitable to them in the absence of an agreement assuring an adequate quid pro quo to the United States./2/

/2/Kohler expressed his views on the invitation in telegram 2469 from Moscow, February 10. (Ibid.)

I have now instructed Ambassador Goldberg to take up with Ambassador Federenko the question of the United Nations benefit performance of the Bolshoi Ballet./3/ He will point out that (1) his acceptance of co-sponsorship of the benefit was based upon the assumption that the ballet would be touring in the United States on the basis of a new exchanges agreement; (2) because of our support for the United Nations school, we are prepared to admit the Bolshoi Ballet specifically and only for the United Nations benefit performance in New York on April 19; and (3) as we have informed the Soviet Government, we would not be prepared to permit the Bolshoi to make any other appearances in the United States in the absence of a new agreement and without a satisfactory arrangement on the unfulfilled commitment under the previous agreement.

/3/The instructions were sent to Goldberg in telegram 1947 to USUN, February 13 at 1:38 p.m. (Ibid.)

We can anticipate that Mr. Hurok will seek to reverse our position concerning the United States tour of the Bolshoi, and he may shortly try pressuring the White House with this in mind. I think it is important that we stand firm, leaving the burden on the Soviets to move ahead on a new agreement. The single United Nations performance will be costly to them unless they get an entire tour, which we should refuse without an agreement.

Dean Rusk/4/

/4/Printed from a copy that indicates Rusk signed the original.

152. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State/1/

Moscow, February 26, 1966, 1345Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 29 USSR. Limited Official Use. Repeated to London, Paris, Rome, and Munich.

2624. Sinyavsky/Daniel Trial./2/

/2/Soviet writers Andrei Sinyavsky and Yuri Daniel had been sentenced to 7 and 5 years, respectively, in a corrective labor camp on February 14 for anti-Soviet writings.

1. In view foreign furor, especially by western Communists over Sinyavsky/Daniel case, it worth speculating on factors motivating Soviets in their handling of case, and degree to which Soviet aims achieved.

2. We were told by Soviet source decision on how to handle case was reached "at highest level," and we inclined believe this. Before trial and Soviet publicity, there were rumors Sinyavsky and Daniel would be given lenient treatment, possibly even trial by comradely court; and after first press attack, we had report Demichev had stated attacker had gone too far. It logical assume Demichev subsequently overruled higher up, hence at Presidium level. Length of time between arrest and trial does not appear to have been required in order build up case, since prosecution relied primarily on defendants' writings, culling of which did not require four months. Delay, therefore, may have been result of difference of opinion within regime, difference centering on method and degree of punishment. Fact they should be dealt with in some fashion does not appear to have been questioned.

3. Tertz/Arzhak/3/ writings clearly hit too close to fundamentals of system. Once it proved their true identity, regime had to act. Regime doubtless really believes their writings constitute anti-Soviet activity, and in this sense is honest in insisting case is separate issue from that of literary freedom. Tertz/Arzhak writings do, in fact, go far beyond range of current internal literary debate and problem for regime was compounded by fact Sinyavsky, at least, enjoyed good local reputation, especially among more liberal intellectuals and youth.

/3/These were Sinyavsky's and Daniel's pen names.

4. Problem, as far as regime concerned, was basically internal--culprits had to be punished both for their own sake and to deter others--and this internal aspect took precedence over problems of foreign repercussions. Since regime also apparently felt it necessary to destroy reputations of culprits, publicity was required and this best accomplished by a trial which at same time could reflect "Soviet legality." In addition, while KGB was probably not averse to seeing intellectuals as whole shaken up a bit, Party seems to have wanted avoid this and have been at pains to emphasize separation of case from question literary freedom. Thus, certain aspect of domestic requirements somewhat dovetailed with problem of avoiding foreign outcry, even though latter was only secondary factor in Soviet considerations.

5. Above considerations led to Soviet publicity campaign, to semi-open trial (relatives, and some respected individuals such as Tvardovsky were allowed attend), and to unusual spectacle of defendants being allowed plead innocent and have this reported, and being heard, apparently at some length. Trial went on four days.

6. In context Soviet legal procedures, all was nicely legal, and regime no doubt considers it gave them fair trial. It probably even thought this observance of Soviet legal norms would tend diminish foreign outcries. Soviet judicial procedures, however, are eminently flexible, and in order score their domestic points, regime exploited this flexibility fully, making trial complete mockery of justice: threatening students who tried attend with expulsion, stationing Komsomol thugs outside courthouse, barring all foreigners (including Communists), publishing distorted press accounts containing complete prejudgment of case, suppressing evidence (so reminiscent of Mott case), especially Paustovsky statement defending Sinyavsky/Daniel.

