Washington, October 6, 1965.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, USSR, Vol. X. Limited Official Use. According to another copy, this memorandum was drafted by William H. Edgar (SOV) and cleared by Toon and Stoessel. At the bottom of the memorandum Bromley Smith, NSC Executive Secretary, wrote in a note to Francis Bator: "What a pity-and a real loss to the U.S. No one who ever lived through a Cuban missile crisis could accept the inadequate communication facilities to our Embassy in Moscow."

SUBJECT
Leased Line With Embassy Moscow

For more than ten years we have sought without success to establish a direct, exclusive communications link between the American Embassy in Moscow and the Department of State. Such a link would assure prompt transmission of messages, which now are sent via Soviet commercial channels, sometimes with delays.

In February of 1964 Gromyko told Ambassador Kohler that the Embassy could have a leased teletype line in late 1964. In December of 1964, however, the Soviet Foreign Ministry claimed that a leased-line was not possible due to a shortage of available facilities. The Foreign Ministry offered us Telex service instead. While Telex would not be a facility available for our exclusive use, it would be an improvement over present arrangements. After exhaustive efforts to obtain the leased line, we informed the Foreign Ministry on September 9 of this year that a Telex would be acceptable, but reiterated the hope that a leased line could be established as soon as possible. We are according the Soviet Embassy in Washington Telex service on a reciprocal basis. Technical arrangements for beginning service have almost been completed and service for our Embassy and the Soviet Embassy will begin simultaneously.

Benjamin H. Read/2/

/2/Lawrence Eagleburger signed for Read.

132. Research Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hughes) to Acting Secretary of State Ball/1/

RSB-112

Washington, October 7, 1965.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 1 USSR. Secret; Exdis. No drafting information appears on the memorandum, but it was signed by Hughes.

SUBJECT
Gromyko's New York Conversations

We have examined Gromyko's remarks to the Secretary on September 29 and October 1/2/ in the light of recent Soviet policy trends manifest elsewhere.

/2/A memorandum of the conversation on September 29, primarily devoted to the India-Pakistan dispute is ibid., Conference Files: Lot 66 D 347, CF 2547; a memorandum of the October 1 conversation on arms control is printed in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XI, Document 97.

Conclusions

1. Gromyko's conversations leave the impression that the USSR is not ready either to increase tensions or take steps to ease them. Moscow seems to want to buy itself a little time to see what directions events take and sort out its interests and objectives.

2. Gromyko's business-as-usual tone in his annual tour d'horizon suggests that Moscow is less willing to see a further deterioration in US-Soviet relations over Vietnam than Brezhnev implied in his September 29 speech./3/ Gromyko does not, of course, reverse policy views enunciated by Brezhnev, but he makes it clear that both in private talks with American leaders and on certain policy matters of interest to it, Moscow is unwilling to take nearly so hard a line as it does in public statements chiefly addressed to communists at home and abroad.

/3/For text of Brezhnev's September 29 comments on U.S.-Soviet relations and Vietnam, see Current Digest of the Soviet Press, October 20, 1965, p. 8.

3. The Soviets presumably see their relations with the US as their principal source of leverage in efforts to restrain American actions in Southeast Asia. If so, they may be cautious about using up their diplomatic capital too quickly. At the same time, Moscow may wish to use continuing contacts with the US to convey a warning to Hanoi and Peking that the Soviet Union's global interests impose limits on how far the USSR can be cajoled into supporting Asian communist intransigence.

4. Gromyko's continuing interest in the topic of military budgets and his restraint in not renewing reproaches that the US had reneged on an understanding about them suggests that the USSR hopes to weather the Vietnam crisis without substantial increases in military spending which might upset its domestic economic calculations.

5. Hence, to a remarkable degree Gromyko (unlike Kosygin in his talks with Governor Harriman),/4/ avoided explicitly linking Vietnam to other issues. He agreed to start negotiations on a new cultural agreement (these may prove to be difficult), and on the less controversial aspects of the US and Soviet draft treaties on nonproliferation, but he gave no hint of any Soviet change on the issue of NATO nuclear arrangements, and there is a danger that he may have misread the conversations as indicating that a US shift is in the offing.

/4/See Documents 118 and 119.

6. In keeping with his generally restrained approach, Gromyko did not air current Soviet views on support for national liberation movements. But he was not responsive to hints that coincidence of US-Soviet interests in the India-Pakistan situation might extend to the third world generally. On the contrary he drew a distinction between partial measures, which he favored, and regional approaches to disarmament, about which he was skeptical. Moscow's efforts to use the issue of American imperialism as a rallying point for communists and the nonaligned, as well as specific differences in particular areas, remains a major barrier to cooperation in third areas despite Gromyko's mildness of manner.

7. Reading Gromyko against the background of other Soviet moves and statements, we foresee no change in the orientation in Soviet foreign policy. While some increased sharpness toward Communist China seems to be creeping into Soviet pronouncements, Moscow apparently intends to maintain a public posture of hostility toward US policies in Vietnam and elsewhere. But public hostility toward the US will be tempered by restraint in what the Soviets actually do about it, and relieved by a modicum of cordiality in such private talks as Governor Harriman's in Moscow and the Secretary's in New York and by a degree of cooperativeness on some specific issues.

[Here follow a table of contents and 6 pages of discussion.]

133. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State/1/

Moscow, October 28, 1965.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, EDX US-USSR. Limited Official Use. No time of transmission appears on the telegram, but it was received in the Department of State on October 28 at 3:59 p.m.

1429. Pass USIA. Ref Embtel 1417./2/ Exchanges.

/2/Also dated October 28, it summarized a general review of the exchanges program in which the Soviet representative stressed that changes in the international situation had arisen since the signature of the agreement that "could not but affect" U.S.-Soviet relations. (Ibid.)

Soviets have now clearly made decision to apply "freeze" to exchanges in cultural field. Decision to allow Aronson-Elder to proceed apparently trickle to indicate freeze not total. We doubt education group to study science-mathematics will be allowed to come this year although there may be outside chance; tone Krylov's remarks permit impression Soviets might use tactic of curtailing program to make us cancel delegation.

Krylov left distinct inference Sovs would be dilatory in moving to negotiate new agreement. Said much remained to be discussed among Soviet authorities, including scope of agreement, programs to be included, date of negotiations and seemed to be conveying impression Sovs in no hurry to finish their preparations. EmbOffs deduced committee not engaged at this time in preparation of any preliminary draft./3/

/3/On October 30 the Department of State informed the Embassy in Moscow that the Soviet refusal to fulfill exchange commitments should not be allowed to pass without a formal U.S. reaction. (Telegram 1144 to Moscow; ibid.) On November 2 the Embassy presented an aide-mémoire to this effect to the Soviet Foreign Ministry. (Telegram 1477 from Moscow, November 2; ibid.)

Guthrie

134. Intelligence Memorandum/1/

No. 2394/65

Washington, November 12, 1965.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/P Files: Lot 72 D 139, USSR. Secret. Prepared in the CIA's Directorate of Intelligence.

RUSSIA WITHOUT KHRUSHCHEV

Summary

A year after the fall of Khrushchev it is still difficult to define the character of the new regime in Moscow. The new leaders' internal policy has been directed in large part toward rectifying Khrushchev's mistakes in economic organization and administration. They have initiated an economic reform program which has a strong liberal cast, while in other matters a more orthodox hard line seems to be emerging.

In foreign policy too there has been some ambivalence. Party Secretary Brezhnev and Premier Kosygin have reaffirmed the major changes in post-Stalin policy. At the same time they have adopted new tactics in dealing with the challenge from China, tactics which have improved the Soviet position in the Communist world but have led to involvements in a war over which Moscow has little control. As a result, Soviet freedom of action on other East-West issues has become narrowly limited.

A clearer picture may emerge at the 23rd Party Congress in March. Collective leadership seems to be functioning effectively, but Brezhnev's power is growing. Political maneuvering should be stimulated by approach of the congress, and the need to present a new five-year economic plan, thereby outlining the regime's priorities, could lead to political trouble.

1. Following the fall of Khrushchev in October 1964, the new Soviet leaders hastened to guarantee the continuity of Soviet domestic and foreign policy. Their promise has been kept in the sense that there has been no fundamental reversal of post-Stalin policy. However, differences in approach and shifts in emphasis have accumulated, many of Khrushchev's major programs have been undone, and the new leaders have left their own imprint on almost every field of policy. Their foreign policy decisions have resulted in significant changes in the USSR's international position and their domestic proposals could, if implemented, produce important transformations in Soviet society.

[Here follow sections on "The Top Leadership" and "Domestic Policies."]

Foreign Policy

13. The extensive changes in internal policies make it clear, in retrospect, that Khrushchev was probably overthrown in order to rectify his past blunders and to head off whatever further internal changes he had in mind last fall. From the vantage point of the present, it also appears that the new leaders considered Khrushchev's tactics in meeting the Chinese challenge to be self-defeating. At the outset it was apparent that they had no intention of forcing the issue with Peking, or of continuing to wage the conflict of Peking's rules, i.e., through an exchange of vociferous polemics. Beyond this, it became evident that they would try to reassert their influence in the Communist world, even at the expense of Khrushchev's détente with the West.

Vietnam

14. This change occurred last winter, before Kosygin visited Hanoi and the Pleiku incident. It is still not clear how the Soviets estimated the outcome of the Vietnamese war at that time. Perhaps they saw a cheap opportunity to gain some credit for the successful conclusion of the war, with no great risk. In any event, once committed to winning over the Vietnamese and North Koreans, the Soviets have had little choice but to become increasingly involved. Thus, the Vietnamese war and its repercussions for Sino-Soviet relations have become pivotal issues in the USSR's foreign policy, setting fairly narrow limits on its freedom of action in other East-West issues.

15. This attempt to regain the initiative within the Communist movement has been a moderate success. There is no doubt that the Soviets have made gains in Hanoi and Pyongyang. But the strong Chinese challenge continues to do damage to the Soviet position and the Vietnamese war has added one more acute issue driving the Soviets and Chinese apart. Moreover, the Soviets are in the unenviable position of being unable to advance in Vietnam without higher risks or to retreat without great loss of prestige. To be sure, the Soviets can carefully control the scope of their own involvement and the extent of their commitment, and for this reason the Soviet leaders probably regard gains in the Communist world worth the potential risk of a US-Soviet confrontation. Nevertheless, the Soviets are involved in a war over which they have only limited control, and the initiative remains largely in the hands of Hanoi, and to some extent with China and the US.

16. The obvious way out for Moscow is a negotiated settlement. From the very beginning of their involvement, the Soviets have proposed this course to the other Communist powers. This attitude has led to constant Chinese accusations of seeking to sacrifice the Vietnamese on the altar of US-Soviet détente. At the same time the Chinese have effectively blocked Soviet attempts to promote a common Communist policy. In the face of this impasse, the Soviets will probably have to continue their present efforts: supplying military aid, playing down their own involvement, and seeking opportunities to urge the US and North Vietnamese to negotiate.

17. If the Soviets have now settled down for a long haul, they may have also decided to try to limit some of the damage to Soviet-American relations. Some recent gestures suggest this. For example, the talks between Secretary Rusk and Gromyko were held in a relaxed atmosphere, free of recriminations over Vietnam. After sitting quiescent through the Geneva disarmament talks, the Soviets now seem to have decided to make a more active effort so as not to foreclose the possibility of an agreement in nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. On the other hand, the US-Soviet cultural exchange negotiations are in doubt. On a number of other issues the Soviets have no choice but to mark time or substitute propaganda for policy. Thus the Soviets will probably maintain the current "freeze" in relations with the US, as long as their new line in Vietnam seems to be paying dividends within the Communist world.

[Here follow sections on Soviet foreign policy in other areas of the world.]

The Outlook

42. Although the leadership has survived a year intact and has been able to make decisions on important issues, it is still too early for any firm predictions for the future either of this leadership or of general Soviet policies. A clearer picture should emerge at the Party Congress in March. The surprising degree of harmony displayed by the present leadership has been in marked contrast to the immediate and obvious struggle for power which began after Stalin's death. In advance of the party congress, however, political maneuvering will probably intensify. Such maneuvering is likely to be aggravated not only by the important economic choices [of] the leaders, but also by the other questions such as the proper historical and political perspective of Stalinism, or de-Khrushchevization, both of which can become important divisive issues. Finally, the leadership is likely to want to redefine foreign policy in an authoritative way at the congress, and this means that the Sino-Soviet question must be treated. Congresses have historically marked crucial turning points in Soviet history, and the 23rd Congress is likely to be a watershed for the new regime.

135. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Washington, November 15, 1965.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 29 USSR. Confidential. Drafted and initialed by Thompson and approved in S/AL on November 15. A summary of this conversation was transmitted to Moscow in telegram 1260, November 15. (Ibid.)

SUBJECT
Publication of the Penkovsky Papers

PARTICIPANTS
Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, USSR
Llewellyn E. Thompson, Ambassador-at-Large, Department of State

The Ambassador called at his own request and made the following oral statement:

"Moscow has noted the publication in a number of American newspapers of the so-called 'Penkovsky Papers' and a report that these 'Papers' are going to be published soon in the USA and in England in the form of a book. Familiarization with the contents of these 'Papers' leaves no doubt that they are a crude forgery concocted in the spirit of the worst time of the 'cold war.' There is attributed to Penkovsky a whole collection of stereotyped, slanderous fabrications about the Soviet Union, its policy and Soviet leaders.

"The authors of this forgery do not even stop before such a monstrous lie as attributing to Soviet leaders the idea of preventive war which has actually been propagated, as is known, by certain circles in the West.