7. Effect Soviet handling of case will have on primary target, potential shippers abroad of anti-Soviet writings, is obviously impossible to determine, but will presumably be beneficial from regime's point of view, at least temporarily. In this sense, therefore, they may regard operation as success.

8. Other domestic effects seem less favorable, however. Trial has certainly left some segments of intellectuals worried. While KGB and certain hard-liners probably not disturbed by this, Party apparatus charged with supervision of intellectuals apparently is, since it prefers intellectuals who behave docilely by choice and conviction, not because they cowed. Hence effort in February 22 Pravda article to reassure intellectuals trial does not affect literary scene was aimed primarily at criminal activity. Meanwhile, facts that trial virtually closed, that press reports distorted, and that evidence suppressed are certainly no secret here. Suppression Paustovsky statement will prove particularly damaging among intellectual circles, since he highly respected figure.

9. As for foreign reaction, while Soviets were probably willing ride out foreign uproar, they seem to have grossly miscalculated its extent, and are particularly pained by extent of foreign Communist attacks. Latter, furthermore, will have domestic repercussions, especially among intellectual circles, since Soviet public no longer completely shut off from outside news.

10. It appears, therefore, Soviets probably benefited little from their effort to gain credit by supplying trappings, but not substance, of justice. By this halfway treatment, with its attendant publicity, they created more interest in writers than probably would have been the case if they had thrown them out, as they did Tarsis,/4/ or conducted secret trial. It was half-open handling of case, and attempts present it as valid legal operation, that made it impossible, for example, for western Communists overlook distortions of justice. Soviets achieved their immediate objective-punishment and deterrence-but at cost, both domestic and international, far higher than what they probably had expected.

/4/Valery Tarsis was deprived of his Soviet citizenship on February 21; he eventually settled in Greece.

Kohler

153. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson/1/

Washington, March 2, 1966.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, USSR, Vol. VIII. Confidential. No drafting information appears on the memorandum.

SUBJECT
Opening of Negotiations with Soviet Union on Renewal of Exchanges Agreement

Today we opened negotiations in Washington to renew our over-all agreement with the Soviets for across-the-board exchanges ranging from science to tourism./2/

/2/On February 14, 1966, Sergei K. Romanovsky, Chairman of the Soviet State Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, told Kohler that the Soviet Union was now willing to proceed with the negotiating of the fifth agreement on exchanges. (Telegram 2496 from Moscow, February 14; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, EDX 4 US-USSR) In an analysis of this development Kohler stated that the decision to go ahead was significant even beyond the maintenance of exchanges. (Telegram 2497 from Moscow, February 14; ibid., CUL 16 USSR)

If successful, this will be the fifth agreement--the first was in 1958--and will cover the period 1966-67.

The Soviets have been dragging their feet in starting these talks. Now they have given us a draft and want to wind up matters quickly. They talk of two weeks whereas the 1964-65 negotiations took 46 days. We are ready to cooperate in arriving at an agreement promptly but only if the Soviets do not persist in rehashing old arguments already settled in previous agreements and only if they give us satisfaction on clauses which will assure adequate reciprocity and a truly balanced agreement.

Repetition of the "Hello, Dolly!" episode/3/ must be prevented by making it clear that no Soviet performance will be allowed here unless we have a firm contract in hand for an American performance there. We must assure adequate arrangements for distribution of Amerika magazine in the Soviet Union. We must obtain reasonable access for American exhibits in the USSR. And we must keep the whole program under U.S. Government direction and not allow them to by-pass the State Department in their dealings with private American organizations. These are essentials on which we will insist.

/3/Although never canceled, the Soviet Union continually delayed the appearance of "Hello, Dolly" in Moscow throughout 1965.

We expect hard bargaining but no serious problems in the other fields: scientific, technical, agricultural, medical, educational, films, cultural, sports and tourism.

The Soviet draft of the proposed agreement would reduce the exchanges somewhat, in keeping with the Viet-Nam atmosphere. Significantly, the draft also omits the color words of previous agreements, which implied a desire for more friendly relations. They may have seriously debated stopping the exchanges entirely but evidently decided otherwise. We would like to put the emphasis on expansion of exchanges and on language conveying the idea of improving relations but will not fight hard on these points. The important thing is to keep the program going, if we can do so, on a fully equitable basis.

I will report to you further before negotiations are concluded./4/

/4/Memoranda of the discussions at the plenary meetings and subcommittee sessions are in National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, EDX US-USSR.