"At the same time when one becomes acquainted with the contents of the 'Penkovsky Papers' it becomes completely clear that they are not simply the product of the imagination of some irresponsible journalist. American and English intelligence services whose agent Penkovsky was, as proved in the course of the trial against him in May 1963, lent their efforts to the fabrication of this forgery and to this entire provocational scheme.

"In this connection the publication in the USA of the above-mentioned forgery and intention to publish it as a book cannot be viewed by us other than premeditated action which is in direct contradiction of repeated pronouncements by representatives of the Government of the USA about striving for improvements in Soviet-American relations. The responsibility for the negative consequences of this action for Soviet-American relations, the state of which at present, even without this, leaves much to be desired, will rest on the American side."

I said I would make no official comment until there had been an opportunity to examine his statement. I said, however, I could tell him on a personal basis and off the record, that when the publication of this series was announced, I inquired of our people and was told that we had nothing to do with the publication of this series. I said I understood that the CIA was asked whether they had any objection to publication and that they had replied that they had considered the matter solely from the security point of view and from this point of view, had no objection to publication.

The Ambassador then asked if he could expect an official reply, and I said I presumed that he could.

136. Memorandum for the Files/1/

Washington, November 18, 1965.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL US-USSR. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Kohler, who was in Washington for consultations, and cleared by Bator. Copies were sent to Thompson, Leddy, and Toon.

The President received me shortly before 12:30 and I remained with him for approximately one hour and a quarter./2/ At the outset, while the photographers were at work, I expressed my pleasure at seeing him looking so well. I added that an additional reason for my pleasure was that my wife had just undergone abdominal surgery and was trying to emulate his example of getting well fast.

/2/Bator was also present during the meeting. (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary)

The President then read briefing memoranda drafted by Mr. Francis Bator of the White House staff as well as by the Department in preparation for the President's meeting with me./3/ He then invited me to report. I related some of the difficulties involved in maintaining a holding operation in Moscow during the year since I last talked with him./4/ I said that I was sure that the posture of continued interest in improvement in our relations with the Soviets had been the correct one during the past year. I had been sorry, however, that it had been necessary to postpone specific actions, such as ratification of the Consular Convention, implementation of the Civil Air Agreement and the East-West trade legislation which would provide a basis for trade talks with the Soviets.

/3/A copy of Bator's briefing memorandum is ibid., Bator Papers, Chron File; a copy of the State Department briefing memorandum is in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, PER Kohler, Foy D.

/4/On December 9, 1964, Kohler, Rusk, and Thompson met with the President for 15 minutes prior to the President's meeting with Gromyko. (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary) For a memorandum of the Johnson-Gromyko conversation, see Document 78.

The President commented that the climate had been made more difficult for progress on such matters by Soviet anti-American statements, which extended to personal attacks on the President and Secretary McNamara. I said I realized this and understood his difficulties in this connection. However, as he knew, Secretary Rusk in Washington and I in Moscow had made observations to the Soviets on this score and I felt there had been a diminution of the violence of the attacks during recent months. As to the specific measures on which I had suggested we should go forward, I of course bowed to his judgment as to political possibilities. However, in my view, all three of these items were more in the national interest than that of the Soviet Union. I stated my reasons in connection with each item along lines set forth in Moscow Embassy telegrams. With regard specifically to the Consular Convention prospect, I reported on my conversation with Admiral Raborn/5/ regarding his exchanges with FBI Director Hoover and subsequent talks with key Senators and said that some of those Senators who had opposed in the past would go along with ratification in the new session of Congress.

/5/No record of this conversation with Director of Central Intelligence Raborn has been found.

The President observed that the cancellation of the "Hello Dolly" show under the exchanges agreement had again raised the question of Soviet violation of their international agreements. I explained that following my intervention with Gromyko/6/ the Soviets had tried to escape the charge of violating an agreement by labelling their actions postponement rather than a cancellation of the "Hello Dolly" show. I went on to say that I had always believed that agreements with the Soviet Union had to be self-enforcing. I then set forth my reasons for believing that in the projected agreements I previously cited this would be the case. While I considered that the preponderant advantages were on our side because of the differing natures of the two societies and our objective of opening up the closed Soviet society, I expressed the view that the Soviet interest was important enough in these cases to impel them to observe the agreements.

/6/See Document 123.

The President then asked my views with respect to Soviet relations with the Chinese Communists and Vietnam. I replied along the lines of Moscow Embassy analyses and of my response to similar questions from Secretary McNamara, including the latter's inquiry relating to the effect of a possible suspension of bombing. In this connection he asked about the Severeid allegations attributing to Adlai Stevenson the claim that the Soviets had informed U Thant last year Hanoi was ready to talk settlement. I said I had had no knowledge of this myself and no confirmation from Soviet sources. I commented, however, that--as I had just said in analyzing the policy of the new Soviet leadership--this approach would have come at the precise time when the Kremlin was convinced our politico-military base in South Vietnam was collapsing under us and thought it was only a matter of ushering us out.

The President inquired about the prospect of wheat sales to the Russians. I expressed the view that they would not purchase wheat this year but would seek to satisfy their needs from other sources, notably Canada, Australia, Argentina or France or, if necessary, by reneging on their outside commitments and letting other Eastern European countries turn to us instead. The President expressed full appreciation of the political and psychological factors involved and thought steps should be taken to stop misleading agitation of this question in the U.S. He told Mr. Bator to ask Mr. Bundy to take action along these lines.

The President reverted to the question of the new exchanges agreement. I gave him a run-down on the present situation, the prospect of negotiations in January, and the importance of the program to our objective of breaking down the closed Soviet society.

During a walk in the garden the President asked me many questions with respect to Soviet economic problems and the status of the leadership to which I replied along the lines of Embassy reporting on these subjects. He also asked me what I thought Senator Mansfield's group would get in Moscow. I said I thought they would hear the same phonograph record I had been listening to for the last 10 months. The President commented, that is, no business until Vietnam is over? I replied "Yes".

In conclusion the President said he was proud of the job that we were doing in Moscow. I replied that it was a privilege to work for him.

Foy D. Kohler/7/

U.S. Ambassador to the USSR

/7/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

137. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Washington, November 18, 1965.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL US-USSR. Secret. Drafted and initialed by Kohler on November 19.

SUBJECT
US-USSR Relations

PARTICIPANTS
Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, Soviet Ambassador
Foy D. Kohler, U.S. Ambassador to the USSR

At his invitation I lunched with Ambassador Dobrynin today, staying at the Embassy from 1:45 p.m. (having been delayed one-half hour by my talk with the President at the White House)/2/ until nearly 4:00 p.m., when Dobrynin had an appointment at the Department. After general initial conversation, including apologies for my tardiness and reference to my leave in Florida and Mrs. Dobrynin's trip to Cuba with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko, the Ambassador inquired about the President's health and views on Soviet-American relations. I said I was glad to inform him that the President had made friendly references to him personally. However, the President continued to be disturbed by the hostile nature of Soviet statements about the U.S. including unfriendly references to him personally. The President had never been a communist-baiter and would continue to wish that there were some way to make some progress in our relationship. However, the sustained nature of this hostility had created an atmosphere, especially among members of Congress, which made forward movement difficult.

/2/See Document 136.

Dobrynin interrupted to say that he did not know of personal attacks on the President by members of the Soviet leadership and he was particularly certain that none had been made since his conversation with Secretary Rusk/3/ and his reports on this subject when he was back in Moscow on vacation this summer. I said that except for one reference which I recalled in a Brezhnev speech which mentioned the President by name and which was not exactly friendly, I agreed that it was true that personal references had not been made by members of the leadership. However, such statements did appear in the Soviet press and Soviet propaganda. The effect was about the same since these newspapers were officially controlled in the Soviet Union and the headlines appearing in American newspapers did not make any fine distinctions as to the Soviet source. Dobrynin argued that the Soviet press was not under the strict control that it used to be; since there were no official Soviet statements hostile to the President, the remarks cited by me could only be Soviet press reporting of articles or statements from foreign sources. I repeated that, be this as it might, such fine distinctions were not made by the reporters and the result was the creation of a difficult atmosphere here.

/3/See Document 114.

The conversation then turned to a general discussion of Vietnam and Germany with particular reference to nuclear sharing with the Germans along familiar lines with nothing essentially new being said on either side.

Later Dobrynin reverted to bilateral relations saying he hoped we could find some new ideas or proposals to move things forward. I replied that we would like to do this but that Soviet statements about the impossibility of any progress in our relationship so long as "American aggression continued in Vietnam" not only contributed to a worsening of the atmosphere but created the impression that we were in fact up against a brick wall with respect to any new moves. Practically every Soviet leader from Brezhnev to Polyansky made such statements in every public speech touching on international relations. I thought the Soviets had made clear that they would not be receptive to new proposals until Vietnam was settled but I did not see why they had to keep repeating this all the time, especially every time they were jumped on by the Chinese. Indeed, this process was creating increasing difficulty for the President even in connection with moving ahead on such presently pending matters as the ratification of the Consular Convention and conclusion of the Civil Air Agreement as well as East-West trade legislation. Moreover, I thought the Soviets had made a great mistake in canceling "Hello Dolly" performances in Moscow since this had raised again the charge that the Soviets could not be depended upon to respect any agreements that were made with them. Dobrynin immediately replied that this was not a cancellation of a performing arts attraction but only a postponement. I replied that it had only become a postponement after I had gone to Mr. Gromyko and pointed out that the original cancellation was a direct violation of an inter-governmental agreement. The Ambassador did not try to respond to my observation about the incessant repetition of the Soviet line on our bilateral relations. He did, however, expand on the question of the ratification of the Consular Convention. He said this was not regarded as an important matter from a substantive point of view but that failure of ratification had been regarded as an indication of American intentions to freeze our relationship. He recounted at some length his experience on returning to the USSR for leave last summer, when on the basis of assurances from Secretary Rusk he tried to convince Moscow skeptics that the U.S would ratify the Consular Convention. By the time he returned to Moscow from leave in the Crimea he had been proven wrong. He went on to say that he supposed that since the agreement had not been ratified in the last session of Congress it would not be in the new session. I replied that this might depend to a considerable extent on Moscow. I thought it would be useful if the Soviet side would pipe down on its attacks and charges and try to improve the atmosphere before the new session of Congress convenes. Dobrynin said it might be useful if I made some of the observations in Moscow I had just made to him today. I said I intended to do so; I usually had a talk with Foreign Minister Gromyko after my return to Moscow from the United States and would expect to do the same this time.

Finally, I reverted to the question of the "postponement" of "Hello Dolly" and pointed out that we had not, as we might have, in reciprocity "postponed" the visit of the Moscow Philharmonic. They should take note of this and realize that they were already in our debt for one major performing arts attraction.

138. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Washington, November 18, 1965.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 29 USSR. Confidential. Drafted and initialed by Thompson and approved in S/AL on November 18.

SUBJECT
The "Penkovsky Papers"

PARTICIPANTS
Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, USSR
Llewellyn E. Thompson, Ambassador-at-Large, Department of State

I made the following oral statement to Dobrynin:

"With reference to your statement to me on November fifteenth/2/ with regard to the 'Penkovsky Papers,' The United States Government was not responsible for their publication. As the Ambassador is aware, our newspapers and publishing houses are free to print what they please. The responsibility is theirs and theirs alone.

/2/Document 135.

"In view of this, no comment on your other statements is necessary. I should like, however, to reject in particular the charge that the publication of the 'Penkovsky Papers' is a 'premeditated action in direct contradiction of repeated pronouncements by the Government of the USA about striving for improvement of Soviet-American relations.' There can be no question about the sincerity of the statements by the President, the Secretary of State and others expressing their hope for improved relations with the Soviet Union. We will continue to do what we can to further this objective, but obviously this is a two-way street and progress depends not on us alone."

He said he would, of course, inform his Government, but then he commented saying he was speaking personally. He said: "Of course you understand, and I understand, somebody in an American agency was responsible for writing these papers." He noted that my statement referred to the President and the Secretary of State and said that he had not suggested that this had been done at the top levels of the American Government.

I said I could only repeat what I had told him before, which was that I had checked with the CIA which had denied any involvement. The Ambassador again indicated, as in his original oral statement, that the accusation that the Soviets had considered preventive war had particularly disturbed his Government.

139. Research Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hughes) to Acting Secretary of State Ball/1/

RSB-135

Washington, November 23, 1965.

/1/Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files. Secret. No drafting information appears on the memorandum but it was signed by Hughes.

SUBJECT
The Soviet Union A Year After Khrushchev

In this report, prepared originally for the fall session of the NATO Working Group of National Experts in Paris, we review Soviet developments during the year since Khrushchev's ouster. The report, which incorporates information available as of November 5, 1965, might be read with a companion piece, RSB-128, "The Situation in Eastern Europe," November 3, 1965 (Secret)./2/

/2/Not printed. (Ibid.)

Abstract

In the year since the ouster of Khrushchev the Soviet leadership has endeavored to project an image of collectivity and has claimed to be approaching the considerable Soviet domestic and foreign problems inherited from Khrushchev in a more reasonable and careful manner. The style of Brezhnev and Kosygin has been more deliberate and less flamboyant than Khrushchev's. Their collective approach has necessarily reduced the popular appeal of their moves as compared to his. Moreover, the removal of Khrushchev has removed none of the dilemmas, divisive issues, and chronic domestic problems which confronted the regime under his leadership. The present leaders are thus under constraint to adjust their differences within the framework of collegiality as long as possible, but it does not seem that the post-Khrushchev collective leadership is more likely to remain a permanent feature of Soviet politics than was the first post-Stalin junta.