Dean Rusk

154. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson/1/

Washington, March 14, 1966.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, EDX 4 US-USSR. Confidential. Drafted by Klosson.

SUBJECT
New Exchanges Agreement with Soviet Union

We have now completed negotiations and are prepared to sign on March 16 a new two-year exchanges agreement with the Soviet Union./2/

/2/For text of the Agreement, signed March 19, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1966, pp. 461-476.

The new agreement provides for a balanced program of exchanges generally comparable in scope and size to the previous program. The agreement also preserves the provisions which keep the program under United States Government direction.

In addition, we successfully introduced new language regarding the appearance of performing arts groups in order to prevent any repetition of the "Hello, Dolly!" situation. Henceforth, if the Soviets fail to receive an agreed American group, we now have a clearly understood basis for refusing their groups. The Soviets are also signing today a contract to receive the Iowa State Symphony Band to make up for their failure to receive "Hello, Dolly!". Thus, when we sign the over-all agreement on Wednesday, the way will be clear for the Bolshoi Ballet to come to the United States on April 19.

After prolonged resistance, the Soviets finally accepted an exchange of two exhibits. The previous agreement had provided for an exchange of three exhibits, but in practice the Soviets refused to approve more than two, since American exhibits are politically troublesome for them.

We made clear to the Soviets our concern over obtaining adequate arrangements for distribution of Amerika magazine in the U.S.S.R. They in turn indicated that our distribution would be improved if circulation of their magazine Soviet Life increases in the United States.

The Soviet decision to negotiate the agreement, after months of stalling, and Soviet willingness to receive American attractions beginning next month (after refusing to do so since last September on the grounds of Viet-Nam) indicate a Soviet desire not only to keep the exchanges program alive, but also to avoid further deterioration in U.S.-U.S.S.R. relations.

The Soviets have indicated that they wish a minimum of publicity on the agreement. Obviously they are sensitive to Peiping's charges of Soviet-American collaboration. For our part, we see no reason to play up the agreement.

Dean Rusk/3/

/3/Printed from a copy that indicates Rusk signed the original.

155. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Washington, March 18, 1966.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL US-USSR. Confidential. Drafted and initialed by Thompson and approved in S/AL on March 19. In addition to U.S.-USSR bilateral relations the participants also discussed Soviet defectors (see Document 156), limitations on missiles, nuclear free zones, the peaceful uses of atomic energy, the Tri-Continent conference held in Havana, Communist China, the CPSU Congress, and Indochina. Memoranda of these parts of the conversation are in the Department of State, S/S-I Files: Lot 73 D 154, S/AL Memcons. The memorandum of the conversation on the peaceful uses of atomic energy is printed in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XI, Document 123.

SUBJECT
US-USSR Bilateral Problems

PARTICIPANTS
The Secretary
Llewellyn E. Thompson, Ambassador-at-Large, Department of State
Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, USSR

At a luncheon that the Secretary gave for Ambassador Dobrynin today, the Ambassador raised the status of bilateral problems between our two countries. The Secretary said that the Ambassador would have observed the statements that had been made by Mansfield and others on the Consular Agreement. This was simply the result of a nose count. When Dobrynin asked about the Air Agreement, the Secretary observed that this did not require action by the Senate and was still under consideration.

On the subject of the negotiations for a Cultural Exchange Agreement, the Secretary assured the Ambassador that the last-minute difficulties had not been the result of any deception on the part of our negotiators. He hoped that we would be able to give the Ambassador very shortly our views on what would be required to complete the Agreement. He pointed out that we have some rather special problems in this country because in our case it is not simply the Government that is involved, but the people we have to contract with to carry out some phases of the Agreement.

In the course of the conversation, the Secretary referred to a subject which he had previously mentioned to the Ambassador, and that was the matter of personal attacks upon the President. He explained that the President took very seriously the role which he and the Soviet leaders had to play as Heads of the two most powerful countries in the world. The Secretary observed that there appeared to have been some improvement in respect to personal attacks since his last talk with the Ambassador on this subject, for which he expressed his appreciation.

Ambassador Dobrynin vigorously argued that no Soviet leaders had, to the best of his knowledge, attacked the President personally. He said, of course they did express themselves strongly on matters of policy and such things as they considered to be American imperialism, but he said he had carefully studied the Soviet press and he knew of no single incident of a personal attack upon the President by the leaders of the Soviet Government. He spelled out the difference between a "Tass statement," which was a rather official declaration and the publication by Tass of despatches from their correspondents. The Soviet press did report on matters relating to the President, usually by quotations from the American press, but he repeated that he knew of no attacks by the Soviet leaders themselves.

The Secretary said he would check into this matter.

The Secretary referred to the problem of a location for a new Soviet Embassy in Washington and said that we would do all we could to help. When Dobrynin asked about the possibility of their getting Tregaron, the Secretary said he had to state frankly that the prospects of obtaining a decision to rezone the area which would make this possible did not seem very bright. Upon further questioning from Dobrynin, he said we would be glad to look further into the question as to whether or not we could make any Federal property available.

156. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Washington, March 18, 1966.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 30 USSR. Secret. Drafted and initialed by Thompson and approved in S/AL on March 19. For other topics discussed during the conversation, see footnote 1, Document 155.

SUBJECT
Soviet Defectors

PARTICIPANTS
The Secretary
Llewellyn E. Thompson, Ambassador-at-Large, Department of State
Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, USSR

At a luncheon conversation with the Soviet Ambassador today, Ambassador Thompson said that he thought the Soviet Government made a mistake when we returned Soviet defectors to the Soviet Union; the Soviet press published charges and attacks against us. He said that we had followed scrupulously a principle of returning anyone who wanted to go back, but the Soviet action in exploiting these people made it more difficult for us to maintain our policy. When the Ambassador pointed out that Soviet actions were based upon statements made by the returned defectors, the Secretary and Mr. Thompson pointed out that the returned defectors naturally had to try to justify their actions.

Ambassador Dobrynin then launched upon a very vigorous discussion of our actions in promptly getting hold of Soviet defectors in every part of the world. He mentioned the recent case in Greece as an example. He said he was quite sure that we got little of value from these people but he could assure the Secretary that our actions in quickly getting hold of these people and flying them to the United States made a very strong impression upon his Government and had a serious effect upon our bilateral relations.

157. Paper Prepared in the Policy Planning Council/1/

Washington, March 23, 1966.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 1 US-USSR. Confidential. Drafted by John Huizenga. Transmitted to all U.S. diplomatic missions on April 1 as an enclosure to airgram CA-9782, which stated that it had "been used as a discussion paper in a recent policy planning meeting with the Secretary and in other Washington meetings sponsored by the Council," and its views had "found general concurrence"; however, it was "a discussion paper and not a guidance." (Ibid.) The paper was initially drafted by Huizenga on December 13, 1965, and revised in light of discussions at Policy Planning Council meetings on January 7 and February 25, 1966. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/P Files: Lot 71 D 273, USSR) Komer forwarded a copy of the initial draft to Bundy on December 23, 1965, calling it in his covering memorandum "a quite well written essay by John Huizenga (my favorite demonologist) that's worth holiday reading." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Komer Files, USSR, November 1963-March 1966)

PROSPECTS FOR DETENTE WITH THE USSR

Summary

The view that efforts for resumption of détente with the USSR should have the highest priority in our policy appears to have acquired some currency in recent months. The specific calculations which might argue for such a course seem to have been only vaguely articulated, however. This paper attempts to define and evaluate them.

The conclusions reached are not very hopeful for the near term. The argument that the détente marked by the 1963 test ban was intended by the USSR to open a phase of continuing improvement in Soviet-American relations does not stand close analysis. The Soviets had more limited aims in view and soon returned to traditional priorities.

The avenue of progress through new arms control agreements remains blocked by the persistence of strong Soviet inhibitions against inspection. Political exploitation of the disarmament issue evidently still weighs more heavily with the USSR than does the achievement of effective agreements.

The disorders and conflicts looming ahead in the Third World suggest the possibility of parallel action by the US and USSR to contain the risks. Thus far the Soviets appear to believe that these developments manifest "the world revolution" and can be used to diminish US and Western influence. As in the war between Pakistan and India, parallelism promises to be fortuitous and transient.

The Chinese challenge to Soviet influence in the Communist movement and in the Third World is currently the primary preoccupation of the leaders in Moscow. The imperatives of this struggle, in particular the USSR's need to avoid being outdone in revolutionary fervor, works against rather than for détente with the US.

Nevertheless, the Soviet system is in some trouble, and there are pressures within it which may in time bring moderation and larger possibilities for transforming present tensions into tolerable coexistence. Our policy should be alert to these possibilities, but recognize that they are probably still some time off. A patient effort, undistracted by illusion, to manifest to the USSR both a desire for fair accommodation and effective resistance to its expansionist aims is still our best course.