In domestic affairs, the new leaders have defined perhaps more carefully than any of their predecessors some of the more serious problems, and have taken some policy initiatives that have at least set the broad framework for dealing with several of these problems. The agricultural measures adopted at the Central Committee plenum last March should prove beneficial over the long run; those in the sphere of industrial management and planning adopted at the September plenum may well produce at least short-run deleterious effects, as they have already led to confusion and indecision. The economic reforms, if fully implemented, would represent a significant policy departure, but in their present form they lag behind the proposals of the more "liberal" Soviet economists and the reforms introduced recently in a number of East European countries. A major drawback of the projected reforms is that they connote postponing until 1967-68 the introduction of the revised, presumably more rational system of wholesale prices. One crucial question for the success of the reforms is whether the industrial managers, long accustomed to a "command system," will avail themselves of the opportunities to exercise initiative constructively.

There were signs of top-level disagreement over the extent and timing of the economic reforms and governmental restructuring right up to the eve of the September plenum. Behind these differences loomed the perennial debate over allocation of resources and over priorities for the next Five-Year Plan. Differences have also been evident in other key areas: in defining the Party's role towards the government and the economy; in setting stricter limitations on Party membership and revising rules on rotation of personnel in leading Party organs; and in determining how, and at what pace, to carry out re-evaluation of the Stalin period.

In foreign affairs, the programmatic underpinnings of Soviet policy shifted soon after Brezhnev and Kosygin took over in 1964, and for the ensuing year Moscow emphasized bloc unity as a stated policy goal. By so doing, the Soviets evidently hoped to regroup their forces in the international communist movement and to put the onus for any further polemics on the Chinese. In this context they tried to build up a call for joint action in Vietnam both as a rallying slogan for communists and their sympathizers throughout the world and as a device for embarrassing the Chinese. Moscow seemed willing to pursue this policy even at the risk of serious deterioration in its relations with the US, but the Soviets remained circumspect in avoiding direct US-USSR military confrontation over Vietnam, and in the end there appeared to be no intention to change the basic relationship with the US that might be labeled limited hostility. By the end of their first year in office, Khrushchev's successors had made no remarkable breakthroughs. To the extent that they have proven their point that the Chinese were to blame for continued disunity in the communist world, they have but demonstrated their lack of defined purpose to choose an alternative follow-up policy. In the third world, the Soviets have encountered some knotty dilemmas in the face of international and internecine conflicts, but on the whole their flexible policy has brought them some slight gain in favor, illustrated by their experience with the abortive Bandung II episode.

[Here follow a Table of Contents and sections on leadership and internal developments comprising 20 pages.]

III. SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY

A. General Guidelines

Although the post-Khrushchev regime attempted some initiatives during the year and responded to various crisis situations, its policy now seems to be hung up on the interplay of a number of conflicting pressures. This impression was confirmed by Brezhnev's comments on the state of Soviet foreign policy included in his speech to the September plenum. Despite Brezhnev's efforts to characterize Soviet diplomacy as "active" and "advancing," the net impression is that Moscow has at least as many problems and fewer solutions than it had a year ago. When he failed to point to any new directions on the major issues of China and particularly the US, Brezhnev perhaps inadvertently drew a starkly pessimistic picture that would be depressing to a large part of the Soviet public, which tends to look on good Soviet-US relations as a harbinger of a happier state of affairs for themselves.

The likelihood also exists that Brezhnev's remarks reflect an increased preoccupation of the regime with domestic matters. Beginning with Presidium member Kirilenko's statement in the Far East in July, a series of authoritative comments on Soviet foreign policy, including articles in Kommunist and Pravda, and most recently Suslov's speech to the Seventh Comintern Congress commemoration, have, in roughly similar language, stressed that the first or "supreme revolutionary principle" of Soviet foreign policy is the "building of communism" at home. While this statement also has connotations for the running polemic with the Chinese Communists on the proper revolutionary tactic in the international field, the way it has been emphasized in recent months, and particularly accompanied by reference to the CC CPSU plenums of the past year, all of which were primarily concerned with domestic matters, suggests that the regime at least for the moment is focusing inward.

The programmatic underpinnings of Soviet foreign policy shifted soon after the accession of the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime in 1964 and continued to point during the year in the direction of greater concern with problems of bloc unity and leadership even at the risk of a serious deterioration of US-Soviet ties. The formula used was first enunciated by Brezhnev in November 1964. It included six aims or tasks, involving the fostering of (1) peaceful conditions for socialist construction, (2) socialist unity, (3) national liberation, (4) cooperation with independent Afro-Asian and Latin American states, (5) peaceful coexistence with capitalist states, and (6) deliverance from world war. Although these six points basically follow the tenets of the CPSU Program issued in 1961, peaceful coexistence was no longer the umbrella under which all other tasks are to be carried out but became one of the six distinct, though interrelated, priorities of Soviet foreign policy and placed near the end of the list. Slight deviations from the six-point formula have appeared during the year, and although the formula is not necessarily included in every authoritative foreign policy statement, it has been reiterated recently and remains a useful template against which future policy statements can be measured.

Despite Brezhnev's somewhat negative picture of Soviet policy, recent developments suggest some movement in certain areas. There have been hints that the Soviet regime may be shifting its tactics vis-á-vis Communist China in the direction of more forthright hostility and possibly a more overt move to isolate the Chinese. This likelihood has been accelerated by the Indo-Pakistan crisis as well as the Indonesian internal crisis but was already apparent in late summer. At the same time, the Soviet regime in the last half year has increasingly resorted to a "soft-sell" approach in an effort to improve relations with countries on its southern borders-i.e., Iran, Turkey, Afghanistan and Pakistan. The "soft-sell" also has emerged in relations with the Scandinavian and other Western powers and seems a coefficient of recent Soviet moves to reemphasize popular-front movements, both in Western Europe and Latin America, and to cooperate with "revolutionary" democrats in Africa and Asia.

[Here follow sections on Sino-Soviet relations, Eastern Europe, and Vietnam.]

E. No Fundamental Shift in Relations with the US

The hardening of the Soviet demeanor toward the US continues to be limited and apparently intended more as a tactic than a fundamental reorientation of policy. Brezhnev in his plenum speech chose to make US-Soviet relations depend upon the course of events in Vietnam, although he seemed to be at a loss to foresee how the Vietnam crisis might be resolved. He stated that these relations have been "considerably complicated" by the Vietnam crisis and have a "clear tendency toward freezing," although he gave no indication whether or in what way they would worsen.