[Here follow sections entitled: Some Propositions Said to Argue for Détente Now; The Détente of 1963: Meaning and Aftermath; The Soviet Interest in Arms Control and Non-Proliferation; Soviet Policy in the Third World; China as a Factor in Soviet-American Relations; and Change in the Soviet System.]

Conclusion

The various rationales which argue that now is a propitious time for a new advance in Soviet-American understanding are not very persuasive. The official Soviet view is that relations "have become considerably complicated and have a clear tendency toward freezing." This seems nearer the mark.

American policy should, of course, always be open to improved understanding with the USSR. And, in fact, it has always been extremely easy for the Soviets, even by mere gestures, to provoke new waves of hope in this country for such improvement. We do not need to burden ourselves with any feeling of guilt that it is we who have sought and sustained the cold war. The proposals we have made for settlement of major issues have not been designed to endanger the security of the USSR. What they have evidently affronted, however, is the USSR's view of its interests as a revolutionary power bent on the extension of its own system.

What people usually mean when they speak of a new effort for understanding, though they do not necessarily say so explicitly, is that some sort of "sacrifices" should be made. Mere expressions of good will and new offers to talk are rightly recognized as insufficient to revive détente. It is always possible, of course, to advance understanding with the Soviets by conceding their demands, at least for a time. Currently they would be pleased to have us negotiate a settlement in Vietnam on Hanoi's terms, to abandon plans for nuclear sharing in NATO, to accept the indefinite division of Germany, to stop "exporting counterrevolution" by aiding states which are the victims of Communist subversion and insurrection. But the détente we could have now on the basis of "sacrifices" of this kind would almost certainly be both damaging and short-lived.

The truth is that the clear insight we had when the issues of the cold war were starker and simpler is still valid: only "situations of strength" can make possible the kind of détente we seek. Such "situations" cannot be defined, however, as we have sometimes seemed to believe, merely in terms of preponderant military power and the will to use it. First and foremost, they are produced by promoting social and political cohesion of those states which are threatened by Communist encroachment.

Thus the basic elements of an effective American policy toward the USSR remain what they were when the cold war began:

--Harbor no illusions and make no myths about the USSR's intentions, but pay close attention to what its leaders constantly say and actually do about the kind of world they want.

--Together with our allies, maintain an adequate margin of economic and military power.

--Do as much as we can to assist weaker societies in the less developed parts of the world to achieve viability and genuine independence, and thereby immunity to Communist influence.

--Offer and offer again to settle issues on terms which take account of the legitimate aspirations and security of all states, including the USSR, but on no other terms.

--Press the Soviets again and again to open their society, to make coexistence real, and to acknowledge that there must be one world, but one that allows for all diversity.

There are no maneuvers of policy which can bring a quick fix in Soviet-American relations, and least of all can a policy which aims at détente for its own sake do so. The spirit of President Kennedy's American University speech/2/ is a proper part of our stance toward the USSR. The words he addressed to the Soviet leaders in another tone about Berlin in 1961 and about missiles in Cuba in 1962 are equally so. The only prudent judgment at present is that our policy will continue to require both of the ingredients contained in these utterances, the spirit of accommodation and the spirit of resistance, if we are to arrive eventually at a genuine détente with the USSR.

/2/Given on June 10, 1963; for text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1963, pp. 459-464.

It is not unreasonable to hope for this if we are patient and do not try to act on potential historical developments before they are ripe. As suggested above, the next decades will be critical ones in the evolution of the Soviet system. Together with the liberalization of the internal political order which may come, there may be a growing desire for wider and freer contact with the outside world. This might in turn bring an end to ideologically inspired hostility, and lead the Soviets to accept an international order which allows for variety and imposes limits on the power aspirations of all states and systems.

The desire to become a modern society and to share the benefits of progress in normal intercourse with other advanced societies is strong among the Soviet people. If and when it breaks through and begins to determine the conduct of the Soviet state, the constructive and cooperative relations with the USSR toward which our policy aims should be within reach. Until then, we may from time to time have phases we will call détente, and they may serve our interest, but we should not mistake the false dawn for the real./3/

/3/On March 24 Rostow forwarded to Rusk a supplement to this paper, drafted by Huizenga at Rusk's suggestion, that discussed "Areas of Mutual Interest in Soviet-American Relations." Huizenga's "mixed bag of items," which he "intended mainly to be illustrative," included China, Third World Conflicts, Economic Aid to Less Developed Countries, Regional Arms Races, Science and Technology, Military Contacts, and Trade and Consular Relations. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/P Files: Lot 72 D 139, USSR)

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