Brezhnev did not, however, repeat his August 27 criticism of the President, nor have other authoritative Soviet statements since then criticized the President. Developments since the end of August, when it seemed possible that the Brezhnev criticism would open a harsher phase in US-Soviet relations, reveal both positive and negative moves vis-á-vis the US. These moves to some extent cancel out each other and leave the USSR roughly on its previous course of carefully limited hostility toward the US in bilateral state relations. While the cultural aspects of the US-Soviet exchange program have bogged down further, the scientific and educational exchanges continue to limp along. This behavior contrasts to the outpourings of Soviet propaganda media which have steadily increased the anti-imperialist emphasis concentrating on the US as the main culprit responsible for exacerbating international tension.

[Here follow sections on new tactics in Western Europe, flexibility in the third world, disarmament, and the United Nations.]

140. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Leddy) to the Under Secretary of State (Ball)/1/

Washington, November 24, 1965.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, LEG 7 MANSFIELD. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by James W. Pratt (SOV).

SUBJECT
Summary of Codel Mansfield Talks With Soviet Leaders

Attached is a summary of the main topics discussed by Senator Mansfield and his four colleagues with Soviet Premier Kosygin (November 19) and Foreign Minister Gromyko (November 18). The summary is based on telegrams from our Chargé, who was present at both meetings./2/ You may wish to refer to this paper in briefing Foreign Secretary Stewart./3/

/2/A memorandum of Senators Mansfield, Boggs, Inouye, Aiken, and Muskie's conversation with Gromyko was transmitted in telegram 1654 from Moscow, November 19. (Ibid.) Memoranda of their conversations with Kosygin and members of the Supreme Soviet (on November 18) were transmitted as enclosures to airgram A-841 from Moscow, November 23. (Ibid.) A summary of the conversation with Kosygin was transmitted in telegram 1684 from Moscow, November 21. (Ibid.)

/3/Michael Stewart, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

Neither of the Soviet leaders covered new ground or deviated markedly from previous Soviet positions on the topics discussed. On the other hand, in some important instances the statements of Senator Mansfield and others of his colleagues do not conform with generally understood Administration policy. While the Senators said that they were giving their opinions and those of their Congressional colleagues, Senator Mansfield stated that "he had discussed the trip with the President and that he could speak with some assurance that his remarks would reflect the President's thoughts." You may wish to stress in your discussions with Mr. Stewart that Senator Mansfield's views are a matter of public record and do not necessarily reflect those of the Administration. Senator Mansfield's statement that we had guaranteed the Oder-Neisse line is, of course, inaccurate. Additionally, you may wish to suggest to Mr. Stewart that it would be desirable for him to disabuse the Soviets, should they refer to Senator Mansfield's remarks, of any notion that they can use his comments to play on possible differences within the alliance regarding such matters as nuclear sharing and non-proliferation.

A cable from Senator Mansfield requests that the content of his talks in Moscow not be made public prior to his return and report to the President. We have not informed our allies of the substance of these discussions.

Enclosure

Paper Prepared in the Office of Soviet Union Affairs/4/

Washington, undated.

/4/Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Sol Polansky and cleared by Pratt, Stoessel, and FE/VN.

MAIN TOPICS OF DISCUSISON BETWEEN SENATOR MANSFIELD'S
GROUP AND SOVIET LEADERS

1. MLF and Non-Proliferation

Gromyko made the following points in response to Mansfield's request for his views:

a. USSR attaches great importance to non-proliferation and to need to prevent German access to nuclear weapons;

b. USSR categorically opposed to any plans for giving the FRG such access in any form;

c. implementation of such plans would have a negative effect on the interests not only of the USSR, but also of the US, UK and others;

d. efforts to convince the USSR that any nuclear sharing arrangements would be subject to adequate safeguards are futile;

e. if the US does not want an improvement in US-USSR relations, the implementation of any MLF plan will achieve this purpose;

f. a non-proliferation agreement would greatly improve US-Soviet relations, and USSR is prepared to discuss their draft treaty with all powers concerned.

Kosygin made the following comments:

a. US is inconsistent in seeking MLF on the one hand and non-proliferation on the other;

b. MLF is aimed at the USSR;

c. FRG has nuclear delivery vehicles and access to nuclear warheads will make it ready for nuclear war;

d. creation of MLF would result in great military tension and an immediate increase in military budgets in the USSR and Eastern Europe;

f. if an MLF is created, the USSR will take appropriate steps and respond in due manner.

Mansfield made the following remarks, expressing the belief that he could speak on behalf of the entire group:

a. he appreciated Gromyko's argument on the inability to convince Soviet leaders on adequate safeguards for nuclear sharing arrangements;

b. there is a great division of opinion in the US on the MLF; he personally is opposed to the idea;

c. the emphasis on MLF had declined in the US in recent months;

d. the JAEC had voted unanimously against the project;

e. the JAEC, as well as his group, was bipartisan and reflected the feeling in Congress generally;

f. the subject would be given a very close look by Congress, with due account given to views expressed by the USSR, France and others;

g. while foreign policy is the prerogative of the Executive Branch, it is very difficult to implement without Congressional approval.

2. Germany, Reunification, and the Oder-Neisse Line

Kosygin made the following points:

a. the German problem was complicated and made even more so by US European policies;

b. sharply attacked the FRG and the US for aligning its policies with those of the FRG, which were revanchist;

c. the US had not taken issue with Erhard's remarks on the 1937 borders;

d. the present borders could be changed only by war;

e. the German problem can be solved only on the basis of the present boundaries, and on the basis of agreement between the two German states, which needed no special outside help;

f. West Germany had been the primary recipient of the Marshall Plan.

Mansfield said:

a. the USSR, US and UK had guaranteed the Oder-Neisse line, and that de Gaulle had later supported this;

b. this border supposedly was subject to confirmation in a peace treaty, but that the line seems to have been drawn;

c. he rejected the assertion that the US was helping revanchism or fascism in Germany;

d. we did not say Erhard was right about the 1937 borders;

e. reunification will not be imposed by force, and it is obvious that the two German nations will have a say, as will the four powers;

f. the UK and France had received larger shares of Marshall Plan assistance than the FRG, and the USSR and Eastern Europe had been offered but had refused aid under the Plan.

3. Vietnam

Mansfield, noting that we understood the Soviet position, observed that:

a. Vietnam was of paramount concern to the President, who, while having inherited the situation, was looking for ways to bring it to the conference table and an honorable resolution, and had expressed willingness to go anywhere any time toward this end;

b. his (Mansfield's) September 1 speech in the Senate, which had been discussed with and approved by the President, should be compared with Pham Van Dong's four points;

c. there had been no response to his speech, and the war was now more likely to get worse rather than better;

d. in connection with suggestions to reconvene the Geneva Conference with consideration of Pham Van Dong's four points and a cessation of US bombing, he was certain this possibility would be given the most serious consideration by the US if Hanoi signalled that the conference could be resumed if we stopped bombing;

e. the President had also approved Sihanouk's idea for a conference on Cambodia, which might also discuss matters relating to other countries, but nothing had come of it.

Kosygin and Gromyko reiterated standard Soviet positions on Vietnam, pointing out that:

a. the USSR had not been authorized or asked to negotiate on this matter;

b. the US should talk directly with North and South Vietnam, in the latter instance with the Viet Cong;

c. the US should cease bombing;

d. the Geneva Conference is not workable.

4. US-USSR Relations

Kosygin and Gromyko asserted that:

a. an improvement in bilateral relations, which they said they wanted, was hindered by US policies on MLF and Vietnam;

b. under the circumstances, the USSR questioned whether the US desired better relations;

c. various US actions, such as certain Congressional resolutions, the Penkovsky Papers, and US shipping policies also increased US-Soviet tensions.

Mansfield pointed out that he had no magic formula for improvement of relations, but that the frank talks they had had been useful.

141. Memorandum of Conversation Between the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) and the Soviet Ambassador (Dobrynin)/1/

Washington, November 24, 1965, 1-3 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, USSR, Dobrynin Conversations, Vol. I. Secret. Bundy forwarded the memorandum to the President on November 25. (Ibid.)

Ambassador Dobrynin and I had the most candid and cordial conversation of our three-year acquaintance today. In approximate order of importance, the topics we discussed are as follows:

[Here follows Item 1, which deals with NATO and the Multilateral Force; for text, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, volume XIII, Document 111.]

2. Vietnam. Ambassador Dobrynin raised this question only briefly. He expressed again the well-known Soviet view that a renewed and longer pause would be helpful. He said that the brevity of the pause of last spring had caused many members of his government to regard it as cynical. He said that if there could be a pause of "12 to 20 days" we could be assured of intense diplomatic effort. But he acknowledged under questioning that his government could give no advance assurances about the results of such diplomatic effort. He repeated the well-known Soviet view that it is psychologically impossible for a country under bombardment to agree to negotiations.

3. Private communication. Not only in the context of the European problem, but more generally, the Ambassador emphasized his view that private and informal communications between our two governments are important. He referred nostalgically to the period in which there was intimate communication with President Kennedy both through his brother, and through informal written notes. I reminded him that in that period, everything that was said had been known to the Secretary of State and Ambassador Thompson. He agreed, but he seemed to believe that there was something valuable in direct access to the White House, and he asked me where he could establish such contact if necessary. I told him that the President preferred generally to conduct this important business, as he now does, through the Secretary of State and Ambassador Thompson, but I said that of course he could always reach me if he thought it necessary, and I also told him that I thought it would be helpful for him to be better acquainted with Mr. Moyers. (We also agreed that informal communication between his counselors and my deputies would be helpful, and I expect that Messrs. Komer and Bator will be getting luncheon invitations from their opposite numbers.)

4. The Ford Foundation. The Ambassador said that he knew I was the subject of a current guessing game in Washington, and that he was interested to see how it would come out. I asked for advice, and he said that he thought it all depended on the sort of future I wanted. Similar problems arose in Moscow from time to time. A number of his friends had been successful in withdrawing from important official jobs into quieter and more academic pursuits-although usually at the expense of some temporary unpopularity with the ministers whom they had abandoned.

5. Habits of the Soviet bureaucracy. In my opening remark to the Ambassador, I commented on his obviously healthy appearance, and he told me of his month on the Black Sea and his month of intense consultations with all the members of his government who are curious about the US. It became clear from these accounts that Dobrynin is a person of growing consequence in Moscow, and I think he rather expects to be offered a more important appointment at home soon. He agreed with me that men in our two foreign offices work too hard-he said he had had only three Sundays off in his two and one-half years as the head of the American desk. He thinks it is easier to be an Ambassador, and he clearly likes his present job. I told him at the end of lunch that we liked having him here-and I meant it.

McG.B.

142. Memorandum From David E. Murphy of the Central Intelligence Agency to Peter Jessup of the National Security Council Staff/1/

Washington, November 24, 1965.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, USSR, Vol. XI. Secret.

SUBJECT
Concerning the Soviet Response to Publication of The Penkovskiy Papers

1. Soviet reactions to The Penkovskiy Papers have been violent beyond any past precedent, with numerous acts of retaliation threatened. Probably the nub of the Soviet reaction was expressed by Premier Kosygin to Senator Mansfield when he observed that The Penkovskiy Papers seemed designed to cast aspersions on the USSR and on certain Soviet citizens and were detrimental to U.S.-Soviet relations. Mr. Kosygin went on to add that the USSR could also "concoct a similar book" on the leadership of the Democratic Party, but did not wish to take such action.

2. Attached is a list of recent Soviet publications which show that the USSR has already concocted many such books and there is no evidence that the intent to continue publishing more of them has abated in the past year. Also attached are samples of this Soviet treatment taken from some of the publications described in the list./2/

/2/Not attached.

David E. Murphy
Chief, SR Division

143. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Washington, December 12, 1965.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL US-USSR. Secret. Drafted by Harriman, approved by S/AH, and initialed by Harriman.

PARTICIPANTS
W. Averell Harriman, Ambassador at Large
Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, Ambassador of USSR

As Amb. and Mrs. Dobrynin had been assigned to Mrs. Harriman and myself as our guests for the United Nations concert, we invited them to the house for a cup of coffee before going to Constitution Hall.

Most of the conversation was of a trivial nature. I did, however, have a few minutes talk with Dobrynin alone.

In reply to my question, he stated that the Soviet Government believed the cessation of bombing of North Viet-Nam for a long enough (not defined) period might well lead to discussions for peaceful settlement. He implied that the Soviet Government would encourage North Vietnamese, but dodged being specific on just what his Government would do or what made them believe that Hanoi would take a constructive attitude. He did say that it was the Soviet opinion that Hanoi, though influenced by Peiping, was not controlled in their decisions by Peiping.

He then asked me whether the United States Government had any desire at the present time to improve relations with the Soviet Union or to come to any understandings. He inferred that it was his opinion that we did not and referred to the delay in ratification of the Consular Convention, decision on Moscow-New York air service, failure to improve trade and nonproliferation, etc. I explained the reasons for the delay in the ratification of the Consular Convention and in proposals for Congressional action on the President's building bridges trade policy. But I told him that from Mr. Kosygin's statements to me and other evidence, we had gained the impression that the Soviet Union did not wish to come to any new agreements in the nuclear field until Viet-Nam was out of the way. I asked whether the more recent statements made by Soviet Government officials indicated that Soviet policy had changed and that the Soviet Government was now ready to come to an agreement. He replied in the affirmative. He then discussed the German problem and problems of other countries with potential nuclear capability in connection with nonproliferation. He gave me the standard line that if the Soviet Union and the United States came to an agreement, these matters could be dealt with as a second step.

He reiterated the impression he was gaining that the United States did not wish to improve relations at the present time. I denied this and pointed to some of the difficulties that the Soviets have placed in the way of reaching understandings.

I gathered he was doing a little "fishing." The conversation was frank but relaxed.

144. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State/1/

Moscow, December 13, 1965, 1645Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 15 USSR. Confidential. Also sent to all East European posts, Berlin, and Hong Kong, and repeated to Saigon, Paris, London, Bonn, and Rome.

1924. Embtels 524 and 1893, Deptel 1461./2/

/2/Telegram 524 has not been found. Telegram 1893, December 10, offered comments on recent changes in the Supreme Soviet requested in telegram 1461, December 9. (Both ibid.)

1. There is nothing in the minor realignment of Soviet leadership occurring here last week which leads me to see any prospective changes in Soviet policy. I doubt that Mikoyan any longer had important part in policy formulation, and his not unexpected retirement therefore of little significance. We all seem agreed that Podgorny's assumption of titular presidency probably means he is less effective rival for Brezhnev's power, and that Shelepin's restriction to party work has brought him more immediately under Brezhnev's control, even though latter's long-term potentiality for eventual power may prove to have been enhanced. Indeed, net effect of these and other changes suggests a moderate strengthening of present leadership as result of apparent improvement of Brezhnev's position and fact that Kosygin's status does not seem to have been affected.

2. Nor is there anything in economic and political statements accompanying these changes which suggests any important shift in Soviet foreign policy. Gromyko's long speech to supreme Soviet was restatement of familiar arguments, mainly against FedRep, and charted no new ground. We can perhaps take some comfort therefore from expectation that Soviet leaders' present deliberate policies will remain in effect, and that one of their chief continuing concerns will be to avoid military conflict with U.S. in Southeast Asia.

3. At same time, there has been disturbing increase in level of noise directed against us in last few weeks. We are now in midst, of another series of public meetings being staged throughout the country in protest against our "aggression" in Viet Nam, and I am sure we were spared another massive demonstration and perhaps attack against Embassy premises last Wednesday/3/ only because of lesson learned when the last one on March 4 got out of hand and Soviet authorities decided to hold these demonstrations in safer sections of Moscow. Kosygin's intemperate interview with Reston, uncompromising line he and others are taking toward U.S. in their talks with Stewart and other visitors, arbitrary travel ban in effect on our entire military staff, expulsion of Washington Post correspondent, continuing blight on exchanges-these are fairly stark features of our bilateral relations today and they are unrelieved by actions or statements looking in other direction.

/3/December 8.

4. It may be that one element helping to account for this sharper tone is Moscow's concern that we may be on eve of another escalation in Viet Nam war and its possible extension to Laos, which would give Soviet leadership yet another painful dilemma in terms of its putative leadership of world Communist movement, on one hand, and its reluctance to increase both scale and scope of aid to its Communist allies, on the other. Moscow's dispute with Peking, however, continues to be mainspring governing Soviet behavior, and it seems to be as true as it is irrational that the harder Peking presses Moscow, the more violently Moscow lashes out at us. Since it is also true that the more powerless the Soviet leaders feel themselves to be in affecting the outcome in Viet Nam, the greater their manifestation of hostility toward us, I fear we have nothing to look forward to but a great deal more of the same in the foreseeable months ahead.

Kohler

145. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State/1/

Moscow, December 23, 1965, 1400Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL US-USSR. Confidential. Repeated to Saigon.

2009. 1. When we had finished with problems of immediate concern in my meeting last night with Gromyko (Embtel 2000),/2/ I turned to over-all state of our relations. Our discussion centered on Vietnam and German access to nuclear weapons, and I did not see in Gromyko's remarks evidence of any fresh thinking on either of these problems.

/2/Dated December 22, it transmitted a brief summary of Kohler's 1-1/4 hour meeting with Gromyko on December 22. The other problems discussed were the travel ban on military attachés, negotiations for a new exchanges agreement, non-proliferation and the Federal Republic of Germany, and the case of Newcomb Mott who was arrested on September 4 after crossing into the Soviet Union from Norway. Further documentation on the Mott case, which ended on January 21, 1966, when Soviet authorities informed the United States that he had committed suicide, is ibid., PS 7-1 US-USSR/Mott, Newcomb.

2. I began by recalling my recent conversation with Ambassador Dobrynin in Washington/3/ in which I had had to tell him that I had found the President and others of our government discouraged by constant hostile tone of Soviet press and of statements by Soviet leaders, that I had regretted this trend in our affairs, and that I had been distressed on my return to find that if anything the attacks upon us had become even harsher. Gromyko replied that he could cite many of our own statements about USSR and its policy which were hostile in extreme, and indeed there would not be file big enough to hold all anti-Soviet material in US press, and these attacks had increased of late. He said he knew of my conversation with Dobrynin but that he must tell me his opinion that US was to blame for fact that our relations had gotten cooler. We knew their appraisal of certain aspects of our policy, he said, and they made no effort to conceal it. But if true comparison could be made of the relative tone of hostility in each other's press and public statements, we would not be the gainer by such comparison.

/3/See Document 137.

3. Gromyko said Soviet Government had always tried and was still trying to find common ground with US, to find points of agreement on all issues, but fact was that US did not show same readiness. It was our policy in Vietnam above all which aggravated our relations, and he and Brezhnev and Kosygin had made this clear in their statements. It followed from all this, he said, that whether our relations deteriorated or not depended on US.

4. I said I was glad to have him confirm Soviet interest in better relations. However, we had not been organizing anti-Soviet meetings all over US of kind Soviets had been holding against us in recent days, and it had been Soviet leaders who were speaking of a "freeze" in our relations. I said it was true that we had fundamental differences between us over Vietnam, but I had thought from our previous talks that there was an element of common interest in peaceful settlement and removal of this dangerous situation. Not only were Soviets taking harder propaganda line on Vietnam in general but going farther in stress on demand that US must get out of Vietnam, on Pham Van Dong's four points, on the acceptance of the NFLSV. This could only delay rather than help towards settlement.

5. Gromyko denied there had been any change in Soviet line. He said it had been their position for two or three years that US forces had no place in South Vietnam; that it was US who had torpedoed 1954 Geneva Agreements which called for elections and reunification. As for legitimate government in South Vietnam, it is only NLFSV which represented any real force there and it is they, and "not those who are constantly changing like a kaleidoscope," who are true government.

6. I concluded that I did not want today to engage Gromyko in long debate on Vietnam. Our versions of history there were different. We considered that real breach of Geneva Agreement was aggression from North Vietnam. Whatever Soviets might think of our presence in Vietnam, we had undertaken a commitment to South Vietnamese Government, which continued to consist of people who like South Vietnamese in general were fighting to keep from being taken over by force. We did not like to be there, but we would honor our commitment. We had accepted Soviet Government's statements they were not in position to take action to facilitate peaceful settlement, but I hoped that at least they would not make statements and take positions which would make it harder for solution to be reached.

7. At this point Gromyko shifted our conversation to German nuclear access, subject of septel./4/

/4/Telegram 2008 from Moscow, December 23. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 18)

Kohler

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